PATERNITY & FILIATION

TEOFISTA BABIERA vs. PRESENTACION B.

CATOTAL
G.R. No. 138493
June 15, 2000
Facts:
TeofistaBabiera claims that she was born to
the spouses Eugenio and HermogenaBabiera then
65 and 54 years old respectively, at the time of
her birth. PresentacionBabiera-Catotal, daughter
of the late spouses Eugenio and Hermogena
counters this claim, saying that she saw with her
own eyes that Teofista was actually born to their
housemaid named Flora Guinto. Presentacion
testified that Teofista was born through the help
of a hilot and that her mother Flora forged the
Teofistas birth certificate, making it appear that
HermogenaBabiera was the mother by forging
Hermogenas signature. Presentacion further
claims that Teofistas real surname is Guinto, her
mother being single; the father, a carpenter,
refused to sign the birth certificate. Teofista on
her defense, claims that Presentacion has no
legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant
to Article 171 of the Family Code which states
that only the father could impugn the child's
legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a
collateral attack.
Issue:

Whether or not such petition may prosper

considering Teofistas claim that Presentacion has
no legal capacity to file the instant petition and
can the presumption of regularity in the issuance
of her birth certificate be upheld.
Ruling:
Yes, the petition may prosper. The case at
bar is not covered by Article 171 for the prayer
therein is not to declare that Teofista is an
illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish
that the former is not the latter's child at all. The
present action does not impugn Teofistas filiation
to Spouses Eugenio and HermogenaBabiera,
because there is no blood relation to impugn in
the first place. Presentacion only aims to assail
and cancel Teofistas birth certificate for the void
and simulated birth certificate of the latter would
affect the formers hereditary rights.
Also, Teofistas birth certificate cannot be
taken into consideration for there were already
irregularities regarding the birth certificate itself.
It was not signed by the local civil registrar.More
importantly, the Court of Appeals observed that
the mothers signature therein was different from
her signatures in other documents presented
during the trial. The most significant piece of
evidence, however, is the deposition of
HermogenaBabiera which states that she did not
give birth to Teofista, and that the latter was not
hers nor her husband Eugenios.

JANICE MARIE JAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

et al.
G.R. No. L-49162
July 28, 1987
Facts:
In 1967, Arlene Salgado was introduced to
PericoJao. After such introduction, Jao courted
Arlene. Not long thereafter, they had sexual
intercourse and subsequently, they lived together.
1968, Arlene became pregnant. Jao paid for all
the expenses related to Arlenes pregnancy but
when the child, Janice was born, Jao insisted that
she could not be the father of such child. When
the case was filed with the RTC, the RTC ordered
the NBI for a group blood testing. The group
blood testing result showed that Janice could not
have been the possible offspring of Jao and
Arlene.
Issue:
Whether or not group blood testing could
be conclusive evidence to impugn the legitimacy
of Janice.
Ruling:
Yes, group blood testing could be admitted
as conclusive evidence to impugn the legitimacy
of Janice. For the past three decades, the use of
blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has
already become an important legal procedure.

There is now almost universal scientific

agreement that blood grouping tests are
conclusive
as
to
non-paternity,
although
inconclusive as to paternity that is, the fact
that the blood type of the child is a possible
product of the mother and alleged father does not
conclusively prove that the child is born by such
parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not
the possible blood type when the blood of the
mother and that of the alleged father are cross
matched, then the child cannot possibly be that of
the alleged father.
Medical science has shown that there are
four types of blood in man which can be
transmitted through heredity. Although the
presence of the same type of blood in two
persons does not indicate that one was begotten
by the other, yet the fact that they are of different
types will indicate the impossibility of one being
the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed
father and the alleged child are not in the same
blood group, they cannot be father and child by
consanguinity.

COMPULSARY RECOGNITION
TAYAG vs. TAYAG-GALLOR
GR. No. 174680
March 24, 2008

Facts:
On January 15, 2001, respondent, Felicidad
A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration over the estate of Ismael
Tayag. The respondent alleged that she is one of
the illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag
and Ester Angeles.
On September 7, 2000, Ismael Tayag died
intestate, leaving behind two real properties both
of which are in the possession of petitioner, and a
motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10 October
2000 preparatory to the settlement of the
decedents estate. Petitioner allegedly promised
to give respondent and her brothers P100, 000.00
each as their share in the proceeds of the sale.
However, petitioner only gave each of them half
the amount she promised.
In a Motion dated August 31, 2001,
petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of the
properties and presented the transfer certificates
of title thereof in her name. She also averred that
it is necessary to allege that respondent was
acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as
his illegitimate child.
There being no such
allegation, the action becomes one to compel
recognition which cannot be brought after the
death of the putative father. To prevent further
encroachment upon the courts time, petitioner
moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses.
The motion was denied.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents petition for
the issuance of letters of administration
sufficiently states a cause of action considering
that respondent merely alleged therein that she
is an illegitimate child of the decedent, without
stating that she had been acknowledged or
recognized as such by the latter.
Ruling:
The appellate court held that the mere
allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child
suffices. Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides
that a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration must be filed by an interested
person. The Court, applying the provisions of the
Family Code which had then already taken effect,
ruled that since Graciano was claiming
illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph
of Article 172 of the Family Code, i.e., open and
continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, the action was already barred
by the death of the alleged father.
In contrast, respondent in this case had not
been given the opportunity to present evidence to
show whether she had been voluntarily
recognized and acknowledged by her deceased
father because of petitioners opposition to her
petition and motion for hearing on affirmative
defenses. There is, as yet, no way to determine if
her petition is actually one to compel recognition

which had already been foreclosed by the death

of her father, or whether indeed she has a
material and direct interest to maintain the suit
by
reason
of
the
decedents
voluntary
acknowledgment
or
recognition
of
her
illegitimate filiation.
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ, et al. vs. ROMEO
FERNANDEZ, et al.
G.R. No. 143256
August 28, 2001
Facts:
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and
Generosa A. de Venecia being childless by the
death of their son, purchased from a certain
Miliang for P20.00 a one month baby boy. The
boy being referred to was later on identified as
Rodolfo Fernandez, the herein appellant.
Appellant was taken care of by the couple and
was sent to school and became a dental
technician. He lived with the couple until they
became old and disabled. On August 31, 1989,
after the death of Dr. Jose, appellant and
Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dividing and allocating to
themselves the estate left by the deceased. Same
day, Generosa sold her share to Rodolfos son,
Eddie Fernandez. After learning the transaction,
Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco, Julita, William,
Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo and Gregorio,
all surnamed Fernandez, being nephews and

nieces of the deceased Jose K. Fernandez, their

father Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed on
September 21, 1994, an action to declare the
Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale
void ab initio. They claimed that Rodolfo is not a
legitimate nor a legally adopted child of spouses
Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia
Fernandez, hence Rodolfo could not inherit from
the spouses.
Issue:
Whether or not Rodolfo is a legitimate or a
legally adopted child of Jose Fernandez and
Generosa de Venecia Fernandez.
Ruling:
No, Rodolfo is neither a legitimate nor a
legally adopted child of Jose Fernandez and
Generosa de Venecia Fernandez. Rodolfo failed to
come up with evidences to prove his filiation. The
only public document he could show was the
Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights
under Act No. 897. 897. Such is a public
document but nevertheless, it was not executed
to admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with
him. Rodolfo also claims that he enjoyed and
possessed the status of being a legitimate child of
the spouses openly and continuously until they
died. Open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child is meant the
enjoyment by the child of the position and
privileges usually attached to the status of a
legitimate child such as bearing the paternal

surname, treatment by the parents and family of

the child as legitimate, constant attendance to
the child's support and education, and giving the
child the reputation of being a child of his
parents. However, it must be noted that
possession of status of a child does not in itself
constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground
for a child to compel recognition by his assumed
parent. His baptismal certificate, although public
documents, is evidence only to prove the
administration of the sacraments on the dates
therein specified, but not the veracity of the
statements or declarations made therein with
respect to his kinsfolk. It may be argued that a
baptismal certificate is one of the other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws of
proving filiation but in this case, the authenticity
of the baptismal certificate was doubtful when Fr.
Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St. John the
Evangelist Parish of Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan
City issued a certification on October 16, 1995
attesting that the records of baptism on June 7,
1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged. The
pictures he presented do not also constitute proof
of filiation.
CAMELO CABATANIAvs. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 124814
October 21, 2004
FACTS:

