LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA,

Complainant,
A. M. No. MTJ-92-706
March 29, 1995
-versusJUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR.,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28, Manila,
Respondent.
DECISION
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for gross immorality and appearance of
impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are
living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro
Manila. He stays in said house which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in
Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent
sleeping on his [complainant's] bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy
that respondent had been co-habiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother
to wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving instructions to his
houseboy to take care of his children.cralaw
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even
alienated the affection of his children from him. Complainant claims that
respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as
appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities.
Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992,
after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's office.cralaw
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro
and that the filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim
on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De Castro.cralaw
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was
even a witness to the withdrawal of the complaint for grave slander filed by De
Castro against complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro who
called the police to arrest complainant.c
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits
having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through
a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the
same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of
the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with
her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license.
Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care
and custody as a single parent.c
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles,
California on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal
intents and purposes, that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized
without a license.cralaw
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article
40 of said Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not
apply to him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was

governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took
place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage.
Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive
effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with
Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested
right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.cralaw
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive
application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected [Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229
(1968)]. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws [Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA
674 (1965)].cralaw
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery
of the institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a
woman, who beget him five children.
Respondent passed the bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice
of law in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with
Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license.
Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary before one can
get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first
marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to
secure a marriage license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and
bad faith.cralaw
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for
membership in the legal profession. While the deceit employed by respondent
existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and
illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was already
in the judiciary.cralaw
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a
whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial
duties but also as to his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of
morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in order to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in
his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked.
No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the judiciary [Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA 690
(1994)].cralaw
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all
leave and retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch,
instrumentality, or agency of the government, including government-owned and
controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory.cralaw
SO ORDERED
[G. R. No. 183622 : February 08, 2012]
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, PETITIONER, VS.
LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, RESPONDENT.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[1] and Resolution[2]regarding the issuance of letters of administration of
the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.cralaw

The facts are as follows:

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining
a divorce in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a
second marriage with petitioner herein.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.
Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for
her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. The case was
docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A.
Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar
petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis
pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was
already pending.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an
interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent
alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner before Branch
54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner
contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one
Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.[3] The trial court
ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that
divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between
him and petitioner was not valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending
action with the trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the
deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a prejudicial
question in determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been
married to Eusebio Bristol.
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the
Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted
that of private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the
RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and
subsisting when she married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further
that her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the
trial court held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration.[4]
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated
the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging

grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should
have been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while
a petition for letters of administration may have been filed by an "uninterested
person," the defect was cured by the appearance of a real party-in-interest. Thus,
she insisted that, to determine who has a better right to administer the decedent's
properties, the RTC should have first required the parties to present their evidence
before it ruled on the matter.
On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that
petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. She should have instead filed a petition
for review rather than a petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition for
Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a petition
for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed the Petition and continued to
decide on the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:
As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For litis
pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity
of the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same acts, and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment
which may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in the other. A petition for letters of administration is a
special proceeding. A special proceeding is an application or proceeding to
establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. And, in contrast to an
ordinary civil action, a special proceeding involves no defendant or respondent.
The only party in this kind of proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant.
Considering its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration can
hardly be barred by a similar pending petition involving the estate of the same
decedent unless both petitions are filed by the same person. In the case at bar, the
petitioner was not a party to the petition filed by the private respondent, in the
same manner that the latter was not made a party to the petition filed by the
former. The first element of litis pendentia is wanting. The contention of the
petitioner must perforce fail.
Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory the
provision of the Rules requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to be an
"interested party," inasmuch as any person, for that matter, regardless of whether
he has valid interest in the estate sought to be administered, could be appointed as
administrator for as long as he files his petition ahead of any other person, in
derogation of the rights of those specifically mentioned in the order of preference
in the appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of
administration. As a spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred to
administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a marriage certificate, like
any other public document, is only prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy and was
acquitted has not been disputed by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal
marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the
first marriage has been dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in a proper proceedings. The
deduction of the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case
negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has
not been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt from the

petitioner to deny the findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis for
us to make a contrary finding. Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger
to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters of
administration by the trial court is in place.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law
on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed.We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his
first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of
comity. xxx

SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.[6] She alleged that the
reasoning of the CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was
acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still holding that her marriage with
Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the crime of bigamy, the
marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.
Hence, this Petition.
At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate
the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never
married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial courtconcluded that, because petitioner
was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed
and was valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence
of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that
petitioner was not an interested party in the estate of Orlando.
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No.
2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity,
our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign
nationality. This doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.[7] wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. xxx
We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,[8] to wit:
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered
by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that
once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he
obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from
him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent

Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated
in Garcia v. Recio,[9] to wit:
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted
in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The
decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or
tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document
may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an
authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not
sufficient;compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but
only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of
Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to
petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight
by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce
decree admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he
acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting
an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.
Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the
attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed
his allegiance to the Philippines and thevinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon
petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment.
He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree
and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and
worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law
is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of
foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges
the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action."In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their
answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a defense
raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law
validating it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. Australian marital laws are not among those matters that judges are
supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power of judicial
notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the
subject should be resolved in the negative. (Emphasis supplied)
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of
Orlando's divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between
petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the
trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage,
she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the
estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who is
undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec.
6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,[10] in which we said:
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly
obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would
have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry
Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of
the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for
pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and
due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing
or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by
either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the
annotated text of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that
their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia,
however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be
alleged and proved.cralaw
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the
divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration
over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20
June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Let
this case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos,
Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998.]

FE D. QUITA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA
DANDAN, * respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the

Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with children.
Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo
for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce
proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to
live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On
23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter
she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also
ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain
Wernimont.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier
Inciong filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance
of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the
Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as
Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and
Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan,
named in the petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition
and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was
resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty.
Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors
(Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July
1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and
Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the
decedent and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23
October 1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and
Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court
required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the

issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution.

The prescribed period lapsed without the required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao 1 which held that "a foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present
Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo.
Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death
of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of
conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval. 3 On the other hand, it opined
that there was no showing that marriage existed between private respondent and
Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged Padlan children had been
acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it
found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 4 only petitioner
and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal
adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate
heirs. 5
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to
present proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his
legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child,
had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988 6
partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the
exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto
Padlan, and petitioner to the other half. 7 Private respondent was not declared an
heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she and
Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void since it
was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one
of the errors allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case
was decided without a hearing; in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of
Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are
the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided
as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the
appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November
1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the
remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it
denied reconsideration. 9
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings?
Petitioner insists that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue
obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to their
respective shares in the intestate estate of the decedent; and, second, the issue as
to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the
decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on
established facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent courts is
clear: If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is
entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6)

Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they
have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them
as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But
controversy remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The
trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the
scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of
heirs and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of
the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of
heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioners motion private respondent raised,
among others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from
the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact
had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. 11 To
this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally
married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained. 12 Reading between the lines,
the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her
divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a
hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the
truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial evidence
as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence.
Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely
applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.
Then in private respondents motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower
courts decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the
light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for
hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue
on her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private respondents prayer for
a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner
and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." 16 It
maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on
their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court
was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioners citizenship at the time of
their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen
when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the
materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at
the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could
very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioners citizenship; 17 it
did not merit enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In the present
proceeding, petitioners citizenship is brought anew to the fore by
private Respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of
stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution
of the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new
owners duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. When asked whether
she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she was since 1954. 19
Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in the
same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase
the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue
requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent
appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for
further proceedings.cralawnad

We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court

should be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his
surviving spouse. Private respondents claim to heirship was already resolved by
the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior
marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous
marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil
Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as
this status presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be
declared in contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum
shopping, 21 the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must
involve the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There
must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 The present
petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed
before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owners duplicate
copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously,
there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of
Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D.
Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the
appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half () of the net
hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead
of Arturos brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however
emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to
the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to
dismiss the present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.cha
G. R. No. 150758 - February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the ground of
psychological incapacity, on an individuals criminal liability for bigamy. We hold
that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity does not retroact to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the Philippines penal laws are concerned. As such, an
individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence
of a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the
subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private
complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge
Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and
Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part
of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to
a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a

photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this

previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared
with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.1
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a
certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she
verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a
handwritten letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was
indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. 4 The
Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, having
been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the
said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS,
which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the essential
requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".6
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 19841988, with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and
Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage
ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a
marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in
connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested his
brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any
marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said
marriage.9
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch 54,
rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing
him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.10 On appeal, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND THIS
ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NONEXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE
CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN
DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE
AND EFFECT.11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to
disturb the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of
Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.12
Petitioners assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1)
denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the
essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage
was celebrated.13 Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the
crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.14
Petitioners defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and oral, to
prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and Villareyes.
Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage
contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as
seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto
Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes to Ancajas
dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and Tenebro were legally
married.16
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a
certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7, 1995; 17 and
(2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila, dated February 3,
1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective issuing offices have no
record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B.
Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately assail the
marriage contract, which in itself would already have been sufficient to establish
the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and the
Rules of Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to all.
Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. When the
original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public
officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a public
officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The
marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between
petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the
full faith and credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the
National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil
Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither
document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated between
Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the
documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such
a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is quite different
from documentary evidence as to the absence of a marriage ceremony, or
documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive evidence as
to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be
given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any
record of the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no
requirement in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil
registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact that
no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all

requisites for its validity are present.19 There is no evidence presented by the
defense that would indicate that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes
lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the
accused himself. Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes letter, Ancajas
testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage,
and petitioners own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first
marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-existence
of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to validate such
purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the certifications issued by
the National Statistics Office and the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated
October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore,
are dated after the accuseds marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this
case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the
prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioners defense hinges on the effects of the subsequent
judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the date of
the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, since his
marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the crime of
bigamy was not committed.21
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the
Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the States penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of
petitioners valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioners marriage to Ancajas would be
null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioners psychological capacity
or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the
law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of
contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10,
1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had
already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for
distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because
it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and
void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal
liability for bigamy is concerned. The States penal laws protecting the institution
of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract
between spouses, and punish an individuals deliberate disregard of the permanent
character of the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly
done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioners marriage to Ancajas
lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites for the validity of a
marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the
contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the

solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage

license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their
agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two
witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age
of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in
Articles 3725 and 3826 may contract marriage.27
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage
were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age,
and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required license
before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in
the presence of at least two witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note
that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children
conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself
that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for
bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the States penal laws on bigamy
completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each
marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences
of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with
the promise of futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy are
present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner
contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and Ancajas
were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the determination of the
accuseds guilt for purposes of this particular case, the act of the accused displays
a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look
kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key characteristic of
which is its permanence. When an individual manifests a deliberate pattern of
flouting the foundation of the States basic social institution, the States criminal
laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for the
crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a
duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of
Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which sentenced
petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is
DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 164435
September 29, 2009
VICTORIA S. JARILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, praying that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated July 21,
2003, and its Resolution2 dated July 8, 2004, be reversed and set aside.
On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged with Bigamy before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 117 under the following Information in
Criminal Case No. 00-08-11:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses VICTORIA S. JARILLO of
the crime of BIGAMY, committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of November 1979, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage with
Rafael M. Alocillo, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered
on January 12, 1999.
Contrary to law.
On July 14, 2000, petitioner pleaded not guilty during arraignment and, thereafter,
trial proceeded.
The undisputed facts, as accurately summarized by the CA, are as follows.
On May 24, 1974, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil
wedding ceremony solemnized by Hon. Monico C. Tanyag, then Municipal
Mayor of Taguig, Rizal (Exhs. A, A-1, H, H-1, H-2, O, O-1, pp. 20-21, TSN
dated November 17, 2000).
On May 4, 1975, Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo again celebrated marriage in
a church wedding ceremony before Rev. Angel Resultay in San Carlos City,
Pangasinan (pp. 25-26, TSN dated November 17, 2000). Out of the marital union,
appellant begot a daughter, Rachelle J. Alocillo on October 29, 1975 (Exhs. F, R,
R-1).
Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with
Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, at the City Court of Pasay City, Branch 1, before
then Hon. Judge Nicanor Cruz on November 26, 1979 (Exhs. D, J, J-1, Q, Q-1,
pp. 15-18, TSN dated November 22, 2000).
On April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in
a church wedding in Manila (Exh. E).
In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against the appellant Civil Case No. 99-93582 for
annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City x x x.
xxxx
Parenthetically, accused-appellant filed against Alocillo, on October 5, 2000,
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Civil Case No. 00-1217, for
declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On July 9, 2001, the court a quo promulgated the assailed decision, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby finds accused
Victoria Soriano Jarillo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
BIGAMY.
Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS of
prision mayor, as maximum.
This court makes no pronouncement on the civil aspect of this case, such as the
nullity of accuseds bigamous marriage to Uy and its effect on their children and
their property. This aspect is being determined by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila in Civil Case No. 99-93582.
Costs against the accused.

