ESTATE OF ROGELIO G.

ONG, Petitioner,
Vs.
Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and
Guardian, JINKY C. DIAZ, Respondent
GR No. 171713, December 17, 2007
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
FACTS:
Minor Joanne Diaz, represented by her mother Jinky Diaz filed a complaint for
compulsory recognition with prayer for support against Rogelio Ong before RTC
February 1993: Jinky married Japanese Hasegawa Katsuo November 1993:
Jinky and Rogelio got acquainted and fell in love January 1994-September 1998:
Jinky and Rogelio cohabited February 1998: Joanne was born, Rogelio paid
all expenses, recognized child as his September 1998: Rogelio abandoned them
and stopped giving support, alleging that the is not the father of the child RTC ordered
defendant to recognize plaintiff as natural child and provide monthly support
RTC granted Rogelios Motion for New Trial (because he was declared in default before)
RTC declared Joanne to be the illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong with Jinky
Diaz. Support to continue until she reaches majority age.Rogelio appealed to
CA but he died in February 2005 during its pendency December 2000: CA
granted appeal and remanded case to RTC for the issuance of an order directing the parties
to make arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of
Joanne.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in remanding the case for DNA analysis
despite the fact that it is no longer feasible due to Rogelios death
RULING:
No, the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto

negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate
biological samples of his DNA. Even if Rogelio already died, any of his
biological samples may be used for DNA testing Biological sample means any
organic material originating from a persons body, even if found in inanimate objects,
that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other
body fluids, tissues, hairs, and bones.
Death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. According to
jurisprudence, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from
body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead
parent could be resorted to. (People v. Umanito, citingTecson v. COMELEC)
Petition denied for lack of merit. CA decision is affirmed.

ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE
PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN
FE ANGELA PROLLAMANTE, respondents.
G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005
Ponente: CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins
alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel Agustin, for support and
support pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after
which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly
impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnels insistence on
abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The
babys birth certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel
shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes
repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity
and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also
denied having fathered the child.
On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the
Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van,
with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was reported to the
police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since
then, been undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for
support.
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing, which Arnel opposed
by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and moving to
dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action.

The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent court erred in denying the petitioners
MTD
W/N the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity
testing and was a form of unreasonable search
RULING:
1. No. The trial court properly denied the petitioners motion to
dismiss because the private respondents complaint on its face showed that
they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The elements of a cause of
action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right and the defendants corresponding
primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant,
by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of action
is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.
2. No. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme Court struck down the proposed
national computerized identification system embodied in Administrative
Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not
bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle
scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and
the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper
safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and
seizures, and the infringement of privacy of communication where the
constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioners case

involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against
self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.

ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS

SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO, petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 114931-33 November 16, 1995
Ponente: Justice Puno
FACTS:
On July 27, 1986, in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution, a
rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Despite
being denied a permit, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal
Monument of the Luneta and started an impromptu singing contest, recited
prayers and delivered speeches in between. When the authorities arrived and
no permit could be produced, they were told to disperse. One of the leaders,
Atty. Oliver Lozano, turned to his group and said Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat
ng mga Cory infiltrators, and a commotion ensued. They eventually fled,
and later, some of them converged at the Chinese garden of Luneta. Another
commotion ensued and the loyalists started attacking persons in yellow, the
color of the Coryistas, one of which was Salcedo. He was chased, boxed,
kicked and mauled. One Ranulfo Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away
from them, but several accused came forward and resumed mauling Salcedo
despite his pleas for mercy. He died upon arrival at the Philippine General
Hospital of hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic.
ISSUE:
Were the photographs of the incident presented properly given
evidentiary weight despite lack of proper identification by their respective
photographers?
RULING:
Yes. Photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by
the photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances

under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in
its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its
admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the
time of the crime.
The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify
the pictures he has taken. The correctness of the photograph as a faithful
representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by
the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses,
after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy.
Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any
other competent witnesses who can testify to its exactness and accuracy.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO A. TAN as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. Br. XIII, PACITA MADRIGAL-GONZALES, ANGELITA
CENTENO, JULIA CARPIO, CALIXTO HERMOSA, and CRISPULA
R. PAGARAN alias PULA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-14257, July 31, 1959
LABRADOR, J.:
FACTS:
Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales and her co-accused were charged with the
crime of falsification of public documents, in their capacities as public
officials and employees, for having made it appear that certain relief
supplies and/or merchandise were purchased by Gonzales for distribution to
calamity indigents, in such quantities and at such prices, and from such
business establishments or persons as written in said public documents. The
truth was no such distributions of such relief and supplies as valued and as
supposedly purchased had ever been made.
The prosecution presented as evidence a booklet of receipts from the
Metro Drug Corporation in Magallanes, Cebu City. Said booklet contained
triplicate copies, the original invoices of which were sent to the companys
Manila office, the dupicates given to customers, and the triplicates left
attached to the booklet. One of the Metro Drugs salesmen who issued a
receipt further explained that, in preparing receipts for sales, two carbon
copies were used between the three sheets, so that the duplicates and the
triplicates were filed out of the use of the carbons in the course of the
preparation and signing of the originals.
The trial court judge, Hon. Bienvenido Tan, interrupted the
proceeding, holding that the triplicates were not admissible unless it was
proven that the originals were lost and cannot be produced. Another witness
was presented, and he alleged that the former practice of keeping the original

white copies no longer prevails as the originals are given to the customers,
while only the duplicates are submitted to the Manila office.
ISSUE:
Are the triplicates of the receipts admissible as evidence?
RULING:
Yes. Under the law on evidence, the best evidence rule is that rule
which requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed
fact. The admissibility of duplicates or triplicates under this rule has long
been settled. When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets
of writing paper so that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet,
including the signature of the party to be charged thereby, produced 2
facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signatures being thus reproduced by
the same stroke of the pen which made the surface or exposed impression,
all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate originals and either
of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the
nonproduction of the others.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BERNARDO GREGORIO and EUSTAQUIO BALISTOY, defendantsappellants.
G.R. No. L-5791 December 17, 1910
Ponente: TORRES, J.:
FACTS:
Pedro Salazar filed a suit for the collection of a sum of money against
Eustaquio Balistoy. Judgment was rendered in favor of the former, and
Balistoy was ordered to pay him P275.92, plus interest. Two rural properties
belonging to Balistoy were attached and set for sale at a public auction on
May 27, 1908. Before the auction, Bernardo Gregorio requested the deputy
sheriff to exclude one of the properties from attachment as he owned said
property, having acquired it by purchase from Balistoy in 1905, prior to the
filing of the complaint. Gregorio presented to the sheriff a document, at the
end of which appears a memorandum stating that Balistoy bought the land
referred to from Luis Balistoy and subsequently sold it to Gregorio.
Salazar filed a complaint for falsification against Gregorio and
Balistoy for having simulated the conveyance of the property in favor of
Gregorio in order to avoid its attachment and sale. Salazar further alleged
that, though the said memorandum was dated February 1905, it was actually
written in April 1908. However, the original document setting forth the
memorandum was not presented, and only a copy thereof was produced in
court.
ISSUE:
Can a person be convicted of falsification of a document without the original
of said falsified document?

