MARCELINA EDROSO, vs.

PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN

FACTS:
-

Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four
children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea
Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan,
the properties left by Saturnino upon his death were left to his children as follows: Lot 3366 to
Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377 (southern portion) to Paulina, and
Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a result of the cadastral proceedings, an OCT
covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco.

Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the property for him,
declared it in her name for taxation purposes, and paid the taxes due thereon. When Francisco
died at the age of 20, single and without any descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed
the public instrument and sold the property in question to appellants in consideration of the sum
of P800.00. Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone reservee surviving her being
Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952. Said vendees demanded from Paulina and
her husband, the surrender of the OCT which was in their possession, the latter refused, thus
giving rise to the filing of the corresponding motion in the cadastral, which was denied.

ISSUE:
-

Whether or not the reservable property in question is part of and must be reverted to the estate of
Cipriana Yaeso.

RULING:
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was reservable
property.
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two resolutory
conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of
his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came. This
Court has held in connection with this matter that the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the
reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the
reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting
only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being
revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista.
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that the
vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without
being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when Andrea Gutang
died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by
the former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter
thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.

On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in
favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition. The
reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from which the
reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit
conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and
when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the
reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former
became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's death. While it may be true that the
sale made by her and her sister prior to this event, became effective because of the occurrence of the
resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to reverse the appealed decision, in so far as it orders
the reversion of the property in question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees did not
appeal therefrom.

CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., vs. FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL.,

Facts:
-

Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso.

-

First wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and
Cipriana,

Second wife, Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco.

According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan, the properties left by Saturnino upon his death
were left to his children as follows:
-

Lot 3366 to Cipriana,

Lot 3367 to Fernando,

Lot 3375 to Agaton,

Lot 3377 (southern portion) to Paulina

Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco.

-

As a result of the cadastral proceedings, Original Certificate of Title No. 10275

covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of Francisco.

Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the
property for him, declared it in her name for taxation purposes and paid the
taxes due thereon.

When Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and without any
descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public instrument Exhibit

F entitled EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among other

things, for and in consideration of the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in
question to appellants.
-

When thereafter said vendees demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband
Jose Esparcia, the surrender of Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 which
was in their possession the latter refused, thus giving rise to the filing of the
corresponding motion in the cadastral record No. 507. The same, however,
was denied.

Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving halfsisters of Francisco, and who as such had declared the property in their name, on January 1,
1951 executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes who, in
turn, declared it in their name for tax purposes and thereafter secured the issuance in their name
of Transfer Certificate of Title.

As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was
reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino,
and upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his
mother, Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any
survived her.

The record discloses in this connection that Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone
reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952.

Held:
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two resolutory
conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time of
his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came (6
Manresa 268-269; 6 Sanchez Roman 1934). This Court has held in connection with this matter that the
reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory condition;
that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may alienate the same but subject to
reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservists,
the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of reservatarios at the time
of the death of the reservista.
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that the
vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died without
being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch as when Andrea Gutang died,
Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the previous sale made by the
former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable property subject matter thereof
passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in
favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition. The
reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from which the

reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and dispose of, albeit
conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and
when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the present case, Cipriana Yaeso, one of the
reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to reserve, died. Thus the former
became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's death. While it may be true that the
sale made by her and her sister prior to this event, became effective because of the occurrence of the
resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to reverse the appealed decision, in so far as it orders
the reversion of the property in question to the Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees the
Esparcia spouses did not appeal therefrom.

IGNACIO FRIAS CHUA, DOMINADOR CHUA and REMEDIOS CHUA vs. THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH V and SUSANA DE LA TORRE, in her capacity as
Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre,
Facts:
-

It appears that in the first marriage of Jose Frias Chua with Patricia S. Militar alias Sy Quio he
sired three children, namely: Ignacio, Lorenzo and Manuel, all surnamed Frias Chua.

When Patricia S. Militar died, Jose Frias Chua contracted a second marriage with Consolacion de
la Torre with whom he had a child by the name of Juanito Frias Chua.

Manuel Frias Chua died without leaving any issue.

Then in 1929, Jose Frias Chua died intestate leaving his widow Consolacion de la Torre and his
son Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage and sons Ignacio Frias Chua and Lorenzo Frias
Chua of his first marriage.

In Intestate Proceeding No. 4816, the lower court issued an order dated January 15,
1931 1 adjudicating, among others, the one-half (1/2,) portion of Lot No. 399 and the sum of
P8,000.00 in favor of Jose Frias Chua's widow, Consolacion de la Torre, the other half of Lot No.
399 in favor of Juanito Frias Chua, his son in the second marriage; P3,000.00 in favor of Lorenzo
Frias Chua; and P1,550.00 in favor of Ignacio Frias, Chua, his sons of the first marriage.

On February 27, 1952, Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriage died intestate without any
issue.

After his death, his mother Consolacion de la Torre succeeded to his pro-indivisio share of Lot
No. 399.

