XIII.

RESERVA TRONCAL. Art. 891

Edroso v. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 6878

September 13, 1913

MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
Francisco Dominguez for appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellees.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as required
by law to be reserved. Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two
parcels of land situated in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of 1
hectare 77 ares and 63 centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26 centares. Two
applications were filed, one for each parcel, but both were heard and decided in a single
judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882.
In this marriage they had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at
his father's death inherited the two said parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried
and without issue and by this decease the two parcels of land passed through inheritance to
his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the application
for registration of her ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan
appeared in the case to oppose the registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the
registration be denied, "or that if granted to her the right reserved by law to the opponents be
recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of E., 11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed through
a bill of exceptions.
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question
partake of the nature of property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case
application could only be presented jointly in the names of the mother and the said two
uncles of Pedro Sablan.
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of error),
and denies that the land which are the subject matter of the application are required by law
to be reserved a contention we regard as indefensible.

Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by
inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan,
likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had likewise acquired them by inheritance from
his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been adjudicated to
him in the partition of hereditary property had between him and his brothers. These are
admitted facts.
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable
consideration [gratuitous title], and it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for
he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return for what he receives; and a very
definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles german are within the third degree of blood
relationship.
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired
without a valuable consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister,
is under obligation to reserve what he has acquired by operation of law for the
relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line whence the property
proceeded. (Civil Code, art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land
which he had acquired without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from
another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having acquired them by operation of law, she is
obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of Mariano Sablan and
Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake
of the nature property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question have
been acquired by operation of law, and that only property acquired without a valuable
consideration, which is by operation of law, is required by law to reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance,
but only herein. Certainly, the allegation in first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan
acquired the property in question in 1882, before the enforcement of the Civil Code, which
establishes the alleged right required by law to be reserved, of which the opponents speak;
hence, prescription of the right of action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of their right,
admitting that it existed and that they had it" (p. 49).
However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the
applicant inherited the two parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and
without issue." The trial court so held as a conclusion of fact, without any objection on the
appellant's part. (B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his mother
became his heir by virtue of her right to her son's legal portion under article 935 of the Civil
Code:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his
ascendants shall from him, to the exclusion of collaterals.
The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these
lands had passed into her possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the case
presents no testamentary provision that demonstrate any transfer of property from the son to
the mother, not by operation of law, but by her son's wish. The legal presumption is that the
transfer of the two parcels of land was abintestate or by operation of law, and not by will or

the wish of the predecessor in interest. (Act No. 190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the provision of
article 811 of the Civil Code have therefore been fully complied with.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all
he left at death would not be required by law to be reserved, but only what he would have
perforce left her as the legal portion of a legitimate ascendant.
The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the
hereditary estate of the children and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly
dispose of the other half, with the exception of what is established in article 836.
(Civil Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be
reserved, because it is what by operation of law could full to the mother from her son's
inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have to be reserved. This is all that
article 811 of the Civil Code says.
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject
matter of the application are required by law to be reserved, because the interested party
has not proved that either of them became her inheritance through the free disposal of her
son.
Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be
admitted that a half of Pedro Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother by operation
of law. The law provides that the other half is also presumed to be acquired by operation of
law that is, by intestate succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this presumption must be
presented by the interested party, that is, that the other half was acquired by the man's wish
and not by operation of law.
Nor is the third assignments of error admissible that the trial court failed to sustain the
renunciation of the right required by law to be reserved, which the applicant attributes to the
opponents. Such renunciation does not appear in the case. The appellant deduces it from
the fact that the appellees did not contradict the following statement of hers at the trial:
The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his brother came to my
house and said that those rice lands were mine, because we had already talked about
making delivery of them. (p. 91).
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact that
Basilio Sablan said that the lands belong to the appellant and must be delivered to her it
cannot be deduced that he renounced the right required by law to be reserved in such lands
by virtue of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really belong to her and
must be delivered to her.
The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of action. The
appellant alleges prescription of the opponent's right of action for requiring fulfillment of the
obligation they attribute to her recording in the property registry the right required by law to
be reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law; and as such obligation
is created by law, it prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190. She
adds: "Prescription of the right alleged to the reserved by force of law has not been invoked."
(Eight allegation.)

The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law are. Nor
did she do so in first instance, where she says only the following, which is quoted from the
record: "I do not refer to the prescription of the right required by law to be reserved in the
property; I refer to the prescription of the right of action of those who are entitled to
the guaranty of that right for seeking that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the
Mortgage Law grants a period of time for recording it in the property registry, if I remember
correctly, ninety days, for seeking entry in the registry; but as they have not exercised that
right of action, such right of action for seeking here that it be recorded has prescribed. The
right of action for requiring that the property be reserved has not prescribed, but the right of
action for guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is required by law to be
reserved" (p. 69 of the record).
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring the
applicant to constitute the mortgage imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the
effectiveness of the required by law to be reserved; but because that right of action has
prescribed, that property has not been divested of its character of property required by law to
be reserved; that it has such character by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went
into effect in the Philippine in December, 1889, and not by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which
only went into effect in the country by law of July 14, 1893; that from December, 1889, to
July, 1893, property which under article 811 of the Civil Code acquired the character of
property reserved by operation of law was such independently of the Mortgage Law, which
did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country; that although the Mortgage Law
has been in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the force of
article 811 of the Civil Code, but has operated to reinforce the same merely by granting the
right of action to the persons in whose favor the right is reserved by operation of law to
require of the person holding the property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage to answer for
the enforcement, in due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the guaranty is not
to lose the right itself; that the right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage the
accessory obligation, and loss of the accessory does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth
and sixth allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in
question being indisputable, even though it be admitted that the right of action which the
Mortgage Law grants as a guaranty of final enforcement of such right has prescribed, the
only thing to be determined by this appeal is the question raised in the first assignment of
error, that is, how said two parcels of land can and ought to be registered, not in the property
registry newly established by the Mortgage Law, but in the registry newly organized by Act
No. 496. But as the have slipped into the allegations quoted some rather inexact ideas that
further obscure such an intricate subject as this of the rights required to be reserved in
Spanish-Philippine law, a brief disgression on the most essential points may not be out of
place here.
The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one of
the colonies, not the first enforced in the colonies and consequently in the Philippines. The
preamble of said amended Mortgage Law states:
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the
modifications necessary for its adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the
Philippines on December 1, 1889, thus commencing in those regions the renovation
of the law on real property, and consequently of agrarian credit.

The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the eight
day.
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code, as
set forth in article 968 thereof, where it says:
Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a seconds
marriage shall be obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage
the ownership of all the property he or she may have required from the deceased spouse by
will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a valuable consideration."
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on
December 1, 189, do not contain any provision that can be applied to the right reserved by
article 811 of the Civil Code, for such right is a creation of the Civil Code. In those laws
appear merely the provisions intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the right in favor of
the children of the first marriage when their father or mother contracts a second marriage.
Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court of Spain, for the first time set forth in the
decision on appeal of November 8, 1894, has been reiterated:
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to secure
the right required to be reserved in the property refer especially to the spouses who
contract second or later marriages, they do not thereby cease to be applicable to the
right establishes in article 811, because, aside from the legal reason, which is the
same in both cases, such must be the construction from the important and
conclusive circumstance that said provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals
with inheritances in common, either testate or intestate, and because article 968,
which heads the section that deals in general with property required by law to be
reserved, makes reference to the provisions in article 811; and it would consequently
be contradictory to the principle of the law and of the common nature of said
provisions not to hold them applicable to that right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the supreme
court has already declared, the guaranties that the Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the
rights required by law to the reserved to which said articles refer, are applicable to the
special right dealt with in article 811, because the same principle exists and because of the
general nature of the provisions of the chapter in which they are found."
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a
case had occurred of a right required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to
such right would have been able to institute, against the ascendant who must make the
reservation, proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that article 977 and 978 grant to
the children of a first marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The
proceedings for assurance, under article 977; are: Inventory of the property subject to the
right reserved, annotation in the property registry of such right reserved in the real property
and appraisal of the personal property; and the guaranty, under article 978, is the assurance
by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of what is validly alienated.
But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the
Philippines this is not only a principle of jurisprudence which may be invoked for the
applicability to the right reserved in article 811 of the remedies of assurance and guaranty
provided for the right reserved in article 968, but there is a positive provision of said law,
which is an advantage over the law of Spain, to wit, article 199, which read thus:

The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil
Code can only be required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be
reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be require by the person who should
legally represent them. In either case the right of the persons in whose favor the
property must be reserved will be secured by the same requisites as set forth in the
preceding article (relative to the right reserved by article 968 of the Civil Code),
applying to the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to
the father.
In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article 199
quoted, so that said article 168 reads as thus:
Legal mortgage is established:
1. . . .
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the
property required to be reserved, upon the property of the person obliged to reserve
it.
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the period of
ninety days fixed for the right of action to the guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that
guarantees the effectiveness of the right required by law to be reserved, has prescribed, it is
necessary to lay down a principle in this matter. Now it should by noted that such action has
not prescribed, because the period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for the
exercise of the right of action of the persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the
fulfillment of the obligation of the person who must make the reservation.
Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in court the
proceeding to which the foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves may demand
fulfillment, etc., . . . applying, according to said article 199, to the person obligated to reserve
the right the provisions with respect to the father."
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the case of
article 199 of the law the proceedings to which article 190 thereof refers will be instituted
within the ninety days succeeding the date of the date of the acceptation of the inheritance
by the person obligated to reserve the property; after this period has elapsed, the interested
parties may require the institution of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other
case, their legal representatives."
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription
of the period for the right must be reserved, but really the commencement thereof, enables
them to exercise it at any time, since no limits is set in the law. So, if the annotation of the
right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question must be made in
the property registry of the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute
proceedings to that end, and an allegation of prescription against the exercise of such right
of action cannot be sustained.
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action
for requiring that the property be reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the
case presents no necessity for the proceedings that should be instituted in accordance with
the provisions of the Mortgage Law, this prescription of the right of action cannot take place,

