Metaphors in The Hebrew Bible
Metaphors in The Hebrew Bible
Metaphors in The Hebrew Bible
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HOW DOESONE talk about the God of the Bible?' Within the
universityor seminary classroom,discussions attemptto describe
and explain the deity and the religioussystemsin which he2 is venerated. That ongoing dialogue is a facet of God-talk: talk offered
by people not responsible for the writing of Scripturebut who
strive to make sense of its content. I shall look briefly at this facet
of God-talk,but I do so only to set the stage for my main interests
in this article: (1) notions of literalityand (2) the metaphoriclanguage used for God amongthe writersof the HebrewBible.3I highlight that one must be readyto use terminologyfor literalmeaning
precisely, and I consider the metaphoriclanguage for God alongside a frameworkof first-and second-ordermeaning. I turn first to
modern God-talkand spotlight two viewpoints.
509
510
GOD-TALKAND CONTRASTINGVIEWS
The student of religion and philosophy can only discover
quickly that scholars have greatly divergentopinions about literal
and nonliterallanguage. JanetSoskicehas drawnattentionto positivism of the sort espoused by A.J.Ayer,positivism that considers
God-talkto be without empirical cognitivemeaning because such
talk cannot escape figuration (68, 142-3). Ayer asserts the
following:
[T]herecanbe no wayof provingthattheexistenceof a god, such
as the God of Christianity,is even probable..... For to say that
A substantialand ever-growingcorpus of writing stands in contrastto the frameof mind exemplifiedby Ayer. Within philosophy,
MarkJohnson challengespositivism (1980; 1987), as does the linguist and cognitive scientist, George Lakoff (1987; Lakoff and
Johnson). Within religion and theology, Ian Ramsey(1957; 1964;
1971), PaulRicoeur(1977; 1978-9), Sallie McFague,Janet Soskice,
PeterMacky(1990), and MarjoKorpelare a few who acknowledge
the vital cognitivefunctionof nonliterallanguage,particularlymetaphor, and its importance in understanding the world and the
other-world. Metaphor is meaningful for scientific description,
4This summationis offeredby LakoffandJohnson(186ff) and Lakoff(1987:xi-xvii),who
do not hold a positivistposition.
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withpoeticlanguage,exaggeration,
guage-contrasting
approximaexcessivepoliteness,indirectness,
and so on.
tion,embellishment,
Literal2, or subjectmatterliterality:languageordinarilyused
to talkaboutsomedomainof subjectmatter.
Literal3, or nonmetaphorical
literality:directlymeaningfullan-
512
Literal4, or truth-conditional
literality:languagecapableof "fitting the world"(i.e., of referringto objectivelyexisting objectsor of
being objectivelytrue or false). (1986:292)
Lakoff states that people often make various assumptions
based on these senses so that the four senses converge into a single
meaning of "literal."7 But Lakoff argues against making those
assumptions and stresses that the four senses do not converge. He
looks at the customary way we English speakers talk of electricity
(1986:295).8 We understand it metaphorically, he says, as flowing
fluid and crowd movement, and he offers the following for
discussion:
{ 11 A resistorwill impede the flow of electricity.
{2} A resistoris a narrowgate that will only let a certain number
of electrons get throughat once, and when there is a whole
crowd of electronsthey get backed up at the gate. (1986:295)
These two utterances9 are metaphoric, he claims, because they
describe electricity through something else. As such they are not
nonmetaphoric literal (Literal 3). But they are conventional literal
(Literal 1) because they are conventional ways to talk about electricity. The utterances are also subject matter literal (Literal 2)
because they are conventional ways of talking about the subject of
electricity, yet they cannot be truth-conditional literal (Literal 4)
because "[b]oth metaphors could not both be objectively true,
because fluids are continuous and crowds are individuated"
(1986:295).1o They have inconsistent ontologies. The two utterances are subject matter literal (Literal 2), but they are not truthconditional literal (Literal 4). An utterance, then, can be literal in
one sense and nonliteral in another.
