Duncan Vs Cfi Rizal
Duncan Vs Cfi Rizal
Duncan Vs Cfi Rizal
]
ROBIN FRANCIS RADLEY DUNCAN and MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN, Petitioners, v. COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF RIZAL (Branch X) presided over by HON.
JUDGE HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Sometime in May, 1967, a three-day old baby was given by a
lawyer to petitioning spouses for adoption. Later, the child was
baptized, and the names of said spouses appeared in the
baptismal records as the childs parents. The lawyer, on the other
hand, received the infant from its unwed mother who told the
former to look for a suitable couple who would adopt the child,
and never reveal her (the mothers) identify because she wanted
to get married and did not want to destroy her future.
In the petition for adoption, the lawyer as the childs de facto
guardian or loco parentis gave the written consent required by
law. The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that the
consent given is improper and falls short of the express
requirement of Art. 340 of the Civil Code that the consent must
be given by the parents, guardian or person in charge of the to
be adopted.
The Supreme Court reversed the trial courts dismissal order,
holding that the childs unidentified mother can be declared as
having abandoned the child so that there is no more legal need
to require her written consent; and that the consent given by the
de facto guardian who exercised patria potestas over the
abandoned
child
was
sufficient.
Appealed decision under review annulled, and the minor
declared as the adopted child and heir of petitioners.
SYLLABUS
1.
PARENTS
AND
CHILDREN;
ADOPTION;
PERSONS
REQUIRED TO GIVE CONSENT FOR ADOPTION WHERE CHILD
IS ILLEGITIMATE AND UNRECOGNIZED. Where the child is
illegitimate and unrecognized only one of two persons
particularly described by law may be considered as legally
capable of giving the required written consent. They are: under
Art. 340 of the Civil Code, the parent, guardian or person in
charge of the person to be adopted; and under Sec 3, Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court, each of the known living parents "who had
not abandoned such child." The fathers consent is out of the
question, where the child is illegitimate and unrecognized.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONSENT OF NATURAL MOTHER WHO HAD
ABANDONED CHILD NOT NECESSARY. The parental consent
required by law in adoption proceedings refers to parents who
have not abandoned their child. Thus, where the natural and
unwed mother turned over her three-day old child to another
person and from that date on to the time of the adoption
proceedings in court, the mother had not bothered to inquire into
the condition of the child, much less to contribute to its
livelihood, maintenance and care, such parent is the antithesis of
that described in the law as "known living parent who is not
insane or hopelessly intemperate or has not abandoned such
child." As such, she may be declared as having completely and
absolutely abandoned her child so that there would be no more
legal need to require her consent to the adoption.
3. ID.; ID.; PERSON STANDING IN LOCO PARENTIS OR DE
FACTO GUARDIAN. Where it appears that the natural mother
left her three-day old baby with another person who was under
no legal compulsion to accept, protect, or take care of the child,
but nevertheless took actual physical custody of the hapless
infant and out of compassion and motherly instinct protected it
which otherwise would have suffered a tragic fate (like being
thrown into some garbage heap as had often happened to some
unwarranted illegitimate babies); that the natural mothers
identity was not made known to the trial court or to the persons
adopting the child and said natural mother did not present
herself before the court despite the public notice given to the
proceedings as required by law; that no guardian ad litem had
been appointed by the court and the child is not in the custody of
an orphanage or any benevolent society; under these
circumstances, the person to whom the natural mother entrusted
the child may be considered as the guardian (under Art. 340 of
the Civil Code) exercising patria potestas over such abandoned
child, or as person standing in loco parentis of said infant (under
Art. 349 of the Civil Code). Recognizing such person as the de
facto guardian over said abandoned child is the least that can be
done to acknowledge her good Samaritan deed.
