Kosman What Does The Maker Mind Make
Kosman What Does The Maker Mind Make
Kosman What Does The Maker Mind Make
DOI: 10.1093/019823600X.003.0019
I. The Question
The title of this essay is the first half of a question unattested in late
antiquity and in the Greek commentators but easily imagined: Ti pote poiei
ho nous ho poitikos, kai ti pote estin?what does the maker mind make,
and what is it, anyway? The rendering of nous poitikos as maker mind is
meant to suggest the inadequacy of the more usual translation of this phrase
as active mind or active intellect. Although it is true that nous poitikos
is active and that it is therefore proper to call it active intellect, it is odd
to think of this as an Englishing of the Aristotelian idiom; surely we should
expect Aristotle's Greek for active intellect or active mind to use some form
of his favourite word energeia rather than of poiein.
Poiein may carry a more general sense of acting or doing, almost equivalent
to prattein; a notable Aristotelian example of this use is in the categorical
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So what does the maker mind make? Perhaps the most obvious answer is
this:
(1) This suggestion has much to recommend it. It fits well with the
description in our text, in which, as we saw, the nous in question is said to
be what it is ti panta poieinby virtue of making all things. 3 And it fits well
with other views concerning nous; for example, those we find in Plotinus
and his followers. The notion that there is a mind which creates the world
by thinking the ideas of all things has a rich history in Western philosophical
thought, from the earliest of postclassical thinkers such as Albinus, through
the Middle Ages, through Berkeley and Leibniz, and up to such modern
philosophers as Fichte and Hegel.
But it does not follow that it is the notion that Aristotle had in mind, nor
that it is what he envisaged in 3. 5 specifically as the office of mind. And
surely the attentive reader of Aristotle's text will balk at the generality of
everything. Of course panta in t panta poiein does not mean everything
simpliciter; the phrase is prefaced by the qualification hekast genei, which
makes clear that what we are talking about is what makes things be of
a particular sort, and the sort is clearly specified in two respects. (i) The
context of Aristotle's remarks makes clear that the discussion of nous, like
the discussion of psych in general, is a discussion of faculties and their
activities, and is therefore governed by the distinction between potentiality
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and actuality; the nous poitikos makes what is potential to be actual. (ii) In
3. 5, Aristotle is concerned specifically with thought and what can think, or
with what is thought and what is thinkable; the genos in question is clearly
that governed by the concept of nous, the power and activity of thought. So
we might say that:
(2)
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words, does the maker mind (a) make the potentially thinkable actually
thinkable or does it (b) make the already actually thinkable actually thought?
Or alternatively, depending on our answer to (i) does it (c) make our native
faculty of thought, a faculty possessed by the most nave neonate, into the
developed ability to think, an ability that might characterize, for example,
a sleeping scientist, or does it (b) realize that developed ability to think in
actual acts of thinking?
It is easy to overlook the ambiguity revealed by question (i): is it thinking
or is it being thought that's actualized? Hicks, for example, in his extensive
notes on the De Anima, begins his explanation of the office of nous poitikos
by remarking that
Aristotle has to find an efficient cause by which the transition
of nous from potentiality to actuality, which is implied in the
foregoing chapter, is effected. 5
On the very next page, however, he tells a different story, one which
suggests that nous poitikos actualizes not mind but what mind thinks:
The word panta refers strictly to ta nota, as the simile from
light shows. Light makes potential colours actual colours, nous
makes potential nota actual nota. 6
There is, however, a simple explanation for what looks like interpretative
fickleness on Hick's part, an explanation that provides an interestingly simple
answer to the question: is it thinking or what is thought that is actualized?
It is this: question (i) is a specious question, and results from disregarding
a simple but important fact concerning Aristotle's views on thought. For
Aristotle the activity of the subject of consciousness and the activity of
the object of consciousness are, in the actuality of consciousness, one and
the same entity. Compare the parallel case of perception; when the light
shines on an object so that I see it, my seeing and the object's being seen
are actualized together; indeed (p. 346 ) they are, as Aristotle says, one
actuality, although their being is different. 7 This is exactly what we learn in
3. 4 about mind; in the case of actual thinking, the subject thinking and the
object being thought are one and the same; the actuality of the one is the
same entity as the actuality of the other.
It is not surprising, therefore, that in his commentary Hicks should shift with
such ease between understanding the maker mind as responsible for the
actuality of thinking and understanding it as responsible for the actuality
of what is thought. For there is in fact no such ambiguity as (i) invites us to
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think needs resolution; thinking and what is thought are one in the act of the
mind's thinking what is thought.
