EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs, with the

Committees on Peace, Unification and Reconciliation, and Finance drafted a
Joint Committee Report on the bloody Mamasapano operation conducted on 25
January 2015.
The Committees findings and recommendations are based on the
testimonies given under oath by the 37 resource persons who attended the five
public hearings and five executive sessions, as well as documents submitted,
including the PNP Board of Inquiry report, the Presidents public statements, and
all applicable laws.
The following are indicative findings of liability and the Committees leave
the conclusive determination of liability to the prosecutorial arm of the
government:

1. The concerned members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),

Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and other armed groups
murdered and robbed the Philippine National Police (PNP) Special Action
Force (SAF) Commandos.

The SAF troopers were outnumbered by various armed groups in the

Pintakasi which included the MILF, BIFF and private armed groups (PAGs). The
members of the 55th and 84th Special Action Company (SAC) were no match for
the firepower coming from the hundreds of armed men surrounding them.

Survivors recount how their companies were surrounded and decimated

even wounded SAF soldiers were fired upon. This was supported by the autopsy
reports which showed that the SAF commandos were shot at close range. At
least 26 out of the 44 SAF agents were shot in the head. Of the 26, 7 were shot
through the back of the head; 7 were shot near or between the eyes; 5 were shot
through the forehead; the rest were shot through the temples or through the
jaws.1

The trajectories of the bullets further indicate that the shots were fired
while victims lay on the ground. One skull was so severely injured that the point
of exit could no longer be determined. The autopsy report also found it possible

Pages 81 to 86 of the PDF format of the BOI Report entitled The Mamasapano Report.

that a number of the SAF troopers had their vests removed before they were
shot.

Clearly, there was no intent to let any of these men live.

Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), any person who acts
in defense of his person or rights does not incur any criminal liability provided
that the following circumstances concur: (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. There can be no selfdefense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed
unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense. The
assailants cannot validly claim that its fighters acted in self-defense because of
the absence of the element of unlawful aggression on the part of the PNP-SAF
troopers. Based on the testimony of the lone survivor from the 55 th SAC, the
troopers were stationary at the cornfield. The MILF fighters approached and
surrounded the 55th SAC, and later on, initiated the firefight with them. On the
contrary, the unlawful aggression was on the part of the MILF fighters. The
MILFs claim of self-defense is, therefore, unavailing.

Although the Committees leave the responsibility of identifying the

particular assailants to the Department of Justice, the following criminal charges
may be instituted against the MILF fighters, as well as those from the BIFF and
the members of other PAGs involved in the Mamasapano incident:

(1)

As to the deaths of the PNP-SAF troopers:

Murder as qualified by the circumstances of taking advantage

of superior strength and with the aid of armed men pursuant
to Article 248 of the RPC (with respect to the deaths of the
PNP-SAF troopers who are proven to have been given fatal,
finishing blows, the additional qualifying circumstance of
employing xxx means to insure or afford impunity may also be
appreciated);
(2)

As to the injuries suffered by some of the PNP-

SAF troopers: frustrated or attempted murder, depending on the

nature of the injuries sustained; and
(3)

As to the taking of the weapons, equipment,

uniforms and personal effects of the killed PNP-SAF troopers:

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Robbery as defined in Article 293 and qualified under Articles

294 and 295 of the Revised Penal Code.

Given that the MILF has declared that the actions of its fighters were not
sanctioned by their organization, and were committed in their private individual
capacities, the MILF fighters involved in the incident should be charged in their
individual and personal capacities as common criminals.

All those who qualify as accomplices and accessories to the above crimes
as defined in Articles 18 and 19, respectively, of the Revised Penal Code should
also be charged.

The Committees found unmeritorious and without basis the statement of

Mr. Mohagher Iqbal before the committees that the actions of the MILF fighters in
Mamasapano against the PNP-SAF troopers were not sanctioned by the MILF
leadership and were not part of any MILF operation and, therefore, such acts
were individual acts on the part of the MILF fighters, who claimed that they acted
in in self-defense as armed men entered their communities.