This controversy stemmed from a petition for

recognition and support filed by Florencia
Regodos in behalf of her minor son, private
respondent Camelo Regodos.
During the trial, Florencia testified that she was
the mother of private respondent who was born
on September 9, 1982 and that she was the one
supporting the child. She recounted that after her
husband left her in the early part of 1981, she
went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for
work and was eventually hired as petitioners
household help. It was while working there as a
maid that, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City
where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and
had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to
support her if she got pregnant.
Florencia claimed she discovered she was
carrying petitioners child 27 days after their
sexual encounter. The sexual intercourse was
repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later,
on suspicion that Florencia was pregnant,
petitioners wife sent her home. But petitioner
instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City
where he rented a house for her. On September
9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her aunts house in
Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her
child, private respondent Camelo Regodos.

Petitioner Camelo Cabatanias version was

different. He testified that he was a sugar planter
and a businessman. Sometime in December,
1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home.
During the course of her employment, she would
often go home to her husband in the afternoon
and return to work the following morning. This
displeased petitioners wife, hence she was told
to look for another job.
In the meantime, Florencia asked permission
from petitioner to go home and spend New Years
Eve in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the
Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and invited
her to dinner. While they were eating, she
confided that she was hard up and petitioner
offered to lend her save money. Later, they spent
the night in San Carlos City and had sexual
intercourse. While doing it, he felt something
jerking and when he asked her about it, she told
him she was pregnant with the child of her
husband. They went home the following day.
In March 1982, Florencia, then already working
in another household, went to petitioners house
hoping to be reemployed as a servant there.
Since petitioners wife was in need of one, she
was re-hired. However petitioners wife noticed
that her stomach was bulging and inquired about

the father of the unborn child. She told

petitioners wife that the baby was by her
husband. Because of her condition, she was again
told to go home and they did not see each other
anymore.
Petitioner
was
therefore
surprised
when
summons was served on him by Florencias
counsel. She was demanding support for private
respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused,
denying the alleged paternity. He insisted she
was already pregnant when they had sex. He
denied going to Bacolod City with her and
checking in at the Visayan Motel. He vehemently
denied having sex with her on January 2, 1982
and renting a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod
City.
TC: gave more probative weight to the testimony
of Florencia despite its discovery that she
misrepresented herself as a widow when, in
reality, her husband was alive. Deciding in favor
of private respondent, the trial court declared:

The child was presented before the Court, and if

the Court is to decide this case, based on the
personal appearance of the child then there can
never be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the

child of the defendant with plaintiff-minors

mother, Florencia Regodos.
Issue:
Whether
or
not
respondent
compulsorily be recognized by petitioner.

may

Ruling:
No. Respondent failed to show conclusive
evidence as to establish his filiation with
petitioner. Aside from Florencias self-serving
testimony that petitioner rented a house for her,
private respondent failed to present sufficient
proof of voluntary recognition. A certificate of live
birth purportedly identifying the putative father
is not competent evidence of paternity when
there is no showing that the putative father had a
hand in the preparation of said certificate. The
local civil registrar has no authority to record the
paternity of an illegitimate child on the
information of a third person.
More importantly, the fact that Florencias
husband is living and there is a valid subsisting
marriage between them gives rise to the
presumption that a child born within that
marriage is legitimate even though Florencia may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress. Only the
husband or in exceptional cases, his heirs may
impugned the presumed legitimacy of the child.

With regards the personal appearance of

the child, the Supreme Court provided that in this
age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective test of
physical resemblance or similarity of features will
not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and
filiation before the courts of law.
SAYSON VS CA
FACTS:
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely,
Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro.
Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May
15, 1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista,
died on March 23, 1972. His wife died nine years later,
on March 26,1981. Their properties were left in the
possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, all
surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and
Remedios, together with Juana C. Bautista, Isabel's
mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting
of the intestate estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It
was filed in the RTC of Albay. The action was resisted
by Delia, Edmundo and Doribel Sayson, who alleged
successional rights to the disputed estate as the
decedent's lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed
their own complaint, this time for the accounting and

partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela

Sayson, against the couple's four surviving children.
And filed in the RTC of Albay. The complainants
asserted the defense they raised , that Delia and
Edmundo were the adopted children and Doribel was
the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such,
they were entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his
parents' estate by right of representation.

from the estate of the deceased spouses Eleno and

Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all other respects.

Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private

respondents on the basis of practically the same
evidence.

On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that

the findings of the trial courts as affirmed by the
respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth
certificate is a formidable piece of evidence. It is one
of the prescribed means of recognition under Article
265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family
Code. It is true, as the petitioners stress, that the birth
certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation
and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However,
such evidence is lacking in the case at bar.

The Judge declared in his decision dated May 26, 1986,

that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted
children of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson by virtue of the
decree of adoption. Doribel was their legitimate
daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate.
Consequently, the three children were entitled to
inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by right of
representation. In his decision dated September 30,
1986,
Judge Jose S. Saez dismissed Civil Case,
holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs
of Teodoro and Isabel as established by the
aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from
sharing in their estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals,
where they were consolidated and affirmed. In Civil
Case, the appealed decision is modified in that Delia
and Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from inheriting

ISSUE:
Whether or not the birth certificate is a formidable
evidence ?
SC HELD:

Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel

was born to Edita Abila was understandably suspect,
coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit
of Abila denying her earlier statement in the petition
for the guardianship of Doribel is of course hearsay, let
alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in
the lower courts. Even without it, however, the birth
certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court
of Appeals, where we ruled that "the evidentiary
nature of public documents must be sustained in the
absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its
falsity or nullity."

Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must

fail is the impropriety of the present proceedings for
that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be
questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting
but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper
party. The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code
x x x does not have this purely evidential character. It
serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a
civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil
status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy
of the child can be impugned only in a direct action
brought for that by the proper parties, and within the
period limited by law. The legitimacy of the child
cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different
purpose.

WILLIAM LIYAO, JR. vs. JUANITA TANHOTILIYAO, et al.

G.R. No. 138961
March 7, 2002
Facts:
Corazon Garcia alleges that she was
cohabiting with William Liyao from 1965 up to
Williams death in December, 1975 even though
Corazon is still legally married but living
separately to a Ramon Yulo. William Liyao himself
was legally married to Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao at
the time of his cohabitation with Corazon.