In a week's time or on March 6, 1952, Consolacion de la Torre executed a declaration of heirship

adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito as a result of which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 31796 covering the whole Lot No. 399 was issued in her name.

Then on March 5, 1966, Consolacion de la Torre died intestate leaving no direct heir either in the
descending or ascending line except her brother and sisters.

In the "Intestate Estate of Consolacion de la Torre", the petitioners herein, Ignacio Frias Chua, of
the first marriage and Dominador and Remedios Chua, the supposed legitimate children of the
deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, also of the first marriage filed the complaint a quo praying that the
one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 399 which formerly belonged to Juanito Frias but which passed to
Consolacion de la Torre upon the latter's death, be declared as a reservable property for the
reason that the lot in question was subject to reserva troncal pursuant to Article 981 of the New
Civil Code.

On July 29, 1986, the respondent Court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint of
petitioner.

Hence this instant case.

Held:
The pertinent provision of reserva troncal under the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inheritts from his descendant any property which the latter may
have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendat, or a brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives
who are within the third degree and belong to the line from which said property came.
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, in order that a property may be impressed with a reservable
character the following requisites must exist, to wit: (1) that the property was acquired by a descendant
from an ascendant or from a brother or sister by gratuitous title; (2) that said descendant died without an
issue; (3) that the property is inherited by another ascendant by operation of law; and (4) that there are
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came.
In the case, all of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out by the records, Juanito Frias
Chua of the second marriage died intestate in 1952; he died without leaving any issue; his pro-indiviso
share of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la Torre died, Juanito Frias
Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third degree. These relatives are Ignacio Frias Chua and
Dominador Chua and Remidios Chua, the suppose legitimate children of the deceased Lorenzo Frias
Chua, who are the petitioners herein.
The crux of the problem in instant petition is focused on the first requisit of reserva troncal whether the
property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his father Jose Frias Chua, gratuitously or
not.
It is, As explained by Manresa which this Court quoted with approval in Cabardo v. Villanueva, 44 Phil.
186, "The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in
return." It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be not subject to any prior charges; what is
essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, or by an act of mere liberality of the person
making it, without imposing any obligation on the part of the recipient; and that the person receiving the
property gives or does nothing in return; or, as ably put by an eminent Filipino commentator, "the essential
thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from pure generosity, without requiring from
the transferee any prestation."

It is evident from the record that the transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the
second marriage upon the death of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession
and therefore gratuitous

RICARDO LARCERNA, ET AL vs. AGATONA PAURILLO VDA. DE CORCINO, defendant-appellee.

JACOBA MARBEBE, intervenor-appellee.
Facts:
-

This action was instituted by Ricardo, Patrocinia, Patria, Faustino, Leonor, Ramona, Asuncion,
Emiliana, Arsenio and Felipe, all surnamed Lacerna, for the recovery of three parcels of
unregistered lands upon the ground that said lands belonged to the deceased Juan Marbebe, and
that his cousins, plaintiffs herein, are his sole heirs.

In her answer, defendant Agatona Vda. de Corcino alleged that Juan Marbebe might still be alive;
that she held the disputed lands under a power of attorney executed by Juan Marbebe; and that,
if he has died, she is entitled to succeed him in the same manner as plaintiffs herein, she being
related to him in the same manner as plaintiffs are.

Jacoba Marbebe filed an answer in intervention alleging that she is a half sister of Juan Marbebe
who died intestate, leaving neither ascendants nor descendants, and that, as his half sister, she is
entitled, by succession, to the properties in dispute.

The court rendered judgment for the intervenor. Hence, this appeal by the plaintiffs.
-

The lower court found, and appellants do not question, that the lands described in the
complaint belonged originally to Bonifacia Lacerna.

Upon her death in 1932, they passed, by succession, to her only son, Juan Marbebe who
died intestate, single and without issue on February 21, 1943.

The question for determination is: who shall succeed him?

It appears that his mother, Bonifacia Lacerna, had a sister, Agatona Paurillo Vda. de
Corcino, the defendant herein;

Catalino Lacerna died in 1950 and was survived by his children, plaintiffs Ricardo,
Patrocinia and Patria, all surnamed Lacerna;

Marcelo Lacerna who died in 1953, was survived by his children, the other plaintiffs
herein, namely, Ramona, Faustino, Leonor, Asuncion Emiliano, Arsenio and Felipe, all
surnamed Lacerna.

Intervenor Jacoba Marbebe is daughter, by first marriage, of Valentin Marbebe, husband

of Bonifacia Lacerna and father of Juan Marbebe, who, accordingly, is a half brother of
said intervenor.

Issue:
-

Whether Jacoba Marbebe, as half sister of Juan Marbebe, on his father's side, is his sole heir.