Consider now the second question; does the nous poitikos actualize from
first potentiality to first actuality or from first actuality to second actuality?
It is unlikely that this question will disappear in the same way, but it does
seem to many commentators to have an equally clear answer. A dominant
group of voices within the tradition speak for the former alternative; they
hold that the office of the nous poitikos is the development of material nous
into nous as hexis, the actualization, that is, of our native ability to think into
the developed skill of intelligent thought. Alexander expresses this view as
follows:
For as light is the cause of colours that are potentially visible
becoming actually visible, so this third nous makes potential,
that is, material nous, into actual nous by producing within in
the power to think (hexis notik). 8
To see whether Alexander is correct, it may be useful to consider the analogy
in terms of which Aristotle introduces nous poitikos and which Alexander
here invokes, the analogy with light. Nous poitikos, we remember, is said to
be
a kind of hexis, like light; for in a sense light also makes what
are potentially colours actually colours. 9
It will help, therefore, to ask: in what sense may light be said to make
potential colour into actual colour, and what sort of a transformation is this?
We might reason like this: since, as we read earlier in the De Anima, 10
colour is the visible, it follows that in making what is potentially a colour
actually a colour, light is making what is potentially visible actually visible.
And since visibility is itself a first actuality, that is, a realized structure of
potentiality relative to the further actuality of being seen, light brings into
being a first actuality: it makes things visible.
It is easy to see why Aristotle understands light as effecting a transition from
(p. 347 ) first potentiality to first actuality. We distinguish entities such as
the surface of a table or the hand of a judge, part of whose nature is to able
to be seen, from entities such as the square root of seven, or the hand of
justice, which are invisible, and this distinction remains a real distinction
even when there is no light present. They are not all alike in the dark, even
though none of them can be seen. This is due to the fact that visibility, like
so many of the structures of potentiality that Aristotle finds interesting, is
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(3)
I will call (3) the Standard View. I use capital letters in order to redirect
the semantic force of the phrase and thus (cravenly) to evade the issue
of whether it in fact is the standard view. It is, in any case, a commonly
held understanding of the productive activity of nous poitikos, although
it is clear that not all who hold it have chosen it from the Talmudic matrix
of possibilities I have offered. It is, furthermore, a limited view about nous
poitikos, which leaves unresolved the wide variety of important and
ramified differences concerning the nature of nous poitikos which has
characterized the hermeneutical tradition.
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It is this view about which I will now raise more questions, and which I hope
thereby to call back into question. I will not mean finally to deny that nous is
the source and principle of concept formation, or to put it more traditionally,
that the activity of nous is instrumental in the formation and development of
that faculty. (p. 348 ) My suggestion will be, however, that that is not what
is being argued in our text, and that the office of nous poitikos described
in DA 3. 5 is a different though importantly related one. Here then are some
questions that I think should cause us uncertainty about the Standard View
as expressed in (3).
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appears to claim not that light creates visibility, but that it creates vision.
In the short treatise On Perception and the Perceived, for example, he links
a special feature of light to an analogous special feature of seeing with the
explanation that light makes vision (to phs poiei to horan). 12 He does not
say, we may note, that light makes the visible (to phs poiei to horaton):
light here seems to be thought of as bringing into existence the full actuality
of being seen, and not merely the first actuality of visibility.
In DA 2. 7, we find Aristotle speaking the same way in the course of
explaining phosphorescent objects: (p. 349 )
The reason why these things are seen [horatai] is another
story. This much at least is clear: that in the light we see
colour; that's why it is not seen without light: ouch horatai
aneu phtos. 13
Again, where Aristotle might have said that something is not visible without
light (ouch horaton aneu phtos), we find him saying that it is not seen (ouch
horatai). 14
In these passages, Aristotle's view seems to conflict with the view we saw
earlier. This conflict emerges, however, only if we assume that light cannot
serve to effect both actualizations; we might be lead to this assumption
by presupposing that light is uniquely positioned within a linear and one
dimensional model of Aristotle's doctrine. But suppose we relinquish that
presupposition; suppose we say that there are three and not merely two
necessary conditions for the joint actuality of seeing and being seen to take
place. What is needed is not simply the visibility of the object and the visual
capacity of the eye, horaton and horatikos, but light as well. On this view,
light is a third hexis necessary to the activity of vision and on a par with the
other two. No decision of the sort about which I have asked us to worry will
then be required; for while light could be said to make the object of sight
visible if the seeing eye is not yet at hand, it could be said either to make it
visible or actually envisioned if it is.