because such right of action does not exist with reference to instituting proceedings for
annotation in the registry of Act No. 496 of the right to the property required by law to be
reserved. It is sufficient, as was done in the present case, to intervene in the registration
proceedings with the claim set up by the two opponents for recording therein the right
reserved in either parcel of land.
Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because of
this finding set forth in its decision:
Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the
two uncles of the deceased Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot be made
except in the name of all of them in common. (B. of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of, and
recover. The person who has in himself all these rights has the absolute or complete
ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person who has the right to use and enjoy will have
the usufruct, and the person who has the rights of disposal and recovery the direct title. The
person who by law, act, or contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or
using an enjoying, and then he is said not to have the fee simple that is, the rights of
disposal and recovery, which pertain to another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into
full ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the
reservation of article 811 of the Civil Code?
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title
belonging to the person in whose favor the reservation is made. If that were so, the person
holding the property could not apply for registration of title, but the person in whose favor it
must be reserved, with the former's consent. This opinion does not seem to be admissible,
although it appears to be supported by decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May 21,
1861, and June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code, and of June 22, 1895, somewhat
subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points the usufruct and the fee
simple; the remaining features of the arrangement are not perceived, but become obscure in
the presence of that deceptive emphasis which only brings out two things: that the person
holding the property will enjoy it and that he must keep what he enjoys for other persons."
(Manresa, VII, 189.)
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be maintained
that is, that the surviving spouse (the person obliged by article 968 to make the reservation)
can be regarded as a mere usufructuary and the descendants immediately as the owner;
such theory has no serious foundation in the Code." (Ibid., 238.)
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by
operation of law, requires the inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute
ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership belong to him exclusively use,
enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership, which is inherent in the
hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no relatives within the third degree in the
line whence the property proceeds or they die before the ascendant heir who is the

possessor and absolute owner of the property. If there should be relatives within the third
degree who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a limitation to that
absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined
with exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion
which makes this limitation consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition in of a
mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of disposal and recovery, does not seem to
have any support in the law, as it does not have, according to the opinion that he has been
expressed in speaking of the rights of the father or mother who has married again. There is a
marked difference between the case where a man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs,
one as usufructuary and the other as owner of his property, and the case of the ascendant in
article 811 or of the father or mother in article 968. In the first case, there is not the slightest
doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the hereditary owner and he can
dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform any act of disposal of
the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in accordance
with the provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except the
limited one in the form prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks
the fee simple. But the ascendants who holds the property required by article 811 to be
reserved, and the father of mother required by article 986 to reserve the right, can dispose of
the property they might itself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his of her
child in first marriage, and recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the
persons in whose favor the right is required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any
act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to reserve the
right may dispose of the property itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the
surviving spouse aftercontracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his or her
death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a
condition subsequent, to wit: "If at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of
the first marriage survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation
thereof would necessarily be null and void, as executed without a right to do so and without a
right which he could transmit to the acquirer. The law says that the alienation subsists (to
subject is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law."
Article 109 of this Law says:
The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still
pending may mortgage or alienate it, provided always that he preserve the right of
the parties interested in said conditions by expressly reserving that right in the
registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose favor the right
is reserved cannot impugn the validity of the alienation so long as the condition subsequent
is pending, that is, so long as the remarried spouse who must reserve the right is alive,
because it might easily happen that the person who must reserve the right should outlive all
the person in whose favor the right is reserved and then there would be no reason for the
condition subsequent that they survive him, and, the object of the law having disappeared,

the right required to be reserved would disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid
but also in very way absolutely effective. Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right
required by law to be reserved to the children is respected; while the effects of the alienation
depend upon a condition, because it will or will not become definite, it will continue to exist or
cease to exist, according to circumstances. This is what the law establishes with reference to
the reservation of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly directs that the surviving
spouse who contracts a second marriage shall reserve to the children or descendants of the
first marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that the ascendants must make
the reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading, "Rights and
obligations during the existence of the right required by law to be reserved," in these words:
During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law to
be reserved and the extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after the right
that in their turn may pertain to them has beenassured, have only an expectation, and
therefore they do not even have the capacity to transmit that expectation to their heirs.
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things
according to their nature, in the manner and form already set forth in commenting upon the
article of the Code referring to use and usufruct.
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner in
fee simple of the property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in article 974 and 976
of the same Code. Doubt arose also on this point, but the Direccion General of the registries,
in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974 and 975, which are applicable by
analogy, for they refer to property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the attitude
of the legislator on this subject, and the relatives with the third degree ought not to be more
privileged in the right reserved in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article
975, chiefly for the reason that the right required to be reserved carries with it a condition
subsequent, and the property subject to those conditions can validly be alienated in
accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such alienation to continue, pending
fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether
or not there exists at the time of his death relatives within the third degree of the
descendants from whom they inherit in the line whence the property proceeds. If
such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property at the death of the
ascendants. If they do not exist, the ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is
true, since the possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent can alienate
and encumber it, the ascendants may alienate the property required by law to be
reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more because no one can
give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore receive a limited
and revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn have an
expectation to the property while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be
transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also within the third degree. After the
person who is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives may rescind
the alienation of the realty required by law to be reserved and they will complete
ownership, in fee simple, because the condition and the usufruct have been

terminated by the death of the usufructuary. (Morell, Estudios sobre bienes

reservable, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any
doubt at all, the rights of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the
legal title and dominion, although under a condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an
express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property reserved, and to dispose of
is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is the
one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable
one. In a word, the legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him
while he lives. After the right required by law to be reserved has been assured, he can do
anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved
cannot dispose of the property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or
formally, in their possession; and, moreover, because they have no title of ownership or of
the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis that only when the
person who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a
fee simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendants of
whom they are relatives within the third degree, that it to say, a second contingent place in
said legitimate succession in the fashion of aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the
persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their rights has been assured in the
registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to be
reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the decision on
appeal of December 30, 1897, it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain
therein to the relative at the time he exercised the right, because in view of the nature and
scope of the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right cannot be foreseen,
for it may disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as may even
become absolute should that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter vivos of
the person required by law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is
reserved, because such person has all, absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership,
except that the legal title is burdened with a condition that the third party acquirer may
ascertain from the registry in order to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition
subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of
persons other than relatives within the third degree of the descendants from whom he got
the property to be reserved must be prohibited to him, because this alone has been the
object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special
accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein." (Decision of
December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the
condition of a mere usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot
attack the alienation that may be absolutely made of the property the law requires to be
reserved, in the present case, that which the appellant has made of the two parcels of land in
question to a third party, because the conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent
to an alienation of the usufruct, which is authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and,
practically, use and enjoyment of the property required by law to be reserved are all that the
person who must reserve it has during his lifetime, and in alienating the usufruct all the
usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible manner. The question as
to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re, for it is not real,

actual positive, as is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and the other
the owner, by the express wish of the predecessor in interest.
If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in
ownership, he can use, enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he
is in fact and in law the real owner and can alienate it, although under a condition, the whole
question is reduced to the following terms:
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a condition
subsequent is annexed to his right of disposal, himself alone register the ownership of the
property he has inherited, when the persons in whose favor the reservation must be made
degree thereto, provided that the right reserved to them in the two parcels of land be
recorded, as the law provides?
It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the vendor:
The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art.
1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he has
once acquired it. This title, however, in its attribute of being disposable, has a condition
subsequent annexed that the alienation the purchaser may make will be terminated, if the
vendor should exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which says:
Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the right to
recover the thing sold, with the obligation to comply with article 1518, and whatever more
may have been agreed upon," that is, if he recovers the thing sold by repaying the vendee
the price of the sale and other expenses. Notwithstanding this condition subsequent, it is a
point not at all doubtful now that the vendee may register his title in the same way as the
owner of a thing mortgaged that is to say, the latter with the consent of his creditor and the
former with the consent of the vendor. He may alienate the thing bought when the acquirer
knows by well from the title entered in the registry that he acquires a title revocable after a
fixed period, a thing much more certain and to be expected than the purely contingent
expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit some day what another
has inherited. The purpose of the law would be defeated in not applying to the person who
must make the reservation the provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto de
retracto, since the argument in his favor is the more power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio,
eadem legis dispositivo.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare
that the applicant is entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the
subject matter of the applicants, recording in the registration the right required by article 811
to be reserved to either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, should
they survive her; without special findings as to costs.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.

Seinnes v. Esparcia, 1 SCRA 750

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12957

March 24, 1961

CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Proceso R. Remollo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Leonardo D. Mancao for defendants-appellees.
DIZON, J.:
Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null and void the
sale executed by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, the spouses Fidel
Esparcia and Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses to reconvey to appellants
Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan (now Amlan), Oriental Negros; and (3)
ordering all the appellees to pay, jointly and severally, to appellants the sum of P500.00 as
damages, plus the costs of suit. In their answer appellees disclaimed any knowledge or
information regarding the sale allegedly made on April 20, 1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of
appellants and alleged that, if such sale was made, the same was void on the ground that
Andrea Gutang had no right to dispose of the property subject matter thereof. They further
alleged that said property had never been in possession of appellants, the truth being that
appellees, as owners, had been in continuous possession thereof since the death of
Francisco Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense and counterclaim, they further alleged that
on July 30, 1951, Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso, as the only surviving heirs of Francisco
Yaeso, executed a public instrument of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and
Paulina Sienes, the said sale having been registered together with an affidavit of adjudication
executed by Paulina and Cipriana on July 18, 1951, as sole surviving heirs of the aforesaid
deceased; that since then the Esparcias had been in possession of the property as owners.
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (1) that
the sale of Lot No. 3368 made by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff spouses Constancio
Sienes and Genoveva Silay is void, and the reconveyance prayed for by them is
denied; (2) that the sale made by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of defendants
Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes involving the same lot is also void, and they have
no valid title thereto; and (3) that the reservable property in question is part of and
must be reverted to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso, the lone surviving relative and heir
of Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea Gutang as of December 13, 1951. No
pronouncement as to the costs.
From the above decision the Sienes spouse interposed the present appeal, their principal
contentions being, firstly, that the lower court erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the Cadastral
Survey of Ayuquitan was a reservable property; secondly, in annulling the sale of said lot
executed by Andrea Gutang in their favor; and lastly, in holding that Cipriana Yaeso, as
reservee, was entitled to inherit said land.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:

Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had
four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife,
Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral records of
Ayuquitan, the properties left by Saturnino upon his death the date of which does not
clearly appear of record were left to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367
to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368
(western portion) to Francisco. As a result of the cadastral proceedings, Original Certificate
of Title No. 10275 covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco. Because
Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the property for him, declared it
in her name for taxation purposes (Exhs A & A-1), and paid the taxes due thereon (Exhs. B,
C, C-1 & C-2). When Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and without
any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public instrument Exhibit F
entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among other things, for and in
consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in question to appellants. When
thereafter said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the
surrender of Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 which was in their possession the
latter refused, thus giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion in the cadastral record
No. 507. The same, however, was denied (Exhs. 8 & 9).
Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving
half-sisters of Francisco, and who as such had declared the property in their name, on
January 1, 1951 executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina
Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in turn, declared it in their name for tax purposes and thereafter
secured the issuance in their name of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141 (Exhs. 5 & 5-A).
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question
was reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father
Saturnino, and upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants, it was inherited,
in turn, by his mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it
for the benefit of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said
property came, if any survived her. The record discloses in this connection that Andrea
Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso
who died only on January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two
resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the
survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from
which the property came (6 Manresa 268-269; 6 Sanchez Roman 1934). This Court has held
in connection with this matter that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the
reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of
the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said
alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the
rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at
the time of the death of the reservista (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega,
46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; and Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 65 Phil.
279).
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the
condition that the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation,
only if the vendor died without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable
property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the
conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the former in favor of

appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof
passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana
Yaeso in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar
resolutory condition. The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree
belonging to the line from which the reservable property came, constitutes a real right which
the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the
alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when the reservee survives the
person obliged to reserve. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was
still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former became
the absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's death. While it may be true that
the sale made by her and her sister prior to this event, became effective because of the
occurrence of the resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to reverse the appealed
decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the property in question to the Estate of
Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees the Esparcia spouses did not appeal therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision as above modified is affirmed, with costs, and
without prejudice to whatever action in equity the Esparcia spouses may have against the
Estate of Cipriana Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.
Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera
and Paredes, JJ.,concur.