RULING:
No. The issue in this case is whether the subject memorandum was
falsified, having been made to appear to have been written on a date prior to
the one when it was actually prepared and simulating the sale to a third party
of a land, with the intent to defraud the creditor who, through proper judicial
process, solicited and obtained the attachment and sale of said land.
Though the sheriff testified to having seen the original of the
document wherein the memorandum was written, or at least the original
memorandum of the conveyance, the mere exhibition of a copy of an
unauthenticated private document cannot legally produce the effect of
suspending the sale of said land inasmuch as such copy is not sufficient
proof of the right of Gregorio, being a mere copy of a private document
whose legality has not been proven. He was not able to compare the copy of
the memorandum with that written on the original document, having only
seen the original for a few moments.
As the original document setting forth said memorandum was not
presented, but merely a copy thereof, and as it could not be ascertained who
had the original of said document, nor the exact date when it was written,
doubt arises as to whether the original of the document really existed at all
and whether the memorandum is an exact copy of that alleged to have been
written at the end of said original document. Consequently, Gregorio and
Balistoy cannot be convicted of its falsification.

VILLA REY TRANSIT v. FERRER

25 SCRA 845 (1968)
GANCAYCO, J.

FACTS:
Jose Villarama, the operator of the Villa Rey Transit bus company
pursuant to certificates of public convenience (CPC) granted to him by the
Public Service Commission, sold two of the CPCs to the Pangasinan
Transportation Company (Pantranco), with the condition that Villarama shall
not, for 10 years, apply for any TPU service identical or competing with the
buyer. Three months later, the Villa Rey Transit Inc. (VRTI) was formed,
with Villaramas wife and relatives as stockholders and incorporators. VRTI
bought 5 CPCs from Valentin Fernando, two of which was levied pursuant to
a writ of execution in favor of Eusebio Ferrer, a creditor of Fernando. The
CPCs were sold at auction, of which Ferrer was the highest bidder. Ferrer
then sold the CPCs to Pantranco. VRTI filed a complaint for annulment of
the sheriffs sale in favor of Ferrer and the subsequent sale of the CPCs to
Pantranco. Pantranco, on its part, alleged that Jose Villarama and VRTI were
one and the same; hence, the non-competition clause in the abovementioned
deed of sale executed by Villarama is also binding to VRTI. As evidence,
Pantranco presented photostatic copies of ledger entries and vouchers, the
admissibility of which was assailed by Villarama on the ground that the best
evidence were the originals themselves.
ISSUE:
Were the photo static copies of the ledger entries and vouchers of
VRTI sufficient to prove Pantrancos allegations, and thereby are admissible
as evidence?

RULING:
Yes. The photo static copies of the ledger entries and vouchers
showing that Villarama had co-mingled his personal funds and transactions
with those made in the name of VRTI are very illuminating evidence. The
requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in
the custody of the adverse party are: a) the adverse partys possession of the
original; b) reasonable notice to the adverse party to produce the same; c)
satisfactory proof of its existence; and d) the failure or refusal of the adverse
party to produce the original in court.
Villarama himself admitted the previous existence of the files of
VRTI. He said that the originals were missing and that VRTI was no longer
in possession of the same. However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to
introduce secondary evidence o show that the original is in the actual
possession of the adversary. It is enough that circumstances show that the
writing is in his possession or under his control. It is also not required that
the party entitled to the custody of the instrument, upon notice to produce it,
admit having it in his possession. The party seeking its production may
introduce a copy thereof as in the case of loss because among the exceptions
to the best evidence rule is when the original has been lost, destroyed or
cannot be produced in court. The original of the vourchers in this case must
be deemed to have been lost, thus, secondary evidence are admissible.

E. MICHAEL & CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ADRIANO ENRIQUEZ, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-10824 December 24, 1915
MORELAND, J.:
FACTS:
Adriano Enriquez allegedly executed a sale with a right to repurchase
in favor of E. Michael and E. Michael & Co., a sociedad en comandita, of
which Michael & Co. claims to be the successor, by virtue of an instrument
duly executed and delivered by said companies to Enriquez, transferring
property, business and assets of every kind, including the subject land in this
litigation. Michael & Co. alleged that the time of repurchase had expired;
hence, the title to the property had become absolute, and that Michael & Co.
is now the owner of the land.
Seeking to prove the execution of the sale and the conveyance of the
title to the land, Michael & Co. alleged that the instrument executed and
delivered to Enriquez was lost, thereby rendering secondary evidence as to
its contents admissible as evidence. However, the trial court denied the
admissibility of such secondary evidence.
ISSUE:
Is secondary evidence admissible in this case?
RULING:
No. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, an original writing must be
produced and proved, except as otherwise provided in this Act. If it has been
lost, proof of the loss must first be made before evidence can be given of its
contents. Upon such proofs being made, together with proof of the due
execution of the writing, its contents may be proved by a copy or by a recital

of its contents in some authentic document or by the recollection of a

witness.
The writing itself must be produced, unless it has been lost or
destroyed, in which case, it must be shown by the party seeking the
admission of secondary evidence that 1) the document was duly executed
and delivered, where delivery is necessary; 2) it had been lost or destroyed.
Such due execution and delivery may be established the person/s who
executed the document, by the person before whom its execution was
acknowledged, or by any person who was present and who saw it executed
and delivered, or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and recognized
the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the instruments have
previously confessed the execution thereof. The loss or destruction of the
instrument, meanwhile, may be proved by any person aware of the fact, or
by anyone who has made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar
character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document was
kept, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation
sufficient to satisfy the Court that the document was indeed lost. If it appears
that the document is in fact in existence, the proof of loss or destruction will
fail and secondary evidence will be inadmissible.

BASILIO DE VERA, LUIS DE VERA, FELIPE DE VERA, HEIRS OF

EUSTAQUIA DE VERA-PAPA represented by GLICERIA PAPAFRANCISCO, et al., petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES MARIANO AGUILAR and LEONA V.
AGUILAR, respondents.
G.R. No. 83377 February 9, 1993
CAMPOS, JR., J.
FACTS:
Marcosa Bernabes children mortgaged Bernabes land. Upon
maturity of the mortgage, the Spouses Mariano and Leona Aguilar redeemed
the property, and were able to acquire a title to said property. The title in the
name of Bernabe, meanwhile, was cancelled. Three years later, however,
Bernabes heirs wrote to the Spouses Aguilar, claiming that, as Bernabes
children, they were co-owners of the property and, hence, entitled to the
partition thereof. They also claimed that the Sps. Aguilar had resold the
property to Bernabe. They filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot and
presented a Xerox copy of an alleged deed of sale executed by the Sps.
Aguilar, selling, transferring and conveying back to Bernabe the disputed
lot.
The trial court ruled in their favor. The Sps. Aguilar assailed the
admissibility of the Xerox copy of the deed of sale on the ground that it was
not the best evidence of the alleged sale and, hence, should be excluded.
ISSUE:
Was the Xerox copy of the deed of sale properly admitted as
evidence?
RULING:
No. Under the Rules of Court, when the original writing has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution
and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a

copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the

recollection of witnesses. Prior to the introduction of secondary evidence,
therefore, the proponent must first establish the former existence of the
instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution,
loss, contents, although this order may be changed if necessary in the
discretion of the court. The sufficiency of proof for the admission of an
alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court.
In this case, the trial court merely ruled on the existence and due
execution of the alleged deed of sale. Existence was sufficiently proved by
the xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of absolute sale. Execution,
meanwhile, may be established by the person or persons who executed it, by
the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person
who was present and saw it executed or who, after its execution saw it and
recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the
instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof.
However, the loss or destruction of the originals were not proved. This
may be done through the testimony of any person who knew the fact of its
loss or by anyone who had made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination in the place(s) where papers of similar character are usually
kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been
unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient
to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost. However, all duplicates
of such document must first be accounted for before using copies. Since all
the duplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for nonproduction of the writing itself can be regarded as established until it appears
that all of its parts are unavailable. Here, the notary public testified that there
were 4 or 5 original copies of the alleged deed of sale. The petitioners,
however, failed to account for all these copies. Therefore, secondary
evidence cannot be admitted.

People vs. Nuevo

G.R. No. 132169 October 26, 2001
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Roberta Cido recalled that about 9:00 oclock in the evening of
December 4, 1994, Nuevo passed in their house and invited her husband for
the drinking spree at Anselmo Sr., his father. She was left at home with her
10 month old daughter and her 9 years old niece. At around 11:00 pm,
appellant returned and entered their room. She was awakened when
appellant held her neck, pinned down her arms and took off her clothing.
She struggled to extricate herself but to no avail. Appellant lay on top of her
and proceeded forcibly to have sexual intercourse with her, Gemma Atis
who was present, witnessed what was being done to her. Appellant
threatened her and her niece. Roberta testified that she did not see him
because it was very dark that night; she identified him through his voice.
His husband corroborated part of his wifes story. He saw Sanico left his
fathers place at around 11:00 pm and returned only at around 1:00 pm. Dr.
Esmeralda Nadela testified that there is no fresh injury found on the victim,
that only old lacerations were present. Sanico Nuevo, declared that he knew
Roberta since they were schoolmates in grade school and she was a former
neighbor. He denied, he invited Anselmo Jr. He denied raping Roberta. Trial
court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt with aggravating
circumstances. The accused was sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of
death.
ISSUES:
Whether or not appellant was sufficiently identified by the offended
party based only on her recognition of the sound of his voice;
Whether or not the prosecutions evidence suffices for the conviction
of rape and the imposition of the death penalty on him.

RULING:
In People vs. Reyes, once a person gained familiarity with another,
identification becomes quite an easy talk even from a considerable distance.
In a number of cases, it is ruled that the sound of the voice of a person is an
acceptable means of identification where the witness and the accused knew
each other personally and closely for a number of years. In People vs.
Amadore, it is held that the attendance of any of the circumstances under the
provisions of Section 11 of R.A. No.7659, mandating the death penalty are
in the nature of qualifying circumstances and the absence of proper averment
thereof in the complaint will bar the imposition of that extreme
penalty.While the decision of the trial court held that dwelling and the use of
a deadly weapon aggravated the crime committed, court find that these were
not averted in the information. Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
effective December 1, 2000, provides that every complaint or information
must state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances
with specify. This requirement has retroactive effect. The result is that the
crime committed by appellant is only simple rape, which under Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code amended by R.A. 7659, the law prevailing at the
time of commission thereof, is punished only with Reclusion Perpetua.

ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

GR No. 176389 December 14, 2010
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
On 30 June 1991, Estellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela and
Jennifer were brutally slain at their home in Paranaque City. Four years later
in 1995, the NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It presented starwitness Jessica Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she had
witnessed the crime. She pointed to Hubert Webb, Antonio Lejano, Artemio
Ventura, Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel
Rodriguez and Joy Filart as the culprits. She also tagged police officer,
Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Alfaro had been working as an
asset to the NBI by leading the agency to criminals. Some of the said
criminals had been so high-profile, that Alfaro had become the darling of
the NBI because of her contribution to its success. The trial court and the
Court of Appeals found that Alfaros direct and spontaneous narration of
events unshaken by gruesome cross-examination should be given a great
weight in the decision of the case.
In Alfaros story, she stated that after she and the accused got high of
shabu, she was asked to see Carmela at their residence. After Webb was
informed that Carmela had a male companion with her, Webb became
piqued and thereafter consumed more drugs and plotted the gang rape on
Carmela. Webb, on the other hand, denied all the accusations against him
with the alibi that during the whole time that the crime had taken place, he
was staying in the United States. He had apparently left for the US on 09
March 1991 and only returned on 27 October 1992. As documentary
evidence, he presented photocopies of his passport with four stamps
recording his entry and exit from both the Philippines and the
US, Flights Passenger Manifest employment documents in the US during
his stay there and US-INS computer generated certification authenticated by
the Philippine DFA. Aside from these documentary alibis, he also gave a
thorough recount of his activities in the US

ISSUE:
Whether or not Webbs documented alibi of his U.S. travel should be given
more credence by the Court than the positive identification by Alfaro.
RULING:
For a positive identification to be acceptable, it must meet at least two
criteria:
The positive identification of the offender must come from a credible
witness; and
The witness story of what she personally saw must be believable, not
inherently contrived.
The Supreme Court found that Alfaro and her testimony failed to meet
the above criteria. She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness
bothered by her conscience. She had been hanging around the agency for
sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and
squealing on them. And although her testimony included details, Alfaro had
prior access to the details that the investigators knew of the case. She took
advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the
clearly incompatible acts of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass
frames, for example, just so she can accommodate the crime scene feature.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear and satisfactory
evidence that:
He was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the
crime, and
That it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime.

The Supreme Court gave very high credence to the compounded

documentary alibi presented by Webb. This alibi altogether impeaches
Alfaros testimony not only with respect to him, but also with respect to the
other accused. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the
US when the crime took place, Alfaros testimony will not hold altogether.
Webbs participation is the anchor of Alfaros story.

PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK (PSBank)

VS.
CHOWKING FOOD CORPORATION (Chowking)
G.R. No. 177526, July 04, 2008

Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the CA

REYES, R.T., J.:

FACTS:
The RTC ordered petitioner PSBank and its Bustos Branch Head,
Erlinda O. Santos, to reimburse respondent Chowking the amount
corresponding to five (5) illegally encashed checks. The total amount of the
subject checks reached P556,981.86. On the respective due dates of each
check, Chowking's acting accounting manager, Rino T. Manzano, endorsed
and encashed said checks with the Bustos branch of respondent PSBank. All
the five checks were honored by defendant Santos, even with only the
endorsement of Manzano approving them. The signatures of the other
authorized officers of respondent corporation were absent in the five (5)
checks, contrary to usual banking practice. Unexpectedly, Manzano
absconded with and misappropriated the check proceeds. When Chowking
found out Manzano's scheme, it demanded reimbursement from PSBank.
When PSBank refused to pay, Chowking filed a complaint for a sum of
money with damages before the RTC. In its Answer, petitioner did not
controvert the foregoing facts, but denied liability to respondent for the
encashed checks. RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent. On motion
for reconsideration of the plaintiff, the RTC reversed its earlier decision and
dismissed Chowking's complaint. In its appeal, CA granted the petition
reinstating the first decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not banks required diligence is that of pater familias.