But it is because light, when other conditions are fulfilled, causes things to
be seen, that we are also willing to say that it causes visibility. If I am looking
at a judge in the dark, turning on the lights will make her seen and therefore
visible; if I am in the next room, it will make her visible because only my
looking at her will be required for her to be seen. (No amount of light, on the
other hand, will succeed in making visible the square root of seven or the
hand of justice or, needless to say, Justice Itself.)
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that nous is not a faculty for the discovery of the principles of scientific
understanding, nor a method for the acquisition of scientific understanding.
It will therefore be misleading to claim that nous poitikos effects the
transition to the first stage of concept mastery. To do so will encourage us
to continue to think of nous as a virtually miraculous power that provides
us with a magical intuitive grasp of scientific principles. 21 Far the better
teaching is that the first actuality of nous is acquired by learning, by the
various forms of epagg which include above all the activities of science
themselves. So it will be inaccurate to say in any simple sense that nous
poitikos is responsible for bringing about the first actuality of our ability to
think and understand. I stress simple in part because those who have held
this doctrine have never claimed that it was simple, but more because on the
developing view according to which nous poitikos effects the transition to
second actuality, there will remain a sense in which it is as well responsible,
thought only mediately responsible, for the bringing into being of first
actuality.
(iii) Finally, the Standard View should occasion in us a question about the
rhetorical structure of the chapters of De Anima which Aristotle devotes to
a discussion of nous. For the Standard View suggests not only that Aristotle
views the maker mind as the cause of the development of nous as hexis,
but also that he devotes to setting forth and explaining that fact a central
chapter of his discussion. That fact follows, however, fairly straightforwardly
from features quite general to Aristotle's theory of faculties and their activity.
Of course the perfected habitus of nous is developed by the active agency of
nous. For in general a hexis is (p. 352 ) established by those very activities
for which it is a dispositional capacity. 22 We might, therefore, find it odd
that Aristotle should have devoted a chapter at the heart of his discussion
of nous to spelling out a specific application of this general feature of
acquired habits. If he had felt it necessary to give a specific account of the
development of nous as first actuality, wouldn't the obvious point for him
to do so have been in the heart of ch. 4 when firstactuality nous is initially
introduced? 23
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by virtue of which the intelligible structure of the cosmos is both ordered and
apprehended.
In a sense, ch. 5 may be thought of as turning to that function of mind, mind
as the principle of cosmic ordering and apprehending, that is, of intelligibility
and intelligizing en hapasi ti phusei, to redirect the words Aristotle uses at
the beginning of the chapter. In this sense, nous poitikos is, as the intrepid
half of the tradition has always understood, divine, a fact to which we should
be alerted by its description, with clear echoes of Metaphysics, as a being
whose ousia is energeia. 29 For just as light is (though in a special sense)
most visible, and thus the source of seeing and therefore of visibility, so is
the divine most thinkable and thus the source of thinking and therefore of
thinkability; light is never in the dark, and God is always, as we know, busy
thinking.
This is not, however, the entire story; to see this, let us return to ch. 4. At the
end of that chapter, Aristotle raises several aporiai:
If nous is something simple and unaffected and has nothing in
common with anything, as Anaxagoras says, how will it think, if
thinking is paschein tibeing affected in some way? 30
A second question is whether nous
can itself be thought? For then either nous will belong to all
other things, if it is not thought because of something else, and
that which is thought is one in form, or it will have something
mixed in it which makes it itself be thought as other things are.
31
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nous. There is not, as should be clear, a single story to be told about nous, or
at least not a single story which will make sense of nous apart from its deep
connections to the entire philosophicalscientific picture Aristotle wants to
draw. In one sense, nous is the human capacity to think; in another it is the
arch of that developed cognitive perceptual capacity we have to recognize
things for what they are and to construct logically connected bodies of
rational discourse that explain and make intelligible the world about us,
the arch, in other words, of epistme. In yet another sense it is, as I have
argued, the arch of consciousness in general; (p. 357 ) thus Aristotle's hint
at the end of the Posterior Analytics that animals have a rudimentary form
of nous in the general capacity of discrimination which is aisthsis. 43 I think
this must mean that nous is only the purest form of that general power of
cognitive awareness and discrimination that is increasingly revealed in scala
naturae.