Florentino v. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
ENBANC
DECISION
November15,1919
G.R.No.14856
ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL.,plaintiffsappellants,
vs.
MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL.,defendantsappellees.

Ramon Querubin, Simeon Ramos and Orense and Vera for

appellants. Vicente Foz, Jose Singsong Tongson and Angel
Encarnacion for appellees.
TORRES, J.:
OnJanuary17,1918,counselforEncarnacion(togetherwithherhusband
SimeonSerrano),Gabriel,Magdalena,Ramon,Miguel,Victorino,and
AntoninoofthesurnameFlorentino;forMiguelFlorentino,guardianadlitem
oftheminorRosarioFlorentino;forEugenioSingson,thefatherandguardian
adlitemofEmilia,Jesus,Lourdes,Caridad,andDoloresofthesurname
SingsonyFlorentino;andforEugenioSingson,guardianoftheminorsJose
andAsuncionFlorentino,filedacomplaintintheCourtofFirstInstanceof
IlocosSur,againstMercedesFlorentinoandherhusband,allegingasfollows:
ThatApolonioIsabeloFlorentinoIImarriedthefirsttimeAntoniaFazdeLeon;
thatduringthemarriagehebegotninechildrencalled,Jose,Juan,Maria,
Encarnacion,Isabel,Espirita,Gabriel,Pedro,andMagdalenaofthesurname
FlorentinoydeLeon;thatonbecomingawidowerhemarriedthesecondtime
SeverinaFazdeLeonwithwhomhehadtwochildren,MercedesandApolonio
IIIofthesurnameFlorentinoydeLeon;thatApolonioIsabeloFlorentinoII
diedonFebruary13,1890;thathewassurvivedbyhissecondwifeSeverina
FazdeLeonandthetenchildrenfirstabovementioned;thathiseleventhson,
ApolonioIII,wasbornonthefollowing4thofMarch1890.
ThatofthedeceasedApolonioIsabelo'saforementionedelevenchildren,Juan,
MariaandIsabeldiedsingle,withoutleavinganyascendantsordescendants;
thatRamon,Miguel,Victorino,Antonio,andRosarioarethelegitimate
childrenofthedeceasedJoseFlorentinowhowasoneofthechildrenofthe
deceasedApolonioIsabelo;thatEmilia,Jesus,Lourdes,Caridad,andDolores
arethelegitimatechildrenofEspiritaFlorentino,nowdeceased,andher
husbandEugenioSingson;thatJoseandAsuncionarethechildrenofPedro
Florentino,anothersonofthedeceasedApolonioIsabeloFlorentino.

ThatonJanuary17andFebruary13,1890,ApolonioIsabeloFlorentino
executedawillbeforethenotarypublicofIlocosSur,institutingashis
universalheirshisaforementionedtenchildren,theposthumosApolonioIII
andhiswidowSeverinaFazdeLeon;thathedeclared,inoneoftheparagraphs
ofsaidwill,allhispropertyshouldbedividedamongallofhischildrenofboth
marriages.
That,inthepartitionofthesaidtestator'sestate,therewasgiventoApolonio
FlorentinoIII,hisposthumosson,thepropertymarkedwiththelettersA,B,C,
D,E,andFinthecomplaint,agoldrosary,piecesofgold,ofsilverandoftable
service,livestock,palay,somepersonalpropertyandotherobjectsmentioned
inthecomplaint.
ThatApolonioFlorentinoIII,theposthumossonofthesecondmarriage,died
in1891;thathismother,SeverinaFazdeLeon,succeededtoallhisproperty
describedinthecomplaint;thatthewidow,SeverinaFazdeLeondiedon
November18,1908,leavingawillinstitutingasheruniversalheiressheronly
livingdaughter,MercedesFlorentino;that,assuchheir,saiddaughtertook
possessionofallthepropertyleftatthedeathofhermother,SeverinaFazde
Leon;thatamongsameisincludedtheproperty,describedinthecomplaint,
whichthesaidSeverinaFazdeLeoninheritedfromherdeceasedson,the
posthumosApolonio,asreservableproperty;that,asareservist,theheirofthe
saidMercedesFlorentinodeceasedhadbeengatheringforherselfalonethe
fruitsoflandsdescribedinthecomplaint;thateachandeveryoneoftheparties
mentionedinsaidcomplaintisentitledtooneseventhofthefruitsofthe
reservablepropertydescribedtherein,eitherbydirectparticipationorby
representation,inthemannermentionedinparagraph9ofthecomplaint.
Thatseveraltimestheplaintiffshave,inanamicablemanner,askedthe
defendantstodelivertheircorrespondingpartofthereservableproperty;that
withoutanyjustifiablemotivethedefendantshaverefusedanddorefuseto
deliversaidpropertyortopayforitsvalue;thatfornineyearsMercedes
Florentinohasbeenreceiving,asrentforthelandsmentioned,360bundlesof
palayatfiftypesosperbundleand90bundlesofcornatfourpesosperbundle;

thattherebytheplaintiffshavesuffereddamagesinthesumoffifteenthousand
fourhundredandtwentyeightpesosandfiftyeightcentavos,inadditionto
threehundredandeightpesosandfiftyeightcentavosforthevalueofthefruits
notgathered,ofonethousandpesos(P1,000)fortheunjustifiableretentionof
theaforementionedreservablepropertyandfortheexpensesofthissuit.
Whereforetheyprayitbedeclaredthatalltheforegoingpropertyisreservable
property;thattheplaintiffshadanddohavearighttothesame,inthequantity
andproportionmentionedintheaforementionedparagraph9ofthecomplaint;
thatthedefendantsMercedesFlorentinoandherhusbandbeorderedtodeliver
totheplaintiffstheirshareofthepropertyinquestion,ofthepalayandofthe
cornabovementioned,ortheirvalue;andthattheybecondemnedtopaythe
plaintiffsthesumofonethousandpesos(P1,000)togetherwiththecostsofthis
instance.
Totheprecedingcomplaintcounselforthedefendantsdemurred,allegingthat
thecauseofactionisbasedontheobligationofthewidowSeverinaFazde
LeontoreservethepropertysheinheritedfromherdeceasedsonApolonio
FlorentinoydeLeonwho,inturn,inheritedsamefromhisfatherApolonio
IsabeloFlorentino;that,therebeingnoallegationtothecontrary,itistobe
presumedthatthewidowSeverinaFazdeLeondidnotremarryafterthedeath
ofthishusbandnorhaveanynaturalchild;thattherightclaimedbythe
plaintiffsisnotthatmentionedinarticle968andthefollowingarticles,butthat
establishedinarticle811oftheCivilCode;thattheobjectoftheprovisionsof
theaforementionedarticlesistoavoidthetransferofsaidreservableproperty
tothoseextraneoustothefamilyoftheownerthereof;thatiftheproperty
inheritedbythewidowSeverinaFazdeLeonfromherdeceasedsonApolonio
FlorentinoyFazdeLeon(propertywhichoriginatedfromhisfatherandher
husband)hasallpassedintothehandsofthedefendant,MercedesFlorentinoy
Encarnacion,adaughterofthecommonancestor'ssecondmarriage(said
ApolonioIsabeloFlorentinowiththedeceasedSeverinaFazdeLeon)itis
evidentthatthepropertyleftatthedeathoftheposthumossonApolonio
FlorentinoyFazdeLeondidnotpassafterthedeathofhismotherSeverina,
hislegitimateheirsasanascendant,intothehandsofstrangers;thatsaid

propertyhavingbeeninheritedbyMercedesFlorentinoyEncarnacionfromher
mother(Severina),article811oftheCivilCodeisabsolutelyinapplicableto
thepresentcasebecause,whenthedefendantMercedes,byoperationlaw,
enteredintoandsucceededto,thepossession,ofthepropertylawfullyinherited
fromhermotherSeverinaFazdeLeon,saidpropertyhad,whileinthe
possessionofhermother,lostthecharacterofreservablepropertytherebeing
alegitimatedaughterofSeverinaFazdeLeonwiththerighttosucceedherin
allherrights,propertyandactions;thattherestraintsofthelawwherebysaid
propertymaynotpassedintothepossessionofstrangersarevoid,inasmuchas
thesaidwidowhadnoobligationtoreservesame,asMercedesFlorentinoisa
forcedheiressofhermotherSeverinaFazdeLeon;that,inthepresentcase,
thereisnopropertyreservedfortheplaintiffssincethereisaforcedheiress,
entitledtothepropertyleftbythedeathofthewidowSeverinaFazdeLeon
whoneverremarried;thattheobligationtoreserveissecondarytothedutyof
respectingthelegitime;thatintheinstantcase,thewidowSeverinaFazde
LeonwasindutyboundtorespectthelegitimeofherdaughterMercedesthe
defendant;thatherobligationtoreservethepropertycouldnotbefulfilledto
theprejudiceofthelegitimewhichbelongstoherforcedheiress,citingin
supportofthesestatementsthedecisionofthesupremecourtofSpainof
January4,1911;that,finally,theapplicationofarticle811oftheCivilCodein
favoroftheplaintiffswouldpresupposetheexclusionofthedefendantfrom
hererighttosucceedexclusivelytoalltheproperty,rightsandactionsleftby
herlegitimatemother,althoughthesaiddefendanthasabetterrightthanthe
plaintiffs;andthattherewouldbeinjusticeifthepropertyclaimedbe
adjudicatedtotheplaintiffs,aswellasviolationofsection5oftheJonesLaw
whichinvalidatesanylawdeprivinganypersonofanequalprotection.
Whereforetheyprayedthatthedemurrerbesustained,withcostsagainstthe
plaintiffs.
Afterthehearingofthedemurrer,onAugust22,1918,thejudgeabsolvedthe
defendantsfromthecomplaintandcondemnedtheplaintiffstopaythecosts.

