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ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE

June 24, 2002

No. 00SC885, Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Co.: Parent and Child

Relationship -- Release of Liability -- Indemnification
Agreement.

The supreme court reverses the court of appeals’ judgment

and remands the case to that court with instructions to return

the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent

with its opinion. In 1995, David Cooper, then seventeen,

suffered injuries, including blindness, when he lost control and

crashed into a tree while training on a ski race course. Both

David and his mother had signed a release of liability prior to

the injury. The trial court held that David’s mother’s

signature on the release bound David to the terms of the

agreement and barred his claims against Defendants. The court

of appeals affirmed, holding that the release signed by David’s

mother was enforceable against David, even though he was a minor

both when the release was signed and when the accident occurred.

The supreme court reverses. It holds that that the public

policy of Colorado affords minors significant protections that

preclude a parent or guardian from releasing a minor’s own

prospective claims for negligence. It also holds that an

indemnity provision that shifts the source of compensation for

negligence from the tortfeasor to the minor’s parent or guardian

creates an unacceptable conflict of interest between a

parent/guardian and a minor and violates Colorado’s public

policy to protect minors. Accordingly, it reverses the judgment

of the court of appeals and remands the case to that court with

instructions to return it to the trial court for further

proceedings consistent with its opinion.

2
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO Case No. 00SC885
Two East 14th Avenue
Denver, Colorado 80203

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals

Court of Appeals Case No. 99CA187

Petitioners:

DAVID COOPER and MICHAEL COOPER,

v.

Respondents:

THE ASPEN SKIING COMPANY; THE ASPEN VALLEY SKI CLUB; JOHN MCBRIDE,
JR.; and THE UNITED STATES SKI ASSOCIATION.

JUDGMENT REVERSED
EN BANC
June 24, 2002

Freeman & Freeman

Martin H. Freeman
Aspen, Colorado

Klein-Zimet, P.C.
Herbert S. Klein
Aspen, Colorado

Michele Nelson Bass

Aspen, Colorado

Attorneys for Petitioners

Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC

Stephen Hopkins
David McLain
Geoffrey N. Blue
Lakewood, Colorado
 Attorneys for Respondents The Aspen Skiing Company; The
Aspen Valley Ski Club; and John McBride, Jr.Rietz and
Smith, LLC
Peter W. Rietz
Jere K. Smith
Dillon, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent United States Ski Association

Chalat Law Offices, P.C.

James H. Chalat
Denver, Colorado

Attorney for Amicus Curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers

Association.
JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

5
 In 1995, petitioner David Cooper, then seventeen, suffered

injuries, including blindness, when he lost control and crashed

into a tree while training on a ski race course. David and his

parents filed suit against the Aspen Valley Ski Club Inc. and

David’s coach, John McBride, Jr., (Defendants) alleging, among

other claims, negligence. The trial court determined as a

matter of law pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56(h) that a release signed

by both David and his mother, Diane Cooper, before the injury

occurred “should be enforced and act as a bar to claims of

negligence against these defendants.” (R. at v. VIII, p. 1984.)

In addition, the trial court determined as a matter of law that

“defendants’ motion for determination of law should be denied in

part in so far as the motion seeks to enforce the indemnity

provisions of the agreement against plaintiff, Diane Cooper.”

(Id.) David appealed1 the trial court’s order, and in Cooper v.

Aspen Ski Ass’n, 32 P.3d 502 (Colo. App. 2000), the court of

appeals affirmed, holding that the release signed by David’s

1 David’s mother, Diane Cooper, did not contest the trial

court’s order that the release barred her own claims against
Defendants.