Held:
The latter's pretense is based upon the theory that, pursuant to Article 891 of the Civil Code, establishing
what is known as "reserva troncal", the properties in dispute should pass to the heirs of the deceased
within the third degree, who belong to the line from which said properties came, and that since the same
were inherited by Juan Marbebe from his mother, they should go to his nearest relative within the third
degree on the maternal line, to which plaintiffs belong, not to intervenor, Jacoba Marbebe, despite the
greater proximity of her relationship to the deceased, for she belongs to the paternal line.
Jacoba Marbebe contends, however, and the lower court held, that brothers and sisters exclude all other
collateral relatives in the order of intestate succession, and that, as Juan Marbebe's half-sister, she has,
accordingly, a better right than plaintiffs herein to inherit his properties.
The main flaw in appellants' theory is that it assumes that said properties are subject to the "reserva
troncal", which is not a fact, for Article 891 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides:
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired
by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such
property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within
the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis supplied.)
This article applies only to properties inherited, under the conditions therein set forth, by an ascendant
from a descendant, and this is not the case before us, for the lands in dispute were inherited by a
descendant, Juan Marbebe, from an ascendant, his mother, Bonifacia Lacerna. Said legal provision is,
therefore, not in point, and the transmission of the aforementioned lands, by inheritance, was properly
determined by His Honor, the Trial Judge, in accordance with the order prescribed for intestate
succession, particularly Articles 1003 to 1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, pursuant to which a
sister, even if only a half-sister, in the absence of other sisters or brothers, or of children of brothers or
sisters, excludes all other collateral relatives, regardless of whether or not the latter belong to the line
from which the property of the deceased came.

BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA

Beatriz Legarda Gonzales appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing
her complaint for partition, accounting, reconveyance and damages and holding, as not subject to reserve
troncal, the properties which her mother Filomena Races inherited in 1943 from Filomena Legarda (Civil
Case No. 73335). The facts are as follows:
Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was
survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario,
Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose.

On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal
portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la
Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda.
Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her
mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed on May 12, 1947 an affidavit adjudicating extrajudicially to herself the properties
which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena Legarda. The said properties consist of the
following: 1wph1.t
(a) Savings deposit in the National City Bank of New York with a credit balance of
P3,699.63.
(b) 1,429 shares of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company and a 1/7 interest in
certain shares of the San Miguel Brewery, Tuason & Legarda, Ltd., Philippine Guaranty
Company, Insular Life Assurance Company and the Manila Times.
(c) 1/7 of the properties described in TCT Nos. 80226, 80237 to 80243 (7 titles), 80260,
80261 and 57512 of the Manila registry of deeds.
1/21st of the properties covered by TCT Nos. 48164, 84714, 48201, 48202, 48205,
48203, 48206, 48160 and 48192 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/21st of the property described in TCT No. 4475 of the registry of deeds of Rizal, now
Quezon City; 1/14th of the property described in TCT No. 966 of the registry of deeds of
Baguio;
1/7th of the lot and improvements at 127 Aviles described in TCT No. 41862 of the Manila
registry of deeds; 1/7th of the lots and improvements at 181 San Rafael describe in TCT
Nos. 50495 and 48161 of the Manila registry of deeds;
1/7th of the property described in TCT No. 48163 of the Manila registry of deeds
(Streets);
l/21st of the properties described in TCT Nos. 48199 and 57551 of the Manila registry of
deeds (Streets and Estero):
2/21st of the property described in TCT No. 13458 of tile registry of deeds of T0ayabas.
These are the properties in litigation in this case. As a result of the affidavit of adjudication, Filomena
Races succeeded her deceased daughter Filomena Legarda as co-owner of the properties
held proindiviso by her other six children.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of
the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito,
Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). The document reads: 1wph1.t

A mis hijos :
Dispongo que se reparta a todos mis nietos hijos de Ben, Mandu y Pepito, los bienes que
he heredado de mi difunta hija Filomena y tambien los acciones de la Destileria La
Rosario' recientemente comprada a los hermanos Values Legarda.
De los bienes de mi hija Filomena se deducira un tote de terreno que yo he 0donada a
las Hijas de Jesus, en Guipit
La case No. 181 San Rafael, la cede a mi hijo Mandu solo la casa; proque ella esta
construida sobre terreno de los hermanos Legarda Races. 1wph1.t
(Sgd.) FILOMENA ROCES LEGARDA
6 Marzo 1953
During the period from July, 1958 to February, 1959 Mrs. Legarda and her six surviving children
partitioned the properties consisting of the one-third share in the estate of Benito Legarda y Tuason which
the children inherited in representation of their father, Benito Legarda y De la Paz.
Mrs. Legarda died on September 22, 1967. Her will was admitted to probate as a holographic will in the
order dated July 16, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 70878,
Testate Estate of Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda. The decree of probate was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in Legarda vs. Gonzales, CA-G.R. No. 43480-R, July 30,1976.
In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a
motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her
deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which should
be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito,
Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F.
Legarda.
Without awaiting the resolution on that motion, Mrs. Gonzales filed on June 20, 1968 an ordinary civil
action against her brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces and her mother's estate for the purpose of
securing a declaration that the said properties are reservable properties which Mrs. Legarda could not
bequeath in her holographic will to her grandchildren to the exclusion of her three daughters and her three
sons (See Paz vs. Madrigal, 100 Phil. 1085).
As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action of Mrs. Gonzales. ln this appeal under Republic
Act No. 5440 she contends in her six assignments of error that the lower court erred in not regarding the
properties in question as reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, defendants-appellees in their six counter-assignments of error contend that the lower
court erred in not holding that Mrs. Legarda acquired the estate of her daughter Filomena] Legarda in
exchange for her conjugal and hereditary shares in the estate of her husband Benito Legarda y De la Paz
and in not holding that Mrs. Gonzales waived her right to the reservable properties and that her claim is
barred by estoppel, laches and prescription.

