International Antitruste and The Doha Dome - Eleanor M Fox
International Antitruste and The Doha Dome - Eleanor M Fox
International Antitruste and The Doha Dome - Eleanor M Fox
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract................................................................................................911
I.
Introduction ................................................................................912
II. Extraterritoriality and Cooperation ............................................915
A. Introduction .......................................................................915
B. Inbound Restraints .............................................................916
C. Outbound CommerceRestraining and Restrained
Exports and Investment .....................................................918
D. Global Problems ................................................................922
E.
Summary...........................................................................925
III. Global Antitrust? ........................................................................925
ABSTRACT
In the wake of globalization, national antitrust law has an imperfect
fit with world markets. The need to solve practical problems has led to
an expansion of the concept of extraterritoriality of national law and to
the adoption of bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements.
Globalization has led also to the creation of a horizontal network of
antitrust agencies (the International Competition Network, or ICN), the
formation of a WTO Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade
and Competition Policy, and also to the seeds of a WTO negotiating
agenda for minimal principles on competition as identified in the
* Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation at New York University School of
Law. The author thanks Andrew Guzman, Paul Stephan, John Shenefield, Chantal Thomas and
the other participants at the University of Virginia Law School and at the Fordham Law School
workshops for their helpful comments.
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I. INTRODUCTION
International antitrust has been a gleam in the eye of the world at
least since the proposal of the Havana Charter in the 1940s.1 At that
time, it was poignantly understood that significant restraints of trade and
competition by powerful firms in international commerce can harm the
flow of trade and ideas, create critical shortages, undermine the attempt
to build a community of nations, and crystalize the power of dictators.
Now, we live in the era of globalization, in which history repeats itself
1. See Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law, in ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW 340, 37475 (Intl Econ. L. Series, 2002). The United States lost interest in the
Charter, and it was never adopted. See LOWENFELD, supra 2526.
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II.
A.
Introduction
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B.
Inbound Restraints
9. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
10. See Fox, supra note 1, at 34552.
11. A harmed or targeted nation can simply close some gaps by legislating. In some cases
the scope of the legislation is in question; but that is not a subject of this article.
For cases taking a narrow view of the reach of U.S. law to private persons injured abroad,
see United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chemical Co., 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003); Den Norske
Stats Oljeselskap AS v. Heeremac, 241 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127
(2001). For cases taking a copious view, see Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.
3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Kruman v. Christies Intl PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).
12. See Frdric Jenny, Globalization, Globalization, Competition and Trade Policy:
Convergence, Divergence and Cooperation, in COMPETITION POLICY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING
SYSTEM: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE EU, JAPAN AND THE USA (Clifford A. Jones and Mitsuo
Matsushita eds., 2002) [hereinafter Globalization, Competition and Trade Policy]; Frdric
Jenny, A Tale of Three Cartels, Luncheon Remarks at the ABA Antitrust Sections 2003 Forum
on International Competition Law (Feb. 5, 2003).
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C.
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23. The United States is such a jurisdiction. The law exempts export cartels. Under the
language the 1995 U.S. Agency International Guidelines and according to the public statements
of a number of federal officials, the Sherman Act may be invoked to open foreign markets closed
by anticompetitive restraints such as an import cartel or monopolistic exclusive dealing. See U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMMN, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES FOR
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 3.122 (1995). As a matter of comity, the officials explain that
they are likely to use this power only if the home country of the excluding firms also prohibits the
restraints and declines to enforce its law. Id. at 3.2
24. The U.S. antitrust agencies assert that there is legislative jurisdiction under U.S.
antitrust law to pry open foreign markets closed by anticompetitive restraints. See Fox, supra
note 1, at 35052.
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D.
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Global Problems
30. This may have been the case in Kimberly-Clark/Scott and in Union Pacific/Southern
Pacific Railroad, both of which impacted Mexico. Kimberly-Clark/Scott Paper, Case IV/M623
(Jan. 16, 1996), [1996] O.J. (L 183) 1; Union Pacific Corp., Finance Docket No. 32760, Decision
No. 44, 1996 WL 467636 (S.T.B. Aug. 12, 1996), affd, Western Coal Traffic League v. Surface
Transp. Board, 169 F.3d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
31. See Case No. 3622 (C2227), Fiatimpresit-Mannesmann Demag-Techint/Italimpianti,
Bolletino della Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercado, Mar. 4, 1996, pp. 1516, 70
71, 130 (Italian Antitrust Auth. Feb. 15, 1996). The proposed merger was below a level that
would have required notifying the European Commission.
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E. Summary
In sum, for inbound problems, within the area entrusted to
agencies and courts for antitrust enforcement, the combination of
extraterritoriality and cooperation works quite well for nations with
well-resourced agencies and incentivized private parties addressing
restraints not authorized by conflicting home country policies. It does
not work well otherwise. For small nations and resource-poor agencies,
the gaps are large.
For outbound problems, gaps are significant and, if they are filled
unilaterally, illegitimacies are significant. For world problems, gaps
exist and illegitimacies abound. Voluntary horizontal coordination of
national interests when and only when those interests are aligned will
neither produce the best result for us as citizens of the world nor inspire
trust in whatever national agency plays the role of global arbiter.
It does not necessarily follow from this criticism that the horizontal
solution is not the best solution. The question is, as compared with
what?
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(1994) (section 8, Art. 40(3) treats the issue of control of anticompetitive practices in licenses);
see also NAFTA Report, supra note 21, at 11112.
57. This model addresses other elements as well, many of which are ancillary to model 2
also and some of which overlap with ongoing initiatives of ICN (technical assistance) and OECD
(peer review).
58. See supra note 54.
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