6
mother was enforceable against David, even though he was a minor

both when the release was signed and when the accident occurred.2

We granted certiorari to determine whether Colorado’s

public policy allows a parent to validate exculpatory provisions

on behalf of his minor child.3 Specifically, we must resolve

2 On cross-appeal in Cooper, the Defendants argued that the

trial court erred in determining that the indemnity provision in
the release signed by David’s mother was unenforceable. Cooper,
32 P.3d at 511. The court of appeals determined that the cross-
appeal was moot, however, because it held that the release was
enforceable against David, and this conclusion necessarily
precluded a finding of liability against the Aspen Valley Ski
Club. Id.
3 We granted certiorari to consider: “Whether the public policy
of Colorado allows a parent to release the claims of a minor
child for possible future injuries from a recreational activity.”

7
whether a parent may release the claims of a minor child for

future injuries and whether a parent may enter into an

indemnification agreement that shifts the source of compensation

for a minor’s claim from a tortfeasor to the parent. We hold

that the public policy of Colorado affords minors significant

protections that preclude a parent or guardian from releasing a

minor’s own prospective claim for negligence.4 We also hold that

an indemnity provision that shifts the source of compensation

for negligence from the tortfeasor to the minor’s parent or

4 However, section 13-21-116(2.5)(a), 5 C.R.S. (2001) protects

“‘persons,’ be they individuals or entities who perform
volunteer services" for designated types of organizations from
liability. Concerned Parents of Pueblo, Inc. v. Gilmore, No.
00SC950, 2002 Colo. LEXIS 311, at *3, *16 (Colo. April 22,
2002). Section 13-21-116(2.5)(a) does not, however, insulate
the organization itself from liability. Concerned Parents, 2002
Colo. LEXIS 311, at *3. Our holding does not affect the
applicability of section 13-21-116(2.5) or our decision in
Concerned Parents; rather section 13-21-116(2.5)(a) would
preclude liability against volunteer leaders, volunteer
assistants, volunteer teachers, volunteer coaches, and volunteer
trainers, with certain statutory limitations. § 13-21-
116(2.5)(a).
We note, in addition, that risks other than a party’s
negligence may be present in a recreational activity. For
example, a sport may present inherent dangers that can not be
eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care. We do not
consider this issue; nor do we rule on the assumption of risk
and inherent risk provisions in legislative acts such as the Ski
Safety Act of 1979.
Finally, we emphasize that our holding applies only to parental
releases of liability for negligence and not to, for example,
parental consent forms for medical services such as surgery and
the like.

8
guardian creates an unacceptable conflict of interest between a

parent/guardian and a minor and violates Colorado’s public

policy to protect minors. Accordingly, we reverse the court of

appeals’ judgment and remand the case to that court with

instructions to return the case to the trial court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1995, seventeen-year-old petitioner David Cooper had

been a member of the Aspen Valley Ski Club, Inc. (the Ski Club),

for about nine years and was actively involved in competitive

ski racing. At the beginning of the 1995-1996 ski season, David

and his mother signed a form titled “Aspen Valley Ski Club, Inc.

Acknowledgment and Assumption of Risk and Release” (the Release).

The Release relieved the Ski Club from:

any liability, whether known or unknown, even though

that liability may arise out of negligence or
carelessness on the part of persons or entities
mentioned above. The undersigned Participant and
Parent or Guardian agree to accept all responsibility
for the risks, conditions and hazards which may occur
whether or not they are now known.

The Release further stated:

. . . the undersigned Participant and Parent or

Guardian HEREBY AGREE TO WAIVE, RELEASE, DISCHARGE,
INDEMNIFY AND HOLD HARMLESS any and all claims for
damages for death, personal injury or property damage
which they may have or which may hereafter accrue as a
result of any participation in an Aspen Valley Ski
Club, Inc. program and related activities and events .
. . . The undersigned Participant and Parent or
Guardian further agree to forever HOLD HARMLESS and

9
 IDEMNIFY all persons and entities identified above,
generally and specifically, from any and all liability
for death, personal injury or property damage
resulting in any way from participating in the
activities and events described above. By signing
this Acknowledgement and Assumption of Risk and
Release as the Parent or Guardian, I am consenting to
the participant’s participation in the Aspen Valley
Ski Club, Inc. programs and related activities and
acknowledge that I understand that all risk, whether
known or unknown, is expressly assumed by me and all
claims, whether known or unknown, are expressly waived
in advance.

