Second, That The Scale Report Bears The Name "B. Savilla," Not That of

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GENARO CORDIAL, petitioner, vs. DAVID MIRANDA, respondent.

G.R. No. 135495. December 14, 2000


FACTS: Petitioner contends that there was a contract between him and
respondent, under which the former allegedly agreed to supply rattan poles
to the latter at the stipulated price. He further alleges that he had already
delivered rattan poles to respondent, who thereafter refused to pay for them
despite repeated demands. Petitioner prays that the CA Decision be
reversed and the RTC judgment sustaining his position be reinstated.
Respondent, on the other hand, reiterates the CA ruling that he
contracted with Savilla, not with petitioner. He further alleges that petitioner
was merely a partner or an agent of Savilla.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals, Eighth Division, erred
in reversing and setting aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
and entering a new one dismissing the complaint, as said Decision of
the Court of Appeals is without factual and legal basis.
2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals, Eighth Division, erred
in completely brushing aside the findings of fact of the trial court and
supplant[ing them] by its own findings which are based merely on
suppositions, surmises and conjectures.
RULING: The CA had ruled that petitioner was a mere agent or partner of
Savilla, with whom respondent had admittedly contracted. It relied on two
pieces of documentary evidence: (1) the Scale Report, indicating the weight
of the rattan delivered and bearing the name B. Savilla and not that of
petitioner; and (2) the cash vouchers reflecting several cash advances that
had allegedly been made by Savilla, not petitioner, before the rattan was
delivered

on

November

3,

1992. Allegedly, the

rattan

delivered

to

respondent was offset by Savillas cash advances.


These

documents,

however,

do

not

prove

the

existence

of

partnership or an agency. First, it should be stressed that the bulk of the


alleged cash advances had been obtained by Savilla even before petitioner
and respondent met for the first time in April 1992. The cash advances,
therefore, were personal to Savilla and should not be charged to petitioner.
Second, that the Scale Report bears the name B. Savilla, not that of
petitioner, does not necessarily support the cause of respondent. He did not

controvert the claim of petitioner that on November 3, 1992, the latter had
indeed delivered rattan poles to the formers house in Angeles City. He
merely testified that petitioner had delivered the poles in the latters alleged
capacity as Savillas partner or agent. But such contention amounts only to
a general denial, because respondent did not set forth the substance of the
matters which he had relied upon to support his denial. At the very least, to
prove his allegations, he should have presented Savilla as his witness or filed
a third-party claim against the latter. Allegations, after all, are not proofs.
The

other

bases

of

the

CAs

ruling

are

mere

conjectures

and

surmises. That petitioner went to the residence of Savilla when no payment


was made does not at all prove that the former was an agent or a partner of
the latter. That Savilla accompanied petitioner to Palawan where the latter
was to get the rattan poles does not support respondents thesis. Indeed,
that Savilla did so is consistent with the assertion of petitioner that the
former, who had been in the trade for a longer period, agreed to help him
secure the required permits.
The Civil Code upholds the spirit over the form, and an agreement will be
deemed to exist provided the essential requisites are present. A contract will
be upheld as long as there is proof of consent, subject matter and
cause. Moreover, it is generally obligatory in whatever form it may have
been entered into. From the moment there is a meeting of minds between
the parties, it is perfected. The CA and Respondent Miranda stress the
absence of a written memorandum of the alleged contract between the
parties.] Respondent

implicitly

argues

that

the

alleged

contract

is

unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, contained in Article 1403 of the


Civil Code. However, the Statute of Frauds applies only to executory and not
to completed, executed, or partially executed contracts. Thus, where one
party has performed ones obligation, oral evidence will be admitted to prove
the agreement. In the present case, it has clearly been established that
petitioner had delivered the rattan poles to respondent on November 3,
1992. Because the contract was partially executed, the Statute of Frauds
does not apply

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