Personality and Individual Differences 55 (2013) 218223

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Personality and Individual Differences

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/paid

Resolute ignorance on race and Rushton

Linda S. Gottfredson
School of Education, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716, USA

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history:
Available online 26 November 2012
Keywords:
Evolution
Intelligence
Life-history theory
Mob science
Race differences
Resolute ignorance

a b s t r a c t
I review Rushtons research on the evolutionary divergence of the three major human lineages. His lifehistory theory predicts, and his multiple analyses document, a consistent three-way patterning of mean
differences among blacks, whites, and East Asians on coevolved sets of morphological, physiological,
developmental, psychological, and behavioral traits. I then analyze a typical example of how critics evaluate his work, including the rate at which they cast his scientic hypotheses, methods and conclusions in
politically charged language. The set of articles in question, although authored by well-known academics
and appearing in a major, peer-reviewed journal, illustrate how mob science works to discredit valid
research and enforce collective ignorance about entire bodies of evidence. Rushton is a scholar and gentleman but it appears that his critics often act like neither.
2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
Philippe (Phil) Rushton has contributed important works to
evolutionary psychology, intelligence, and personality psychology.
I focus here on his work receiving the most attention. That is his
life history theory of how the major races, or geographic lineages,
evolved in somewhat different directions as humans spread out of
Africa about 50100 kya (Rushton, 1995). He has documented a
large suite of morphological, physiological, developmental, psychological, and behavioral differences among these groups, whose
most recent common ancestors are from Africa, Europe and East
Asia. These various traits cohere evolutionarily and are consistent
with his life history explanation of the wide array of mean group
differences that persist over generations.
I rst assess Rushtons research contributions. Then I analyze a
typical example of the scornful commentary on the man and his
worka target article and eight comments published together in
a major, peer-reviewed journal. I look especially at the nature of
evidence and argument used by Rushton and the authors asked
to evaluate his work.

us we could form children into anything we wished, not unlike

the Soviets New Man.
Phil Rushton began his career by addressing one of evolutionary
psychologys biggest challenges at the time. Altruism seems to require reproductive self-sacrice, so how could it possibly have
evolved? This work garnered him praise and a Guggenheim Fellowship. Humans are not promiscuous altruists, of course, but favor persons genetically similar to themselves. This led him to
ponder the dissimilarities that have intrigued writers and travelers
throughout human history: Why do the different tribes of man
look and live so differently?
During the 1980s Rushton began systematically testing a
theory-based life-history explanation. As I describe later, the lifehistory perspective allowed him to predict a particular pattern of
evolved differences among genetic lineages. These predictions are
not obvious because they link seemingly unconnected attributes
across different realms of human existence, from sexual behavior
to social organization. The great sweep yet high specicity of his
theory with regard to racial differences would seem to make it easy
to disprove if false. To test it, Rushton collected a broad spectrum
of primary and secondary data, comprising three categories.

2. Rushtons approach to human biodiversity

2.1. Evolutionary life history

Rushton is proudly of the London School of thought in psychology. It rejects the separation of mind from body and of culture from
its genetic substrate, preferring instead to probe their connections.
It was an outpost of biological realism during the long reign of
behaviorism, whose founder James B. Watson famously assured

Life history is a population-level concept. It refers to the coordinated suite of traits and behaviors that characterizes a particular
species or subspecies (its shared life), which evolved in response
to the recurring adaptive challenges its members faced (its evolutionary history). The life-history concept highlights an important
empirical phenomenon. A species distinctive traitssuch as humans large brain, slow maturation, and pair bondingdo not
evolve independently, one by one, but as a constellation of

Tel.: +1 302 831 1650; fax: +1 302 831 6058.