On December 30, 1995, David was training for a competitive,

high speed alpine race. The course had been set by David’s

coach, defendant McBride. During a training run, David fell and

collided with a tree, sustaining severe injuries, including the

loss of vision in both eyes.

The trial court ruled that Diane Cooper’s signature on the

release bound her son, David, to the terms of the release and

barred his claims against the Ski Club and McBride. The court

of appeals affirmed, holding that based on a parent’s

fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control

of her child, David’s mother had the right to release David’s

claims for possible future injuries. Cooper, 32 P.3d at 507.

We granted certiorari and now reverse.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellate courts review a trial court’s order granting or

denying a motion for summary judgment de novo. Pierson v. Black

Canyon Aggregates, No. 01SC161, 2002 Colo. LEXIS 424, at *12

10
(Colo. May 20, 2002). This is because such judgments “are

rulings of law in the sense that they may not rest on the

resolution of disputed facts.” Id. (quoting Feiger, Collison &

Killmer v. Jones, 926 P.2d 1244, 1250 (Colo. 1996)). Therefore,

we decide today’s issue de novo.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Validity of the Release

We must first determine whether Colorado’s public policy

allows parents to contractually release their child’s future

claims for injury caused by negligence.5

While it is a well-settled principle that “[a] minor during

his minority, and acting timely on reaching his majority, may

disaffirm any contract that he may have entered into during his

minority,” Nicholas v. People, 973 P.2d 1213, 1219 (Colo. 1999);

Doenges-Long Motors v. Gillen, 138 Colo. 31, 35-36, 328 P.2d

1077, 1080 (1958), we have never specifically addressed whether

a parent or guardian may release a child’s cause of action on

his behalf6 or whether Colorado’s public policy allows a parent

5 In Jones v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981), this court
established a four-factor test to determine the validity of an
exculpatory agreement. Id. at 376. However, because we rely on
a public policy exception specifically relating to
parental/guardian releases of a minor’s claims to invalidate the
exculpatory agreement, we need not consider the Jones factors to
determine whether the exculpatory agreement in this case would
have been valid under Jones.
6 In Jones, 623 P.2d 370, we noted that “the approval by a
parent does not necessarily validate an infant child’s
contract.” Id. at 372 n.1. However, we determined that Jones
ratified the contract by accepting the benefits of it when he

11
or guardian to serve as indemnitor for his minor child’s claims

against an indemnitee. As such, the issue in this case presents

a significant question regarding the junction of contract law,

tort law, and public policy.7

Here, we agree with the Washington Supreme Court that

“there are instances where public policy reasons for preserving

an obligation of care owed by one person to another outweigh our

traditional regard for freedom of contract.” Scott v. Pac. W.

Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 11, 12 (Wash. 1992) (holding that

“to the extent a parent’s release of a third party’s liability

for negligence purports to bar a child’s own cause of action, it

violates public policy and is unenforceable”). Accordingly, we

hold that Colorado’s public policy affords minors significant

used the defendant’s recreational skydiving facilities after

reaching the age of majority, Jones, 623 P.2d at 374, and
accordingly did not decide the issue we analyze today.
7 While we traditionally recognize a “strong policy of freedom
of contract,” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc.,
947 P.2d 341, 346 (Colo. 1997), we also recognize that
“exculpatory agreements have long been disfavored.” B & B
Livery, Inc. v. Riehl, 960 P.2d 134, 136 (Colo. 1998). Indeed,
“[exculpatory clauses] stand at the crossroads of two competing
principles: freedom of contract and responsibility for damages
caused by one’s own negligent acts.” Id.

12
protections which preclude parents or guardians from releasing a

minor’s own prospective claim for negligence. We base our

holding on our understanding of Colorado’s public policy to

protect children as reflected by legislation protecting minors

as well as decisions from other jurisdictions, which we find

persuasive. However, we note that this question is a matter of

legislative prerogative, and, of course, the General Assembly

could choose to address it differently.