Counselfortheplaintiffsexceptedtothisorder,movedtovacateitandtogrant
themanewtrial;saidmotionwasoverruled;theplaintiffsexpectedtheretoand
filedthecorrespondingbillofexceptionswhichwasallowed,certifiedand
forwardedtotheclerkofthiscourt.
Onappealthetrialjudgesustainedthedemurrerofthedefendantstothe
complaintoftheplaintiffs,but,insteadoforderingthelattertoamendtheir
complaintwithintheperiodprescribedbytherulesundoubtedlybelievingthat
theplaintiffscouldnotalternorchangethefactsconstitutingthecauseof
action,andthat,asbothpartieswereagreedastothefactsallegedinthe
complaintaswellasinthedemurrer,everyquestionreduceditselftooneofthe
law,alreadysubmittedtothedecisionofthecourtthesaidjudge,disregarding
theordinaryprocedureestablishedbylaw,decidedthecasebyabsolvingthe
defendantsfromthecomplaintandbycondemningtheplaintiffstopaythe
costsoftheinstance.
Therecertainlywasnorealtrial,inasmuchasthedefendants,insteadof
answeringthecomplaintoftheplaintiffs,confinedthemselvestofilinga
demurrerbasedonthegroundthatthefactsallegedinthecomplaintdonot
constituteacauseofaction.However,thejudgepreferredtoabsolvethe
defendants,therebymakinganendtothecause,insteadofdismissingthesame,
becauseundoubtedlyhebelieved,inviewofthecontroversybetweenthe
parties,thattheargumentsadducedtosupportthedemurrerwouldbethesame
whichthedefendantswouldallegeintheiranswerthosedealingwithamere
questionoflawwhichthecourtswouldhavetodecideandthat,thedemurrer
havingbeensustained,iftheplaintiffsshouldinsisttheycoulddonoless
uponallegingthesamefactsasthosesetoutintheircomplaintandifanother
demurrerwereafterwardssetup,hewouldbeobligedtodismisssaidcomplaint
withcostsagainsttheplaintiffsinspiteofbeingundoubtedlyconvincedinthe
instantcasethattheplaintiffsabsolutelylacktherighttobringtheactionstated
intheircomplaint.
Beingoftheopinionthattheemendationoftheindicateddefectsisnot
necessaryasinthiscasewhathasbeendonedoesnotprejudicetheparties

theappellatecourtwillnowproceedtodecidethesuitaccordingtoitsmerits,
asfoundintherecordandtothelegalprovisionsapplicabletothequestionof
lawincontroversysothatunnecessarydelayandgreaterexpensemaybe
avoided,inasmuchas,evenifalltheordinaryproceedingsbefollowed,thesuit
wouldbesubsequentlydecidedinthemannerandtermsthatitisnowdecided
intheopinionthoughtfullyandconscientiouslyformedforitsdetermination.
Inordertodecidewhethertheplaintiffsareorarenotentitledtoinvoke,in
theirfavor,theprovisionsofarticle811oftheCivilCode,andwhetherthe
samearticleisapplicabletothequestionoflawpresentedinthissuit,itis
necessarytodeterminewhetherthepropertyenumeratedinparagraph5ofthe
complaintisofthenatureofreservableproperty;andifso,whetherin
accordancewiththeprovisionoftheCivilCodeinarticle811,SeverinaFazde
Leon(thewidowofthedeceasedApolonioIsabeloFlorentino)whoinherited
saidpropertyfromhersonApolonioFlorentinoIII(bornafterthedeathofhis
fatherApolonioIsabelo)hadtheobligationtopreserveandreservesameforthe
relatives,withinthethirddegree,ofheraforementioneddeceasedsonApolonio
III.
Theabovementionedarticlereads:
Anyascendantwhoinheritsfromhisdescendantanypropertyacquiredbythe
lattergratuitouslyfromsomeotherascendant,orfromabrotherorsister,is
obligedtoreservesuchofthepropertyashemayhaveacquiredbyoperationof
lawforthebenefitofrelativeswithinthethirddegreebelongingtotheline
fromwhichsuchpropertycame.
DuringthemarriageofApolonioIsabeloFlorentinoIIandSeverinaFazde
Leontwochildrenwereborn,namelythedefendantMercedesFlorentinoand
ApolonioFlorentinoIII(bornafterthedeathofhisfather).Atthedeathof
ApolonioIsabeloFlorentinounderawill,hiselevenchildrensucceededtothe
inheritanceheleft,oneofwhom,theposthumossonApolonioIII,wasgiven,
ashisshare,theaforementionedpropertyenumeratedinthecomplaint.In1891
thesaidposthumossonApolonioFlorentinoIIIdiedandwassucceededbyhis

legitimatemotherSeverinaFazdeLeon,whoinheritedthepropertyheleftand
whoondying,November18,1908,institutedbywillashersoleheiressher
survivingdaughter,MercedesFlorentino,thedefendantherein,whotook
possessionofallpropertyleftbyherfather,sameconstitutingtheinheritance.
Includedinsaidinheritanceistheproperty,specifiedinbytheposthumosson
ApolonioFlorentinoIIIfromhisfatherApolonioIsabeloFlorentino,and
which,atthedeathofthesaidposthumosson,hadinturnbeeninheritedbyhis
mother,SeverinaFazdeLeon.EvenifSeverinaleftinherwillsaidproperty,
togetherwithherown,toheronlydaughterandforcedheiress,Mercedes
Florentino,neverthelessthispropertyhadnotlostitsreservablenature
inasmuchasitoriginatedfromthecommonancestorofthelitigants,Apolonio
Isabelo;wasinheritedbyhissonApolonioIII;wastransmittedbysame(by
operationoflaw)tohislegitimatemotherandascendant,SeverinaFazdeLeon.
Theposthumosson,ApolonioFlorentinoIII,acquiredtheproperty,now
claimedbyhisbrothers,byalucrativetitleorbyinheritancefromhis
aforementionedlegitimatefather,ApolonioIsabeloFlorentinoII.Althoughsaid
propertywasinheritedbyhismother,SeverinaFazdeLeon,nevertheless,she
wasindutybound,accordingtoarticle811oftheCivilCode,toreservethe
propertythusacquiredforthebenefitoftherelatives,withinthethirddegree,
ofthelinefromwhichsuchpropertycame.
Accordingtotheprovisionsoflaw,ascendantsdonotinheritthereservable
property,butitsenjoyment,useortrust,merelyforthereasonthatsaidlaw
imposestheobligationtoreserveandpreservesameforcertaindesignated
personswho,onthedeathofthesaidascendantsreservists,(takinginto
considerationthenatureofthelinefromwhichsuchpropertycame)acquirethe
ownershipofsaidpropertyinfactandbyoperationoflawinthesamemanner
asforcedheirs(becausetheyarealsosuch)saidpropertyrevertstosaidline
aslongastheaforementionedpersonswho,fromthedeathoftheascendant
reservists,acquireinfacttherightofreservatarios(personforwhomproperty
isreserved),andarerelatives,withinthethirddegree,ofthedescendantfrom
whomthereservablepropertycame.

Anyascendantwhoinheritsfromhisdescendantanyproperty,whilethereare
living,withinthethirddegree,relativesofthelatter,isnothingbutalife
usufructuaryorafiduciaryofthereservablepropertyreceived.Heis,however,
thelegitimateownerofhisownpropertywhichisnotreservablepropertyand
whichconstituteshislegitime,accordingtoarticle809oftheCivilCode.But
if,afterwards,alloftherelatives,withinthethirddegree,ofthedescendant
(fromwhomcamethereservableproperty)dieordisappear,thesaidproperty
becomesfreeproperty,byoperationoflaw,andistherebyconvertedintothe
legitimeoftheascendantheirwhocantransmititathisdeathtohislegitimate
successorsortestamentaryheirs.Thispropertyhasnowlostitsnatureof
reservableproperty,pertainingtheretoatthedeathoftherelatives,called
reservatarios,whobelongedwithinthethirddegreetothelinefromwhichsuch
propertycame.
Followingtheorderprescribedbylawinlegitimatesuccession,whenthereare
relativesofthedescendantwithinthethirddegree,therightofthenearest
relative,calledreservatario,overthepropertywhichthereservista(person
holdingitsubjecttoreservation)shouldreturntohim,excludesthatoftheone
moreremote.Therightofrepresentationcannotbeallegedwhentheone
claimingsameasareservatarioofthereservablepropertyisnotamongthe
relativeswithinthethirddegreebelongingtothelinefromwhichsuchproperty
came,inasmuchastherightgrantedbytheCivilCodeinarticle811isinthe
highestdegreepersonalandfortheexclusivebenefitofdesignatedpersonswho
aretherelatives,withinthethirddegree,ofthepersonfromwhomthe
reservablepropertycame.Therefore,relativesofthefourthandthesucceeding
degreescanneverbeconsideredasreservatarios,sincethelawdoesnot
recognizethemassuch.
Inspiteofwhathasbeensaidrelativetotherightofrepresentationonthepart
ofonealleginghisrightasreservatariowhoisnotwithinthethirddegreeof
relationship,neverthelessthereisrightofrepresentationonthepartof
reservatarioswhoarewithinthethirddegreementionedbylaw,asinthecase
ofnephewsofthedeceasedpersonfromwhomthereservablepropertycame.