Corazon and deceased lived together with the

company of Corazons two children from her
subsisting marriage- Enrique and Bernadette,
both surnamed Yulo. In 1974, they begot a child,
William Liyao, Jr. It was alleged that William
Liyao paid for all the expenses for the subsistence
of William Jr. and also that of Corazon and her
two children from her subsisting marriage during
their cohabitation. William Jr. was said to be in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the
status of the child of said William Liyao, having
been recognized and acknowledged as such child
by the decedent during his lifetime. Upon the
death of his alleged father, William Jr. prays that
he be recognized as an illegitimate child and an
heir by the family of the deceased from his
subsisting marriage. The deceaseds legitimate
children on their part, alleges that the deceased
could not have fathered petitioner for their father
and mother have never been separated.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may impugn his
legitimacy with that of his mothers subsisting
marriage and establish his claim of filiation with
the late William Liyao.
Ruling:
Holding that Corazons marriage with
Ramon Yulo is still subsisting, it is presumed that
petitioner is the legitimate child of Ramon Yulo
and not the illegitimate child of William Liyao.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and

conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to

be legitimate. This presumption is grounded in a
policy to protect innocent offspring from the
odium of illegitimacy. The presumption of
legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive
and consequently, may be overthrown by
evidence to the contrary. Article 255 of the New
Civil Code provides: Children born after one
hundred
and
eighty
days
following
the
celebration of the marriage, and before three
hundred days following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be
legitimate. No evidence other than that of
physical impossibility of the
husband having
access to his wife within the first one hundred
and twenty days of the three hundred which
preceded the birth of the child can be admitted.
Such physical impossibility may be caused by: (a)
By the impotence of the husband; (b) by the fact
that husband and wife were living separately in
such a way that access was not possible; (c) by
the serious illness of the husband.
Petitioner
cannot
impugn
his
own
legitimacy. Article 255 of the Civil Code provides
that only the husband, or in proper cases, his
heirs under the conditions set forth under Article
262 of the Civil Code can impugn such legitimacy.
And, in the case at bar, the petition was initiated
by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon
Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette
Yulo who are the undisputed children of Corazon

and Ramon Yulo. The child himself cannot choose

his own filiation.
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS vs. ESTATE
OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON
G.R. No. 142877
October 2, 2001
Facts:
Danilo and Carolina de Jesus were married
on 23 August 1964. It was within this marriage
that the petitioners, Jinkie and Jacqueline were
born. In 1991 though, Juan Dizon acknowledged
petitioners as his own illegitimate children
through a notarized document. Thereafter, Juan
died intestate and petitioners filed a prayer that
they be given their legitime and be recognized as
illegitimate children by the surviving spouse and
legitimate children of Juan Dizon.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners legitimacy as
children of Danilo may be impugned and they be
recognized as illegitimate children of Juan Dizon.
Ruling:
No. The petitioners were born under the
subsisting marriage of Danilo and Carolina. It is
presumed that children born in wedlock are
legitimate.
This
presumption
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that
there is physical impossibility of access between
the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300

days which immediately precedes the birth of the

child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse
is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the
husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse. And only the father, or in exceptional
instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an
appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born
to his wife. Since the petitioners failed to show
records of the impossibility of their parents
access to each other during the first 120 days of
the 300 days which preceded their birth, they
cannot assail their presumed legitimacy. Failing
therefore to impugn their legitimacy, petitioners
cannot claim that they are the acknowledged
illegitimate children of the deceased, Juan Dizon.

Ma. Theresa had already married a Mario Gopiao

nine years before their marriage. Such marriage
of Ma. Theresa to Mario was never annulled. The
trial court ruled that Gerardo and Ma. Theresas
marriage was bigamous and that her marriage to
Mario is valid and subsisting. It declared the
child as being illegitimate. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower courts decision but on appeal,
reversed its ruling and held that Jose Gerardo
was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by
Mario during her first marriage.

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 123450
August 31, 2005

Ruling:
Yes, a child born out of a bigamous
marriage is considered legitimate. The legitimacy
would come from the validity of the first marriage
and not on the bigamous marriage for that
bigamous marriage is void from the very
beginning(ab initio). Ma. Theresa was married to
Mario Gopiao, and that she had never entered
into a lawful marriage with the Gerardo since the
so-called marriage with the latter was
void ab initio. Ma. Theresa was legitimately
married to Mario Gopiao when the child Jose

Facts:
Gerardo B. Concepcion and Ma. Theresa
Almontewere married on December 29, 1989. A
year later, they begot Jose Gerardo. On December
19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to annul his
marriage to Ma. Theresa on the ground of
bigamy. This was because it was found out that

Issues:
a) Whether or not the child born out of a
bigamous marriage is considered
legitimate.
b) Whether or not Gerardo could assail Jose
Gerardos legitimacy.

Gerardo was born on December 8, 1990.

Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo under the law
is the legitimate child of the legal and
subsisting marriage between Ma. Theresa and
Mario Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the
illegitimate child of the void and non-existent
marriage between Ma. Theresa and Gerardo.The
status and filiation of a child cannot be
compromised. Article 164 of the Family Code is
clear. A child who is conceived or born during the
marriage of his parents is legitimate.
As a guaranty in favor of the child and to
protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the
Family Code provides that the child shall be
considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.
No, Gerardo is not in a position to assail
Jose Gerardos legitimacy. He has no standing in
law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only
Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper
case, his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of
the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.Impugning
the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal
right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his
heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma.
Theresa was void from the very beginning; he
never became her husband and thus never
acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of
her child.

ACTION TO CLAIM LEGITIMACY

EDGARDO A. TIJING vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 125901
March 8, 2001
Facts:
Edgardo and BienvenidaTijing are husband
and wife, they have six children, youngest of
whom is Edgardo Tijing Jr. In August 1989,
Angelita Diamante fetched Bienvenida for an
urgent laundry job. Bienvenida left to Angelita
her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she usually
let Angelita take care of her child while she was
doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from
work to get her son, Angelita was nowhere to be
found, and despite her and her husbands efforts,
they could not locate Angelita and their childs
whereabouts.
Four years later, Bienvenida read about the
death of Tomas Lopez, the common-law husband
of Angelita, whose interment is in Bulacan. She
went there and allegedly saw her son Edgardo Jr.,
now named John Thomas Lopez. John is now
being claimed by Angelita as her own son, sired
by her common-law husband Tomas Lopez during
their cohabitation. Bienvenida now alleges that
the child cannot possibly be born to Angelita and
Tomas for it was the latters own brother who
admitted that Tomas was rendered sterile, caused
by an accident. Tomas begot no children from his
legal marriage nor with the cohabitation with

Angelita. Tomas brother even testified that

Tomas himself admitted to him that the subject
child was adopted.
Issue:
Who among the claimants is the true parent
of the subject child.
Ruling:
Bienvenida. It was Bienvenida who was
able to produce the competent evidences to
establish the childs filiation with her and her
husband. She substantiated her claim with
sufficient clinical records, presenting the proper
and credible witnesses who assisted her in her
childs birth. Not to mention the fact that it could
be readily observed that Bienvenida and the child
have strong similarities in their faces, eyes,
eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance
between a minor and his alleged parent is
competent and material evidence to establish
parentage. Whereas, Angelita had been known to
have undergone ligation years before the alleged
birth of the child and the admission of Tomas
own brother that Tomas was sterile makes it
impossible that he and Angelita could have
produced subject child. More importantly, the
birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez
and private respondent were legally married
which is false because even private respondent
had admitted she is a common-law wife. This
false entry puts to doubt the other data in said
birth certificate.