1. Colorado’s Public Policy

The General Assembly has demonstrated an on-going

commitment to afford minors significant safeguards from harm by

passing numerous statutes designed to protect minor children.8

Most significant of these for purposes of this case are the

protections accorded minors in Colorado in the post-injury claim

context. Colorado laws do not allow a parent the unilateral

right to foreclose a child’s existing cause of action to recover

for torts committed against him.9 Rather, the General Assembly

8 See generally, e.g., § 13-22-101, 5 C.R.S. (2001) (eighteen is
minimum age of competence for people to independently enter into
contracts, manage estates, and sue and be sued); § 16-11-
201(4)(a)(II), 6 C.R.S. (2001) (possibility for increased
criminal penalties for certain crimes committed against a
child); § 17-22.5-405(5)(b) (same); § 17-27.9-103(1)(a) (same);
§ 18-3-412, 6 C.R.S. (2001) (same); § § 26-6-101 to -307, 8
C.R.S. (2001) (comprehensive regulations in the Child Care
Licensing Act); § 42-4-236, 11 C.R.S. (2001) (unless exempted
under subsection (3), mandatory use of child restraint systems
in motor vehicles).
9 See generally 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 114, at 469 (1978)
(“In the absence of statutory or judicial authorization, the
parent has no authority, merely because of the parental

13
has granted minors a number of protections to safeguard their

post-injury rights of recovery. Indeed, the Colorado Probate

Code provides significant procedural protections for minors in

the post-injury claim context.10 This legislation creates

mechanisms for the appointment of a conservator to protect a

minor’s settlement rights. § 15-14-403, 5 C.R.S. (2001); § 15-

14-425(2)(t), 5 C.R.S. (2001). It also provides minors

important protections by creating means by which the court may

ratify the settlement of a minor’s claims. § 15-14-412(1)(b), 5

C.R.S. (2001). Importantly, a parent may not act as a minor’s

relation, to waive, release, or compromise claims by or against

the child. This rule applies to a waiver, settlement, or
release of the child’s right of action for a personal injury or
other tort.”).
10 For example, under section 15-14-403(1), 5 C.R.S. (2001) of
the Colorado Probate Code, the “person to be protected” (in this
case the minor), § 15-14-403(1)(a), 5 C.R.S. (2001) or “an
individual interested in the estate, affairs, or welfare of the
person to be protected,” § 15-14-403(1)(b), 5 C.R.S. (2001),
“may petition for the appointment of a conservator or for any
other appropriate protective order.” § 15-14-403(1). Unless
qualified or limited by the court, § 15-14-425(1), 5 C.R.S.
(2001), a conservator may “[p]ay or contest any claim, settle a
claim by or against the estate of the protected person by
compromise, arbitration, or otherwise.” § 15-14-425(2)(t), 5
C.R.S. (2001). Furthermore, “[i]f a basis is established for a
protective order with respect to an individual, the court,
without appointing a conservator, may,” § 15-14-412(1), 5 C.R.S.
(2001), “[a]uthorize, direct, or ratify any other contract,
trust, will or transaction relating to the protected person’s
property and business affairs, including a settlement of a
claim, upon determining that it is in the best interest of the
protected person.” § 15-14-412(1)(b). Moreover, a parent may
only act as a minor’s conservator when appointed by the court.
§ 15-14-413, 5 C.R.S. (2001) (listing parents sixth in
prioritized list of eligibility for court appointment as
conservator.)

14
conservator as a matter of right, but only when appointed by the

court. § 15-14-413, 5 C.R.S. (2001).

Thus, we agree with the Utah Supreme Court and the

Washington Supreme Court – both of which recently analyzed the

same issue presented here – that “since a parent generally may

not release a child’s cause of action after injury, it makes

little, if any, sense to conclude a parent has the authority to

release a child’s cause of action prior to an injury.” Scott,

834 P.2d at 11-12; accord Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062, 1066

(Utah 2001).