E-mail address: [email protected]
0191-8869/$ - see front matter 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2012.10.021

L.S. Gottfredson / Personality and Individual Differences 55 (2013) 218223

co-evolving traits. In fact, the nexus of traits typifying a species had

to have evolved in a coordinated manner in order for the organism
to maintain or enhance its evolutionary tness. For instance, a bigger brain relative to body size consumes more of an organisms
xed energy budget, so humans (those who survived) evolved a
smaller gut to afford their metabolically expensive brains, which
in turn required a less toxic and more easily digested diet, which
the innovation of cooking provides. The physical and logistic constraints of bearing and nurturing big-brained babies likewise generated correlated selection pressures on social behaviors, including
male and female mating strategies, pair bonding, parenting, and
provisioning.
Rushton relies on the rK version of life history theory that evolutionary biologists have used to distinguish species throughout
the animal kingdom. The rK version arrays organisms along a continuum of reproductive strategies, from highly r-selected species
(many offspring, little parenting) to highly K-selected species
(few offspring, much parenting). The assumption is that, given its
evolutionary importance, reproductive strategy is likely the axis
around which other species-typical traits become organized. The
two strategies, r and K, are alternative means to the same end:
reproductive tness, which is to produce more genetic descendants
than the Joneses.
Biologists have used rK theory to compare members of the
same species, but Rushton was the rst to apply it so systematically to humans. His aim has been to determine whether, and
how well, it can explain the many systematic differences observed
today among major branches of the human family. He focuses on
three. While their labels have changed over time, their origins have
not: lineages tracing their ancestry to sub-Saharan Africa (Negroids
or blacks), East Asia (Orientals or East Asians), and the lands inbetween (Caucasians or whites).
Rushton gathered already-published population data on several
dozen traits from institutional sources such as the US military (e.g.,
head size) and Interpol (international crime rates). His most recent
update (Rushton & Jensen, 2005, Table 3; reproduced in Nyborg,
this issue) compares the three geographic lineages on 26 measures: intelligence (3 indicators), brain size (2), maturation rate
(7), personality (5), reproduction (6), and social organization (3).
The set forms a consistent pattern illustrating key insights from life
history theory, in turn supporting his application of it to humans.
First, mean population differences are numerous, consistent,
and generalized across the body and behavior. Whites are intermediate to blacks and East Asians on virtually all (24) of the 26 measures, whether they be physical or behavioral, speed or size. For
instance, physical maturation (skeletal, motor, dental, lifespan)
and sexual maturation (age of rst intercourse, rst pregnancy)
are accelerated in blacks relative to whites, and in whites relative
to East Asians. Compared with whites, American blacks have larger
bodies (reported elsewhere), larger secondary sex characteristics,
higher hormone levels, and higher rates of sexual intercourse and
two-egg DZ twinning (not MZ twinning)with the reverse being
true for reproductive behavior in East Asians compared with
whites. A three-way pattern of mean differences is also seen in personality, with blacks being the most (and East Asians the least)
aggressive, impulsive, dominant and sociable, whereas East Asians
are the most cautious (and blacks the least) on average. It is also
seen in social organization, with East Asians having higher rates
of marital stability, law abidingness, and mental health than
whites, and whites having higher rates than blacks.
The apparent evolutionary divergence between the three lineages is not just from the neck down. East Asians have the largest
skulls, largest brains, and most cortical neurons, whereas blacks
have the smallest skulls and brains and the fewest cortical neurons,
on average. These differences in the physical brain are mirrored by
comparable mean group differences in the speed and quality of the