RULING:

CA decision affirmed. Petition Denied.

It cannot be over emphasized that the banking business is impressed with
public interest. Of paramount importance is the trust and confidence of the
public in general in the banking industry. Consequently, the diligence
required of banks is more than that of a Roman pater familias or a good
father of a family. The highest degree of diligence is expected. In its
declaration of policy, the General Banking Law of 2000 requires of banks
the highest standards of integrity and performance. Needless to say, a bank is
"under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care.
The fiduciary nature of the relationship between the bank and the depositors
must always be of paramount concern.

METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE

SYSTEM, petitioner,
vs.

COURT OF APPEALS (Now INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT)

and THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents.
G.R. No. L-62943 July 14, 1986
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) had an

account with PNB. When it was still called NAWASA, MWSS made a
special arrangement with PNB so that it may have personalized checks to be
printed Mesina Enterprises. These personalized checks are the ones being
used by MWSS in its business transactions.
From March to May 1969, MWSS issued 23 checks to various payees
in the aggregate amount of P320,636.26. During the same months, another
set of 23 checks containing the same check numbers earlier issued were
forged. The aggregate amount of the forged checks amounted to
P3,457,903.00. This amount was distributed to the bank accounts of three
persons: Arturo Sison, Antonio Mendoza, and Raul Dizon.
MWSS then demanded PNB to restore the amount of P3, 457,903.00.
PNB refused. The trial court ruled in favor of MWSS but the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PNB should restore the said amount attributable to the
forgeries.
RULING:
No. MWSS is precluded from setting up the defense of forgery. It has
been proven that MWSS has been negligent in supervising the printing of its
personalized checks. It failed to provide security measures and coordinate
the same with PNB. Further, the signatures in the forged checks appear to be

genuine as reported by the National Bureau of Investigation so much so that

the MWSS itself cannot tell the difference between the forged signature and
the genuine one. The records likewise show that MWSS failed to provide
appropriate security measures over its own records thereby laying
confidential records open to unauthorized persons. Even if the twenty-three
(23) checks in question are considered forgeries, considering the MWSSs
gross negligence, it is barred from setting up the defense of forgery under
Section 23 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
The Supreme Court further emphasized that forgery cannot be
presumed. It must be established by clear, positive, and convincing evidence.
This was not done in the present case.

NATIVIDAD GEMPESAW, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE BANK
OF COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.
G.R. No. 92244 February 9, 1993
CAMPOS, JR., J.:

FACTS:
Natividad Gempesaw is a businesswoman who entrusted to her
bookkeeper, Alicia Galang, the preparation of checks about to be issued in
the course of her business transactions. From 1984 to 1986, 82 checks
amounting to P1,208,606.89, were prepared and were supposed to be
delivered to Gempesaws clients as payees named thereon. However,
through Galang, these checks were never delivered to the supposed payees.
Instead, the checks were fraudulently indorsed to Alfredo Romero and
Benito Lam.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the bank should refund the money lost by reason of
the forged indorsements.
RULING:
No. Gempesaw cannot set up the defense of forgery by reason of her
negligence. As a rule, a drawee bank (in this case the Philippine Bank of
Communications) who has paid a check on which an indorsement has been
forged cannot charge the drawers (Gempesaws) account for the amount of
said check. An exception to this rule is where the drawer is guilty of such
negligence which causes the bank to honor such a check or checks. If a
check is stolen from the payee, it is quite obvious that the drawer cannot
possibly discover the forged indorsement by mere examination of his
cancelled check. A different situation arises where the indorsement was
forged by an employee or agent of the drawer, or done with the active
participation of the latter.

The negligence of a depositor which will prevent recovery of an

unauthorized payment is based on failure of the depositor to act as a prudent
businessman would under the circumstances. In the case at bar, Gempesaw
relied implicitly upon the honesty and loyalty of Galang, and did not even
verify the accuracy of amounts of the checks she signed against the invoices
attached thereto. Furthermore, although she regularly received her bank
statements, she apparently did not carefully examine the same nor the check
stubs and the returned checks, and did not compare them with the same
invoices. Otherwise, she could have easily discovered the discrepancies
between the checks and the documents serving as bases for the checks. With
such discovery, the subsequent forgeries would not have been accomplished.
It was not until two years after Galang commenced her fraudulent scheme
that Gempesaw discovered that eighty-two (82) checks were wrongfully
charged to her account, at which she notified the Philippine Bank of
Communications.

ANTILANO G. MERCADO, petitioner,

vs.
ALFONSO SANTOS, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, respondents.
ROSARIO BASA DE LEON, ET AL., intervenors
G.R. No. 45629 September 22, 1938
LAUREL, J.:
FACTS:
Mercado filed a petition for the probate of the will of his deceased
wife. The court admitted the will to probate. 16 months after the probate of
the will, the intervenors filed a complaint against Mercado for falsification
or forgery of the will probated. Mercado moved to dismiss claiming that the
will alleged to have been forged had already been probated and, further, that
the order probating the will is conclusive as to the authenticity and due
execution thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the probate of the will bars criminal prosecution for
the alleged forgery of the probated will.
RULING:
YES. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the
due execution thereof and cannot be impugned on any of the grounds
authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent
action or proceeding. The probate of a will by the probate court
having jurisdiction thereof is usually considered as conclusive as to its
due execution and validity, and is also conclusive that the testator was of
sound and disposing mind at the time when he executed the will,
and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and
that the will is genuine and not a forgery. T h e p r o b a t e o f a w i l l i s a
p r o c e e d i n g i n r e m. Th e p r o v i s i o n o f n o t i c e by p u b l i c a t i o n a s
a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to

the whole world, and when probate is granted, the judgment of the
court is binding upon everybody, even against the State. Conclusive
presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that it will
not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong. The
will in question having been probated by a competent court, the law will not
admit any proof to overthrow the legal presumption that it is genuine and not
a forgery.