Arguably, the differences between the two types of releases

may weaken any comparison between them. See Angeline Purdy,

Scott v. Pacific West Mountain Resort: Erroneously Invalidating

Parental Releases of a Minor’s Future Claim, 68 Wash. L. Rev.

457, 472 (1993)(arguing that while existing tort claims are

vulnerable to parental mismanagement because of the financial

pressure to accept inadequate settlements, outright parental

dishonesty, and the existence of indemnity provisions in

settlements, parents who release future claims do not have the

same financial motivation to sign a release because - by signing

the release before injury - the parent will ultimately be

required to pay for medical care).

We do not find these distinctions meaningful or persuasive,

however. It may be true that parents in the pre-injury setting

15
have less financial motivation to sign a release than a parent

in the post-injury setting who needs money to care for an

injured child. Nonetheless, the protections accorded minors in

the post-injury setting illustrate Colorado’s overarching policy

to protect minors, regardless of parental motivations, against

actions by parents that effectively foreclose a minor’s rights

of recovery. Thus, while a parent’s decision to sign a pre-

injury release on his child’s behalf may not be in “deliberate

derogation of his child’s best interests,” Purdy, supra, at 474,

the effect of a release on the child in either the pre-injury

context or the post-injury one is the same. If parents are

unwilling or unable to care for an injured child, he may be left

with “no recourse against a negligent party to acquire resources

needed for care and this is true regardless of when

relinquishment of the child’s rights might occur.” Scott, 834

P.2d at 12. In addition, while pre-injury releases might be

less vulnerable to mismanagement, children still must be

protected against parental actions – perhaps rash and imprudent

ones – that foreclose all of the minor’s potential claims for

injuries caused by another’s negligence.

Thus, given our historical regard for the special needs of

minors and the fact that both a pre-injury release and a post-

injury one work to deprive a child of rights of recovery, the

fact that a parent is not afforded unilateral power to foreclose

16
a minor’s rights in the post-injury context supports our holding

that he may not do so in the pre-injury setting either.

Moreover, our case law firmly supports the proposition that

Colorado’s public policy works to protect minors from parental

actions that foreclose a minor’s rights to recovery. See, e.g.,

Elgin v. Bartlett, 994 P.2d 411, 414-15 (Colo. 1999) (holding

that the statute of limitations applicable to a minor’s cause of

action for medical negligence does not begin to run until the

minor reaches the age of eighteen, unless the minor has a court-

appointed legal representative, because the language of the

applicable statutory sections reflects the General Assembly’s

policy choice to operate literally for the protection of the

minor by not allowing parents to remove or waive a minor child’s

legal disability by instituting a next friends suit, and thereby

refusing to penalize the minor for the parents’ action); Rojhani

v. Arenson, 929 P.2d 23, 26 (Colo. App. 1996) (concluding that

parents’ failure as next friends to timely file notice of

minor’s injury did not preclude the minor’s suit because the

minor was not capable of appreciating his injury and because no

guardian or personal representative was appointed); Cintron v.

City of Colo. Springs, 886 P.2d 291, 295 (Colo. App. 1994)

(concluding that although a parent may voluntarily undertake to

aid the assertion of a child’s claim by acting as a next friend,

a minor may not be charged with the parents’ failure, acting as

17
next friends, to discover the minor’s injury or to provide

notice thereof on the parents behalf); cf., e.g., In re Miller,

790 P.2d 890, 892-93 (Colo. App. 1990) (reasoning that “[t]he

law and policy of this state is that the needs of the children

are of paramount importance and cannot be altered by the

parties” and holding that an agreement between parents regarding

child support is not enough, in and of itself, to allow

deviation from the child support guidelines and that a trial

court must presume, unless rebutted, that child support

obligations must be set in the amount specified in the statutory

schedule).

