Caltex Philippines, Inc.

, petitioner-appellee
Vs.

to person whose rights are affected by a statute, to determine any question of

construction or validity arising under the statute and for a declaration of rights
thereunder.

Enrico Palomar, in his capacity as The Postmaster General, respondentappellant

In amplification, conformably established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down

certain conditions:

FACTS:

There must be a justiciable controversy.

The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse.
The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy.
The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
With the appellees bent to hold the contest and the appellants threat to issue a fraud
order if carried out, the contenders are confronted by an ominous shadow of imminent
and inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized by a
declaration. And, contrary to the insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past
when it can rightly be said that merely the appellees desires are thwarted by its own
doubts, or by the fears of others which admittedly does not confer a cause of
action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in
the case at bar, it was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually
contested.

In the year 1960, Caltex Philippines conceived and laid the ground work for a
promotional scheme calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. The contest
was entitled Caltex Hooded Pump Contest, which calls for participants to estimate
the actual number of liters as hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense
during a specific period.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for
publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of communications,
representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be
cleared in advance for mailing. This was formalized in a letter sent by Caltex to the
Post master General, dated October 31, 1960, in which Caltex, thru its counsel,
enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the
contest does not violate the The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law.
Unfortunately, the Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied Caltexs
request stating that the contest scheme falls within the purview of the Anti-lottery
Provision and ultimately, declined Clatexs request for clearance.
Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there being no consideration
involved in part of the contestant, the contest was not commendable as a lottery.
However, the Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest involves
consideration, or even it does not involve any consideration it still falls as Gift
Enterprise, which was equally banned by the Postal Law.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief?
Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex the appellee is within the coverage of
the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law?
HELD:

Construction

Is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of
the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given
case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just
reached is not without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117
A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged in promotional advertising was advised by
the county prosecutor that its proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of
a lottery, and that if such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation would be
subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled to
maintain a declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor to determine the
legality of its sales promotion plan.
II.
Is the Contest Scheme a Lottery?

I.
Lottery
By express mandate of Section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court which deals with
the applicability to invoke declaratory relief which states: Declaratory relief is available

Extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance

e.g. policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles and fairs as well as various
forms of gambling.
Three Essential Elements:
Consideration
Prize
3. Chance
No, according to the Supreme Court, the contest scheme is not a lottery but it
appears to be more of a gratuitous distribution since nowhere in the rules is any
requirements that any fee be paid, any merchandise be bought, any services be
rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to participate. Since, a
prospective contestant has to do is go to a Caltex Station, request for the entry form
which is available on demand and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of
the winner. Because of this, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration
which would brand it as a lottery.
Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance,
if no consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance,
but it does condemn as criminal scheme in which a valuable consideration of some
kind is paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
Is the scheme, as sales promotion which would benefit the sponsor in the way of
increased patronage be considered as a consideration and thus violates the Postal
Law?
No, the required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit
derived by the sponsors of the contest. The true test lies on whether or not the
participant pays a valuable consideration for the chance of winning and not whether or
not those conducting the enterprise receiver something of value for the distribution of
the prize.
Is the Contest Scheme a Gift Enterprise?
Even if the term Gift Enterprise is not yet defined explicitly, there appears to be
a consensus among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is common
applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods are sold for their market value but
by way of inducement to purchase the product, the purchaser is given a chance to win
a prize.
And thus, the term of gift enterprise cannot be established in the case at bar
since there is not sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an

inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestant

irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellees products.
The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is that every
case must be resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory
provision. It is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no
other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated
therewith.
In the end, the Supreme Court ruled out that under the prohibitive provision of the
Postal Law, gift enterprise and similar schemes therein contemplated are
condemnable only if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration. Finding
non in the contest, it was ruled out that the appellee may not be denied the use of the
mails for the purpose thereof.
PCFI v. NTC
Statutory Construction. Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire.
PCFI v. NTC
G.R. No. L-63318 November 25, 1983
FACTS:
Private respondent PLDT filed an application with the NTC for the approval of a
revised schedule for its Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP). The NTC issued an exparte order provisionally approving the revised schedule which, however, was set
aside by this Court on August 31, 1982. The Court therein ruled that "there was
necessity of a hearing by the Commission before it should have acted on the
application of the PLDT. On November 22, 1982, the NTC rendered the questioned
decision permanently approving PLDT's new and increased SIP rates. It is the
submission of petitioner that the SIP schedule presented by the PLDT is pre-mature
and, therefore, illegal and baseless, because the NTC has not yet promulgated the
required rules and regulations implementing Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 217.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion when it approved the
Revised Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) of respondent PLDT in the absence of
specific rules and regulations implementing Presidential Decree No. 217.
HELD:
There is merit in the contention of petitioner that it is the duty of respondent NTC to
promulgate rules and regulations. In the separate opinion of Justice Abad Santos, it is
said that the case involves a simple problem of statutory construction - that of Section
2 of Presidential Decree No. 217. The decision sustained the petitioner's contention
that it is the duty of NTC to first promulgate rules and regulations. The resolution does