BONIFACIO DOLERA Y TEJADA, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 180693 September 4, 2009

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged before the RTC with violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. 9165. The trial court, convicted petitioner. His motion for
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition for
review. Petitioner initially takes issue on the appellate courts ruling that he
waived any objection to his arrest when he entered a plea upon arraignment
and actively participated in the trial. Underscoring that an appeal in a
criminal case opens the whole case for review, petitioner reiterates his
lament that he was arrested without a warrant.
ISSUE:
Will presumption of innocence be sustained if the chain of custody
rule has not been satisfied?
RULING:
Yes. The appellate courts reliance on the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official functions would not suffice to uphold petitioners
conviction. Once challenged by evidence, such as in this case, the
presumption of regularity cannot be regarded as binding truth and cannot
prevail over the presumption of innocence of petitioner-accused. Although
petitioners defense is denial which, standing alone is inherently weak, the
Court has repeatedly stressed that the conviction of an accused must rest on
the strength of the prosecutions evidence and not on the weakness of his
defense.
Anonymous vs. Emma Curamen
A.M. No. P-08-2549, June 18, 2010
CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
T h i s i s a n a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c a s e a g a i n s t E mm a B a l d o n a d o
C u r a me n , C o u r t Interpreter I in the Municipal Trial Court of Rizal
in Nueva Ecija, for dishonesty and falsification of a public document.
On 6 March 2007, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
received an anonymous complaint charging respondent with
falsification of a public document and simulation of birth.
The complaint alleged that respondent registered
t h e b i r t h o f a c h i l d supposedly named Rica Mae Baldonado
Curamen in the local civil registry of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. Complainant
submitted the childs purported birth certificate to show respondent
misrepresented that she was the childs biological mother and her
husband, Ri cardo Curamen, wa s the biological fath er.
C o m p l a i n a n t c l a i m e d respondent was, in fact, the childs maternal
grandmother.
Complainant submitted the childs original birth certificate to
show that the childs real name was Rinea M a e C u r a m e n Aq u i n o
a n d t h a t h er p a r e n t s w e r e s p o u s e s O l g a M a e B a l d o n a d o
Curamen Aquino and Jun Aquino. According to complainant, respondent
included the child as additional dependent in her income tax declaration.
In his Report, Executive Judge Rodrigo S. Caspillo of the Regional
Trial Court(Branch 24) of Cabanatuan City verified that Rinea Mae
Curamen Aquino and Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen were the same
child. Judge Caspillo confirmed that the child was, in fact, respondents
granddaughter. The childs real mother, Olga, was one of respondents
children. J u d g e C a s p i l l o v e r i f i e d t h a t o n 3 1 M a r c h 2 0 0 6 ,
r e s p o n d e n t e x e c u t e d a n a ff i d a v i t f o r d e l ay e d r e g i s t r at i o n o f
t h e a l l e g e d b i r t h o f h e r c h i l d . R e s p o n d e n t claimed that her
supposed child, Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen, was born on

30November 2005. Respondents application was given due course and the
supposed birth of Rica Mae Baldonado Curamen was registered in
the Civil Registry of Rizal, Nueva Ecija under Registry No. 2006507. This second birth certificate of the child indicated that the childs
parents were respondent and her husband.
ISSUE:
Whether Curamen is liable for simulation of birth by falsification.
RULING:
With respect to the alleged falsification of the childs birth certificate,
we find r e s p o n d e n t g u i l t y o f d i s h o n e s t y a n d f a l s i f i c a t i o n o f a
p u b l i c d o c u me n t . A b i r t h certificate, being a public document,
serves as prima facie evidence of filiation. The making of a false
statement therein constitutes dishonesty and falsification of a public
document. Respondent cannot escape liability by claiming that she
did not have any intention to conceal the identity of the child nor cause the
loss of any trace as to the childs true filiation to the childs prejudice.
When public documents are falsified, the intent to injure a third
person need not be present because the principal thing p u n i s h e d i s
the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the
t r u t h t h e document proclaims.
H o w e v e r, t h e e x t r e m e p e n a l t y o f
a u t o ma t i c a l l y

i mp o s e d ,

especially

di s mi s s a l
where

is not

mitigating

circumstances exist. Although under the schedule of p e n a l t i e s

a d o p t e d b y t h e C i v i l S er v i c e , d i s h o n e s t y a n d f a l s i f i c a t i o n o f
a p u b l i c document are classified as grave offenses punishable by
dismissal, the fact that this is respondents first offense may be
considered a mitigating circumstance in her favor. The law requires
that the mitigating circumstance must first be pleaded by the proper

party. But in the interest of substantial justice, we may appreciate

the

mitigating

circumstance

in

the

imposition

of

p e n a l t y , e v e n i f n o t r a i s e d b y respondent. We thus impose on

respondent the penalty next lower in degree, which is s u s p e n s i o n
f o r s i x mo n t h s a n d o n e d ay w i t h o u t p ay w i t h a s t e r n w a r n i n g
t h a t a re petition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.

ROSALINA P. ECETA
vs.
MA. THERESA VELL LAGURA ECETA
G.R. NO. 157037 May 20, 2004
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:
Isaac and Rosalina married in 1926. The begot a child named Vicente.
When Isaac died, he left behind properties to which Rosalina and Vicente
were the compulsory heirs. Thereafter, Vicente also died but he had an
illegitimate daughter, Ma. Theresa. Thus, the latter is a compulsory heir
together with Rosalina. Theresa then filed for a petition that she be made coowner of a property which was originally owned by Isaac, passed to
Rosalina and Vicente upon his death. Ma. Theresas contention was that she
should be made as co-owner by virtue of her fathers death. During pre-trial,
Rosalina already admitted that she is the grandmother of Ma. Theresa. On
appeal though, she questions the alleged filiation and whether if such could
be established by mere birth certificate and by her admission during the trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents filiation to her alleged father could be
established by the birth certificate and by the admission made.
RULING:
Yes. Ma. Theresa successfully established her filiation with Vicente
through the duly authenticated birth certificate. Vicente himself signed
respondents birth certificate thereby acknowledging that she is his daughter.
By this act alone, Vicente is deemed to have acknowledged his paternity
over Ma. Theresa, thus, the filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate
children, is established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due

recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement

before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgement of the child. In fact, any authentic
writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself
a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval.

ELINO RIVERA, DOMINADOR CLAUREN, SOLEDAD CLAUREN

DE RIVERA, TEOFILA RIVERA and CECILIA RIVERA, petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF ROMUALDO VILLANUEVA represented by
MELCHORVILLANUEVA, ANGELINA VILLANUEVA,

VICTORIANO DE LUNA, CABANATUAN CITY RURALBANK, INC.

and REGISTER OF DEEDSOF NUEVA ECIJA, Respondents
G.R. No. 141501 July 21, 2006
CORONA, J.:
FACTS:
Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of marriage
because the latter was married to one Amanda Musngi. They allegedly had
an illegitimate daughter, respondent Angelina. Thereafter, Gonzales died
intestate. Villanueva and respondent Angelina then executed an extrajudicial
settlement of Gonzales' estate; some were allegedly acquired during the
cohabitation. In this document, Villanueva, for the amount of P30,000,
conveyed his interests in the estate to Angelina.
Petitioners who are Gonzales half -brothers contested such extrajudicial settlement and questioned Angelinas illegitimacy. Angelina
adduced her birth certificate to prove her filiation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the adduced birth certificate is able to prove
Angelinas filiation.
RULING:
No. A close examination of the birth certificate reveals that respondent
Angelina was listed as "adopted" by both Villanueva and Gonzales. It was
previously held that the mere registration of a child in his or her birth
certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption, and
does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal
rights of such child. Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is
merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not
conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the

interested parties. Angelina should have adduced evidence of her adoption,

in view of the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, are
bereft of any such evidence. Lastly, Gonzales was already 44 years old and
on the verge of menopausal and that she had been living childless with
Villanueva for 20 years at the time of the alleged birth. Thus, it was not
sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales' biological
daughter, nor even her adopted daughter.

MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, ANSELMO A. CRISTOBAL and

ELISA CRISTOBAL SIKAT, Petitioners,
Vs.

EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL, JOSE

CRISTOBAL, HEIRS OF NORBERTO CRISTOBAL and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners are the alleged children of Buenaventura during his first
marriage. Private respondents on the other hand, claim to be Buenaventuras
children from his second marriage. Long after their alleged father died,
petitioners learned that respondents had executed an extrajudicial partition of
a certain property belonging to their alleged father and transferred such to
their names. Such was contested by the petitioners and filed a complaint to
recover their alleged shares in the property. To prove their filiation,
petitioners presented their baptismal certificates. Such contention was also
confirmed by witnesses presented during the trial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the alleged filiation of the petitioners to Buenaventura
was sufficiently proven.
RULING:
Yes. Article 172 of the Family Code provides that the filiation of
legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission
of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the
foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) the open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. "Any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws," may consist of the
childs baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which

the childs name has been entered, common reputation respecting the childs
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds
of proof of admission. In the case at bar, the baptismal certificates of
respondents were adduced. In the case of Mercedes, she produced a
certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar attesting to the fact that
records of birth for the year she was born were all destroyed. A witness was
also presented who testified that petitioners enjoyed that common reputation
in the community where they reside as being the children of Buevaventura.
Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to prove filiation by
continuous possession of the status as a legitimate child. The foregoing
evidences thus suffice to prove that petitioners are children of the late
Buenaventura.

ANTONIO PERLA, Petitioner, vs.

MIRASOL BARING and RANDY PERLA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 172471 November 12, 2012
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

FACTS:
Mirasol alleges that she and Antonio cohabited for about 2 years. As a
result, Randy was born to her. However, when Antonio landed a job as
seaman, he left them and refused to give support to their son. Antonio for his
part denied that they ever cohabited although admitted that he had a one
night stand with Mirasol. During the trial, Mirasol presented Randys birth
and baptismal certificates. She avers that she and Antonio supplied the
information indicated in the certificates, as
the hilotwho assisted her went to Antonios house to solicit the said
information. Randy also testified, saying that he even had a vacation at her
aunt, Antonios sister for a week with which he 1 st met Antonio, calling him
Papa and while the latter hugged him, he promised to support Randy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Randys filiation to Antonio was sufficiently proven.
RULING:
No.
Respondents failed to establish Randys illegitimate filiation to
Antonio. The rules for establishing filiation are found in Arts.175 and 172 of
the Family Code.
Whereas, in the case at bar, the birth and baptismal certificates
presented have no probative value to establish the alleged filiation since the
Antonio had not signed them. It is settled that such evidences adduced
identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when
there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in their preparation.
Mirasol failed to present the mentioned hilot to prove her claim that it was

Antonio who supplied the information in the certificates. Besides, they do

not contain Antonios signature and that there were also inconsistencies such
as Antonios middle name, signifying that he had no hand in their
preparation. Neither does the testimony of Randy establish his filiation. The
single instance of Antonios hug and promise to support Randy cannot be
considered as proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. To
emphasize, the fathers conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and
uninterrupted for this ground to exist. Whereas, except for this mentioned
single instance, there were no other acts of Antonio treating Randy as his
son.
Lastly, assuming that Antonio indeed had sexual contact with
Mirasol, still, none of these sexual congresses could have led to the
conception of Randy who was born two years later.

EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R TIJING, petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and ANGELITA
DIAMANTE, respondents.
G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001

QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing are husband and wife; they have six
children, youngest of who is Edgardo Tijing Jr. In August 1989, Angelita
Diamante fetched Bienvenida for an urgent laundry job. Bienvenida left to
Angelita her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she usually let Angelita take
care of her child while she was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned
from work to get her son, Angelita was nowhere to be found, and despite her
and her husbands efforts, they could not locate Angelita and their childs
whereabouts.
Four years later, Bienvenida read about the death of Tomas Lopez, the
common-law husband of Angelita, whose interment is in Bulacan. She went
there and allegedly saw her son Edgardo Jr., now named John Thomas
Lopez. John is now being claimed by Angelita as her own son, sired by her
common-law husband Tomas Lopez during their cohabitation. Bienvenida
now
alleges that the child cannot possibly be born to Angelita and Tomas for it
was the latters own brother who admitted that Tomas was rendered sterile,
caused by an accident. Tomas begot no children from his legal marriage or
with the cohabitation with Angelita. Tomas brother even testified that
Tomas himself admitted to him that the subject child was adopted.

ISSUE:
Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subject child.

RULING:

Bienvenida. She presented sufficient clinical records, presenting the

proper and credible
witnesses who assisted her in her childs birth. Not to mention that it could
be readily observed that Bienvenida and the child have strong similarities in
their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor
and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish
parentage.
Whereas, Angelita had been known to have undergone ligation years
before the alleged birth of the child and the admission of Tomas own
brother that Tomas was sterile makes it impossible that he and Angelita sired
subject child. More importantly, the birth certificate of the child stated
Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married which is false
because even Angelita had admitted she is a common-law wife. This false
entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate. In this case, the
Supreme Court made mention of the DNA test for identification and
parentage testing. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are
analyzed to establish parentage. The use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge, but as the appropriate case comes, courts should not
hesitate to rule on its admissibility. Though it is not necessary in this case to
resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the
prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.

ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner,

vs.

ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA,

and HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48,
Regional Trial Court, Manila, respondents.
G.R. No. 148220 June 15, 2005
CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
On

14

May

1998,

then

thirteen-year-old

Rosendo

Alba

(respondent), represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed before the trial
court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against
petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim
where he denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also
denied physical contact with
respondents mother.
Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity
testing to abbreviate the proceedings. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described
the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that the test had an
accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity. Petitioner opposed
DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability.
Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against
self-incrimination.
In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted
respondents motion to conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner,
respondent and Armi Alba. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the 3 February 2000 Order. He asserted that under the present
circumstances, the DNA test is compelled to take would be inconclusive,
irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite specimen,
unconstitutional.