7The first assumption is conventional literality equals nonmetaphorical literality, that is, the
conventional literality equals truth-conditional literality, that is, "all ordinary conventional
513
Returning to the Lakoff-MacCormacdebate, one finds MacCormac stating that his task is to "define the literal as different
from the metaphorical"(1985:73). He then adds, "Idefine the literal as the use of ordinarylanguageto express concreteobjects and
events" (1985:73). In the first quotation, literal for MacCormac
means at least nonmetaphoricliteral (Literal3). The latter statement seems grounded in empiricism and conflates conventional,
nonmetaphoric, and truth-conditionalliterality,and Lakoff faults
him for not recognizingthat literalhas differentsenses and that it
is not "theory-neutral"
(1986:296).11
That "literal"has various senses is vital to keep in mind. One
cannot prudentlyanswerthe basic questions of whetherliterallanguage is distinct from metaphoricwithout knowingwhich literalis
meant. If nonmetaphoricliteralis meant,yes is the answer;if con-
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This is second-ordermeaning.17
Perhaps a more significant example that first- / second-order
meaning is not solely nonfigurative/metaphoricmeaning is seen
by comparing simile with metaphor. Without attemptinghere to
define simile in detail, I reserve the term to referto cross-categorical comparisons, comparisons involving two different semantic
fields.18 Nonfigurativecomparisons are inner-categorical,that is,
they are comparisonswithin a single semanticfield. Simile may be
exemplifiedby
{7} An educationis like a stairway,
nonfigurativecomparisonby
{8} A scalpelis like a razor.
Simile, defined (incompletely)as a comparisonthat crosses semantic fields, is regardedas figurativecomparison. (Novel) metaphors
are also figurative. Though both may be consideredfigurativelanguage, simile has first-ordermeaning while (novel) metaphorhas
second-ordermeaning (see Kittay:17-19,140-56, esp. 142-3 and
143nl). Simile, which includes the lexeme "like,"however it be
grapheticallyinstantiatedin biblical Hebrew(e.g., k, kmw,dmh),is
figurativebecause it brings togethertwo (widely) divergentsemantic fields. But simile has first-ordermeaningbecause the occasionmeaning of the utterance-typeand the utterer'soccasion-meaning
are identical to an appropriateapplied timeless meaning. (Novel)
metaphorhas second-ordermeaning.
17ToillustrateGrice'sdistinctionsfurther,we can look at these last threeutterances. The
appliedtimelessmeaningof {4} can be characterizedas a statement that describes to a
receiverthat the receiver'sfoot or feet is/are placeddown on top of the utterer'sfoot. If {4}
werenot an indirectspeech act, thatis, the uttererhad no otherintentthansimplyto inform
the receiverof the conditionof foot on top of foot, and if the receiverunderstoodit only as
such, then the receiverwould respondwith {5}. In that case, what the utterermeantby the
utterance(occasion-meaning
and what (s)he meantin utteringthe utterof an utterance-type)
ance (utterer'soccasion-meaning)
are identical to the applied timeless meaning. But now
considering {4} as an indirectspeech act, the uttererdoes not simply wish to inform the
receiverof the foot-steppingcondition. Rather,in utteringthe utterance,the uttereris telling
the receiverto get off the former'sfoot. That is, what the utterermeant in uttering the
utterance(utterer'soccasion-meaning)
is that the receiveris to removehis/her foot/feet from
the utterer's. Here then, at least utterer'soccasion-meaninghas divergedfrom the applied
timeless meaning,thus second-ordermeaning.
181offer a detaileddefinitionand explanationin Simileand Metaphorin theSongof Songs
(workingtile), which I am currentlywriting.
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Kittay also contends that her distinction is more than a replication of a sentence/speaker's meaning distinction embellished to
account for linguistic units ranging from words to discourse. If
speaker's meaning designates the speaker's intentions, Kittay
argues that speaker's meaning is not germane to metaphor (or indirect speech acts for that matter); metaphoric use of language is not
always dependent on the intentions of the speaker (1987:44-46).
For example, if one were to find the single utterance
{9} Youreyes are doves ('ynykywnym,Cant 4:1)
within Jerrold Katz and Jerry Fodor's "anonymous letter," I can
only think that one would suspect metaphoric language.19 One
could construct a situation in which doves were used to refer to, or
represent eyes, such as in a work of art. But the point is that one is
clued into the metaphoricity of {9} without a knowledge of
speaker's meaning.20
Kittay believes that Grice's distinctions of meaning can supplant the sentence/speaker dichotomy. Grice's timeless meaning
of an utterance-type and applied timeless meaning of an utterancetype are akin to sentence meaning, and utterer's occasion-meaning
matches speaker's meaning, but his interjection of occasion-meaning of utterance-type is most important to Kittay. Though Grice
contends that the occasion-meaning of utterance-type can ultimately be subsumed under utterer's occasion-meaning, Kittay
argues for the necessity of distinguishing the two (45-49). After
setting out her argument, Kittay concludes,
My point is that, while the utterer'sintention,that is, the utterer's
occasion meaning, often coincides with the occasion meaning of
the utterance-type,it need not do so.