4. ID.; ADOPTION; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; DURA LEX,
SED LEX; LAWS ON ADOPTION SHOULD BE LIBERALLY
CONSTRUED TO ACHIEVE THEIR SALUTARY HUMANE
POLICY. While the old adage "Dura lex sed lex" finds apt
application in may other legal cases, in adoption of children,
however, this should be softened so as to apply the law with less
severity and with compassion and humane understanding, for
adoption is more for the benefit of unfortunate children,
particularly those born out of wedlock than for those born with
a silver spoon in their mouths. All efforts or acts designed to
provide homes, love, and care and education for unfortunate
children, who otherwise may grow from cynical street urchins to
hardened criminal offenders and become serious social
problems, should be given the widest latitude of sympathy,
encouragement and assistance. The law is not, and should not be
made an instruments to impede the achievement of a salutary
humane policy. As often as is legally and lawfully possible, their
texts and intendments should be construed so as to give all the
chances for human life to exist with a modicum promise of a
useful
and
constructive
life.
5. ID.; ID.; ADOPTING PARENTS; QUALIFICATION AND
SINCERITY CONSIDERED. Where it appears that petitioners
are qualified, and do not suffer from any disqualification, to
adopt the child, that they have the means to support, take care
of, and educate the child; although they had previously adopted
another child; that even before they applied for adoption they
had the infant baptized and had their names appear in the
baptismal records as the childs parents, thus showing their
genuine desire to have the child as their very own; that from the
time the child, then about a week old, was turned over to them,
they have taken care of and loved the child who must have
known no other parents than petitioners, the court would be
doing a grave injustice, particularly to petitioners, and worse,
would be imposing a cruel sanction upon the innocent child and
all other children similarly situated, if the petition for adoption
were to be dismissed simply because the unidentified mothers
written consent could not be had. It is more justifiable and more
humane to formalize a factual relation, that of parents and son,
existing between petitioning spouses and the minor than to
sustain the hard, harsh and cruel interpretation of the law. It is in
consonance with the true spirit and purpose of the law, and with
the policy of the state, to uphold, encourage and give life and
meaning to the existence of family relations.
DECISION
ESGUERRA, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent
court, dated June 27, 1968, dismissing petitioners petition to
adopt the minor, Colin Berry Christensen Duncan. It seeks to
have the findings and conclusions of law contained in the
decision annulled and revoked and to declare the petition for
adoption meritorious and the child sought to be adopted, the
minor Colin Berry Christensen Duncan, declared the child by
adoption and heir of herein petitioners-appellants, Robin Francis
Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christensen. 1
Petitioners Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy
Christensen are husband and wife, the former a British national
residing in the Philippines for the last 17 years and the latter an
American Citizen born in and a resident of the Philippines.
Having no children of their own but having previously adopted
another child, said spouses filed a petition with respondent court
(Sp. Proc. No. 5457) for the adoption of a child previously
by the court and the child not being in the custody of an orphan
asylum, childrens home or any benevolent society, there could
not have been anyone other than Atty. Corazon de Leon
Velasquez who could, with reason, be called the guardian of said
infant. It was she who had actual physical custody of the infant
and who, out of compassion and motherly instinct, extended the
mantle of protection over the hapless and helpless infant which
otherwise could have suffered a tragic fate, like being thrown
into some garbage heap as had often happened to some
unwanted illegitimate babies. The least this Court could do to
recognize and acknowledge her good Samaritan deed is to
extend, as it hereby extends, to her the recognition that she was
a de facto guardian exercising patria potestas over the
abandoned child.
The trial court in its decision had sought refuge in the ancient
Roman legal maxim "Dura lex sed lex" to cleanse its hands of the
hard and harsh decision it rendered. While this old adage
generally finds apt application in many other legal cases, in
adoption of children, however, this should be softened so as to
apply the law with less severity and with compassion and
humane understanding, for adoption is more for the benefit of
unfortunate children, particularly those born out of wedlock,
than for those born with a silver spoon in their mouths. All efforts
or acts designed to provide homes, love, care and education for
unfortunate children, who otherwise may grow from cynical
street urchins to hardened criminal offenders and become
serious social problems, should be given the widest latitude of
sympathy, encouragement and assistance. The law is not, and
should not be made, an instrument to impede the achievement of
a salutary humane policy. As often as is legally and lawfully
possible, their texts and intendments should be construed so as
to give all the chances for human life to exist with a modicum
promise of a useful and constructive existence.
The herein petitioners, the spouses Robin Francis Radley Duncan
and Maria Lucy Christensen, appear to be qualified to adopt the
child. There is no showing that they suffer from any of the
disqualifications under the law. Above all, they have the means to
provide the child with the proper support, care, education and