SIL Study
SIL Study
www.risknowlogy.com/best-practice
Table of Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................5
Demonstrating IEC 61508/61511 compliance for safety devices ..............7
Current market situation...........................................................................15
Approach for selection of safety device ...................................................23
Conclusion.................................................................................................26
References .................................................................................................28
Share If You Liked It .................................................................................28
About The Authors ....................................................................................29
About The Best Practice ...........................................................................30
About Risknowlogy ...................................................................................33
Certification Increase The Trust ...............................................................34
History .......................................................................................................35
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Introduction
Safety instrumented system (SIS) play a significant role within the
process industry. They reduce the likelihood of events causing harm to
personnel, environment and assets by either preventing (PSD, ESD) or
mitigating further escalation (F&G, Fire water control). IEC 61508 and
IEC 61511 are international standard on best practices for the functional
safety of devices used within the SIS.
These standards are world wide considered good engineering
practices and some countries incorporate them directly into their safety
cases. For those instances it indeed has the force of law. Hence,
compliance with the standards is seen as important from an end user
perspective as it helps them to demonstrate due diligence including for
other mandatory safe operating legislation such as Health and safety act
1994, Management of Health and Safety at work regs, 1992 and Control
of major accident hazards regulation, 1999, see Figure 1.
The hardware of SIS consists of devices such as sensors, logic solvers,
actuator and peripheral devices, see Figure 2. As with any piece of device
also safety devices can fail. One of the main objectives of IEC 61508 is to
design a safety system that will take the plant to a safe state when it fails.
In order to design safety devices and systems as per IEC61508/61511,
one should first understand how safety devices and thus safety systems
can fail. In practice safety devices can fail due to random, systematic or
common cause failures. The higher the SIL level the more strict the IEC
61508 requirements are in terms of these random, systematic and
common cause failures.
End users must be able to select safety devices that give them a high
level of confidence in terms of compliance with IEC 61508. The safety
device should be provided to the end-user with key reliability and
functional safety parameters such as failures rates, safe failure fraction
(SFF), hardware fault tolerance (HFT), type A, type B, etc. With all this
information in hand, it becomes easier for an end user to demonstrate
compliance with the IEC 61508 and/or IEC 61511.
Ultimately it is the responsibility of an end user to demonstrate that
the device selected for SIS is compliant. In practice this means that the
end users needs to assure themselves that the chosen safety device meets
the requirement of the standard in such a manner that they are able to
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c. Reliability requirements
Concerning the reliability requirement, the purpose is to accurately
predict random and common cause hardware failures using reliability
data. Key reliability data should include the following:
Type A or B (a designation for the complexity of a device);
Probability of Failure on Demand (PFDavg);
Recommended proof testing interval;
Hardware fault tolerance;
Safe failure fraction;
Safe detected failure rate;
Safe undetected failure rate;
Dangerous detected failure rate;
Dangerous undetected failure rate.
All of the above information is normally obtained through a process
called Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). This information can
be delivered by the supplier itself, third party report or through a third
party certification (see section 3 on compliance demonstration
approaches). With this information end users can easily determine how
to comply with the architectural constraints and integrity level of the
safety function as described in the safety required specification.
Not addressed by the standard but equally important for an end-user
is information about the probability of a spurious trip caused due to an
internal safe failure of the safety device. The standard requires the
information above to be collected from a dangerous failure point of view.
The same information can be used though to make statements from a
safe failure point of view.
d. Software requirements
IEC 61508 part 3 covers the development of embedded and application
software used within safety device as part of SIS. The main problems
with software are the systematic failures. Many techniques are available
to avoid these failures. Achieving safe software is important as many of
the measures to control random hardware failures are implemented in
software. Safe software is the software that meets IEC 61508 part 3
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requirements and that can still put the safety system in a safe state
despite hardware failures or software bugs. Requirements to
demonstrate compliance with this part include among others the
following:
The use of the V model approach to software design, with the
number of phases in the V model being adapted according to the
safety integrity level and the complexity of the project. Although
the standard refers to V model but does not say anywhere that it is
required. An example of a V-model is given in Figure 4.
The design methods should aid modularity and embrace features
which reduce complexity and provide clear expression of
functionality, information flow, data structures, sequencing, time
related constraints and design assumptions;
The embedded software should include software for diagnosing
faults in the system hardware and software, including error
detection for communication links and on-line testing of standard
application software;
The detail design of the software modules and coding
implementation should result in small manageable software
modules;
The system should as far as possible use trusted and verified
software modules which have been used in similar application;
The system should not use dynamic objects which depend on the
state of the system at the moment of allocation where they do not
allow checking by off-line tools;
The programming languages hould be capable of being fully and
unambiguously defined;
The support tool needs to be either well proven in use or certified
as suitable for safety system application.
In the IEC 61508 standard there are many requirements for
software and from a supplier/manufacturer point of view it is the
software which is the design and development bottleneck. Once the
software is under control basically the device is under control and
the hardware follows. In other words, from an end-user point of
view buying and installing devices with software means really
assuring themselves that the software of the device is IEC 61508
compliant.
e. Basic safety
Functional safety is one aspect of a safety device. But this does not cover
automatically all basic safety issues of the device in its operating
environment. Each device should also address the following basic safety
requirements, through appropriate environmental testing, to make sure
the device can be used in its intended environment:
Operational temperature range;
Storage temperature range;
EMC / EMI environment;
Vibration / shock testing;
IP classification;
Pressure (PED);
Explosive atmospheres (ATEX);
Basic electrical safety and compliance to product standards.
Whichever environment the end-user of the device has, is ultimately
the environment the safety device must be able to withstand. The
product supplier should be able to demonstrate this environment so that
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the end-user can verify that the device is suitable for his specific
environment.
f. User documentation
One can have the best safety device in the world but if it is not used
properly it can still lead to undesired situations like accidents. User
documentation must be provided for the device in the form of a product
safety manual. This manual not only addresses all safety aspects during
installation, commissioning, operation, maintenance and repair but
sometimes also contains restrictions to the application of the device. It is
important for end-users that the information in the safety manual is
correct and that the restrictions do not limit the end-user unnecessarily.
Hence a safety manual should be available before one buys the
equipment.
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61508. Not the end-user or the product supplier attests this statement
but an independent party does. This is of course only valuable if the
independent party is truly independent and has no legal, financial or
political interest the product.
Self-declaration means that the supplier makes the statement
about the product himself. End users can find this difficult to trust,
as nobody independent was involved. So it becomes a matter for
the end-user of whom can I trust? or whom do I allow to use
self-declaration and from whom do I want to see a third party
certification?.
When it comes to proven in use self-declaration is done by product
suppliers and end-users. When the supplier self-declares proven in
use then the above point is applicable again. When the end-user
self declares then of course this is only of value if the analysis work
done within the company is performed with sufficient
independence and without any pressure from within the company.
Independently of the approach chosen a technical report should
explain and document the work performed. It details the basis of the
verification and assessment work. If there is no technical report then end
users do not know what work has been done, looses confidence, and
cannot demonstrate to any third party that they themselves are
compliant with the standard.
For an end-user the question is whether they can trust selfdeclaration or not. The same applies to independent third party
certification. But as stated before independent third parties should not
have any financial or political interest in a company and thus one should
be able to say that third party certification should be of higher trust then
self-declaration.
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Conclusion
SIS plays a vital role in providing protective layer functionality within
process industry and helps to reduce risk to As low As Reasonably
Practicable (ALARP). End users need to select device used within SIS
compliant with IEC 61508 / 61511 standards for their own peace of mind
and to be able to defend their decision to regulatory body. Two options
are available to demonstrate compliance with the standards i.e. for new
and existing devices to follow IEC 61508 requirement or for existing
devices to use IEC 61511 proven in use requirement.
Compliance against IEC 61508 can be demonstrated for a safety
device by fulfilment of specific requirements in each of the following
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References
1. The offshore Installation (Safety Case) Regulations 192 SI1992/2885
HMSO ISBN 011025869X
2. Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (Commencement No.1)
Order 1974, 1974/1439
3. Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999, SI 1999 No.
743 HMSO ISBN 0 11 0821920
4. Smith, D. J. and K. G. L. Simpson (2005). Functional safety A
straightforward guide to applying the IEC 61508 and related
standards. Burlington, U.K.: Elsevier
5. IEC 61508 (1998). Functional safety of electrical /electronic /
programmable electronic safety-related systems. Geneva:
International Electrotechnical Commission.
6. IEC 61511 (2003). Functional safety - safety instrumented systems for
the process industry. Geneva: International Electrotechnical
Commission.
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About Risknowlogy
Experts in Risk, Reliability and Safety
Risknowlogy was founded in 2002 with a passion for risk, reliability and
safety. We are particularly known for our leading role in functional
safety. At Risknowlogy we apply all typical risk, reliability and safety
techniques you might heard of: Bowtie, HAZOP, HAZID, LOPA, AHA,
OHA, PHA, QRA, FMEA, FMECA, ETA, Markov, FTA, Reliability Block
Diagrams, FMEDA, FSM, SIL Assessment, SIL Verification, SIL
Certification, Calibration Risk Matrix and Risk Graph, STL and so on.
But our services go beyond the application of the classic and standard
techniques. Contact Risknowlogy if you are in need of risk, reliability or
safety services.
At Risknowlogy we apply risk, reliability and safety techniques so that
our customers become more profitable. Our services help companies to
be compliant with standards and thus to meet regulatory requirements,
to meet the requests of insurance companies, to meet and exceed their
availability goals. And more availability leads to more profitability.
Not so typical for industry, but for us bread and butter, services we
have carried out for our customers:
Setup a risk, reliability, and safety competence program for the
technical employees of a chemical plant
Implement a risk management program including a functional
safety handbook for an oil refinery
Calculate the availability of gas supply (needed for electricity,
cooling) for a major city in the middle east
Decision support for the implementation of safety functions
including their proof test frequency for a petrochemical plant
Pipeline risk management program for countrys pipeline operator
Governmental functional safety audit program for tunnel operators
Decision support for the best out of five infrastructure solutions
taking into account image, environmental, cost, legal, sustainability
aspects for a local government.
Contact Risknowlogy if you are in need of a customised risk, reliability
or safety solution.
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History
Risknowlogy was founded in 2002 and is an employee owned
business. Today we have offices in Argentina, Colombia, Germany, India,
the Netherlands, Switzerland (HQ), the United Arab Emirates, the
United Kingdom and Uruguay. We offer our services in Dutch, English,
French, German, Italian, and Spanish.
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