Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155800

March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,

vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth

Antecedent Facts

has unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of

deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting.

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26

Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and

years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their

irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the

first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel 4 at the

guilty spouses capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.

Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding 5 at the Sta.
Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December

The Petition

for

Review

on

Certiorari assails

the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November

1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly
died five (5) months later.

2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the
judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the

On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to

marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes

respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on

(respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and

Article

affirm instead the trial court.

psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of

36

of

the

Family

Code

alleging

that

respondent

was

marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the time

commercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that

their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.8

respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him
when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized

As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity,

that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her

petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the

imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected

people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and

with Blackgold.18

other events or things, to wit:

9

(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate

altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income.

son, and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of

She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she

her family. She only confessed the truth about the boys parentage when

acquired it from a famous furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on

petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.11

unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on

10

(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted
to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr.
Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with
a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13

false pretexts.20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of
calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no
longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991.
He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change,
he finally left her for good in November 1991.21

(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with

Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of
her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede

(Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.

the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the

Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests

Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to

they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective,

that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of

shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed

Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.

that respondents persistent and constant lying

15

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and

to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic

under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from

relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. 22 They

Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the

further

asserted

that

respondents

extreme

jealousy

was

also

pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her

basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another

and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the

woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was

Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes

psychologically

Santos was employed with Saniwares.29

incapacitated

to

perform

her

essential

marital

obligations.23
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her

averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was

marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She

the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her

asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated

husbands whereabouts.30

stories, told lies and invented personalities. 24 She presented her version,
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported

thus:

almost ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child

was afraid of losing her husband.25

prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were
(2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because

mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the

she surmised such intent from Davids act of touching her back and

evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological

ogling her from head to foot.26

incapacity on her part.32

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a

teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years. 27

psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition.

Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive

assistant,33together

producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with

Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself

McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson &

conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically

Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a

incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated

Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the

that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and

company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She

poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence

claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the

of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34

Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.

28

with

the

screening

procedures

and

the

In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation

the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents

conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and

psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case

interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use

of Republic

of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a

interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.

good liar can fake the results of such test.

v. Court of Appeals40 governing the application and

35

Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner

After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and

elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence

held that respondents propensity to lying about almost anythingher

conclusively establish respondents psychological incapacity.

occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among

othershad been duly established. According to the trial court,

In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by

respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and

the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of

personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made

petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions

her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving

of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great

meaning and significance to her marriage. 36 The trial court thus declared

respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an

the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.

opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony

which may indicate their candor or lack thereof. 42 The Court is likewise

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan

guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of

Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of

the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court

the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the

concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the

parties. During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals,

psychological incapacity of respondent.43

37

the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was affirmed with modification by both

the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as

respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion. 38 Subsequently, the

the operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the

decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the

state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards

Roman Rota of the Vatican.39

set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the

Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Courts

Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the

1997

ruling

in Republic

Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTCs judgment.

the Molina case ),

While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest

the Molina guidelines

with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of

bar.46 Since Molinawas decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to

45

and
in

v.

Court

indeed
reversing

of

the
the

Appeals44 (also
Court
RTC

of
in

known

Appeals
the

as

cited

case

at

squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of

ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917, 53 but a marriage where

the Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there

"either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited

was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, wherein the Court

as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929. 54 Divorce on

definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated

the ground of a spouses incurable insanity was permitted under the

under Article 36.

divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation. 55 Upon the

48

enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of

This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that

"unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a

the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as

voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying

the Supreme Court is concerned. Yet what Molina and the succeeding

spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab

cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly

initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article

onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave

45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind. 58

49

room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did
not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of

raised the bar for its allowance.

consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one
of the essential requisites of a contract. 59 The initial common consensus

Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground
for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental
incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a
marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage
persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of
contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as
void,52 in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons
already married, among others. A partys mental capacity was not a

on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that

it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and
Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that
drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice
of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and
voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of
fulfilling such rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the
1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this
"psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations
does not affect the consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as
phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that
"psychologically incapacity to comply would not be

juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the

with the essential marital obligations of marriage." 69 At the same time, it

marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of

has been consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the

the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment

Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency

of the marriage only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be

in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the

different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential

applicability

marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to

generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the

the marriage." These concerns though were answered, beginning

judge to interpret the provision ona case-to-case basis, guided by

with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice

experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in

Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no

psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals

less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to

which, although not binding on

63

of

the

provision

under

the

principle

ofejusdem

be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly

must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." 65

the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law."70

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to

understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to
comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the
Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed
that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to
such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological
incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity
deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase
reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the
law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to
its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with
another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual
milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological
incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in
intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity
may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the
particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even

canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the

interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while

deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed

Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the

the Molina rules,

trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological

which

have

been

consistently

applied

since

1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary

incapacity are binding on lower courts.76

framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of

nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide

set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case

utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under

perception

this

Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying

evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to

petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of

disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall

the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the

rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other

Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall

perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for

strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and

declaration of nullity under Article 36.

that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the

of

each

situation,

and Molina itself

arising

from

family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then

importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the

in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the

institution of marriage.

interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable,

considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state

that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon

protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the

law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem

family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects

of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent

of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it,

under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of

based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject

Catholic

subsequent

of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself

understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged

adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it

that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal

also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional

of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given

provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been

great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the

accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code,

Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation

which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal

of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from

effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well

canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial

as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal

Church

doctrine

in

the

formulation

and

separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for

1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs

declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect

to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the

marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of

existence and continuation of the marriage and against its

marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is.

dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our

Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not

Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and

be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in

unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article

resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.

on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It

decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted

dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and

by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed

marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the

avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and

family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a

the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and

corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-

solidarity.

equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36

do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family,

2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)

as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent

medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)

of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the

sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the

essential obligations of marriage.

decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the

incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its

These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present

manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence

petition.

must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized
in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court
has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the
guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in
full:

not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing

them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.

Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and

that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and

clinical psychologists.

thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the

6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by

celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the

Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband

illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The

and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code

manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,

in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital

but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior

obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by

thereto.

evidence and included in the text of the decision.

4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or

7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial

clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be

Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not

absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not

controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our

necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.

courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code

Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption

Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon

of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to

Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a

job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are

of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be

unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of

psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her

psychological nature."

own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to

5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability

harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to

of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight

Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,

should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject

occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root

to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should

causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or

also be decreed civilly void.77

inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In

other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor

General issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or
opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with

following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on

respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event,

Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of

both courts below considered petitioners evidence as credible enough.

Voidable Marriages. Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that

Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally

the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on

honest with petitioner.80

79

behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties
and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously,

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity

collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous

under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a

opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any

preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be

event, the fiscals participation in the hearings before the trial court is

considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is

extant from the records of this case.

impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the
participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding

Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties

on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the

and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus,

primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute

even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of

the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that

respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among

respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her

the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.

character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of

fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent

Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has

with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.

been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently

proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The

We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines

initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited

in Molina.

unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating

ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the

letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual

psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he

occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background,

presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes

among others.81

behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine

Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further

alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from

linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of

the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of

psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr.

Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the

at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:

respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then

incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?

WITNESS:
xxx
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I
can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated

over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent,

Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the

constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on

third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been

assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or

calling up the petitioners officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of

pathological. x x x

the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is
specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes,

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

what can you say about this, Mr. witness?

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of

A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid,

the respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations

which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her

of her marriage?

husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme,

then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the

A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards

same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is

another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it

carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in

is also something that endangers human relationship. You see,

reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman

relationship is based on communication between individuals and what we

and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with

generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one

different women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid

talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth.

jealousy.

And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen
as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that

Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered

basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.

psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the

marriage?
A- Yes, Maam.83

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the

She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not

psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological

in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to

capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological

petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent

liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself." 84

undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is

based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity

presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological

on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondents

and amounts to psychological incapacity.87

testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these

witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already

Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have

held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by the

clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage.

physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically

She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well

incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioners

before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark

witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly,

about her natural childs real parentage as she only confessed when the

Drs. Abcede

latter had found out the truth after their marriage.

and

Lopezs

common

conclusion

of

respondents

psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of

petitioners version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court

Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient

itself accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no

to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It

cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn

is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a

therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses.

year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife.

Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of

Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court

petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondents psychological

explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this

incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any

wise:

prolonged marital life was dubitable.

To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted

is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of

as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More

marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent

disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish

has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her

truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and

occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She

the trial court were emphatic on respondents inveterate proclivity to

has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities.

telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to

them, were revelatory of respondents inability to understand and perform

respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital

the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to

obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.

distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to

comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital

meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage,

obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article

including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected

68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual

to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.

love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted
by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent

would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between

allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited

spouses based on love, trust and respect.

her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given
the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into

marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the

consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the

essential marital obligations. Respondents ability to even comprehend

Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally

what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering

inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed

that the evidence convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere to

decision despite petitioners efforts

the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be

attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which

accorded much credence.

held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial

to bring the matter to its

Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or

At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which

decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila

constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other

decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated

misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or

30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of

chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the

respondent.90Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National

annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between

Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican. 92 In

misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations

fact, respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave that

under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the

a restrictive clause93was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting

consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated

respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunals

consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of

consent.

In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial

the trial court, of the veracity of petitioners allegations. Had the trial court

Tribunal pronounced:

instead appreciated respondents version as correct, and the appellate

court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this

The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent

matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual

is considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective

findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts,

when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a

that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.

discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly

inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that

serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance

such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically

and implications of the marriage vows.

permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals

reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it

The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by

did not appear certain that respondents condition was incurable and that

law that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised

Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.95

on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the

Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially

personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the

separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work.

substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and

However, respondents aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she

that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent

continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy.

in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with

From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondents condition is

a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment

incurable.

formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the

Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that

matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case

respondents condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that

however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the

respondents psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable

part of the Petitioner.94

feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioners expert

witnesses characterized respondents condition as incurable. Instead,

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not

they remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable

only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify

or incurable.

the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this
case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts
taciturnity on this point.

The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial

We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument

court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired

that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively

well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the
requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be

with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the

medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not

courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in

expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.

enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical

considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January

shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that

1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family

necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case,

Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars, 97 before

there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that

arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological

respondents psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply

incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioas opinion expressed

because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and

during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable," 99 and

the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we

the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal

apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to

of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be

those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on

characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)

appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their

incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological

expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of

incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a

incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the

characteristic of psychological incapacity.101

psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not

pronounced as such at the trial court level.

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the

trial court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the

respondents

incurable.

interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It

Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the

would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical

psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of

or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no

nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial

impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case

of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial courts decision

was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of

that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only

the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of

with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or

respondents psychological incapacity has been established by the

after the reception of evidence.

petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the

psychological

incapacity

was

Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an

nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on

integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced

respondents avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the

that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree

Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality.

that annulment was warranted.

Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a

desire of people in love to live together.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action
for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated

correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.

10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and

respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it

REINSTATED. No costs.

does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is
possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love
with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for

SO ORDERED.