The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the same court in that
assailed Order dated 2 August 2001.3
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to
Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a
certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her
marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage
license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to
Alocillo as far back as 1978.
On appeal to the CA, petitioners conviction was affirmed in toto. In its Decision
dated July 21, 2003, the CA held that petitioner committed bigamy when she
contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage
to Rafael Alocillo had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being
so, the presumption is, her previous marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the
time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack of sufficient
evidence, petitioners contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a
marriage license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as
1978.
In the meantime, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, rendered a Decision dated
March 28, 2003, declaring petitioners 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo null
and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillos psychological incapacity. Said
decision became final and executory on July 9, 2003. In her motion for
reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the
reversal of her conviction. However, in its Resolution dated July 8, 2004, the CA,
citing Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,4 denied reconsideration and ruled that "[t]he
subsequent declaration of nullity of her first marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, while it retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, the said
marriage is not without legal consequences, among which is incurring criminal
liability for bigamy."5
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court where petitioner alleges that:
V.1. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
PROCEEDING WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF A CASE
WHICH IS PREJUDICIAL TO THE OUTCOME OF THIS CASE.
V.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME OF
BIGAMY DESPITE THE SUPERVENING PROOF THAT THE FIRST TWO
MARRIAGES OF PETITIONER TO ALOCILLO HAD BEEN DECLARED BY
FINAL JUDGMENT NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
V.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS A PENDING ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE AT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 38 BETWEEN
EMMANUEL SANTOS AND VICTORIA S. JARILLO.
V.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE INSTANT CASE OF BIGAMY HAD
ALREADY PRESCRIBED.
V.5. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE MARRIAGE OF VICTORIA JARILLO
AND EMMANUEL SANTOS UY HAS NO VALID MARRIAGE LICENSE.
V.6. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER BUT IMPOSED AN ERRONEOUS
PENALTY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND THE
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.
The first, second, third and fifth issues, being closely related, shall be discussed
jointly. It is true that right after the presentation of the prosecution evidence,
petitioner moved for suspension of the proceedings on the ground of the pendency
of the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioners marriages to Alocillo,
which, petitioner claimed involved a prejudicial question. In her appeal, she also

asserted that the petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Uy, initiated
by the latter, was a ground for suspension of the proceedings. The RTC denied her
motion for suspension, while the CA struck down her arguments. In MarbellaBobis v. Bobis,6 the Court categorically stated that:
x x x as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, he who contracts a second marriage before
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended
on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. x x x
xxxx
x x x The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first
marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all
legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his
second marriage with petitioner. Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the
civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a
second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the
civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is,
therefore, not a prejudicial question. x x x7
The foregoing ruling had been reiterated in Abunado v. People,8 where it was held
thus:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was
immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been
consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution
of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare
his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to [private
complainant] had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or
guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even
if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab
initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before
the first marriage was annulled.9
For the very same reasons elucidated in the above-quoted cases, petitioners
conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioners two marriages to Alocillo cannot be
considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner
contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially
declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at
the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioners marriage to
Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial
declaration of the nullity of petitioners marriage to Uy make any difference. 10 As
held in Tenebro, "[s]ince a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x A plain reading
of [Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage."11
Petitioners defense of prescription is likewise doomed to fail.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, bigamy is punishable by prision
mayor, which is classified under Article 25 of said Code as an afflictive penalty.
Article 90 thereof provides that "[c]rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties
shall prescribe in fifteen years," while Article 91 states that "[t]he period of
prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered
by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents x x x ."

Petitioner asserts that Uy had known of her previous marriage as far back as 1978;
hence, prescription began to run from that time. Note that the party who raises a
fact as a matter of defense has the burden of proving it. The defendant or accused
is obliged to produce evidence in support of its defense; otherwise, failing to
establish the same, it remains self-serving.12 Thus, for petitioners defense of
prescription to prosper, it was incumbent upon her to adduce evidence that as
early as the year 1978, Uy already obtained knowledge of her previous marriage.
A close examination of the records of the case reveals that petitioner utterly failed
to present sufficient evidence to support her allegation. Petitioners testimony that
her own mother told Uy in 1978 that she (petitioner) is already married to Alocillo
does not inspire belief, as it is totally unsupported by any corroborating evidence.
The trial court correctly observed that:
x x x She did not call to the witness stand her mother the person who allegedly
actually told Uy about her previous marriage to Alocillo. It must be obvious that
without the confirmatory testimony of her mother, the attribution of the latter of
any act which she allegedly did is hearsay.13
As ruled in Sermonia v. Court of Appeals,14 "the prescriptive period for the crime
of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was
discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their [agents]," as opposed to
being counted from the date of registration of the bigamous marriage. 15 Since
petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the period of prescription began to
run as of 1978, her defense is, therefore, ineffectual.1avvphi1
Finally, petitioner avers that the RTC and the CA imposed an erroneous penalty
under the Revised Penal Code. Again, petitioner is mistaken.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that the accused shall be sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
Revised Penal Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the
crime. The Indeterminate Sentence Law leaves it entirely within the sound
discretion of the court to determine the minimum penalty, as long as it is
anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the
periods into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are
considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate
sentence.16
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that the penalty imposed on petitioner is
proper. Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for
bigamy is prision mayor. The penalty next lower is prision correccional, which
ranges from 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. The minimum penalty of six years
imposed by the trial court is, therefore, correct as it is still within the duration of
prision correccional. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances
proven in this case, the prescribed penalty of prision mayor should be imposed in
its medium period, which is from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Again, the trial
court correctly imposed a maximum penalty of 10 years.
However, for humanitarian purposes, and considering that petitioners marriage to
Alocillo has after all been declared by final judgment17 to be void ab initio on
account of the latters psychological incapacity, by reason of which, petitioner
was subjected to manipulative abuse, the Court deems it proper to reduce the
penalty imposed by the lower courts. Thus, petitioner should be sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4)
months and One (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day
of prision mayor, as maximum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 21, 2003, and its Resolution dated
July 8, 2004 are hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty imposed, but AFFIRMED
in all other respects. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision

correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-53703. August 19, 1986.]
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE ALICIA V.
SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, Respondents.
Dapucanta, Dulay & Associates for Petitioner.

(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and the
first husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in 1972 already married
to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence because the existence
of force exerted on both parties of the first marriage had already been agreed
upon. Hence, the present petition for certiorariassailing the following Orders of
the respondent Judge

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office for Private Respondent.
(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties were compelled to submit
the case for resolution based on "agreed facts;" and
SYLLABUS
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioners motion to allow her to
present evidence in her favor.
1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY RELATIONS; VOID MARRIAGE; EVIDENCE
THAT PRIOR MARRIAGE WAS VITIATED BY FORCE; NEED NOT BE
INTRODUCED. There is not need for petitioner to prove that her first
marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming
this to do so, the marriage will not be void but merely voidable (Art. 85, Civil
Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made,
it is clear that when she married respondent she was still validly married to her
first husband, consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil
Code).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE ABOUT THE EXISTING PRIOR MARRIAGE OF
FIRST SPOUSE; NEED NOT BE INTRODUCED. There is likewise no need
of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at
the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs
according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents
and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the
marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law.

We find the petition devoid of merit.

There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by
force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage
will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid
until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she
married respondent she was still validly married to her first husband,
consequently, her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior
marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a
marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration 1 of
such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a
married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl
Heinz Wiegel); accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be
regarded VOID under the law.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and the
Orders complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

DECISION
SO ORDERED.
PARAS, J.:

In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel
(plaintiff therein) asked for the declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated
on July, 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in Makati,
Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel (Lilia, for short, and
defendant therein) on the ground of Lilias previous existing marriage to one
Eduardo A. Maxion, the ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at
our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting the existence
of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that said marriage was null and void, she
and the first husband Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter
said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by both
parties was the status of the first marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted
against both parties): was said prior marriage void or was it merely voidable?
Contesting the validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia asked the respondent court for
an opportunity to present evidence

G.R. No. 181089 : October 22, 2012

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAS, Complainant, v. LOURDES
TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the
Order1rll dated September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL which
dismissed the lnformation for Bigamy filed against respondent Lourdes Tajolosa
Cipriano. Also assailed is the RTC Resolution2rll dated January 2, 2008
denying the motion for reconsideration.
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo,
Aklan.3rll On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage,
respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro,
Laguna.4rll In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of
the latters psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family