The preliminary issue raised by the private respondents as to the timeliness of Mrs. Gonzales' petition for
review is a closed matter. This Court in its resolution of December 16, 1971 denied respondents' motion
to dismiss and gave due course to the petition for review.
In an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440 only legal issues can be raised under undisputed facts. Since
on the basis of the stipulated facts the lower court resolved only the issue of whether the properties in
question are subject to reserva troncal that is the only legal issue to be resolved in this appeal.
The other issues raised by the defendants-appellees, particularly those involving factual matters, cannot
be resolved in this appeal. As the trial court did not pass upon those issues, there is no ruling which can
be reviewed by this Court.
The question is whether the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil
Code, formerly article 811, and whether Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in his
will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children.
Did Mrs. Legarda have the right to convey mortis causa what she inherited from her daughter Filomena to
the reservees within the third degree and to bypass the reservees in the second degree or should that
inheritance automatically go to the reservees in the second degree, the six children of Mrs. Legarda?
As will hereinafter be shown that is not a novel issue or a question of first impression. lt was resolved
in Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480. Before discussing the applicability to this case of the doctrine in
the Florentino case and other pertinent rulings, it may be useful to make a brief discourse on the nature
of reserve troncal, also calledlineal, familiar, extraordinaria o semi-troncal.
Much time, effort and energy were spent by the parties in their five briefs in descanting on the nature
of reserve troncal which together with the reserva viudal and reversion legal, was abolished by the Code
Commission to prevent the decedent's estate from being entailed, to eliminate the uncertainty in
ownership caused by the reservation (which uncertainty impedes the improvement of the reservable
property) and to discourage the confinement of property within a certain family for generations which
situation allegedly leads to economic oligarchy, and is incompatible with the socialization of ownership.
The Code Commission regarded the reservas as remnants of feudalism which fomented agrarian unrest.
Moreover, the reserves, insofar as they penalize legitimate relationship, is considered unjust and
inequitable.
However, the lawmaking body, not agreeing entirely with the Code Commission, restored the reserve
troncal, a legal institution which, according to Manresa and Castan Tobenas has provoked questions and
doubts that are difficult to resolve.
Reserva troncal is provided for in article 811 of the Spanish Civil Code, now article 891, which
reads: 1wph1.t
ART. 811. El ascendiente que heredare de su descendiente bienes que este hubiese
adquirido por titulo lucrative de otro ascendiente, o de un hermano, se halla obligado a
reservas los que hubiere adquirido por ministerio de la ley en favor de los parientes que
eaten dentro del tercer grade y pertenezcan a la linea de donde los bienes proceden

ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter
may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which
said property came.
In reserve troncal (1) a descendant inherited or acquired by gratuitous title property from an ascendant or
from a brother or sister; (2) the same property is inherited by another ascendant or is acquired by him by
operation of law from the said descendant, and (3) the said ascendant should reserve the said property
for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree from the deceased descendant (prepositus) and
who belong to the line from which the said property came.
So, three transmissions are involved: (I) a first transmission by lucrative title (inheritance or donation) from
an ascendant or brother or sister to the deceased descendant; (2) a posterior transmission, by operation
of law (intestate succession or legitime) from the deceased descendant (causante de la reserve) in favor
of another ascendant, the reservor or reservista, which two transmissions precede the reservation, and
(3) a third transmissions of the same property (in consequence of the reservation) from the reservor to the
reservees (reservatarios) or the relatives within the third degree from the deceased descendant belonging
to the line of the first ascendant, brother or sister of the deceased descendant (6 Castan Tobenas
Derecho Civil, Part l, 1960, 6th Ed., pp. 198-9).
If there are only two transmissions there is no reserve. Thus, where one Bonifacia Lacerna died and her
properties were inherited by her son, Juan Marbebe, upon the death of Juan, those lands should be
inherited by his half-sister, to the exclusion of his maternal first cousins. The said lands are not reservable
property within the meaning of article 811 (Lacerna vs. Vda. de Corcino, l l l Phil. 872).
The persons involved in reserve troncal are (1) the ascendant or brother or sister from whom the property
was received by the descendant by lucrative or gratuitous title, (2) the descendant
or prepositus (prepositus) who received the property, (3) the reservor (reservista) the other ascendant
who obtained the property from the (prepositus) by operation of law and (4) the reserves (reservatario)
who is within the third degree from theprepositus and who belongs to the (line o tronco) from which the
property came and for whom the property should be reserved by the reservor.
The reservees may be half-brothers and sisters (Rodriguez vs. Rodriguez, 101 Phil. 1098; Chua vs. Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental, L-29901, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 412). Fourth degree relatives
are not included (Jardin vs. Villamayor, 72 Phil. 392).
The rationale of reserve troncal is to avoid "el peligro de que bienes poseidos secularmente por una
familia pasen bruscamente a titulo gratuito a manos extraas por el azar de los enlaces y muertes
prematuras or impeder que, por un azar de la vide personas extranas a una familia puedan adquirir
bienes que sin aquel hubieran quedado en ella (6 Castan Tobenas Derecho Civil, Part l, 6th Ed., 1980, p.
203; Padura vs. Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
An illustration of reserve troncal is found in Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295. ln that case, Pedro Sablan
inherited two parcels of land from his father Victorians. Pedro died in 1902, single and without issue. His
mother, Marcelina Edroso, inherited from him the two parcels of land.