In an Order dated 8 June 2000, the trial court denied petitioners

motion for reconsideration. On 29 November 2000, the appellate court
issued a decision denying the petition and affirming the questioned Orders of
the trial court. The appellate court stated that petitioner merely desires to
correct the trial courts evaluation of evidence.
Thus, appeal is an available remedy for an error of judgment that the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The appellate court also
stated that the proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his right
against self-incrimination because the right applies only to testimonial
compulsion. Finally, the appellate court pointed out that petitioner can still
refute a possible adverse result of the DNA paternity testing.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction
to determine filiation.
RULING:
Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing, we deem it
appropriate to give an overview of a paternity suit and apply it to the facts of
this case. We shall consider the requirements of the Family Code and of the
Rules of Evidence to establish paternity and filiation. Filiation proceedings
are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal
right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support, or inheritance.
The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the
putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four significant
procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to
face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy,
and physical resemblance between the putative father and child.

In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four
aspects. Armi Alba, respondents mother, put forward a prima facie case
when she asserted that petitioner is respondents biological father. Aware
that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial court, she offered
corroborative proof in the form of letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the
other hand, denied Armi Albas assertion.
He denied ever having sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated that
respondent is Armi Albas child with another man. Armi Alba countered
petitioners denial by submitting pictures of respondent and petitioner side
by side, to show how much they resemble each other. Paternity and filiation
disputes can easily become credibility contests. We now look to the law,
rules, and governing jurisprudence to help us determine what evidence of
incriminating acts on paternity and filiation are allowed in this jurisdiction.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO @ PUKE, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 144656 May 9, 2002
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
On July 10, 1999 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her neighbors
house to seek help in an assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the
neighbor, helped Daisy in her assignment. At 5pm of the same day, Daisys
mom noticed that her child wasnt home yet. She went to Vallejos house
and Daisy wasnt there. 7pm, still no word of Daisys whereabouts. The next
morning, Daisys body was found tied to a tree near a river bank.
Apparently, she was raped and thereafter strangled to death.
In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejos house to
question the latter as he was one of the last persons with the victim. But
prior to that, some neighbors have already told the police that Vallejo was
acting strangely during the afternoon of July 10. The police requested for the
clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied and
the clothes were submitted for processing.
The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a
Forensic Biologist of the NBI. At the instance of the local fiscal, he also took
mouth/cheek swabs from Vallejo and a vaginal swab from Daisys body for
DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that there were bloodstains in Vallejos
clothing Blood Type A, similar to that of the victim, while Vallejos Blood
Type is O. Buan also found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained
Vallejos DNA profile.
Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the
crime. But when trial came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement was
coerced; that he was threatened by the cops; that the DNA samples should be

inadmissible because the body and the clothing of Daisy were already
soaked in smirchy waters, hence contaminated. Vallejo was convicted and
was sentenced to death by the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence.

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are
conclusive. The court reiterated that even though DNA evidence is merely
circumstantial, it can still convict the accused considering that it
corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-slay case.
The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA
evidence in this case and for the first time recognized its evidentiary value in
the Philippines, thus: DNA is an organic substance found in a persons
cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each
persons DNA profile is distinct and unique. When a crime is committed,
material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victims body
for the suspects DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is
then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the
victim. The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association
exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples
collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their
profile.

ANICE MARIE JAO, represented by her mother and guardian ad litem,

ARLENE S. SALGADO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
In 1967, Arlene Salgado was introduced to Perico Jao. After such
introduction, Jao courted Arlene. Not long thereafter, they had sexual
intercourse and subsequently, they lived together. 1968, Arlene became
pregnant. Jao paid for all the expenses related to Arlenes pregnancy but
when the child, Janice was born, Jao insisted that she could not be the father
of such child. When the case was filed with the RTC, the RTC ordered the
NBI for a group blood testing. The group blood testing result showed that
Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Jao and Arlene.
ISSUE:
Whether or not group blood testing could be conclusive evidence to
impugn the legitimacy of Janice.
RULING:
Yes, group blood testing could be admitted as conclusive evidence to
impugn the legitimacy of Janice. For the past three decades, the use of blood
typing in cases of disputed parentage has already become an important legal
procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood
grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to
paternity that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product
of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is
born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible

blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are
cross matched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.
Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood in man
which can be transmitted through heredity. Although the presence of the
same type of blood in two persons does not indicate that one was begotten
by the other, yet the fact that they are of different types will indicate the
impossibility of one being the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed
father and the alleged child are not in the same blood group, they cannot be
father and child by consanguinity.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARIANO BOSTON, defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-4795 November 23, 1908
CARSON, J.:
FACTS:
The accused in this case was convicted of the crime of abortion as
define and penalized in paragraph 3 of article 410 of the Penal Code.
Here, the counsel for appellant interposed the defense that the evidence does
not conclusively establish intention to abort in light of the absence of
evidence in the record which would disclose the character and medicinal
qualities of the option which the accused gave to the mother whose child
was aborted. In fact, the evidence clearly showed the child was born three
months in advance of the full period of gestation; that the appellant, either
believing of pretending to believe that the child in the womb of the woman
was a sort of a fish-demon (which he called a balat), gave to her a portion
composed of herbs, for the purpose of her relieving her of this alleged fishdemon; that two hours thereafter she gave premature birth to a child, having
been taken with the pains of child birth must immediately after drinking that
herb potion given by her the appellant; that after the birth of the child the
appellant, still believing or pretending to believe that the child was a fishdemon which had taken upon itself human form, with the permission and aid
of the husband and the brother of the infant child, destroyed it by fire in
order to prevent its doing the mischief which the appellant believed or
affected to believe it was capable of doing.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal should be granted on grounds interposed by
the defense?

RULING:
No. The above facts constitute prima facie proof of the intent of the
accused in giving the herb potion to the mother of the child, and also of the
further fact that the herb potion so administered to her was the cause of its
premature birth. The defense wholly failed to rebut the prosecution
testimony warranting conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The sentence
imposed is in strict accord with the penalty provided by the code, and was
affirmed with cost against the appellant.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JAN MICHAEL TAN

and ARCHIE
G.R. No. 182310 December 9, 2009
ABAD, J.:

FACTS:
After investigation of the prosecution, the above respondents became
suspects in the commission of parricide and two murders; their father, their
step-mother and stepsister. Respondents Archie and Jan-Jans defense is
alibi. They claimed that they were away when the crimes took place at the
house. Based on Dr. Lebaquins forensic computation, however, the victims
probably died at about midnight, more or less. The two were still at home
when the killings happened.
RTC issued an order, directing the City Prosecutors Office to submit
additional evidence in the case but the latter office asked for more time to
comply. Meanwhile, the DOJ issued a resolution dismissing respondents
Archie and Jan-Jans petition for review. After a new presiding judge, Judge
Globert Justalero, took over the RTC, he issued an order on March 30, 2007
granting the prosecutions request for additional time within which to
comply with the courts order of January 12, 2007. On April 2, 2007 the
prosecutors office filed its compliance and submitted its amended resolution
in the case. The petitioners assailed this amended resolution and pointed out
that the public prosecutor did not submit any additional evidence. Probable
cause was found against respondents Archie and Jan-Jan this time and
ordered the issuance of warrants for their arrest.
The CA granted accuseds petition for certiorari and reversed all
RTCs decisions. After being denied the motion for consideration, the Public
Prosecutor filed this instant petition. Here, admittedly, the evidence against
respondents Archie and Jan-Jan is merely circumstantial. The prosecution
evidence shows that they had motive in that they had been at odds with their