Code, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC
of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an Amended Decision5rlldeclaring the
marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became final
and executory on October 13, 2003.6rll
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montaz, Silverios daughter from
the first marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, a
Complaint7rll for Bigamy against respondent, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached to the complaint was an
Affidavit8rll (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated August 23, 2004,
thumb-marked and signed by Silverio,9rll which alleged, among others, that
respondent failed to reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates. On
November 17, 2004, an Information10rll for Bigamy was filed against
respondent with the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL. The Information
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro, Province of
Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second
or subsequent marriage with one SILVERIO CIPRIANO VINALON while her
first marriage with SOCRATES FLORES has not been judicially dissolved by
proper judicial authorities.11rll
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a
Motion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal
Complaint)12rll alleging that her marriage with Socrates had already been
declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior
to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element of the
crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed
that since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy had already
prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment13rll arguing that the crime of
bigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed her petition for
declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of contracting a second
marriage which appears to be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting and
has not yet been annulled or declared void by the court.
In its Order14rll dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It found
respondent's argument that with the declaration of nullity of her first marriage,
there was no more first marriage to speak of and thus the element of two valid
marriages in bigamy was absent, to have been laid to rest by our ruling in
Mercado v. Tan15rll where we held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet
no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the
Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a
letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. For contracting a second marriage
while the first is still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by
then. x x x16rll
As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC found
that while the second marriage indeed took place in 1983, or more than the 15year prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy, the commission of the crime was
only discovered on November 17, 2004, which should be the reckoning period,
hence, prescription has not yet set in.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17rll claiming that the Mercado
ruling was not applicable, since respondent contracted her first marriage in 1976,
i.e., before the Family Code; that the petition for annulment was granted and
became final before the criminal complaint for bigamy was filed; and, that Article
40 of the Family Code cannot be given any retroactive effect because this will

impair her right to remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity of a

completely void prior marriage.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,18rll the dispositive
portion of which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let a new
one be entered quashing the information. Accordingly, let the instant case be
DISMISSED.rllbrr
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a second
marriage on January 24, 1983, i.e., before the effectivity of the Family Code, the
existing law did not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition
precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before the
Family Code was ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior judicial declaration
of absolute nullity of the first marriage. The RTC found that both marriages of
respondent took place before the effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering
the unsettled state of jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage before commencing a second marriage and the principle that
laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the accused, it declared that the
absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not prejudice the accused whose
second marriage was declared once and for all valid with the annulment of her
first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.
Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but
opposed by respondent. In a Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC denied
the same ruling, among others, that the judicial declaration of nullity of
respondent's marriage is tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation that
said marriage never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in contracting a
second marriage cannot be considered criminal.
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising the
following issues:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the
Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the ground of
psychological incapacity is a valid defense for a charge of bigamy for entering
into a second marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code and the
pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?
II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to the
enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy
regarding the necessity of securing a declaration of nullity of the first marriage
before entering a second marriage ambivalent, such that a person was allowed to
enter a subsequent marriage without the annulment of the first without incurring
criminal liability.19rll
Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's dismissal of the
Information for bigamy was filed by private complainant and not by the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) which should represent the government in all judicial
proceedings filed before us.20rll
Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had done in the
past. In Antone v. Beronilla,21rll the offended party (private complainant)
questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA) the RTC's dismissal of the
Information for bigamy filed against her husband, and the CA dismissed the
petition on the ground, among others, that the petition should have been filed in
behalf of the People of the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in
all appealed criminal cases. In a petition filed with us, we said that we had given
due course to a number of actions even when the respective interests of the
government were not properly represented by the OSG and
said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following
manner:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by any

order ruling of the trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the prosecutor,
must be the one to question the order or ruling before us. x x x
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or the
plaintiff People of the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on this
technical ground. Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the petition, as we
had done before in some cases. In light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has
ratified and adopted as its own the instant petition for the People of the
Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)22rll
Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition,
which it did, praying that the petition be granted in effect, such Comment had
ratified the petition filed with us.
As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC
erred in quashing the Information for bigamy filed against respondent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy as
follow:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally
married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to
the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the
second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The
felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage.23rll It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged
second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not
for the subsistence of the first marriage.24rll
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage with
Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was still
subsisting as the same had not yet been annulled or declared void by a competent
authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were alleged in the Information. In her
Motion to Quash the Information, she alleged, among others, that:
xxxx
2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's marriage with said
Socrates Flores was declared void ab initio on 14 April 2003 by Branch 256 of the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. The said decision was never appealed,
and became final and executory shortly thereafter.
3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her marriage
with Mr. Flores had already been declared void from the beginning.
4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak of. In other
words, there was only one marriage.
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid marriages, is
therefore wanting.25rll
Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity was declared only in 2003. The question now is whether
the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage justifies the dismissal of
the Information for bigamy filed against her.
We rule in the negative.
In Mercado v. Tan,26rll we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of
the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial, because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. And by contracting a
second marriage while the first was still subsisting, the accused committed the
acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
In Abunado v. People,27rll we held that what is required for the charge of
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted.28rll Even if the accused eventually obtained a

declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and
the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.29rll
In Tenebro v. CA,30rll we declared that although the judicial declaration of
the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the
date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without
legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the
judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There
is, therefore, a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal
consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would
render the States penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some
manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages,
while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and
commitment.31rll
And in Jarillo v. People,32rll applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we
affirmed the accused's conviction for bigamy, ruling that the moment the accused
contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially
declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at
the time of the celebration of the second marriage, the accuseds first marriage
which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction
was deemed valid and subsisting.
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage
was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the abovementioned jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage
during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly
charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense
charged were sufficiently alleged.
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33rll is not applicable, since the
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage came after the filing of the
Information, unlike in this case where the declaration was rendered before the
information was filed. We do not agree. What makes a person criminally liable
for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage
exists.34rll Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.35rll
Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two marriages were
contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 40 of the Family
Code cannot be given retroactive effect because this will impair her right to
remarry without need of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of a completely
void marriage.
We are not persuaded.
In Jarillo v. People,36rll where the accused, in her motion for reconsideration,
argued that since her marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the
Family Code, then the applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act
3613),37rll instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract a
subsequent marriage. We did not find the argument meritorious and
said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the
declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied
retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said
"Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive
application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested
right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the
provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration nullity
of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent
his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all
that an adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code,
contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming
that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for
lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter
into a marriage license and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without
obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first
marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision on
bigamy.38rll
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Order
dated September 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated January 2, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case
No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ordered
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.rllbrr
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 188775 : August 24, 2011]
CENON R. TEVES, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND DANILO R. BONGALON, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION

Services, Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan.

On 13 February 2006, Danilo Bongalon, uncle of Thelma, filed before the Office
of the Provincial Prosecutor of Malolos City, Bulacan a complaint[5] accusing
petitioner of committing bigamy.
Petitioner was charged on 8 June 2006 with bigamy defined and penalized under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in an Information[6] which
reads:
That on or about the 10th day of December, 2001 up to the present, in the
municipality of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Cenon R. Teves being previously
united in lawful marriage on November 26, 1992 with Thelma B. Jaime and
without the said marriage having legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with one Edita T.
Calderon, who knowing of the criminal design of accused Cenon R. Teves to
marry her and in concurrence thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously cooperate in the execution of the offense by marrying Cenon R.
Teves, knowing fully well of the existence of the marriage of the latter with
Thelma B. Jaime.
During the pendency of the criminal case for bigamy, the Regional Trial Court ,
Branch 130, Caloocan City, rendered a decision[7] dated 4 May 2006 declaring
the marriage of petitioner and Thelma null and void on the ground that Thelma is
physically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital obligations pursuant
to Article 36 of the Family Code. Said decision became final by virtue of a
Certification of Finality[8] issued on 27 June 2006.
On 15 August 2007, the trial court rendered its assailed decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused Cenon R. Teves, also known as Cenon Avelino R. Teves, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy penalized under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, as charged in the Information dated June 8, 2006. Pursuant
to the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum.[9]

PEREZ, J.:
This Petition for Review seeks the reversal of the 21 January 2009 decision [1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31125 affirming in toto the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Malolos City in Criminal
Case No. 2070-M-2006. The RTC decision[2] found petitioner Cenon R.
Teves guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy penalized under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
THE FACTS
On 26 November 1992, a marriage was solemnized between Cenon Teves
(Cenon) and Thelma Jaime-Teves (Thelma) at the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila.[3]
After the marriage, Thelma left to work abroad. She would only come home to
the Philippines for vacations. While on a vacation in 2002, she was informed that
her husband had contracted marriage with a certain Edita Calderon (Edita). To
verify the information, she went to the National Statistics Office and secured a
copy of the Certificate of Marriage[4] indicating that her husband and Edita
contracted marriage on 10 December 2001 at the Divine Trust Consulting

Refusing to accept such verdict, petitioner appealed the decision before the Court
of Appeals contending that the court a quo erred in not ruling that his criminal
action or liability had already been extinguished. He also claimed that the trial
court erred in finding him guilty of Bigamy despite the defective Information filed
by the prosecution.[10]
On 21 January 2009, the CA promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the Decision dated August 15,
2007 in Criminal Case No. 2070-M-2006 is AFFIRMED in TOTO.[11]
On 11 February 2009, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision.[12] This however, was denied by the CA in a resolution issued on 2 July
2009.[13]
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void,
"there is in effect no marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak

of."[14] He differentiates a previous valid or voidable marriage from a marriage

null and void ab initio, and posits that the former requires a judicial dissolution
before one can validly contract a second marriage but a void marriage, for the
same purpose, need not be judicially determined.

which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position
that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is
void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the
nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. [19]

Petitioner further contends that the ruling of the Court in Mercado v. Tan[15] is
inapplicable in his case because in the Mercado case the prosecution for bigamy
was initiated before the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed. In
petitioner's case, the first marriage had already been legally dissolved at the time
the bigamy case was filed in court.

In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also

for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal
and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her
marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.[20]

We find no reason to disturb the findings of the CA. There is nothing in the law
that would sustain petitioner's contention.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code states:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been
legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code;

In numerous cases,[21] this Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of
nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
If petitioner's contention would be allowed, a person who commits bigamy can
simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered
therein before anyone institutes a complaint against him. We note that in
petitioner's case the complaint was filed before the first marriage was declared a
nullity. It was only the filing of the Information that was overtaken by the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following petitioner's argument, even
assuming that a complaint has been instituted, such as in this case, the offender
can still escape liability provided that a decision nullifying his earlier marriage
precedes the filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so
would make the crime of bigamy dependent upon the ability or inability of the
Office of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on complaints and eventually
file Informations in court. Plainly, petitioner's strained reading of the law is
against its simple letter.

3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.[16]
The instant case has all the elements of the crime of bigamy. Thus, the CA was
correct in affirming the conviction of petitioner.
Petitioner was legally married to Thelma on 26 November 1992 at the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. He contracted a second or
subsequent marriage with Edita on 10 December 2001 in Meycauayan,
Bulacan. At the time of his second marriage with Edita, his marriage with
Thelma was legally subsisting. It is noted that the finality of the decision
declaring the nullity of his first marriage with Thelma was only on 27 June 2006
or about five (5) years after his second marriage to Edita. Finally, the second or
subsequent marriage of petitioner with Edita has all the essential requisites for
validity. Petitioner has in fact not disputed the validity of such subsequent
marriage.[17]
It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime charged. His
contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the declaration of
nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code has settled once
and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the
absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a
final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.[18]
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee

Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until
extinguished as provided by law, and that the time of filing of the criminal
complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is material only for determining
prescription.[22] The crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner on 10
December 2001 when he contracted a second marriage with Edita. The finality on
27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage to
Thelma cannot be made to retroact to the date of the bigamous marriage.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED and the assailed
Decision dated 21 January 2009 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. NO. 182760 : April 10, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. ROBERT P.
NARCEDA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, C.J.:
The present case stems from a Petition for Review1 filed by the Republic of the
Philippines (petitioner), praying for the reversal of the Decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated 14 November 2007 and its subsequent Resolution 3 dated 29
April 2008. The CA dismissed the appeal of petitioner, because it supposedly
lacked jurisdiction to decide the matter. It held that the Decision 4 of the Regional
Trial Court of Balaoan, La Union (RTC) declaring the presumptive death of
Marina B. Narceda (Marina) was immediately final and executory, "because by

express provision of law, the judgment of the RTC is not

appealable."5chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Robert P. Narceda (respondent) married Marina on 22 July 1987. A reading of the
Marriage Contract6 he presented will reveal that at the time of their wedding,
Marina was only 17 years and 4 months old.
According to respondent, Marina went to Singapore sometime in 1994 and never
returned since.7 There was never any communication between them. He tried to
look for her, but he could not find her. Several years after she left, one of their
town mates in Luna, La Union came home from Singapore and told him that the
last time she saw his wife, the latter was already living with a Singaporean
husband.8chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In view of her absence and his desire to remarry,9 respondent filed with the RTC
on 16 May 2002 a Petition for a judicial declaration of the presumptive death
and/or absence of Marina.10chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The RTC granted respondent's Petition in a Decision11 dated 5 May 2005, the
dispositive portion of which reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment
declaring the PRESUMPTIVE DEATH of MARINA B. NARCEDA for all legal
intents and purposes of law as provided for in Rule 131, Sec. 3(w-4), Rules of
Court, without prejudice to the effect of re-appearance of the absent spouse.
SO ORDERED.12chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the
foregoing Decision to the CA. According to petitioner, respondent failed to
conduct a search for his missing wife with the diligence required by law and
enough to give rise to a "well-founded" belief that she was
dead.13chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The CA dismissed the appeal ruling that the hearing of a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding under the Family Code
and is thus governed by Title XI thereof.14 Article 247 of the Family Code
provides that the judgment of the trial court in summary court proceedings shall
be immediately final and executory. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision
reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED
OUTRIGHT on the GROUND OF LACK OF JURISDICTION, and this Court
hereby reiterates the fact that the RTC Decision is immediately final and
executory because by express provision of law, the judgment of the RTC is not
appealable.
SO ORDERED.15chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was likewise denied through
the CA's 29 April 2008 Resolution.16chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Petitioner now comes to this Court, through Rule 45, alleging as
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
1. The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.17chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
2. Respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee
spouse is dead.18chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The OSG insists that the CA had jurisdiction to entertain the Petition, because
respondent had failed to establish a well-founded belief that his absentee spouse
was dead.19 The OSG cites Republic v. CA (Jomoc),20 in which this Court
ruled:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
By the trial court's citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the
petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively
dead had for its purpose her desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo,
the petition for that purpose is a "summary proceeding," following above-quoted
Art. 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
xxx
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore,
a summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the

Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on
Appeal. It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal
from the trial court's order sufficed. (Emphasis in the
original)21chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The CA points out, however, that because the resolution of a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death requires a summary proceeding, the procedural
rules to be followed are those enumerated in Title XI of the Family Code. Articles
238, 247, and 253 thereof read:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules provided for
in this Title shall apply as regards separation in fact between husband and wife,
abandonment by one of the other, and incidents involving parental authority.
xxx
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
xxx
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern
summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar
as they are applicable.
The appellate court argues that there is no reglementary period within which to
perfect an appeal in summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code,
because the judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Article 247,
are immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties.22 In support of its
stance, it cited Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino (Bermudez-Lorino),23 in which this
Court held:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family
Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory." It was erroneous, therefore,
on the part of the RTC to give due course to the Republic's appeal and order the
transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by
express provision of law, is immediately final and executory. As we have said in
Veloria vs. Comelec, "the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of
due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege." Since, by express mandate of
Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial
proceedings in Family Law are "immediately final and executory," the right to
appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the
Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death,
should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of
November 7, 2001.24chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We agree with the CA.
Article 41 of the Family Code provides:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
This Court has already declared in Republic v. Granda 25 that Jomoc cannot be
interpreted as having superseded our pronouncements in Bermudez-Lorino,
because Jomoc does not expound on the characteristics of a summary proceeding
under the Family Code; Bermudez-Lorino, however, squarely touches upon the
impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning a trial court's

decision in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death under

Article 41 of the Family Code.26chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As explained in Republic v. Tango,27 the remedy of a losing party in a summary
proceeding is not an ordinary appeal, but a petition for certiorari, to
wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding
shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no
appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance
with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court
of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court
may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which
are the proper subject of an appeal.
When the OSG filed its notice of appeal under Rule 42, it availed itself of the
wrong remedy. As a result, the running of the period for filing of a Petition
for Certiorari continued to run and was not tolled. Upon lapse of that period, the
Decision of the RTC could no longer be questioned. Consequently, petitioner's
contention that respondent has failed to establish a well-founded belief that his
absentee spouse is dead28 may no longer be entertained by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. The 14 November 2007 Decision
of the Court Appeals and its subsequent 29 April 2008 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV
No. 85704, dismissing the appeal of the Republic of the Philippines are
AFFIRMED.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Balaoan, La Union in Special
Proceeding No. 622 dated 5 May 2005 declaring the presumptive death of Marina
B. Narceda is hereby declared FINAL and EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 94053. March 17, 1993.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. GREGORIO
NOLASCO, Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; ARTICLE 41 THEREOF COMPARED TO

ARTICLE 83 OF THE CIVIL CODE. When Article 41 is compare with the
old provision of the Civil Code, which it superseded, the following crucial
differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to
arise has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry. Also,
Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code:
Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such
absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and
believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390
and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes a
"well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
2. ID.; ID.; DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH; REQUISITES.

As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code: "1. That
the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the
circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; 2. That the present spouse
wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEGREE OF DILIGENCE REQUIRED IN SEARCHING FOR
MISSING SPOUSE; CASE AT BAR. United States v. Biasbas, is instructive
as to degree of diligence required in searching for a missing spouse. In that case,
defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the
defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had already died. The Court held
that defendant had not exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his
first wife, noting that: "While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries
concerning the whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of whom he made such
inquiries. He did not even write to the parents of his first wife, who lived in the
Province of Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information concerning her
whereabouts. He admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife was dead.
He admits that the only basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had been
absent . . ." In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly
conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parkers
whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded
belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after
learning of Janet Monicas departure, instead of seeking the help of local
authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seamans contract and
went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mothers letter sometime
in January 1983, he cut short his employment contract to return to San Jose,
Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months from January
1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when
he finally reached San Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet
Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents and their place of residence.
Also, respondent failed to explain why he did not even try to get the help of the
police or other authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife.
The circumstances of Janet Monicas departure and respondents subsequent
behaviour make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica
was dead a well-founded one.
4. ID.; ID.; MARRIAGE; NATURE, CONSEQUENCES AND INCIDENTS
THEREOF GOVERNED BY LAW AND NOT SUBJECT TO STIPULATIONS;
EXCEPTION; PUBLIC POLICY INVOLVED OF THE MOST
FUNDAMENTAL KIND. In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, the Court stressed that:
". . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is
deeply interested. It is a relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate it at
any shorter period by virtue of any contract they make . . ." By the same token,
the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one of
them leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy
of the laws on marriage. The Court notes that respondent even tried to have his
marriage annulled before the trial court in the same proceeding. In In Re Szatraw,
the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when they find it
impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means. While the
Court understands the need of respondents young son, Gerry Nolasco, for
maternal care, still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent
failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial
declaration or presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage
like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family Code emphasizes that.." . .

Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman

entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family
life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code." In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, the Court stressed strongly the need to protect.." . . the basic social
institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which the State has
the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental
kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following
basic state policy: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . The
same sentiment has been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in
Article 149: The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social
institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family
relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of
the family shall be recognized or given effect."
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY NOT SYNONYMOUS
WITH CREDIBILITY; CASE AT BAR. Neither can this Court give much
credence to respondents bare assertion that he had inquired from their friends of
her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his
testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this
evidence during trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its
nature, be rebutted. In any case, admissibility is not synonymous with credibility.
As noted before, there are serious doubts to respondents credibility. Moreover,
even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely tended to show that the
missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances,
and not that she was dead.

RESOLUTION

Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he

obtained another employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his
parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime in January 1983, while working overseas,
respondent received a letter from his mother informing him that Janet Monica had
given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had left
Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave his
ship to return home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his
ship docked in England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had
sent to his missing spouse at No. 38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England,
the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica first met, were all returned to
him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too had no
news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married
Janet Monica Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background.
He insisted that his wife continued to refuse to give him such information even
after they were married. He also testified that he did not report the matter of Janet
Monicas disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She
testified that her daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to
England even before she had given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982.
When asked why her daughter-in-law might have wished to leave Antique,
respondents mother replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural way of
life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to dissuade
Janet Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days
before, but when she (Alicia) failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00
for her expenses before she left on 22 December 1982 for England. She further
claimed that she had no information as to the missing persons present
whereabouts.

FELICIANO, J.:

The trial court granted Nolascos petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988
the dispositive portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death
of his wife Janet Monica Parker, involving Article 41 of the Family Code. The
petition prayed that respondents wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the
alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void. 1

"Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family code of the Philippines
(Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227,
July 17, 1987) this Court hereby declares as presumptively dead Janet Monica
Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance." 4

The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial
Prosecutor of Antique who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in
the instant case. The Republic argued, first, that Nolasco did not possess a "wellfounded belief that the absent spouse was already dead;" 2 and second, Nolascos
attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning
attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage. 3
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had
first met Janet Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of
his ships port calls. From that chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker
lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6) months until they returned to
respondents hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980 after his
seamans contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica
Parker in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg
in the Cathedral of San Jose.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court
erred in declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent
Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well founded belief for such
declaration.

2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Courts declaration that the
petition was a proper case of the declaration of presumptive death under Article
41, Family Code." 5
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is" ([w]hether or not
Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead." 6
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the
Family Code which provides that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years
and the spouse present had a well founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse." (Emphasis
supplied).
When Article 41 is compare with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it
superseded, 7 the following crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time
required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years;
however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable
the spouse present to remarry. 8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a
stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires
either that there be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is
generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is
presumed dead under Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. 9 The Family Code,
upon the other hand, prescribes a "well founded belief" that the absentee is
already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be
granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family
Code:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, holding that respondent
had sufficiently established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had
already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a
Petition for Review where the following allegations are
made:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts finding that there
existed a well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was
already dead; and

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee." 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements. 11
Petitioners argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent
failed to prove that he had complied with the third requirement, i.e., the existence
of a "well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is already dead.

The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his
missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she
is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence required in
searching for a missing spouse. In that case, defendant Macario Biasbas was
charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up the defense of a good faith belief
that his first wife had already died. The Court held that defendant had not
exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife, noting
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the
whereabouts of his wife, he fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He did
not even write to the parents of his first wife, who lived in the Province of
Pampanga, for the purpose of securing information concerning her whereabouts.
He admits that he had a suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits that
the only basis of his suspicion was the fact that she had been absent . . ." 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted
by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parkers whereabouts is
too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was
already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet
Monicas departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the
British Embassy, 14 he secured another seamans contract and went to London, a
vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
"Q: After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to inquire the
whereabouts of your wife:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The Court also views respondents claim that Janet Monica declined to give any
information as to her personal background even after she had married respondent
17 too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. The same can be
said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent had sent to his wife which
respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost these
returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondents bare assertion that he
had inquired from their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent
did not identify those friends in his testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that
since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during trial, it is good evidence.
But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case,
admissibility is not synonymous with credibility. 18 As noted before, there are
serious doubts to respondents credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as
evidence, said testimony merely tended to show that the missing spouse had
chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she
was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mothers letter sometime
in January 1983, he cut short his employment contract to return to San Jose,
Antique. However, he did not explain the delay of nine (9) months from January
1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to November 1983 when
he finally reached San Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married Janet
Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents and their place of residence.
19 Also, respondent failed to explain why he did not even try to get the help of the
police or other authorities in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife.
The circumstances of Janet Monicas departure and respondents subsequent
behaviour make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet Monica
was dead a well-founded one.

A: Yes, Sir.

stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code." (Emphasis supplied)
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly the need to
protect.
". . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of
which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the
most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set
forth the following basic state policy:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . .
The same sentiment has been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in
Article 149:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which
public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed
by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be
recognized or given effect." 24
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required
by law that his absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a
court order declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead.chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990,
affirming the trial courts decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively
dead is hereby REVERSED and both Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE. Costs against Respondent.

