Bankruptcy Court Objection To Discharge Marc Randazza Debtor, Crystal Cox Creditor
Bankruptcy Court Objection To Discharge Marc Randazza Debtor, Crystal Cox Creditor
Bankruptcy Court Objection To Discharge Marc Randazza Debtor, Crystal Cox Creditor
DistrictofNevada
Inre:
CaseNo.1514956
Chapter11
MarcJohnRandazza,
Debtor
ObjectiontoDischargeDebt
I,CounterPlaintiffCrystalCoxinDistrictofNevadaCaseCoxv.Randazzaetal,
2:12cv02040JADPALandinNinthCircuitAppealCase,UNITEDSTATESCOURTOF
APPEALSCase:1515610,herebyobjecttothedischargeofdebtofMarcJ.Randazzain
regardtotheabovementionedcase.
I,CounterPlaintiffCrystalCoxhavevalidclaimsinthiscase.Iamaninjuredparty,andentitled
toclaimsofMalpracticeandDefamationasIhaveproveninthiscaseandamawaitinga
mandatorysettlementarbitration.
I,CounterPlaintiffCrystalCoxamentitledto10milliondollarsfromMarcRandazza,my
exattorney,asthecounterclaimsinthiscaseclearlyspellout.
CoxclaimssheisentitledtoatleasttheamountofcoverageRandazzahasorhadin
connectiontohisattorney/lawlicenseinseveralstates.Randazzaisliableforhiswillfuland
maliciousinjuriescausedtoCrystalCoxandCoxobjecttothedischargeofthisdebt.
Coxcanprovidethiscourtwithmoredetailsoftheabovementionedcaseuponrequest.
WillfulandMaliciousInjuriesareNotDischargeableinBankruptcy
CoxclaimsthatRandazzacannotdischargehisfinancialresponsibilitiestothiscaseasamatter
oflaw.
From1904until1998,theUnitedStatesSupremeCourtinterpretedthewillfulandmalicious
injuryexceptionverybroadly.Toexceptadebtfromdischargeundertheexception,oneonly
neededtoprovethatthedebtorsactwasintentionalandnecessarilycausedinjury.The
existenceofmalicewasassumedfromthefactthatanintentionalactcausedtheinjury.
1
MarcRandazza,Cox'sexattorneycausedherinjuryandhedidsowithwillfulandmalicious
intentandwithclearknowledgeofwhathewasdoing.Heisanexpertinthisareaoflawand
usedittodeliberatelyandwillfullycauseCoxharm
Thischangedin1998,whentheSupremeCourtdecidedthecaseofKawaahuauv.Geiger.In
thatcase,adoctortreatedapatientsfootinfectionwithoralpenicillininsteadofintravenous
penicillinbecauseoralpenicillinwaslessexpensive.Ajuryawardedthepatientalarge
judgmentinamalpracticesuitagainstthedoctorandthedoctor,whodidnothavemalpractice
insurance,declaredbankruptcy.Thepatientsoughttohavethedebtdeclarednondischargeable
underthewillfulandmaliciousinjuryexception.
TheSupremeCourtnotedthat,asusedinSection523(a)(6),thewordwillfulreferstotheinjury
ratherthantotheact.Therefore,theCourtheldthatthewillfulandmaliciousinjuryexception
onlyappliestointentionalinjuriesthatthelawcallsintentionaltorts,notrecklessornegligent
torts,likethedoctorsmalpractice.
Thiswasanintentionaltort.MarcRandazzaintentionallyharmedhisformerclientCrystalCox
andwithfullknowledgeofthelawanduseofthoselawstocausefurtherharmtoCox.
CoxobjectstotheDischargeofDebtintheRandazzav.Coxcounterclaims,asifthiscourt
dischargeshisdebtsthenwhatistopreventallattorneysfromcausingsuchharmtotheir
clients,filingbankruptcyandmovingontocreatemorevictims?
CoxclaimsthatperSection523(a)(6)ofthebankruptcycodemakesdebtsnondischargeableif
theyarisefrom"willfulandmaliciousinjurybythedebtortoanotherentityortothepropertyof
anotherentity."
CounterPlaintiffCoxhasaclearandconvincingcaseintheDistrictofNevadathatprovesthat
Randazzahadwillfulintent,fullknowledgeofhisactionsandthathecaused"willfuland
maliciousinjurybythedebtortoanotherentityortothepropertyofanotherentity."Cox'sclaims
ofDefamationandMalpracticeagainstattorneyMarcJ.Randazzaarevalidandarenot
dischargeable.
Coxclaimsthatifattorneyscanharmtheirclientsthensimplyfilebankruptcythenthissetsa
precedentforallattorneystoviolatetheirclientsrightsintentionallywithmaliceandthensimply
filebankruptcyleavingtheclienttoalifeofruincausedbythem.
Coxhasarightforthismattertomoveforwardandtobeawardedreliefasamatteroflaw.
ClaimsofDefamation
320Assault,Libel,andSlander
28:1332DiversityLibel,Assault,Slander
Intentionaltortsarenotdischargeable.Cox'sclaimsagainstMarcRandazzaareregarding
intentionaltortsandhiswillfulandintentionalinjurytoCox,hisformerclient.
ClaimsofDefamationareassault,andtheclaimsofDefamationinthiscasewereintentionalas
MarcRandazza,CrystalCoxsexattorneyofRandazzaLegalGroupknewwhathewas
posting,publishing,speakingandfilinginarbitrationswasnottrueandwasmaliciousflatout
liesthathe,asherformerattorney,knewwerelies.
Section523(a)(6)ofthebankruptcycodemakesdebtsnondischargeableiftheyarisefrom
"willfulandmaliciousinjurybythedebtortoanotherentityortothepropertyofanotherentity."