2. Police Director General Alan LM Purisima committed Usurpation of

Authority or Official Functions, violating Article 177 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) and Section 36(b)(4) of Presidential Decree No. 807, in relation
to Section 46(A)(3), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service:

On 4 December 2014, the Ombudsman issued an order preventively

suspending Purisima for a period of six months.

In all cases of preventive

suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his
office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile.

However, on 8 January 2015, Purisima informed the President through

text message at 5:29 p.m., Sir good afternoon. May I know on your convenient
time when can I report to you to brief regarding the impending operation against
HVTs in Maguindanao. Thank you sir.

Purisima received by 5:51 p.m. the

Presidents reply Bukas pagbalik mula sa Romblon.

Accordingly, on the following day of 9 January 2015, Purisima, Napeas,

and the Director of the Intelligence Group (IG) presented the mission update and
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the new concept of operation to President Aquino at the Bahay Pangarap in

Malacaang.
Thus, even before 8 January 2015, Purisima was already barred from
performing the functions of the Office of the Chief of the PNP. Yet, he personally
took charge over the presentation of the updated plan to get Marwan and Usman
before the President and accordingly made himself present when Napeas gave
the briefing and mission update on Oplan Exodus to the President at the 9
January 2015 meeting held at the Bahay Pangarap in Malacaang. Being on
preventive suspension, Purisima should not have been at this meeting, where a
highly classified police operation was being discussed. The President should
have excluded Purisima from this meeting.

After the said meeting, Purisima

even gave the following instructions to Napeas: Huwag mo munang sabihan

iyong dalawa.

Saka na pag nandoon na. Ako na ang bahala kay General

Catapang. Upon these instructions, the Secretary of Interior and Local

Government and the Officer-in-Charge of the PNP were deliberately kept
unaware of Oplan Exodus. Upon the Presidents instructions to coordinate the
operation with the AFP, Purisima took it upon himself to inform the Chief of Staff,
AFP of the operation, which he did at 5:51 a.m. on 25 January 2015.

Thereafter, at 1:27 p.m. on 13 January 2015, Purisima sought the

clearance and approval of the President by endorsing the verbatim message of
Napeas to him:
SIR FROM: DSAF Sir good PM, In consideration of the
comments of the Pres during our meeting re number of pers to
be deployed on the opns, recommend that we follow the
secondary date as the additional pers to be used are deployed
in Tacloban for the Popes visit. Also, the primary date is too
tight while we have a longer window on the secondary date. For
your consideration& approval.

Despite being on preventive suspension, Purisima continued to involve

himself in Oplan Exodus. In a message that he sent to Napeas on 19 January
2015, Purisima inquired, Leo, whats our plan? To this, Napeas responded,
Sir, good pm. The plan for the opns is go on the timeline. The troops will move
from Zambo to CenMin on January 21 to 22, 2015 while intel will closely monitor
the situation on the route of entry. There is no problem in the target area, preps
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continue so the troops are ready once situation is good. The warring faction
engaged & the entry of the PA is the factor denying us safety Sir.

It was even Purisima who informed the President of the neutralization of

Marwan in a text message at 5:45 a.m. on 25 January 2015. Until late in the
afternoon of 25 January 2015, it was Purisima who was providing the President
with updates on the progress of the operation. While the President was in
Zamboanga City for most of 25 January 2015 with the Secretaries of Defense
and of Interior and Local Governments, as well as the Chief of Staff of the AFP
and the OIC of the Philippine National Police, the President communicated only
with Purisima about the operation.
Upon Purisimas instructions, knowledge of Oplan Exodus was kept from
the Secretary of the DILG and the OIC of the PNP until the morning of 25
January 2015 when both the Seaborne and the 55 th SAC were already heavily
engaged with hostile forces. Purisima informed PDDG Espina of the operation
and the neutralization of Marwan in a 5:30 a.m. telephone conversation.
Clearly, PDG Purisimas actions with respect to Oplan Exodus during the
period of his suspension were in violation of Article 177 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides, as follows:

Usurpation of authority or official functions. - Any

person who shall knowingly and falsely represent himself to be
an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency
of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government, or
who, under pretense of official position, shall perform any act
pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the
Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any
agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so, shall
suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods.