In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

Court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
How did you do that?
A: I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to London and I
went to London to look for her I could not find her (sic)." 15 (Emphasis supplied).
Respondents testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool
and this casts doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The
Court of Appeals justification of the mistake, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical
difference between London and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the
two places could mean one place in England, the port where his ship docked
and where he found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave home
to visit relatives in Pasay City, Kalookan City. or Paraaque, would announce to
friends and relatives, Were going to Manila. This apparent error in naming of
places of destination does not appear to be fatal," 16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities,
on one hand, and London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by
the Solicitor-General, are around three hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We
do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool or London with a
simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there which is in
effect what Nolasco says he did can be regarded as a reasonably diligent
search.

Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

". . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is
deeply interested. It is a relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate it at
any shorter period by virtue of any contract they make . . ." 21 (Emphasis
supplied).

Gutierrez, Jr., J., On terminal leave.

[G.R. No. 111717. October 24, 1994.]

By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of
agreeing that one of them leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to
circumvent the policy of the laws on marriage. The Court notes that respondent
even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial court in the same
proceeding.

NENITA BIENVENIDO, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

LUISITA CAMACHO and LUIS FAUSTINO C. CAMACHO, Respondents.

SYLLABUS
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion between the parties
when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal
means.
While the Court understands the need of respondents young son, Gerry Nolasco,
for maternal care, still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent
failed to satisfy the clear requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial
declaration or presumptive death must be denied. The law does not view marriage
like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family Code emphasizes that
". . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to

1. CIVIL LAW; FAMILY RELATIONS; MARRIAGE; RULE WHEN A

MARRIAGE IS CONTRACTED DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE FIRST
SPOUSE; EXCEPTIONS. As this Court has already explained, the general
rule is that stated in the first sentence of this provision: "Any marriage
subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void
from its performance." The exceptions are those stated in paragraphs 1 and 2. The
burden is on the party invoking any of the exceptions. Paragraph 2 mentions three
cases when the subsequent marriage will not be considered void: (1) when the
absent spouse has not been heard from for seven consecutive years and the
present spouse has no news that he/she is alive; (2) when, although he/she has
been absent for less than seven years, the absent spouse is generally considered to

be dead and believed to be by the spouse present; and (3) when he/she is
presumed to be dead after four years from the occurrence of any of the events
enumerated in art. 391 5 of the Civil Code.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.;ID.; ID.; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. In the case at
bar, the burden of proof was on respondents to show that Luisita and Aurelios
marriage falls under any of these exceptions in order to be considered valid. They
failed to discharge this burden. Instead the contrary appears. It has been held that
the first exception refers to the subsequent marriage of the abandoned spouse and
not the remarriage of the deserting spouse, after the period of seven years has
lapsed. This exception cannot be invoked in this case in order to sustain the
validity of Aurelios marriage to Luisita because apparently it was Aurelio who
had left his first wife. At the time of his second marriage to Luisita, he and Luisita
had already been living together as husband and wife for five years. In fact the
couple begot a child, in 1961, even before their marriage in 1962. What applies in
this case, therefore, is the general rule, i.e., since Aurelio had a valid, subsisting
marriage to Consejo Velasco, his subsequent marriage to respondent Luisita was
void for being bigamous.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT ON SALE MADE BETWEEN PARTIES GUILTY
OF ADULTERY OR CIONCUBINAGE; RULE; CASE AT BAR AN
EXCEPTION. there is no basis for holding that the property in question was
property of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and the late Aurelio because there
was no such partnership in the first place. The Court of Appeals held that the sale
of the property to Nenita is void on the principle embodied in art. 739(1) of the
Civil Code which declares donations made between persons who are guilty of
adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation to be void. In the first place,
an action for declaration of the nullity of such donations can only be brought by
the innocent spouse, perhaps in this case by the first wife, but certainly not by
Luisita whose marriage to Aurelio is itself void. The last paragraph of art. 739
clearly provides: In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of
nullity may be brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the
donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.
In the second place, until otherwise shown in an appropriate action, the sale to
petitioner must be presumed. Petitioners ownership is evidenced by a deed of
absolute sale executed with all the solemnity of a public document and by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 issued in due course in her name.
Petitioner is in possession of the property. It was error for the Court of appeals to
annul petitioners title at the instance of one whose marriage to the seller is void.
Indeed, the property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a long period of
cohabitation with petitioner which lasted for twenty years (1968-1988). While
petitioner knew respondent Chito to be Aurelios son way back in 1976, there is
nothing to show that she knew Aurelio to be married to Luisita. To the contrary,
Aurelio represented himself to be single. As far as petitioner was concerned,
Chito could have been Aurelios child by a woman not his wife. There was,
therefore, no basis for the Court of Appeals ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in
good faith of the property because she ought to have known that Aurelio was
married to Luisita.

library
WHEREFORE, and upon all the foregoing, the decision of the court below dated
August 29, 1989 is REVERSED. The deed of sale executed by the late Aurelio
Camacho in favor of defendant Nenita T. Bienvenido and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 326681 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued in her name are
ANNULLED and in lieu thereof, a new transfer certificate of title in the name of
the spouses Aurelio P. Camacho and Luisita C. Camacho shall ISSUE, herein
declaring said spouses the owners of the property described in par. 8 of the
complaint and DISMISSING the other prayers in the complaint as well as the
defendants counterclaim as baseless or without sufficient evidence in support
thereof. With costs against the appellee. 2
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but her motion was denied in a
resolution of the Court of Appeals promulgated on August 19, 1993. 3

Respondent Luisita was granted death benefits by the Armed Forces of the
Philippines as the surviving spouse of Aurelio. Soon she also claimed ownership
of the house and lot on Scout Delgado Street in which Nenita had been living. The
two met at a barangay conciliation meeting but efforts to settle their dispute
failed.

The background of this case is as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Aurelio P. Camacho married Consejo Velasco in Manila on October 3, 1942. On
February 6, 1962, without his marriage to Consejo Velasco being dissolved,
Aurelio P. Camacho contracted another marriage with respondent Luisita C.
Camacho (Luisita) with whom he had been living since 1953 and by whom he
begot a child, respondent Aurelio Luis Faustino C. Camacho (Chito), born on may
22, 1961. The marriage was solemnized in Tokyo, Japan where Aurelio and
Luisita had been living since 1958.
There were instances during Luisita and Aurelios marriage when, because of
their quarrels, one or the other left the dwelling place for long periods of time. In
her case Luisita stayed on those occasions at various times in Davao City,
Hongkong or Japan.
In 1967 Aurelio met petitioner Nenita T. Bienvenido, who had been estranged
from her husband, Luis Rivera. Aurelio courted her and apparently won her heart
because from June 1968 until Aurelios death on May 28, 1988, he lived with her,
the last time in a duplex apartment on 84 Scout Delgado Street, Quezon City.
Petitioners daughter, Nanette, stayed with them as did Aurelios son, Chito, who
lived with them for about a year in 1976.
On April 30, 1982, Aurelio bought the house and the lot on Delgado Street in
which they were staying from the owners, Paz Lorenzo Infante and Suzette
Infante-Moozca. In the deed of sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 288350
of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, issued in his name, Aurelio was
described as single.
On November 26, 1984, Aurelio executed a deed of sale of the property in favor
of petitioner Nenita in consideration of the sum of P250,000.00, by virtue of
which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 was issued in petitioners name on
January 11, 1985.

MENDOZA, J.:

Between 1985 and 1987 Nenita an Luisita came to know each other. How they
did is the subject of conflicting versions. Luisita claims that Nenita called her
(Luisitas) residence several times, looking for Aurelio because the latter had
allegedly left their dwelling place. Petitioner, according to Luisita, introduced
herself as Mrs. Nenita Camacho.

This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 24893, the dispositive portion of which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw

On the other hand petitioner claims it was the other way around that it was
respondent Luisita who had called up their residence many times, also looking for
Aurelio to urge him to file an application for American citizenship.

DECISION

On May 28, 1988, Aurelio died. Petitioner, using her Loyola Life Plan and
Aurelios account in the PCI Bank, took care of the funeral arrangements.
Respondent Luisita was then in the United States with respondent Chito, having
gone there, according to her, at the instance of Aurelio in order to look for a house
in San Francisco so that Aurelio could follow and rejoin them. Upon learning of
the death of Aurelio she and her son Chito came home on May 31, 1988. She had
the remains of Aurelio transferred from the Loyola Memorial Chapels, first to the
St. Ignatius Church and later to the Arlington Memorial Chapels. Luisita paid for
the funeral services.

On September 7, 1988, Luisita and her son Chito brought this case in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, seeking the annullment of the sale of the property to
petitioner and the payment to them of damages. Luisita alleged that the deed of
sale was a forgery and that in any event it was executed in fraud of her as the
legitimate wife of Aurelio.
In answer petitioner claimed that she and the late Aurelio had purchased the
property in question using their joints funds which they had accumulated after
living together for fourteen years; that the sale of the property by the late Aurelio
to her was with respondent Luisitas consent; and that she was a purchaser in
good faith.
On August 29, 1989, the trial court rendered a decision upholding the sale of the
property to petitioner and dismissing the complaint of Luisita. It found the deed of
sale in favor of petitioner to be genuine and respondents Luisita and Chito to be in
estoppel in not claiming the property until 1988 despite knowledge of the sale by
the late Aurelio who had represented himself to be single. Respondents moved for
a reconsideration but the trial court denied their motion.
On appeal the respondents prevailed. On June 4, 1993, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the trial court and declared respondents to be the owners
of the house and lot in dispute. Although Luisita had admitted that as early as
1985 she knew that knew that Nenita had been staying in the premises, the
appellate court held that respondents action was not barred by laches because
Luisita allegedly did not know that Nenita had obtained title to the property. On
the merit, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the absence of proof to the contrary,
Aurelios first wife must be presumed to have been absent for seven years without
aurelio having news of her being alive when Aurelio contracted a second
marriage. On this premise, it held (1) that the property in dispute belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Aurelio and Luisita and (2) that the sale of the property to
Nenita was void for the same reason that donations between persons who are
guilty of concubinage or adultery are declared void under art. 739 of the Civil
Code.
Hence this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
claims that
I THE COURT ERRED IN PRESUMING THE VALIDITY OF THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN AURELIO AND LUISITA [RESPONDENT
HEREIN];

II THE COURT ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE 739 OF THE NCC AND

DECLARING INVALID THE DEED OF SALE BETWEEN AURELIO AND
NENITA [PETITIONER HEREIN];

shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be
brought by the spouse of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee
may be proved by preponderance of evidence in the same action.

(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

III THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY
FORMS PART OF THE CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF AURELIO AND
LUISITA.
IV THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT (sic)
A PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH AND LAWFUL OWNER OF SUBJECT
PROPERTY.

(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being
alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the
time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in
any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

We find the petition to be meritorious.

