Weinberg v. National Football League Players Association Et Al - Document No. 47

Weinberg v. National Football League Players Association et al Doc.
47
Case 3:06-cv-02332 Document 47 Filed 06/19/2007 Page 1 of 5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
STEVE WEINBERG, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:06-CV-2332-B
§ ECF
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE §
PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, et al., §
§
Defendant. §
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court is the Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss the Petition (doc. 13)
filed by Defendants National Football League Players Association (“NFLPA”), Richard Berthelsen,
Gene Upshaw, Tom DePaso, Trace Armstrong, John Collins, Keith Washington, and Mark Levin
on January 9, 2007. On June 14, 2007, the Court held a hearing on the motion, heard oral
arguments by the parties, and GRANTED Defendants’ motion. At the close of the hearing, the
Court briefly articulated its reasons for granting the motion to compel and indicated that a more
detailed analysis would follow in writing. That analysis is provided below.
The Federal Arbitration Act favors arbitration and “establishes that, as a matter of federal
law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). The Fifth Circuit
has instructed that “arbitration should not be denied ‘unless it can be said with positive assurance
that an arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation which would cover the dispute at
issue.’” Neal v. Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 918 F.2d 34, 37 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting Commerce Park at
DFW Freeport v. Mardian Constr. Co., 729 F.2d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 1984)). The Fifth Circuit has also
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articulated a standard for determining whether parties must submit their dispute to arbitration:
Courts conduct a two-step inquiry when deciding whether parties

must submit to arbitration. The first step is to decide whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute. “This determination involves
two considerations: (1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate
between the parties; and (2) whether the dispute in question falls
within the scope of that arbitration agreement.” To resolve these
issues, “courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles
that govern the formation of contracts.” Once a court determines
that the parties agreed to arbitrate, the court must assess “ ‘whether
legal constraints external to the parties’ agreement foreclosed the
arbitration of those claims.’ ”
OPE Int’l LP v. Chet Morrison Contractors, Inc., 258 F.3d 443, 445-46 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations
omitted). The parties here do not dispute that Weinberg’s Application for Certification as an
NFLPA Contract Advisor, the NFLPA Regulations, and the Standard Representation Agreement
constitute valid agreements to arbitrate. The question raised is one of scope. Thus, the Court will
turn to the issue of whether these arbitration agreements contemplate the disputes at issue here.
First, as to Weinberg’s claims against the NFLPA, the Court finds that these claims fall within
the scope of the arbitration clause in Section 5 of the NFLPA Regulations. Specifically, the
Regulations expressly call for arbitration to be the exclusive method for resolving any and all disputes
that may arise from “[a]ny other activities of a Contract Advisor within the scope of these
regulations.” (App. to Mot. to Compel Arbitration (“App.”) at 024) Weinberg’s claims against the
NFLPA stem from his alleged improper activities that were the subject of disciplinary action by the
NFLPA pursuant to the Regulations. His claims therefore involve his activities as a contract advisor
operating under the authority of the Regulations and thus are subject to arbitration.
Turning next to Weinberg’s claims against fellow contract advisors Agnone and Shatsky, the
Court finds that these claims are likewise subject to Section 5's arbitration clause. More to the point,
the arbitration clause in Section 5 specifies arbitration as the exclusive method for resolving disputes
between two or more contract advisors involving claims of interference with the contractual
relationship between a contract advisor and a player. (See id.) Weinberg’s claims against Agnone
and Shatsky–grounded in his allegations that the two advised his former clients not to pay agent fees
he claims he was owed under the players’ contracts–is precisely the type of dispute contemplated by
Section 5 and accordingly must be resolved by arbitration.
The individual NFLPA Defendants are also subject to the arbitration clause. As another
court in this district has previously held: “Using tradition[al] principles of agency law, if a principal
is bound under the terms of a valid arbitration clause, its agents, employees, and representatives are
also covered by that agreement.” North River Ins. Co. v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 2002
WL 1315786, at *5 (N.D. Tex. 2002)(Lindsay, J.). Applying these principles here, the Court finds
the individual NFLPA Defendants, Berthelsen, Upshaw, DePaso, Armstrong, Kaplan, Levin, and
Collins as agents, employees, and/or representatives of the NFLPA are subject to the arbitration
clauses at issue.
A separate basis for including the individual NFLPA Defendants in the arbitration process
is the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The doctrine of equitable estoppel has been applied to allow
nonsignatories to an arbitration agreement to compel arbitration and to prevent a signatory to the
agreement from preventing arbitration of his claims against nonsignatories when those claims are
closely related to the rights and obligations set forth in the signatory’s arbitration agreement. The
Fifth Circuit has adopted the Eleventh Circuit’s test for the application of equitable estoppel in the
arbitration context:
Existing case law demonstrates that equitable estoppel allows a nonsignatory to

compel arbitration in two different circumstances. First, equitable estoppel applies when
the signatory to a written agreement containing an arbitration clause must rely on the terms
of the written agreement in asserting its claims against the nonsignatory. When each of a
signatory's claims against a nonsignatory makes reference to or presumes the
existence of the written agreement, the signatory's claims arise out of and relate
directly to the written agreement, and arbitration is appropriate. Second, application
of equitable estoppel is warranted when the signatory to the contract containing an
arbitration clause raises allegations of substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct
by both the nonsignatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract. Otherwise the
arbitration proceedings between the two signatories would be rendered meaningless and the
federal policy in favor of arbitration effectively thwarted.
Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 527 (5th Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original)
(citing MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 1999)). Here, Weinberg
asserts that the NFLPA, as signatory, and all of the nonsignatory individual Defendants acted
together in a conspiracy to defraud, decertify, and tortiously interfere with the contracts and
prospective business relations of Plaintiff. Because Weinberg’s claims against those Defendants raise
allegations of “substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct”, the individual Defendants
may compel Weinberg to submit his claims to arbitration pursuant to the doctrine of equitable
estoppel.
As to the third and final consideration of the Fifth Circuit in deciding the arbitration issue–
the existence of external legal constraints–the Court is unaware of and the parties have not identified
any such constraints in this case.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to compel
arbitration of all of Weinberg’s claims and orders the parties to arbitrate this matter in accordance
with the NFLPA Regulations Governing Contract Advisors. Furthermore, because the Court has
determined that all of the issues the parties have raised must be submitted to arbitration, it
DISMISSES the case with prejudice. See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 1161, 1164 (5th
Cir. 1992).
SO ORDERED.
4
SIGNED June 19th , 2007.
_________________________________
JANE J. BOYLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Weinberg v. National Football League Players Association et al Doc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

detailed analysis would follow in writing. That analysis is provided below.

Courts conduct a two-step inquiry when deciding whether parties

Section 5 and accordingly must be resolved by arbitration.

nonsignatories to an arbitration agreement to compel arbitration and to prevent a signatory to the

Existing case law demonstrates that equitable estoppel allows a nonsignatory to

allegations of “substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct”, the individual Defendants

any such constraints in this case.

SIGNED June 19th , 2007.

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