Thesereservatarioshavetherighttorepresenttheirascendants(fathersand
mothers)whoarethebrothersofthesaiddeceasedpersonandrelativeswithin
thethirddegreeinaccordancewitharticle811oftheCivilCode.
Inthiscaseitisconcededwithoutdenialbydefendants,thattheplaintiffs
Encarnacion,GabrielandMagdalenaarethelegitimatechildrenofthefirst
marriageofthedeceasedApolonioIsabeloFlorentinoII;thatRamon,Miguel,
Ceferino,Antonio,andRosarioarebothgrandchildrenofApolonioIsabelo
FlorentinoII,andchildrenofhisdeceasedson,JoseFlorentino;thatthesame
havetherighttorepresenttheiraforementionedfather,JoseFlorentino;that
Emilia,Jesus,Lourdes,Caridad,andDoloresarethelegitimatechildrenofthe
deceasedEspiritaFlorentino,oneofthedaughtersofthedeceasedApolonio
IsabeloFlorentinoII,andrepresenttherightoftheiraforementionedmother;
andthattheotherplaintiffs,JoseandAsuncion,havealsotherighttorepresent
theirlegitimatefatherPedroFlorentinooneofthesonsoftheaforementioned
ApolonioIsabeloFlorentinoII.Itisafact,admittedbybothparties,thatthe
otherchildrenofthefirstmarriageofthedeceasedApolonioIsabeloFlorentino
IIdiedwithoutissuesothatthisdecisiondoesnotdealwiththem.
Therearethenseven"reservatarios"whoareentitledtothereservableproperty
leftatthedeathofApolonioIII;theposthumossonoftheaforementioned
ApolonioIsabeloII,towit,histhreechildrenofhisfirstmarriage
Encarnacion,Gabriel,Magdalena;histhreechildren,Jose,EspiritaandPedro
whoarerepresentedbytheirowntwelvechildrenrespectively;andMercedes
Florentino,hisdaughterbyasecondmarriage.Alloftheplaintiffsarethe
relativesofthedeceasedposthumosson,ApolonioFlorentinoIII,withinthe
thirddegree(fourofwhombeinghishalfbrothersandtheremainingtwelve
beinghisnephewsastheyarethechildrenofhisthreehalfbrothers).Asthe
firstfourarehisrelativeswithinthethirddegreeintheirownrightandthe
othertwelvearesuchbyrepresentation,allofthemareindisputablyentitledas
reservatariostothepropertywhichcamefromthecommonancestor,Apolonio
Isabelo,toApolonioFlorentinoIIIbyinheritanceduringhislifetime,andin

turnbyinheritancetohislegitimatemother,SeverinaFazdeLeon,widowof
theaforementionedApolonioIsabeloFlorentinoII.
Inspiteoftheprovisionsofarticle811oftheCivilCodealreadycited,thetrial
judgerefusedtoacceptthetheoryoftheplaintiffsand,acceptingthatofthe
defendants,absolvedthelatterfromthecomplaintonthegroundthatsaid
articleisabsolutelyinapplicabletotheinstantcase,inasmuchasthedefendant
MercedesFlorentinosurvivedherbrother,ApolonioIII,fromwhomthe
reservablepropertycameandhermother,SeverinaFazdeLeon,thewidowof
herfather,ApolonioIsabeloFlorentinoII;thatthedefendantMercedes,being
theonlydaughterofSeverinaFazdeLeon,islikewiseherforcedheiress;that
whensheinheritedthepropertyleftatthedeathofhermother,togetherwith
thatwhichcamefromherdeceasedbrotherApolonioIII,thefundamental
objectofarticle811oftheCodewastherebycompliedwith,inasmuchasthe
dangerthatthepropertycomingfromthesamelinemightfallintothehandsof
strangershadbeenavoided;andthatthehopeorexpectationonthepartofthe
plaintiffsoftherighttoacquirethepropertyofthedeceasedApolonioIIInever
didcomeintoexistencebecausethereisaforcedheiresswhoisentitledtosuch
property.
Thejudgmentappealedfromisalsofoundedonthetheorythatarticle811of
theCivilCodedoesnotdestroythesystemoflegitimatesuccessionandthatthe
pretensionoftheplaintiffstoapplysaidarticleintheinstantcasewouldbe
permittingthereservablerighttoreduceandimpairtheforcedlegitimatewhich
exclusivelybelongstothedefendantMercedesFlorentino,inviolationofthe
preceptofarticle813ofthesameCodewhichprovidesthatthetestatorcannot
deprivehisheirsoftheirlegitime,exceptinthecasesexpresslydeterminedby
law.Neithercanheimposeuponitanyburden,condition,orsubstitutionofany
kindwhatsoever,savingtheprovisionsconcerningtheusufructofthesurviving
spouse,citingthedecisionoftheSupremeCourtofSpainofJanuary4,1911.
Theprincipalquestionsubmittedtothecourtfordecisionconsistsmainlyin
determiningwhethertheypropertyleftatthedeathofApolonioIII,the
posthumossonofApolonioIsabeloII,wasorwasnotinvestedwiththe

characterofreservablepropertywhenitwasreceivedbyhismother,Severina
FazdeLeon.
Thepropertyenumeratedbytheplaintiffsinparagraph5oftheircomplaint
came,withoutanydoubtwhatsoever,fromthecommonancestorApolonio
IsabeloII,andwhen,onthedeathofApolonioIIIwithoutissuethesame
passedbyoperationoflawintothehandsofhislegitimatemother,Severina
FazdeLeon,itbecamereservableproperty,inaccordancewiththeprovisionof
article811oftheCode,withtheobjectthatthesameshouldnotfallintothe
possessionofpersonsotherthanthosecomprehendedwithintheorderof
personotherthanthosecomprehendedwithintheorderofsuccessiontracedby
thelawfromApolonioIsabeloII,thesourceofsaidproperty.Ifthisproperty
wasinfactclothedwiththecharacterandconditionofreservableproperty
whenSeverinaFazdeLeoninheritedsamefromhersonApolonioIII,shedid
nottherebyacquirethedominionorrightofownershipbutonlytherightof
usufructoroffiduciarywiththenecessaryobligationtopreserveandtodeliver
orreturnitassuchreservablepropertytoherdeceasedson'srelativeswithinthe
thirddegree,amongwhomisherdaughter,MercedesFlorentino.
Reservablepropertyneithercomes,norfallsunder,theabsolutedominionof
theascendantwhoinheritsandreceivessamefromhisdescendant,thereforeit
doesnotformpartofhisownpropertynorbecomethelegitimateofhisforced
heirs.Itbecomeshisownpropertyonlyincasethatalltherelativesofhis
descendantshallhavedied(reservista)inwhichcasesaidreservableproperty
lossessuchcharacter.
WithfullrightSeverinaFazdeLeoncouldhavedisposedinherwillofallher
ownpropertyinfavorofheronlylivingdaughter,MercedesFlorentino,as
forcedheiress.Butwhateverprovisionthereisinherwillconcerningthe
reservablepropertyreceivedfromhersonApolonioIII,orrather,whatever
provisionwillreducetherightsoftheotherreservatarios,thehalfbrothersand
nephewsofherdaughterMercedes,isunlawful,nullandvoid,inasmuchas
saidpropertyisnotherownandshehasonlytherightofusufructorof

fiduciary,withtheobligationtopreserveandtodeliversametothe
reservatarios,oneofwhomisherowndaughter,MercedesFlorentino.
Itcannotreasonablybeaffirmed,foundeduponanexpressprovisionoflaw,
thatbyoperationoflawallofthereservableproperty,receivedduringlifetime
bySeverinaFazdeLeonfromherson,ApolonioIII,constitutesorformsparts
ofthelegitimepertainingtoMercedesFlorentino.Ifsaidpropertydidnotcome
tobethelegitimateandexclusivepropertyofSeverinaFazdeLeon,heronly
legitimateandforcedheiress,thedefendantMercedes,couldnotinheritallby
operationoflawandinaccordancewiththeorderoflegitimatesuccession,
becausetheotherrelativesofthedeceasedApolonioIII,withinthethird
degree,aswellasherselfareentitledtosuchreservableproperty.
Forthisreason,innomannercanitbeclaimedthatthelegitimeofMercedes
Florentino,comingfromtheinheritanceofhermotherSeverinaFazdeLeon,
hasbeenreducedandimpaired;andtheapplicationofarticle811oftheCode
totheinstantcaseinnowayprejudicestherightsofthedefendantMercedes
Florentino,inasmuchassheisentitledtoapartonlyofthereservableproperty,
therebeingnolawfulorjustreasonwhichservesasrealfoundationto
disregardtherighttoApolonioIII'sotherrelatives,withinthethirddegree,to
participateinthereservablepropertyinquestion.Astheserelativesareat
presentliving,claimingforitwithanindisputableright,wecannotfindany
reasonableandlawfulmotivewhytheirrightsshouldnotbeupheldandwhy
theyshouldnotbegrantedequalparticipationwiththedefendantinthe
litigatedproperty.
TheclaimthatbecauseofSeverinaFazdeLeon'sforcedheiress,herdaughter
Mercedes,thepropertyreceivedfromthedeceasedsonApolonioIIIlostthe
character,previouslyheld,ofreservableproperty;andthatthemother,thesaid
Severina,therefore,hadnofurtherobligationtoreservesamefortherelatives
withinthethirddegreeofthedeceasedApolonioIII,isevidentlyerroneousfor
thereasonthat,ashasbeenalreadystated,thereservableproperty,leftinawill
bytheaforementionedSeverinatoheronlydaughterMercedes,doesnotform
partoftheinheritanceleftbyherdeathnorofthelegitimateoftheheiress