Further, Purisima may be held administratively liable for grave misconduct

under Section 36(b)(4) of Presidential Decree No. 807 in relation to Section
46(A)(3), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service. Misconduct has been defined as a transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
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negligence by a public officer. On the other hand, when the elements of

corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule
are manifest, the public officer shall be liable for grave misconduct. Purisima
should also be held administratively liable for conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.

The acts of Purisima exercising the functions of the Office of the Chief,
PNP despite his preventive suspension constitute unlawful behavior. His actions
show a clear and manifest intent to defy the preventive suspension order of the
Ombudsman. His acts likewise constitute grave misconduct.

Purisima may also be held in indirect contempt by the Ombudsman for

disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process or order of the anti-graft
body.

3.

PDIR Getulio Napeas committed grave misconduct, violating

Section 36(b)(4) of Presidential Decree No. 807, in relation to Section

46(A)(3), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service:
Given that PDIR Getulio Napeas actions in directly coordinating and
reporting with suspended PDG Purisima instead of the PNP OIC PDDG Espina,
PDIR Napeas broke the PNP Chain of Command and for which he may be held
administratively liable for grave misconduct under Section 36(b)(4) of Presidential
Decree No. 807 in relation to Section 46(A)(3), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. PDIR Napeas had known that
Purisima was already under preventive suspension by the Office of the
Ombudsman long before the 9 January 2015 meeting with the President at the
Bahay Pangarap. This notwithstanding, he continued to follow the instructions
of PDG Purisima.

The PNP-SAF is a national operational support unit of the PNP under the
direct control of the Chief PNP. During the period of PDG Purisimas preventive
suspension, Napeas, as the Director of the PNP-SAF, could only legitimately
take and follow orders and directives from PDDG Espina, who was designated
Officer-in-Charge of the PNP by the President. Certainly, PDIR Napeas should
not have followed orders given by the suspended Purisima.

Napeas may also be held administratively liable for inefficiency and

incompetence in the performance of official duties and for conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the service on account of the poor planning and execution of
Oplan Exodus and his failure to coordinate the operation with the AFP.

4. The President must bear responsibility for giving assent to and failing to
prevent the unlawful exercise of official functions by PDG Purisima in
connection with Oplan Exodus.

It is beyond doubt that the President was fully aware that PDG Purisima
was preventively suspended by the Ombudsman on 4 December 2014, and that
PDDG Espina was designated Officer-in-Charge of the PNP on 12 December
2014. Yet, the President:
1.
Allowed PDG Purisima to join the 9 January 2015
meeting at the Bahay Pangarap, where a sensitive and
classified PNP operation was being discussed;
2.
Instructed PDG Purisima to coordinate Oplan
Exodus with the AFP;
3.
Communicated exclusively with PDG Purisima in
regard the progress of Oplan Exodus on 25 January 2015; and
4.
Gave instructions to PDG Purisima as to the
conduct of Oplan Exodus on 25 January 2015, as when the
President sent PDG Purisima a text message reading, Basit
should not get away.
The President himself admitted that all the communication regarding
Oplan Exodus emanating from him to PDIR Napeas, and vice-versa, was being
coursed through a then suspended PDG Purisima. The President said:
Una kong natanggap na text, nandito pa ho sa
telepono ko, parang pinadala ng 5:45aminin ko nakapatay
yung telepono ko, 7:00 more or less nung pagbangon (ko)
binuksan, sinagot ko siyang about 7:30 or soat sinabi sa akin
doon sa text ni Director General (Alan) Purisima Sa kanya ko
ho dinadaan kasi parati mula nung umpisa yung mga
mensahe ng director ng SAF. Hindi ko ho kausap yung
director ng SAF e, diretsuhan, mula nungumpisa. So
naabot si Marwan, na-neutralize, nagkaroon ng firefight at
napaatras sila. Sa dulo ho sa palitan namin, tinanong kokasi
nakalagay ho sa text niya 15 hanggang 20 katao ang lumaban
dito sa puwersa natinso ang tanong ko sakanya: 160 yung
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ipinadala ninyo, mayroong suportang AFP at saka PNP units

