Comcast Cpuc
Comcast Cpuc
FILED
2-13-15
02:36 PM
Agenda ID #13731
Ratesetting
ALJ/KJB/avs
PROPOSED DECISION
Agenda ID #13731
Ratesetting
Application 14-04-013
(Filed April 11, 2014)
Application 14-06-012
146814573
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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2 Statutory references are to the Cal. Pub. Util. Code unless otherwise noted.
3 Codified at 47 U.S.C. 1302(a).
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5(USDOJ), and State Attorney Generals (State AGs). The FCC is also reviewing
the impacts of the merger on a national basis and may come to a separate
conclusion once they review a larger aspect of the merger than what falls under
the Commissions Section 706(a) delegated authority and 854.
The Applicants must meet the conditions adopted herein in order to
provide reasonable assurance that the proposed transaction will be in the public
interest in accordance with Pub. Util. Code 854(a) and (c). The conditions
adopted herein are based upon review of the proposals submitted by parties in
this proceeding. Although we do not discuss every single proposal that was
presented, we have taken parties proposals into consideration in developing the
adopted conditions. We only adopt conditions which mitigate an effect of the
merger in order to satisfy the public interest requirements of 854. The fact that
we decline to adopt a particular partys proposed condition should not be
construed as an indication of whether or not the proposal may have merit in
some other context or proceeding.
1. Background
On April 11, 2014, Comcast, Time Warner, TWCIS, and Bright House filed
an application for approval of the transfer of control of TWCIS and Bright House
to Comcast. TWCIS and Bright House are regulated entities licensed by the
Commission. The Application was filed under 854(a) of the Public Utilities
Code which provides, in relevant part, that transfers of control of regulated
entities may only be made with the prior approval of the Commission. The
Application also contained a brief analysis of the ways in which the Joint
Applicants meet the factors set forth in Pub. Util. Code 854(c).
Protests were filed on May 15 and May 19, 2014 by the following parties:
Jesse Miranda Center for Hispanic Leadership, the Los Angeles Latino Chamber
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ORA, TURN and Joint Minority Parties argue that the Commission should
adopt a broad public interest standard and look at not only the implications of
the transfer for voice customers of TWCIS and Bright House but also at the
implications of the proposed merger for the cost and availability of broadband
services in California. Joint Minority Parties and Greenlining argue that the
merger will widen the digital divide between affluent and poor communities by
restricting access to broadband services and making them more expensive.
TURN argues that the Joint Applicants have failed to demonstrate the claimed
public benefits of the merger. ORA, TURN and Joint Minority Parties, therefore,
argue that the Commission should judge the transaction by the standards of
review established by Pub. Util. Code 854(c).
854(c) of the Pub. Util. Code states:
Before authorizing the merger, acquisition or control of any
electric, gas, or telephone utility organized and doing business
in this state, where any of the entities that are parties to the
proposed transaction has gross annual California revenues
exceeding five hundred million dollars ($500,000,000), the
commission shall consider each of the criteria listed in
paragraphs (1) to (8), inclusive, and find, on balance, that the
merger, acquisition, or control proposal is in the public
interest:
PROPOSED DECISION
In the present case, Comcast and Time Warner are entities that are parties
to the proposed transaction and each entity has gross annual California revenues
exceeding $500 million. Therefore, this transaction is subject to Pub. Util. Code
854(c) and Joint Applicants are required to demonstrate that the proposed
change of control satisfies the 854(c) criteria enumerated above.
The Commission may also look to the 854(c) standards for guidance even
if the plain language of 854(c) does not apply to this transaction. Over time, the
Commission has used its discretion in different ways in reviewing mergers. In
D.97-08-29 the Commission approved a transfer of control after determining that
the transaction would not be adverse to the public interest.7 Historically, the
Commission has sought more broadly to determine whether a change in control
is in the public interest:
1. The Commission is primarily concerned with the question
of whether or not the transfer of this property from one
ownership to another...will serve the best interests of the
public. To determine this, consideration must be given to
whether or not the proposed transfer will better service
7
In the matter of the Joint Application of MCI Communications Corporation and British
Telecommunications, D. 97-07-060, 1997 Cal. PUC LEXIS 557, Finding of Fact 3, 645.
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8
9
D.9707060,1997CalPUCLEXIS557at2225.
10
D.70829,65CPUCat637,n.1.
R.L.Mohr(AdvancedElectronics),69CPUC275,277(1969).Seealso,SantaBarbaraCellular,Inc.
32CPUC2d478(1989).
11
12
UnionWaterCo.ofCalifornia,19CRRC199,202(1920).
13
SouthernCountiesGasCo.ofCalifornia,70CPUC836,837(1970).
SouthernCaliforniaGasCo.ofCalifornia,74CPUC30,50,modifiedonothergrounds,
74CPUC259(1972).
14
15
CityTransferandStorageCo.,46CRRC5,7(1945).
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CommunicationsIndustries,Inc.13CPUC2d595,598(1993);Seealso,IntheMatterofQwest
CommunicationsCorporation,LCIInternationalTelecomCorp.,USLDCommunications,Inc.,Phoenix
Network,Inc.andUSWestLongDistance,Inc.,andUSWestInterpriseAmerica,Inc.,D.0006079
(2000CalPUCLEXIS645,*17*20),footnotesincludedbutrenumberedintothecurrent
sequence.
16
Id.,at1738;seealsoD.0106007(2001Cal.PUCLEXIS390at2526)forasimilarlistof
factors.
17
NorthernCaliforniaPowerAgencyv.PublicUtilitiesCom.,5Cal.3d370,377(1971)at380.See
also,IntheMatteroftheApplicationofSCECorpanditspublicutilitysubsidiarySCCEandSDG&E
forAuthoritytoMergeSDG&EintoSCE,D.9105028,40CPUC2d159;UnitedStatesSteelCorp.v.
PublicUtilitiesCom.,29Cal.3d603(Cal.1981);IndustrialCommunicationsSystems,Inc.v.PUC,22
Cal.3d572;ReProposedPoliciesGoverningRestructuringCaliforniasElectricServicesIndustryand
ReformingRegulation,D.9902085;85CPUC2d158,February18,1999;Rulemakingonthe
Commissionsownmotionforthepurposeofmodifyingexistingtarifffilingrulesfortelecommunications
utilities,otherthanlocalexchangecarriersandAT&TC,andforthepurposeofaddressingotherissues
concerningtheregulationoftheseutilities,D.9206069,1992Cal.PUCLEXIS972,23(Cal.PUC
1992);GreenliningInstitutev.PublicUtilitiesCom.,103Cal.App.4th1324,1333(Cal.App.1st
Dist.2002);1981Cal.AGLEXIS74,1113(Cal.AG1981).
18
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Commission must take into account any antitrust implications and competitive
considerations when it weighs the public interest.19
Therefore, a review of this transaction in terms of 854(c), as well as a
consideration of safety, consumer benefits, broadband infrastructure, and
competitive issues, constitutes the appropriate scope of this proceeding.
In addition, Joint Applicants have tied together the merger between
Comcast and Time Warner with the change of control and asserted that the
merger will benefit TWCIS and Bright House and other affiliates of the merging
companies.20 The Commission, therefore, may review these assertions and
require Joint Applicants to provide factual data to verify these assertions of
public interest benefits.
3.4. Applicability of Section 706(a) of the
1996 Telecommunications Act
We conclude that under Section 706(a) of the 1996 Telecommunications
Act this Commission has limited jurisdiction to evaluate the broadband aspects
of the merger between Comcast and Time Warner.