Mercedes.Justbecauseshehasaforcedheiress,witharighttoherinheritance,
doesnotrelieveSeverinaofherobligationtoreservethepropertywhichshe
receivedfromherdeceasedson,nordidsamelosethecharacterofreservable
property,heldbeforethereservatariosreceivedsame.
ItistruethatwhenMercedesFlorentino,theheiressofthereservistaSeverina,
tookpossessionofthepropertyinquestion,samedidnotpassintothehandsof
strangers.ButitislikewisetruethatthesaidMercedesisnottheonly
reservataria.Andthereisnoreasonfoundeduponlawandupontheprincipleof
justicewhytheotherreservatarios,theotherbrothersandnephews,relatives
withinthethirddegreeinaccordancewiththepreceptofarticle811oftheCivil
Code,shouldbedeprivedofportionsofthepropertywhich,asreservable
property,pertaintothem.
Fromtheforegoingithasbeenshownthatthedoctrineannouncedbythe
SupremeCourtofSpainonJanuary4,1911,fortheviolationofarticles811,
968andconsequentlyoftheCivilCodeisnotapplicableintheinstantcase.
Followingtheprovisionsofarticle813,theSupremeCourtofSpainheldthat
thelegitimeoftheforcedheirscannotbereducedorimpairedandsaidarticleis
expresslyrespectedinthisdecision.
However,inspiteoftheeffortsoftheappelleetodefendtheirsupposedrights,
ithasnotbeenshown,uponanylegalfoundation,thatthereservableproperty
belongedto,andwasundertheabsolutedominionof,thereservista,therebeing
relativeswithinthethirddegreeofthepersonfromwhomsamecame;thatsaid
property,uponpassingintothehandsoftheforcedheiressofthedeceased
reservista,formedpartofthelegitimeoftheformer;andthatthesaidforced
heiress,inadditiontobeingareservataria,hadanexclusiverighttoreceiveall
ofsaidpropertyandtodeprivetheotherreservatarios,herrelativeswithinthe
thirddegreeofcertainportionsthereof.
Concerningtheprayerinthecomplaintrelativetotheindemnityfordamages
andthedeliveryofthefruitscollected,itisnotpropertograntthefirstforthere

isnoevidenceofanydamagewhichcangiverisetotheobligationofrefunding
same.Astothesecond,thedeliveryofthefruitsproducedbythelandforming
theprincipalpartofthereservableproperty,thedefendantsareundoubtedlyin
dutyboundtodelivertotheplaintiffssixseventhsofthefruitsorrentsofthe
portionsoflandclaimedinthecomplaint,inthequantityexpressedin
paragraph11ofthesame,fromJanuary17,1918,thedatethecomplaintwas
filed;andtheremainingseventhpartshouldgotothedefendantMercedes.
Fortheforegoingreasonsitfollowsthatwiththereversaloftheorderof
decisionappealedfromweshoulddeclare,asweherebydo,thatthe
aforementionedproperty,inheritedbythedeceasedSeverinaFazdeLeonfrom
hersonApolonioFlorentinoIII,isreservableproperty;thattheplaintiffs,being
relativesofthedeceasedApolonioIIIwithinthethirddegree,areentitledto
sixseventhsofsaidreservableproperty;thatthedefendantMercedesisentitled
totheremainingseventhpartthereof;thatthelatter,togetherwithherhusband
AngelEncarnacion,shalldelivertotheplaintiffs,jointly,sixseventhsofthe
fruitsorrents,claimedfromsaidportionofthelandandofthequantity
claimed,fromJanuary17,1918,untilfullydelivered;andthattheindemnity
foronethousandpesos(P1,000)prayedforinthecomplaintisdenied,without
specialfindingsastothecostsofbothinstances.Soordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, Malcolm and Avancea,
JJ., concur.
Padura v. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065
Chua v.CFI, 78 SCRA 406
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-29901 August 31, 1977

IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and
SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her capacity as Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of
Consolacion de la Torre, respondents.
Dominador G. Abaria and Primitivo Blanca for private respondent.
Rodrigo O. Delfinado for petitioners.

MARTIN, J.:
Petition for review of the decision of the respondent Court which dismissed the complaint of
petitioners in Civil Case No. 7839-A, entitled "Ignacio Frias Chua, et al. vs. Susana de la
Torre, Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre"
It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio
he sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua.
When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with
Consolacion de la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanita Frias Chua.
Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any issue. Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died
intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and his son Juanito Frias Chua of the
second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias Chua of his first marriage.
In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued an order dated January 15,
1931 1 adjudicating, among others, the one-half (1/2,) portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of
P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other half of Lot No.
399 in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenze
Frias chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias, Chua, his sons of the first marriage. By virtue
of said adjudication, Transfer Certificate of Title No. TR-980 (14483) 2 dated April 28, 1932 was
issued by the Register of Deeds in the names of Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua
as owners pro-indiviso of Lot No. 399.
On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate without any
issue. After his death, his mother Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-indivisio
share of Lot No. 399. In a week's time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la Torre
executed a declaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son
Juanito as a result of which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering the whole Lot No.
399 was issued in her name. Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion de la Torre died intestate
leaving no direct heir either in the descending or ascending line except her brother and
sisters.
In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7839-A, the
petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of the first marriage and dominador and Remedios
Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the first
marriage filed the complaint a quo 3 (subseqently segregated as a distinct suit and docketed as
Civil Case No. 7839-A) on May 11, 1966 before the respondent Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Branch V, praying that the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly
belonged to Juanito Frias but which passed to Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter's death, be
declaredas a reservable property for the reason that the lot in questionn was subject to reserval

troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New Civil Code, Private respondent as administratrix of the
estate of individually the complaint of petitioners 4

On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of
petitioner. Hence this instant.
The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendat,
or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have
acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the
third degree and belong to the line from which said property came.
Persuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with a
reservable character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was
acquired by a descendant from an asscendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title;
(2) that said descendant died without an issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another
ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which said property came. 5 In the case before Us, all of the
foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanoito Frias Chua of the
second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died withour leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2
share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre died, Juannnito Frias
Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias
Chua and Dominador Chua and Remidios Chua, the suppose legitimate children of the deceased
Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners herein.
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisit of reserva troncal
whether the property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose
Frias Chua, gratuitously or not. In resolving this point, the respondent Court said:
It appears from Exh. "3", which is part of Exh. "D", that the property in
question was not acquired by Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias
Chua gratuitously but for a consideration, namely, that the legatees were to
pay the interest and cost and other fees resulting from Civil Case No. 5300 of
this Court. As such it is undeniable that the lot in question is not subject tot
a reserva troncal, under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code, and as such the
plaintiff's complaint must fail.
We are not prepared to sustain the respondent Court's conclusion that the lot in question is
not subject to a reserva troncal under Art. 891 of the New Civil Code. It is, As explained by
Manresa which this Court quoted with approval inCabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, "The
transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in
return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior
charges; what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere
liberality of the person making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient;
and that the person receiving the property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by
an eminent Filipino commentator, 6 "the essential thing is that the person who transmits it does
so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from the transferee any prestation." It is
evident from the record that the transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of
the second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary
succession and therefore gratuitous. It is true that there is the order (Exh. "D") of the probate
Court in Intestate Proceeding No. 4816 which estates in express terms;

2. Se adjudicada pro el presente a favor de Consolacion de la Torre,

viuda, mayor de edad, y de su hiju, Juanito Frias Chua, menor de edad,
todos residente de San Enrique, Negros Occidental, I.F.,como herederos del
finado Jose Frias Chua Choo, estas propiadades:
14483
La parcela de terrenno concida por Lote No. 399 del Catsatro de la Carlota,
Negros Occidental, de 191.954 metros cuadddrados y cubierto por el
Certificado de Titulo No. 11759, en partes equales pro-indiviso; por con la
obligscion de pagar a las Standard Oil Co. of New York la deuda de
P3971.20, sus intereses, costas y demas gastos resultantes del asunto civil
No. 5300de este jusgado
But the obligation of paying the Standard Oil Co. of New York the amount of P3,971.20 is
imposed upon Consolacion de la Torre and Juanito Frias Chua not personally by the
deceased Jose Frias Chua in his last will and testament but by an order of the court in the
Testate Proceeding No.4816 dated January 15, 1931. As long as the transmission of the
property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed by the deceased himself and the
property is given out of pure generosity, itg is gratuitous. it does not matter if later the court
orders one of the heirs, in this case Juanito Frias Chua, to pay the Standare oil co. of New
York the amount of P3,971.20. This does not change the gratuitous nature of the
transmission of the property to him. This being the case the lot in question is subject
to reserva troncal under Art, 891 of the New Civil Code.
It is contented that the distribution of the shares of the estate of Jose Frias Chua to the
respondent heirs or legatees was agreed upon by the heirs in their project of partition based
on the last will and testament of Jose Frias Chua. But petitioners claim that the supposed
Last Will and Testament of Jose Frias Chua was never probated. The fact that the will was
not probated was admitted in paragraph 6 of the respondents' answer. 7 There is nothing
mentioned in the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 7839 A which is the subject of the
present appeal nor in the order of January 15, 1931 of the trial court in the Testate Estate
Proceeding No. 4816 nor in the private respondent's brief, that the Last Will and Testament of
Jose Frias Chua has ever been probated. With the foregoing, it is easy to deduce that if the Last
Will and Testament has in fact been probated there would have been no need for the
testamentary heirs to prepare a project of partition among themselves. The very will itself could
be made the basis for the adjudication of the estate as in fact they did in their project of partition
with Juanito Frias Chua getting one-half of Lot 399 by inheritance as a sone of the deceased
Jose Frias Chua by the latter's second marriage.
According to the record, Juanito Frias Chua died on February 27, 1952 without any issue.
After his death his mother Consolation de la Torre succeeded to his one-half pro-indiviso
share of Lot 399. This was, however, subject to the condition that the property was
reservable in character under Art. 891 of the Civil Code in favor of relatives within the third
degree of Jose Frias Chua from whom the property came. These relatives are the petitioner
herein.
It is claimed that the complaint of petitioners to recover the one-half portion of Lot 399 which
originally belonged to Juanito Frias Chua has already prescribed when it was filed on May
11, 1966. We do not believe so. It must be remembered that the petitioners herein are
claiming as reservees did not arise until the time the reservor, Consolacion de la Torre, died
in March 1966. When the petitioners therefore filed their complaint to recover the one-half
(1/2) portion of Lot 399, they were very much in time to do so.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside. The
petitioners Ignacio Frias Chua, Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua are declared owners
of 1/2 undivided portion of Lot 399; and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental is
hereby ordered to cancel. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering Lot No. 399 issued
in the name of Consolacion de la Torre and to issue a new Certificate of Title in the names of
Consolacion de la Torre, 1/2 undivided portion; Ignacio Frias Chua, 1/4 undivided portion;
and Dominador Chua and Remedios Chua, 1/4 undivided portion, of said lot. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Mu;oz Palma, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Exh. D, pp. 8-14, Folder of Exhibits.
2 Exh. C, p. 6, Ibid.
3 pp. 3-7, Record on Appeal.
4 pp. 8, Record on Appeal.
5 Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. III, p. 300(1973).
6 Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p.294, citing 6 Manresa
399.
7 p. 15, R.A.