not subscribe to the view that the NTC should or must promulgate rules and
regulations because the decree must be given its ordinary meaning; the word used is
the permissive "may" and not the mandatory "shall." The non-unanimous resolution
thus relies on the canons index animi sermo est (speech is the indication of intent) and
a verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of the statute there should be no
departure). Any lawyer of modest sophistication knows that canons of statutory
construction march in pairs of opposite. Thus with the canons above mentioned we
have the following opposite: verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire (words
ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words). It is an
elementary rule in statutory construction that the word "may" in a statute is permissive
while the word "shall" is mandatory. The rule, however, is not absolute. The literal
interpretation of the words of an act should not prevail if it creates a result contrary to
the apparent intention of the legislature and if the words are sufficiently flexible to
admit of a construction which will effectuate the legislative intention. In the case at bar
compelling reasons dictate that the provision of the decree should be construed as
mandatory rather than merely directory. There is no justification for the rate increase of
the revised schedule of PLDT's SIP. It is untimely, considering the present economic
condition obtaining in the country. The approved rate defeats the purpose of the
decree which is to spread ownership among the wide base of investors. Accordingly,
the decision of NTC is annulled and set aside.
National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma
GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1
concur with comments, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts:
On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the Ministry of Labor and
Employment(Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City), a petition for direct
certification as the sole exclusivecollective bargaining representative of the monthly
paid employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing plantof the Zamboanga Wood
Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17 April 1982, such employees charged the
firmbefore the same office for underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3 May
1982, the union issued anotice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal termination of
Dionisio Estioca, president of the said localunion; unfair labor practice; nonpayment of
living allowances; and employment of oppressive alienmanagement personnel
without proper permit. The strike began on 23 May 1982.On 9 July 1982, Zambowood
filed a complaint with the trial court against the officers and members of theunion, for
damages for obstruction of private property with prayer for preliminary injunction
and/orrestraining order. The union filed a motion for the dismissal and for the
dissolution of the restrainingorder, and opposition to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction, contending that the incidents of picketing are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa 227
(LaborCode, Article 217) and not to the Court of First Instance. The motion was
denied. Hence, the petition forcertiorari.
Issue:

Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.

Held:
The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and
interpretation comeonly after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible
or inadequate without them.Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding
is conferred by the sovereign authority whichorganizes the court; and it is given only
by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred bylaw in words that do not
admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is
derivedexclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue should be resolved on the
basis of the law or statutein force. Therefore, since (1) the original wording of Article
217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction;since (2) Presidential Decree 1691
reverted the jurisdiction with respect to money claims of workers orclaims for damages
arising from employer-employee relations to the labor arbiters after PresidentialDecree
1367 transferred such jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and since (3) Batas
Pambansa 130 madeno change with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of Labor Arbiters with respect to moneyclaims of workers or claims for damages
arising from employer-employee relations; Article 217 is to beapplied the way it is
worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided
forexplicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then, a
regional trial court judgenow, certainly acts beyond the scope of the authority
conferred on him by law when he entertained thesuit for damages, arising from
picketing that accompanied a strike.The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of
certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20 July 1982 orderissued by the court a quo.
It granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court, orwhoever acts
in his behalf in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further action
on thecivil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of dismissing it. It also
made permanent therestraining order issued on 5 August 1982.
Paat v CA (Natural Resources)
PAAT v CA
G.R. No. 111107
January 10, 1997
FACTS:
On May 19, 1989 when the truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman while on
its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan, was seized by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity) personnel in Aritao, Nueva
Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest
products found concealed in the truck.
LOWER COURTS:
* CENRO: Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989 an order of
confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to

submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents,
however, failed to submit the required explanation.
* RED- DENR: On June 22, 1989,i[1] Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan
of DENR sustained petitioner Layugan's action of confiscation and ordered the
forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as
amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director
Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989.ii[2]
* DENR-SECRETARY (Pending resolution)

dispose of the same is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in
favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made in accordance
with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.
SECTION 68. xxx
xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber
or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the
machinery, equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found. (Underline ours)