See,Phonetele,Inc.,v.PublicUtil.Com.(1974)11Cal.3d125;IndustrialComm.Systemsv.Public
Util.Com.(1978)22Cal.3d572;andU.S.SteelCorp.v.PublicUtil.Com.(1981)29Cal.3d603).
19
JointApplicationofComcastCorporation,TimeWarnerCableInc.,TimeWarnerCableInformationServices
(California),LLC,andBrightHouseNetworksInformationServices(California),LLCforExpeditedApprovalofthe
TransferofControlofTimeWarnerCableInformationServices(California),LLC(U6874C);andtheProForma
TransferofControlofBrightHouseNetworksInformationServices(California),LLC(U6955C),toComcast
CorporationPursuanttoCaliforniaPublicUtilitiesCodeSection854(a)(JointApplication),filedonApril11,2014
at14,n.16: ThefocusinthissectionisonbenefitsthatwillinuretoComcastCorporation,
TimeWarnerCableandtheiraffiliates(Emphasissupplied);Seealso,JointApplicationat14,where
JointApplicantsstatethemergerwillencouragemorenetworkinvestmentbypermitting
ComcastCorporationandTimeWarnerCabletocombinethebestaspectsofComcastsand
TimeWarnersrobustandinnovativevoiceservices,andbyaddingscaletoComcast
Corporationsoverallbusiness. (Emphasisadded.)
20
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ORA, NAAC, and TURN argue that the Commission has jurisdiction to
review the effects of the merger on broadband deployment in California under
Section 706(a) of the federal Telecommunications Act, citing to a recent decision
of the District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit Court on this topic.21 Joint Applicants
dispute the Section 706(a) argument under federal law and strongly object to
including an examination of the effects of the Merger on broadband deployment,
which they argue is an action beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission.
Section 706(a) of the 1996 Federal Telecommunications Act states, in
relevant part:
The Commission and each State commission with Regulatory
jurisdiction over telecommunications services shall encourage
the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of advanced
telecommunications capability to all Americans (including, in
particular, elementary and secondary schools and classrooms)
by utilizing, in a manner consistent with the public interest,
convenience and necessity, price cap regulation, regulatory
forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that
remove barriers to infrastructure investment.22 (Emphasis added.)
This section of the 1996 Act was the subject of a recent opinion of the D.C.
Circuit Court in which the question discussed was whether this language
constitutes a grant of authority to the FCC and the state commissions or is merely
an expression of legislative intent.23 The D.C. Circuit Court unambiguously
found the former to be the preferred interpretation, saying that the legislative
history suggests that Congress may have, somewhat presciently, viewed the
21
Verizonv.FCC,740F.3d623,638(D.C.Cir.2014).
22
47U.S.C.1302(a),etseq.
23
Verizonv.FCC,740F.3d623,638(D.C.Cir2014).
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Id.,at639.
25
Id.,at637.
26
Id.,at640.
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27
Id.,at650.
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provides that this Commission consistent with due process, public policy and
statutory requirements, shall determine whether a proceeding requires a
hearing. The Commission has previously addressed this issue of whether and
when due process considerations require hearings. In Re Competition for Local
Exchange Service, the Commission stated:28
Due process is the federal and California constitutional
guarantee that a person will have notice and an opportunity
to be heard before being deprived of certain protected
interests by the government. Courts have interpreted due
process as requiring certain types of hearing procedures to be
used before taking specific actions.
The California Supreme Court has laid down a simple rule
regarding the application of due process. According to the
Court if a proceeding is quasi-legislative, as opposed to quasijudicial, there are no vested interests being adjudicated, and
therefore, there is no due process right to a hearing. (Citing
Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com.
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 891, 901; Wood v. Public Utilities Commission
(1971) 4 Cal. 3d 288, 292).
This proceeding is not a quasi-judicial proceeding in which a hearing is
required as no vested interests of any party are being adjudicated. Rather, it is
categorized as a ratesettingproceeding. Moreover, no party argued in its protest
that theproceeding should be classified as adjudicatory for purposes of 1701 of
the Public Utilities Code or the Commissions rules.
For purposes of determining whether evidentiary hearings are necessary,
ratesetting cases are treated like quasi-legislative proceedings. The California
Court of Appeal has confirmed that the Public Utilities Code does not require the
Commission to conduct public hearings concerning rates, but leaves the matter
28
ReCompetitionforLocalExchangeService,D.9509121,1995Cal.PUCLEXIS788,at1314.
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to the Commissions discretion,29 noting that the Code expressly permits the
Commission to determine whether or not to hold hearings.30 For example, Pub.
Util. Code 1701.3 states that if the Commission determines that a ratesetting
proceeding requires a hearing,certain procedures should apply, thus indicating
that the Commission has the discretion to determine whether to hold a hearing in
a ratesetting proceeding. Similarly, Pub. Util. Code 454(b) allows the
Commission to adopt rules that apply in ratesetting cases including the form and
manner of the presentation of the showing, with or without a hearing, and the
procedure to be followed. These statutes and precedents demonstrate that, in a
ratesetting case such as this one, the Commission has discretion to determine
whether to hold an evidentiary hearing. The Commission has also affirmed that
due process does not require a hearing that serves no useful purpose.31
4.2. There is Sufficient Evidence in the
Record to Permit the Commission
to Decide the Matter
The record in this proceeding is sufficient. This evidentiary record was
developed through extensive discovery where intervenors had opportunity to
discover the facts on which the Joint Applicants positions are based and to
present facts which support their own positions. The parties presented their
positions in many hundreds of pages of briefs and reply briefs, with attached
testimony, declarations and /or any stipulations of facts by the parties.
PacificGas&ElectricCo.v.StateDepartmentofWaterResources,112Cal.App.4th477,500502
(2003).
29
30
Id.at500501.
InTouchCommunications,Inc.andInflexionCaliforniaComm.Corp.,FortheSaleandPurchase,
RespectivelyoftheCustomerBase,OperatingAuthoritiesandotherAssets,D.0409027,2004Cal.
PUCLEXIS417at67.
31
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32
See,AT&T/MediaOne,D.0005023,2000Cal.PUCLEXIS355at17.
33
InReAT&TandMediaOne,supra,2000Cal.PUCLEXIS355at17.
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InRulemakingReThirdTriennialReviewoftheNewRegulatoryFramework,D.9810026,
1998Cal.PUCLEXIS669.
35
InRePG&EEnergyRecoveryBonds,D.0411015,2004Cal.PUCLEXIS538.
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sections 6.1 through 6.6, we summarize Joint Applicants arguments that they
have satisfied the merger and broadband related concerns of the Scoping
Memorandum. In Section 7 we summarize and discuss intervenors objections to
approval of the license transfer and/or their proposed conditions on approval.
In Section 8 we enumerate conditions we impose on approval to ensure
compliance with state and federal law and the requirements of the Scoping
Memorandum.
5.1. Section 854(c) Requirements
5.1.1. Maintain or Improve Financial Condition
Pub. Util. Code 854(c)(1) requires that the merged company maintain or
improve the financial condition of the resulting public utility. The
Joint Applicants assert that Comcasts financial statements show a strong balance
sheet with significant assets.36 The proposed transfer involves a stock for stock
transaction at the holding company level that does not entail the issuance of any
additional debt or other obligations that might impair the financial condition of
the new California entity.37 Additionally, Applicants assert the transfer of
control will generate substantial overall efficiencies and cost savings for the
combined company. Comcast estimates approximately $1.5 billion in operating
efficiencies and approximately $400 million in capital expenditures efficiencies
by the third year resulting from the nationwide transaction, with operating
36
JointApplication,ExhibitC(ComcastCorp.AnnualReportForm10K),filedonApril11,2015.