The resolution of this case hinges on the validity of Aurelios marriage to
respondent Luisita. If that marriage was valid then the property of their conjugal
partnership and Luisita is the proper party to question the validity of the sale to
Nenita. Otherwise, if the marriage is not valid, Luisita can not bring this suit.
On the question of validity of Luisitas marriage to Aurelio, the Court of Appeals
ruled:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
There is no dispute on the fact of appellant Luisitas marriage in 1962 to Aurelio.
What is in the question is the validity of that marriage considering Aurelios
purported previous marriage to Consejo Velasco. The appellee had attacked the
validity of appellants marriage in the trial below, on account of the previous
marriage of Aurelio to Consejo Velasco, presenting evidence to that effects (Exhs.
43 and 44) to bolster her claim. Appellee likewise prove that Consejo Velasco
although then a resident of Australia, is still alive.
The burden of proof on the legality of appellants marriage with Aurelio must rest
on the appellee as the party who stands to benefit from a declaration of its
invalidity. But appellee failed to prove that such second marriage (appellants)
was not valid because it was contracted at a time and on the assumption that the
first spouse had been absent for seven years without the spouse present having
news of the absentee being alive.
This court finds that the presumption of the validity of the marriage Aurelio and
Luisita has not been successfully assailed by appellee.
The Court of Appeals thus presumed the validity of Aurelios second marriage
from the failure of petitioner to prove that at the time of such marriage Aurelios
first wife, Consejo, had not been absent for at least seven years and that Aurelio
did not have news that his first wife we still alive.
Petitioner had shown that on February 6, 1962, when Aurelio married Luisita,
Aurelios previous marriage to Consejo Velasco was still subsisting and,
therefore, his second marriage was bigamous. It was the burden of herein
respondents to prove that, at the time of his second marriage to respondent
Luisita, Aurelios first wife, Consejo Velasco, had been absent for at least seven
years and that Aurelio had no news that she was alive. To assume these facts
because petitioner has not disproved them would be to stand the principle on its
head.
Thus, art. 83 of the Civil Code provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime
of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse

As this Court has already explained, the general rule is that stated in the first
sentence of this provision: "Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than
such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance." The exceptions
are those stated in paragraphs 1 and 2. The burden is on the party invoking any of
the exceptions. 4
Paragraph 2 mentions three cases when the subsequent marriage will not be
considered void: (1) when the absent spouse has not been heard from for seven
consecutive years and the present spouse has no news that he/she is alive; (2)
when, although he/she has been absent for less than seven years, the absent
spouse is generally considered to be dead and believed to be by the spouse
present; and (3) when he/she is presumed to be dead after four years from the
occurrence of any of the events enumerated in art. 391 5 of the Civil Code.
In the case at bar, the burden of proof was on respondents to show that Luisita and
Aurelios marriage falls under any of these exceptions in order to be considered
valid. They failed to discharge this burden. Instead the contrary appears.
It has been held that the first exception refers to the subsequent marriage of the
abandoned spouse and not the remarriage of the deserting spouse, after the period
of seven years has lapsed. 6 This exception cannot be invoked in this case in order
to sustain the validity of Aurelios marriage to Luisita because apparently it was
Aurelio who had left his first wife. At the time of his second marriage to Luisita,
he and Luisita had already been living together as husband and wife for five
years. In fact the couple begot a child, in 1961, even before their marriage in
1962.
What applies in this case, therefore, is the general rule, i.e., since Aurelio had a
valid, subsisting marriage to Consejo Velasco, his subsequent marriage to
respondent Luisita was void for being bigamous.
Consequently, there is no basis for holding that the property in question was
property of the conjugal partnership of Luisita and the late Aurelio because there
was no such partnership in the first place.
The Court of Appeals held that the sale of the property to Nenita is void on the
principle embodied in art. 739(1) of the Civil Code which declares donations
made between persons who are guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of
the donation to be void. In the first place, an action for declaration of the nullity of
such donations can only be brought by the innocent spouse, perhaps in this case
by the first wife, but certainly not by Luisita whose marriage to Aurelio is itself
void. The last paragraph of art. 739 clearly provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

In the second place, until otherwise shown in an appropriate action, the sale to
petitioner must be presumed. Petitioners ownership is evidenced by a deed of
absolute sale 7 executed with all the solemnity of a public document and by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 issued in due course in her name. 8
Petitioner is in possession of the property. It was error for the Court of appeals to
annul petitioners title at the instance of one whose marriage to the seller is void.
Indeed, the property in question was acquired by Aurelio during a long period of
cohabitation with petitioner which lasted for twenty years (1968-1988). While
petitioner knew respondent Chito to be Aurelios son way back in 1976, there is
nothing to show that she knew Aurelio to be married to Luisita. To the contrary,
Aurelio represented himself to be single. As far as petitioner was concerned,
Chito could have been Aurelios child by a woman not his wife. There was,
therefore, no basis for the Court of Appeals ruling that Nenita was not a buyer in
good faith of the property because she ought to have known that Aurelio was
married to Luisita.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and another one is
entered, DISMISSING the complaint against petitioner and DECLARING the
deed of sale executed in her favor and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 326681 of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued in her name to be VALID.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 165842 November 29, 2005]

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of
bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.
Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001,
the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to
RUBYLUS [GAA] and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a
second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who
does not know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P.
MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaa].
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to
Rubylus Gaa before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a
municipality of the Province of Rizal.4 He met the private complainant Tina B.
Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan,
Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a
Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went
to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a
motel where, despite Tina's resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with

her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions, assuring her that he was
single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina's parents,
and was assured by them that their son was still single.
Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996.
They were married on April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the
Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.5It appeared in their
marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."
The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through
their joint efforts, they were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan,
Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and
went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever
she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.6 Sometime in January 2001,
Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving
financial support.
Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the
National Statistics Office (NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had
been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the marriage
contract.7 She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo
was in fact already married when they exchanged their own vows. 8
For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where
she worked as a Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and
married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus Gaa, but
she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until
this one time when he noticed that she had a "love-bite" on her neck. He then
abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was "single" in his
marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first
marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the
nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.
Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because
she threatened to commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged
with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three
months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that
his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for
more than 20 years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10) years,
as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera
the amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.9
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt all the elements of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It
declared that Eduardo's belief, that his first marriage had been dissolved because
of his first wife's 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from
liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,10 the trial
court further ruled that even if the private complainant had known that Eduardo
had been previously married, the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally
liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in
good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he
married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage
no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He
was not motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did
so only out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that
the trial court should have taken into account Article 390 of the New Civil Code.
To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States
v. Pealosa11and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.12

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardo's defense of good
faith and reliance on the Court's ruling in United States v. Enriquez13 were
misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended
Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v.
Nolasco,14 the OSG further posited that as provided in Article 41 of the Family
Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even assuming that the first
marriage was void, the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for
themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the
OSG maintained, the private complainant's knowledge of the first marriage would
not afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against the State and not just
against the private complainant.
However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial
court was erroneous and sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with
modification.
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC
with modification as to the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution
was able to prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention of the
appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could
lawfully marry the private complainant, there should have been a judicial
declaration of Gaa's presumptive death as the absent spouse. The appellate
court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v. Tan15 and Domingo v. Court of
Appeals16 to support its ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July
31, 2002 is herebyMODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accusedappellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years
of prision mayor as maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other
respects.
SO ORDERED.17
Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari ,
insisting that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW
WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER'S FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE
LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL CODE
AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE
DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW
WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL
DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.18
The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of
the felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead under the
Civil Code. He avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaa had been
"absent" for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was
presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of
Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether
or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for
succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of
death with respect to succession.
The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by
operation of law upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouse's reasonable belief that the absentee is
dead. He insists that he was able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife
since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was

still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death of
Gaa had arisen by operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of
the Civil Code are present. The petitioner concludes that he should thus be
acquitted of the crime of bigamy.
The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article
390 of the Civil Code, the rule therein on legal presumptions remains valid and
effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it require that there
must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death
would apply. He further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and
appellate courts, the requirement of a judicial declaration of presumptive death
under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a requirement for the validity of the
subsequent or second marriage.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding
moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The private complainant was
a "GRO" before he married her, and even knew that he was already married. He
genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her financial support. He also
pointed out that she had an illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to
their house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA
affirming the petitioner's conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence and
the evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this Court
in Republic v. Nolasco.19
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy,
reads:
Art. 349. Bigamy. 'The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:
El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legtimamente
disuelto el anterior, ser castigado con la pena de prision mayor. xxx
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the
juridical tie of marriage established by law.20 The phrase "or before the absent
spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the
drafters of the law were of the impression that "in consonance with the civil law
which provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of
years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of
marriage should be a justification for bigamy."21
For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove
the felony: (a) he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a
subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully dissolved.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
subsequent marriage.22 It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the
alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid
were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.23 Viada avers that a third
element of the crime is that the second marriage must be entered into with
fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element of a felony
by dolo.24 On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two
elements of bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully
dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second marriage. It does not matter whether
the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical effects
until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.25 As the Court ruled
in Domingo v. Court of Appeals26 and Mercado v. Tan,27 under the Family Code
of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a
defense.

In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as
Viada and declared that there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved
marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention constituting the felony
of the act.28 He explained that:
'This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly
incorporated in the principle antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the
landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no willfulness there is no crime.
There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported
by very strong evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to
constitute a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a second marriage in the
reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many
years that have elapsed since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of
his endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy,
because there is no fraudulent intent which is one of the essential elements of the
crime.29
As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with
bigamy, a felony by dolo(deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent.
Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as
an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary.30 Although the words "with malice"
do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in
the word "voluntary."31
Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without
legal excuse or justification from which another suffers injury. 32 When the act or
omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by
the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional.33Indeed, it is a legal
presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable consequence of
his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption
must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole
evidence.34
For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of
both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.35
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to
Gaa in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence,
the marriage is presumed to subsist.36 The prosecution also proved that the
petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the
Family Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he
married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith
of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such
defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an
excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem
excusat.
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the
private complainant in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20
years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent
court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such
judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith,
and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private
complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such
case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.
The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement
for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of

the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second
marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if
the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.
The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, the "State shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social
institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest
of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every
safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes
specified by law.37 The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the
interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the
parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil
marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over
transient ones; it enhances the welfare of the community.
In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses
and an approving State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each
other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life and death. The
consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to
society, are so serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the
procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the
presumptive death of the absent spouse38 after the lapse of the period provided for
under the law. One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a
competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as proof that the
present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the
death of the first spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what they wish to be true,"
is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first
because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the existence
of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable
of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of
individuals.39 Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to
permit second marriages.40 Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made
the dissolution of marriage dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties,
but upon certain objective facts easily capable of accurate judicial
cognizance,41 namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.
The petitioner's sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his
acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide'
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the
absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his
succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of
seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing
for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years.
The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it
being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises
without any necessity of judicial declaration.42However, Article 41 of the Family
Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent forfour consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided
in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.43
With the effectivity of the Family Code,44 the period of seven years under the first
paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years.
Thus, before the spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage, he or she
must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death
of the absentee spouse,45 without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the
absentee spouse. As explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:46
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous
marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must
concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent
for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the
circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance;
(b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already
dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a
summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is
consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in
subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the
Family Code.
The Court rejects petitioner's contention that the requirement of instituting a
petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code
is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid second
marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision
was designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court and comments
of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.
As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela47 that, for
purposes of the marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse
judicially declared an absentee before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose the taking of the
necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the
celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former
spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be
living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse
present so believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.48 In In Re
Szatraw,49 the Court declared that a judicial declaration that a person is
presumptively dead, because he or she had been unheard from in seven years,
being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the
stage of finality or become final; and that proof of actual death of the person
presumed dead being unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in
another proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined. The Court
ruled that if a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead because he or
she had not been heard from in seven years cannot become final and executory
even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be
taken, for such presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary
proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary, superfluous