AGUSTIN V. PROLLAMANTE

Facts:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin
Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological
father, petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and
support pendente lite before the Quezon City
RTC.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel
courted Fe, after which they entered into an
intimate
relationship.
Arnel
supposedly
impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite
Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give
birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The
babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by
Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the prenatal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes
repeated requests for Martins support despite
his adequate financial capacity and even
suggested to have the child committed for
adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the
child.
On January 2001, while Fe was carrying fivemonth old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and
Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his
van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This

incident was reported to the police. Several

months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia
and
has,
since
then,
been
undergoing
chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for
support.
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order
directing all the parties to submit themselves to
DNA paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by
invoking his constitutional right against selfincrimination and moving to dismiss the
complaint for lack of cause of action.
The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity
testing at the expense of the applicants. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus
this petition.

Issue:
W/N the respondent court erred in denying the
petitioners Motion to Dismiss and directing
parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and
was a form of unreasonable search.

Held:

No. The trial court properly denied the

petitioners motion to dismiss because the private
respondents complaint on its face showed that
they had a cause of action against the petitioner.
The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the
plaintiffs primary right and the defendants
corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or
wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by
which the primary right and duty have been
violated. The cause of action is determined not by
the prayer of the complaint but by the facts
alleged.
No. In Ople v. Torres, the Supreme Court struck
down the proposed national computerized
identification system embodied in Administrative
Order No. 308, we said:In no uncertain terms, we
also underscore that the right to privacy does not
bar all incursions into individual privacy. The
right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public
service and the common good... Intrusions into
the right must be accompanied by proper
safeguards that enhance public service and the
common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of
legality of searches and seizures, and the
infringement of privacy of communication where

the constitutional right to privacy has been

critically at issue. Petitioners case involves
neither and, as already stated, his argument that
his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy
holds no water.

For too long, illegitimate children have been

marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their
existence. The growing sophistication of DNA
testing technology finally provides a much
needed equalizer for such ostracized and
abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the
merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly
expressed as much in the past. This case comes
at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally
evolved into a dependable and authoritative form
of evidence gathering. We therefore take this
opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that
DNA testing is a valid means of determining
paternity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals
decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

IN RE: CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN LIN WANG

Facts:
Petitioner Julian Lin Wang a minor represented
by his mother Anna Lisa Wang filed a petition
dated 19 September 2002 for change of name of
entry in the civil registry of Julian Lin Wang.
Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and
have his registered name changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner
theorizes that it would be for his best interest to
drop his middle name as this would help him
adjust more easily to integrate himself into
Singaporean society.

Issue:
Whether or not the law the law provides for his
middle name to be changed.

Ruling:
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name
is that there be proper and reasonable cause for
which the change is sought. to justify a request
for the change of name, the petitioner must show
not only some proper reason therefore but also
that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true

and official name. Among the grounds for the

change of name which have been held valid are:
a.) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce. b.)
When the change results as a legal consequence
c.) When the change will avoid confusion.
d.) When one has continuously used and been
known since childhood by a Filipino name and
was not aware of the alien parentage.
e.) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name and
f.) When the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose.
BRIONES V. MIGUEL

Facts:
On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D.
Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus to
obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin
Pineda.The petitioner alleges that the minor
Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with
respondent Loreta P. Miguel. He was born in
Japan on September 17, 1996 as evidenced by his
Birth Certificate. The respondent Loreta P. Miguel
is now married to a Japanese national and is

presently residing in Japan. The petitioner prays

that the custody of his son Michael Kevin Pineda
be given to him as his biological father and has
demonstrated his capability to support and
educate him.
Issue:
Whether or not the natural father may be
denied the custody and parental care of his own
child in the absence of the mother who is away.
Ruling:
Having been born outside a valid marriage,
the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of
petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of
the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly
provides that "illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to
support in conformity with this Code." This is the
rule regardless of whether the father admits
paternity.
Parental authority over recognized natural
children who were under the age of majority was
vested in the father or the mother recognizing
them. If both acknowledge the child, authority
was to be exercised by the one to whom it was
awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both,
the rule as to legitimate children applied. In other
words, in the latter case, parental authority
resided jointly in the father and the mother.

De santos vs Angeles
Facts:
-

Antonio De Santos married Sofia Bona and had a

child, which is herein petitioner (Maria Rosario
De Santos)
Their relationship became strained to the
breaking point, thereafter Antonio fell in love
with a fellow doctor, Conchita Talag (herein
private respondent)
Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first
marriage thru a divorce from a Nevada court,
and aware that said decree was a worthless
scrap of paper in our jurisdiction, they
proceeded to Tokyo and got married, and they
had eleven children
Sofia died in Guatemala, and less than a month
later, Antonio and private respondent got
married in tagaytay under Philippine laws
Antonio died intestate having properties with an
estimated value of 15,000
Private respondent went to court asking for
letter of administration in her favor and alleged
that the decedent was survived by twelve
legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten
surviving children and petitioner, which were
granted by the court there having no opposition.
Six years after, petitioner decide to intervene
and argued that private respondents children
were illegitimate where the court ruled in favor
of private respondent and declared the children

legitimated and thereupon instituted and

declared them as heirs of Antonio
Petitioner sought reconsideration but was
denied, hence this petition

Issues:
-

WON court erred in declaring the ten children of

private respondent as legitimated

Held:
-

Yes
Art 269 of the Civil Code provides that only
natural children can be legitimated. Children
born outside wedlock of parents who, at the
time of the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other, are natural
In the present case, it is clear that all the
children born to private respondent and Antonio
were conceived and born when the latters valid
marriage to petitioners mother was still
subsisting. The marriage under question is
considered void from the beginning because
bigamous, contracted when a prior valid
marriage was still subsisting. It follows that the
children begotten of such union cannot be
considered natural children proper for at the
time of their conception, their parents were
disqualified from marrying each other due to the
impediment of a prior subsisting marriage.

In this case, the term natural children by legal

fiction was invented, thus giving rise to another
category of illegitimate children, clearly not to
be confused with natural children as defined in
art 269 but by fiction of law to be equated with
acknowledged natural children and
consequently, enjoying the status, rights and
obligations of the latter.
Private respondent contends that, an
acknowledged natural children have the right to
be legitimated, hence respondents children
have the right to be legitimated, as in fact they
were deemed legitimated by the subsequent
valid marriage of their parents in the Philippines
This contention of private respondent is not
meritorious, legitimation is not a right which is
demandable by a child, it is a privilege available
only to natural children proper, as defined under
art 269. Although natural children by legal
fiction have the same rights as acknowledged
natural children, it is a quantum leap in the
syllogism to conclude that, they likewise have
the right to be legitimated. Art 269 itself clearly
limits the privilege of legitimation to natural
children as defined thereunder, there was,
therefore from the outset, an intent to exclude
children conceived or born out of illicit relations
from the purview of the law.
Much more is involved here than the mere
privilege to be legitimized. The rights of other
children like the petitioner in this case, may be
adversely affected as her testamentary share

may well be reduced in the event that her ten

surviving half siblings should be placed on par
with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled
to only half of her share.
Wherefore, petitioner is declared as the sole
legitimate child of the decedent