In speaking of metaphor . .. and, those cases in which we can
distinguish what is said from what is meant in some systematic
fashion, and in which what is meant is dependenton, though not
19The "anonymous letter situation is the case where an ideal speaker of a language receives
an anonymous letter containing just one sentence of that language, with no clue whatever
about motive, circumstances of transmission, or any other factor relevant to understanding
the sentence on the basis of its context of utterance" (Katz 1977:14; the phrase was used in
Katz and Fodor).
20Here Macky has overstated the role of speaker's meaning in nonfiguration and figuration
(1990:esp. 18-19, 31-32). Considering metaphor, I certainly agree that it is a (linguistic)
pragmatic phenomenon, as Macky emphasizes. However, I believe Kittay has successfully
shown that metaphor is also a semantic phenomenon.
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520
revealed. Further,Ugaritianscould see that no deity, no Ba'l,physdwelt on the mountainin a palace of cedar,
icallyor nonfiguratively
and
other
brick, gold,
material;yet the myth affirms this.
Further, Ba'l, as a storm-god, is associated with lightening,
brq.24But the myth-telleralso seems to describe lightening as an
'arz bymnh "cedar-(lance)in his [Ba'l]right hand.""25Are we to
think that the ancients in observing lighteningcould not recognize
that it was not a nonfigurativewooden lance? The myth-teller
apparentlyassociates Ba'lwith nonfigurativeand figurativelightening (brq and 'arz respectively).26Considering these bits of evidence, I believe it most likely, along with Korpel,that Ugaritians
24RS 24.245:3-4: Ba'lis describedas sitting on his mountainand associatedwith him at
that scene are
9b'tbrqm[1
[
"sevenlightening-flashes...
]
(4) tmnt 'isr r't eight storehousesof thunder,
's brq y[
a shaft of lightening..."
Fora commentaryon this text and possiblerestorationsin the lacunaesee Pardee(chap. 3).
KTU 1.4 V:8-9 describesBa'las designatingthe time for
(8) wtn qlh b'rpt "hisutteringwithin the clouds,
(9) 9rh l'ars brqm his letting loose lightening-flashesto earth."
25KTU1.4 VII:41;de Moor(1987:64, 1. 41). De Moorsays of 'arz,"Theshaftof his speaklike thunderbolt,"(64n290). Here one may note the limestone stele discoveredat Ras
Shamrain 1932 (LouvreAO 15.775; for a photographand the first descriptionsee Schaeffer:123-24and pl. XVI). In bas-reliefit depicts a standinggod (he wearsa horned helmet)
brandishing,in his righthand, a mace abovehis head and holding,in his left hand, a lance,
with branches,pointeddownwardto the ground. Schaefferidentifiedthe god as "Hadadou
Baalde la montagne,commandantaux orageset aux vents"(123). The lance could well be
the representationof lighteningas 'arz "cedar-(lance)."(Basedon cognatelanguages,one
would fully expect Ugariticymn to mean "righthand." With that in mind, it is interesting
that the god on the stele has the lance in his left hand.)
26Associatedwith lightening,Korpelbelievesthat the wordsfor"thunder"show metaphoric
awareness(83). The writerrefersto thundernonfigurativelywith the word r't, "thunder,"
but also as Ba'l'sql, 'voice'(for r't see RS 24.245:4 [textand translationgiven abovein my
n.24]; forql see KTU1.4 V:8 [textand translationgivenabovein my n.24];KTU1.19 1:45-46
bl tbn ql b'Z"withoutthe goodness/delightof Ba'l'svoice,"in a contextof weatherphenomena). However,I do not find this as convincingas the palace-taleor lightening. If thunder
were the only piece of evidenceat Ugarit,I see little to preventone fromthinkingthat the
Ugaritiansreallydid considerthunderto be Ba'l'svoice and thatwithin this phenomenon's
semantic field was r't, referringto the phenomenon'sshaking,tremblingcharacteristic(if
the root is R'D)or perhapsto its sound (if the root is RW'). (The root R'Mis also possible
but, fromthe perspectiveof Ugariticphonology,is the least likely of the threesince the fem.