Gonzales v. CFI 104 SCRA 161

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), BENITO F. LEGARDA,
ROSARIO L. VALDEZ, ALEJANDRO LEGARDA, TERESA LEGARDA, JOSE LEGARDA,
BENITO LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y FERNANDEZ, FILOMENA
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, CARMEN LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO
LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, RAMON LEGARDA Y HERNANDEZ, FILOMENA LEGARDA

Y LOBREGAT, JAIME LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, CELSO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT,

ALEJANDRO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA. TERESA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, MA.
ANTONIA LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, JOSE LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, ROSARIO
LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, BENITO LEGARDA Y LOBREGAT, EDUARDO LEGARDA Y
LOBREGAT, TRINIDAD F. LEGARDA, and the ESTATE OF DONA FILOMENA ROCES DE
LEGARDA, respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

1wph1.t

Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, dismissing her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and
holding, as not subject to reserve troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Races
inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17,
1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four
daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito,
Alejandro and Jose.
On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in
three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son
Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole
heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the
properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said
properties consist of the following:
1wph1.t

(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit
balance of P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7
interest in certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd.,
Philippine Guaranty Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and
the Manila Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7
titles), 80260, 80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202,
48205, 48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of
Rizal, now Quezon City; 1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of
the registry of deeds of Baguio;

1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862
of the Manila registry of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181
San Rafael describe in TCT Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of
deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of
deeds (Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila
registry of deeds (Streets and Estero):
2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds of
T0ayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication,
Filomena Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the
properties held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she
disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of
her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The document reads:
1wph1.t

A mis hijos :
Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito,
los bienes que he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los
acciones de la Destileria La Rosario' recientemente comprada a los
hermanos Values Legarda.
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he
0donada a las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit
La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque
ella esta construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Races.
1wph1.t

(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES

LEGARDA
6 Marzo 1953
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving
children partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito
Legarda y Tuason which the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito
Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a
holographic will in the order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in
Special Proceeding No. 70878, Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The
decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R.
No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.

In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May
20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which
she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties
are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and
three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda.
That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an
ordinary civil action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's
estate for the purpose of securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable
properties which Mrs. Legarda could not bequeath in her holographic will to her
grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three sons (See Paz vs.
Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal
under Republic Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error that the lower
court erred in not regarding the properties in question as reservable properties under article
891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend
that the lower court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her
daughter Filomena] Legarda in exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the estate
of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her
right to the reservable properties and that her claim is barred by estoppel, laches and
prescription.
The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs.
Gonzales' petition for review is a closed matter. This Court in its resolution of December 16,
1971 denied respondents' motion to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed
facts. Since on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of
whether the properties in question are subject to reserva troncal that is the only legal issue to
be resolved in this appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual
matters, cannot be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those issues,
there is no ruling which can be reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891
of the Civil Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could
dispose of them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her
daughter Filomena to the reservees within the third degree and to bypass the reservees in
the second degree or should that inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the second
degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. lt was
resolved in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to this
case of the doctrine in the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to

make a brief discourse on the nature of reserve troncal, also called lineal, familiar,
extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on
the nature of reserve troncal which together with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was
abolished by the Code Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being entailed, to
eliminate the uncertainty in ownership caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes
the improvement of the reservable property) and to discourage the confinement of property
within a certain family for generations which situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy,
and is incompatible with the socialization of ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented
agrarian unrest. Moreover, the reserves, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is
considered unjust and inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored
the reserve troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has
provoked questions and doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891,
which reads:
1wph1.t

ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este

hubiese adquirido por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano,
se halla obligado a reservas los que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley
en favor de los parientes que eaten dentro del tercer grade y pertenezcan a
la linea de donde los bienes proceden
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came.
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an
ascendant or from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another
ascendant or is acquired by him by operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the
said ascendant should reserve the said property for the benefit of relatives who are within
the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and who belong to the line from
which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or
donation) from an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior
transmission, by operation of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased
descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor of another ascendant, the reservor
or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and (3) a third transmissions
of the same property (in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the reservees
(reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant
belonging to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6
Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).

If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna
died and her properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan,
those lands should be inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first
cousins. The said lands are not reservable property within the meaning of article 811
(Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom
the property was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the
descendant or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor
(reservista) the other ascendant who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by
operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario) who is within the third degree from
theprepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which the property came and for
whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098;
Chua vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA
412). Fourth degree relatives are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente
por una familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extraas por el azar de los
enlaces y muertes prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la vide personas extranas a
una familia puedan adquirir bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella (6 Castan
Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p. 203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that case,
Pedro Sablan inherited two parcels of land from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902,
single and without issue. His mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two parcels of
land.
It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees
were Pablo Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus.
Marcelina could register the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact that the
land was reservable property in favor of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her,
should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of a
parcel of conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Maalac. When Juliana died
intestate in 1920, said one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Maalac who
owned the other one-half portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt was held
that the said one-half portion was reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Maalac and,
upon his death, should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria
and materna aunts of Juliana Maalac, who belonged to the line from which said one-half
portion came (Aglibot vs. Maalac 114 Phil. 964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva
and Alcala vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46
Phil. 551; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664;Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha,
48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs. Centeno 52 Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil.
89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil. 279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.

The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the
end of the line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by
descent. He is called the prepositus(Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia
Cabardo. When Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands,
the property was reservable property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the
property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative
within the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot
even represent their parents because representation is confined to relatives within the third
degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule of
representation. But the representative should be within the third degree from
the prepositus (Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and
relationship by affinity are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing
in return such as donacion and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190,
citing 6 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant
obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third
degree belonging to the line from which the property came
(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the
resolutory condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee.
The reservor is a usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the
reservation. The transferee gets the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor.
The transferee's rights are revoked upon the survival of the reservees at the time of the
death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the reservees predecease the reservor.
(Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs. Ortega,
46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480: Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.
279.)
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta de
retro sale or to a fideicomiso conditional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition,
meaning that if at the time of the reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of the
property should deliver it to the reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of the
reservor's death, the transferee's title would become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil.
664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia 93 Phil. 120).

On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His
expectant right would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute
should the reservor predecease the reserves.
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that
the reservable character of the property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48
Phil. 737; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property is
illegal for being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil.
89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and
dispose of conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the
vendee only if and when the reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil.
349, 353).
1wph1.t

The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the

descendant (prepositus) said property merely reverting to the line of origin
from which it had temporarily and accidentally stayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there being
reservatarios that survive the reservists, the latter must be deemed to have
enjoyed no more than a than interest in the reservable property. (J. J. B. L.
Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate
acquirers of the property, can already assert the right to prevent
the reservista from doing anything that might frustrate their reversionary right,
and, for this purpose, they can compel the annotation of their right in the
registry of property even while the (reservista) is alive (Ley Hipotecaria de
Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).
This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the
natural heirs of the reservista lt is likewise clear that the reservable property
is no part of the estate of the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by
will, so long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil.
226, 237).
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the
descendant (prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis
causa, subject to the condition that they must survive thereservista. (Sanchez
Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp.
274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960,
December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes,
"automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs.
Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the
hands of Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a

certainty when at the time of her death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or they survived Mrs. Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the
reservable properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her
sixteen grandchildren) to the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three
daughters and three sons. As indicated at the outset, that issue is alreadyres
judicata or cosa juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen
grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena
because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44
Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable
properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable
properties from theprepositus, not from the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the
nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six
children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable
property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable
properties in favor of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the
reservees in the second degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary
disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs. Florentino,
40 Phil. 480, a similar case, where it was ruled:
1wph1.t

Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of

ascendant (reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of
his descendants as forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance
nor of the legitime, for the reason that, as said property continued to be
reservable, the heir receiving the same as an inheritance from his ascendant
has the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives, within the third degree,
of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without prejudicing the right of the
heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the same time the right of
areservatario (reserves).
ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina
Faz de Leon begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties
from their father. Upon Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties were inherited by his
mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her will, she instituted her daughter Mercedes as
heiress to all her properties, including those coming from her deceased husband through
their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the
descendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the
recovery of their share in the reservable properties, which Severina de Leon had inherited

from Apolonio III which the latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina
willed to her daughter Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be disposed
of in Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of
Severina's estate and could not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of the
properties. The other six sevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this case the
doctrine of theFlorentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's
lifetime and upon his death there are relatives within the third degree of
the prepositus regardless of whether those reservees are common descendants of the
reservor and the ascendant from whom the property came, the property retains its
reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor cannot,
by means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable property should be
awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the only
relatives within the third degree are the common descendants of the predeceased ascendant
and the ascendant who would be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in
the light of the ruling in the Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable
properties because only relatives within the third degree from the paternal line have survived
and that when Mrs. Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen grandchildren, who are
third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the reason
for the reserva troncal has been satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from securing,
by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein".
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the
reservable properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the
other six reservors, the relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.
In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the
reservor to her daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's
estate but should be given to all the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus
within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one
reserves it did not pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the
heiress of the reservor was only one of the reservees and there is no reason founded upon
law and justice why the other reservees should be deprived of their shares in the reservable
property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will
the properties in question even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third

degree from Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article 891, should go to
Mrs. Legarda's six children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the
reservor but from the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject
to the condition that they must survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960,
December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the nonexistence of third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the
reservor, Mrs. Legarda, belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree relatives who
pertain to both" the Legarda and Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the
absence of reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death,
there were (and still are) reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed
properties did not lose their reservable character. The disposition of the said properties
should be made in accordance with article 891 or the rule on reserva troncal and not in
accordance with the reservor's holographic will. The said properties did not form part of Mrs.
Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby adjudged
that the properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter
Filomena Legarda, with all the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which
belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa, Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y
Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L. Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in
1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to their respective heirs. Costs against the
private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.

1wph1.t

Justice Concepcion, Jr., is on leave.

Justice Guerrero was designated to sit in the Second Division.

De Papa v. Camacho, 144 SCRA 281

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-28032 September 24, 1986
FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO
PAPA, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.

DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO

CAMACHO, defendants-appellants.

NARVASA, J.:
This case, which involves the application of Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva
troncal, was submitted for judgment in the lower court by all the parties on the following
"Stipulation of Facts and Partial Compromise":
1. They stipulate that the defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho and the
plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are
legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being said defendant's grandaunt and
granduncles.
2. They stipulate that plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay D. Tongo-Camacho
have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister by the
name of Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of
defendant. The family relationship of the parties is as shown in the chart
attached hereto as Annex 'A' and made an integral part of this stipulation.
3. They stipulate that Romana Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated
four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Tioco (legitimate sister of
plaintiffs), which parcels of land are presently covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. A-64165, 64166 and 64167 of the Registry of Deeds
of Manila, copies of which are attached to this stipulation as Annexes 'B', 'B-l',
and 'B-2'.
4. They stipulate that Toribia Tioco died intestate in l9l5, survived by her
husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon
and Trinidad Dizon (mother of defendant Dalisay D, Tongko-Camacho) and
leaving the afore-mentioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her
said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares.
5. They stipulate that in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived by his
legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix (among them plaintiffs) and
legitimate grandchildren Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of
his estate, three (3) parcels of land now covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. 16545 and 16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila, copies of
which are attached hereto as Annexes 'C' and 'C-l', were adjudicated as the
inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father,
Balbino Tioco, the said three (3) parcels of land devolved upon her two
legitimate children Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon in equal pro-indiviso
shares.
6. They stipulate that in 1937, Faustino Dizon died intestate, single and
without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso share in the seven (7)
parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole
intestate heir, who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal
which was subsequently annotated on the Transfer Certificates of Title
Annexes 'B', 'B-l', 'B-2', 'C' and 'C-l'.