* RTC (action for replevin): denied motion to dismiss by Paat (DENR-RED)

* CA (review): denied, has legal questions involved.
ISSUES & RULINGS:
(1) Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an
action for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter
of an administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The
Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines?
NO, before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition
that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by
giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court's
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court's intervention is fatal
to one's cause of action.
(2) Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and
forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the
government?
YES.
SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized
Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other
forest laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized
representative, may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut,
gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all conveyances used either by
land, water or air in the commission of the offense and to dispose of the same in
accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies on the matter. (Underline
ours)
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized
representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances
utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase to

A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents'
thinking not only because the aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor
include conveyances that can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a
large extent, due to the fact that private respondents' interpretation of the subject
provision unduly restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the
other provision of Section 68-A.
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to
confiscate, not only conveyances,' but forest products as well. On the other hand,
confiscation of forest products by the court' in a criminal action has long been
provided for in Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power on confiscation
cannot be exercised except only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68A would have no purpose at all.
it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against the petitioners for the
subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in
pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended.
Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation as
well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized
representatives of the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws.
Evidently, the continued possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for
administrative forfeiture proceeding is legally permissible, hence , no wrongful
detention exists in the case at bar.
OBITER DICTA:
(1) the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by a battery of
cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called
upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a
case. Hence, it is disregarded
(1) when there is a violation of due process,
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction,
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,

(5) when there is irreparable injury,

(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter,
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.

Issue:
Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense
to illegal possession of firearms.

Ruling:

(2) the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations and the protection,
development and management of forest lands fall within the primary and special
responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower courts decision. It stated that the

(3) The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to

administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied
when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or
hearing.

person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor,

People of the Philippines vs. M. Mapa

G.R. No. L-22301
August 30, 1967
En Banc

Facts:
The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the
Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further
amended by R.A. 4. On August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in its
possession and control a home-made revolver cal. 22 with no license permit. In the
court proceeding, the accused admitted that he owns the gun and affirmed that it has
no license. The accused further stated that he is a secret agent appointed by Gov.
Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of appointment. In his defense, the
accused presented the case of People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must
acquitted because he is a secret agent and which may qualify into peace officers
equivalent to municipal police which is covered by Art. 879.

law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any

or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of

firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." The next section provides that "firearms
and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines
[of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,
lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors,
and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are
in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their
official duties.
The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the
list therefore the accused is not exempted.
Leveriza vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 282 (1988)
FACTS:This case involves three contracts of lease:1) Contract A: executed between
Civil Aeronautics Administration (lessor) and Rosario Leveriza (lessee)2) Contract B:
executed between Leveriza (lessor) and Mobil Oil (lessee)3) Contract C: executed
between CAA (lessor) and Mobil Oil (lessee)When Leveriza subleased the property to
Mobil Oil (Contract B) without permission from the lessor, CAA cancelled Contract A
and executed Contract C with Mobil Oil. Leveriza contended that Contract C was
invalid not only because it was entered into by CAA without approval by the
Department Secretary but also because it was not executed by the President of the
Philippines or officer duly designated. Accordingto Leveriza, the officer duly
designated to cancel the contract is not the Airport General Manager but the Secretary
of Public Works and Communication or the Director of the CAA.
ISSUE:W/N Contract C was validly entered into
HELD:SC held that the Airport General Manager had authority to enter into contracts
of lease. In executing Contract C, the Airport General Manager signed for the Director

of the CAA, who subsequently ratified thesame.Under sec. 567 of the RAC, a contract
of lease may be executed by: (1) President; (2) officer duly designated by him; and (3)
officer expressly vested by law. Under sec. 32 (24) of RA 776, the Director of the CAA
is one such officer vested by law.
Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas
GR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)

FACTS:

Petitioner was the incumbent Punong Barangay who won during the last regular
barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the
registered voters of the barangay. At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the

Facts:

petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. Acting on the petition for

On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the adoption of minors Quirino
Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. However, minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted
by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners herein filed an opposition to the
said adoption. They contended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a
legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1 March
1971, and therefore said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the
Civil Code, which provides that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged
natural children or children by legal fiction cannot adopt.

recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve

Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualified to
adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.

the petition and set recall election date. To prevent the holding of recall election,
petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for injunction which was later
dismissed. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction,
insisting that the recall election is barred by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election
under Sec. 74(b) of Local Government Code (LGC) which states that no recall shall
take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one
(1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.