219

brains information processing. East Asians have the fastest decision reaction times (measured in milliseconds) on elementary cognitive tasks, which are so simple that virtually everyone can
perform them correctly, and they also have the highest average
levels of general intelligence (g) on validated, unbiased tests of
intelligence.
The pattern of cranial vs. sub-cranial group differences illustrates a second insight from life-history theory: evolution imposes
tradeoffs. For example, the populations with larger brains have
(had to evolve) smaller bodies; and those with slower maturing
offspring have (had to evolve) more socially and sexually constrained adults.
Note that none of the aforementioned biological traits is a social
marker of race, either singly or collectively, as would be skin color
and hair type. Moreover, as Rushton and others have shown, within-race variation in all these characteristics is moderately to highly
heritable, so we cannot dismiss the possibility that mean group differences in body and behavior are also somewhat genetically
rooted. In fact, these mean differences in non-racial traits appear
to shift in tandem, as a coordinated set, from one human lineage to
another. This implicates a consistent deep inuence linked more
tightly to distant genetic heritage than to current circumstance.
The great variation within racial groups is entirely consistent with
genetic divergence, because within-population variation is the
grist for evolution. Also consistent is the systematic overlap among
groups, because mean differences in genotype will emerge from
the same ancestral genotype, slowly but surely, when the groups
adaptive demands diverge and consistently pull selection in somewhat different directions.
Rushtons results reect a third insight of life history theory:
individuals do not evolve, populations do. A populations social
organizationits culturenecessarily co-evolves with the distribution of its members attributes. Humans, for example, are not just
an exceptionally brainy primate, but also an especially social one.
We have a special penchant for pair bonding (even if serial), living
and working in groups, forming networks and coalitions, trading,
teaching, gossiping, reading others minds, and befriending nonkin. Our big-brained, slow-maturing, vulnerable and care-intensive
children would not survive without such enduring social networks
and bonds of long-term reciprocity.
Rushtons version of life-history theory proposes that reproductive strategies drive (cause) differences in social organization.
Although all humans are K-oriented (relatively few offspring with
much parenting), his rK theory posits that the somewhat less Koriented human populations will tend more strongly toward social
relations guided by self-interest, relative physical strength, and a
tolerance for interpersonal conict, with the result that, from a K
perspective, they produce cultures with less stable families, less organized institutions, more transgressions of person and property,
and therefore higher rates of mental and physical illness. In contrast, more K-oriented lineages produce societies whose members
tend to exercise more self-control, social control, and mutual coordination in the pursuit of longer-term shared goals, with the result
that such groups will create somewhat better organized, more productive, personally secure andfrom an r perspectivemore rigid
societies that tightly constrain what their members may do. Nonevolutionary explanations have been offered for these differences
in social organization but none, to my knowledge, can account
forlet alone has predictedthe nexus of physical, mental, and
behavioral mean differences that Rushton foundand had
predicted.
2.2. Forensic anthropology
Rushton has also tested his life-history theory by following
hominoids back down their evolutionary tree. Rushton and

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L.S. Gottfredson / Personality and Individual Differences 55 (2013) 218223

Rushton (2004) examined progressive changes in 76 musculo-skeletal traits across seven hominoid populations, listed here by evolutionary age: Pan troglodytes (chimpanzee), Australopithecines, Homo
habilis, Homo erectus, Africans, Europeans, and East Asians (for humans: Rosenberg et al., 2005). The aim was to test the hypothesis
that a cascade of skeletal changes accompanied the evolution of
brain size in hominoids, ranging from humans most distant relative (the chimpanzee, 5 mya) to the youngest human lineage (East
Asians). Standard texts on evolutionary anatomy provided data on
76 skeletal traits for the one ape and the three fossil species, and
standard forensic anthropology textbooks provided data on 42
traits for the three human populations.
The skeletal data for the seven hominoid groups did, in fact, differentiate them in the same order as did their evolutionary distance from the youngest human lineage (East Asians). Of the 42
traits available for the three racial groups, 38 were measured in
absolute terms14 cranial traits (including cranial capacity), 8
teeth and mandibular traits, 3 neck, 3 pelvic, and 12 upper and
lower limb traits. All but one (nasal bone prominence) t the predicted pattern.
The 6 other traits, measured as body proportions, uniformly did
not (e.g., leg length as a % of height, weight of upper limbs as % of
body weight). Ratios and percentages of a trait are hard to interpret
because they have different measurement properties than do absolute measures of a trait, such as length, area, volume and weight.
Nor is it clear that rK theory makes any predictions for body proportions. If we set the body proportions data aside for now, it appears that the increase in cranial capacity from 380 to 1364 cm3
across the 7 hominoid groups was accompanied by systematic
and pervasive changes across the musculo-skeletal system, including cranial traits (e.g., size and shape of the skull, jaw, teeth, eye
sockets, brows, muscle attachments) as well as post-cranial traits
(e.g., dimensions, shape and orientation of particular bones, joints,
and pelvis). The most general change is that the musculo-skeletal
system became less robust as brain size increased. Perhaps there
is a non-evolutionary explanation for the progressive and pervasive skeletal differences among blacks, whites, and East Asians that
are so well known to forensic investigators, but I am not aware of
any plausible ones having been offered.