Coxsclaimsdoarisefromsuchcauseofaction.
ClaimsofAttorneyMalpractice
CoxhasclaimsofMalpracticeagainstherformerattorneyMarcRandazza.Randazzawillfully
andmaliciouslycausedCoxharmandwithfullintentandknowledgehewasdoingso.He
endangeredCox,maliciouslydefamedCox,madefalseswornstatementstocourtsand
arbitrator's,stalkedher,andputherinconstantduressforyearsuponyears.Andhedidso
deliberatelyandwithsuperiorknowledgeofthelaw.
InKawaauhauv.Geiger,theCourtheldthatamedicalmalpracticejudgmentbasedupon
debtorsnegligentorrecklessconductwasnotexemptfromdischargeunder523(a)(6).There
thedebtorhadrenderedinadequatemedicalcareforafootinjuryultimatelyplaintiffsleghadto
beamputatedbelowtheknee.AjuryfoundDr.Geigerliableandawardedapproximately
$355,000indamages.
InGeigerssubsequentbankruptcy,thebankruptcycourtfoundthemalpracticejudgment
nondischargeableasadebtforwillfulandmaliciousinjury,exceptedfromdischargeby11
U.S.C.523(a)(6).
MarcRandazzaintentionallyrenderedinadequate,unlawfulservicestoCoxasherattorneyand
indoingsocausedherharm.TheEighthCircuit,enbanc,reversed,holdingthatthe523(a)(6)
exemptionfromdischargewaslimitedtodebtsbasedonwhatthelawhasforgenerations
calledanintentionaltort.TheSupremeCourtrejectedtheargumentthatthemalpracticeaward
fitwithintheexceptionbecausethedefendanthadintentionallyrenderedinadequatemedical
careto[her]thatnecessarilyledtoherinjury,andaffirmedtheEighthCircuit.
ThecourtinGrossstated:[Thedebtors]interpretationoftheGeigercaseasrequiringaspecific
intenttocauseinjuryfor523(a)(6)nondischargeability,isincorrect.TheSupremeCourt,in
Geiger,didnotdefinetheprecisestateofmindrequiredtosatisfythe523(a)(6)willfulness
imperative.Anintentionalwrongfulactthatnecessarilycausesinjurymeetsthewillfulness
standardunderGeiger.4COLLIERONBANKRUPTCY523.13[1],at52392(LawrenceP.King,
etal.eds.,15thed.2001).
TheSupremeCourtagreedthatplaintiffsmedicalmalpracticejudgmentwasdischargeable
becauseitwasnotbasedonintentionalconduct,butratheronconductthatwasnegligentor
reckless.TheCourtstatedthatnondischargeabilitytakesadeliberateorintentionalinjury,not
merelyadeliberateorintentionalactthatleadstoinjury.However,Randazzadeliberatelytook
Cox'scasetosabotagehercaseandcauseherharm.Randazzawasintentionallyrecklessand
negligentandwithfullknowledgeofthelawasaprofessionalattorney,heknewwhathewas
doing.
JahrlingisanIllinoislawyerwhofiledforbankruptcyprotection.Acreditorwhohadwonalegal
malpracticejudgmentagainstJahrlingsoughttoblockthedischargeofthatobligationinthat
bankruptcyproceeding.
TheEstateseekstoexceptfromdischargea$26,000statecourtlegalmalpracticejudgment
enteredagainstJahrlingin2007.ItalsoseekstodenytheDebtoradischarge.TheAmended
ComplaintassertscausesofactionunderfourBankruptcyCode(Code)sections:523(a)(4)
denialofdischargeofaparticulardebtduetodefalcationbyafiduciary523(a)(6).In
otherwordsthecreditorwasclaimingthatJahrlingbreachedhisfiduciarydutytothecreditor
andthereforecouldnotdischargethedebtinhisbankruptcyproceeding.
In2003,Jahrlingbecameinvolvedinarealestatetransactioninwhichhewasretainedto
representStanleyCora(aged90atthetime)inasaleofhishometoBohdanDemkov
(Demkov)andNadjaKoval(Koval).Corawantedtoselltheproperty,butwantedtoretaina
lifeestatesothathecouldcontinuetoliveintheproperty.Afterthehomewassoldfor$35,000,
DemkovandKovalmovedtoevictCorafromtheproperty.Jahrlingreceived$400attheclosing
ofthesale.
Afterthesale,CorasuedDemkovandKovalforrescissionandsuedJahrlingforlegal
malpractice.
TheCircuitCourtofCookCountyenteredjudgmentinfavorofCoraandagainstJahrlinginthe
legalmalpracticeactionbecause(a)JahrlingdidnotcommunicatewithCorawhoonlyspoke
Polish(b)JahrlingreliedonthelawyerforthebuyerstocommunicatewithCora(c)thehome
wassoldforonethirdofitsmarketvalue.In2007,Corawasawardedajudgmentof$26,000
againstJahrling.
Yearslater,Jahrlingsoughttodischargethe$26,000legalmalpracticeawardinbankruptcy.
4
TheBankruptcyCourtinthatcaseheldthatthedebtwasnotdischargeable.
RandazzawillfullyharmedCoxandcannotdischargetheclaims.
I,CrystalCoxobjecttothedischargeofadebt/interestofMarcRandazzaowedtomeasper
mylegalandconstitutionalrightandrighttodueprocessandper11U.S.C.523(a)(6).
/s/CrystalL.Cox
_________________________
CrystalL.Cox,ProSeCreditor
CertificateofService
Sentto
BankruptcyCLerksOffice
300LasVegasBlvd.South
LasVegas,NV89101
AND
emailedtoZ.Larson,Randazzaattorney
[email protected]