Consti Law Part 1
Consti Law Part 1
Consti Law Part 1
Niceforo Solis) 1
1ST EXAM COVERAGE CASE COMPILATION
I. IN GENERAL
A. POLITICAL LAW DEFINED
MACARIOLA v. ASUNCION
114 S 77 (1982)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
BERNARDITA R. MACARIOLA, complainant,
vs.
HONORABLE ELIAS B. ASUNCION, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Leyte, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J:
In a verified complaint dated August 6, 1968 Bernardita R.
Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of
the Court of First Instance of Leyte, now Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals, with "acts unbecoming a judge."
The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated
May 27, 1971 of then Associate Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma
of the Court of Appeals now retired Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court, to whom this case was referred on October
28, 1968 for investigation, thus:
Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte
was a complaint for partition filed by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz
R. Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela
Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against Bernardita R.
Macariola, defendant, concerning the properties left by the
deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of the
plaintiff and defendant.
In her defenses to the complaint for partition, Mrs. Macariola
alleged among other things that; a) plaintiff Sinforosa R.
Bales was not a daughter of the deceased Francisco Reyes;
b) the only legal heirs of the deceased were defendant
Macariola, she being the only offspring of the first marriage
of Francisco Reyes with Felisa Espiras, and the remaining
plaintiffs who were the children of the deceased by his
second marriage with Irene Ondez; c) the properties left by
the deceased were all the conjugal properties of the latter
and his first wife, Felisa Espiras, and no properties were
acquired by the deceased during his second marriage; d) if
there was any partition to be made, those conjugal
properties should first be partitioned into two parts, and one
part is to be adjudicated solely to defendant it being the
share of the latter's deceased mother, Felisa Espiras, and
the other half which is the share of the deceased Francisco
already ruled that "... for the prohibition to operate, the sale
or assignment of the property must take place during the
pendency of the litigation involving the property" (The
Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979],
Rosario vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641,
646 [1978]).
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased
on March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in
Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was
already final because none of the parties therein filed an
appeal within the reglementary period; hence, the lot in
question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, at
the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order
dated October 23, 1963 and the amended order
dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963
project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963
decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from
said orders.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in
question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier
purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the
plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R.
Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No.
3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more specifically
one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla
Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and
Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and the same was
subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to
Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the
Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965 he
sold a portion of said lot to respondent Judge and his wife
who declared the same for taxation purposes only. The
subsequent sale on August 31, 1966 by spouses Asuncion
and spouses Galapon of their respective shares and interest
in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the president and
his wife was the secretary, took place long after the finality of
the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent
two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of
partition.
While it appears that complainant herein filed on or
about November 9 or 11, 1968 an action before the Court of
First Instance of Leyte docketed as Civil Case No. 4234,
seeking to annul the project of partition and the two orders
approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate and
the subsequent conveyances, the same, however, is of no
moment.
The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on
March 6, 1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio
Galapon; hence, after the finality of the decision which he
rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No. 3010 and his two
questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and November
11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer subject of
litigation.
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate
paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring
by purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in
his court, it was, however, improper for him to have acquired
the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official
conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety,
and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench and in
the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday
life, should be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by
the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on
the part of respondent to have purchased or acquired a
portion of a piece of property that was or had been in
litigation in his court and caused it to be transferred to a
corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers at
the time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted
position in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility of
maintaining the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of
justice, so that not only must he be truly honest and just, but
his actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and
mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In
this particular case of respondent, he cannot deny that the
transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and render his
actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even if respondent
honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in litigation
in his court and that he was purchasing it from a third person
and not from the parties to the litigation, he should
nonetheless have refrained from buying it for himself and
transferring it to a corporation in which he and his wife were
financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his
acquisition was related in one way or another to his official
actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent
gave cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers
practising in his court, and the public in general to doubt the
honesty and fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our
courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).
II
With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant
alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5,
Article 14 of the Code of Commerce when he associated
himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said
PER CURIAM:
In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents,
petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section
5 (not Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the
proposed 1986 Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and
Vice-President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for
purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to
noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and VicePresident under this Constitution shall be held on the second
Monday of May, 1992.