OpeningBriefofJointApplicants,ExhibitA,DeclarationofChristopherMcDonald(McDonald
Declaration),filedonDecember3,2015at3.
37
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expense efficiencies recurring at or above the $1.5 billion level each year
thereafter.38
5.1.2. Effects on Quality of Service
Pub. Util. Code 854(c)(2) mandates that the Commission consider, in its
evaluation of a merger proposal, whether the merger maintains or improves
service to public utility ratepayers in the state. Joint Applicants assert that the
Merger will result in the extension of enhanced voice services currently available
to Comcast customers to the customers of TWCIS. Such services include the
ability of residential voice customers to access their voice services from different
locations including wired and wireless connections provided by Comcast, as well
as Wi-Fi connections and public Internet connections provided by third parties;
and Voice 2Go which allows users to place outbound calls over a Wi-Fi or data
connection using an application installed on a mobile device, and to receive calls
to their home numbers through the mobile application; readable voicemail;
unlimited text messaging via a mobile device or a downloadable application; and
expanded international calling options.39
38
Id.
OpeningBriefofJointApplicants,ExhibitB,DeclarationofShanePortfolio(PortfolioDeclaration),
filedonDecember3,2015at3.
39
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Id.,at45.(Seealso,OpeningBriefofJointApplicants,ExhibitM,SelectedManagementBiographies,
filedonDecember3,2014.)
40
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OpeningBriefofJointApplicants,filedonDecember3,2014at47;PressRelease,Comcast.
Corp.ComcastShareholdersOverwhelminglyApprovetheStockIssuanceforMergerwith
TimeWarner,(October8,2014),http://corporate.comcast.com/newsinformation/news
feed/comcastshareholdersoverwhelminglyapprovethestockissuanceformergerwithtime
warnercable?print=1;PressRelease,TimeWarnerCableInc.,TimeWarnerCableStockholders
ApproveMergerwithComcastCorporation,(Oct.9,2014),
http://www.timewarnercable.com/content/twc/en/aboutus/press/twcshareholdersapprove
mergerwithcomcast.html.
41
42
Id.,at1518.
43
Id,at1819.
44
Id.,at1920.
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Id.,at5052;Seealso,McDonaldDeclarationat714foradetaileddescriptionoftheInternet
Essentialsprogram.
45
46
OpeningBriefofJointApplicantsat7783.
47
Id.,at8387.
48
Id.,at76and8892.
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49
Id.,n.343.
50
Id.,at43;PortfolioDeclarationat11.
51
Id.
52
PortfolioDeclarationat3.
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53
OpeningBriefofJointApplicantsat51;McDonaldDeclaration,at813.
54
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company the greater scale and geographic reach necessary to compete effectively
for large business customers.55
6.4. Merger-Specific and
Verifiable Efficiencies
In response to an ORA data request, Comcast stated that it expects to
achieve significant national operating efficiencies as a result of the merger,
including approximately $1.5 billion in operating expenses and $400 million in
capital expenditures by the third year, with operating expense efficiencies
reoccurring at or above the $1.5 billion level each year thereafter. Comcast
expects to achieve $750 million of the $1.5 billion in operating efficiencies in the
first year after closing, another 25 percent in year two and the remaining
25 percent in year three.56 As a result, Joint Applicants assert that the
additional investments and innovations that will be needed to deliver the
services consumers are demanding in the future will be more effectively and
efficiently achieved by the combined company than either company could
achieve alone.57 Generally, Joint Applicants make four general claims about
efficiencies: 1) Joint Applicants argue that Comcast offers consumers superior
products and services to what Time Warner Cable offers, so that Time Warner
subscribers would be upgraded; 2) Joint Applicants argue that Comcast needs
to be even larger than it is today in order to gain economies of scale and scope
and spread its fixed costs; 3) Joint Applicants argue that the two companies
together could offer consumers the best of both in terms of products and
55
Id.
OpeningBriefofJointApplicants,ExhibitK,ComcastResponsetoORAdatarequest3:61,filedon
December3,2014.
56
57
OpeningBriefofJointApplicantsat7576.
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PROPOSED DECISION
services; and 4) Joint Applicants claim that through the merger they would be
able to take additional steps to help bridge the digital divide.58
6.5. Effects of the Merger on Special Access
and Backhaul Services
Joint Applicants assert that the Merger will create a more effective
competitor for the provision of wireless backhaul and special access services. A
majority of these wholesale services are currently provided by a handful of
national facilities-based providers. The merged entity will be in a stronger
position to compete with these existing providers in offering backhaul services to
wireless networks, resulting in better service at lower rates.59
6.6. Effects of the Merger on Competition in the
California Marketplace for Broadband Customers
Comcast and Time Warner do not compete with one another for the
provision of broadband Internet services in any local market in California.
According to Joint Applicants, there is no reasonable likelihood that they would
do so in the future, given the prohibitive cost of overbuilding an existing cable
companys service territory.60 Accordingly, Joint Applicants claim that the
merged company will be a stronger competitor against other providers of
broadband Internet services, including ILECs, satellite companies and local
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and will increase competition for the business of
58
Id.
59
OpeningBriefofJointApplicantsat7073.
OpeningBriefofJointApplicants,ExhibitD,DeclarationofMarkA.Israel,etal(Israeletal
Declaration)at35.
60
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Id.,at15.
62
SelwynDeclarationat13and153.
63
Id.,at1315.
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64
Id.,at19.
TheU.S.DepartmentofJustice,theFederalTradeCommission,andstateattorneysgeneral
haveusedtheHHIsince1982tomeasuremarketconcentration.TheHHImeasuresmarket
concentrationbysummingthesquaresofmarketshareenjoyedbyvariouscompetitors.For
example,anHHIof10,000indicatesamonopoly.Ifthatmarkethadtenparticipantseach
supplying10%ofdemand,theHHIwouldbe1,000(10shareofmarketsquared=100;10times
100=1,000).AnHHIof1,000indicatesacompetitivemarket.
65
UnitedStatesDepartmentofJusticeandFederalTradeCommission,HorizontalMerger
Guidelines2010edition(HMG),at5.3,MarketConcentration;seealsoSelwynDeclaration
at15,13.
66
67
Id.
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entity.68 ORA cites the tables below in Dr. Selwyns testimony to bolster the
argument that a post-merger Comcast will become the single dominant provider
of last-mile broadband access in California.69 For high speed broadband Internet
access offering download speeds of 25 Mbps and above in California, Comcast
will have a monopoly except in those few areas where Verizon's FiOS or a
high-speed version of AT&T's U-Verse is deployed.70 This limited choice is
exacerbated by price stickiness in the market due to high switching costs that
include early termination fees and equipment rental fees.71 As FCC Chairman
Tom Wheeler recently observed:
Counting the number of choices the consumer has on the day
before their Internet service is installed does not measure
their competitive alternatives the day after. Once consumers
choose a broadband provider, they face high switching costs
that include early-termination fees, and equipment rental fees.
And, if those disincentives to competition werent enough the
media is full of stories of consumers struggles to get ISPs to
allow them to drop service.72
WetakeofficialnoticeofthefactthatonJanuary29,2015,theFCCadoptedthe2015
BroadbandProgressReportandupdateditsbroadbandbenchmarkspeedsto25megabitsper
second(Mbps)fordownloadsand3Mbpsforuploads.