It was held that the land was reservable property in the hands of Marcelina. The reservees were Pablo
Sablan and Basilio Sablan, the paternal uncles of Pedro Sablan, the prepositus. Marcelina could register
the land under the Torrens system in her name but the fact that the land was reservable property in favor
of her two brothers-in-law, should they survive her, should be noted in the title.
In another case, it appears that Maria Aglibot died intestate in 1906. Her one-half share of a parcel of
conjugal land was inherited by her daughter, Juliana Maalac. When Juliana died intestate in 1920, said
one-half share was inherited by her father, Anacleto Maalac who owned the other one-half portion.
Anacleto died intestate in 1942, survived by his second wife and their six children. lt was held that the
said one-half portion was reservable property in the hands of Anacleto Maalac and, upon his death,
should be inherited by Leona Aglibot and Evarista Aglibot, sisters of Maria and materna aunts of Juliana
Maalac, who belonged to the line from which said one-half portion came (Aglibot vs. Maalac 114 Phil.
964).
Other illustrations of reserva troncal are found in Florentino vs Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; Nieva and Alcala
vs. Alcala and Deocampo, 41 Phil. 915; Maghirang and Gutierrez vs. Balcita 46 Phil. 551; Lunsod vs.
Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Dizon vs. Galang, 48 Phil. 601; Riosa vs. Rocha, 48 Phil. 737; Centeno vs.
Centeno 52 Phil. 322; Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89; Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.
279; Fallorfina vs. Abille, CA 39 O.G. 1784.
The person from whom the degree should be reckoned is the descendant, or the one at the end of the
line from which the property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. He is called
the prepositus(Cabardo vs. Villanueva. 44 Phil. 186, 190).
In the Cabardo case, one Cornelia Abordo inherited property from her mother, Basilia Cabardo. When
Cornelia died, her estate passed to her father, Lorenzo Abordo. ln his hands, the property was reservable
property. Upon the death of Lorenzo, the person entitled to the property was Rosa Cabardo, a maternal
aunt of Cornelia, who was her nearest relative within the third degree.
First cousins of the prepositus are in the fourth degree and are not reservees. They cannot even
represent their parents because representation is confined to relatives within the third degree (Florentino
vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480).
Within the third degree, the nearest relatives exclude the more remote subject to the rule of
representation. But the representative should be within the third degree from the prepositus (Padura vs.
Baldovino, 104 Phil. 1065).
Reserva troncal contemplates legitimate relationship. illegitimate relationship and relationship by affinity
are excluded.
Gratuitous title or titulo lucrativo refers to a transmission wherein the recipient gives nothing in return such
as donacion and succession (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 189-190, citing 6 Manresa, Codigo
Civil, 7th Ed., 195 l, p. 360).
The reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve
and (2) the survival, at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from