pa, bakit aatras yung 160 kung ang lumalaban 15 hanggang
20? (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing shows that the President knew that PDG Purisima was
exercising official functions despite the latters preventive suspension, and did
nothing to prevent it. The President assented to PDG Purisimas unlawful
exercise of official functions, and continued to communicate with PDG Purisima
in regard the Oplan Exodus.

5. The President must show leadership.

The Mamasapano incident raises serious questions about whether the

President, as well as some other high-ranking officials of the government, could
have done more to minimize the number of deaths which resulted from the
incident. The President has publicly acknowledged that he approved Oplan
Exodus. He knew of the importance and magnitude of the operation, as well as
the dangers that it posed to the operating troops.

If we are to believe the testimonies of the resource persons who were in

Zamboanga, it appears that the ongoing operation at Mamasapano was not
discussed further by the President and the key security officials who were with
him.

Did any of them endeavor to get more information about the incident?
More importantly, did any of them take action to reinforce or rescue the
beleaguered PNP SAF troops? It appears that the President, along with Sec.
Roxas, Sec. Gazmin, Gen. Catapang, could have done more.

Perhaps, if the President and the key security officials who were with him
in Zamboanga City discussed the incident and shared information with each
other at the early stages of the day, coordination between the Army and the PNP
might have been hastened and fewer lives would have been lost.

As the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines, the

President exercises supreme operational command of the nations military
forces. The President also controls all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He wields the awesome powers of government, and has its vast
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resources at his disposal. The Presidents decision not to use these resources at
that instance, must be explained by him. The President is ultimately responsible
for the outcome of the mission.

In police or military operations, the decisions are made by ground

commanders. However, in this instance, what was required was inter-agency
coordination which might have been easily ordered by the Commander-in-Chief.
The President might have stepped in and taken responsibility, especially since he
was familiar with the plan. In his defense, the President says he was given
inaccurate information, and is orders to coordinate with the PNP hierarchy and
AFP were disobeyed.

If there is one thing the President should be commended for, it is his

unwavering commitment to finding a genuine and lasting peace in Mindanao.
Under his term, finding a political solution to the decades-long violent conflict has
been made priority and rightly so.

At this crucial time, it is imperative that the President display

unquestionable leadership, be forthright and candid with our people, accept
responsibility for all decisions he makes as President, and admit the mistakes he
made along the way.

6. There are indications that the planning and the execution of the Oplan
Exodus were not 100% Filipino planned and implemented.

The testimonies of various resource persons, particularly during the

executive hearings, provide indications that the US had significant participation in
Oplan Exodus. This is contrary to the submission of the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) that based on their discussions with the United States authorities,
they were able to ascertain that the planning and the execution of the Oplan
Exodus were 100% Filipino planned and implemented.

The following facts, based on testimonies which the Committees had

approved to be made public, were attested to:

Napeas brought three Americans into the Army

Brigade headquarters (HQ). A helicopter arrived and three more
Americans came into the HQ and joined Napeas at his work
table.
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One of the Americans, identified by Napeas as
Mr. Al Katz, supposedly handled the training of the Seaborne
unit.

One of the Americans ordered Maj. Gen.

Edmundo Pangilinan to fire the artillery. However, Pangilinan
refused and told him, Do not dictate to me what to do. I am the
commander here!

The Americans provided surveillance in the area

through their Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR).
TV monitors were brought in by the Americans to the HQ.
Briefly, ISR in the United States is shorthand for the system of
collection assets and analysts which brings information about the enemy or
potential enemy to the decision-maker, whether that decision-maker is a top
general in Washington, DC or a soldier on the ground facing an armed attacker.
During the public hearings on the Mamasapano incident, Napeas
admitted that a U.S. counterpart was involved in at least three aspects intelligence cooperation, training and equipment provision:
MR. NAPEAS: Your Honor, tumulong iyong US counterpart
doon sa intelligence Mayroon kaming isang US counterpart
doon sa Seaborne who is working with them in terms of training
at saka iyongequipment provision, Your Honor. Kasama po
iyon na ibinibigay nila iyong maps na ginagamit for operation.
But never nakasama iyong US counterpart in actual combat
operation.

Although the DFA emphasized that the only constitutionally restricted

activity in Philippine cooperation with the US under existing agreements is that,
they (US) may not and have not, in the case of Mamasapano either, engage in
combat operations and which nonparticipation in combat was affirmed by PDIR
Napeas, the Committees recommend that the executive branch, in particular the
DFA and the VFA Commission, consider taking steps to clarify and address
issues regarding US role and involvement in domestic counter-terrorism and
internal security that surfaced in our legislative inquiry into the Mamasapano
incident. For example,
(a)

What should be the policy of the Philippine

government, in this regard, that best upholds Philippine

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sovereignty and interests and promotes compliance with the

Philippines human rights and similar legal obligations under
domestic and international laws?
(b)
ground-level)

Given policy-level, strategic, and operational (and

arrangements

and

protocols

presumably

negotiated and agreed on by the Philippines and the US, how

are these translated into complementary, coherent,

and

accountable structures, systems, and procedures at all stages

of counter-terrorism and internal security-related campaigns
from policy setting, planning, execution,

and post-law

enforcement operation?
In this connection, the Committees note that the Anti-Terrorism Council
(ATC), which was established under the Human Security Act, may be well within
its mandate and functions under this law to initiate discussions and propose
appropriate actions within the executive branch. The ATCs membership includes
the secretaries of foreign affairs, national defense, justice, and interior and local
governments. These are executive agencies that are directly concerned with
addressing the foregoing and related issues. The chairpersonship of the ATC by
the Executive Secretary and the membership in it of the Presidential Adviser on
National Security, in our view, enhance the diversity of positions, perspectives,
and interests that need to be taken into account in the deliberation of these
matters.

6. Should the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have fired the white
phosphorus or artillery rounds much earlier? Did the strategy to promote
the peace process hinder the AFP from engaging in a more aggressive
response?
The AFP did not fire artillery support for the 55th SAC in the morning of 25
January, owing to incomplete information from the PNP-SAF. On the other hand,
the white phosphorous, which appears to be crucial in the retreating 84th
Seaborne unit, was only fired at 5:48 p.m., almost 11 hours after gun battle
ensued.

If the AFP had been allowed by circumstances to respond earlier in the

day to support the pinned down 55th SAC, it is possible that the battle might have
ended sooner. The AFP, as a party to the cessation of hostilities with the MILF
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may have been constrained by the peace process, considered as the centerpiece
of our current national security program. Had the AFP been more decisive,
proactive, and swifter in their actions in seeking ways to comply with the doctrinal
requirements for firing artillery support, would the loss of lives have been
minimized?

7. The Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP)

should pursue peace with justice

The President should be commended for his unwavering commitment to

finding a genuine and lasting peace in Mindanao. It was in his term that the
primacy of the peace agreement was put in effect as the centerpiece of the
countrys national security policy.

The OPAPP was at the helm of executing this policy, however, it is

impossible to have peace without justice. Should the government continue to
deal with the MILF which refuses to submit the findings of its internal
investigations into the incident or disclose the identities of those involved in the
massacre? The peace that we must seek must be based on justice where the
rule of law reigns supreme, and where criminals are prosecuted and punished
accordingly. #

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