sing. morphemeaffixedto a base whose root is RW'is unproblematic[-'(a)t-/], while */dt-/ > /-tt-/, which occurs if the root is R'D, makes a stronger argument than
*/-mt-/ > /-tt/ with the root R'M.) Of course, once it is establishedfrom other evidence
that therewas metaphoricawareness,it becomesmorelikelythat thunderas Ba'l'svoice was
known by the writerto be what we call metaphor.
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522
tures of the land, sky, and sea. Whetherone sees this passage as a
recordof Moses'speech, as the polemics of religiousleadersduring
Josiah'sreign, or whatever,it revealsan understandingthat YHWH
was Other. YHWHtook no form on this most importantoccasion;
no form, then, could adequately,or should, depict him. Yet the
ubiquity of what modern readerscall metaphoramong the writers
of the Hebrew Bible for their God is testimony that through such
figuration God, the Other,was comprehensible.
Thejuxtaposition of concreteand abstractis not insignificant.27
In Isa 59:17b one reads, "Ahelmet of salvation/victoryis on his
[YHWH]head" (wkwb'ySw'hbr'Sw). The psalmist in Ps 93:1a-b
claims, "YHWHreigns, clothed with majesty;YHWH is clothed,
girdedwith strength"(yhwhmlkg'wt lbs lbsyhwh 'z ht'zr)(see also
Isa 51:9; Pss 65:7; 104:1, 2). The writerswerewell acquaintedwith
a physical piece of armor, and they could speak of an abstract/
intangible notion such as salvationwithout linking it to a physical
item.28 But claiming that YHWH'sarmor or his clothes are composed of intangiblenotions shows the writers'awarenessof figuration to say something meaningfulabout their deity.29
One may note in passing that in Proverbs(1-9), Canticles,and
Lamentations,for example, the writers used figurationknowingly
to describewisdom, a lover,and a city-things that did not directly
involve deity.30 If figuration was used knowingly for topics not
concerned with deity, I do not think it altogetherunlikely that it
was used knowingly for deity.
In the previous section, I affirmed,with Korpel,that the writings of another culture,writings that predateany of the writing of
the HebrewBible, demonstratean awarenessthat what we call figurationwas used to speak of gods. With that established,the same
could hold true for writings of a later time from another culture.
Indeed, I have tried to show passages within the HebrewBible that
acknowledgeexplicitlya thoroughotherness of the deity: an otherness that was not human, that could not be confined, and that at
27Korpel uses this as part of her evidence (86).
281 Sam 17:5 (of Goliath) 'He had a bronze helmet on his head' (kwb' nhgt
'l-r'?w);Gen
523
least on one occasion had no form, the latterleading to an admonition about worship. These passages, particularlythe assertion and
admonition in Deut 4:15ff about YHWHand form, along with a
historical precedent for awareness,indicate that the writers of the
Hebrew Bible were aware that they used language we today call
figurativeand, to be more specific, figures of speech we call metaphors. That being true, I move on to considerwhether their metaphors had first- or second-ordermeaning.
GOD-METAPHORSIN THE HEBREWBIBLE:
FIRST-OR SECOND-ORDERMEANING?
The biblical writers knowingly used (what we call) metaphors
to talk of God. But metaphorsthat are at one time novel become
conventionalthroughrepetition. The more they are used, the more
they become conventional, and this may proceed until their
"death."31 As metaphoric language becomes conventional, it
becomes a sense within timeless meaning so that an applied timeless meaning, an occasion-meaning, and an utterer's occasionmeaning may coincide-first-ordermeaning. Thus a novel metaphor-second-order meaning-as it becomes more conventional
moves towardfirst-ordermeaning. Even a phrase will in time be
treated as a single lexical item with first-ordermeaning.32 Metaphors can become conventional,that is, they may become literal,
remembering,of course, the distinction of conventionalliteral and
nonfigurativeliteral discussed above.33
31Burbules,Schraw,and Trathengive three stages in the "evolutionof metaphoricalinterpretation":"Freshmetaphors(e.g., 'Freudwas themidwifeof silences').... Frozenmetaphors
(e.g., 'Heis burnedup') .... Deadmetaphors(e.g., 'Shekickedthebucket')... ." (106). Ch.