2.3. Patterns of phenotypic and genetic variation in intelligence

If the major human races diverged physically and behaviorally
during evolution, their living descendants should differ genetically,
on average. Self-identied races are different branches of the human family, as conrmed in the last decade by studies of the Y
chromosome, mitochondrial DNA, neutral markers on the 22 pairs
of autosomal chromosomes, number of short tandem repeats on
various ones, and more. But that is not the issue here. It is whether
a highly particular, much documented, mean phenotypic difference among the major human races has a genetic component.
Of all human traits, variation in general intelligence (g) is the
functionally most important in modern life. The rst question that
behavior genetics tackled was how heritable are within-group differences in intelligence?the answer: very. The next obvious
question is how heritable are the between-group differences in
phenotypic intelligence? It could easily be answered using todays
analytical methods, but no scientic discipline will touch it. Most
would have to be shut down completely, however, to avoid generating relevant evidence. Traits that are so useful in daily life and so
heritable across generations are going to manifest themselves in
many predictable ways. Rushton has marshaled relevant such evidence on intelligence to test competing hypotheses about the longstanding mean IQ difference between American blacks and whites:
0% genetic vs. 5080% genetic.

The latter range of percentages is Jensens (1998) default

hypothesis, which is that within-race variation and between-race
variation arise from the same sources, whether genetic or environmental. Accordingly, there is no Factor X operating on all members
of one race but on no member of another. (Anything that affects
some but not all members of a group would show up as a within-group inuence.) If within-race IQ variation is 5080% heritable,
as it is in the West, the default hypothesis predicts that betweengroup differences will be too. This is a readily testable hypothesis,
but virtually no one with the necessary data has been willing to
test it or lend the data to others who are.
Rushton and Jensen (2005) tackled the question by having their
hereditarian hypothesis (5080% genetic) compete head-to-head
with the culture-only hypothesis (0% genetic) in 10 categories of
evidence: the worldwide distribution of test scores, the g factor of
mental ability, heritability, brain size and its relation to mental
ability, transracial adoption, racial admixture, regression to the
mean effects, related life-history traits, human origins research,
and hypothesized environmental inuences on intelligence. This
set captures much of the dense nomological network of empirical
evidence on psychometric g, including its genetic structure, biological and social correlates, behavioral manifestations, joint heritability with brain structure, function, and life outcomes,
developmental course, and manipulability by various experimental
means, including adoption.
The evidence in at least 7 of the 10 categories is much replicated, often over time, age, sex, race, class, and geography, and
therefore provides a rm basis for comparison. The 5080% genetic
hypothesis ts this array of evidence far better than does the culture-only hypothesis (Gottfredson, 2005). Where the two make
opposite predictions, the hereditarian predictions are conrmed
and the culture-only predictions are contradicted. For instance,
achievement differences expand just when the culture-only explanation says they will contractwhen resources and opportunity
are equalized (Ceci & Papierno, 2005). And, as noted earlier, group
differences follow geographic ancestry far more closely than the
groups current location or circumstances. They behave just like
evolved, genetically-inuenced traits are expected to behavewith
great consistency regardless of species-typical variations in nongenetic milieu. The greater explanatory success of the 5080% genetic hypothesis does not prove it true, but that is better approximates the truth than does its never-plausible 0%-genetic
competitor.
3. The critics approach to Rushton and race
In 1989 Rushton summarized his evidence for a black-whiteEast Asian gradient in life-history traits at the AAAS meeting in
San Francisco. There followed a convulsion of excoriation by the
scientic establishment, his home institution (University of Western Ontario), and the Canadian government (Rushton, 1998). All
launched investigations into his work. He was shunned and isolated by fellow academics, as if having a professionally deadly contagious disease. When he presented his corpus of published
evidence in book formRace Evolution, and Behavior: A Life History
Perspective (1995)it was greeted as inammatory, indecent,
pseudoscientic, racist trash, and in scatological terms too
(Gottfredson, 1996).
3.1. High talk and low blows
In a collective exercise in conrmation bias, Rushtons critics
spied damning evidence of scientic and moral perdy wherever
they looked. They saw nothing exculpatory, or even ordinary, in
his conduct. So, where evolutionary psychology had always
concentrated on sexual selection and therefore on mating strate-