To allow a parent or guardian to execute exculpatory

provisions on his minor child’s behalf would render meaningless

for all practical purposes the special protections historically

accorded minors. In the tort context especially, a minor should

be afforded protection not only from his own improvident

decision to release his possible prospective claims for injury

based on another’s negligence, but also from unwise decisions

made on his behalf by parents who are routinely asked to release

their child’s claims for liability. In Colorado, it has long

been the rule that courts owe a duty to “exercise a watchful and

protecting care over [a minor’s] interests, and not permit his

rights to be waived, prejudiced or surrendered either by his own

acts, or by the admissions or pleadings of those who act for

18
him.” Seaton v. Tohill, 11 Colo. App. 211, 216, 53 P. 170, 172

(1898). Nearly one hundred years later we confirmed this

steadfast principle: “Courts are charged with the responsibility

to take special care in protecting the rights of minor

children.” Abrams v. Connolly, 781 P.2d 651, 658 (Colo. 1989).

Thus, a minor is accorded special protection, and to allow a

parent to release a child’s possible future claims for injury

caused by negligence may as a practical matter leave the minor

in an unacceptably precarious position with no recourse, no

parental support, and no method to support himself or care for

his injury.11
11 The court of appeals based its holding that a parent may
execute a pre-injury release on behalf of his minor child on
parents’ fundamental right under the Due Process Clause to make
decisions “concerning the care, custody, and control of their
children.” Cooper, 32 P.3d at 507 (citing Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57 (2000)). While we certainly agree that parents have
a liberty interest in the “care, custody and control of their
children,” Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 65, we do not
believe that right encompasses a parent’s decision to disclaim a
minor’s possible future recovery for injuries caused by
negligence by signing a release on the minor’s behalf. A
parental release of liability on behalf of his child is not a
decision that implicates such fundamental parental rights as the
right to “establish a home and bring up children,” Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), and the right “to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control,”
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
Moreover, it does not implicate a parent’s “traditional interest
. . . with respect to the religious upbringing of their
children,” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972), or such
medical decisions as a parent’s right to “retain a substantial .
. . role” in the decision to voluntary commit his child to a
mental institution (with the caveat that the child’s rights and
the physician’s independent judgment also plays a role), Parham
v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1979); rather a parental release on
behalf of a child effectively eliminates a child’s legal right

19
 2. Other Jurisdictions

Our holding that parents may not release a minor’s

prospective claim for negligence comports with the vast majority

of courts that have decided the issue. In fact, the highest

courts of two of our sister states, Utah and Washington,

recently analyzed the precise issue facing us today, and both

concluded that a parent may not execute a release on behalf of

his minor child for prospective claims sounding in negligence.

to sue an allegedly negligent party for torts committed against

him. It is, thus, not of the same character and quality as
those rights recognized as implicating a parents’ fundamental
liberty interest in the “care, custody, and control” of their
children.
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo, that a parental
release on behalf of a minor child implicates a parent’s
fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his
child, this right is not absolute. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 166 (1944); People v. Shepard, 983 P.2d 1, 4 (Colo.
1999). Indeed, “[a]cting to guard the general interest in
youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the
parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulating or
prohibiting the child’s labor and in many other ways.” Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (footnotes omitted).
In fact, “in order to protect a child’s well-being, the state
may restrict parental control.” Shepard, 983 P.2d at 4.

20
 In Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062 (Utah 2001), eleven-

year-old Jessica Hawkins was injured when she was thrown from a

horse during a trail ride with her family. Id. at 1063.

Jessica’s mother had signed a release containing a waiver of

liability and an indemnity provision.12 Id. Relying on a public

policy exception specifically relating to releases of a minor’s

claims and reasoning that Utah’s statutes and rules favored the

protection of minors with respect to contractual obligations,

the Utah Supreme Court held that a parent may not release a

minor’s prospective claim for negligence. Id. at 1065-66.