ADOPTION
Republic v. CA
G.R. No. 92326 January 24, 1992
On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a
petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years old
and who had been living with her family since he was
four (4) months old, before the Regional Trial Court of
Legaspi City. The petition for adoption was filed by
private respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles on February 2,
1988, when the law applicable was Presidential Decree
No. 603, the Child and Youth Welfare Code. Under said
code, a petition for adoption may be filed by either of
the spouses or by both of them. However, after the
trial court rendered its decision and while the case was
pending on appeal in the Court of Appeals, Executive
Order No. 209, the Family Code, took effect on August
3, 1988. Under the said new law, joint adoption by
husband and wife is mandatory. Petitioner contends
that the petition for adoption should be dismissed
outright for it was filed solely by private respondent
without joining her husband, in violation of Article 185
of the Family Code which requires joint adoption by the
spouses. It argues that the Family Code must be
applied retroactively to the petition filed by Mrs.
Bobiles, as the latter did not acquire a vested right to
adopt Jason Condat by the mere filing of her petition
for adoption.
Issues:
1.) Can the Family Code be applied retroactively to the
petition for adoption filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles and;

2.) Granting that the FC should be applied

retroactively should the adoption in favor of private
respondent only, her husband not being a petitioner.
Held:
1.)Article 246 of the Family Code provides for
retroactive effect of appropriate relevant provisions
thereof, subject to the qualification that such
retrospective application will not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws. A vested right is one whose
existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon
events foreign to the will of the holder. The term
expresses the concept of present fixed interest which
in right reason and natural justice should be protected
against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and
imperative right which enlightened free society,
sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights,
cannot deny. Vested rights include not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but
also an exemption from new obligations created after
the right has vested. Under the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a
petition for adoption by herself, without joining her
husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition,
she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right
under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file
such petition alone and to have the same proceed to
final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force
at the time, was already vested and cannot be
prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.
When private respondent filed her petition in Special
Proceeding No. 1386, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction thereover in accordance with the governing
law. Jurisdiction being a matter of substantive law, the
established rule is that the jurisdiction of the court is

determined by the statute in force at the time of the

commencement of the action. We do not find in the
present case such facts as would constitute it as an
exception to the rule.
2.)Petitioner argues that, even assuming that the
Family Code should not apply retroactively, the Court
of Appeals should have modified the trial court's
decision by granting the adoption in favor of private
respondent Zenaida C. Bobiles only, her husband not
being a petitioner. We do not consider this as a tenable
position and, accordingly, reject the same. Although
Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the
petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by his wife,
his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as
Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part
thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife
in adopting the child. The pertinent parts of his written
consent and the foregoing declarations, and his
subsequent confirmatory testimony in open court, are
sufficient to make him a co-petitioner. Under the
circumstances then obtaining, and by reason of his
foreign residence, he must have yielded to the legal
advice that an affidavit of consent on his part sufficed
to make him a party to the petition. This is evident
from the text of his affidavit. Punctiliousness in
language and pedantry in the formal requirements
should yield to and be eschewed in the higher
considerations of substantial justice. The future of an
innocent child must not be compromised by arbitrary
insistence of rigid adherence to procedural rules on the
form of pleadings.
HERBERT CANG vs CA
G.R. No. 105308 September 25, 1998

Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano are

married and begot 3 children Keith, Charmaine and
Joseph. Anna learned of her husband extra marital
affair hence filed a petition for legal separation which
the court granted. Herbert went to the US to get
divorce, the court granted it and granted sole custody
of the children to Anna. Herbert took an American wife
and thus became a naturalized American citizen. He
divorced his American wife and never remarried.
When Herbert was working in the US, he remitted
money for his children's expenses and another,
deposited in the bank in the name of his children.
Ronald and Maria Clavano ( siblings of Anna ) filed for
the adoption of the 3 children. Anna Marie likewise
filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband
had "evaded his legal obligation to support" his
children and that her husband had "long forfeited his
parental rights" over the children.
Upon learning, Herbert immediately returned to
the Philippines and filed an opposition Pending
resolution of the petition for adoption, Herbert moved
to reacquire custody. Therefore RTC issued an order
finding that Anna in effect relinquished custody over
the children and, therefore, such custody should be
transferred to the father. The court then directed the
Clavanos to deliver custody over the minors to
Herbert. Thereafter RTC issued a decree granting the
petition for adoption of the 3 children to the Clavanos.
Upon appeal, Herbert asserted that the petition
for adoption was fatally defective and tailored to divest
him of parental authority because: (a) he did not have
a written consent to the adoption; (b) he never
abandoned his children; (c) Keith and Charmaine did

not properly give their written consent; and (d) the

petitioners for adoption did not present as witness the
representative of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development who made the case study report
required by law. CA affirmed the decree of adoption on
the ground that the consent of the parent who has
abandoned the child is not necessary.

Issue:
WON Herberts consent is required for adoption to be
valid?
WON Herbert has abandoned their children w/c
dispenses his required consent?
Held: YES and NO
When Clavanos filed the petition for adoption on
September 25, 1987, the applicable law was the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by
Executive Order No. 91. It is thus evident that
notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the
written consent of the natural parent to the
adoption has remained a requisite for its
validity.
In reference to abandonment of a child by his
parent, the act of abandonment imports "any
conduct of the parent which evinces a settled
purpose to forego all parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims to the child." It
means "neglect or refusal to perform the natural
and legal obligations of care and support which
parents owe their children."
Physical estrangement alone, without financial
and moral desertion, is not tantamount to
abandonment.

He maintained regular communication with his

wife and children through letters and telephone.
He used to send packages by mail and catered
to their whims.
The conclusion of the courts below that
petitioner abandoned his family needs more
evidentiary support other than his inability
to provide them the material comfort that
his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide.
There should be proof that he had so
emotionally abandoned them that his children
would not miss his guidance and counsel if they
were given to adopting parents.
The letters he received from his children prove
that petitioner maintained the more important
emotional tie between him and his children. The
children needed him not only because he could
cater to their whims but also because he was a
person they could share with their daily
activities, problems and triumphs
the actuality that petitioner carried on an affair
with a paramour cannot be taken as sufficient
basis for the conclusion that petitioner was
necessarily an unfit father. "bad" husband does
not necessarily make a "bad" father.
The law is clear that either parent may
lose parental authority over the child only
for a valid reason. No such reason was
established in the legal separation case.

Angelie CERVANTES vs FAJARDO

G.R. No. 79955 January 27, 1989

Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreon are common

law spouses who had a daughter named Angelie Anne
Cervantes. Fajardo offered Angelie for adoption to
Cervantes spouses. Cervantes filed petition for
adoption w/ the RTC w/c granted their petition. Then
Cervantes, received a letter from the respondents
demanding to be paid the amount of P150,000.00,
otherwise, they would get back their child. Cervantes
refused to accede to the demand. Gina took the child
and refused to return Angelie saying that she had no
desire to give up her child for adoption and that the
affidavit of consent to the adoption she had executed
was not fully explained to her. However, she would
return the child to the petitioners if she were paid the
amount of P150,000.00. Cervantes filed a petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Issue:
WON the writ should be issued?
Held: YES
In all controversies regarding the custody of
minors, the foremost consideration is the moral,
physical and social welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the resources
and moral as well as social standing of the
contending parents. Never has this Court
deviated from this criterion.
Fajardos common law relationship will not
accord the minor that desirable atmosphere
where she can grow and develop into an upright
and moral-minded person
Gina also has a child with another married man
w/c became Angelies sister. For a minor (like
Angelie Anne C. Cervantes) to grow up with a
sister whose "father" is not her true father,

could also affect the moral outlook and values of

said minor.
Upon the other hand, Cervantes who are
legally married appear to be morally,
physically, financially, and socially capable
of supporting the minor and giving her a
future better than what the natural mother

Besides, Angelie has been legally adopted by

petitioners with the full knowledge and consent
of respondents. A decree of adoption has the
effect, among others, of dissolving the authority
vested in natural parents over the adopted
child, except where the adopting parent is the
spouse of the natural parent of the adopted.
In this case, parental authority over the adopted
shall be exercised jointly by both spouses.
Adopting parents have the right to the
care and custody of the adopted child and
exercise
parental
authority
and
responsibility over him.