which the property came

(Sienes vs. E Esparcia l l l Phil. 349, 353).
The reservor has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to the resolutory
condition that such title is extinguished if the reservor predeceased the reservee. The reservor is a
usufructuary of the reservable property. He may alienate it subject to the reservation. The transferee gets
the revocable and conditional ownership of the reservor. The transferee's rights are revoked upon the
survival of the reservees at the time of the death of the reservor but become indefeasible when the
reservees predecease the reservor. (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil.
295; Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480: Director of Lands vs. Aguas,
63 Phil. 279.)
The reservor's title has been compared with that of the vendee a retro in a pacta de retro sale or to
a fideicomiso conditional.
The reservor's alienation of the reservable property is subject to a resolutory condition, meaning that if at
the time of the reservor's death, there are reservees, the transferee of the property should deliver it to the
reservees. lf there are no reservees at the time of the reservor's death, the transferee's title would
become absolute. (Lunsod vs. Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944; Mono vs. Nequia
93 Phil. 120).
On the other hand, the reserves has only an inchoate, expectant or contingent right. His expectant right
would disappear if he predeceased the reservor. lt would become absolute should the reservor
predecease the reserves.
The reserves cannot impugn any conveyance made by the reservor but he can require that the reservable
character of the property be recognized by the purchaser (Riosa vs. Rocha 48 Phil. 737; Edroso vs.
Sablan, 25 Phil. 295, 312-3; Gueco vs. Lacson, 118 Phil. 944).
There is a holding that the renunciation of the reservee's right to the reservable property is illegal for
being a contract regarding future inheritance (Velayo Bernardo vs. Siojo, 58 Phil. 89, 96).
And there is a dictum that the reservee's right is a real right which he may alienate and dispose of
conditionally. The condition is that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the vendee only if and when
the reserves survives the reservor (Sienes vs. Esparcia, 111 Phil. 349, 353). 1wph1.t
The reservatario receives the property as a conditional heir of the descendant
(prepositus) said property merely reverting to the line of origin from which it had
temporarily and accidentally stayed during the reservista's lifetime. The authorities are all
agreed that there being reservatarios that survive the reservists, the latter must be
deemed to have enjoyed no more than a than interest in the reservable property. (J. J. B.
L. Reyes in Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
Even during the reservista's lifetime, the reservatarios, who are the ultimate acquirers of
the property, can already assert the right to prevent the reservista from doing anything
that might frustrate their reversionary right, and, for this purpose, they can compel the
annotation of their right in the registry of property even while the (reservista) is alive (Ley
Hipotecaria de Ultramar, Arts. 168, 199; Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295).

This right is incompatible with the mere expectancy that corresponds to the natural heirs
of the reservista lt is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the estate of
the reservista who may not dispose of them (it) by will, so long as there are reservatarios
existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 226, 237).
The latter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista but from the descendant
(prepositus) of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the
condition that they must survive thereservista. (Sanchez Roman, Vol. VI Tomo 2, p. 286;
Manresa, Commentaries, Vol. 6, 6th Ed., pp. 274, 310, cited by J. J.B.L. Reyes in Padura
vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
Hence, upon the reservista's death, the reservatario nearest to the prepositus becomes, "automatically
and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property." (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l5.)
In the instant case, the properties in question were indubitably reservable properties in the hands of Mrs.
Legarda. Undoubtedly, she was a reservor. The reservation became a certainty when at the time of her
death the reservees or relatives within the third degree of the prepositus Filomena Legarda were living or
they survived Mrs. Legarda.
So, the ultimate issue in this case is whether Mrs. Legarda, as reservor, could convey the reservable
properties by will or mortis causa to the reservees within the third degree (her sixteen grandchildren) to
the exclusion of the reservees in the second degree, her three daughters and three sons. As indicated at
the outset, that issue is already res judicata or cosa juzgada.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the
reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable
properties did not form part of her estate (Cabardo vs. Villanueva, 44 Phil. 186, 191). The reservor cannot
make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the
reservor.
As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties from
theprepositus, not from the reservor.
Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives
within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She
could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and deprive the other
reservees of their share therein.
To allow the reservor in this case to make a testamentary disposition of the reservable properties in favor
of the reservees in the third degree and, consequently, to ignore the reservees in the second
degree would be a glaring violation of article 891. That testamentary disposition cannot be allowed.
We have stated earlier that this case is governed by the doctrine of Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480,
a similar case, where it was ruled: 1wph1.t
Reservable property left, through a will or otherwise, by the death of ascendant
(reservista) together with his own property in favor of another of his descendants as
forced heir, forms no part of the latter's lawful inheritance nor of the legitime, for the

reason that, as said property continued to be reservable, the heir receiving the same as
an inheritance from his ascendant has the strict obligation of its delivery to the relatives,
within the third degree, of the predecessor in interest (prepositus), without prejudicing the
right of the heir to an aliquot part of the property, if he has at the same time the right of
a reservatario (reserves).
ln the Florentino case, it appears that Apolonio Florentino II and his second wife Severina Faz de Leon
begot two children, Mercedes and Apolonio III. These two inherited properties from their father. Upon
Apolonio III death in 1891, his properties were inherited by his mother, Severina, who died in 1908. ln her
will, she instituted her daughter Mercedes as heiress to all her properties, including those coming from
her deceased husband through their son, Apolonio III.
The surviving children, begotten by Apolonio II with his first wife Antonia Faz de Leon and the
descendants of the deceased children of his first marriage, sued Mercedes Florentino for the recovery of
their share in the reservable properties, which Severina de Leon had inherited from Apolonio III which the
latter had inherited from his father Apolonio II and which Severina willed to her daughter Mercedes.
Plaintiff's theory was that the said properties, as reservable properties, could not be disposed of in
Severina's will in favor of Mercedes only. That theory was sustained by this Court.
It was held that the said properties, being reservable properties, did not form part of Severina's estate and
could not be inherited from her by her daughter Mercedes alone.
As there were seven reservees, Mercedes was entitled, as a reserves, to one-seventh of the properties.
The other six sevenths portions were adjudicated to the other six reservees.
Under the rule of stare decisis et non quieta movere, we are bound to follow in this case the doctrine of
theFlorentino case. That doctrine means that as long as during the reservor's lifetime and upon his death
there are relatives within the third degree of the prepositus regardless of whether those reservees are
common descendants of the reservor and the ascendant from whom the property came, the property
retains its reservable character. The property should go to the nearest reservees. The reservor cannot, by
means of his will, choose the reserves to whom the reservable property should be awarded.
The alleged opinion of Sanchez Roman that there is no reserva troncal when the only relatives within the
third degree are the common descendants of the predeceased ascendant and the ascendant who would
be obliged to reserve is irrelevant and sans binding force in the light of the ruling in the Florentino case.
It is contended by the appellees herein that the properties in question are not reservable properties
because only relatives within the third degree from the paternal line have survived and that when Mrs.
Legarda willed the said properties to her sixteen grandchildren, who are third-degree relatives of
Filomena Legarda and who belong to the paternal line, the reason for the reserva troncal has been
satisfied: "to prevent persons outside a family from securing, by some special accident of life, property
that would otherwise have remained therein".
That same contention was advanced in the Florentino case where the reservor willed the reservable
properties to her daughter, a full-blood sister of the prepositus and ignored the other six reservors, the
relatives of the half-blood of the prepositus.