Held:
The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the
persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When the New Civil Code
was adopted, it changed the word descendant, found in the Spanish Civil Code to
which the New Civil Code was patterned, to children. The children thus mentioned
have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. Well known is
the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on
its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or
doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction. In the present case,
Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and Amanda
Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos by
the Agonoys.
The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the Municipal
Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37), wthout pronouncement
as to costs.

DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the prohibition on Sec.74(b) of the LGC may refer to SK elections,
where the recall election is for Barangay post.

HELD:

NO. But petition was dismissed for having become moot and academic.

RATIO:

Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government
unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of
recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The
proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local

Ponente: FRANCISCO

elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the officials replacement in

the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected
through a recall election.

It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the
Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office
held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by
the electorate.

By the time of judgment, recall was no longer possible because of the limitation stated
under the same Section 74(b) now referred to as Barangay Elections.

CONCURRING OPINION:

DAVIDE:

A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated
in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise disqualified by law,
and who are registered voters. One of the requirements for the exercise of suffrage
under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the person must be at least 18
years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is that he be a registered voter
pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Section
113-118).

Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec. 424,
Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are not
qualified to vote in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18. In no

FACTS:On June 28, 1967, some employees of Philex Mining Corporation

died asa result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the copper
mine (Tuba,Benguet) during underground operations. Allegedly, Philex was
in violation ofgovernment rules and regulations for negligently and
deliberately failing to takethe required precautions for the protection of the lives of
its men working underground. The Petitioners (Floresca et al) are the heirs of the
deceased employees ofPhilex Mining Corporation. Petitioners moved to claim their
benefits pursuant to theWorkmens Compensation Act before the Workmens
Compensation Commission. Theyalso petitioned before the regular courts and sued
Philex for additional damages. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued
because the petitioners havealready claimed benefits under the WCA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue.
HELD: Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they
filedfor benefits under the WCA then they will be prohibited from proceeding with a
civil casebefore the regular courts. On the contrary, if they sued before the civil courts
then theywould also be prohibited from claiming benefits under the WCA. The SC
however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency dueto ignorance of
the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed ofsuch a
remedy. The SC ruled that the dismissal of the case in the lower court bereversed and
case is remanded for further proceedings.However, if in case the petitioners win in the
lower court, whatever award may begranted, the amount given to them under the
WCA should be deducted. The SCemphasized that if they would go strictly by the
book in this case then the purpose of thelaw may be defeated. (Refer to excerpt
below)WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY
REVERSED ANDSET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD AGREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED
IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THEPAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO
THEM PURSUANT TO THE WORKMENS COMPENSATION ACTSHALL BE
DEDUCTED. NO COSTS.Justice Gutierrez dissentingNo civil suit should prosper
after claiming benefits under the WCA. If employers arealready liable to pay benefits
under the WCA they should not be compelled to bear the cost of damage suits or get
insurance for that purpose. Theexclusion provided by theWCA can only be properly
removed by the legislature NOT the SC.
China Banking Corporation vs Ortega Digest
Facts:

manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election (whether national or

local).

Vicente Acaban won in a civil case for sum of money against B & B Forest
Development Corporation. To satisfy the judgment, the Acaban sought the

PERFERCTO FLORESCA VS PHILEX MINING CORPORATION

garnishment of the bank deposit of the B & B Forest Development Corporation with
the China Banking Corporation (CBC). Accordingly, a notice of garnishment was

issued by the Deputy Sheriff of the trial court and served on said bank through its
cashier, Tan Kim Liong. Liong was ordered to inform the Court whether or not there is

No. The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into deposit of B & B

a deposit in the CBC of B & B Forest Development Corporation, and if there is any

Forest Development Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan

deposit, to hold the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order from

Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the defendant B & B Forest Development

the Court. CBC and Liong refuse to comply with a court process garnishing the bank

Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for the purposes of

deposit of a judgment debtor by invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405

the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the same intact and not

( Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) which allegedly prohibits the disclosure of any

allow any withdrawal until further order. It is sufficiently clear that the prohibition

information concerning to bank deposits.

against examination of or inquiry into bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude
its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a judgment. Indeed there is no real inquiry

Issue:

in such a case, and the existence of the deposit is disclosed the disclosure is purely
incidental to the execution process. It is hard to conceive that it was ever within the

Whether or not a banking institution may validly refuse to comply with a court

intention of Congress to enable debtors to evade payment of their just debts, even if

processes garnishing the bank deposit of a judgment debtor, by invoking the

ordered by the Court, through the expedient of converting their assets into cash and

provisions of Republic Act No. 1405.

depositing the same in a bank. (China Banking Corporation vs Ortega, G.R. No. L34964, 31 January 1973)

Held: