Case 1:10 CV 00151 RCL Document 9
Case 1:10 CV 00151 RCL Document 9
Case 1:10 CV 00151 RCL Document 9
)
ORLY TAITZ, )
29839 Santa Margarita Parkway, Suite 100 )
Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No.: 10-0151 (RCL)
)
v. )
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BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA, )
c/o The White House, )
1600 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, )
Washington, DC 20500, )
)
Defendant. )
)
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
The Clerk of the Court will please enter the appearance of Assistant United States
/s/
ALAN BURCH, D.C. Bar # 470655
Assistant United States Attorney
555 4th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 514-7204
[email protected]
Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 9 Filed 02/26/10 Page 2 of 2
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing Notice of Appearance to be served upon pro
se Plaintiff by first class mail addressed to:
Orly Taitz
29839 Santa Margarita Parkway, Suite 100
Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688
and on
Christopher-Earl Strunk
593 Vanderbilt Ave., #281
Brooklyn, NY 11238
2
Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 10 Filed 02/26/10 Page 1 of 20
)
ORLY TAITZ, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No.: 10-0151 (RCL)
)
v. )
)
BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA, )
)
Defendant. )
)
Defendant, Barack H. Obama, respectfully moves to dismiss this action for lack of
qualifications of President Obama for office. Her complaint, like the others she has litigated as
counsel for various clients, fails to present a justiciable claim for several reasons, primarily her
lack of standing and the inherently political nature of her claims. Plaintiff also seeks a
preliminary injunction and the attached memorandum also serves as Defendant’s opposition
thereto. Because this motion seeks to dispose of the entire case, counsel for Defendant did not
/s/
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, D.C. Bar # 434122
Assistant United States Attorney
Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 10 Filed 02/26/10 Page 2 of 20
/s/
ALAN BURCH, D.C. Bar # 470655
Assistant United States Attorney
555 4th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 514-7204, [email protected]
2
Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 10 Filed 02/26/10 Page 3 of 20
)
ORLY TAITZ, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No.: 10-0151 (RCL)
)
v. )
)
BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA, )
)
Defendant. )
)
points and authorities in (1) support of his motion to dismiss this case, and (2) opposition to
Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction (R.8). Plaintiff lacks standing to bring her claims,
as has been thoroughly established by the several other federal courts in which she has litigated
substantially similar claims. For this reason alone, her case should be dismissed and her request
for preliminary injunction denied. As to her motion for a preliminary injunction, she seeks the
recusal of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia from representing the
President in this civil lawsuit as well as the release of a number of documents purportedly related
to a vague series of allegations associated with her representations about the President’s
Background
Although, to Defendant's knowledge, this is Dr. Taitz’s first case in which she serves as
Plaintiff, this is not her first bite at the apple, or even her second: she has unsuccessfully
Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 10 Filed 02/26/10 Page 4 of 20
represented plaintiffs in at least three judicial districts seeking to raise similar claims. In each of
these cases, the United States district courts have declined to find jurisdiction and have denied
Dr. Taitz’s Complaint suffers from exactly the same defects that doomed many of her
previous litigation efforts. Simply put, her allegations about the President’s citizenship are not a
concrete and particularized injury, as required to establish standing under the “case or
controversy” requirement of Article III, and the harms that she has suffered from judicial and/or
bar sanctions for her conduct in litigation are the consequences of her own actions and not in any
Even if plaintiff had standing, however, her request for a preliminary injunction should
nonetheless be denied. A preliminary injunction entered with respect the underlying issue would
carry with it the potential of irreparable harm to the public interest, whereas Plaintiff has not
provided any credible showing that she will be irreparably harmed if her application is denied.
1. Cook v. Good, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, No. 09-cv-82, 2009 WL 2163535 (M.D. Ga.
On July 9, 2009, United States Army Major Stefan Frederick Cook sought a temporary
restraining order in the Middle District of Georgia to enjoin his pending overseas deployment to
Afghanistan. See Civil Docket sheet, Cook v. Good, No. 09-cv-82, attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
Represented by Dr. Taitz, Major Cook alleged that his orders were not valid and that his doubts
about the President's citizenship would cause him to violate his oath to the United States
Constitution if he were forced to deploy. See generally 2009 WL 2163535. After a hearing on
2
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July 16, 2009, Judge Clay Land dismissed Major Cook’s claims, finding that “Major Cook
cannot satisfy” the standing prerequisite of Article III. Id. at *1. The district court also noted
that Dr. Taitz had sought to salvage the action by “seek[ing] to amend the complaint to add two
additional parties, Maj. Gen. Carol Dean Childers (Retired) and Lt. Col. David Earl Graef.” Id.
at *2. Judge Land rejected this proposed amendment, noting that the two officers had “alleged
no concrete particularized injury,” and that “[t]heir political claim does not give rise to a case or
Still represented by Dr. Taitz, Major Cook appealed the dismissal to the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal “for want of prosecution” on November 24, 2009.
See 11th Circuit Docket sheet, No. 09-14698-CC (noting pending motion to reinstate appeal),
Dr. Taitz returned to court in late August, 2009, representing a new plaintiff, Dr. Connie
Rhodes, a United States Army Captain slated to deploy to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom. Plaintiff and her client initially sought a temporary restraining order in the Western
District of Texas, but the case was summarily dismissed as the district court quickly found their
claims had “no substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” Rhodes v. Gates, No.
09-00703-XR, Order Denying Mot. for TRO (W.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2009). A copy of this order
Plaintiff then re-filed the same action in the Middle District of Georgia, the same court
which had previously dismissed Cook v. Good. See Rhodes v. MacDonald, 2009 WL 2997605
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at *1 (M.D. Ga. 2009), copies of the three Rhodes decisions are attached as Exhibit 5. Plaintiff
again sought a temporary restraining order to enjoin her client's overseas deployment. Id.
Finding that there was “no credible evidence” and ‘no reliable factual allegations to support [the]
unsubstantiated, conclusory allegations and conjecture that President Obama is ineligible to serve
as President of the United States,” the Georgia district court again dismissed the complaint,
deeming the claims “frivolous” and the “threatened injury . . . not substantial.” Id. at *3, *5.
In addition, the Georgia district court issued a stark warning to Dr. Taitz: “Plaintiff's
counsel is hereby notified that the filing of any future actions in this Court, which are similarly
Responding with what the Georgia district court characterized as a “tirade,” Plaintiff then
moved for reconsideration of the district court’s dismissal. See Rhodes v. MacDonald, 2009 WL
3111834 at *1. The district court noted that Plaintiff had “contemptuously ignore[d] the Court’s
previous admonition that Plaintiff's counsel discontinue her illegitimate use of the federal
judiciary to further her political agenda.” Id. Accordingly, in conjunction with its previous
warning, the district court denied the reconsideration motion as “frivolous” and found that Dr.
Taitz’s conduct violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court
ordered her to “show cause why the Court should not impose a monetary penalty of $10,000.00
After Dr. Taitz withdrew as counsel for Major Rhodes, she continued to litigate the award
of sanctions. As the district court noted in its next order, however, "[i]nstead of responding to
the Court’s specific concerns or addressing the contemplated amount of the monetary sanction,
Ms. Taitz continued her attacks on the Court,” floating a number of implausible theories and
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alleging bias on the part of the district court. Rhodes v. MacDonald, --- F. Supp. 2d ----, 2009
WL 3299817 (M.D. Ga. 2009) at *4. In response, the district court issued a detailed opinion
documenting Dr. Taitz's misconduct, the frivolousness of her actions, and increasing the dollar
Dr. Taitz has appealed these sanctions to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See 11th
Cir. Docket sheet, in Rhodes v. MacDonald, No. 09-15418BB, attached hereto as Exhibit 6. Her
3. Barnett v. Obama, No. 09-0082, 2009 WL 3861788 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2009).
Meanwhile, throughout the pendency of the above cases, Dr. Taitz maintained yet another
action purportedly challenging the President’s eligibility for office. In this case, a group of 44
plaintiffs comprising “third party candidates from the American Independent Party for president
and vice president in the 2008 presidential election, inactive and active military personnel, and
state representatives” brought an action in the Central District of California on January 20, 2009,
shortly after the President's inauguration. See Barnett v. Obama, 2009 WL 3861788 at *1, *3.
Similar to the instant case, the amended complaint in California “set[] forth ten questions for
relat[ing] to the meaning of the Constitution’s natural born citizen clause and the appropriate
recourse should a sitting president not meet the ‘natural born citizen’ requirement.” Id. The
plaintiffs in Barnett also “request[ed] that the Court order the production of documents pursuant
to FOIA.” Id. As with Dr. Taitz’s other cases, the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Barnett at *3-8. Although the Barnett court identified
one category of plaintiffs -- presidential candidates defeated by the President in the 2008 election
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-- who might satisfy Article III's injury requirement, see Barnett at *8 (discussing the potential
injury to failed presidential candidates), Dr. Taitz is not representing those plaintiffs in this action
In its opinion, the California district court also discussed Dr. Taitz’s litigation conduct,
observing that she “has favored rhetoric . . . rather than the language of a lawyer seeking to
present arguments through cogent legal reasoning,” and that she took the “improper and
unethical” step of “encourag[ing] her supporters to attempt to influence this Court’s decision.”
See id. at *19. In addition, the district court expressed its “deep[] concern[] that Taitz may have
suborned perjury through witnesses she intended to bring.” Id. In contrast to the district court’s
characterization of Dr. Taitz’s conduct, the same court noted that Gary Kreep, who served as
separate counsel for two of the Barnett plaintiffs, had attempted “to bring serious issues before
Following dismissal, the Barnett plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which has not yet decided the appeal. See 9th Cir. Docket sheet in Barnett v. Obama,
Argument
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to challenge the President's qualifications for office, she
lacks standing to raise the issue. The question of standing is a threshold determination
concerning “whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of
particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). A plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing proper standing “at the outset of its case.” Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection
6
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Agency, 292 F.3d 895, 901 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In so doing, the plaintiff must allege facts
sufficient to satisfy the “irreducible Constitutional minimum” of Article III standing. Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Accordingly, to have standing here, Plaintiff
must first allege that she “suffered an ‘injury in fact’ -- an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or
‘hypothetical[.]’” Id. at 560 (citations omitted). “Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of.” Id. (quotations omitted). “Third, it must be
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.” Id. (quotations omitted). In her Complaint, plaintiff has entirely failed to establish
By now, it is well-established that the purported injury suffered by citizens who doubt the
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217, 220 (1974); Berg v.
Obama, 574 F. Supp. 2d 509, 518-21 (E.D. Pa. 2008), and cases cited therein; see also Barnett;
Rhodes, 2009 WL 2997605; Rhodes, 2009 WL 3299817. Having served as counsel in many of
the prior cases establishing this principle, Plaintiff is well aware that an allegation of such injury
is inadequate. In this case, she now alleges that she herself has suffered a unique injury through
having her theories of standing and subject matter jurisdiction rejected in those prior cases. Even
if this could constitute a tangible injury, it is neither causally related to the President's citizenship
nor redressable by a favorable decision by this Court. Therefore, the instant complaint must also
7
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her claim that she has somehow been “injured” through her prior efforts to litigate the President's
eligibility for office including, inter alia, that she suffered “vicious attacks coming from the
media,” that an “emissions hose” in her car “was disconnected,” that certain private individuals
“submitted [sic] perjured affidavits . . . and forged her signature,” and that “her paypal account
was tampered with.” Complaint at 2-3. Of these, the only harm that conceivably stems from
official action on the part of any governmental entity is her claim that “[w]hen she brought two
legal actions in the Middle District of Georgia . . . she was sanctioned $20,000.” Complaint at 3.
This injury is not traceable to any action of Defendant, but stems instead from her
decisions to file, repeatedly, frivolous motions in district court in the Middle District of Georgia,
This injury would not be redressed by the relief she seeks, because this Court cannot
affect, through relief affecting Defendant, the sanctions issued by the Georgia court, nor the
actions of the third parties allegedly responsible for her other injuries. Where injuries result only
indirectly, “from the independent action of some third party not before the court,” then “the
presence of intervening factors interrupts the chain of traceability” and there is no standing.
International Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush, 954 F.2d 745, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
In her application for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff raises the prospect of another type
of harm: that her “law license” will be “undermine[d]” or “endanger[ed].” (Taitz Affidavit at
18-22.) She intimates that this threat is a collateral consequence of the decisions in Rhodes,
claiming that the order from the Middle District of Georgia “was forwarded to the CA Bar.” (Id.
at 17.) Like the sanction from the Georgia district court, however, this injury is neither traceable
8
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Plaintiff cannot circumvent the requirement that she have standing merely by recasting
her claims under the quo warranto statute, 16 D.C. Official Code § 3501, et seq. It is well-
established that statutes conferring a right-to-sue may not extend that right to individuals who
otherwise lack standing under Article III. See, e.g., McClure v. Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981)
(affirming McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265, 271 (D. Idaho 1981) (finding inadequate
appointment of another Member as an Article III judge). In certain circumstances, that provision
permits an “interested person [to] apply to the court by certified petition for leave to have the writ
issued. Without Article III standing, however, Dr. Taitz cannot maintain such a claim.1
Plaintiff cannot establish constitutional standing and her case should be dismissed in its
entirety.
It is well settled that when the United States Constitution makes a “textually
demonstrable commitment” of an issue to another branch of the government, other than the
judiciary, that issue presents a non-justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962). “The principle that the courts lack jurisdiction over political decisions that are
by their nature committed to the political branches to the exclusion of the judiciary is as old as
the fundamental principle of judicial review.” Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 193 (D.C.
1
There is ample reason to believe that the D.C. statute is entirely consistent with Article III
because the definition of an “interested person” likely excludes those who have not suffered a
cognizable injury-in-fact. See Columbian Cat Fanciers, Inc. v. Koehne, 96 F.2d 529, 532 (D.C.
Cir. 1938) (“an action in quo warranto . . . must be brought by a person claiming title to the
office in question and out of possession thereof.”).
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Cir. 2005). The political question doctrine serves to “restrain the Judiciary from inappropriate
interference in the business of the other branches of Government” by prohibiting the courts from
deciding issues that properly rest within the province of the political branches. United States v.
Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990). Accordingly, claims “involving political questions
outside of the Article III jurisdiction of federal courts are “consistently dismissed for want of
subject matter jurisdiction.” Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1233 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
2009).
According to the text of the Constitution, the issues Plaintiff seeks to raise in this case
regarding both whether President Obama is a “natural born citizen of the United States,” and
therefore qualified to be President, are to be judged (if at all), by other parts of the government
At the outset, the Constitution indicates that issues related to a candidate’s eligibility for
the Office of President rest, in the first instance, with the voters and the Electoral College, the
Constitutionally created body responsible for selecting the President of the United States. See
U.S. Constitution, Article II, section 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct,” electors for the President and Vice President); Amend. XXIII
section 1; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 43 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The [Electoral]
College was created to permit the most knowledgeable members of the community to choose the
responsibility to select the President necessarily includes the authority to decide whether a
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The Constitution also provides that, after the Electoral College has voted, further review
of a presidential candidate’s eligibility for office, to the extent such review would ever be
required, rests with Congress. Where no candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes, the
Constitution commits to the House of Representatives the authority to select the President and, in
so doing, to evaluate the candidates’ qualifications. See U.S. Constitution Amendment XII.
Similarly, the Twentieth Amendment exclusively grants Congress the responsibility for selecting
a President when a candidate elected by the Electoral College does not satisfy the Constitution’s
eligibility requirements. See id. Amendment XX, § 3 (“the Congress may by law provide for the
case wherein neither a President-elect nor a Vice President-elect shall have qualified, declaring
who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and
such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.”). Thus,
review of Presidential qualifications after the Electoral College has acted rests in Congress,
Federal legislation further details the process for counting electoral votes in the Congress.
Under 3 U.S.C. § 15, Congress is directed to be in session on the appropriate date to count the
electoral votes for President, with the President of the Senate presiding. The statute further
directs that the electoral votes be counted, and then the results be presented to the President of
the Senate, who shall then “announce the state of the vote.” The statute then provides a
Every objection shall be made in writing, and shall state clearly and concisely, and
without argument, the ground thereof, and shall be signed by at least one Senator
and one Member of the House of Representatives before the same shall be
received. When all objections so made . . . shall have been received and read, the
Senate shall thereupon withdraw, and such objections shall be submitted to the
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Senate for its decision; and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall, in
like manner, submit such objections to the House of Representatives for its
decision.
3 U.S.C. § 15. The statute is clear that Congress adjudicates all challenges to the counting of
In summary, the text of the Constitution and the relevant statutory law make plain that
challenges to the qualifications of a candidate for President can, in the first instance, be presented
to the voting public before the election, and, once the election is over, can be raised as objections
as the Electoral votes are counted in the Congress. Therefore, challenges such as those
purportedly raised in this case are committed to the electors, and to the Legislative branch.
Barack Obama has been President of the United States for over a year now. The issues
which Plaintiff seeks to litigate in this case, and the allegations which she makes in her
Complaint all relate to the fitness, competence, and qualification of President Obama to continue
to serve in office. As the D.C. Circuit observed, under different circumstances, these issues are
Although the primary reason for invoking the political question doctrine in our
case is the textual commitment . . . to the Senate, the need for finality also
demands it. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 210, 82 S. Ct. at 706 . . . . [T]he
intrusion of the courts would expose the political life of the country to months, or
perhaps years, of chaos. Even if the courts qualified a finding of justiciability
with a rule against stays or specific relief of any kind, their review would
undermine the new President’s legitimacy . . . for at least as long as the process
took. And a declaratory action without final relief awarding the Office to one
person or the other could confound matters indefinitely.
Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (emphasis added), aff’d, 506 U.S.
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224 (1992).2
Litigation of these issues in this Court would be an equal intrusion of the judiciary into
the political life of the other branches of government. The intrusion would do violence to the
question is outside the jurisdiction of the Court. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210 (“The non-
In summary, the issues which Plaintiff seeks to litigate in this case are constitutionally
and statutorily within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress. Litigation of these
issues in this Court at all, and certainly the granting of any of the relief sought by Plaintiff herein,
Plaintiff seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, to
produce the birth certificate supporting the President’s application for a U.S. passport. Plaintiff
cannot meet the high standards for mandamus relief. See, e.g., In re DRC, Inc., No. 09-5083,
2009 WL 5125602 (Dec. 8, 2009). In addition to failing to state a claim for any cause of action
2
The same interest in finality has also long been recognized to limit the scope of actions in quo
warranto. See Newman v. U.S. ex rel., Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537, 548 (1915) (“[G]eneral public
interest is not sufficient to authorize a private citizen to institute such [Quo Warranto]
proceedings, for if it was, then every citizen and every taxpayer would have the same interest and
the same right to institute such proceedings, and a public officer might, from the beginning to the
end of his term, be harassed with proceedings to try his title.”).
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Plaintiff seeks the production of Defendant’s birth certificate and various other records,
but the simple problem with her claim is that she has no legal entitlement to them. For example,
she has no basis to pursue a claim under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552,
because she has neither sued a federal agency nor produced any evidence of a request she made
to a federal agency for such records (still less exhausting her administrative remedies). Other
than her groundless claim for quo warranto relief, she has cited no other statute or common law
right that would entitle her to production of any such records from Defendant. Her complaint
therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
Even if the Court were to find that Plaintiff had standing, she would still not be entitled to
injunctive relief. A grant of preliminary injunctive relief under Rule 65(a) “is considered an
extraordinary remedy in this circuit.” Sociedad Anonima Vina Santa Rita v. U.S. Dep’t of
injunctive relief is such “a drastic and unusual judicial measure,” see Marine Transp. Lines v.
Lehman, 623 F. Supp. 330, 334 (D.D.C. 1985), the power to issue such an injunction must be
“sparingly exercised,” see Dorfmann v. Boozer, 414 F.2d 1168, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
To prevail in her request for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff bears the burden of
demonstrating that: (1) there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) failure to
grant the injunction would result in irreparable injury; (3) the requested injunction would not
substantially injure other interested parties; and (4) the public interest would be furthered by the
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injunction. See Katz v. Georgetown Univ., 246 F.3d 685, 687-88 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Nat’l Head
Start Ass’n v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 297 F. Supp. 2d 242, 246-47 (D.D.C. 2004). In a
case such as this, where “the injunction sought would alter, rather than preserve, the status quo,”
Plaintiff must meet an even higher standard: she must demonstrate “a clear entitlement to relief”
or that “extreme or very serious damage will result if the injunction does not issue.” Qualls v.
Here, Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction to (1) recuse the U.S. Attorney’s Office
from defending this suit, and (2) compel production of various “vital records” of Defendant. As
explained above, she has no prospect of prevailing on the merits on her latter request. As for
recusal of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, her theory is pure speculation that the Office may bring a
criminal prosecution against her and that if that happened, it would suffer a conflict of interest in
defending this suit. Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971) (plaintiffs lacked standing
where they did not claim they had ever been threatened with prosecution, that a prosecution was
likely, or even that a prosecution was remotely possible). Plaintiff offers no plausible support for
her conspiracy theory or that it, if true, it would justify recusal of the Office, much less on an
More generally, because Plaintiff cannot show an injury to satisfy Article III standing, she
cannot show irreparable harm for purposes of receiving an injunction. See, e.g., In re Navy
Moreover, her allegation of immediate injury falls well short of constituting a serious or
irreversible harm. In her affidavit, Plaintiff claims: “I have a serious concern that a CA bar [sic]
will be used as yet another tool in the same effort to destroy me,” and that she is “supposed to
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provide an answer to the CA bar by 02.26.10.” (Taitz Affidavit R.8 ¶¶ 21-22.) Even if this were
taken at face value, Plaintiff provides no specifics as to what her “answer” to the bar is required
to include, what sort of inquiry is being performed by the Bar, or what additional stages of any
The finality associated with Plaintiff's suggested date of February 26, 2010, is further
undercut by the pendency of her appeals in Barnett and Rhodes. Those appeals are far more
directly relevant to the (extremely tenuous) claims of harm she makes regarding her law license
than anything likely to be resolved in this case. She has fallen far short of justifying preliminary
relief, much less preliminary relief that would so significantly alter, rather than preserve, the
status quo.
Finally, the request for preliminary injunction should be denied based on its adverse
impact to the public interest. “[C]ourts of equity should pay particular regard for the public
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982). Plaintiff cannot meet her burden of establishing that
an injunction will serve the public interest in this case. The public has an interest in the finality
of elections and avoiding disruption in the country’s leadership. The storm of innuendo she
seeks to create, if indulged, cannot but open the door to innumerable, equally frivolous claims.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant asks the Court to dismiss this case for lack of
/s/
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, D.C. Bar # 434122
Assistant United States Attorney
/s/
ALAN BURCH, D.C. Bar # 470655
Assistant United States Attorney
555 4th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 514-7204, [email protected]
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I caused copies of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and supporting
Memorandum to be served by first class mail addressed to pro se Plaintiff at:
Orly Taitz
29839 Santa Margarita Parkway, Suite 100
Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688
and on
Christopher-Earl Strunk
593 Vanderbilt Ave., #281
Brooklyn, NY 11238
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Gov't Ex. 1, 10-0151 (RCL)
Page 1
Slip Copy, 2009 WL 2163535 (M.D.Ga.)
(Cite as: 2009 WL 2163535 (M.D.Ga.))
Hugh Randolph Aderhold, Jr., Macon, GA, for De- In this case, Major Cook cannot satisfy these ele-
fendants. ments. His orders have been revoked. He is not be-
ing deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq. He is under no
present order to report anywhere. There is no evid-
ence that he is subject to future deployment. Any
ORDER
such contention is sheer speculation and entirely
CLAY D. LAND, District Judge. hypothetical. Thus, he has suffered no particular-
ized or concrete injury. There is no causal connec-
*1 To make the record complete and easily access- tion between any conduct by the defendant and any
ible to the parties and other persons interested in alleged injury. And the only remedy he sought from
the Court's oral ruling today, the Court files this this court, avoiding deployment, has already been
written order that puts in writing the oral order that provided, and thus there is no remedy that this court
the Court issued from the bench at the conclusion may provide that will redress his alleged injury.
of the hearing today on the Defendants' motion to
dismiss. Based on all of these reasons, Major Cook does not
have standing to pursue this action. Thus, no case
The same Constitution upon which Major Cook re- or controversy exists under the United States Con-
lies in support of his contention that President stitution, and this Court consequently has no sub-
Barack Obama is not eligible to serve as President ject matter jurisdiction over this action. Accord-
of the United States very clearly provides that fed- ingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss must be gran-
eral courts shall only have the authority to hear ac- ted.
tual “cases and controversies.” By restricting the
Judiciary's power to actual “cases and controver- Recognizing that his opportunity to air his griev-
sies,” our founders wisely established a separation ance over the President's eligibility to serve as Pres-
of powers that would ensure the freedom of their ident of the United States was slipping by,
fellow citizens. They concluded that the Judicial Plaintiff's attorney seeks to rescue the claims with
V.
Defendant
Wanda L Good represented by Rebecca Elaine Ausprung
Colonel U.S. Army Litigation Division
901 N STUART ST STE 400
ARLINGTON , VA 22203
703-696-1614
Fax: 703-696-8126
Email: [email protected]
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
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Gov't Ex. 2, 10-0151 (RCL)
(Entered: 07/16/2009)
07/16/2009 10 ORDER dismissing case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Ordered by
Judge Clay D. Land on 7/16/09 (tls) (Entered: 07/16/2009)
09/15/2009 11 NOTICE OF APPEAL as to 10 Order on Motion to Dismiss, Order on Motion
for Preliminary Injunction, Order on Motion for TRO, 8 Order on Motion to
Dismiss,, Order on Motion for Preliminary Injunction,, Order on Motion for
TRO,, Motion Hearing, by Stefan Frederick Cook. Filing fee $ 455, Receipt
No.: 113G0000000000816523. (Taitz, Orly) (Entered: 09/15/2009)
09/17/2009 12 Notice of Error in Filing (related document(s): 11 Notice of Appeal, filed by
Stefan Frederick Cook ). (tls) (Entered: 09/17/2009)
09/17/2009 13 Letter of Transmittal re 11 Notice of Appeal. Certified Copy of Notice of
Appeal, Docket Sheet, and Order mailed to USCA. NOTICE: A Civil Appeal
Statement must be filed with the Court of Appeals. A copy of this form may be
obtained from the District Clerk's Office or the district court internet site
(www.gamd.uscourts.gov). (tls) (Entered: 09/17/2009)
09/17/2009 14 Letter/Memorandum dated September 17, 2009, to Plaintiff's Counsel
concerning transcript orders. (Attachments: # 1 List of Hearings)(tls)
(Additional attachment(s) added on 9/17/2009: # 2 Address Label) (tls).
(Entered: 09/17/2009)
10/06/2009 15 USCA Case Number 09-14698C re 11 Notice of Appeal, filed by Stefan
Frederick Cook. (tls) (Entered: 10/06/2009)
10/07/2009 16 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 07/16/2009, before Judge Clay D. Land.
Court Reporter/Transcriber Betsy Peterson. Transcript may be viewed at the
court public terminal or purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber
before the deadline for Release of Transcript Restriction. After that date it may
be obtained through PACER. IMPORTANT NOTICE - REDACTION OF
TRANSCRIPTS: In order to remove personal identifier data from the
transcript, a party must electronically file a Transcript Redaction Request with
the Clerk's Office within 21 calendar days of this date. The Policy governing
the redaction of personal information is located on the court website at
www.gamd.uscourts.gov. Read this policy carefully. If no Transcript Redaction
Request is filed within 21 calendar days of this date, the court will assume
redaction of personal identifiers is not necessary and the transcript will be made
available via PACER 90 days from today's date. (Peterson, Betsy) (tls).
(Entered: 10/07/2009)
11/30/2009 17 USCA Order dismissing 11 Notice of Appeal filed by Stefan Frederick Cook.
(Attachments: # 1 USCA Cover Letter - 11/24/09)(tls) (Entered: 11/30/2009)
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Gov't Ex. 3, 10-0151 (RCL)
09-14698-CC
Stefan Frederick Cook v. Wanda L. Good
Closed
Docket #: 09-14698-CC
Short Style: Stefan Frederick Cook v. Wanda L. Good
Docket Date: 09/18/2009
Lead Case:
Agency:
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights: Other
Misc. Type:
Clerk: Dixon, Eleanor
Clerk Phone: (404) 335-6172
District Information
Docket #: Judge:
Dkt Date: / /
Case Relationships
Pending Motions
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Gov't Ex. 3, 10-0151 (RCL)
Atlanta, GA 30303-2289
(404) 335-6100
09-14698-CC
Stefan Frederick Cook v. Wanda L. Good
STEFAN FREDERICK COOK,
Major,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Major General,
Lieutenant Colonel,
Plaintiffs,
versus
WANDA L. GOOD,
Colonel,
THOMAS D. MACDONALD,
Colonel,
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LOUIS B. WINGATE,
Colonel,
Defendants-Appellees.
09-14698-CC
Stefan Frederick Cook v. Wanda L. Good
Appellant Appellant Attorney
Stefan Frederick Cook Orly Taitz
Address Not On File 29839 SANTA MARGARITA PKWY, Ste 100
E-Brief Tendered: Appellant filed on 12/08/2009 RCHO STA MARG, CA 92688-3616
Fees: Paid on 09/15/2009 (949) 683-5411
Fax: (949) 766-7603
[email protected]
No Briefing Information Found.
Appellee Appellee Attorney
Wanda L. Good Eric Fleisig-Greene
Address Not On File 950 PENNSYLVANIA AVE NW RM 7214
WASHINGTON, DC 20530-0009
(202) 514-4815
Fax: (202) 514-9405
[email protected]
No Briefing Information Found.
Thomas D. MacDonald Eric Fleisig-Greene
Address Not On File 950 PENNSYLVANIA AVE NW RM 7214
WASHINGTON, DC 20530-0009
(202) 514-4815
Fax: (202) 514-9405
[email protected]
No Briefing Information Found.
Robert M. Gates Eric Fleisig-Greene
Address Not On File 950 PENNSYLVANIA AVE NW RM 7214
WASHINGTON, DC 20530-0009
(202) 514-4815
Fax: (202) 514-9405
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[email protected]
No Briefing Information Found.
Barack H. Obama Eric Fleisig-Greene
Address Not On File 950 PENNSYLVANIA AVE NW RM 7214
WASHINGTON, DC 20530-0009
(202) 514-4815
Fax: (202) 514-9405
[email protected]
No Briefing Information Found.
Louis B. Wingate Eric Fleisig-Greene
Address Not On File 950 PENNSYLVANIA AVE NW RM 7214
WASHINGTON, DC 20530-0009
(202) 514-4815
Fax: (202) 514-9405
[email protected]
No Briefing Information Found.
Mark B. Stern
950 PENNSYLVANIA AVE NW RM 7531
WASHINGTON, DC 20530-0009
(202) 514-5089
Fax: (202) 514-8151
[email protected]
No Briefing Information Found.
Initial Service
Rebecca E. Ausprung, Major
901 N STUART ST STE 400
ARLINGTON, VA 22203-1821
(703) 696-1627
Hugh Randolph Aderhold, Jr.
U.S. Attorney's Office
PO BOX 1702
MACON, GA 31202-1702
(478) 621-2728
Fax: (478) 621-2710
[email protected]
George F. Peterman, III
U.S. Attorney's Office - Middle Dis. Of Ga.
300 MULBERRY ST STE 400
MACON, GA 31201-7999
(478) 752-3511
Fax: (478) 621-2710
[email protected]
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, N.W.
Atlanta, GA 30303-2289
(404) 335-6100
09-14698-CC
Stefan Frederick Cook v. Wanda L. Good
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02/25/2010 11:03:44
PACER Login: ux0412 Client Code: doj
Description: docket sheet Case Number: 09-14698-CC
Billable Pages: 5 Cost: 0.40
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Case
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1:10-cv-00151-RCL
5:09-cv-00703-XR Document
Document10-4
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Gov't Ex. 5, 10-0151 (RCL)
APPEAL
Plaintiff
Connie Rhodes represented by Connie Rhodes
Captain, M.D., F.S, PRO SE
Orly Taitz
Law Offices Of Orly Taitz Esq
26302 La Paz Ste 211
Mission Viego , CA 92691
949-683-5411
Email: [email protected]
TERMINATED: 09/28/2009
LEAD ATTORNEY
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
V.
Defendant
Thomas D MacDonald represented by Rebecca Elaine Ausprung
Colonel, Garrison Commander, Fort Benning U.S. Army Litigation Division
901 N STUART ST STE 400
ARLINGTON , VA 22203
703-696-1614
Fax: 703-696-8126
Email: [email protected]
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sheetul S. Wall
U.S. Attorney's Office
P.O. Box 2568
Columbus , GA 31902-2568
706-649-7700
Fax: 706-649-7667
Email: [email protected]
Defendant
George Steuber represented by Rebecca Elaine Ausprung
Deputy Commander, Fort Benning (See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
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Sheetul S. Wall
(See above for address)
Defendant
Robert M. Gates represented by Rebecca Elaine Ausprung
Secretary of Defense (See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sheetul S. Wall
(See above for address)
Defendant
Barack Hussein Obama represented by Rebecca Elaine Ausprung
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Sheetul S. Wall
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Movant
Orly Taitz represented by Orly Taitz
Law Offices Of Orly Taitz Esq
26302 La Paz Ste 211
Mission Viego, CA 92691
949-683-5411
Email: [email protected]
PRO SE
Movant
Victor M Serby represented by Victor M Serby
255 Hewlett Neck Road
Woodmere, NY 11598-1452
516-374-2455
PRO SE
09/04/2009 2 Notice of Error in Filing (related document(s): 1 Complaint filed by Connie Rhodes) (tlf).
(Entered: 09/04/2009)
09/04/2009 Notification emailed to Orly Taitz regarding submitting a pro hac vice petition, paying the
$100.00 pro hac vice fee and associating local counsel. (nop) (Entered: 09/04/2009)
09/04/2009 3 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order by Connie Rhodes filed by Orly Taitz.
(Attachments: # 1 Supplement, # 2 Affidavit Affidavit of a Licensed investigator re 39 social
security numbers and 140 addresses for Barack Obama, # 3 Exhibit list of 140 addresses and 39
social security numbers for Barack Obama)(Taitz, Orly) (Entered: 09/04/2009)
09/04/2009 4 MOTION request for emergency hearing September 9-10 due to scheduled deployment
September 12 by Connie Rhodes filed by Orly Taitz.(Taitz, Orly) (Entered: 09/04/2009)
09/08/2009 5 Notice of Error in Filing (related document(s): 3 Motion for TRO, filed by Connie Rhodes, 4
Motion for Miscellaneous Relief filed by Connie Rhodes) (tlf). (Entered: 09/08/2009)
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Gov't Ex. 5, 10-0151 (RCL)
09/09/2009 6 Summons Issued as to Thomas D MacDonald on 9/9/2009; George Steuber on 9/9/2009; Robert
M. Gates on 9/9/2009; Barack Hussein Obama on 9/9/2009, U.S. Attorney (G.F. Peterson, III)
Summons Issued 9/9/2009. (esl) (Entered: 09/09/2009)
09/10/2009 NOTICE of Hearing on Motion 3 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order, 4 MOTION
request for emergency hearing; Motion Hearing set for 9/11/2009 02:00 PM in Columbus before
Judge Clay D. Land. (pgs) (Entered: 09/10/2009)
09/11/2009 8 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for Damages, Declaratory Judgment, and Injunctive
Relief and Application for TRO by Thomas D MacDonald, George Steuber, Robert M. Gates,
Barack Hussein Obama filed by Sheetul S. Wall. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A Deployment
Orders)(Wall, Sheetul) (Entered: 09/11/2009)
09/11/2009 9 DEMAND for Trial by Jury by Connie Rhodes (tlf). (Entered: 09/11/2009)
09/11/2009 10 Request for judicial notice by Connie Rhodes (tlf). (Entered: 09/11/2009)
09/11/2009 Hearing set for 9/14/2009 12:00 PM in Columbus before Judge Clay D. Land (tlf). (Entered:
09/11/2009)
09/11/2009 30 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Clay D. Land, Columbus, GA: Motion Hearing
held on 9/11/2009 re 3 MOTION for Temporary Restraining Order, filed by Connie Rhodes.
[Hearing continued] (tls) (Entered: 10/21/2009)
09/14/2009 12 Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Clay D. Land: Motion Hearing held on
9/14/2009. Written Order to follow (Attachments: # 1 Exhibits) (tlf). (Entered: 09/15/2009)
09/16/2009 13 ORDER denying 3 Motion for TRO; granting 8 Motion to Dismiss. Ordered by Judge Clay D.
Land on 09/16/2009. (CGC) (Entered: 09/16/2009)
09/17/2009 15 BRIEF Request for stay of deployment pending motion for reconsideration of judgment filed by
Connie Rhodes re 13 Order on Motion for TRO, Order on Motion to Dismiss, 14 Judgment
(Taitz, Orly) (Entered: 09/17/2009)
09/17/2009 Attorney Orly Taitz admitted pro hac vice as of 9/14/09 for Cpt. Connie Rhodes. Pro hac vice
fee paid 9/14/09 $100.00 Recept #404677. (nop) (Entered: 09/17/2009)
09/18/2009 16 Notice of Error in Filing (related document(s): 15 Brief filed by Connie Rhodes) (tlf). (Entered:
09/18/2009)
09/18/2009 17 ORDER denying 15 Motion for Stay of Deployment filed by Connie Rhodes. Ordered by Judge
Clay D. Land on 09/18/2009. (CGC) (Entered: 09/18/2009)
09/18/2009 18 Letter from plaintiff regarding withdrawal of motion to stay (tlf). (Entered: 09/18/2009)
09/26/2009 19 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Connie Rhodes filed by Orly Taitz.(Taitz, Orly)
(Entered: 09/26/2009)
09/28/2009 Notice of Error in Filing (related document: 19 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney filed by Connie
Rhodes ). DOCUMENT IS NOT SIGNED AND MUST BE RE-FILED ONCE
EXECUTED WITH AN "S/signature". (esl) (Entered: 09/28/2009)
09/28/2009 20 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Connie Rhodes filed by Orly Taitz.(Taitz, Orly)
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(Entered: 09/28/2009)
09/28/2009 TEXT ONLY Notice of Error in Filing (related document: 20 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney
filed by Connie Rhodes ). SIGNED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE IS MISSING FROM
DOCUMENT. PLEASE E-FILE AN EXECUTED CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND
LINK IT BACK TO DOCUMENT 20 . Failure to include service on Plaintiff will result in
another Notice of Error in Filing. (esl) (Entered: 09/28/2009)
09/28/2009 21 ORDER granting 20 Motion to Withdraw as Attorney with conditions (see order for
explanation). Attorney Orly Taitz terminated. Ordered by Judge Clay D. Land on 09/28/2009
(esl) (Entered: 09/28/2009)
09/29/2009 22 MOTION to Withdraw as Attorney by Connie Rhodes filed by Orly Taitz.(Taitz, Orly)
(Entered: 09/29/2009)
10/02/2009 23 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 9/14/2009, before Judge Clay D. Land. Court
Reporter/Transcriber Betsy Peterson. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or
purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript
Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. IMPORTANT NOTICE -
REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: In order to remove personal identifier data from the
transcript, a party must electronically file a Transcript Redaction Request with the Clerk's Office
within 21 calendar days of this date. The Policy governing the redaction of personal information
is located on the court website at www.gamd.uscourts.gov. Read this policy carefully. If no
Transcript Redaction Request is filed within 21 calendar days of this date, the court will assume
redaction of personal identifiers is not necessary and the transcript will be made available via
PACER 90 days from today's date. (Peterson, Betsy) (Entered: 10/02/2009)
10/02/2009 24 MOTION for Recusal by Connie Rhodes filed by Orly Taitz.(Taitz, Orly) (Entered: 10/02/2009)
10/02/2009 25 MOTION for Extension of Time to File response. by Connie Rhodes filed by Orly Taitz.(Taitz,
Orly) (Entered: 10/02/2009)
10/07/2009 27 TRANSCRIPT of Proceedings held on 9/11/2009, before Judge Clay D. Land. Court
Reporter/Transcriber Betsy Peterson. Transcript may be viewed at the court public terminal or
purchased through the Court Reporter/Transcriber before the deadline for Release of Transcript
Restriction. After that date it may be obtained through PACER. IMPORTANT NOTICE -
REDACTION OF TRANSCRIPTS: In order to remove personal identifier data from the
transcript, a party must electronically file a Transcript Redaction Request with the Clerk's Office
within 21 calendar days of this date. The Policy governing the redaction of personal information
is located on the court website at www.gamd.uscourts.gov. Read this policy carefully. If no
Transcript Redaction Request is filed within 21 calendar days of this date, the court will assume
redaction of personal identifiers is not necessary and the transcript will be made available via
PACER 90 days from today's date. (Peterson, Betsy) (Additional attachment(s) added on
10/8/2009: # 1 Corrected signature page) (esl). (Entered: 10/07/2009)
10/13/2009 28 ORDER denying 24 Motion for Recusal; denying 25 Motion for Extension of Time. Ordered by
Judge Clay D. Land on 10/13/2009. (lra) (Entered: 10/13/2009)
10/23/2009 31 Letter of Transmittal re 29 Notice of Appeal,. Certified Copy of Notice of Appeal, Docket
Sheet, Order appealed from. NOTICE: A Civil Appeal Statement must be filed with the Court of
Appeals. A copy of this form may be obtained from the District Clerk's Office or the district
court internet site (www.gamd.uscourts.gov). (tls) (Entered: 10/23/2009)
10/23/2009 32 Letter to Dr. Orly Taitz regarding transcript order form as to 29 Notice of Appeal. (tls) (Entered:
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Gov't Ex. 5, 10-0151 (RCL)
10/23/2009)
10/23/2009 33 MOTION for Leave to File an amicus curiae brief filed by Victor M Serby (Attachments: # 1
Amicus Brief, # 2 Envelope)(tlf). (Entered: 10/23/2009)
10/29/2009 34 USCA Case Number re 29 Notice of Appeal (tlf). (Additional attachment(s) added on 1/8/2010:
# 1 USCA Letter to Orly Taitz - 10/27/09) (tls). (Entered: 10/29/2009)
11/10/2009 35 BRIEF by Defendant in Response to the Court's Order dated October 13, 2009 filed by Thomas
D MacDonald, George Steuber, Robert M. Gates, Barack Hussein Obama re 28 Order on
Motion for Recusal, Order on Motion for Extension of Time (Misc) (Wall, Sheetul) (Entered:
11/10/2009)
11/13/2009 36 ORDER for final judgment against Orly Taitz. Ordered by Judge Clay D. Land on 11/13/09.
(tls) (Entered: 11/13/2009)
01/13/2010 39 Certified and Transmitted Record on Appeal to US Court of Appeals re 29 Notice of Appeal
(nop) (Entered: 01/13/2010)
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Page 1
ORDER
Only the W estlaw citation is currently available.
Page 2
Page 3
Captain Rhodes is presently stationed at Ft. Benning, decision-making process and chain of command. As
Georgia awaiting deployment to Iraq. This deployment is explained below, the Court must balance several factors to
imminent and will likely occur absent an order from this determine whether judicial review of a military decision is
Court granting Plaintiff's motion for a temporary authorized.
restraining order.
Page 4
of the appropriateness of judicial review of who champions herself as a defender of liberty and
military decisions involves subject matter freedom, seeks to use the power of the judiciary to compel
jurisdiction or abstention principles based on a citizen, albeit the President of the United States, to
comity and respect for the unique military “prove his innocence” to “charges” that are based upon
decision-making process. The Court finds that conjecture and speculation. Any middle school civics
the proper analysis in this case requires an student would readily recognize the irony of abandoning
evaluation of the deployment order using fundamental principles upon which our Country was
principles of abstention. See Winck, 327 F.3d at founded in order to purportedly “protect and preserve”
1299-1300 (distinguishing subject matter those very principles.
jurisdiction from abstention principles).
Page 5
duty to look the other way, while [he] obtained U.S. at 94-95.
the copy” of the document. (Smith Decl. ¶ 7,
Sept. 3, 2009.) Counsel has not, however,
produced an original certificate of authentication *5 Based on an evaluation of all of these factors, the Court
from the government agency that supposedly has concludes that it must abstain from interfering with the
official custody of the document. Therefore, the Army's deployment orders. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion
Court finds that the alleged document is for a temporary restraining order is denied, and her
unreliable due to counsel's failure to properly complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
authenticate the document. SeeFed.R.Evid. 901.
Page 6
CONCLUSION
Page 1
W est KeySummary
FN1
Federal Civil Procedure 170A 2771(2) *1 “It was deja vu all over again.”
170A Federal Civil Procedure FN1. Attributed to New York Yankees baseball
170AXX Sanctions legend and philosopher, Yogi Berra.
170AXX(B) Grounds for Imposition
170Ak2767 Unwarranted, Groundless or
Frivolous Papers or Claims In her most recent tirade, Plaintiff's counsel seeks
170Ak2771 Complaints, Counterclaims and reconsideration of the Court's order dismissing this
Petitions action. FN2 Instead of seriously addressing the substance of
170Ak2771(2) k. Particular T ypes of the Court's order, counsel repeats her political diatribe
Cases. Most Cited Cases against the President, complains that she did not have time
to address dismissal of the action (although she sought
expedited consideration), accuses the undersigned of
Federal Civil Procedure 170A 2812 treason, and maintains that “the United States District
Courts in the 11th Circuit are subject to political pressure,
external control, and ... subservience to the same
170A Federal Civil Procedure illegitimate chain of command which Plaintiff has
170AXX Sanctions previously protested.” (Pl.'s Emergency Req. for Stay of
170AXX(D) Type and Amount Deployment 2.) This filing contemptuously ignores the
170Ak2811 Monetary Sanctions Court's previous admonition that Plaintiff's counsel
170Ak2812 k. In General. Most Cited Cases discontinue her illegitimate use of the federal judiciary to
A Rule 11 sanction of $10,000 was warranted against further her political agenda. The Court finds that the
counsel for a military member who was challenging her claims and legal contentions asserted in the present motion
deployment orders based on President Obama's alleged are not warranted by existing law and that no reasonable
illegitimacy. Counsel was trying to continue to use the basis exists to conclude that Plaintiff's arguments would be
judiciary as a platform to further the birther agenda, but accepted as an extension, modification, or reversal of
had provided no legal or factual basis for interference with existing law. Simply, put the motion is frivolous.
the deployment orders of the United States Army. Moreover, the Court further finds that Plaintiff's motion is
Page 2
being presented for the improper purpose of using the this drastic relief based upon the following arguments,
federal judiciary as a platform to espouse controversial each of which is frivolous.
political beliefs rather than as a legitimate forum for
hearing legal claims. Counsel's conduct violates Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and sanctions are *2 First, counsel contends that the Court dismissed her
warranted. A ccordingly, P laintiff's motion for Complaint without giving her an opportunity to respond
reconsideration (Doc. 15) is denied, and counsel for adequately as required by the Federal Rules of Civil
Plaintiff is ordered to show cause why the Court should Procedure and the Court's Local Rules. Counsel ignores
not impose a monetary penalty of $10,000.00 upon that she sought to have the case heard in an expedited
Plaintiff's counsel for her misconduct. Counsel shall file fashion in the first place because of Plaintiff's imminent
her response to this show cause order within 14 days of deployment. The Court modified its schedule to
today's order. accommodate this request, and in fact held the hearing
during the lunch break in an ongoing jury trial. Yet, she
now complains that she only wanted the temporary
FN2. Though the motion is titled “Emergency restraining order expedited and not the entire case. W hat
Request for Stay of Deployment,” it appears to Plaintiff's counsel either fails to understand or refuses to
be a motion for reconsideration because it acknowledge is that in order to address the motion for a
catalogues Plaintiff's reasons why she believes temporary restraining order the Court had to satisfy itself
the Court's order of dismissal should be vacated. first that it had jurisdiction and legal authority to decide
the matter. See, e.g.,Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court
determines at any time that it lacks subject matter
The Sanctionable Conduct jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”); see also
Winck v. England, 327 F.3d 1296, 1303 & n. 4 (11th
Cir.2003) (explaining framework a court must use to
Plaintiff's counsel filed the present action seeking a decide whether it may review a military determination). As
temporary restraining order to prevent the deployment of thoroughly explained in the Court's order of dismissal, the
Plaintiff, a Captain in the United States Army, to Iraq. Court found that under well established legal precedent
Counsel maintains that the President has not produced related to abstention principles, it did not have authority to
sufficient evidence of his place of birth to satisfy her that interfere with the United States Army's deployment order.
he is a natural born citizen of the United States. Therefore, Therefore, the Court determined that the case must be
she alleges he was not eligible to be elected President of dismissed in its entirety. The Court did not grant the
the United States and has no authority to act as Defendant's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Commander in Chief. At the request of Plaintiff's counsel, Procedure 12(b)(6), although the Court did note that any
the Court held an expedited hearing on Plaintiff's request such motion if considered would be granted based upon
for relief. W ithin two days of that expedited hearing, the the implausibility of Plaintiff's claims. If counsel had
Court issued an order dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint in carefully read the Court's order, she would have
its entirety. (See Order Den. TRO, Sept. 16, 2009.) The understood that the Court dismissed the Complaint based
Court also found that Plaintiff's Complaint was legally upon abstention principles. Furthermore, competent
frivolous and that any future similar frivolous conduct on counsel would have understood that the Court was
the part of Plaintiff's counsel would subject counsel to required to address abstention prior to ruling upon the
sanctions. motion for a temporary restraining order. FN3
Notwithstanding the Court's finding that Plaintiff's claims FN3. In an alternative finding, the Court also
were frivolous and that this Court had no legal authority denied the motion for temporary restraining
under the facts alleged to interfere with a lawful order on the merits, finding that Plaintiff had not
deployment order, Plaintiff's counsel filed the present satisfied the elements for such relief.
motion seeking reconsideration of that order and seeking
a stay of Plaintiff's deployment. Plaintiff's counsel seeks
Page 3
Counsel's contention that the Court denied Plaintiff her her press conferences, the federal courts are reserved for
due process rights under the 5th Amendment to the hearing genuine legal disputes and not as a platform for
Constitution by dismissing her Complaint on abstention political rhetoric that is disconnected from any legitimate
grounds without giving her more time to respond is legal cause of action.
frivolous. Counsel sought expedited review of the motion
for temporary restraining order. To consider that motion,
the Court had the obligation to satisfy itself that it had FN4. As explained in the Court's dismissal order,
legal authority to hear the case. It therefore, at Plaintiff's Plaintiff's counsel is a leader in the so-called
counsel's urging, made an expedited decision on that issue. “birther movement.” She and her followers do
Now that it did not go her way, counsel has fabricated a not believe that President Obama is eligible to
specious argument that she needed more time to address hold the office of President because he has not
the issue. satisfied them that he was born in the United
States.
Page 1
227 Judges
Only the W estlaw citation is currently available. 227IV Disqualification to Act
227k51 Objections to Judge, and Proceedings
Thereon
United States District Court, 227k51(3) k. Sufficiency of Objection or
M.D. Georgia, Affidavit. Most Cited Cases
Columbus Division. Plaintiff's counsel's affidavit that judge had bias or
Connie RHODES, Plaintiff, prejudice against her did not comply with statutory
v. requirement that party file affidavit in support of motion
Thomas D. MacDONALD, Colonel, Garrison for recusal, where affidavit did not claim bias against
Commander, Fort Benning; et al., Defendants. counsel, plaintiff made no claim that judge had personal
Case No. 4:09-CV-106 (CDL). bias against her, and counsel had ceased representation of
plaintiff before filing affidavit. 28 U.S.C.A. § 144.
Page 2
Page 3
Page 4
170Ak2828 k. Notice and Hearing. Most Cited administering justice.” Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421
Cases U.S. 773, 792, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 44 L.Ed.2d 572 (1975). For
Sua sponte imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against justice to be administered efficiently and justly, lawyers
attorney complied with due process, where court cautioned must understand the conditions that govern their privilege
attorney not to continue conduct that violated Rule 11 to practice law. Lawyers who do not understand those
after she filed her first frivolous pleading, court notified conditions are at best woefully unprepared to practice the
her that her continued conduct was sanctionable under profession and at worst a menace to it.
Rule 11 and provided her with notice of specific
misconduct that it found sanctionable, and court provided
her with opportunity to show cause why monetary penalty W hen a lawyer files complaints and motions without a
should not be imposed upon her as sanction for her reasonable basis for believing that they are supported by
misconduct. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5; Fed.Rules existing law or a modification or extension of existing law,
Civ.Proc.Rule 11, 28 U.S.C.A. that lawyer abuses her privilege to practice law. W hen a
Connie Rhodes, Mission Viego, CA, pro se. lawyer uses the courts as a platform for a political agenda
disconnected from any legitimate legal cause of action,
that lawyer abuses her privilege to practice law. W hen a
Rebecca Elaine Ausprung, Arlington, VA, Sheetul S. lawyer personally attacks opposing parties and disrespects
W all, U.S. Attorney's Office, Columbus, GA, for the integrity of the judiciary, that lawyer abuses her
Defendants. privilege to practice law. W hen a lawyer recklessly
accuses a judge of violating the Judicial Code of Conduct
with no supporting evidence beyond her dissatisfaction
ORDER with the judge's rulings, that lawyer abuses her privilege to
practice law. W hen a lawyer abuses her privilege to
practice law, that lawyer ceases to advance her cause or
CLAY D. LAND, District Judge. the ends of justice.
Page 5
Page 6
Page 7
had been issued since the President had taken office. responding to the Court's specific concerns or addressing
Plaintiff's sensitivity to the President's eligibility only the contemplated amount of the monetary sanction, Ms.
existed when she faced deployment to Iraq, where she may Taitz continued her attacks on the Court, as well as her
be in harm's way. Given the obvious frivolous nature of political grandstanding. She now moves to recuse the
the legal claim and the clear evidence that M s. Taitz was undersigned, alleging that the undersigned had ex parte
using the Court for an improper purpose, the Court placed communication with the Attorney General of the United
Ms. T aitz on notice that the filing of any future similar States; that the undersigned's ownership of certain stock
frivolous filings would subject her to Rule 11 sanctions. caused him to have a financial interest in the litigation;
Id. at *1. that the tone of the Court's previous rulings, and the
rapidity with which they were made, demonstrate bias on
the part of the Court; and that sanctions cannot be imposed
IV. Counsel's M otion for Reconsideration in this case by the undersigned without violating her due
process rights. Counsel therefore seeks to burden the
federal judiciary further by having another judge subjected
Undeterred by the Court's warning, counsel filed a motion to her unprofessional conduct and by prolonging the
for reconsideration the next day. (Pl.'s Emergency Req. for inevitable with an unjustified extension of time to respond
Stay of Deployment, Sept. 17, 2009.) That motion is the to the show cause order.
specific conduct that the Court relies upon in determining
that sanctions are appropriate. In her motion for
reconsideration, counsel did not address the substance of DISCUSSION
the Court's order dismissing her case. Rather, counsel used
the motion for reconsideration as a platform to repeat her
political diatribe against the President, to accuse the *5 The Court will first address counsel's Motion to Recuse
undersigned of treason, and to maintain that “the United (Doc. 24) and Motion for Enlargement of Time to
States District Courts in the 11th Circuit are subject to Respond to the show cause order (Doc. 25). The Court
political pressure, external command which Plaintiff has next addresses the sanctionability of counsel's misconduct.
previously protested.” (Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted).) Finally, the Court concludes by determining the
appropriate sanction necessary to deter counsel from
repeating her misconduct and to protect the integrity of the
The Court denied the motion, finding it to be frivolous and Court.
the filing of it to be sanctionable. The Court provided
counsel with the opportunity to show cause why she
should not be sanctioned with a financial penalty of I. M otion to Recuse and M otion for Enlargement of
$10,000.00. (Order Den. Mot. for Recons. 7, Sept. 18, Time
2009, 2009 W L 3111834.)
Page 8
Page 9
order to prevent manipulation of the judicial system by The undersigned has never talked to or met with the
disgruntled litigants. See Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs of Attorney General. As to whether the Attorney General
Mobile County, 517 F.2d 1044, 1051 (5th Cir.1975) took time out of his busy schedule to visit an “obscure”
(“Once the motion is filed under § 144, the judge must “coffee shop” in Columbus, Georgia on July 16, 2009, the
pass on the legal sufficiency of the affidavit[.]”).FN4 As Court cannot definitively say because the Court was not
explained below, counsel provided no factual allegations there. What the Court can say is that no reasonable
other than her dissatisfaction with the Court's rulings to attorney would rely upon this affidavit in support of a
substantiate her claim that the Court has any personal bias legal argument in a court of law. See, e.g., Fox v.
against her. Under these circumstances, the Court finds Prudential Fin., 178 Fed.Appx. 915, 919 (11th Cir.2006)
that § 144 does not provide counsel with the authority to (per curiam) (finding that reasonable person would not
prevent the undersigned from completing its disposition of find partiality based on bare allegations and unsupported
this matter. See, e.g., Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. conclusory statements that “secret discussions” took place
540, 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) between defendant and court). To use this “evidence” in
(“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid support of a false and misleading accusation that a judge
basis for a bias or partiality motion.”). had an ex parte conversation with someone whom the
judge has never spoken to or even met is additional proof
of a pattern of frivolous and outrageous conduct on the
*7 It is clear that the Court is not automatically recused part of Ms. Taitz.FN6
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 simply based upon counsel's
conclusory allegations of bias. However, the Court is
obligated to evaluate counsel's reasons offered in support B. Stock Ownership
of her demand for disqualification and determine whether
they require the undersigned to disqualify himself pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 455. FN5 [4] Counsel's contention that the undersigned has a
financial interest in this case is perhaps more preposterous
than the phantom visit with the Attorney General. In the
A. The Attorney General main action by Captain Rhodes, Plaintiff sought an
injunction enjoining her from being deployed to Iraq. The
outcome of that action had no financial ramifications other
Ms. Taitz alleges that the undersigned may have discussed than perhaps to Captain Rhodes and the U.S. Army. The
this case with the Attorney General of the United States. action certainly did not implicate Microsoft or Comcast,
In support of this accusation, counsel submits the affidavit the two investments specifically referred to in counsel's
of Robert D. Douglas. Mr. Douglas states that on the day motion. (See Mot. to Recuse 2.) Moreover, that action has
of the hearing in the Cook case, he saw in the “coffee terminated in Defendants' favor, with Captain Rhodes
shop” across the street from the federal courthouse having discharged Ms. Taitz and indicating she no longer
someone whom he recognized as Eric Holder, the wished to pursue it. Thus, the legal matter from which
Attorney General. Mr. Douglas's identification is based counsel seeks recusal of the undersigned is the sanctions
upon what he describes as the Attorney General's proceeding against her. W hile that proceeding will
“distinguishing features: his trim upper lip mustache, not certainly affect M s. Taitz's financial condition, it is fantasy
large of stature and general olive complexion.” (Douglas to suggest that these proceedings will in any way affect the
Aff., Sept. 26, 2009.) The affidavit further states that Mr. fortunes of Microsoft and Comcast. Furthermore, counsel's
Douglas “new [sic] instantly that it was none other than suggestion-that if she were to succeed on her frivolous
Eric Holder, the current Attorney General of the United claim, and as a result the President were removed from
States.” (Id.) Mr. Douglas has apparently never seen the office, that these two companies would suffer as a result-is
Attorney General in person, but Mr. Douglas states that he so speculative and ridiculous that it is not worthy of
recognized the Attorney General because he had seen Mr. additional comment. The Court must nevertheless remind
Holder on television. counsel that she has been fired by her former client, who
has made it clear that she no longer wishes to pursue the
matter. Therefore, counsel cannot possibly succeed on her
Page 10
main claim that she maintains would topple Microsoft and movement.
Comcast because she has no means to appeal the Court's
dismissal of that claim.
The Court makes no apology for the tone of its previous
orders. They were direct and strong but apparently not
C. Sua Sponte Imposition of Monetary Sanctions strong enough. They certainly do not demonstrate personal
bias. They do demonstrate a lack of tolerance for frivolous
legal claims asserted by lawyers who should know better.
*8[5] Ms. Taitz argues that the undersigned should be A Court's insistence that lawyers comply with their duty to
recused because a judge cannot sua sponte act as follow the rules and their obligations as officers of the
“prosecutor, judge, and jury” in imposing monetary Court is not a legitimate basis for recusal.
sanctions that are designed as a penalty to punish and
deter lawyer misconduct. (Mot. to Recuse 17.) Once
again, counsel ignores the law. Rule 11 specifically [6] Counsel's contention that the expedited nature of the
authorizes the sua sponte imposition of monetary Court's rulings demonstrates that the Court had prejudged
sanctions for these purposes. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(c)(3); cf. the case is laughable. First, as the Court has noted
Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1558 (finding that due process previously, counsel sought expedited consideration. She
does not require courts to follow criminal contempt sought an injunction enjoining the U.S. Army from
procedures when imposing monetary sanctions under Rule deploying her client, which was to occur within days of the
11). Furthermore, it is likewise well settled that the Court filing of her Complaint. Yes, the Court ruled quickly. Had
has the inherent authority to impose such sanctions. See the Court not done so, counsel undoubtedly would have
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 42-43, 111 S.Ct. accused the Court of some conspiracy to delay ruling until
2123, 115 L.Ed.2d 27 (1991). The Court recognizes that after the deployment had occurred. Furthermore, although
such action is serious and that the lawyer must be given the Court is not personally familiar with the pace of legal
due process before the sanction is imposed. This requires decision making in counsel's home state of California, the
that the Court notify counsel of the conduct and allow Court notes that Georgia courts have long recognized that
counsel an opportunity to respond. To suggest that the the expedited nature of a decision does not detract from its
Court has not done so in this case is simply wrong. The quality. As observed by the Georgia Supreme Court long
Court outlined in its previous order the sanctionable ago:
conduct. Counsel was given ample opportunity to respond.
In fact, she filed a twenty-two page response. Counsel's
contention that this Court, which is most familiar with *9 Both observation and experience teach, that the human
counsel's conduct, must recuse so that another judge may mind acts with increased power according to the
be burdened with counsel's frivolous arguments is pressure put upon it. Give it time and it acts slowly.
meritless. Force it to decide promptly, as the General is required
to do on the battle-field, and the statesman in the midst
of revolutions, and the same mind will do the work of a
D. Judicial Bias month in a moment; and what is more, will do it better.
True, the effect upon the individual himself, is most
exhausting, but the public does not suffer.
Ms. Taitz maintains that the undersigned should recuse
because of bias. In support of her bias claim, she relies
upon three things: 1) the tone of the Court's previous Thornton v. Lane, 11 Ga. 459, 491 (1852).
rulings; 2) the expedited nature in which those rulings
were made; and 3) the substance of those rulings, which
she extrapolates into a personal attack on the Court, Finally, counsel insists that her substantive claims are so
suggesting that the rulings indicate that the Court would meritorious that only a biased judge would find them
have denied access to civil rights claims had the frivolous. Comparing herself to former Supreme Court
undersigned been on the bench during the civil rights Justice and civil rights icon Thurgood Marshall, counsel
Page 11
likens her plight to Justice Marshall's epic legal battle to of the military.
desegregate American schools and public places. Quite
frankly, the Court is reluctant to even dignify this
argument by responding to it, but it captures the essence *10 To suggest that an Army officer, who has received a
of counsel's misunderstanding of the purpose of the courts medical education at the expense of the government and
and her misunderstanding of her own claims. Yes, Justice then seeks to avoid deployment based upon speculation
Marshall had to extend then-existing law to prevail in that the President is not a natural born citizen, is
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, equivalent to a young child, who is forced to attend an
98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). But he did so by persuading the inferior segregated school based solely on the color of her
Court that the de jure discrimination against black skin, demonstrates an appalling lack of knowledge of the
schoolchildren violated their rights under the existing history of this Country and the importance of the civil
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution a fundamental rights movement. Counsel's attempt to align herself with
truth that had been recognized years earlier by Justice Justice Marshall appears to be an act of desperation rather
Harlan in his eloquent and prescient dissent in Plessy v. than one of admiration. For if counsel truly admired
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 555-56, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. Justice M arshall's achievements, she would not seek to
256 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's cheapen them with such inapt comparisons.
arguments were a logical extension and certainly a
necessary modification of then-existing law. Counsel in
this case cannot articulate how the President's ineligibility In summary, counsel, dissatisfied with the Court's rulings
to hold office, even if proven, violates an Army officer's and “seeing the writing on the wall,” now seeks to escape
individual constitutional rights such that it would authorize accountability for her misconduct during this litigation.
that officer to disobey a deployment order. Counsel has She shall not be allowed to do so. Her motion to recuse
likewise never cited any legal authority or made any and motion for enlargement of time have no merit and are
reasonable argument as to why the traditional abstention accordingly denied as frivolous.
doctrine should not have been applied here. Finally,
Justice Marshall had real evidence that black children
were being sent to inferior segregated schools based solely II. Reaffirmation of the Appropriateness of Sanctions
on the color of their skin. He had credible evidence as to
the impact of inferior segregated schools upon the
schoolchildren forced to attend them by their government. [7][8] The major goal of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
Justice Marshall was also able to articulate how this 11 is to “reduce frivolous claims, defenses or motions and
conduct on the part of the government violated the to deter costly meritless maneuvers.” Donaldson, 819 F.2d
Fourteenth Amendment, an amendment clearly designed at 1556 (internal quotation marks omitted).
to assure that the government finally recognized the
promise of the Declaration of Independence: that all men
are created equal. Rule 11 sanctions are properly assessed (1) when a party
files a pleading that has no reasonable factual basis; (2)
when the party files a pleading that is based on a legal
Counsel here has an affidavit from someone who allegedly theory that has no reasonable chance of success and that
paid off a government official to rummage through the cannot be advanced as a reasonable argument to change
files at a Kenyan hospital to obtain what counsel contends existing law; or (3) when the party files a pleading in
is the President's “authentic” birth certificate. Counsel here bad faith for an improper purpose.
makes no coherent argument connecting the Constitution's
presidential citizenship requirement to a violation of her
client's individual constitutional rights. Counsel here Massengale v. Ray, 267 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir.2001)
points to no legal authority-in the Constitution or (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
elsewhere-that could be extended or expanded to create an preliminary legal issue for resolution by the Court is
exception to the well-established doctrine of abstention, whether an attorney, as an officer of the Court, should be
which disfavors judicial interference in the internal affairs sanctioned under Rule 11 for (1) filing a motion for
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“slips through the cracks,” which is how counsel describes the judiciary will participate in the selection or removal of
President Obama. Upon conviction by the Senate of the President, unless an individual can clearly demonstrate
treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors, that his individual constitutional rights are somehow
the President can be removed through impeachment. U.S. violated by the process. A generalized claim that the
Const. art. II, § 4; see also id. art. I, §§ 2 & 3. Thus, if the President is unqualified does not fall within this narrow
President were elected to the office by knowingly and exception and is best addressed to the First branch of
fraudulently concealing evidence of his constitutional government, not the Third.
disqualification, then a mechanism exists for removing
him from office. Except for the Chief Justice's role in
presiding over the trial in the Senate, that mechanism does *13 The absolute absence of any legitimate legal
not involve the judiciary. Id.art. I, § 3, cl. 6. argument, combined with the political diatribe in her
motions, demonstrates that Ms. Taitz's purpose is to
advance a political agenda and not to pursue a legitimate
One can readily see the wisdom of entrusting the elected legal cause of action. Rather than citing to binding legal
representatives of the people with the ultimate decision as precedent, she calls the President names, accuses the
to whether a President should be removed from office undersigned of treason, and gratuitously slanders the
rather than litigating the issue in our courts. Although President's father. As the Court noted in an earlier order,
counsel's present concern is the location of the President's counsel's wild accusations may be protected by the First
birth, it does not take much imagination to extend the Amendment when she makes them on her blog or in her
theory to his birthday. Perhaps, he looks “too young” to be press conferences, but the federal courts are reserved for
President, and he says he stopped counting birthdays when hearing genuine legal disputes, not as a platform for
he reached age thirty. If he refused to admit publicly that political rhetoric and personal insults. Simply put, no
he is older than the constitutional minimum age of reasonable basis existed for counsel to believe that her
thirty-five, should Ms. Taitz be allowed to file a lawsuit legal cause of action was legitimate under existing law or
and have a court order him to produce his birth certificate? under a reasonable extension or modification of existing
SeeU.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. Or perhaps an eccentric law. Thus, counsel's Complaint on behalf of Captain
citizen has become convinced that the President is an alien Rhodes was frivolous.
from Mars, and the courts should order DNA testing to
enforce the Constitution. FN7 Or, more to the point, perhaps
the Court should issue a nationwide injunction that Although the Court found the Complaint frivolous, the
prevents the U.S. Army from sending any soldier to Iraq Court did not impose sanctions upon that finding alone.
or Afghanistan or anywhere else until Ms. Taitz is The Court did notify counsel of its conclusion, as it had a
permitted to depose the President in the Oval Office. The duty to do, in order to prevent future similar filings.
federal courts were not established to resolve such purely Defying that admonition, counsel immediately sought
political disputes or to assist in the pursuit of a political reconsideration of the Court's order. In doing so, she did
fishing expedition, particularly when that intrusion would not challenge with contrary legal authority the legal basis
interfere with the ability of the U.S. Army to do its job. for the Court's decision-abstention-nor did she attempt to
distinguish the authority cited by the Court. She didn't
even mention it.
Contrary to counsel's suggestion, the courts do not refrain
from entering political debates because of bias or personal
disinterest. They do so because the Constitution, within Local Rule 7.6 authorizes a motion for reconsideration
which counsel attempts to wrap herself, prevents their when “absolutely necessary.” M.D. Ga. R. 7.6.
encroachment into the political sphere. That does not Reconsideration is “absolutely necessary” only where the
mean that judicial decisions do not often have political movant demonstrates that (1) there was an intervening
consequences, nor does it mean that the judiciary cannot development or change in controlling law, (2) new
rule upon issues that may overturn actions by the political evidence has been discovered, or (3) the court made a
branches when they are contrary to the Constitution. But clear error of law or fact. McCoy v. Macon Water Auth.,
it is clear that the Constitution does not contemplate that 966 F.Supp. 1209, 1222-23 (M.D.Ga.1997). Counsel
Page 14
Page 15
[7] whether the responsible person is trained in the law; counsel's attention. A significant sanction is necessary to
deter such conduct.
Page 16
Counsel's frivolous and sanctionable conduct wasted the sufficient to deter counsel's misconduct. In response to this
Defendants' time and valuable judicial resources that could threatened sanction, counsel scoffed and resumed similar
have been devoted to legitimate cases pending with the sanctionable conduct. Rather than provide legitimate
Court. W hen she filed the Rhodes case, counsel indicated arguments as to why this amount was unnecessary or why
that it was urgent that the matter be heard because her a lesser amount would be appropriate, she filed a motion
client was facing imminent deployment. The Court to recuse, relying upon false allegations and baseless
rearranged its schedule, took time to read the legal papers, assertions. Counsel had an opportunity to present financial
and conducted preliminary research in preparation for the information to demonstrate that the intended penalty was
hearing. The Army had to activate its legal team on short excessive, yet she never addressed the amount even as an
notice, sending a M ajor from the Army Litigation Division alternative position. If she wished for the Court to
in W ashington, D.C. and a Captain from the CONUS consider whether the $10,000.00 was excessive and
Replacement Center at Ft. Benning. In addition, the unnecessary to deter future similar conduct, she had the
Assistant U.S. Attorney had to accompany them. Like the burden to bring forth evidence to show why. See White v.
Court, the government attorneys had to prepare in an Gen. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 685 (10th Cir.1990).
expedited manner for the hearing. During the week Not only did counsel fail to point to any such evidence,
preceding Captain Rhodes's deployment, the Court was in but her conduct definitively establishes that the meager
the midst of a jury trial. Therefore, the Court had to alter $10,000.00 sanction would have no deterrent effect.
the trial schedule to conduct the hearing during an
extended lunch break, thus affecting other counsel and
jurors. The Clerk's Office was burdened by Ms. Taitz's [10] The Court must therefore determine what amount is
inability to follow the Court's rules regarding pro hac vice sufficient to deter counsel's conduct. The Court observes
admission and the Court's rules for electronic filing. On that Congress has concluded in the context of frivolous
five separate occasions in a short period, the Clerk's Office filings in the Tax Court that financial penalties up to
personnel error-noticed counsel for her failure to follow $25,000.00 may be appropriate. See26 U.S.C. §
simple rules. At the hearing, counsel failed to make 6673(a)(1). The Eleventh Circuit has affirmed a
coherent legal arguments but instead wasted the Court's $10,000.00 sanction against an attorney for conduct far
time with press conference sound bites and speeches. Due less egregious than Ms. Taitz's conduct. See Riccard v.
to the alleged urgency of the situation, the Court issued a Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1294-96 (11th
ruling within two days of the hearing so that the Army Cir.2002); see also Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta,
would have guidance as to whether Captain Rhodes would 751 F.2d 1193, 1209 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming $50,000
be deployed. This expedited ruling, during an ongoing sanction against attorney based on court's inherent
jury trial, obviously placed a burden on the Court and authority to discipline attorney misconduct). Under the
Court staff. Then counsel filed her motion for circumstances in this case and based upon the factors
reconsideration two days before Captain Rhodes was considered above, the Court finds that the Court's
scheduled to deploy, and the Court again was forced to previously contemplated financial sanction of $10,000.00
address the motion in an unusually expedited fashion. The is not adequate to deter future misconduct and that a
Court now has to draft the present order, which is longer monetary penalty of $20,000.00 is the minimum amount
than it should be because the Court must address the necessary to deter counsel's misconduct.FN8
additional frivolous arguments made by counsel in her
motion to recuse and also must make sure the Court of
Appeals has the complete picture of counsel's misconduct. B. Constitutionality of Sanction
Although the Court has not attempted to place a price tag
on the time and expense caused by counsel's misconduct,
any objective observer can ascertain that it is substantial. To make it clear that the Court has carefully considered
the due process protections to which Ms. Taitz is entitled,
the Court finds it appropriate to set forth those
*16 The Court also finds that counsel's response to the considerations in this Order. Attorneys facing discipline
Court's show cause order demonstrates that the originally under Rule 11 “have interests qualifying for protection
contemplated monetary sanction of $10,000.00 is not under the Due Process Clause.” Donaldson, 819 F.2d at
Page 17
1558. Procedural due process requires notice and an complies with the requirements of constitutional due
opportunity to be heard. Id. “Determining what process is process.
due in a Rule 11 case simply requires an application of
familiar principles of due process[.]” Id. The timing and
content of the notice and the nature of the hearing depend The Court fully appreciates its obligation to consider
upon an evaluation of the circumstances on a case-by-case carefully the imposition of sanctions, particularly when
basis. Id. Several factors influence the due process sanctions are imposed sua sponte. The Court understands
requirements in a particular case. These factors include: that such action by the Court is “akin-to-contempt,” and
thus while criminal due process procedures may not be
necessary, the Court must make sure that counsel's due
*17 the interests of attorneys ... in having a specific process rights have been protected. See Kaplan v.
sanction imposed only when justified; the risk of an DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d, 1251, 1255-56 (11th
erroneous imposition of sanctions under the procedures Cir.2003). The Court is also aware that under certain
used and the probable value of additional notice and circumstances, sanctions that are imposed solely to punish
hearing; and the interests of the court in efficiently and deter the sanctioned party may be so severe that the
monitoring the use of the judicial system and the fiscal sanctioned party may be entitled to the full panoply of
and administrative burdens that additional requirements rights under the due process clause, including a jury trial.
would entail. See In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.-Benlate Litig.,
99 F.3d 363, 368-69 (11th Cir.1996).FN9
Page 18
not suggest that additional due process protections may imposed monetary sanctions upon an attorney
not be appropriate in other cases depending upon the sua sponte.
circumstances, but the Court is convinced that Ms. Taitz
has been provided all the process that she is due.
FN2. Immediately on the heels of his loss in this
Court, Major Cook filed another action in the
CONCLUSION Middle District of Florida. Cook v. Simtech, Inc.,
No. 8:09-CV-01382-RAL-EAJ (M.D.Fla.2009).
That case was promptly dismissed. Upon
*18 The Court takes no joy in reaching the conclusions it receiving an adverse ruling in that case, Ms.
has reached in today's Order. As correctly observed by Taitz, consistent with her modus operandi, filed
Judge W illiam Schwarzer from the Northern District of a motion to recuse the district judge there as she
California: has done here. That judge found her motion to be
frivolous.
The Court further directs the Clerk of this Court to send a FN6. Minimal research reveals that the Attorney
copy of this Order to the State Bar of California, 180 General was in Los Angeles on July 15 and July
Howard Street, San Francisco, CA 94105, for whatever 16, the same time Ms. Taitz claims he was in
use it deems appropriate. Columbus, Georgia, 2,000 miles away. E.g.,
Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice,
Attorney General Eric Holder to Visit Los
FN1. The Court does not take this action lightly, Angeles to Address Southwest Border Strategy,
and in fact, cannot recall having previously Violence Against W omen and Gang Prevention
Page 19
09-15418-BB
Connie Rhodes v. Thomas D. MacDonald
Docket #: 09-15418-BB
Short Style: Connie Rhodes v. Thomas D. MacDonald
Docket Date: 10/26/2009
Lead Case:
Agency:
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights: Other
Misc. Type:
Clerk: Camp, Jan
Clerk Phone: (404) 335-6171
District Information
Docket #: Judge:
Dkt Date: / /
Case Relationships
Pending Motions
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US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Page 2 of 5
Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 10-6 Filed 02/26/10 Page 2 of 5
Gov't Ex. 6, 10-0151 (RCL)
09-15418-BB
Connie Rhodes v. Thomas D. MacDonald
CONNIE RHODES,
Plaintiff,
versus
ROBERT M. GATES,
Secretary of Defense,
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US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Page 4 of 5
Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 10-6 Filed 02/26/10 Page 4 of 5
Gov't Ex. 6, 10-0151 (RCL)
(202) 514-4815
Fax: (202) 514-9405
[email protected]
No Briefing Information Found.
Initial Service
Rebecca E. Ausprung, Major
901 N STUART ST STE 400
ARLINGTON, VA 22203-1821
(703) 696-1627
Sheetul S. Wall
U.S. Attorney's Office
PO BOX 2568
COLUMBUS, GA 31902-2568
(706) 649-7700
Fax: (706) 649-7667
[email protected]
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, N.W.
Atlanta, GA 30303-2289
(404) 335-6100
09-15418-BB
Connie Rhodes v. Thomas D. MacDonald
File Date Entry Party Pending
10/20/2009 Fee Status: Paid (10/20/09) for Orly Taitz Orly Taitz No
10/27/2009 Briefing Notice Issued No
DKT7CIV (Docketing Notice confirming brief due date) issued. To:Taitz,
10/27/2009 Orly; c:Gregory J. Leonard; c:Rebecca E. Ausprung, Major; c:Sheetul S. No
Wall
10/27/2009 No Hearings to be Transcribed / all transcripts on file. No
10/28/2009 Probable Jurisdiction Noted: (ProSe) Orly Taitz No
Jonathan Harris
11/09/2009 Appearance Form Submitted. No
Levy
DIS-1 (Dismissal notice, 14 days to correct default) issued. To:Jonathan
11/13/2009 Harris Levy; c:Gregory J. Leonard; c:Rebecca E. Ausprung, Major; No
c:Sheetul S. Wall; c:Taitz, Orly
Motion for Leave to File Civil Appeal Statement Out of Time: (Atty:
11/17/2009 Orly Taitz No
Jonathan Harris Levy)
Attorney Changed for: Orly Taitz (949) 683-5411 [email protected]
11/18/2009 Orly Taitz No
From: To: Levy, Jonathan Harris.
Motion to Stay Lower Court Action Pending Appeal: (Atty: Jonathan
11/20/2009 Orly Taitz No
Harris Levy)
DC Order: Doc. 36 Order for Taitz to pay the $20,000 sanction ordered by
11/20/2009 No
the Court on 10/13/09.
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US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Page 3 of 5
Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 10-6 Filed 02/26/10 Page 3 of 5
Gov't Ex. 6, 10-0151 (RCL)
Defendants-Appellees.
09-15418-BB
Connie Rhodes v. Thomas D. MacDonald
Appellant Appellant Attorney
Orly Taitz Jonathan Harris Levy
29839 SANTA MARGARITA PKWY, Ste 100 Attorney at Law
RCHO STA MARG, CA 92688-3616 37 ROYAL POINTE DR
(949) 683-5411 HILTON HEAD, SC 29926-1166
Fax: (949) 766-7603 (202) 318-2406
[email protected] Fax: (202) 318-2406
E-Brief Tendered: Appellant filed on 12/15/2009 [email protected]
Appellant Brief Filed filed on 12/15/2009 No Briefing Information Found.
Record Excerpts filed on 12/15/2009
Fees: Paid on 10/20/2009
Appellee Appellee Attorney
Thomas D. MacDonald Eric Fleisig-Greene
Address Not On File 950 PENNSYLVANIA AVE NW RM 7214
WASHINGTON, DC 20530-0009
(202) 514-4815
Fax: (202) 514-9405
[email protected]
No Appellee's Brief will be Filed per Letter from Counsel
filed on 01/11/2010
George Steuber Eric Fleisig-Greene
Address Not On File 950 PENNSYLVANIA AVE NW RM 7214
WASHINGTON, DC 20530-0009
(202) 514-4815
Fax: (202) 514-9405
[email protected]
No Briefing Information Found.
Robert M. Gates Eric Fleisig-Greene
Address Not On File 950 PENNSYLVANIA AVE NW RM 7214
WASHINGTON, DC 20530-0009
(202) 514-4815
Fax: (202) 514-9405
[email protected]
No Briefing Information Found.
Barack Hussein Obama Eric Fleisig-Greene
Address Not On File 950 PENNSYLVANIA AVE NW RM 7214
WASHINGTON, DC 20530-0009
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US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit Page 5 of 5
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Gov't Ex. 6, 10-0151 (RCL)
Appellant's Motion for Leave to File Civil Appeal Statement Out of Time
12/01/2009 No
is GRANTED. (by DC)
MOT2 (Notice of court action) issued. To:Jonathan Harris Levy; c:Rebecca
12/01/2009 No
E. Ausprung, Major; c:Sheetul S. Wall
12/01/2009 Civil Appeal Statement Form: (Atty: Jonathan Harris Levy) Orly Taitz No
Over the Phone Extension to File Appellant's Brief Granted by JSC Until
12/04/2009 Orly Taitz No
12/14/09: (Atty: Jonathan Harris Levy)
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10-55084 Summary Page 1 of 2
Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 10-7 Filed 02/26/10 Page 1 of 2
Gov't Ex. 7, 10-0151 (RCL)
If you view the Full Docket you will be charged for 4 Pages $0.32
General Docket
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals Docket #: 10-55084 Docketed: 01/19/2010
Nature of Suit: 3440 Other Civil Rights
Pamela Barnett, et al v. Barack Obama, et al
Appeal From: U.S. District Court for Central California, Santa Ana
Fee Status: Paid
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Gov't Ex. 7, 10-0151 (RCL)
01/19/2010 1 DOCKETED CAUSE AND ENTERED APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL. SEND MQ: Yes. The
schedule is set as follows: Fee due from Appellants Pamela Barnett, et al, on 01/19/2010. Mediation
Questionnaire due by Attorney Orly Taitz due on 01/26/2010. Appellants Pamela Barnett, et al opening
brief due 06/28/2010. Appellee Joseph R. Biden, Appellee Hillary Rodham Clinton, Appellee Robert M.
Gates, Appellee Barack Hussein Obama and Appellee Michelle L.R. Obama answering brief due
07/28/2010. Appellant's optional reply brief is due 14 days after service of the answering brief.
[7198465] (FB)
01/19/2010 2 Filed representation notice by Attorney Orly Taitz. Served on 01/17/2010. [7198493] (FB)
01/22/2010 3 Received notification from District Court re: payment of docket fee. Amount Paid: USD 455 Date paid:
01/21/2010. [7205336] (MT)
01/22/2010 4 Received Appellants notice regarding representation statement. [7208971] (MT)
01/26/2010 5 Received notification from District Court re: payment of docket fee. Amount Paid: USD 455 Date paid:
01/21/2010. [7210425] (MT)
01/27/2010 6 Received Appellants notice regarding payment of fees by appellants. [7210435] (MT)
01/28/2010 7 Filed (ECF) Appellants Capt. Pamela Barnett, Richard Norton Bauerbach, Capt. Robin D. Biron, Col.
John D. Blair, Mr. David L. Bosley, Ms. Loretta G. Bosley, Capt. Harry G. Butler, Rep. Glenn Casada,
Jennifer Leah Clark, Timothy Comerford, Charles Crusemire, Thomas S. Davidson, Rep. Cynthia
Davis, Matthew Michael Edwards, Lt. Jason Freese, Mr. Kurt C. Fuqua, Officer Clint Grimes, Julliett
Ireland, D. Andrew Johnson, Israel D. Jones, Timothy Jones, Alan Keyes, Ph. D., David Fullmer
LaRoque, Gail Lightfoot, Lita M. Lott, Major David Grant Mosby, Steven Kay Neuenschwander, Frank
Niceley, Robert Lee Perry, Col. Harry Riley, Sgt. Jeffrey Wayne Rosner, Capt. David Smithey, John
Bruce Steidel, Douglas Earl Stoeppelwerth, Rep. Eric Swafford, Capt. Neil B. Turner, Richard E.
Venable, Jeff Graham Winthrope and Mark Wriggle Mediation Questionnaire. Date of service:
01/26/2010. [7211032] (OT)
02/01/2010 8 Filed Appellants Mediation Questionnaire. Served on 01/02/2010. [7217859] (MT)
02/11/2010 9 Filed clerk order (Deputy Clerk:MT): The court sua sponte consolidates appeal nos. 09-56827 and 10-
55084. Appeal nos. 09-56827 and 10-55084 are consolidated. The briefing schedule for the consolidated
appeals is as follows: the opening briefs and excerpts of record are due June 28, 2010; the consolidated
answering brief is due July 28, 2010; and the optional reply briefs are due within 14 days after service
of the answering brief. All parties on a side are encouraged to join in a single brief to the greatest extent
practicable. See 9th Cir. R. 28-4. [7229212] [09-56827, 10-55084] (BJB)
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Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 11 Filed 02/26/10 Page 1 of 18
)
ORLY TAITZ, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No.: 10-0151 (RCL)
)
v. )
)
BARACK HUSSEIN OBAMA, )
)
Defendant. )
)
points and authorities in (1) support of his motion to dismiss this case, and (2) opposition to
Plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction (R.8). Plaintiff lacks standing to bring her claims,
as has been thoroughly established by the several other federal courts in which she has litigated
substantially similar claims. For this reason alone, her case should be dismissed and her request
for preliminary injunction denied. As to her motion for a preliminary injunction, she seeks the
recusal of the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia from representing the
President in this civil lawsuit as well as the release of a number of documents purportedly related
to a vague series of allegations associated with her representations about the President’s
Background
Although, to Defendant's knowledge, this is Dr. Taitz’s first case in which she serves as
Plaintiff, this is not her first bite at the apple, or even her second: she has unsuccessfully
Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 11 Filed 02/26/10 Page 2 of 18
represented plaintiffs in at least three judicial districts seeking to raise similar claims. In each of
these cases, the United States district courts have declined to find jurisdiction and have denied
Dr. Taitz’s Complaint suffers from exactly the same defects that doomed many of her
previous litigation efforts. Simply put, her allegations about the President’s citizenship are not a
concrete and particularized injury, as required to establish standing under the “case or
controversy” requirement of Article III, and the harms that she has suffered from judicial and/or
bar sanctions for her conduct in litigation are the consequences of her own actions and not in any
Even if plaintiff had standing, however, her request for a preliminary injunction should
nonetheless be denied. A preliminary injunction entered with respect the underlying issue would
carry with it the potential of irreparable harm to the public interest, whereas Plaintiff has not
provided any credible showing that she will be irreparably harmed if her application is denied.
1. Cook v. Good, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, No. 09-cv-82, 2009 WL 2163535 (M.D. Ga.
On July 9, 2009, United States Army Major Stefan Frederick Cook sought a temporary
restraining order in the Middle District of Georgia to enjoin his pending overseas deployment to
Afghanistan. See Civil Docket sheet, Cook v. Good, No. 09-cv-82, attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
Represented by Dr. Taitz, Major Cook alleged that his orders were not valid and that his doubts
about the President's citizenship would cause him to violate his oath to the United States
Constitution if he were forced to deploy. See generally 2009 WL 2163535. After a hearing on
2
Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 11 Filed 02/26/10 Page 3 of 18
July 16, 2009, Judge Clay Land dismissed Major Cook’s claims, finding that “Major Cook
cannot satisfy” the standing prerequisite of Article III. Id. at *1. The district court also noted
that Dr. Taitz had sought to salvage the action by “seek[ing] to amend the complaint to add two
additional parties, Maj. Gen. Carol Dean Childers (Retired) and Lt. Col. David Earl Graef.” Id.
at *2. Judge Land rejected this proposed amendment, noting that the two officers had “alleged
no concrete particularized injury,” and that “[t]heir political claim does not give rise to a case or
Still represented by Dr. Taitz, Major Cook appealed the dismissal to the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal “for want of prosecution” on November 24, 2009.
See 11th Circuit Docket sheet, No. 09-14698-CC (noting pending motion to reinstate appeal),
Dr. Taitz returned to court in late August, 2009, representing a new plaintiff, Dr. Connie
Rhodes, a United States Army Captain slated to deploy to Iraq in support of Operation Iraqi
Freedom. Plaintiff and her client initially sought a temporary restraining order in the Western
District of Texas, but the case was summarily dismissed as the district court quickly found their
claims had “no substantial likelihood of success on the merits.” Rhodes v. Gates, No.
09-00703-XR, Order Denying Mot. for TRO (W.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2009). A copy of this order
Plaintiff then re-filed the same action in the Middle District of Georgia, the same court
which had previously dismissed Cook v. Good. See Rhodes v. MacDonald, 2009 WL 2997605
3
Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 11 Filed 02/26/10 Page 4 of 18
at *1 (M.D. Ga. 2009), copies of the three Rhodes decisions are attached as Exhibit 5. Plaintiff
again sought a temporary restraining order to enjoin her client's overseas deployment. Id.
Finding that there was “no credible evidence” and ‘no reliable factual allegations to support [the]
unsubstantiated, conclusory allegations and conjecture that President Obama is ineligible to serve
as President of the United States,” the Georgia district court again dismissed the complaint,
deeming the claims “frivolous” and the “threatened injury . . . not substantial.” Id. at *3, *5.
In addition, the Georgia district court issued a stark warning to Dr. Taitz: “Plaintiff's
counsel is hereby notified that the filing of any future actions in this Court, which are similarly
Responding with what the Georgia district court characterized as a “tirade,” Plaintiff then
moved for reconsideration of the district court’s dismissal. See Rhodes v. MacDonald, 2009 WL
3111834 at *1. The district court noted that Plaintiff had “contemptuously ignore[d] the Court’s
previous admonition that Plaintiff's counsel discontinue her illegitimate use of the federal
judiciary to further her political agenda.” Id. Accordingly, in conjunction with its previous
warning, the district court denied the reconsideration motion as “frivolous” and found that Dr.
Taitz’s conduct violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court
ordered her to “show cause why the Court should not impose a monetary penalty of $10,000.00
After Dr. Taitz withdrew as counsel for Major Rhodes, she continued to litigate the award
of sanctions. As the district court noted in its next order, however, "[i]nstead of responding to
the Court’s specific concerns or addressing the contemplated amount of the monetary sanction,
Ms. Taitz continued her attacks on the Court,” floating a number of implausible theories and
4
Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 11 Filed 02/26/10 Page 5 of 18
alleging bias on the part of the district court. Rhodes v. MacDonald, --- F. Supp. 2d ----, 2009
WL 3299817 (M.D. Ga. 2009) at *4. In response, the district court issued a detailed opinion
documenting Dr. Taitz's misconduct, the frivolousness of her actions, and increasing the dollar
Dr. Taitz has appealed these sanctions to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See 11th
Cir. Docket sheet, in Rhodes v. MacDonald, No. 09-15418BB, attached hereto as Exhibit 6. Her
3. Barnett v. Obama, No. 09-0082, 2009 WL 3861788 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2009).
Meanwhile, throughout the pendency of the above cases, Dr. Taitz maintained yet another
action purportedly challenging the President’s eligibility for office. In this case, a group of 44
plaintiffs comprising “third party candidates from the American Independent Party for president
and vice president in the 2008 presidential election, inactive and active military personnel, and
state representatives” brought an action in the Central District of California on January 20, 2009,
shortly after the President's inauguration. See Barnett v. Obama, 2009 WL 3861788 at *1, *3.
Similar to the instant case, the amended complaint in California “set[] forth ten questions for
relat[ing] to the meaning of the Constitution’s natural born citizen clause and the appropriate
recourse should a sitting president not meet the ‘natural born citizen’ requirement.” Id. The
plaintiffs in Barnett also “request[ed] that the Court order the production of documents pursuant
to FOIA.” Id. As with Dr. Taitz’s other cases, the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Barnett at *3-8. Although the Barnett court identified
one category of plaintiffs -- presidential candidates defeated by the President in the 2008 election
5
Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 11 Filed 02/26/10 Page 6 of 18
-- who might satisfy Article III's injury requirement, see Barnett at *8 (discussing the potential
injury to failed presidential candidates), Dr. Taitz is not representing those plaintiffs in this action
In its opinion, the California district court also discussed Dr. Taitz’s litigation conduct,
observing that she “has favored rhetoric . . . rather than the language of a lawyer seeking to
present arguments through cogent legal reasoning,” and that she took the “improper and
unethical” step of “encourag[ing] her supporters to attempt to influence this Court’s decision.”
See id. at *19. In addition, the district court expressed its “deep[] concern[] that Taitz may have
suborned perjury through witnesses she intended to bring.” Id. In contrast to the district court’s
characterization of Dr. Taitz’s conduct, the same court noted that Gary Kreep, who served as
separate counsel for two of the Barnett plaintiffs, had attempted “to bring serious issues before
Following dismissal, the Barnett plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which has not yet decided the appeal. See 9th Cir. Docket sheet in Barnett v. Obama,
Argument
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to challenge the President's qualifications for office, she
lacks standing to raise the issue. The question of standing is a threshold determination
concerning “whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of
particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). A plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing proper standing “at the outset of its case.” Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection
6
Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 11 Filed 02/26/10 Page 7 of 18
Agency, 292 F.3d 895, 901 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In so doing, the plaintiff must allege facts
sufficient to satisfy the “irreducible Constitutional minimum” of Article III standing. Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Accordingly, to have standing here, Plaintiff
must first allege that she “suffered an ‘injury in fact’ -- an invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or
‘hypothetical[.]’” Id. at 560 (citations omitted). “Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of.” Id. (quotations omitted). “Third, it must be
likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.” Id. (quotations omitted). In her Complaint, plaintiff has entirely failed to establish
By now, it is well-established that the purported injury suffered by citizens who doubt the
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217, 220 (1974); Berg v.
Obama, 574 F. Supp. 2d 509, 518-21 (E.D. Pa. 2008), and cases cited therein; see also Barnett;
Rhodes, 2009 WL 2997605; Rhodes, 2009 WL 3299817. Having served as counsel in many of
the prior cases establishing this principle, Plaintiff is well aware that an allegation of such injury
is inadequate. In this case, she now alleges that she herself has suffered a unique injury through
having her theories of standing and subject matter jurisdiction rejected in those prior cases. Even
if this could constitute a tangible injury, it is neither causally related to the President's citizenship
nor redressable by a favorable decision by this Court. Therefore, the instant complaint must also
7
Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 11 Filed 02/26/10 Page 8 of 18
her claim that she has somehow been “injured” through her prior efforts to litigate the President's
eligibility for office including, inter alia, that she suffered “vicious attacks coming from the
media,” that an “emissions hose” in her car “was disconnected,” that certain private individuals
“submitted [sic] perjured affidavits . . . and forged her signature,” and that “her paypal account
was tampered with.” Complaint at 2-3. Of these, the only harm that conceivably stems from
official action on the part of any governmental entity is her claim that “[w]hen she brought two
legal actions in the Middle District of Georgia . . . she was sanctioned $20,000.” Complaint at 3.
This injury is not traceable to any action of Defendant, but stems instead from her
decisions to file, repeatedly, frivolous motions in district court in the Middle District of Georgia,
This injury would not be redressed by the relief she seeks, because this Court cannot
affect, through relief affecting Defendant, the sanctions issued by the Georgia court, nor the
actions of the third parties allegedly responsible for her other injuries. Where injuries result only
indirectly, “from the independent action of some third party not before the court,” then “the
presence of intervening factors interrupts the chain of traceability” and there is no standing.
International Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush, 954 F.2d 745, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
In her application for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff raises the prospect of another type
of harm: that her “law license” will be “undermine[d]” or “endanger[ed].” (Taitz Affidavit at
18-22.) She intimates that this threat is a collateral consequence of the decisions in Rhodes,
claiming that the order from the Middle District of Georgia “was forwarded to the CA Bar.” (Id.
at 17.) Like the sanction from the Georgia district court, however, this injury is neither traceable
8
Case 1:10-cv-00151-RCL Document 11 Filed 02/26/10 Page 9 of 18
Plaintiff cannot circumvent the requirement that she have standing merely by recasting
her claims under the quo warranto statute, 16 D.C. Official Code § 3501, et seq. It is well-
established that statutes conferring a right-to-sue may not extend that right to individuals who
otherwise lack standing under Article III. See, e.g., McClure v. Reagan, 454 U.S. 1025 (1981)
(affirming McClure v. Carter, 513 F. Supp. 265, 271 (D. Idaho 1981) (finding inadequate
appointment of another Member as an Article III judge). In certain circumstances, that provision
permits an “interested person [to] apply to the court by certified petition for leave to have the writ
issued. Without Article III standing, however, Dr. Taitz cannot maintain such a claim.1
Plaintiff cannot establish constitutional standing and her case should be dismissed in its
entirety.
It is well settled that when the United States Constitution makes a “textually
demonstrable commitment” of an issue to another branch of the government, other than the
judiciary, that issue presents a non-justiciable political question. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 217 (1962). “The principle that the courts lack jurisdiction over political decisions that are
by their nature committed to the political branches to the exclusion of the judiciary is as old as
the fundamental principle of judicial review.” Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 193 (D.C.
1
There is ample reason to believe that the D.C. statute is entirely consistent with Article III
because the definition of an “interested person” likely excludes those who have not suffered a
cognizable injury-in-fact. See Columbian Cat Fanciers, Inc. v. Koehne, 96 F.2d 529, 532 (D.C.
Cir. 1938) (“an action in quo warranto . . . must be brought by a person claiming title to the
office in question and out of possession thereof.”).
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Cir. 2005). The political question doctrine serves to “restrain the Judiciary from inappropriate
interference in the business of the other branches of Government” by prohibiting the courts from
deciding issues that properly rest within the province of the political branches. United States v.
Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990). Accordingly, claims “involving political questions
outside of the Article III jurisdiction of federal courts are “consistently dismissed for want of
subject matter jurisdiction.” Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1233 n.3 (D.C. Cir.
2009).
According to the text of the Constitution, the issues Plaintiff seeks to raise in this case
regarding both whether President Obama is a “natural born citizen of the United States,” and
therefore qualified to be President, are to be judged (if at all), by other parts of the government
At the outset, the Constitution indicates that issues related to a candidate’s eligibility for
the Office of President rest, in the first instance, with the voters and the Electoral College, the
Constitutionally created body responsible for selecting the President of the United States. See
U.S. Constitution, Article II, section 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct,” electors for the President and Vice President); Amend. XXIII
section 1; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 43 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The [Electoral]
College was created to permit the most knowledgeable members of the community to choose the
responsibility to select the President necessarily includes the authority to decide whether a
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The Constitution also provides that, after the Electoral College has voted, further review
of a presidential candidate’s eligibility for office, to the extent such review would ever be
required, rests with Congress. Where no candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes, the
Constitution commits to the House of Representatives the authority to select the President and, in
so doing, to evaluate the candidates’ qualifications. See U.S. Constitution Amendment XII.
Similarly, the Twentieth Amendment exclusively grants Congress the responsibility for selecting
a President when a candidate elected by the Electoral College does not satisfy the Constitution’s
eligibility requirements. See id. Amendment XX, § 3 (“the Congress may by law provide for the
case wherein neither a President-elect nor a Vice President-elect shall have qualified, declaring
who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and
such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.”). Thus,
review of Presidential qualifications after the Electoral College has acted rests in Congress,
Federal legislation further details the process for counting electoral votes in the Congress.
Under 3 U.S.C. § 15, Congress is directed to be in session on the appropriate date to count the
electoral votes for President, with the President of the Senate presiding. The statute further
directs that the electoral votes be counted, and then the results be presented to the President of
the Senate, who shall then “announce the state of the vote.” The statute then provides a
Every objection shall be made in writing, and shall state clearly and concisely, and
without argument, the ground thereof, and shall be signed by at least one Senator
and one Member of the House of Representatives before the same shall be
received. When all objections so made . . . shall have been received and read, the
Senate shall thereupon withdraw, and such objections shall be submitted to the
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Senate for its decision; and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall, in
like manner, submit such objections to the House of Representatives for its
decision.
3 U.S.C. § 15. The statute is clear that Congress adjudicates all challenges to the counting of
In summary, the text of the Constitution and the relevant statutory law make plain that
challenges to the qualifications of a candidate for President can, in the first instance, be presented
to the voting public before the election, and, once the election is over, can be raised as objections
as the Electoral votes are counted in the Congress. Therefore, challenges such as those
purportedly raised in this case are committed to the electors, and to the Legislative branch.
Barack Obama has been President of the United States for over a year now. The issues
which Plaintiff seeks to litigate in this case, and the allegations which she makes in her
Complaint all relate to the fitness, competence, and qualification of President Obama to continue
to serve in office. As the D.C. Circuit observed, under different circumstances, these issues are
Although the primary reason for invoking the political question doctrine in our
case is the textual commitment . . . to the Senate, the need for finality also
demands it. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 210, 82 S. Ct. at 706 . . . . [T]he
intrusion of the courts would expose the political life of the country to months, or
perhaps years, of chaos. Even if the courts qualified a finding of justiciability
with a rule against stays or specific relief of any kind, their review would
undermine the new President’s legitimacy . . . for at least as long as the process
took. And a declaratory action without final relief awarding the Office to one
person or the other could confound matters indefinitely.
Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (emphasis added), aff’d, 506 U.S.
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224 (1992).2
Litigation of these issues in this Court would be an equal intrusion of the judiciary into
the political life of the other branches of government. The intrusion would do violence to the
question is outside the jurisdiction of the Court. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210 (“The non-
In summary, the issues which Plaintiff seeks to litigate in this case are constitutionally
and statutorily within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress. Litigation of these
issues in this Court at all, and certainly the granting of any of the relief sought by Plaintiff herein,
Plaintiff seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, to
produce the birth certificate supporting the President’s application for a U.S. passport. Plaintiff
cannot meet the high standards for mandamus relief. See, e.g., In re DRC, Inc., No. 09-5083,
2009 WL 5125602 (Dec. 8, 2009). In addition to failing to state a claim for any cause of action
2
The same interest in finality has also long been recognized to limit the scope of actions in quo
warranto. See Newman v. U.S. ex rel., Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537, 548 (1915) (“[G]eneral public
interest is not sufficient to authorize a private citizen to institute such [Quo Warranto]
proceedings, for if it was, then every citizen and every taxpayer would have the same interest and
the same right to institute such proceedings, and a public officer might, from the beginning to the
end of his term, be harassed with proceedings to try his title.”).
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Plaintiff seeks the production of Defendant’s birth certificate and various other records,
but the simple problem with her claim is that she has no legal entitlement to them. For example,
she has no basis to pursue a claim under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552,
because she has neither sued a federal agency nor produced any evidence of a request she made
to a federal agency for such records (still less exhausting her administrative remedies). Other
than her groundless claim for quo warranto relief, she has cited no other statute or common law
right that would entitle her to production of any such records from Defendant. Her complaint
therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
Even if the Court were to find that Plaintiff had standing, she would still not be entitled to
injunctive relief. A grant of preliminary injunctive relief under Rule 65(a) “is considered an
extraordinary remedy in this circuit.” Sociedad Anonima Vina Santa Rita v. U.S. Dep’t of
injunctive relief is such “a drastic and unusual judicial measure,” see Marine Transp. Lines v.
Lehman, 623 F. Supp. 330, 334 (D.D.C. 1985), the power to issue such an injunction must be
“sparingly exercised,” see Dorfmann v. Boozer, 414 F.2d 1168, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
To prevail in her request for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff bears the burden of
demonstrating that: (1) there is a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) failure to
grant the injunction would result in irreparable injury; (3) the requested injunction would not
substantially injure other interested parties; and (4) the public interest would be furthered by the
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injunction. See Katz v. Georgetown Univ., 246 F.3d 685, 687-88 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Nat’l Head
Start Ass’n v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 297 F. Supp. 2d 242, 246-47 (D.D.C. 2004). In a
case such as this, where “the injunction sought would alter, rather than preserve, the status quo,”
Plaintiff must meet an even higher standard: she must demonstrate “a clear entitlement to relief”
or that “extreme or very serious damage will result if the injunction does not issue.” Qualls v.
Here, Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction to (1) recuse the U.S. Attorney’s Office
from defending this suit, and (2) compel production of various “vital records” of Defendant. As
explained above, she has no prospect of prevailing on the merits on her latter request. As for
recusal of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, her theory is pure speculation that the Office may bring a
criminal prosecution against her and that if that happened, it would suffer a conflict of interest in
defending this suit. Cf. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 (1971) (plaintiffs lacked standing
where they did not claim they had ever been threatened with prosecution, that a prosecution was
likely, or even that a prosecution was remotely possible). Plaintiff offers no plausible support for
her conspiracy theory or that it, if true, it would justify recusal of the Office, much less on an
More generally, because Plaintiff cannot show an injury to satisfy Article III standing, she
cannot show irreparable harm for purposes of receiving an injunction. See, e.g., In re Navy
Moreover, her allegation of immediate injury falls well short of constituting a serious or
irreversible harm. In her affidavit, Plaintiff claims: “I have a serious concern that a CA bar [sic]
will be used as yet another tool in the same effort to destroy me,” and that she is “supposed to
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provide an answer to the CA bar by 02.26.10.” (Taitz Affidavit R.8 ¶¶ 21-22.) Even if this were
taken at face value, Plaintiff provides no specifics as to what her “answer” to the bar is required
to include, what sort of inquiry is being performed by the Bar, or what additional stages of any
The finality associated with Plaintiff's suggested date of February 26, 2010, is further
undercut by the pendency of her appeals in Barnett and Rhodes. Those appeals are far more
directly relevant to the (extremely tenuous) claims of harm she makes regarding her law license
than anything likely to be resolved in this case. She has fallen far short of justifying preliminary
relief, much less preliminary relief that would so significantly alter, rather than preserve, the
status quo.
Finally, the request for preliminary injunction should be denied based on its adverse
impact to the public interest. “[C]ourts of equity should pay particular regard for the public
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982). Plaintiff cannot meet her burden of establishing that
an injunction will serve the public interest in this case. The public has an interest in the finality
of elections and avoiding disruption in the country’s leadership. The storm of innuendo she
seeks to create, if indulged, cannot but open the door to innumerable, equally frivolous claims.
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Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant asks the Court to dismiss this case for lack of
/s/
RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, D.C. Bar # 434122
Assistant United States Attorney
/s/
ALAN BURCH, D.C. Bar # 470655
Assistant United States Attorney
555 4th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 514-7204, [email protected]
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Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that I caused copies of the foregoing Motion to Dismiss and supporting
Memorandum to be served by first class mail addressed to pro se Plaintiff at:
Orly Taitz
29839 Santa Margarita Parkway, Suite 100
Rancho Santa Margarita, CA 92688
and on
Christopher-Earl Strunk
593 Vanderbilt Ave., #281
Brooklyn, NY 11238
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