In addition, the facts of Scott v. Pacific West Mountain

Resort, 834 P.2d 6 (Wash. 1992), are remarkably similar to those

presented in this case. In Scott, twelve-year-old Justin Scott,

a student of a ski school, sustained severe head injuries while

skiing a slalom race course that had been set by the ski

school’s owner. Scott, 834 P.2d at 8. Prior to the injury,

Justin’s mother had signed a ski school application that

included an exculpatory clause relieving the school from any

liability for its own negligence. Id. at 8-9. The Washington

Supreme Court reasoned that “since a parent generally may not

release a child’s cause of action after injury, it makes little,

if any, sense to conclude a parent has the authority to release

a child’s cause of action prior to an injury.” Id. at 11-12.

12 The Utah court’s analysis of the parental indemnity provision
is discussed in the next section of this opinion.

21
Accordingly, the court held, “to the extent a parent’s release

of a third party’s liability for negligence purports to bar a

child’s own cause of action, it violates public policy and is

unenforceable.” Id. at 12.

Finally, other courts across the nation that have

considered the issue have determined that a parent may not

release a minor’s prospective cause of action. See, e.g.,

Apicella v. Valley Forge Military Acad. & Junior Coll., 630 F.

Supp. 20, 24 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (“Under Pennsylvania law, parents

do not possess the authority to release the claims or potential

claims of a minor child merely because of the parental

relationship.”); Fedor v. Mauwehu Council, Boy Scouts of Am.,

143 A.2d 466, 468 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1958) (ruling that “it is

doubtful that either the mother or father of this minor

plaintiff had the power or authority to waive his rights against

the defendant arising out of acts of negligence on the part of

the defendant” and sustaining the demurrer of the plaintiff to

the special defense that the waiver of all claims for damages

absolved the defendant of liability); Meyer v. Naperville

Manner, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 411, 415 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“Since

the parent’s waiver of liability was not authorized by any

statute or judicial approval, it had no effect to bar the minor

child’s (future) cause of action . . . .”); Doyle v. Bowdoin

Coll., 403 A.2d 1206, 1208 n.3 (Me. 1979) (stating in dicta that

22
“a parent, or guardian, cannot release the child’s, or ward’s,

cause of action”); Fitzgerald v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 267

A.2d 557, 559 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970) (concluding that

release and indemnity provision signed by father on behalf of

his minor son was void as against public policy); Alexander v.

Kendall Cent. Sch. Dist., 634 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319 (N.Y. App. Div.

1995) (stating in dicta that “a minor is not bound by a release

executed by his parent”); Childress v. Madison County, 777

S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that mother could not

execute a valid release or exculpatory clause on behalf of her

minor son); Munoz v. II Jaz Inc., 963 S.W.2d 207, 209-10 (Tex.

Ct. App. 1993) (“We hold that section 12.04(7) of the Family

Code, which empowers a parent to make legal decisions concerning

their child, does not give parents the power to waive a child’s

cause of action for personal injuries. Such an interpretation

of the statute would be against the public policy to protect

minor children.”); see also Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson

Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 213 (1991) (White, J., concurring)

(stating the general rule that parents cannot waive causes of

action on behalf of their children). But see Hohe v. San Diego

Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. Rptr. 647, 649-50 (Cal. Ct. App.

1990) (holding that parent may contract for child and therefore

release signed on child’s behalf by parent is valid);13 cf.,

13 However, the Hohe court relied on Doyle v. Giuliucci, 401
P.2d 1 (Cal. 1965), which only allowed a parent to bind a child

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Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 696 N.E.2d 201, 207 (Ohio

1998) (holding that “parents have the authority to bind their

minor children to exculpatory agreements in favor of volunteers

and sponsors of nonprofit sports activities where the cause of

action sounds in negligence”);14 Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., 77

F. Supp. 2d 859 (E.D. Ohio 1999) (applying Zivich holding and

ruling that “[n]othing in the Zivich opinion indicates that its

holding should be limited to nonprofit sports organizations that

are local in scope”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other

grounds, Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., 248 F.3d 1150 (6th Cir.