68
69
SelwynDeclarationat19.
70
Id.
71
SelwynDeclarationat88.
PreparedRemarksofChairmanWheeler,FactsandFutureofBroadbandCompetition
presentedatthe1776Headquarters,Washington,D.C.,September4,2014at4(emphasisin
original).http://www.fcc.gov/document/chairmanremarksfactsandfuture
broadbandcompetition.(Seealso,Id.)
72
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Table1
CENSUSBLOCKSPASSEDWITHATLEASTONECOMPETINGPROVIDERATEACHDOWNLOADSPEEDTIER73
Table2
HOUSEHOLDSPASSEDWITHATLEASTONECOMPETINGPROVIDERATEACHDOWNLOADSPEEDTIER74
73
SelwynDeclarationat71.
74
Id.,at72.
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75
76
Id.
77
BaldwinOpeningTestimonyat33.
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78
Id.,at34.
Id.;JoshLowensohn,Comcastcouldmandateamonthlydatacaponallcustomersinthe
nextfiveyears,TheVerge,May14,2014,http://www.theverge.com/2014/5/14/5718746/comcast
saysitcouldbringdatacapstohomeinternetserviceforall.
79
Id.at4853;ReplyBriefoftheUtilityReformNetwork(TURNBrief),filedon
December10,2014at18.
80
81
Id.
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The Writers Guild also points to the anti-competitive harms of the merger
and claims that removing Time Warner as a potential competitor will harm
benchmark competition, limit the chances of overbuilding, and reduce the
quality of broadband offerings.82 For example, Writers Guild cites comments
from Comcasts Executive Vice President that envision Comcast moving to a
usage based billing model for all customers in the next five years.83 In contrast,
Time Warners customers face no limitations or added costs for data usage on
any of Time Warners plans and Time Warner has stated that its customers will
always have access to unlimited broadband.84
Joint Minority Parties assert that due to a lack of effective competition and
a lack of government regulations, Americans are currently paying higher prices
for slower Internet service when compared to the rest of the world.85 The current
transaction, therefore, would hurt competition by forcing mergers among
competitors who will need to increase their scale in order to remain relevant.86
As an example, the Joint Minority Parties cite AT&Ts pending merger with
DirecTV. Further, Joint Minority Parties state that a post-merger Comcast would
BriefoftheWritersGuildofAmerica,WestInc.(WritersGuildBrief),filedonDecember10,2014
at1320.
82
Id.,at16;JoshLowensohn,Comcastcouldmandateamonthlydatacaponallcustomersin
thenextfiveyears,TheVerge,May14,2014,
http://www.theverge.com/2014/5/14/5718746/comcastsaysitcouldbringdatacapstohome
internetserviceforall.
83
84
Id.
ReplyBriefoftheJointMinorityParties,filedonDecember10,2014at5;RickKarr,Whyis
EuropeanBroadbandFasterandCheaper?BlametheGovernment,ENGADGET,June28,2011,
http://www.engadget.com/2011/06/28/whyiseuropeanbroadbandfasterandcheaperblame
thegovernme/.
85
86
ReplyBriefoftheJointMinorityPartiesat7.
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PROPOSED DECISION
increase its presence to 92 percent of the top 25 designated market areas (DMA),
the most lucrative markets in the country including San Francisco and
Los Angeles.87
ORA, TURN, Greenlining, Writers Guild, Media Alliance, and Joint
Minority Parties also raise the concern that a combined Comcast and Time
Warner will have enormous capacity to damage startup activity, online content,
and new innovations through exploiting their terminating access monopoly
power as a result of the post-merger entitys significant increase in market share.
DISHs opposition is based on the asserted negative impact that the merger
would have on video programming and competing video providers by
foreclosing or degrading their offered services, imposing discriminatory data
caps on them, favoring content provided by Comcast affiliates, and withholding
online rights from DISH.88
7.1.2. Effects of the Merger on
Special Access and
Backhaul Services
The California Association of Telecommunications Companies (CALTEL)
addresses the harmful impacts that the proposed merger would have on the
Id.,at8;InvestorPresentation,ComcastandTimeWarnerCable,February13,2014at6,
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/CMCSA/2671320491x0x725713/781d73e7063547b4
b25e34e5c7ea4ff9/Comcast%20Investor%20Presentation.pdf;SeeDMARegions,NIELSEN,
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/campaigns/dmamaps.html,DMAregionsarethegeographic
areasintheUnitedStatesinwhichlocaltelevisionviewingismeasuredbyTheNielsen
company.TheDMAdataareessentialforanymarketer,researcher,ororganizationseekingto
utilizestandardizedgeographicareaswithintheirbusiness.
87
BriefofDishNetworkCorporationinOppositiontoProposedMerger(DISHBrief),filedon
December10,2014at2.
88
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PROPOSED DECISION
availability of special access and backhaul services.89 CALTEL argues that the
proposed merger would significantly diminish competitive choice in the market
for wholesale inputs needed by CALTEL members and other Competitive Local
Exchange Carriers (CLECs).90 CALTELs expert, Ms. Sarah DeYoung, argues that
CLECs will be uniquely affected by the proposed merger because they
simultaneously purchase and receive wholesale inputs from cable companies
while competing against them in the retail telecommunications and Internet
service markets.91 Unlike Time Warner, Comcast is not committed to continuing
to provide resold voice and Internet or last mile carrier Ethernet services to CLEC
customers and is unlikely to continue offering wholesale inputs to carriers, thus
diminishing competition in this area.92 According to Ms. DeYoung, until the
merger with Time Warner was announced, Comcast offered wholesale carrier
Ethernet on a take-it-or-leave-it basis with onerous terms and conditions.93 In
contrast, Time Warner offers valuable wholesale inputs to CLECs and wireless
carriers that otherwise would only be available from ILECs, thereby providing
critical pricing and terms-and-conditions discipline on the emerging Ethernet
wholesale market. For example, Time Warner currently provides three primary
categories of wholesale products: 1) business voice and Internet access products
for Value Added Resellers (VARs), 2) Carrier Ethernet Last Mile Access used by
OpeningBriefoftheCaliforniaAssociationofTelecommunicationsCompanies(CALTELBrief),filed
onDecember10,2014at2.
89
Id.,at3;OpeningBriefoftheCaliforniaAssociationofTelecommunicationsCompanies,Testimonyof
SarahDeYoung(DeYoungTestimony),filedonDecember10,2014at4.
90
91
DeYoungTestimonyat5.
92
Id.,at14.
93
Id.,at6.
- 44 -
PROPOSED DECISION
94
Id.,at1720.
ReplyBriefoftheGreenliningInstituteandConsumersUnion(GreenliningandCUBrief),filedon
December10,2014at41.
95
96
Id.,at42.
97
Id.,at47.
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PROPOSED DECISION
Id.,at39;StephanieChenandNoemiGallardo,SupplierDiversityReportCard:Unexpected
AchievementsandContinuingGapsat10(June2014),availableathttp://greenlining.org/wp
content/uploads/2014/06/2014SupplierDiversityReportCardprinterfriendly.pdf.
98
99
BriefoftheOfficeofRatepayerAdvocates(ORABrief),filedonDecember10,2014at53.
100
Id.
101
Id.,at54.
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PROPOSED DECISION
result in significant job loss, with resulting costs to the California economy as
workers relocate to other jobs in other industries.102
7.1.4. Service Quality
ORA, CforAT, Media Alliance, Greenlining and Consumers Union claim
that the merger bodes poorly for broadband and voice customers because it
represents a merger of companies that have an objectively poor track record in
providing customer service.