and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste its
valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act. 50 The
Court also took note that a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of
an absent spouse may even be made in collusion with the other spouse.
In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,51 the Court declared that the words
"proper proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to
those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code which
refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person. In Gue
v. Republic of the Philippines,52 the Court rejected the contention of the petitioner
therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil Code, the courts are authorized to
declare the presumptive death of a person after an absence of seven years. The
Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.
Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that "the provision of
Article 349 or "before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment reached in the proper proceedings" is erroneous and should
be considered as not written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if
the prior marriage has not been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has
not been declared presumptively dead in a proper court proceedings, the
subsequent marriage is bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is not
true.53 A second marriage is bigamous only when the circumstances in paragraphs
1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not present.54 Former Senator
Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require
judicial decree of dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but even with such
decree, a second marriage in good faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits that
a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should not give rise to
bigamy.55 Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view that in
the case of an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in case
he/she contracts a second marriage.56
The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the
present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment
declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and
convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. 57 Such judgment is
proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent
marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the
absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As explained by
former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:
'Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code
providing that the present spouse must first ask for a declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she
marries again.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of
the present spouse contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary
proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of the presumptive death
of the absentee, without prejudice to the latter's reappearance. This provision is
intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy
under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration
that the missing spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse
in contracting a second marriage is already established.58
Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of
Justice) who wrote that things are now clarified. He says judicial declaration of
presumptive death is now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of
procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible

clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full

grasp of the facts. The judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absentee.
Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause
"before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead x x x" should be
disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new
law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.59
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent
authority on Criminal Law, in some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to
be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death, which could
then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate.60Before such
declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if
done in good faith.61 Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary views
because of the ruling in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil
Code, which, however, appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of the
Family Code, "which requires a summary hearing for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse before the other spouse can remarry."
Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code may
be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.62
On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for
awarding moral damages in favor of the private complainant. The petitioner
maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in any of the cases provided
in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner
asserts that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People v.
Bondoc,63where an award of moral damages for bigamy was disallowed. In any
case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce evidence
to prove moral damages.
The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its
finding that she adduced evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled
that while bigamy is not included in those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages against the
petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the following ruling
in People v. Bondoc:
... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daos, ello se debi
indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del Cdigo Civil de Filipinas autoriza
la adjudicacin de daos morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto, violacin,
adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeracin
el delito de bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aqu
los daos de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados.64
The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence
and the law. The OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling
in People v. Rodeo.
The Court rules against the petitioner.
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may
be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or
omission.65 An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the following
conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or
psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable
act or omission factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant;
andfourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article
2219 or Article 2220 of the Civil Code.66

Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal
cases enumerated in Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code
and analogous cases, viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases.
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No.
3 of this article, may also recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the
action mentioned in No. 9 of this article in the order named.
Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases
where the aggrieved party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and
similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would
not have been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 2219 67 and
analogous cases (which refer to those cases bearing analogy or resemblance,
corresponds to some others or resembling, in other respects, as in form,
proportion, relation, etc.)68
Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code in which the offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the
private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the
private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.
According to Article 19, "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith." This provision contains what is commonly referred to as
the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed
not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties.
The standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and
observe honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a
legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.69
Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do
not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner
which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision and results
in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible.70 If the provision does not provide a remedy for
its violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the
Civil Code would be proper. Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary
to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the
latter for the same." On the other hand, Article 21 provides that "any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages." The latter
provision is adopted to remedy "the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so
many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold
number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for
specifically in the statutes." Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has
been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil

Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the circumstances of

each case.71
In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to
marry her. He assured her that he was single. He even brought his parents to the
house of the private complainant where he and his parents made the same
assurance - that he was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the
petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was single. She
lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing
all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until the
petitioner heartlessly abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that
he was already married to another before they were married.
Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner's chicanery
and heartless deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a
continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of being a
lawful husband to the private complainant, who changed her status from a single
woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single
man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation,
being bound to a man who it turned out was not her lawful husband. 72
The Court rules that the petitioner's collective acts of fraud and deceit before,
during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate
and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain any
physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v.
Macnab,73 the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:
xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries,
damages for shame, humiliation, and mental anguish are not recoverable where
the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James,
Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all recognize that where the wrong is
willful rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and
proximate consequences though they consist of shame, humiliation, and mental
anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585
(Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579,
591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here the defendant's
conduct was not merely negligent, but was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It
was bound to result in shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff,
and when such result did ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to
compensatory but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery
Co., supra; Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note,
"Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The
plaintiff testified that because of the defendant's bigamous marriage to her and the
attendant publicity she not only was embarrassed and "ashamed to go out" but
"couldn't sleep" but "couldn't eat," had terrific headaches" and "lost quite a lot of
weight." No just basis appears for judicial interference with the jury's reasonable
allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v.
Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App. Div. 741955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioner's acts are against public policy as they
undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the
interest and general welfare of society.
Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner's
perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Besides, even
considerations of public policy would not prevent her from recovery. As held
in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:75
Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act
which, in consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal
nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action
against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by him in consequence
of his having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v.
Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a
false representation by the defendant that he was divorced from his former wife,

whereby the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for
deceit. It seems to have been assumed that the fact that she had unintentionally
violated the law or innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him would
be no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her
damages. The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the promise
to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband
and to assume and act in a relation and condition that proved to be false and
ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman
v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am. Rep.
336.
Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon
any transgression of the law by herself but upon the defendant's
misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed, innocently on her part,
were but one of the incidental results of the defendant's fraud for which damages
may be assessed.
[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the
marriage relation have been maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner,
150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99
Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747;
Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public
policy would not prevent recovery where the circumstances are such that the
plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal action was induced
solely by the defendant's misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause
of action upon any transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to
the enforcement of a contract illegal on its face or to one who has consciously and
voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is
founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R.
958.76
Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award
of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City,
Branch 104, a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased
Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be
inter alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between
the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous
and thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be
appointed administrator, without bond, of the estate of the deceased and that the
inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have
been settled.

[G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000.]

"2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage between oppositor-appellant
and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio is bigamous for failure of the former to
secure a decree o of the presumptive death of her first spouse.

ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, Petitioner, v. MARIETTA

CALISTERIO, Respondent.
DECISION

Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage
with James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latters absence, his
whereabouts being unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted her
second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of
Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the decedent.
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfronio
C. Armas, Jr. and respondent Marietta administrator and administratrix,
respectively, of the intestate estate of Teodorico.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of
petitioner Antonia; it adjudged:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding for the petitioner and
against the oppositor whereby herein petitioner, Antonia Armas y Calisterio, is
declared as the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos."
1chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals, formulating that
"1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code in the
instant case despite the fact that the controversy arose when the New Civil Code
was the law in force.

"3. The trial court erred in not holding that the property situated at No. 32
Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, is the conjugal property
of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio.

VITUG, J.:

"4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-appellant is not a legal heir of
deceased Teodorico Calisterio.

On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of

land with an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife,
herein respondent Marietta Calisterio.

"5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of administration should be
granted solely in favor of oppositor-appellant." 2

Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married
to James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds
disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were
married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly
secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.chanrobles.com :
virtual law library

On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado M.

Vasquez, Jr., promulgated its now assailed decision, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and a new one entered declaring as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) Marietta Calisterios marriage to Teodorico remains valid;

On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving

"(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte,
Quezon City, belong to the conjugal partnership property with the concomitant
obligation of the partnership to pay the value of the land to Teodoricos estate as
of the time of the taking;
"(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodoricos compulsory heir, is entitled to one half
of her husbands estate, and Teodoricos sister, herein petitioner Antonia Armas
and her children, to the other half;
"(d) The trial court is ordered to determine the competence of Marietta E.
Calisterio to act as administrator of Teodoricos estate, and if so found competent
and willing, that she be appointed as such; otherwise, to determine who among
the deceaseds next of kin is competent and willing to become the administrator
of the estate" 3
On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration, prompting her to interpose the present appeal. Petitioner
asseverates:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing
and setting aside the decision of the trial court is not in accord with the law or
with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court." 4
It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the marriage between
the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta, that, in turn, would be
determinative of her right as a surviving spouse.
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was
solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not
the Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the
Family Code 5 itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it
thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of
the New Civil Code which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ARTICLE 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first
spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved: or
"(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of
the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being
alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is
generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the
time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead
according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in
any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is
first annulled or dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the
above rule. For the subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases
therein provided, to be held valid, the spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so

contracting the later marriage must have done so in good faith. 6 Bad faith
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of
wrong it partakes of the nature of fraud, a breach of a known duty through
some motive of interest or ill will. 7 The Court does not find these circumstances
to be here extant.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 187512 : June 13, 2012]

A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary 8 as long

as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the
marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to
be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows
that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second
marriage.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. YOLANDA

CADACIO GRANADA, RESPONDENT.

In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous
marriage may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must
concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent
for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the
circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance;
(b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already
dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a
summary proceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is
consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in
subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41 9 , in relation to Article 40, 10
of the Family Code.

This is a Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the Resolutions dated 23 January
2009[1] and 3 April 2009[2] issued by the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed
the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent.cralaw

In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Mariettas first husband,
James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven
years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased
Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during the
regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the
absence of a judicial declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been
adduced to indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains to
them in common. Upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property
should rightly be divided in two equal portions one portion going to the
surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse. The
successional right in intestacy of a surviving spouse over the net estate 11 of the
deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces
(the latter by right of representation), is one-half of the inheritance, the brothers
and sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other half. Nephews and
nieces, however, can only succeed by right of representation in the presence of
uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and nieces can succeed in
their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude nephews and nieces
except only in representation by the latter of their parents who predecease or are
incapacitated to succeed. The appellate court has thus erred in granting, in
paragraph (c) of the dispositive portion of its judgment, successional rights, to
petitioners children, along with their own mother Antonia who herself is
invoking successional rights over the estate of her deceased brother.chanrobles
virtua| |aw |ibrary
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV
No. 51574 is AFFIRMED except insofar only as it decreed in paragraph (c) of the
dispositive portion thereof that the children of petitioner are likewise entitled,
along with her, to the other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which, it is hereby
DECLARED that said one-half share of the decedents estate pertains solely to
petitioner to the exclusion of her own children. No costs.

DECISION
SERENO, J.:

In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus

Granada (Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics company in
Paranaque where both were then working. The two eventually got married at the
Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in the birth of their
son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus
went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she
had not received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to
locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding
the latters whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared
presumptively dead. The Petition was raffled to Presiding Judge Avelino
Demetria of RTC Branch 85, Lipa City, and was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 20020530.
On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as
presumptively dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this
Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to
locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already
dead. However, in an Order dated 29 June 2007, the RTC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA, presumably
under Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court. Yolanda filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued
that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the
Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is
immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.
In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolandas Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. BermudezLorino,[3] the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under
Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied by the

CA in a Resolution dated 3 April 2009.[4]

xxx

Hence, the present Rule 45 Petition.

Issues

Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.

1. Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that
the Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties
and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal
2. Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on
the evidence that respondent presented
Our Ruling
1. On whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the
Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death is immediately final and executory upon notice to
the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal
In the assailed Resolution dated 23 January 2009, the CA dismissed the Petition
assailing the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of
the absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. Citing Republic v.
Bermudez-Lorino,[5] the appellate court noted that a petition for declaration of
presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage is a summary judicial proceeding
under the Family Code. Hence, the RTC Decision therein is immediately final and
executory upon notice to the parties, by express provision of Article 247 of the
same Code. The decision is therefore not subject to ordinary appeal, and the
attempt to question it through a Notice of Appeal is unavailing.

xxx

xxx

Further, Article 253 of the Family Code reads:

ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern
summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar
as they are applicable.
Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that
since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the
judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.
In Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,[6] the Republic likewise appealed the CAs
affirmation of the RTCs grant of respondents Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of her absent spouse. The Court therein held that it was an
error for the Republic to file a Notice of Appeal when the latter elevated the
matter to the CA, to wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family
Code, supra, are immediately final and executory.
xxx xxx xxx
But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and
the bar, let it be stated that the RTCs decision dated November 7, 2001, was
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for
the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto.
The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have
dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.