2001).

Accordingly, in this case, Diane Cooper’s execution of the

release did not act as a release of the claims of her minor son

David.

to the arbitration forum. Doyle, 401 P.2d at 2-3.

14 Although Ohio’s General Assembly later enacted legislation
affording “qualified immunity to unpaid athletic coaches and
sponsors of athletic events,” Zivich, 696 N.E.2d at 205, at the
time the Zivich case arose, Ohio did not have legislation
providing volunteers any immunity from liability. Subsequently,
the Ohio legislature repealed these laws. See Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2305.381 (Anderson 2002) (repealed 2001); Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 2305.382 (Anderson 2002) (repealed 2001).

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 B. PARENTAL INDEMNITY PROVISIONS

Finally, we consider the validity of parental indemnity

provisions.15 As a practical matter, release and indemnity

provisions in contracts signed by parents or guardians on behalf

of their minor children go hand-in-hand: having invalidated

release provisions, it would be contradictory to then

effectively undercut a minor’s rights to sue by allowing

indemnity clauses that make such suits for all realistic

purposes unlikely.

Thus, we agree with the reasoning of those courts

invalidating parental indemnity provisions that a minor child

would be unlikely to pursue claims if his parent or guardian

served as the ultimate source of compensation for the negligent

party’s torts, and that - if the child did bring a cause of

action - family discord would likely result. See Hawkins, 37

P.3d at 1067 (reasoning that “an indemnification from negligence

that specifically makes a parent the ultimate source of

compensation would likely result in inadequate compensation for

the minor or family discord” and holding that parental

indemnification provisions are invalid); see also, e.g.,

Valdimer v. Mount Verson Hebrew Camps, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 283, 285
15 Though this issue was not specifically encompassed within the
question on which we granted certiorari, given our holding that
Diane Cooper could not contractually release David’s future
claims for injury caused by negligence, and to assist the court
on remand, as well as to conserve scarce judicial resources, we
address the validity of parental indemnification provisions.

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(N.Y. 1961) (concluding that post-injury parental

indemnification agreements thwart state’s protective policy by

discouraging infant to bring claim or creating family disharmony

if infant elects to press his claim); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v.

Mallison, 354 P.2d 800, 802-03 (Or. 1960) (in post-injury

parental indemnification setting, reasoning that a child would

be unlikely to pursue claims if agreement required parent to

indemnify defendant).

Moreover, the effect of a parental indemnity agreement – to

assure that a negligent party will not be held financially

responsible for that party’s torts committed against a minor –

undermines a parent’s duty to protect the best interests of the

child. Thus, we also agree with the Utah Supreme Court that

parental indemnity provisions “can only serve to undermine the

parent’s fundamental obligations to the child.” Hawkins, 37

P.3d at 1067; see also, e.g., Fitzgerald, 267 A.2d at 559

(concluding that release and indemnity provision signed by

father on behalf of his minor son was void as against public

policy because the agreement may have conflicted with the

father’s duty to his son because the father may prevent infant

from bringing suit since the father would ultimately be

responsible under indemnity provision); Childress, 777 S.W.2d at

7 (holding that “[i]ndemnification agreements executed by a

parent or guardian in favor of tortfeasors, actual or potential,

26
committing torts against an infant or incompetent, are invalid

as they place the interests of the child or incompetent against

those of the parent or guardian”).

Therefore, we also hold that parental indemnity provisions

violate Colorado’s public policy to protect minors and create an

unacceptable conflict of interest between a minor and his parent

or guardian.

IV. CONCLUSION

In summary, we hold that Colorado’s public policy disallows

a parent or guardian to execute exculpatory provisions on behalf

of his minor child for a prospective claim based on negligence.

Specifically, we hold that a parent or guardian may not release

a minor’s prospective claim for negligence and may not indemnify

a tortfeasor for negligence committed against his minor child.

Therefore, we reverse the court of appeals’ judgment with

instructions to that court to return the case to the trial court

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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