ORA claims that the Joint Applicants have simply provided a corporate
public relations package without providing detailed plans and commitments of
direct benefits to consumers.103 ORA points out that Comcast claims to have no
standards or metrics for ascertaining how well they are servicing their
customers.104 However, ORA claims that objective data shows that consumers
are generally unhappy with Comcasts and Time Warners broadband service,
with both companies consistently ranking near the bottom of virtually every
independent evaluation of service quality for cable broadband providers.105 For
example, ORA cites to J.D. Powers 2014 Residential Internet Service Provider
Satisfaction Study West where Comcasts Xfinity service ranks seventh among
the nine largest companies, achieving the lowest available scores in 4 of the 5
categories. Time Warner is slightly above at #6, while Charter was closer to the
102
ReplyCommentsoftheMediaAlliance,filedonDecember10,2014at13.
103
ORABriefat61.
Id.,at6263;BriefoftheOfficeofRatepayerAdvocates,Exhibit3,DeclarationofAdamJ.Clark
(ClarkDeclaration),filedonDecember10,2014at1617.
104
105
Id.
- 47 -
PROPOSED DECISION
top at #4.106 Looking back over a longer period from 2009-2014, in five of the last
six years J.D. Powers studies assigned Comcast and Charter Communications a
sub-average score for Overall Customer Satisfaction. In each of the six years
from 2009-2014, Time Warner failed to earn one average mark for overall
customer satisfaction.107 ORA further cites the American Customer Satisfaction
Index (ACSI) where Comcast, Time Warner and Charter received the lowest
scores of all Internet service providers in the study, and their scores went down
from 2013-2014.108
ORA also points to a University of Michigan study where Comcast and
Time Warner are the lowest rated companies compared to not only Internet
service providers, but across all industries and companies included in the
study.109 In addition, there has been an upward trend in the number of
broadband complaints to the Joint Applicants. Comcast escalated many more
complaints (per broadband connection) than Time Warner between
January 1, 2010 and August 31, 2014.110 According to ORA, if Comcast acquires
Time Warner there is a risk that the merged entity will adopt less effective
quality assurance processes and protocols than what Time Warner currently
employs today. Further, Comcast takes much longer than Time Warner to
106
Id.,at1011.
107
Id.
108
Id.,at11.
109
Id.,at1617.
Id.Escalatedcomplaintsarecomplaintsthatarenotresolvedafterthefirstpointofcontact
bythecustomer.TimeWarnerandComcasthavedifferentprocessestoresolveescalated
complaints.
110
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PROPOSED DECISION
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
ORABriefat76.
BriefoftheOfficeofRatepayerAdvocates,Exhibit2,DeclarationofAyatOsman
(OsmanDeclaration),filedonDecember10,2014at1617at78.
114
115
Id.at13.
116
Id.at17.
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PROPOSED DECISION
higher complaint rates than Time Warner. In some instances these rates are
dramatically higher.117
Greenlining and Consumers Union also assert that the proposed
transaction will not improve service quality for consumers. According to a 2014
survey of Consumers Union members, respondents who were current and
former Comcast customers complained of: service that cuts in and out
constantly; download and upload speeds that change erratically and are
sometimes fast and sometimes very slow; [f]requent interruption in Internet
services without explanation; inadequate bandwidth; blocked channels and
unreliable phone service.118
Media Alliance points out that the Customer Satisfaction Index ranked the
Joint Applicants dead last in customer service benchmarks among hundreds of
major US corporations. At ConsumerAffairs.com, 2,513 comments are recorded
about Comcast, 88% of them giving the company 1 star out of 5, the lowest
possible rating. Also, in Worcester, Massachusetts, the City Council voted not to
approve a Charter to Comcast franchise transfer on the basis of poor customer
service.119
CforAT states that to the extent Comcast has attempted to show that its
service is less bad than others, it has not affirmatively demonstrated that it can
or will provide effective customer service following a merger.120
117
Id.,at2426.
118
GreenliningandCUBriefat31;GreenliningandCUBrief,ExhibitA.
119
ReplyCommentsoftheMediaAllianceat7.
120
BriefoftheCenterforAccessibleTechnology(CforATBrief),filedonDecember10,2014at20.
- 50 -
PROPOSED DECISION
121
122
OdellDeclarationat4.
123
Id.
Id.,at6;Pub.Util.Code709(d),thatcallsfor:bridgingthedigitaldividebyencouraging
expandedaccesstostateofthearttechnologiesforrural,innercity,lowincome,anddisabled
Californians;Pub.Util.Code281(b)(1),referringtothegoalsoftheCaliforniaAdvanced
ServicesFundprogram,createdtoencouragedeploymentofhighqualityadvanced
communicationsservicestoallCalifornians.;Pub.Util.Code281(a).
124
- 51 -
PROPOSED DECISION
OdellDeclarationat8.
126
Id.at9.
Id.at11;TomWheeler,Chairman,FCC,RemarksatNationalDigitalLearningDay:TheFacts
andFutureofBroadbandCompetition(Sept.4,2012).
127
TURNBriefat20;ReplyBriefoftheUtilityReformNetwork,ReplyTestimonyofSusanMBaldwin
(BaldwinReplyTestimony),filedonDecember10,2014at3233.
128
129
BaldwinOpeningTestimonyat73.
130
Id.at74.
- 52 -
PROPOSED DECISION
131
Id.,at75.
CommentsoftheCaliforniaEmergingTechnologyFund(CommentsoftheCETF),filedon
October19,2014at4.
132
133
Id.
134
Id.
- 53 -
PROPOSED DECISION
135
Id.,at13.
136
Id.,at14.
137
Id.,at17.
138
Id.
- 54 -
PROPOSED DECISION
139
140
GreenliningandConsumersUnionBriefat26.
CforATBriefat16;BriefoftheCenterforAccessibleTechnology,DeclarationofDmitriBelser
(BelserDeclaration),filedonDecember10,2014at5.
141
142
BelserDeclarationat67.
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PROPOSED DECISION
days to become eligible for the program.143 In other instances, families who were
eligible for the program were not recognized by Comcast as eligible for the
program.144 Even for families that Comcast recognized as eligible, there were
significant delays between the time that the family applied for the program and
the time they actually obtained access.145 As a consequence, Comcast managed to
sign up only 11 percent of eligible families from CforATs pool of applicants in
California.146 In contrast, CforAT points out that Comcast spent $3.2 million in
California alone on Public Service Announcements.147
Media Alliances main criticism of the IE program is in the programs
strong performance in the area of public relations and weak performance in
relation to closing the digital divide. Media Alliance cites to the mere
46,000 California households who are part of the IE program.148 In order to
achieve these numbers, Media Alliance reports that Comcast made 88 million
media impressions, 2.3 million telephone calls, and 242,000 public service
announcements.149 Despite this media blitz, Media Alliance points out that
Comcast does not serve 87% of the eligible population for the program.150 Media
Alliance also urges the Commission to look at the level of service offered by the
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.,at8.
148
ReplyCommentsoftheMediaAllianceat5.
149
Id.
150
Id.