In rejecting that contention, this Court held that the reservable property bequeathed by the reservor to her
daughter does not form part of the reservor's estate nor of the daughter's estate but should be given to all
the seven reservees or nearest relatives of the prepositus within the third degree.
This Court noted that, while it is true that by giving the reservable property to only one reserves it did not
pass into the hands of strangers, nevertheless, it is likewise true that the heiress of the reservor was only
one of the reservees and there is no reason founded upon law and justice why the other reservees
should be deprived of their shares in the reservable property (pp. 894-5).
Applying that doctrine to this case, it results that Mrs. Legarda could not dispose of in her will the
properties in question even if the disposition is in favor of the relatives within the third degree from
Filomena Legarda. The said properties, by operation of Article 891, should go to Mrs. Legarda's six
children as reservees within the second degree from Filomena Legarda.
It should be repeated that the reservees do not inherit from the reservor but from the reservor but from
the prepositus, of whom the reservees are the heirs mortis causa subject to the condition that they must
survive the reservor (Padura vs. Baldovino, L-11960, December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065).
The trial court said that the disputed properties lost their reservable character due to the non-existence of
third-degree relatives of Filomena Legarda at the time of the death of the reservor, Mrs. Legarda,
belonging to the Legarda family, "except third-degree relatives who pertain to both" the Legarda and
Races lines.
That holding is erroneous. The reservation could have been extinguished only by the absence of
reservees at the time of Mrs. Legarda's death. Since at the time of her death, there were (and still are)
reservees belonging to the second and third degrees, the disputed properties did not lose their reservable
character. The disposition of the said properties should be made in accordance with article 891 or the rule
on reserva troncal and not in accordance with the reservor's holographic will. The said properties did not
form part of Mrs. Legarda's estate. (Cane vs. Director of Lands, 105 Phil. l, 4).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. lt is hereby adjudged that the
properties inherited by Filomena Roces Vda. de Legarda from her daughter Filomena Legarda, with all
the fruits and accessions thereof, are reservable properties which belong to Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa,
Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda y Roces, as reservees. The shares of Rosario L.
Valdes and Benito F. Legarda, who died in 1969 and 1973, respectively, should pertain to their respective
heirs. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO PAPA, vs.
DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO CAMACHO,
FACTS:
-

Plaintiffs and respondents of this case are legitimate relatives, plaintiffs being aunt and uncles of
the respondent.Camacho inherited her property from her mother Trinidad, a descendant of Dizon,
first degree cousin of defendants.

ISSUE:
-

Whether or not uncles and aunts, together with niece who survived the reservista would be
considered reservatorios.

RULING:
The court ruled that the uncles and aunts shall not share in the reserveable property, since, under the law
of intestate succession a descendants uncles and aunts may not succeed ab intestate so long as
nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and qualified to inherit. The rule on proximity
applies. (The relatives in the direct ascending shall exclude relatives in the collateral line.