father and stepmother. They had opportunity in that they were still probably
home when the crime took place. Archie took two pairs of new gloves from
his car late that evening. Cindy was apparently executed inside Archies
room. The separate rooms of the two accused had, quite curiously, been
wiped clean even of their own fingerprints. A trial, unlike preliminary
investigations, could yield more evidence favorable to either side after the
interrogations of the witnesses either on direct examination or on crossexamination. What is important is that there is some rational basis for going
ahead with judicial inquiry into the case. This Court does not subscribe to
the CAs position that the prosecution had nothing to go on with.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in finding Judge Justalero gravely abused
his discretion reversing his predecessors finding of no probable cause to the

existence of probable cause

RULING:
There was no grave abuse of the Trial Judge. The prosecution filed its
compliance together with its amended resolution in the case. The judge
considered the following factors: first, the DOJs denial of the appeal of the
two accused and its finding that probable cause existed against them and,
two, the local prosecutors submittal, if not of some new evidence, of
additional arguments respecting the issue of probable cause. Grave abuse of
discretion implies an irrational behavior. The reexamination was proper
considering the said developments and the pending interlocutory orders. In
finding of probable cause, it requires neither absolute certainty nor clear and
convincing evidence of guilt. The test for issuing a warrant of arrest is less
stringent than that used for establishing the guilt of the accused. As long as

the evidence shows a prima facie case against the accused, the trial court has
sufficient ground to issue a warrant for his arrest.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELLY NAELGA
GR NO. 171018, September 11, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.:
FACTS:
Accused-Appellant Elly Naelga was caught in possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu in a buy-bust operation conducted
by the Pangasinan Police on July 15, 2003. In the case filed at the RTC of
Rosales, Pangasinan , said court found accused-appellant Naelga guilty for
violating Sec. 5 & 11 of Art. II of R.A. 9165 known as The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Said decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, submitted to the Supreme Court for Review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not irregularity in the procedural compliance under Sec.
21 (a), Art II of the IRR of R.A. 9165 in a buy-bust operation can be a
ground for the exoneration of the accused.
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court upheld that the failure of the buy-bust team
to strictly comply with the provision of said section did not prevent the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty from applying.
The jurisdiction of the prosecution of a crime of illegal sale of
prohibited drugs is the establishment of the consummation of the sale and
not with the procedural requirements of the arrest. Similarly, the same will
not automatically lead to the exoneration of the accused. Conviction shall
not be based solely on said presumption but rather on documentary and real
evidence. Hence, the Court affirmed the Decision of the Court of Appeals.

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
After receiving from the accused Rustan via multimedia message
service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with her face superimposed on
the figure, Complainant filed an action against said accused for violation of
the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act
(R.A.) 9262.
The senders cellphone number, stated in the message, was 09218084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied
the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in
2003. The accused said to have boasted that it would be easy for him to
create similarly scandalous pictures of her and threatened to spread the
picture he sent through the internet.
The trial court later found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section
5(h) of R.A. 9262. On Rustans appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the
latter rendered a decision affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied
Rustans motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008.
Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene
picture presented in the case?
RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA.

Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text
message constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be authenticated
by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of
the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
However, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the
obscene picture for the first time before the Supreme Court. The objection is
too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on
such ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to
have already waived such ground for objection.
Moreover, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal
action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasijudicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.
In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution has proved each
and every element of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

CITIBANK, N.A., Petitioner,

vs.
SPS. LUIS and CARMELITA CABAMONGAN and their sons
LUISCABAMONGAN, JR. and LITO CABAMONGAN, Respondents.
GR No. 146918 May 2, 2006
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Luis and Carmelita Cabamongan opened a joint and/or
foreign currency time deposit in favor of their two children (Luis Jr. & Lito
Cabamongan) with Citibank. On a material date, a person who claimed to be
Carmelita sought the pre-termination of the account. She presented
identification cards (Bank of America Versatele Card, ATM Card and
Mabuhay Credit Card) to ascertain her identity to the then account officer.
When she left with the money, she left an identification card. She filled up
the necessary forms for pre-termination of deposits with the assistance of
Account Officer Yeye San Pedro. While the transaction was being processed,
she was casually interviewed by San Pedro about her personal circumstances
and investment plans. Since the said person failed to surrender the original
Certificate of Deposit, she had to execute a notarized release and waiver
document in favor of Citibank, pursuant to Citibank's internal procedure,
before the money was released to her. The release and waiver document was
not notarized on that same day but the money was nonetheless given to the
person withdrawing. The transaction lasted for about 40 minutes. After said
person left, San Pedro realized that she left behind an identification card.
The account officer then called up the address. Marites, the wife of Lito,
received a call from San Pedro telling them of what had happened. The
spouses and their family knew of the incident. The spouses Luis and
Carmelita were presently residing in the US (California) and there was a
prior incident wherein they got robbed in their house with the jewelry box
and cards stolen. Spouses made several demands for the return of the amount
but Citibank refused to do so. The Spouses Cabamongan filed a case for
Specific Performance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there Citibank was negligent in detecting the forgery

HELD:
The court held that Citibank was indeed negligent. In this case, it has
been sufficiently shown that the signatures of Carmelita in the forms for
pretermination of deposits are forgeries. Citibank, with its verification
procedure, failed to detect the forgery. Its negligence consisted in the
omission of that degree of diligence required of banks. Jurisprudence
provides that a bank is bound to know the signatures of its customers; and
if it pays a forged check, it must be considered as making the payment out of
its own funds, and cannot ordinarily charge the amount so paid to the
account of the depositor whose name was forged. The Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the CA with modifications as to the fees due by
Citibank.

RAMON K. ILUSORIO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and THE MANILA BANKING
CORPORATION, respondents.
GR No. 139130 November 27, 2002
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon Ilusorio was a prominent businessman (Managing
Director

of

Multinational

Investment

Bancorporation

and

Chairman/President of several other corporations) who, because of different

business commitments out of the country for several times, entrusted to his
then secretary, Katherine Eugenio, the handling of his credit cards and
checkbooks. For a period of time, the secretary was able to encash and
deposit to her personal account 17 checks with the amount of P119,634.34
from the account of petitioner. Petitioner did not bother to check his
statement of account until a business partner apprised him that he saw
Eugenio use his credit cards. She was fired immediately and criminal actions
were filed against her. Thereafter, petitioner requested the bank to restore its
money but the bank refused to do so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ilusorio may request the bank to restore the money
since his signature was forged by his secretary
HELD:
Supreme Court sustained the decision of CA. The rule is that when a
signature is forged or made without the authority of the person whose
signature it purports to be, the check is wholly inoperative. However, the
rule provides for an exception, namely: unless the party against whom it is
sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want
of authority. In the present case, it is the exception that applies. Ilusorio is

precluded from setting up the forgery, assuming there is forgery, due to his
own negligence in entrusting to his secretary his credit cards and checkbook
including the verification of his statements of account.