- 56 -
PROPOSED DECISION
IE program, contrasting the low speeds offered under IE to the 25 Mbps Comcast
is intending to offer California residents under a standard plan.151 Finally, Media
Alliance states that the modems provided under the IE program do not provide
in-house Wi-Fi service, thus preventing households from using more than one
computer and limiting access to tablet devices that are provided to students in
many educational assistance programs.152
TheJointMinorityPartiesconcurwiththeissuesraisedaboveregarding
theInternetEssentialsprogramandpointoutthatthespeedsfortheIEprogram
areinadequate.Forexample,whileIEoffersdownloadspeedsof5Mbps,
Comcastsnationwideaveragedownloadspeedisabout32Mbps.153
7.1.6. Broadband Deployment and Build Out
of broadband Networks to Unserved
and Undeserved Areas
Greenling and Consumers Union assert that Joint Parties claims of
upgrading Time Warners customers is contradicted by the fact that
Time Warner was already planning to speed up service in New York and Los
Angeles to give its standard subscribers a full 50 Mbps download speed,
higher than Comcasts standard of 25 Mbps.154 In addition, Greenlining and
151
Id.,at6.
152
Id.
153
Id.,at14.
Id.,at43;AdiRobertson,ComcastHasVeryBadReasonsforWantingtoBuyTimeWarnerCable:
DefendingtheMassiveTakeovertotheFCCRequiresSomeLeapsofLogic,TheVerge,April9,2014
http://www.theverge.com/2014/4/9/5597074/insidecomcastsshakyfccdefenseoftimewarner
cabletakeover;SeealsoDOrazio,supranote10;TimeWarnerJan.30,2014PressRelease,supra
note101(TimeWarnerCablecustomersinNewYorkCityandLosAngeleswillbethefirstto
benefitfrommajorenhancementsthatwilltransformtheirserviceastheyknowit.).
154
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PROPOSED DECISION
Consumers Union state that the benefit the combined company would gain in
being able to take further advantage of network effects, by which the
attractiveness of a product increases with the number of people using it, would
come at the expense of increasing barriers to entry and further entrenching
Comcasts dominance.155
ORA points to the problems with extending Comcasts home Wi-Fi
gateways to Time Warners service territory. While Comcast heralds the
expansion of its Wi-Fi service by converting its customers home Internet routers
into public Wi-Fi hotspots, ORA points to issues related to privacy, security,
service degradation, energy use, notification to customers and a lack of customer
authorization for this service.156 Essentially, Comcast proposes to use peoples
home Wi-Fi routers as public gateways to allow others who have a Comcast
account to access the Internet as long as they are within the vicinity of a Comcast
customers Wi-Fi router. ORA cites to a recent case where Comcast was sued by
its customers for failing to obtain authorization prior to engaging in this use of
the customers equipment and Internet service for public, non-household use.157
7.1.7. Safety and Reliability
CETFs concerns with the merger rely primarily on the mergers impact on
safety and reliability in California, especially as those impacts affect disabled
customers who are disproportionately low income and highly dependent on
effective, reliable and affordable telecommunications service. From CforATs
155
Id.,at46.
156
ORABriefat5457.
Id.at55;Grearv.Comcast,CaseNo.4:14cv05333,U.S.DistrictCourtfortheNorthern
DistrictofCalifornia.
157
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PROPOSED DECISION
perspective, the public safety issue most implicated for residential customers of a
potential merged entity is the availability and reliability of service in an
emergency, particularly during a power outage. Unlike an ILEC provided
telephone that has an independent power source, a cable phone requires a
battery backup in order to work in a power outage. A phone that works during a
power outage is especially important for members of the disabled community.
CforAT claims that deficiencies in Comcasts battery backup program would be
harmful to consumers if the merger were to be accepted. Currently, Comcast
voice customers must personally check and replace back-up batteries, which
must be purchased from Comcast at substantial expense, and which require 7-10
business days for delivery.158 In addition, education and information provided to
Comcast customers is extremely limited.159 In general, CforAT claims that
improvements are needed in Comcasts provision of battery back-up information
to customers, battery monitoring so customers are aware of changes in battery
performance such as audible alerts for the blind, and increased 911 location
information.160 CforAT claims Comcast has significant improvements to make in
providing accessibility and communications for customers with disabilities.161
CforAT also points out that many of Comcasts materials are not accessible to
people with disabilities. For example, while customer bills are accessible in
Braille for the totally blind, Comcast does not provide information in large print
158
CforATBriefat4.
159
Id.,at5.
160
Id.,at48.
161
Id.,at10.
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PROPOSED DECISION
for the sight impaired.162 In comparison, CforAT asserts that other entities under
the Commission missions jurisdiction, such as PG&E, have taken steps to
provide greater accessibility to materials for the disabled.163
7.2. Discussion
ORA, Common Cause, Greenlining, Consumers Union, CforAT,
Media Alliance and DISH oppose granting the license transfer applications,
arguing that the harms that would be caused by the merger cannot be
ameliorated through the imposition of conditions on the license transfers. All
opponents of approving the application share the belief that the merged
company will be so powerful that it will constitute a de facto state-wide
monopoly in the provision of broadband Internet services, allowing, as the ORA
brief puts it, the merged entity to increase prices without effective restraint, and
constrain the ability of other entrants to provide competitive services at
reasonable prices and offer comparable content to their customers.164 DISHs
opposition is based on the asserted negative impact that the merger would have
on competing video providers by foreclosing or degrading their offered services,
imposing discriminatory data caps on them, favoring content provided by
Comcast affiliates, and withholding online rights from them.165 The protests
based on the allegedly increased market power of the merged company are
within the scope of the proceeding and are addressed below. DISH objections
based on video content agreements are considered only to the extent that they
162
Id.,at11.
163
Id.,at12.
164
ORAbriefat23.
165
DISHBriefat2.
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PROPOSED DECISION
UnitedStatesDepartmentofJusticeandFederalTradeCommission,HorizontalMerger
Guidelines2010edition(HMG),at5.3,MarketConcentration:definesamarketwithanHHI
inexcessof2500ashighlyconcentrated,andsuggeststhatmergersresultinginhighly
concentratedmarketsthatinvolveanincreaseintheHHIofmorethan200pointswillbe
presumedtobelikelytoenhancemarketpower.
166
167
SelwynDeclarationat7172.
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PROPOSED DECISION
to services from the same alternate service providers--such as the ILECs or small
local Internet Service Providers (ISPs)--as were available to them before the
merger. Comcast argues that a similar logic applies to the protestors and
intervenors concerns about the allegedly enhanced ability of the merged
company to compete for business from super-regional customers, i.e., businesses
with locations in both northern and southern California. Pre-merger such
businesses could obtain cable-based services from Comcast in northern
California and from Time Warner in southern California. Post-merger, such
businesses will also face the same competitive landscape as they faced before the
merger. That is, they can choose between receiving cable-based services from the
merged company, arguably a net benefit, or receiving non-cable-based services
from the same alternative service providers as were available to them premerger. In summary, Comcast argues that because the merger does not
materially change the choices available to existing and potential customers of the
merged companies, their allegedly enhanced ability to compete for customers is
not a sufficient reason to reject the license transfer applications.
But the merger does more than simply change the name of the southern
California cable company from Time Warner to Comcast. As Comcast has
acknowledged, the corporate policies and practices of Comcast will supplant the
policies and practices of Time Warner. To the extent that Time Warner
customers have enjoyed better, more reliable service than Comcasts customers,
they could see the quality of their service decline as a result of the merger if this
transaction is approved without conditions. Comcasts record of customer
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PROPOSED DECISION
service has been heavily criticized by protesters,168 yet it will now become the
standard of service for the former customers of Time Warner, absent any
conditions that require Comcast to improve its customer service standards. And
content customers may have received from Time Warner may not be available to
them any longer if the content provider and Comcast are unable to agree on the
terms on which Comcast will carry the content providers material. This may be
true for Internet content as Comcasts share of the Internet Service Provider
market is increased. The ability to exercise that increased market share on
Internet content may be constrained by some of the conditions of this Decision,
and will likely be analyzed in more detail in the proceedings before the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), the U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ),
and State Attorney Generals (State AGs).