7. They stipulate that in 1939 Trinidad Dizon-Tongko died intestate, and her
rights and interests in the parcels of land abovementioned were inherited by
her only legitimate child, defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho, subject to
the usufructuary right of her surviving husband, defendant Primo Tongko.
8. They stipulate that on June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate,
survived his only legitimate descendant, defendant Dalisay D. TongkoCamacho.
9. The parties agree that defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho now owns
one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned as her
inheritance from her mother, Trinidad Dizon-Tongko.
10. Defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho also claims, upon legal advice,
the other half of the said seven (7) parcels of land abovementioned by virtue
of the reserva troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and
under the laws on intestate succession; but the plaintiffs, also upon legal
advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three-fourths (3/4) of the
one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was
inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, or three-eights (3/8) of the
said parcels of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of
Faustino Dizon.
11. The parties hereby agree to submit for judicial determination in this case
the legal issue of whether defendant Dalisay D. Tongko-Camacho is entitled
to the whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question, or whether the
plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino Dizon are reservatarios
(together with said defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso share therein which
was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from his son Faustino Dizon, and entitled to
three-fourths (3/4) of said one-half pro-indiviso share, or three eights (3/8) of
said seven (7) parcels of land, and, therefore, to three-eights (3/8) of the
rentals collected and to be collected by defendant Dalisay P. Tongko
Camacho from the tenants of said parcels of land, minus the expenses
and/or real estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
12. In view of the fact that the parties are close blood relatives and have
acted upon legal advice in pursuing their respective claims, and in order to
restore and preserve harmony in their family relations, they hereby waive all
their claims against each other for damages (other than legal interest on
plaintiffs' sore in the rentals which this Honorable Court may deem proper to
award), attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which shall be borne by the
respective parties. 1
On the basis thereof, the lower Court declared the plaintiffs Francisco Tioco, Manuel Tioco
and Nicolas Tioco, as well as the defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho, entitled,
as reservatarios, to one-half of the seven parcels of land in dispute, in equal proportions,
rendering judgment as follows:
... . Resolving, therefore, the legal question submitted by the parties, the
court holds that plaintiffs Francisca Tioco, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco
are entitled to three-fourths (3/4) of one-half (1/2) pro-indiviso shares or
three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land involved in this action.

Consequently, they are, likewise, entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the rentals

collected and to be collected by the defendant Dalisay D. Tioco-Camacho
from the tenants of the said parcels of land, minus the expenses and/or real
estate taxes corresponding to plaintiffs' share in the rentals.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and inasmuch as the parties expressly
waived all their claims against each other for damages including attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation other than the legal interests on plaintiffs'
share in the rentals, the court renders judgment adjudging the plaintiffs
entitled to three-eights (3/8) of the seven (7) parcels of land described in
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-64165, T-64166, T-64167, T-16546 and T16554 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila. The defendant Dalisay D. TiocoCamacho is hereby ordered to make an accounting of all rents received by
her on the properties involved in this action for the purpose of determining
the legal interests which should be paid to the plaintiffs on their shares in the
rentals of the property in question.
SO ORDERED. 2
Not satisfied, the defendant appealed to this Court.
The issue raised is whether, as contended by the plaintiffs-appellees and ruled by the lower
Court, all relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in the appropriate line succeed
without distinction to the reservable property upon the death of the reservista, as seems to
be implicit in Art. 891 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which
the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired
by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree
and who belong to the line from which said property came. (811),
or, as asserted by the defendant-appellant, the rights of said relatives are subject to, and
should be determined by, the rules on intestate succession.
That question has already been answered in Padura vs. Baldovino, 3 where the reservatario was
survived by eleven nephews and nieces of the praepositus in the line of origin, four of whole blood and seven of half blood, and
the claim was also made that all eleven were entitled to the reversionary property in equal shares. This Court, speaking through
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, declared the principles of intestacy to be controlling, and ruled that the nephews and nieces of whole
blood were each entitled to a share double that of each of the nephews and nieces of half blood in accordance with Article 1006 of
the Civil Code. Said the Court:

The issue in this appeal may be formulated as follows: In a case of reserva

troncal, where the onlyreservatarios (reservees) surviving the reservista, and
belonging to the fine of origin, are nephews of the descendant (prepositus),
but some are nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the
whole blood, should the reserved properties be apportioned among
them equally, or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice
as large as that of the nephews of the half blood?
xxx xxx xxx

The case is one of first impression and has divided the Spanish
commentators on the subject. After mature reflection, we have concluded that
the position of the appellants is correct. The reserva troncalis a special rule
designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable property to the third
degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally
came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting
ascendant (reservista).
xxx xxx xxx
The stated purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has
devolved to the specified relatives of the line of origin. But from this time on,
there is no further occasion for its application. In the relations between
one reservatario and another of the same degree there is no call for applying
Art. 891 any longer; wherefore, the respective share of each in the
reversionary property should be governed by the ordinary rules of intestate
succession. In this spirit the jurisprudence of this Court and that of Spain has
resolved that upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable
property should pass, not to all the reservatarios as a class but only to those
nearest in degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding
those reservatarios of more remote degree (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil.
489-490; T.S. 8 Nov. 1894; Dir. Gen. de los Registros, Resol. 20 March
1905). And within the third degree of relationship from the descendant
(prepositus), the right of representation operates in favor of nephews
(Florentino vs. Florentino, supra).
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession when there
are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the right of the
nearest relative, called reservatarios over the property which the reservista
(person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him, excludes that
of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when
the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not
among the relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which
such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by the Civil Code in
Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of
designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom
the reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the
succeeding degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law
does not recognize them as such.
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the
part of one alleging his right as reservatario who is not within the third degree
of relationship, nevertheless there is right of representation on the part of
reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in the
case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property
came. ... . (Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480, 489-490) (Emphasis
supplied) See also Nieva and Alcala vs. Alcala and de Ocampo, 41 Phil. 915)
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of
ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and
nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half
blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of

degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule
of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be
likewise operative.
In other words, the reserva troncal merely determines the group of
relatives reservatarios to whom the property should be returned; but within
that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the
applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not
specify otherwise. This conclusion is strengthened by the circumstance that
the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should be limited to
what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law. As expressed by
Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 6, 6th Ed., p. 250):
... creandose un verdadero estado excepcional del derecho, no debe
ampliarse, sino mas bien restringirse, el alcance del precepto, manteniendo
la excepcion mientras fuere necesaria y estuviese realmente contenida en la
disposicion, y aplicando las reglas generales y fundamentales del Codigo en
materia de sucesi6n, en aquehos extremes no resueltos de un modo
expreso, y que quedan fuera de la propia esfera de accion de la reserva que
se crea.
The restrictive interpretation is the more imperative in view of the new Civil
Code's hostility to successional reservas and reversions, as exemplified by
the suppression of the reserva viudal and thereversion legal of the Code of
1889 (Art. 812 and 968-980).
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession,
the plaintiffs-appellees must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles,
respectively, of Faustino Dizon (thepraepositus), they are excluded from the succession by
his niece, the defendant-appellant, although they are related to him within the same degree
as the latter. To this effect is Abellana vs. Ferraris 4 where Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code
were cited and applied:

Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy
nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and
uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from
Articles 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that
provide as follows:
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow
or widower, the latter shall be entitle to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood,
they shall inherit in equal shares.
Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and
nieces who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full
blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stirpes.
Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers and sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and
nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles,
cousins, etc.) being called to the succession. This was also and more clearly
the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately preceded
the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the
Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
Art. 952. In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews or nieces,
children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving
spouse, if not separated by a final decree of divorce shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased.
Art. 954. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers
or sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed
to the estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
by reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and
nephews and nieces inheritedab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse,
while other collaterals succeeded only after the widower or widow. The
present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a par with
the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but
without altering the preferred position of the latter vis a vis the other
collaterals.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a
decedent's uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as
nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to
succeed. ...
This conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra, that as to the
reservable property, thereservatarios do not inherit from the reservista, but from the
descendant praepositus:
... . It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of
the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as there
are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The latter,
therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but from the
descendant prepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa,
subject to the condition that they must survive thereservista. (Sanchez
Roman, Vol. VI, Tomo 2, p. 286; Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp.
274, 310) ... .
To the same effect is Cano vs, Director of Lands 5, where it was ruled that intestacy proceedings to determine
the right of a reservatario are not necessary where the final decree of the land court ordering issuance of title in the name of
the reservista over property subject to reserva troncal Identifies thereservatario and there are no other claimants to the latter's
rights as such:

The contention that an intestacy proceeding is still necessary rests upon the
assumption that thereservatario win succeed in, or inherit, the reservable
property from the reservista. This is not true. Thereservatario is not
the reservista's successor mortis causa nor is the reservable property part of
thereservista's estate; the reservatario receives the property as a conditional
heir of the descendant (prepositus), said property merely reverting to the line
of origin from which it had temporarily and accidentally strayed during
the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all agreed that there
beingreservatarios that survive the reservista, the matter must be deemed to
have enjoyed no more than a life interest in the reservable property.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of
the reservista, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus (the appellee in this
case) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the
reservable property. As already stated, that property is no part of the estate of
the reservista, and does not even answer for the debts of the latter. ... .
Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt that
the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules
of intestate succession. There is no reason why a different result should obtain simply
because "the transmission of the property was delayed by the interregnum of
the reserva;" 6 i.e., the property took a "detour" through an ascendant-thereby giving rise to the reservation before its
transmission to the reservatario.

Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant
Dalisay Tongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the
exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the lower Court is reversed and set aside and the
complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Yap, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Record on Appeal, pp. 66-71.

2 Id., pp. 74-75.
3 G.R. No. L-11960, Dec. 27, 1958 (unreported); see 104 Phil. 1065.
4 122 Phil. 319, again per Reyes, J.B.L., J.
5 105 Phil. 1, again per Reyes, J.B.L., J.

6 Padura v. Baldovino, G.R. No. L-11960. Dec. 27, 1958, supra; footnote.3