Padura v Baldovino
SV: Fortunato Padura without any heirs, hence the four parcels of land he received from his father were
transmitted to her mother. After her mother died, Fortunatos nephews and nieces from his full sister and
half-brother took possession of the property. The court ruled that these nephews and nieces will have
equal shares over the property.
SC: Rule on Reserva troncal should be applied, meaning the relatives of Fortunato up to the third degree
will get the reservable property after his mother dies. The children of such relatives (the reservatarios) can
receive the property by way of right of representation. But after applying the rule, the reservatarios and
their relationship will be considered in determining their shares. The rules on ordinary intestate
succession would be followed after the reservatarios have been determined.
Facts:
1. Agustin Padura married twice. His first wife was Gervacio Landig with whom he had one child
named Manuel Padura. His second wife was Benita Garing with whom he had 2 children
named Fortunato and Candelaria Padura
2. He died leaving a last will and testament duly probated wherein he bequeathed his properties
among his children, Manuel, CAndelaria and Fortunato, and his surviving spouse Benita (2 nd
wife). Fortunato was adjudicated 4 parcels of land
a. Fortunato died unmarried and without having executed a will; and not having any
issue, the 4 parcels of land were inherited exclusively by Benita. Benita applied for an
later was issued a Torrens Certificate of Title in her name, BUT subject to the
condition that the properties were reservable in favor of relatives within the 3 rd degree
belonging to the line from which the property came (Fortunato)
b. Candelaria (Fortunatos full sister) died leaving as her heirs her 4 legitimate children
(the appellants) Melania, Anicia and Pablo all surnamed Baldovino
c. Manuel (Fortunatos half brother) also died. His heirs were his legitimate children (the
appellees) Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Cornelio, Francisco, Juana and Severino, all
surnamed Padura
3. Benita Garing (the reservista) died. The children of Candelaria and Fortunato took
possession of the 4 parcels of land (the reservable properties).
a. CFI Laguna issued a resolution declaring the legitimate children of Manuel and
Candelaria are the rightful reserves and as such entitled to the 4 parcels of land
4. The Baldovinos filed this present petition wherein they seek to have the properties partitioned
suh that one-half of the same be adjudicated to them, the other half to the Paduras on the
basis that they inherited by right of representation from their respective parents, the original
reserves.

5. The Paduras opposed, arguing that they should all (all 11 of them) be deemed inheriting in
their own right hence, they should have equal shares.
6. TC rendered judgment declaring them all reservees without distinction and have equal shares
over the properties as co-owners, pro indiviso.
ISSUE:
-

Should the properties be apportioned among the nephews of the whole blood and nephews of the
hald-blood equally? Or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that
of the nephews of the half-blood? The nephews of the whole blood get twice the share.

Held:

The Baldovinos contend that notwithstanding the rule on Reservable character of the property
under Art. 891, the reservatarios nephews of the whole blood are entitled to a share twice as
large as that of the others pursuant to Arts. 1006, 1008 on intestate succession.
The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the reservable
property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally
came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by their relatives of the inheriting ascendant
(reservista)
o Article 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter
may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is
obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which
said property came. (871)
o The motives for such rule were explained by D. Manuel Alonso Martinez in his book El
Codigo Civil en sus relaciones con Las Legislaciones Forales
Summary of not so good translation: consider this sample case: father dies
leaving his wife and lone son as heirs. Wife remarries and had children with 2 nd
husband. Lone son dies and his mother (wife) inherits whatever he got from the
father. In case the wife dies, the relatives of the lone son are prejudiced since the
wifes children from the second marriage will inherit the properties of the lone son
as opposed to his uncle (fathers brother)
The code commission chose to give more importance to lineal succession than
the presumed affection of the deceased.
The commission settled with the suggestion of Manresa, among others, to
reserve the property in case the ascendants inherit in favor of relatives up to the
third degree. No reason was given why 3rd degree.
Aside from the sample case, another reason why this rule was adopted was to
make it the law more democratic.
The purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved to the specified
relatives of the line of origin. After that, Art. 891 has nothing to do with the relations between
one reservatario and another of the same degree. Their shares should be foverned by the
ordinary rules of intestate succession. Upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the
reservable property should pass, not to all reservatarios as a class, but only to those nearest in
degree to the descendant (prepositus), excluding those reseravatarios more remote in degree.
o The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming the same as a
reservatario of the property is not among those relatives within the third degree belonging
to the line from which the property came. Relatives of the fourth and the succeeding
degrees can never be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize
them as such
o But there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third
degree mentioned by law as in the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom
the reservable property came

Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of intestate succession so is
the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers
and nephews of half-blood.
o In determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree and the right of
representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate
collaterals of the whole blood should likewise be operative.
Reserva Troncal merely determines the group pof relatives to whom the property should be
returned. Within the group, the individual right to the property should be decided by applicable
rules of ordinary intestate succession (since art. 891 is silent on the matter).
Reserva Troncal is an exceptional case and its application should be limited to what is strictly
needed to accomplish the purpose of the law
Even during the lifetime of the reservista, the reservatarios could compel the annotation of their
right (over the property) in the registry of property. The reservable property is no part of the estate
of the reservista, who may not dispose them by will so long as there are reservatarios existing.
The reservatarios are in fact inheriting from the descendant prepositus from whom the reservista
inherited the property.
If the nephews of whole and half-blood inherited the prepositus directly, the whole bloods would
receive a double share compared to those of the half-blood. Why then should the half-bloods
inherit equally just because of the delay in the transmission of the property (when it was with the
reservista)? The hereditary portions should not change
Philippine (and Spanish Jurisprudence) agrees with this despite the contrary opinions of authors
such as Sanchez Roman and Mucius Scaevola.

Appealed order REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Whole blood nephews will get twice the share of those who
are nephews of Half-blood.