We are also skeptical that Comcasts plan to turn each subscribing
customers home router into a public Internet Wi-Fi hot spot is in the public
interest. As ORA has pointed out, such a plan, particularly if it is undertaken
without the knowledge or prior approval of the customer, raises serious issues of
privacy and potentially degrades service quality. A plan that, at least on the
surface, fails to address such concerns, does not supply us with a reason to
approve the transaction to which it is related. We are also persuaded by
CforATs discussion of the mergers impact on safety and reliability in California,
in particular the deficiencies in Comcasts customer notification and battery
backup program. Thus, it is not the case that the change of ownership amounts
to nothing more than a change of name from the point of view of the acquired
See,ORABriefat6163,76;ClarkDeclaration;OsmanDeclaration;GreenliningandCUBrief
at31.
168
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PROPOSED DECISION
customers. The merger presents Time Warner customers with the real possibility
that they will receive poorer customer service, fewer service offerings, and fewer
program choices from Comcast after the merger than they received from Time
Warner before the merger.
We are also troubled by Comcasts poor performance in regard to
increasing both workplace and supplier diversity. As Joint Minority Parties169
and Greenlining170 point out, Comcasts record in this regard is substantially
poorer than that of other communications companies and Commission regulated
entities.
Further, as TURN and Writers Guild point out, the Commission and the
ratepayers it represents will lose the ability to compare best practices of both
companies relative benchmarks and the ability to compare both companies
relative performance and prices. For consumers, knowledge of a different
providers superior version of a product, even if it is offered outside the
consumers geographic market, can assist those consumers in advocating on their
own behalf if they are dissatisfied with a providers product. Elimination of such
a benchmark would have the effect of harming both the Commission and
consumers.
The Commission and the parties to Commission proceedings also lose
policy competitors whose different positions and business models affect
Commission decisions. For example, Time Warner has applied to the
Commission to offer Lifeline as a tariffed service, while Comcast has not. Time
Warner argued in the Lifeline proceeding that the Commission decision should
169
ReplyBriefoftheJointMinorityPartiesat12.
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PROPOSED DECISION
ensure that companies that offer VoIP as a tariffed service should be able to offer
Lifeline in Phase I of the program rollout.
TURN and ORA also mention that although neither Comcast nor
Time Warner currently compete in each others geographic area, there may come
a time in the future when it becomes in either companies interest to overbuild
into an adjacent providers service area. A merger between Comcast and
Time Warner at this point in time would preclude any chance of future
competition between these two entities.
ORA and its companion protesters conclude from these lines of argument
that we should find that approval of the license transfers is not in the public
interest. They argue that no conditions that we might reasonably impose on the
transfers will offset the harm that will result from allowing these companies to
merge, especially considering that Comcast will become the sole provider of
broadband service at or above 25 Mbps in almost 80 percent of California. While
we agree that the potential harms identified by these protesters are real, we are
also mindful that our jurisdiction is limited to consideration of the impact of the
license transfers as measured by the factors enumerated in Pub. Util. Code
854(c) and the impact of the merger on broadband deployment in California as
authorized by Section 706(a) of the Telecommunications Act. Potentially
negative impacts of approving the applications on voice communications, such
as degradation of customer service or shrinking of service offerings, are within
our jurisdiction under the Pub. Util. Code. Potentially negative impacts of the
proposed merger on broadband deployment are also within our jurisdiction
170
GreenliningandCUBriefat39.
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PROPOSED DECISION
under Section 706(a) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, provided that we, like
the FCC in itsOpenInternetOrder,concludethatsuchactionsultimatelyretard
thedeploymentofbroadbandwithinthestate.As the D.C. Circuit observed in
its review of theOpenInternetOrder,
The Commission could reasonably have thought that its
authority to promulgate regulations that promote broadband
deployment encompasses the power to regulate broadband
providers' economic relationships with edge providers if, in
fact, the nature of those relationships influences the rate and
extent to which broadband providers develop and expand
their services for end users.171
Since Section 706(a) by its terms confers parallel powers on state
commissions and the FCC, the same rationale applied by the D. C. Circuit in its
review of the FCCs Open Internet Order applies to our review of the probable
consequences of the merger on broadband deployment in California. In other
words, while we may not regulate the terms and conditions on which Comcast
sells Internet access to content providers, we may take note of the potentially
adverse consequences of Comcasts use of its market power against content
providers on the deployment of broadband in California and impose conditions
on our approval to mitigate those consequences.
We may also take note of the mergers likely enhancement of that market
power, if the merger is consummated. From an edge providers perspective, its
choices in reaching California consumers through high-speed broadband in
California will be substantially curtailed. Instead of the choice between two
large cable systems delivering high speed broadband to upwards of 80% of the
171
FCCvs.Verizon,740F.3d.623,4849(D.C.Circuit2014).
- 66 -
PROPOSED DECISION
households in California, the edge or content provider will have only one choice,
Comcast. Even figuring Verizons FIOS and the high-end AT&T U-Verse
products into the mix, Comcast will have significantly expanded market power
to act anti-competitively if it so chooses. The Comcast-Netflix contract at least
suggests that Comcast could compel competing content providers to enter into
contracts with it in order to ensure timely delivery of their competing content to
Comcast subscribers.172 As the D.C. Circuit put it:
Because all end users generally access the Internet through a
single broadband provider, that provider functions as a
"'terminating monopolist,'" with power to act as a
"gatekeeper" with respect to edge providers that might seek to
reach its end-user subscribers. As the Commission reasonably
explained, this ability to act as a "gatekeeper" distinguishes
broadband providers from other participants in the Internet
marketplace--including prominent and potentially powerful
edge providers such as Google and Apple--who have no
similar "control [over] access to the Internet for their
subscribers and for anyone wishing to reach those
subscribers."173
This is precisely the terminating monopoly power that intervenors
fear.174 The power of the terminating monopolist to discriminate or otherwise act
anti-competitively vis-a-vis edge or content providers could increase the cost and
reduce the attractiveness of that competing content. This, in turn, lessens the
demand for high-speed broadband access to the Internet, and thus runs counter
to Section 706(a)s mandate to promote competition in broadband services:
172
SeeORABriefat4247.
173
743F.3dat647(citationsomitted).
174
See,e.g.,ORABriefat4647.
- 67 -
PROPOSED DECISION
175
740F.3dat643.
176
Id.
See,February5,2015FCCpressrelease,http://www.fcc.gov/document/chairmanwheeler
proposesnewrulesprotectingopeninternet.
177
WearepersuadedbythefollowingpartiesargumentsthataresummarizedinSectionVI
above:ORA,TURN,Greenlining,ConsumersUnion,CETF,MediaAlliance,JointMinority
Parties,WritersGuild,CETF,DISHandCALTEL.
178
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PROPOSED DECISION
service goals, and thus do not view it as a mitigating factor without additional
conditions.
While the protesters and intervenors vigorously assert that we should
deny the applications outright, they also urge us, in the alternative, to impose
conditions ameliorating the potential harms should we decide that such
conditions are within our powers and sufficient to render the resulting
transaction not adverse to the public interest. While we are troubled by the
protesters and intervenors many examples of potential harms that may flow
from the merger, we believe that those harms may be mitigated by the
imposition of conditions on our approval consistent with our powers under state
and federal law.