Bally has classified metaphorsaccordingto their "valeurexpressive":"l'image
or "l'imagemorte"(Traitede stylistique
.vocatrice,
imaginatrice,"
"l'imageaffectiveou affaiblie,"
fran.aise,
?? 202ff., quotedby Henry:214). See also Soskice(71-72).
32Forexample,"pushingup (the) daisies."
33In addition to scholars I have alreadymentioned,namely Lakoffand Kittay,Scheffler
states, "Metaphoricaluse . . . fades into literaluse; metaphorsdie" (80). Goodmanalso
affirms that metaphorbecomes more literal as its novelty wanes (68). Dascal, reacting
againstexperimentsof Gibbs,who claimsto show thatthe processingof the nonliteralinterpretationof utterances(with co-text)takes no longer than "literal"interpretation(Gibbs),
states that "allthese experimentsmakeuse of conventionalizedindirectspeech-acts,or idiomatic expressionsor else frozenmetaphors.... [T]heyprovideexcellentevidencefor the
fact that . .. the notion of literalmeaning,namelyconventionality,is ratherimportant....
[T]hese experimentsthereforelead to the conclusion that such conventionalized(wrongly
called non-literal)meanings of many utterances are in fact the literal ones" (Dascal
1987:267).
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substantial differences. Gary Hall has investigated the development of the marriagemetaphorin the HebrewBible, showing how
Jeremiah'suse, groundedin Hosea's, goes beyond the latter's,and
how Ezekiel'suse "completelytransformed"the metaphor(1980 [I
have only seen the abstractin DAI41/09, 4072]). If Hall is correct,
he has shown that the metaphor probably met set (2) criteria
throughoutits use among the prophets.
I offer a third set, but I do so reservedly:
(3) If themetaphoric
expressionin questionhasNOpreciseparallels in otherancientNearEasterncultures,themetaphor's
first
occurrencein the HebrewBibleis likelyto be second-order
meaning;subsequentuses wouldfallwithineitherset (1) or
(2).
My reservationstems mainly from the difficult task of discovering
with certainty a metaphor'sinauguraluse in the Hebrew Bible.45
("kinsmanLeavingthat aspect aside for the moment,GOD=GO'EL
redeemer")can be offeredas a metaphorwithout known parallelin
the ancient Near East (for example, Ps 19:15; Isa 43:14; 44:24;
49:7;Jer 50:34). The Hebrewroot G'Lhas a cognate that appears
in an Amorite personal name and a cognate in Aramaic.46The
attestations in the latter, though, are based on biblical usage.
Recently,Andre Lemairehas argued that the root is attested in a
recently discovered Phoenician inscription, but elsewhere I have
rejectedhis argumenton philologicalgrounds. So, with the exception of an Amoritepersonal name, the root is exclusively used in
the Hebrew Bible and in literaturedependent on its usage there.
Whether kinsman-redeemerpracticeas representedin the Hebrew
Bible existed in like mannerin other ancient Near Easterncultures
is unclear. Similaritiesdo seem to exist, but directparallelsare not
as certain. What is clear is that no other cultureused a cognate of
the Hebrewroot G'Lto referto the human practice,let alone used
one to describe the action of a deity.47 GOD=GO'EL,then, is a
45Wehave alreadyconfrontedthis in the metaphorof YHWH= the husband of a chosen
people, see Whitt'scommentabovein footnote43.
46Ga-i-la-lum
(cited by Huffmon:179;Jastrow1.202).
47Formoreon how the humanpracticein the HebrewBiblecompareswith the idea of God
as go'el,I referthe readerto Daube(39-61); he demonstrateshow particularfunctionsof the
human kinsman-redeemer
are appliedto God but also concludes that specific nuances in
manycases cannotbe inferred;North(esp. 3-8); Stuhlmueller1970 (99-131): aftertreating
the practiceof go'elin pre-exilictradition(wherehe lists the redemptiveacts as redemption
of slaves, redemptionof property,redemptionfrom harm caused by murder,and redemp-
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