Statement of Claim: and Marketing Corporation and Another (1992) 15 MLR 180 (HC) It
Statement of Claim: and Marketing Corporation and Another (1992) 15 MLR 180 (HC) It
Statement of Claim: and Marketing Corporation and Another (1992) 15 MLR 180 (HC) It
1. Breif Facts
1.1 The Plaintiff, Peter Chikaza, was involved in a road accident on 14th
March , 2012 at about 1400hrs. The driver of motor vehicle registration
number BN5349 was driving from the direction of R GAFFAR offices on
his way to work and on arrival at the TCM gate, he lost control of the
vehicle due to speeding and bumped into the Plaintiff who was walking
on the sidewalk of the road.
2. Issues
The main issues to be addressed are;
2.1 Whether the 1st Defendant drove with negligence.
2.2 Whether the Plaintiff contributed to the accident.
3. The Law
Whether the 1st Defendant drove with negligence
3.1 In the case of Kawala and others v Agricultural Development
and Marketing Corporation and another[1992] 15 MLR 180 (HC) it
was noted that to establish negligence it is necessary to establish 3
things:
- a duty of care
- a breach of that duty
- and damage suffered by the victim which was caused as a result of
that breach
3.2 In deducing whether the 1st Defendant owed a duty of care to the
Plaintiff, it is necessary to turn to case law on the subject, which was
well summarised by Banda J (as he then was) in Banda v Agricultural
Development and Marketing Corporation and another Civil
Cause No. 273 of 1987 (unreported), at 3 as follows:
A driver of a motor vehicle owes a duty of care to other road users not
to cause damage to persons, vehicles and property of anyone on or
own safety.
3.6 All that is required in cases of contributory negligence is that the
plaintiff should have failed to take reasonable care for his own safety.
See Nance v British Columbia Electric Railway Co Ltd [1951] AC
601. In Jones v Livox Quarries Ltd [1952] 2 QB 608 at 615 Lord
Denning put it this way that:
a person is guilty of contributory negligence if he ought reasonably to
have foreseen that, if he did not act as a reasonable, prudent man, he
might be hurt himself; and in his reckonings he must take into account
the possibility of others being careless.
3.7 Taking the above into consideration, it can be said that the Plaintiff
in the current case at hand was walking where pedestrians were
supposed to be walking. The Plaintiff did not cross onto the road or
obstruct the path of the oncoming vehicle of the 1st Defendant. It was
the 1st defendant who diverted from the road and onto the pedestrian
sidewalk. It is difficult to see how the Defendants allege that the
Plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence, given that the Plaintiff did
notthing do anything that would have caused a reasonable man to
foresee that he might hurt himself by doing what he was doing.
3.8 Now that it has been established that the Plaintiff cannot possibly
be guilty of contributory negligence, it is important to note that, as
according to Jussab v Mussa and another[1991] 14 MLR 116 (HC),
even if the Plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence , such cannot
be a full defence to the negligence of the Defendant. At most, If
contributory negligence is found, the Plaintiffs claim for damages are
to be reduced proportionately. However, such need not be given any
thought, considering that the Plaintiff did not contribute in any way to
the accident.
4. Submission
4.1 It is the prayer of the Plaintiff that the court finds the Defendants
guilty of negligence, and that the Plaintiff did not contribute to the
accident. It is also prayed that the Plaintiff receive damages for pain
and suffering, loss of amenities, loss of earning capacity, and medical
costs.