But in yet another and broader sense nous is the arch of substance, and
therefore of psuch, the form and principle of those living beings which are
above all substances. For thinking, and consciousness in general, is the
ideal mode of a defining feature of living substances, their capacity to be
open to further determination by virtue of that determinacy of essential
being that characterizes them in the first instance as substances. A basic
ingredient of Aristotle's ontology is the relation between determinacy and
openness to determination. It is because and only because substances are
the determinate beings they are that they are capable of exhibiting that
malista idion, that most characteristic feature of substance identified early in
the Categories as the ability to take on further determination without being
overwhelmed by it, the ability to remain one and the same individual while
undergoing accidental affection. 44
For human beings, this openness to further determination is centred in
perception and thought, but it is a general feature of human psychic powers
as set forth in De Anima. The nutritive capacitythe capacity to eatis a
capacity to take in other matter (the power of ingestion) and to transform it
into oneself (the power of digestion); thus De Anima begins its discussion of
psychic powers with an account of nutrition, and specifically of nutriment,
that is, of food. In the same way, the capacity to perceive is a power to take
in the sensible forms of the world and transform them into consciousness.
Such transformations are grounded in the bodily nature of the nutritional
and perceptive powers. A significantly different story will therefore have
to be told about knowing, and particularly about nous, which is the arch
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Notes:
L. A. Kosman, 1992.
(1) DA 3. 5 430a15 ff.
(2) To say that the problematic nous of DA 3. 5 is called nous poitikos
is true of course, only if we mean called by later commentators; any
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interpretation of the phrase nous poitikos must take account of the fact that
it is not Aristotle's phrase. Every inquiry into the nature of such mind thus
depends on an act of creative inscription: the writing into Aristotle's text of a
concept that is present only implicitly and allusively. The nous poitikos is in
a sense a construction of the Aristotelian hermeneutical tradition, successful
in so far as the conceptual pattern that it actualizes in construing Aristotle's
laconic text is actually potentially present in that text.
(3) DA 3. 430a15.
(4) DA 417a21 ff.
(5) Hicks in Aristotle (1907), 499.
(6) Ibid, 500 f.
(7) DA 425b26 ff.
(8) Alexander (1887), 107, l. 31. Compare Kahn, (1981), 400: What is
regarded as problematic and requiring explanation [by nous poitikos] is
the acquisition, not the exercise, of nous as hexis. This is clearest in III 4,
where potential intellect is compared to a blank tablet on which nothing is
written, and this mode of potentiality (before it has learned or discovered
anything) is contrasted with the potency of an intellect which has become
all things, like someone actually in possession of science (epistmn). It is
the transition from the former to the latter stage of potentiality that Aristotle
attempts to explain, and it is for this explanation that he requires the agent
intellect.
(9) DA 430a15 ff.
(10) DA 418a26, 28. Cf. Ph. 201b4.
(11) As e.g. in APo. 100b16. See Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, 491a42 ff.
(12) Sens. 447a11.
(13) DA 419a7.
(14) Two of the manuscripts do have horata, but the better reading, and
the one that the commentators clearly had before them, is horatai. It may
be that horata was the result of someone being perplexed by just what's
now perplexing us. This perplexity may explain the fact that in Philoponus'
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commentary on the first half of this passage we find horatai in the body of
the commentary, but horata in the lemma (Philoponus (1887), 348, ll. 9 ff.).
(15) Republic 6. 507 ff.
(16) Republic 6. 507 D 11 ff.
(17) Republic 6. 508 C 4 ff.
(18) Reading with Proclus kai to omma ts psuchs hi d noei.
(19) Republic 6. 508 D 4 ff.
(20) EN 1139b31; APo. 85b23.
(21) In so far as readers have thought this way, the doctrine of nous has
often seemed to them an unnatural grafting of an alien teaching on to
Aristotle's considered empiricism. This has usually been part of that morality
play about Platonism and Aristotelianism that still, even against our better
judgement, repeatedly captures our imagination.
(22) I find Kahn's reasoning here exactly backwards: If the transition from
hexis to exercise does not require separate attention, that is perhaps
because Aristotle does not think of it as constituting a distinct problem. It is,
after all, only by repeated acts of nosis that we acquire the hexis of nous
Kahn (1981), 400.
(23) DA 429b5.
(24) Diog. Laert. 2. 6.
(25) Metaph. 985a18 ff.
(26) Metaph. 984b15 ff.
(27) DA 429a18 ff. Philoponus innocently explains (1897, 5231. 2); To rule
for Anaxagoras is to know for Aristotle.
(28) DA 429a22 ff.
(29) DA 430a18; Metaph. 1071b20.
(30) DA 429b23 ff.
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