MACARIO TAMARGO vs CA
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
Adelberto Bundoc, who is 10 years old, shot
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which
resulted in her death. Damages was filed by by
petitioner Macario Tamargo Jennifer's adopting parent
against Sps Bundoc while they were still living. Prior to
the incident, spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura had
filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition for
adoption was granted after the said incident. In their
Answer, spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents,
reciting the result of the foregoing petition for
adoption, claimed that not they, but rather the
adopting parents sps. Rapisura were indispensable
parties to the action since parental authority had
shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the
successful petition for adoption was filed. RTC
dismissed the complaint ruling that natural parents of
Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the
action.
They filed an appeal. Spouses Bundoc argues
that parental authority was vested in the latter as
adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the
petition for adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot
Jennifer which an air rifle. The Bundoc spouses
contend that they were therefore free of any parental
responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious
conduct. Under Article 36 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, a decree of adoption shall be entered,
which shall be effective he date the original petition
was filed.
Issue:

WON the effects of adoption, insofar as parental

authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect
so as to make the adopting parents the indispensable
parties in a damage case filed against their adopted
child, for acts committed by the latter, when actual
custody was yet lodged with the biological parents?
Held: NO
The law imposes civil liability under vicarious
liability, upon the father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, for any
damages that may be caused by a minor child
who lives with them.
Parental liability is made a natural or logical
consequence of the duties and responsibilities of
parents their parental authority which
includes the instructing, controlling and
disciplining of the child.
The shooting occured when parental authority
was still lodged in Bundoc spouses, the natural
parents of the minor Adelberto.
It would thus follow that the natural parents who
had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto,
are the indispensable parties to the suit for
damages.
Under Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, Parents and guardians are responsible for
the damage caused by the child under their
parental authority in accordance with the civil
Code. Article 221 of the Family Code of the
Philippines has similarly insisted upon the
requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act,
shall have beer in the actual custody of the
parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing
damage.

parental authority cannot be properly regarded

as having been retroactively transferred to and
vested in the adopting parents at the time the
air rifle shooting happened.
retroactive effect may not be given to the
decree of adoption so as to impose a liability
upon the adopting parents accruing at a time
when adopting parents had no actual or
physically custody over the adopted child
Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to
the granting of the petition for adoption
where such is essential to permit the
accrual of some benefit or advantage in
favor of the adopted child.

Under the above Article 35, parental authority is

provisionally vested in the adopting parents
during the period of trial custody before the
issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely
because the adopting parents are given actual
custody of the child during such trial period.
trial custody period either had not yet begun or
had already been completed at the time of the
air rifle shooting
actual custody of Adelberto was then with his
natural parents, not the adopting parents.

ISABELITA LAHOM vs JOSE SIBULO

G.R. No. 143989
July 14, 2003
Spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita
Lahom are married but was not blessed w/ a child.
They decided to take into their care Isabelita's nephew
Jose Melvin Sibulo. After several years, they decided to
file a petition for adoption. RTC issued an order
granting the petition that made all the more intense
than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for
Melvin. A sad turn of events came many years later.
Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind the
decree of adoption because Jose Melvin refused to take
up the surname Lahom.
Prior to the institution of the case, RA 8552 or
the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new
statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to
rescind a decree of adoption. Therefore Jose Melvin
moved for the dismissal of the petition on this
grounds. Lahom argued that R.A. No. 8552 should not
retroactively apply to cases where the ground for
rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of
then Article 348 of the Civil Code and Article 192 of the
Family Code.
Petition is ordered dismissed on the ground that
RA 8552 deleted the right of an adopter to rescind an
adoption earlier granted under the Family Code and it
appears clear that the legal grounds for the petition
have been discovered and known to petitioner for
more than five (5) years hence, the action if any, had
already prescribed. Hence appeal.

Issue:
WON adoption decreed on 05 May 1972 may still be
revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
WON Lahoms grounds already prescribed?
Held: YES and YES
R.A. No. 8552 secured these rights and
privileges for the adopted. The new law
withdrew the right of an adopter to rescind the
adoption decree and gave to the adopted child
the sole right to sever the legal ties created by
adoption.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, the Court
concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time
of the commencement of the action. The
Supreme Court ruled that the controversy
should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No.
8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to
revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975.
By then, the new law, had already abrogated
and repealed the right of an adopter under the
Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a
decree of adoption.
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn
from an adopter a consequential right to rescind
the adoption decree even in cases where the
adoption might clearly turn out to be
undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the
bounden duty of the Court to apply the law.
The exercise of the right within a prescriptive
period is a condition that could not fulfill the

requirements of a vested right entitled to

protection.
Matters
relating
to
adoption,
including the withdrawal of the right of an
adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are
subject
to
regulation
by
the
State.
Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute
may be taken away at anytime before it has
been exercised.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF

STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his
minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He prayed that Stephanies middle name
Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mothers
surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed
to "Catindig," his surname. The court granted the
decree of adoption but named Stephanie as
STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. Cantindig filed a
motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying
that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname
of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
RTC denied this petition on the ground that there is no
law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use
the surname of his biological mother as his middle
name.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie
should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the
surname of her natural mother because it is necessary
to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her
natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family
Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter.
Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship
in the future, her relationship or proof of that
relationship with her natural mother should be
maintained. And there is no law expressly prohibiting
Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as
her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it
allows. Lastly it is customary for every Filipino to have
a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the
mother.

Issue:
WON an illegitimate child may use the surname of her
mother as her middle name when she is subsequently
adopted by her natural father?
Held: YES
Law Is Silent as to the Use Of Middle Name. The
middle name or the mothers surname is only
considered in Article 375(1) to identity of names
and
surnames
between
ascendants
and
descendants, in which case, the middle name or
the mothers surname shall be added. Notably,
the law is likewise silent as to what middle name
an adoptee may use.
For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed
to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both
shall acquire the reciprocal rights and
obligations including the right of the adopted
to use the surname of the adopters
Justice Caguioa said that it should be
mandatory that the child uses the surname of
the father and permissive in the case of the
surname of the mother.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to
all the rights provided by law to a legitimate
child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of her
father and her mother
it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname
of the mother should immediately precede the
surname of the father

Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide

that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of
his/her biological parent
Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her
hereditary rights from her natural mother in the
future

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being

humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes
of adoption. The interests and welfare of the
adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration,
hence,
every
reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives
of the law.
since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate
child adopted by her natural father, like
Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers
surname, we find no reason why she should not
be allowed to do so.

PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Libi vs IAC
Facts:
-

Respondent spouses (Gotiong) are the

legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong while
petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then
a minor between 18 and 19 years of age.
Julie Ann and Wendell were sweethearts but the
former broke up her relationship with the latter
after finding him to be sadistic and irresponsible
Wendell kept on pestering Julie Ann with
demands for reconciliation until he resorted to
threats against Julie Ann
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died
each from a single shot wound inflicted with the
same firearm, a smith and Wesson revolver
licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi
which was recovered from the scene of the
crime.

Parents of Julie Ann filed a civil case against the

parents of Wendell to recover damages arising
from the latters vicarious liability under article
2180 of the civil code which was dismissed by
the trial court but reversed by the CA, hence
this petition

2180 of the civil code covers obligations arising

from both quasi delicts and criminal offenses.
Court believes that the civil liability of parents
for quasi delict of their minor children as
contemplated in art 2180 of the civil code is
primary and not subsidiary

Issue:
-

WON the court erred in making the parents of

Wendell civilly liable

David vs CA
Facts:
-

Held:
-

No, Under the present case, court correctly

declared that the parents of Wendell are and
should be held liable for the civil liability arising
from criminal offenses committed by their minor
child under their legal authority and control, or
who live in their company, unless it is proven
that the former acted with the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent such
damages. That primary liability is premised on
the provisions of art 101 of the RPC with respect
to damages ex delicto, such primary liability
shall be imposed pursuant to 2180 of the civil
code
In imposing sanctions for the so called
vicarious liability of petitioners. Courts hold that
the subsidiary liability of parents for damages
caused by their minor children imposed by art

Petitioner Daisie David worked as secretary of

private respondent Ramon Villar, who is married
man and a father of four children
Their relationship became intimate and they had
a child named Christopher J. and followed by
two more children namely Christine and Cathy
Mae
Their relationship became known to private
respondents wife and their children were
eventually accepted by the legal family of
private respondent
Thereafter, private respondent asked petitioner
to allow Christopher , then six years old, to go
with his family to Boracay wherein petitioner
agreed, but after the trip private respondent
refused to give back the child and said that he
had enrolled Christopher at the Holy Family
Academy for the next school year

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus

which was granted by the trial court but was
reversed by the CA, hence this petition

Issue:
-

WON the petition for habeas corpus was proper

Held:
-

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE

ESPIRITU vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R.
No.
115640
March 15, 1995
Facts:

Yes, rule 102 of the rules of court provides that

the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto
In the case at bar, Christopher is an illegitimate
child since at the time of his conception his
father, private respondent, was married to
another woman other than the childs mother.
As such, pursuant to art 176 of the Family Code,
Christopher is under the parental authority of
his mother, who as a consequence of such
authority is entitled to have custody of him.
Since admittedly, petitioner has been deprived
of her rightful custody of the child by private
respondent, she is entitled for the issuance of
the writ of habeas corpus
The fact that private respondent has recognized
the minor child may be a ground for ordering
him to give support to the latter, but not for
giving him custody of the child.

Petitioner
Reynaldo
Espiritu
and
respondent Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan
City where Reynaldo was employed by the
National Steel Corporation and Teresita was
employed as a nurse in a local hospital. Teresita
left for Los Angeles, California to work as a
nurse. Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the
National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo
and Teresita then began to maintain a common
law relationship of husband and wife. On 1986,
their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born.
While they were on a brief vacation in the
Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married,
and upon their return to the United States, their
second child, a son, this time, and given the name
Reginald Vince, was born on 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated
until they decided to separate. Instead of giving
their marriage a second chance as allegedly
pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and
the children and went back to California.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the

Philippines, but because his assignment in

Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent
back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to
leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug
and her family.
Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to
the Philippines and filed the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to
gain custody over the children, thus starting the
whole proceedings now reaching this Court. The
trial court dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority
over Rosalind and Reginald and declared
Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over
them but with rights of visitation to be agreed
upon by the parties and to be approved by the
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to gain custody over the children
be granted.
Ruling:
Supreme Court dismissed the writ of
habeas corpus petition by the mother and retain
the custody of the children to the father. The
illicit or immoral activities of the mother had
already
caused
emotional
disturbances,
personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting
moral values against the children.

The children are now both over seven years

old. Their choice of the parent with whom they
prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all
indications, Reynaldo is a fit person. The children
understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their
mother and have been affected in their emotional
growth by her behavior.
TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE
SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 113054
March 16, 1995
Facts:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army
lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by profession,
were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union
beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was
born July 18, 1987. From the time the boy was
released from the hospital until sometime
thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of
his maternal grandparents, private respondents
herein, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along
with his two brothers, visited the Bedia
household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was
staying. Private respondents contend that
through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner
abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited him
away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros
Oriental.

The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for

Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel
Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. After
an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial
court issued an order on the same day awarding
custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his
grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of
Appeals. In its decision dated April 30, 1992,
respondent appellate court affirmed the trial
court's order.
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the
trial court and the appellate court to award
custody of his minor son to his parents-in-law, the
Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214
of the Family Code, substitute parental authority
of the grandparents is proper only when both
parents are dead, absent or unsuitable.
Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not
been successfully shown by private respondents.
Issue:
Who should properly be awarded custody of
the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
Ruling:
The minor should be given to the legitimate
father. When a parent entrusts the custody of a
minor to another, such as a friend or godfather,
even in a document, what is given is merely

temporary custody and it does not constitute a

renunciation of parental authority. Only in case of
the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may
substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent.
The court held the contentions of the
grandparents are insufficient as to remove
petitioner's
parental
authority
and
the
concomitant right to have custody over the minor.
Private respondents' demonstrated love and
affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the
legitimate father is still preferred over the
grandparents.
The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor,
particularly because there is no proof that at the
present time, petitioner is in no position to
support the boy. While petitioner's previous
inattention is inexcusable, it cannot be construed
as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable
decision against him and his efforts to keep his
only child in his custody may be regarded as
serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To
award him custody would help enhance the bond
between parent and son. The Court also held that
his being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing
him custody over the boy. So many men in
uniform, who are assigned to different parts of
the country in the service of the nation, are still
the natural guardians of their children.

Also, petitioner's employment of trickery in

spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though
unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest
custody from him.

TENDER AGE PRESUMPTION RULE

PEREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R.No. 118870
March 29, 1996
Facts:
Ray
Perez
is
a
doctor
practicing
in Cebu while Nerissa, his wife, (petitioner) is a
registered nurse. After six miscarriages, two
operations and a high-risk pregnancy, Nerissa
finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New
York on July 20, 1992. Ray stayed with her in
the U.S. twice and took care of her when she
became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he
had only a tourist visa and was not employed.
On January 17, 1993, the couple and their
baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only
Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that
they came home only for a five-week vacation and
that they all had round-trip tickets. However, her
husband stayed behind to take care of his sick
mother and promised to follow her with the
baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to
reside permanently in the Philippines but once

Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind

and continued working. She was supposed to
come back immediately after winding up her
affairs there.
When Nerissa came home a few days
before Ray IIs first birthday, the couple was no
longer on good terms. They had quarrels.
Nerissa did not want to live near her in-laws and
rely solely on her husbands meager income of
P5,000.00. On the other hand, Ray wanted to stay
here, where he could raise his son even as he
practiced his profession. He maintained that it
would not be difficult to live here since they have
their own home and a car. Despite mediation by
the priest, the couple failed to reconcile.
Nerissa filed a petition to surrender the
custody of their son to her. The trial court issued
an Order awarding custody to Nerissa citing the
second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family
Code which provides that no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother,
unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise. Upon appeal by Ray Perez, the
Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts order
and held that granting custody to the boys father
would be for the childs best interest and welfare.
Issue:
Whether or not Nerissa has rightful custody
of a child?

