Dillman v. Town of Hooksett - Document No. 25

Dillman v. Town of Hooksett Doc.
25
Case 1:04-cv-00482-JM Document 25 Filed 04/11/2006 Page 1 of 4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Stephen A. Dillman
v. Civil No. 04-cv-482-JM
Town of Hooksett
O R D E R
Plaintiff Stephen A. Dillman was terminated from his
employment with the Defendant, Town of Hooksett, New Hampshire
(the “Town”), on May 24, 2002. At the time he was terminated,
Plaintiff was a member of the Hooksett Permanent Firefighters’
Association I.A.F.F., Local 3264 (the “Union”). The Union filed
a grievance on the Plaintiff’s behalf pursuant to a Collective
Bargaining Agreement in force between the Town and the Union.
The dispute was eventually presented to an arbitrator for
resolution. In a decision dated November 8, 2004, the arbitrator
found, among other things, that the Town had just cause to
terminate the Plaintiff. The Union assigned its rights under New
Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated (“RSA”) 542:8 to seek review
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of the arbitrator’s decision to the Plaintiff.1
On November 9, 2004, the Plaintiff filed a petition in the
New Hampshire Superior Court, Merrimack County, seeking review of
the arbitrator’s award under RSA 542:8. Since the Plaintiff
claimed in his petition that the Town violated his right to due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, the Town removed the action to this court on
December 20, 2004. See Document No. 1. On May 27, 2005, the
Town filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
(lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter).
In its motion, the Town argues that the Plaintiff lacks
standing under RSA 542:8 to seek to vacate or modify the
arbitration award, notwithstanding the Union’s purported
assignment, because the Plaintiff was not a party to the
arbitration. Plaintiff filed an objection in which he argued
1
The statute provides in relevant part:
At any time within one year after the award is made any
party to the arbitration may apply to the superior
court for an order confirming the award, correcting or
modifying the award for plain mistake, or vacating the
award for fraud, corruption, or misconduct by the
parties or by the arbitrators, or on the ground that
the arbitrators have exceeded their powers.
RSA 542:8.
2
that there was no New Hampshire case law that prohibited the
assignment of the right to petition for review of an arbitrator’s
decision under RSA 542:8. After reviewing the parties’ filings,
the Court agreed that this issue had not been determined under
New Hampshire law. Pursuant to New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule
34, the Court certified the following question of law to the New
Hampshire Supreme Court for consideration:
Whether, under New Hampshire law, including N.H. RSA

273-A, an individual public sector union member may be
assigned his union’s right under N.H. RSA 542:8 to seek
a vacation, confirmation, correction, or modification
of an arbitration award entered in an arbitration
conducted pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
between the member’s union and his employer.
See Document No. 21.
In an opinion issued on April 7, 2006, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court concluded that “the assignment of a union’s right
under RSA 542:8 to apply to seek confirmation, correction,
modification, or vacation of an arbitration award to an
individual employee is contrary to the public policy articulated
by the legislature when enacting the New Hampshire Public
Employee Labor Relations Act, RSA chapter 273-A.” Dillman v.
Town of Hooksett, No. 2005-564, --- A.2d ---, 2006 WL 889565 at
*4 (N.H. Apr. 7, 2006). In accordance with that finding, the
3
court answered the certified question in the negative. Id.
Since the New Hampshire Supreme Court has now conclusively
determined that the purported assignment of the Union’s rights
under RSA 542:8 to the Plaintiff is invalid under New Hampshire
law, the Court finds that the Plaintiff does not have standing to
bring this lawsuit. The absence of standing presents a
constitutional defect that deprives this court, and the New
Hampshire state courts, of subject matter jurisdiction. See
Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541-542
(1986) (standing is a jurisdictional question); Hughes v. New
Hampshire Div. of Aero., 152 N.H. 30, 35, 871 A.2d 18, 24 (2005)
(a party’s standing to bring suit is a question of subject matter
jurisdiction that may be raised at any time). Accordingly, the
Town’s motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s petition under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (document no. 15) is granted.
SO ORDERED.
____________________________________
James R. Muirhead
United States Magistrate Judge
Date: April 11, 2006
cc: Richard C. Mooney, Esq.

Thomas B. Merritt, Esq.
Warren D. Atlas, Esq.

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Dillman v. Town of Hooksett Doc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

v. Civil No. 04-cv-482-JM

Plaintiff Stephen A. Dillman was terminated from his

employment with the Defendant, Town of Hooksett, New Hampshire

(the “Town”), on May 24, 2002. At the time he was terminated,

Plaintiff was a member of the Hooksett Permanent Firefighters’

Association I.A.F.F., Local 3264 (the “Union”). The Union filed

a grievance on the Plaintiff’s behalf pursuant to a Collective

Bargaining Agreement in force between the Town and the Union.

The dispute was eventually presented to an arbitrator for

resolution. In a decision dated November 8, 2004, the arbitrator

Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated (“RSA”) 542:8 to seek review

of the arbitrator’s decision to the Plaintiff.1

On November 9, 2004, the Plaintiff filed a petition in the

New Hampshire Superior Court, Merrimack County, seeking review of

the arbitrator’s award under RSA 542:8. Since the Plaintiff

process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, the Town removed the action to this court on

Town filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

(lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter).

In its motion, the Town argues that the Plaintiff lacks

standing under RSA 542:8 to seek to vacate or modify the

arbitration award, notwithstanding the Union’s purported

assignment, because the Plaintiff was not a party to the

arbitration. Plaintiff filed an objection in which he argued

assignment of the right to petition for review of an arbitrator’s

decision under RSA 542:8. After reviewing the parties’ filings,

New Hampshire law. Pursuant to New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule

Hampshire Supreme Court for consideration:

Whether, under New Hampshire law, including N.H. RSA

See Document No. 21.

In an opinion issued on April 7, 2006, the New Hampshire

Supreme Court concluded that “the assignment of a union’s right

under RSA 542:8 to apply to seek confirmation, correction,

modification, or vacation of an arbitration award to an

individual employee is contrary to the public policy articulated

by the legislature when enacting the New Hampshire Public

Employee Labor Relations Act, RSA chapter 273-A.” Dillman v.

Town of Hooksett, No. 2005-564, --- A.2d ---, 2006 WL 889565 at

*4 (N.H. Apr. 7, 2006). In accordance with that finding, the

court answered the certified question in the negative. Id.

Since the New Hampshire Supreme Court has now conclusively

determined that the purported assignment of the Union’s rights

under RSA 542:8 to the Plaintiff is invalid under New Hampshire

bring this lawsuit. The absence of standing presents a

constitutional defect that deprives this court, and the New

Hampshire state courts, of subject matter jurisdiction. See

Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541-542

(1986) (standing is a jurisdictional question); Hughes v. New

(a party’s standing to bring suit is a question of subject matter

jurisdiction that may be raised at any time). Accordingly, the

Town’s motion to dismiss the Plaintiff’s petition under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (document no. 15) is granted.

Date: April 11, 2006

cc: Richard C. Mooney, Esq.

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