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA. June 29, 1992.]
LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO of
the Court of Appeals dated 14 November 1990.
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
An original action for Prohibition instituted by petitioners
seeking to enjoin respondents from replacing them from their
respective positions as Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay,
Province of Rizal.
[MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive
Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity
as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO
S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of
public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of
the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders,
letter of implementation and administrative orders.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have
this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners
have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant
petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any
showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected
or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the
presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are
without the requisite legal personality to institute this
mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved
parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal,
corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to
do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the
petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the
subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is
to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not
show any specific interest for their petition to be given due
course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as
the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act
of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was
not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and
imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425,
442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566.
It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to
the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be
taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular
conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to
have become vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public
policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions
are among the most difficult of those which have engaged
the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest
from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs.
Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium
Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law
was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential
decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an
operative fact which may have consequences which cannot
be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court,
it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by
petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278,
and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so
published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of
these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are
available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is
undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever
been implemented or enforced by the government.
In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon
Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the
public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the
said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The
cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by
respondent officials considering the manifestation in their
comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains
from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same
shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some
other publication, even though some criminal laws provide
that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to
publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
SO ORDERED.
5. When is the publication to be made?
TANADA v TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
LORENZO M. TA;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive
Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in
his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET
AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding
the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which
they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as
a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval. In the
decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the
necessity for the publication of some of these decrees,
declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE,
the
Court
hereby
orders
respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move
for reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1Specifically,
they ask the following questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general
applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general
applicability and laws which are not?
CONSTRUCTION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are
over. This is once again an open society, with all the acts of
the government subject to public scrutiny and available
always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country
is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the
people and all government authority emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they
retain the authority to review the work of their delegates and
to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their
freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they
cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun
instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to
make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint
parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above
defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon
thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their
The FiIipino
First
Policy enshrined
in
the
1987
Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, 1 is in
oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic
Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the
provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing
legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether
the 51% shares form part of the national economy and
patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the
Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The winning bidder,
or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management
expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability
and performance of the Manila Hotel. 2 In a close bidding
held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or
15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the
1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any legislation to put it
in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable When our
Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when
our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain
specified circumstances an action may be maintained to
enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission 34 explains
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and
developed refers not only to out rich natural resources but
also to the cultural heritage of out race. It also refers to our
intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we
should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other
natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our
people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term
patrimony pertains to heritage. 35 When the Constitution
speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual. 27
It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical
presence in Alabel, Sarangani since December 1996 was
sufficiently established by the lease of a house and lot
located therein in January 1997 and by the affidavits and
certifications under oath of the residents of that place that
they have seen petitioner and his family residing in their
locality.
While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself
sufficient to show that from said date he had transferred his
residence in that place. To establish a new domicile of
choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with
conduct indicative of that intention. While "residence" simply
requires bodily presence in a given place, "domicile" requires
not only such bodily presence in that place but also a
declared and probable intent to make it one's fixed and
permanent place of abode, one's home. 28
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile,
physical presence in the locality involved and intention to
adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a
new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of
these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile
without actual residence in the locality does not result in
acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical
presence without intention. 29
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997,
does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease
contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in
Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile.
The mere absence of individual from his permanent
residence, no matter how long, without the intention to
abandon it does not result in loss or change of
domicile. 30 Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house
and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January
1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other
circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year
residence requirement.
Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence
in Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of
registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City.
While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise
to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case
where DOMINO registered in his former barangay.
Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate
public assertion of the fact of residence, and is said to have
decided preponderance in a doubtful case upon the place
the elector claims as, or believes to be, his residence. 31 The
fact that a party continously voted in a particular locality is a
strong factor in assisting to determine the status of his
domicile. 32
His claim that his registration in Quezon City was erroneous
and was caused by events over which he had no control
EN BANC
x------------------------------------------x
b)
c)
d)
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN
RULING
THAT
PETITIONERS
COMPLAINT THAT EXECUTIVE ORDER
NO. 102 IS DETRIMENTAL TO THE
FILIPINO
IS
LIKEWISE
NOT
A
JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY AND
THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS THE
AUTHORITY TO ISSUE SAID ORDER;
AND
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN
UPHOLDING TECHNICALITIES OVER
AND
ABOVE
THE
ISSUES
OF
TRANSCENDENTAL
IMPORTANCE
RAISED IN THE PETITION BELOW. [16]
for so long as they are pursued in good faiththat is, for the
purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.
[38]
On the other hand, if the reorganization is done for the
purpose of defeating security of tenure or for ill-motivated
political purposes, any abolition of position would be
invalid. None of these circumstances are applicable since
none of the petitioners were removed from public service,
nor did they identify any action taken by the DOH that would
unquestionably result in their dismissal. The reorganization
that was pursued in the present case was made in good
faith. The RSP was clearly designed to improve the
efficiency of the department and to implement the provisions
of the Local Government Code on the devolution of health
services to local governments. While this Court recognizes
the inconvenience suffered by public servants in their
deployment to distant areas, the executive departments
finding of a need to make health services available to these
areas and to make delivery of health services more efficient
and more compelling is far from being unreasonable or
arbitrary, a determination which is well within its authority. In
all, this Court finds petitioners contentions to be insufficient
to invalidate Executive Order No. 102.
Without identifying the DOH employees concerned,
much less including them as parties to the petition,
petitioners went on identifying several errors in the
implementation of Executive Order No. 102. First, they
alleged that unidentified DOH employees suffered from a
diminution of compensation by virtue of the provision on
Salaries and Benefits found in Department Circular No. 312,
Series of 2000, issued on 23 October 2000, which reads:
2. Any employee who was matched to a
position with lower salary grade (SG) shall
not suffer a reduction in salary except
where his/her current salary is higher than
the maximum step of the SG of the new
position, in which case he/she shall be
paid the salary corresponding to the
maximum step of the SG of the new
position. RATA shall no longer be
received, if employee was matched to a
Non-Division Chief Position.
12 months
Position
Chief Officer
US$1,400.00
Hours of work
Overtime
I
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided
the case in a way not in accord with applicable decision of
the Supreme Court involving similar issue of granting unto
the migrant worker back wages equal to the unexpired
portion of his contract of employment instead of limiting it to
three (3) months
II
US$4,245.00
III
424.50
TOTAL
US$4,669.50
SO ORDERED.19
The NLRC corrected the LA's computation of the lump-sum
salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the applicable
salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A.
No. 8042 "does not provide for the award of overtime pay,
which should be proven to have been actually performed,
and for vacation leave pay."20
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this
time he questioned the constitutionality of the subject
clause.21 The NLRC denied the motion.22
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari23 with the CA,
reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject
clause.24 After initially dismissing the petition on a
technicality, the CA eventually gave due course to it, as
directed by this Court in its Resolution dated August 7, 2003
which granted the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R.
No. 151833, filed by petitioner.
In a Decision dated December 8, 2004, the CA affirmed the
NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate;
however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by
petitioner.25
His Motion for Reconsideration26 having been denied by the
CA,27 petitioner brings his cause to this Court on the
following grounds:
Does
the
subject
clause
violate
Article III of the Constitution on
of contracts?
Section
10,
non-impairment
the
subject
clause
violate
III of the Constitution, and
Section
Section
1,
18,
3,
Article
XIII
on
labor
of living, and improve the quality of life for all." Any act of
Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum
deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass
muster. (Emphasis supplied)
Imbued with the same sense of "obligation to afford
protection to labor," the Court in the present case also
employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it
perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification
prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially
neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer
examination reveals that the subject clause has a
discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on,
OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than
one year vis--vis OFWs with employment
contracts ofone year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts
of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixedperiod employment;
OFWs with employment contracts of less than one
year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of one
year or more
As pointed out by petitioner,78 it was in Marsaman Manning
Agency,
Inc.
v.
National
Labor
Relations
Commission79 (Second Division, 1999) that the Court laid
down the following rules on the application of the periods
prescribed under Section 10(5) of R.A. No. 804, to wit:
A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice
of which amount to award an illegally dismissed
overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his salaries for
the unexpired portion of his employment contract or
three (3) months salary for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less, comes into play only when the
employment contract concerned has a term of at least
one (1) year or more. This is evident from the words "for
every year of the unexpired term" which follows the
words "salaries x x x for three months."To follow
petitioners thinking that private respondent is entitled to
three (3) months salary only simply because it is the lesser
amount is to completely disregard and overlook some words
used in the statute while giving effect to some. This is
contrary to the well-established rule in legal hermeneutics
that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every
part or word thereof be given effect since the law-making
body is presumed to know the meaning of the words
employed in the statue and to have used them advisedly. Ut
res magis valeat quam pereat.80 (Emphasis supplied)
In Marsaman, the OFW involved was illegally dismissed two
months into his 10-month contract, but was awarded his
Workers
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
- versus -
SO ORDERED.
DATU MICHAEL ABAD KIDA v. SENATE
659 S 270 (2011)
667 S 270 (2012)
- versus -
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
- versus -
- versus -
- versus -
- versus -
b)
c)
d)
I.
Whether
mandates
elections
II.
The Arguments
The petitioners assailing RA No. 9140, RA No. 9333
and RA No. 10153 assert that these laws amend RA No.
9054 and thus, have to comply with the supermajority vote
and plebiscite requirements prescribed under Sections 1 and
3, Article XVII of RA No. 9094 in order to become effective.
The Issues
1987 Constitution
synchronization of
Oral
arguments
were
held
on August
9,
2011 and August 16, 2011. Thereafter, the parties were
instructed to submit their respective memoranda within
twenty (20) days.
the
the
IV.
OUR RULING
We resolve
to DISMISS the
petitions
and
thereby UPHOLD the constitutionality of RA No. 10153 in
toto.
as
recognized
constitutional
The
presidential
certification
dispensed with the requirement not only of
printing but also that of reading the bill on
separate days. The phrase "except when
the President certifies to the necessity of
its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI,
Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated
[19]
Section 4(3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable
solely to the President and Vice-President, states:
xxxx
Section 4. xxx Unless otherwise
provided by law, the regular election for
President and Vice-President shall be held
on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis
ours]
Conclusion
Mr. Romulo. Therefore, complete
autonomy is not really thought of as
complete independence.
Mr. Ople. We define it as a
measure of self-government within the
larger political framework of the nation.
[84]
[Emphasis supplied.]
This exchange of course is fully and expressly reflected in
the above-quoted Section 17, Article X of the Constitution,
and by the express reservation under Section 1 of the same
Article that autonomy shall be within the framework of this
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
we DISMISS the consolidated petitions assailing the validity
of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and UPHOLD the
constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the temporary
restraining order we issued in our Resolution of September
13, 2011. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
II.
III.
THE
SUPERMAJORITY
PROVISIONS
OF
THE
- versus -
V.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
THE
RULING
IN OSMENA DOES NOT APPLY
TO ARMM ELECTED OFFICIALS
WHOSE TERMS OF OFFICE
ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR BY
THE
CONSTITUTION
BUT
PRESCRIBED
BY
THE
ORGANIC ACTS.
VI.
THE REQUIREMENT OF A
SUPERMAJORITY OF VOTES
IN
THE
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES AND THE
SENATE FOR THE VALIDITY OF
A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT
OR
REVISION
OF
THE
ORGANIC ACTS DOES NOT
IMPOSE AN IRREPEALABLE
LAW.
VII.
THE REQUIREMENT OF A
PLEBISCITE
FOR
THE
EFFECTIVITY
OF
A
SUBSTANTIVE
AMENDMENT
OR
REVISION
OF
THE
ORGANIC ACTS DOES NOT
UNDULY
EXPAND
THE
PLEBISCITE
REQUIREMENT
OF THE CONSTITUTION.
VIII.
SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE
ARMM ELECTION WITH THE
NATIONAL
AND
LOCAL
ELECTIONS IS NOT MANDATED
BY THE CONSTITUTION.
IX.
BALANCE OF INTERESTS
TILT IN FAVOR OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE[.][1]
I.
II.
V.
VI.
A.
ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING
THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF OICs FOR
THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
ARMM IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO
BEGIN WITH, SUCH APPOINTMENT OF
OIC
REGIONAL
OFFICIALS
WILL
CREATE A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN
THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE
REGIONAL GOVERNMENT SUCH THAT
R.A. NO. 10153 SHOULD HAVE BEEN
SUBMITTED TO A PLEBISCITE IN THE
ARMM FOR APPROVAL BY ITS PEOPLE,
WHICH PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT
CANNOT BE CIRCUMVENTED BY
SIMPLY
CHARACTERIZING
THE
PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 10153 ON
APPOINTMENT OF OICs AS AN
INTERIM MEASURE.
xxxx
B.
III.
IV.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
D.
WITH THE CANCELLATION OF THE
AUGUST 2011 ARMM ELECTIONS,
SPECIAL
ELECTIONS
MUST
IMMEDIATELY BE HELD FOR THE
ELECTIVE REGIONAL OFFICIALS OF
THE ARMM WHO SHALL SERVE UNTIL
THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN
THE
MAY
2013
SYNCHRONIZED
ELECTIONS.[4]
the
Constitutional
mandate
of
synchronization does not apply to the
ARMM elections;
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
Section
5. Postponement
of
election. - When for any serious cause
such
as violence, terrorism, loss
or
destruction of election paraphernalia or
records, force
majeure,
and other
analogous causes of such a nature that
the holding of a free, orderly and honest
election should become impossible in any
political
subdivision,
the
Commission, motu proprio or upon a
verified petition by any interested party,
and after due notice and hearing, whereby
all interested parties are afforded equal
opportunity to be heard, shall postpone
the election therein to a date which
should be reasonably close to the date
of the election not held, suspended or
which resulted in a failure to elect but
not later than thirty days after the
cessation of the cause for such
postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect.
CHAVEZ v. JBC
In this regard, we note an important distinction
between Tolentino and the present case. While it may be
true that Tolentino and the present case are similar in that, in
both cases, the petitions assailing the challenged laws were
dismissed by the Court, an examination of the dispositive
portion of the decision in Tolentino reveals that the Court did
not categorically lift the TRO. In sharp contrast, in the
present case, we expressly lifted the TRO issued on
September 13, 2011. There is, therefore, no legal
impediment to prevent the President from exercising his
authority to appoint an acting ARMM Governor and Vice
Governor as specifically provided for in RA No. 10153.
Conclusion
doctrine
is
applicable
when
a
declaration
of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those
who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a
criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would
put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the
acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating
it.33
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception
applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its
finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the
JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect the
Constitution which was ratified by the direct action of the
Filipino people, it cannot correct what respondents perceive
as a mistake in its mandate. Neither can the Court, in the
exercise of its power to interpret the spirit of the Constitution,
read into the law something that is contrary to its express
provisions and justify the same as correcting a perceived
inadvertence. To do so would otherwise sanction the Court
action of making amendment to the Constitution through a
judicial pronouncement.
In other words, the Court cannot supply the legislative
omission. According to the rule of casus omissus "a case
omitted is to be held as intentionally omitted." 34 "The principle
proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular
person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under its
power of interpretation supply the omission even though the
omission may have resulted from inadvertence or because
the
case
in
question
was
not
foreseen
or
contemplated."36 "The Court cannot supply what it thinks the
legislature would have supplied had its attention been called
to the omission, as that would be judicial legislation."37
Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another
member by judicial construction.
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the
Court tasked to guard the Constitution against usurpation.
The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers in the
sphere granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial activism
should never be allowed to become judicial exuberance. 38 In
cases like this, no amount of practical logic or convenience
can convince the Court to perform either an excision or an
insertion that will change the manifest intent of the Framers.
To broaden the scope of congressional representation in the
JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which
was not included in the provision as enacted. True to its
constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor
constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all of
situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed
solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion, the
Court declines.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
respondents is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.