7.3. Proposed Mitigation Measures
and Conditions
We now consider conditions proposed by the protesters to mitigate the
adverse consequences of the merger.
7.3.1. Broadband Deployment
The most frequently voiced criticism of the license transfer applications is
that they do not include a commitment by Comcast to expand the availability of
broadband Internet to unserved and underserved communities. While Comcast
has committed to offer Internet Essentials to qualifying customers acquired from
Time Warner as a result of the merger, it has made no promises regarding
expanded IE eligibility, concrete enrollment goals for IE, faster download and
upload speeds for IE recipients, continued provision of standalone broadband
Internet access at reasonable rates, or the construction of additional Internet
access points in underserved communities. CETF, CforAT, The Joint Minority
Parties (JMP), TURN, and the Writers Guild have all proposed mitigation
- 69 -
PROPOSED DECISION
179
McDonaldDeclarationat11.
180
CforATBriefat1517;BelserDeclarationat410.
181
CommentsofCETFat4,13,19;Seealso,AttachmentsA,CandD.
182
CommentsofCETFat13.
183
Id.,at18.
184
TURNBriefat2122;BaldwinOpeningTestimonyat3233.
185
WritersGuildBriefat3435.
186
ReplyBriefoftheJointMinorityPartiesat1416.
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PROPOSED DECISION
187
TURNBriefat23.
188
WritersGuildBriefat14,17,18.
189
BaldwinReplyDeclarationat9.
190
WGABriefat36.
191
TURNBriefat67;BaldwinOpeningTestimonyat3233.
192
CforATBriefat19;PortfolioDeclarationat3.
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PROPOSED DECISION
technical limitations of VoIP telephony; and (3) report to the state all voice and
broadband outages for the next three years.193
CforAT makes four specific safety and reliability recommendations:
1) require Comcast to disclose to consumers that cable-based phone systems
require battery back-up; (2) make information about battery back-up and
911 systems more prominent; (3) install more effective low battery indicators;
and (4) make available effective battery replacement.194
7.3.4. Miscellaneous Proposed Conditions
CALTEL argues for imposing a series of conditions specifically related to
the merged companies wholesale services. These include:
a. Time Warner actually launching the resold business voice
and Internet product (BCP with SIA) that Time Warner
describes as currently available in its responses to data
requests.
b. Comcast continuing to offer Time Warners BCP with SIA
to interested CLECs for a period of 5 years at existing
prices, terms and conditions.
c. Comcast continuing to offer Time Warners Carrier
Ethernet Last Mile Access product to interested CLECs for
a period of 5 years at existing prices, terms and conditions.
d. Comcast committing to develop a product similar to Time
Warners BCP with SIA and offering it to interested CLECs
for 5 years at prices, terms and conditions comparable to
those of the Time Warner product.
e. Comcast committing to develop and expand its share of
the carrier Ethernet last mile market for a period of 5 years
193
TURNBriefat1519;BaldwinOpeningTestimonyat3057.
194
CforATBriefat48;ComcastresponsetoCforATDataRequestNo.1at7.
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PROPOSED DECISION
195
DeYoungTestimonyat6,8,10,11,13,1418,20,25.;andAttachmentAthereto.
196
BriefofJointMinorityPartiesat1214;CommentsofCETF,DeclarationofFaithBautistaat2.
197
OsmanDeclarationat3547.
ORABriefat7982;OdellDeclarationat411.SeealsoORABriefat6079;ClarkDeclaration
at45,1014,1617,1926,3141,84;ORABriefat6879;OsmanDeclarationat714,1718,2226,
3034.
198
199
ORABriefat29;SelwynDeclarationat13,15,24,3233,59,6372,87,145149.
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PROPOSED DECISION
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PROPOSED DECISION
2.
PROPOSED DECISION
4.
StephanieChenandNoemiGallardo,SupplierDiversityReportCard:UnexpectedAchievementsand
ContinuingGapsat10(June2014),availableathttp://greenlining.org/wp
content/uploads/2014/06/2014SupplierDiversityReportCardprinterfriendly.pdf;2013Utility
SupplierDiversityProcurementReports,CaliforniaPublicUtilitiesCommission,availableat
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/SupplierDiversity/2013_Utility_Supplier_Diversity_Procurement
_Reports.htm.
200
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PROPOSED DECISION
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
PROPOSED DECISION
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PROPOSED DECISION
201
- 79 -
PROPOSED DECISION
- 80 -
PROPOSED DECISION
202
203
WritersGuildBriefat3738.
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PROPOSED DECISION
PROPOSED DECISION
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PROPOSED DECISION
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PROPOSED DECISION
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PROPOSED DECISION
already highly concentrated before the merger, and becomes more highly
concentrated as a result of the Comcast acquisition.
15. As of June 30, 2014, according to the California Broadband Availability
Database, 76.6% of households in Joint Applicants territory have no competitors
for broadband service at download speed tiers greater than or equal to 25
Megabits per second.
16. Post-merger, Comcast will serve 84% of the households in California.
17. Deficiencies in Comcasts customer notification and battery backup
program have a negative impact on safety and reliability in California.
18. Comcasts Internet Essentials program has had a weak performance in
closing the digital divide in California and fulfilling universal service goals.
19. The anti-competitive effects of the merger, absent any mitigation
measures, will hinder broadband development in California.
Conclusions of Law
1. The Commission examines proposed mergers, acquisitions, or transfers of
control on a case-by-case basis to determine the applicability of Pub. Util. Code
854.
2. To obtain approval of the proposed transfers, Applicants must
demonstrate that they meet the requirements of 854(a) and (c).
3. Section 854(e) requires that the Applicants must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the requirements of 854(c) are met.
4. Section 706(a) of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, codified in 47 United
States Code 1302(a) is a grant of authority to the Commission to examine the
implications of the proposed merger of the parent companies on broadband
deployment in California and to impose pro-competitive conditions that enhance
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PROPOSED DECISION
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PROPOSED DECISION
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APPENDIX A
Appendix A
Conditions Applicable to Transfer of Control of Time Warner Cable
Information Services (California), LLC; and the Pro Forma Transfer of
Control of Bright House Networks Information Services (California), LLC,
to Comcast Corporation
1. Comcast shall extend the Lifeline program to all eligible
customers of the merged companies, and offer California
Lifeline and Federal Lifeline on the same basis as Time
Warners October 2013 filing (A.13-10-019) with the
Commission. Comcast shall provide California Lifeline
as a tariffed service and shall apply to the Commission,
within four months of the effective date of the parent
company merger, to offer Lifeline as a tariffed service on
the same terms as in Time Warners application
(A.13-10-019). Comcast shall commence offering
California Lifeline as a tariffed service within five
months of any Commission decision or order granting
approval of its application or advice letter to provide
California Lifeline.
2.
4.
5.
StephanieChenandNoemiGallardo,SupplierDiversityReportCard:UnexpectedAchievementsand
ContinuingGapsat10(June2014),availableathttp://greenlining.org/wp
content/uploads/2014/06/2014SupplierDiversityReportCardprinterfriendly.pdf;2013Utility
SupplierDiversityProcurementReports,CaliforniaPublicUtilitiesCommission,availableat
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/SupplierDiversity/2013_Utility_Supplier_Diversity_Procurement
_Reports.htm.
204
-2-
7.
8.
9.
-3-
-4-
205
-5-
-6-
206
207
WritersGuildBriefat3738.
-7-
-9-
(END OF APPENDIX A)
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