Court in Jomoc did not expound on the characteristics of a summary proceeding

under the Family Code. In contrast, the Court in Bermudez-Lorino expressly
stated that its ruling on the impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a vehicle for
questioning the trial courts Decision in a summary proceeding for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code was intended to set the
records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar.
At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this Court settled the rule regarding appeal of
judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code when it ruled
in Republic v. Tango:[9]
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments
rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine
our previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern
summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title
shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard
to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in
chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern
summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar
as they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.

We affirm the CA ruling.

Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage,the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Underscoring
supplied.)
Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the
purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code
is a summary proceeding as provided for under the Family Code.
Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled Summary Judicial Proceedings in
the Family Law. Subsumed thereunder are Articles 238 and 247, which provide:
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title
shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard
to technical rules.

Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, who concurred in the result
reached by the Court inRepublic v. Bermudez-Lorino, additionally opined that
what the OSG should have filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a
petition for review under Rule 45.
In the present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been
superseded by the subsequent Decision of the Court in Republic v.
Jomoc,[7] issued a few months later.
In Jomoc, the RTC granted respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death of her absent husband for the purpose of remarriage. Petitioner Republic
appealed the RTC Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court
disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that, under the Rules of
Court,[8] a record on appeal is required to be filed when appealing special
proceedings cases. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In reversing the CA, this
Court clarified that while an action for declaration of death or absence under Rule
72, Section 1(m), expressly falls under the category of special proceedings, a
petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code
is a summary proceeding, as provided for by Article 238 of the same Code. Since
its purpose was to enable her to contract a subsequent valid marriage, petitioners
action was a summary proceeding based on Article 41 of the Family Code, rather
than a special proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Considering
that this action was not a special proceeding, petitioner was not required to file a
record on appeal when it appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.
We do not agree with the Republics argument that Republic v. Jomoc superseded
our ruling in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino. As observed by the CA, the Supreme

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding

shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no
appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance
with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court
of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court
may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which
are the proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for
certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From
the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court
via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republics
Notice of Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of respondents spouse was immediately final

and executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.

2. On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs
grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death
under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence
that respondent had presented
Petitioner also assails the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she had
not adduced the evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her
absent spouse was already dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the Family
Code. Petitioner cites Republic v. Nolasco,[10] United States v.
Biasbas[11] and Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro[12] as authorities on the
subject.
In Nolasco, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CAs affirmation of the
RTCs grant of respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of his
absent spouse, a British subject who left their home in the Philippines soon after
giving birth to their son while respondent was on board a vessel working as a
seafarer. Petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the ruling on the ground that
respondent was not able to establish his well-founded belief that the absentee is
already dead, as required by Article 41 of the Family Code. In ruling thereon,
this Court recognized that this provision imposes more stringent requirements
than does Article 83 of the Civil Code.[13] The Civil Code provision merely
requires either that there be no news that the absentee is still alive; or that the
absentee is generally considered to be dead and is believed to be so by the spouse
present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. In
comparison, the Family Code provision prescribes a well-founded belief that
the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death
can be granted. As noted by the Court in that case, the four requisites for the
declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code are as follows:
That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to prove the existence of a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead, the Court
in Nolasco cited United States v. Biasbas,[14] which it found to be instructive as to
the diligence required in searching for a missing spouse.
In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise due diligence
in ascertaining the whereabouts of his first wife, considering his admission that
that he only had a suspicion that she was dead, and that the only basis of that
suspicion was the fact of her absence.
Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, petitioner Republic sought
the reversal of the CA ruling affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse on the ground that the
respondent therein had not been able to prove a well-founded belief that his
spouse was already dead. The Court reversed the CA, granted the Petition, and
provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a well-founded
belief under Article 41 of the Family Code:
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in

this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and
that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the
present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not define what
is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that es menester que su
creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales.
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It
may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend,
even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination
probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character,
habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually
control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it
tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their
intentions, competence [sic] evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse
and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the
spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent spouse
depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature
and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.(Footnotes omitted,
underscoring supplied.)
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that
respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband.
While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about the
whereabouts of Cyrus from the latters relatives, these relatives were not
presented to corroborate Diosdados testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly
not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she
would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance
from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have
also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain
these omissions.
The Republics arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to
deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her wellfounded belief that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the
Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be
modified or reversed. Indeed, [n]othing is more settled in law than that when a
judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable.
The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or
law.[15]cralaw
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated 23 January 2009 and 3 April 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90165
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993

ROBERTO DOMINGO, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA

SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R.
AVERA, Respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no
grave abuse of discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of
property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The
petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among
others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center
Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage
License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a
previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage
is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage only sometime
in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23 1979 up
to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the
Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave
granted by her foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been
unemployed and completely dependent upon her for support and subsistence; out
of her personal earnings, she purchased real and personal properties with a total
amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the possession and
administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month
vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further
discovered that he had been disposing of some of her properties without her
knowledge or consent; she confronted him about this and thereafter appointed her
brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he
failed and refused to turn over the possession and administration of said properties
to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer and possess
the same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining
Roberto from exercising any act of administration and ownership over said
properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force and effect;
and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties
acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the
proper management and administration of the attorney-infact.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause
of action. The marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its
nullity is, therefore, superfluous and unnecessary. It added that private respondent
has no property which is in his possession.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the
motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man
with another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of
Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is no
dispute that the second marriage contracted by respondent with herein petitioner
after a first marriage with another woman is illegal and void. However, as to
whether or not the second marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is
not an issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v.GSIS, the Supreme
Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:

And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although
the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated
while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)chanrobles virtual law library
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings of
the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and
Mendoza.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property in his
possession is an issue that may be determined only after trial on the merits. 1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application
of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS 2 and the absence of justiciable controversy as to
the nullity of the marriage. On September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the
motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt
within which to file his answer.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action
of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to
dismiss.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals 3 dismissed the petition. It explained
that the case of Yap v. CA 4 cited by petitioner and that of Consuegra
v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have relevance in the case at bar,
there being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with the successional
rights of the second wife while the instant case prays for separation of property
corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the
separation and subsequent distribution of the properties acquired during the union
can be had only upon proper determination of the status of the marital relationship
between said parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by
petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits, the
declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with
the partition and distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and
52 of the Family Code, it held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised together with other incidents of
their marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since
the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to
dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have been to
file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate
the issue on appeal. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied for
lack of merit. 5chanrobles virtual law library
Hence, this petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the
following.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is
necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for
purposes of remarriage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent
to recover certain real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her
exclusively.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon 6 and People
v.Mendoza, 7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
and Separation of Property filed by private respondent must be dismissed for
being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own interpretation of
Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the
petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no allegation of private respondent's intention
to remarry, said petition should therefore, be
dismissed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial

declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in
order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of the properties
acquired during coverture.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent
celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was
still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning. 8 Petitioner himself
does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage. 9chanrobles virtual law
library
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner
are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to
establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe
that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there
would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that
marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . .
. 10chanrobles virtual law library
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases
involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez v.Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its
earlier ruling in the Aragon andMendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's
order forfeiting the husband's share of the disputed property acquired during the
second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or annulment of the marriage
is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial
declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that
purpose."chanrobles virtual law library
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra
v. Government Service Insurance System, that "although the second marriage can
be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was
still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such
nullity."chanrobles virtual law library
In Tolentino v. Paras, 12 however, the Court turned around and applied
the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife
asking for a declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of the
death certificate of her deceased husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage
that he contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first spouse is
null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."chanrobles virtual law
library
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to
the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of introducing evidence
about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married
each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this
Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."chanrobles virtual law library
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is
now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. 14 Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable
in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void. 15chanrobles virtual law library
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision
Committee 16 which drafted what is now the Family Code of the Philippines took
the position that parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry

again. This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of
the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the present Article 40, then
Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void
but also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above provision be
modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked
only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself
whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is needed. Justice
Puno accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment
annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno,
however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to
produce the judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it
include the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void?
Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some
judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno
suggested that this matter be made clear in the
provision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a
judicial declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages, with which
the other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are
presumed valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members
affirmed. Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase "absolute
nullity" can stand since it might result in confusion if they change the phrase to
"invalidity" if what they are referring to in the provision is the declaration that the
marriage is void.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as
well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is
that there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party
should not declare for himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the other
members affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid
a collateral attack on that point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which
are brought on the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they
depriving one of the right to raise the defense that he has no liability because the
basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there
will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be
taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is a
void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that
they limit the provision to remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be
reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked
only on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of

establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage, the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not
solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters
into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring the
nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab
initio.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original
wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also
for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal
and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her
first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with
bigamy. 18chanrobles virtual law library
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity
for a declaration of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before
contracting another in the recent case of Terre v.Terre. 19 The Court, in turning
down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral
conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another
woman other than complainant while his prior marriage with the latter remained
subsisting, said that "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free
to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was
null and void ab initio is essential."chanrobles virtual law library
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage,
petitioner submits that the same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of
remarriage. Failure to allege this purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will
warrant dismissal of the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of
the word "solely." As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void." Realizing the need for careful
craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the
provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in
which case "solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage."
Had the phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been
correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the clause "on
the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void."chanrobles virtual law library
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that
such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained

only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other

instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the
erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their
common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such
cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity.
These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring
such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has
previously contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into
another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that
the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of
remarriage, why should the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous
marriage an absolute nullity be a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is
acceptable?chanrobles virtual law library
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected
by the State." 20 In more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a
special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family life." 21 So
crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that
their "nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage
for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis
of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with
respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso
jure and with no legal effect - and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable
social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky
foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage would be as diverse
and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a social
significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and
nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an
open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the
contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records
accessible to everyone.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second
sought to be contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from new
information required in the Family Code to be included in the application for a
marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and where the previous
marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23chanrobles virtual law library
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family
Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's
failure to state in the petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will
result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art.
40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was in fact
anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for
purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final
judgment."Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final
judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term "solely" instead of
"only," which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of
marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private respondent should have

filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery of the properties alleged to have
been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would
not be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule
on the issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is
actually nothing to separate or partition as the petition admits that all the
properties were acquired with private respondent's
money.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer
for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the
other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their
properties."chanrobles virtual law library
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment
therein shall provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and
the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing
therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case
may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said
marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property
or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common
children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous
marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;chanrobles virtual law
library
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are
revoked by operation of law;chanrobles virtual law library
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who
acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such
designation be stipulated as irrevocable; andchanrobles virtual law library
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate
succession. (n)chanrobles virtual law library
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said
marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law. (n) 26chanrobles virtual law library
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for
separation of property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's
suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil
action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which
is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations
governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of
nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide
the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the
respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court
committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss
SP No. 1989-J.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of
respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20,
1992 are AFFIRMED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.