Ruling:
Yes. Aside from Article 213 of the Family
Code, the Revised Rules of Court also contains a
similar provision. Rule 99, Section 6 (Adoption
and Custody of Minors) provides: SEC. 6.
Proceedings as to child whose parents are
separated.Appeal. - When husband and wife are
divorced or living separately and apart from each
other, and the questions as to the care, custody,
and control of a child or children of their
marriage is brought before a Court of First
Instance by petition or as an incident to any other
proceeding, the court, upon hearing the
testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the
care, custody, and control of each such child as
will be for its best interest, permitting the child
to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it
be over ten years of age, unless the parent
chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by
reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness,
incapacity, or poverty x x x. No child under seven
years of age shall be separated from its mother,
unless the court finds there are compelling
reasons therefor.
The provisions of law quoted above clearly
mandate that a child under seven years of age
shall not be separated from his mother unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. The use of the word shall in Article
213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of
the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory
character.

The general rule that a child under seven

years of age shall not be separated from his
mother finds its reason in the basic need of a
child for his mothers loving care. Only the most
compelling of reasons shall justify the courts
awarding the custody of such a child to someone
other than his mother, such as her unfitness to
exercise sole parental authority. In the past the
following grounds have been considered ample
justification to deprive a mother of custody and
parental
authority:
neglect,
abandonment,
unemployment
and
immorality,
habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the
child,
insanity
and
being
sick
with
a
communicable disease.
It has long been settled that in custody
cases, the foremost consideration is always the
welfare and best interest of the child. In fact, no
less than an international instrument, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child provides:
In all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions,
courts
of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.
In the case, financial capacity is not a
determinative factor inasmuch as both parties
have demonstrated that they have ample means.
Nerissas present work schedule is not so
unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time

with her son. Quite a number of working mothers

who are away from home for longer periods of
time are still able to raise a family well, applying
time management principles judiciously. Also,
delegating child care temporarily to qualified
persons who run day-care centers does not
detract from being a good mother, as long as the
latter exercises supervision, for even in our
culture, children are often brought up by
housemaids under the eagle eyes of the mother.

named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law

wife, Helen G. Belmes. Bonifacia obtained a
favorable court decision appointing her as legal
and judicial guardian over the persons and estate
of Valerie and Vincent.

Although Rays is a general practitioner, the

records show that he maintains a clinic, works for
several companies on retainer basis and teaches
part-time. He cannot possibly give the love and
care that a mother gives to his child.

On August 13, 1987, Helen submitted an

opposition
to
the
subject
guardianship
proceedings asseverating that she had already
filed a similar petition for guardianship before the
RTC of Pagadian City. On June 27, 1988, Helen
followed her opposition with a motion for the
Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New
One, asserting that she is the natural mother in
actual custody of and exercising parental
authority over the subject minors at Dumingag,
Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently
residing. She also states that at the time the
petition was filed, Bonifacia was a resident of
Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American
citizen.

VANCIL vs. BELMES

G.R. No. 132223
June 19, 2001

On October 12, 1988, the trial court

rejected and denied Helens motion to remove
and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as guardian of
Valerie and Vincent Jr. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals rendered its decision reversing the RTC.
Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at
the time the case reached the Supreme Court,
the issue revolved around the guardianship of
Vincent.

Facts:
Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C.
Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died on 1986.
During his lifetime, Reeder had two children

Issue:

Who between the mother and grandmother

of minor Vincent should be his guardian?
Ruling:
Respondent Helen Belmes, being the
natural mother of the minor, has the preferential
right over that of petitioner Bonifacia to be his
guardian. Article 211 of the Family Code
provides: "Art. 211. The father and the mother
shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail,
unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
xxx." Indeed, being the natural mother of minor
Vincent, Helen has the corresponding natural and
legal right to his custody.
"Of considerable importance is the rule
long accepted by the courts that the right of
parents to the custody of their minor children is
one of the natural rights incident to parenthood,
a right supported by law and sound public policy.
The right is an inherent one, which is not created
by the state or decisions of the courts, but
derives from the nature of the parental
relationship."
Bonifacia contends that she is more
qualified as guardian of Vincent. Bonifacias claim
to be the guardian of said minor can only be
realized by way of substitute parental authority
pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus:
"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or

unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental

authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. xxx."
Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent,
can exercise substitute parental authority only in
case of death, absence or unsuitability of Helen.
Considering that Helen is very much alive and
has exercised continuously parental authority
over Vincent,
Bonifacia
has to prove, in
asserting her right to be the minors guardian,
Helens unsuitability. Bonifacia, however, has not
proffered convincing evidence showing that
Helen is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent.
Bonifacia merely insists that Helen is morally
unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her
live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But
Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a
subject of this guardianship proceeding.
Even assuming that Helen is unfit as
guardian of minor Vincent, still Bonifacia cannot
qualify as a substitute guardian. She is an
American citizen and a resident of Colorado.
Obviously, she will not be able to perform the
responsibilities and obligations required of a
guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted
the difficulty of discharging the duties of a
guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure,
she will merely delegate those duties to someone
else who may not also qualify as a guardian.

There is nothing in the law which requires

the courts to appoint residents only as
administrators
or
guardians.
However,
notwithstanding the fact that there are no
statutory requirements upon this question, the
courts, charged with the responsibilities of
protecting the estates of deceased persons,
wards of the estate, etc., will find much difficulty
in complying with this duty by appointing
administrators and guardians who are not
personally
subject
to
their
jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding that there is no statutory
requirement; the courts should not consent to the
appointment of persons as administrators and
guardians who are not personally subject to the
jurisdiction of our courts here.

SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY

ST. MARYS ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS
G.R. No. 143363
February 6, 2002
Facts:
Defendant-appellant St. Marys Academy of
Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for
the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the

enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools

from where prospective enrollees were studying.
As a student of St. Marys Academy, Sherwin
Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group.
Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin,
along with other high school students were riding
in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio
Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary
School, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by
James Daniel II then 15 years old and a student of
the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the
jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep
turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result
of the injuries he sustained from the accident.
The parents of Sherwin filed a case against James
Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and
Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio
Villanueva and St. Marys Academy before the
RTC of Dipolog City and claimed for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner St. Marys
Academy is liable for damages for the death of
Sherwin Carpitanos.
Ruling:
GRANTED and REMANDED to the RTC for
determination of any liability of the school. The
Court held that for the school to be liable there
must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause
of the injury caused because of negligence, must

have causal connection to the accident. There is

no showing of such.
Hence, with the overwhelming evidence
presented by petitioner and the respondent
Daniel spouses that the accident occurred
because of the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the
registered owner of the vehicle who shall be held
responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
WHEN IS SUPPORT DEMANDABLE
LACSON vs. LACSON
G.R. No. 150644
August 28, 2006
Facts:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and
Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters
of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea
Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4,
1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later.
Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left
the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually
forcing mother and children to seek, apparently
for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For
a month, they stayed with Leas mother-in-law,
Alicia Lacson, then with her (Leas) mother and
then with her brother Noel Daban. After some
time, they rented an apartment only to return

later to the house of Leas mother. As the trial

court aptly observed, the sisters and their
mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of
eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling
place to another not their own.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is obliged to give
support.
Ruling:
Petitioner admits being obliged, as father,
to provide support to both respondents, Maowee
and Maonaa. It is his threshold submission,
however, that he should not be made to pay
support in arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no
previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand
having been made by the respondents. He
invokes the following provision of the Family
Code to complete his point:Article 203 The
obligation to give support shall be demandable
from the time the person who has a right to
receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it
shall not be paid except from the date of judicial
or extrajudicial demand.
To petitioner, his obligation to pay under
the afore quoted provision starts from the filing
of Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from
that moment can it be said that an effective
demand for support was made upon him