L.S. Gottfredson / Personality and Individual Differences 55 (2013) 218223

gies, sexual behavior, and physical attractiveness to the opposite

sex, critics insinuated that Rushtons interest was prurient.
Although behavioral geneticists were busy estimating the heritability of intelligence differences within races, Rushtons interest
in possible between-race genetic differences betrayed, to them,
an archaic racial elitism. And while none denied that the human
species remarkably large brain is largely responsible for its
remarkably high intelligence, they said Rushton was resurrecting
long-discredited 19th century thinking when he asserted (correctly) that brain size and intelligence are correlated in modern
humans.
Rushton answered all published critiques while carefully adhering to the scientic coda his critics often agrantly violatedlogic,
weight of evidence, and no aspersions on character. Rushtons dispassionate scientic manner on socially sensitive questions only
conrmed for them that he was a heartless ideologue misusing science for pernicious ends. I illustrate this phenomenon of high talk
and low blows, as sociologist Robert A. Gordon calls it, with a concrete example. It is a target article (Lieberman, 2001) and associated comments published in Current Anthropology. The
Anthropological Reviews 2007 obituary for Lieberman lauded him
for having often challenged racists and racialist views. It pointed
specically to his 2001 article because it dissected and ridiculed
[Rushtons] views of supposed racial differences in intelligence.

3.2. Argument from authority, political opinion, and impossible

standard of proof
Lieberman opens with a question that itself damns Rushton. A
century of anthropological work has invalidated Rushtons claims,
so how can he claim to nd in it a racial hierarchy for intelligence
and brain size? The question is thus not whether Rushton is wrong,
but why and how he persists in being so wrong. The articles rst
section (Changing Hierarchical Worldviews) justies the premise, and the second (Abusing Anthropological Research) explains the paradox of how Rushton and other scientic
racists could claim to be doing science when they draw evidence
from the very elds that disavow racism and the concept of race (p.
74).

221

To justify his premise, Lieberman describes 19th century research on cranial size and its social context which, he says, was
the need by Caucasians to justify their domination and exploitation
of other races. He discredits that research and Rushtons own primarily by appealing to authority in 20th century anthropology:
Franz Boass theorizing (no link between culture and genes), ofcial statements on race from the UN and the American Anthropological Association (no biological races, no meaningful innate
racial differences), Goulds critiques of research on intelligence,
brain size, and heritability (none is valid), and anthropologys disavowal of hierarchical and racist thinking. Lieberman also
draws from stock concerns, long-since resolved, about possible
methodological aws in twin research, brain research, behavior
genetics, and mental testing. He says nothing about the explosion
of research in the 1990s using the Y chromosome and mtDNA to
trace the evolution of human lineages as they migrated across
the globe. He says nothing about Rushtons many other 3-way results on reproductive behavior, sex hormones, twinning rate,
speed of physical maturation, personality, family stability, lawabidingness, and social organization (p. 74), except to summarily
dismiss them as a faulty blizzard of data (p. 78).
Zeroing in on Rushtons IQ, race, and brain size analyses,
Lieberman details his own list of 6 major errors. Briey, Rushton
uses race despite decades of ndings that invalidate it, his conclusions about racial differences in cranial capacity are contradicted by evolutionary anthropology, he did not account for
environmental factors that surely inuence cranial capacity and
intelligence, his measurements tell us nothing because they are
confounded or the differences they reveal are trivial in size, he cannot claim to explain a vast array of human behaviors because
some of his measures and concepts may be faulty, and his principle of aggregation (e.g., grouping diverse populations into races,
averaging results from different studies) is invalid. Aggregation is
Liebermans single most frequent complaint of the 6 (38 times in
14 pages), even though it is a well-known principle that averaging
non-comparable samples would work against Rushtons nding
consistent patterns.
The rst two errors are, again, appeals to authority. The next
two disallow drawing conclusions until an innite regress of alternatives has been considered, and the last two demand uniformly

Table 1
Terms used to impugn Rushton without rebutting his evidence.
Category

Instances per page

Examples (Italicized items appeared only in Lieberman, boldfaced only in commentaries)

Lieberman (2001)
(12 pages article,
2 of reply)

Associated 6 hostile
commentaries
(7 pages total)

Evil ideology
Hierarchical thinking

4.9

4.4

Racist thinking

2.8

7.1

Evil people & events

Evil politics
Destructive results
Subtotal

0.7
1.3
0.3
10.0

0.9
2.6
1.1
16.1

Unacceptable science
Incompetent

8.4

6.0

Pseudoscientic

2.0

5.7

Dangerous

0.4

0.9

Subtotal
Total per page
(N instances)

10.8
20.8
(291)

12.6
28.7
(201)

Essentialism, Eurocentric, Causasoid-centrism, hierarchical or typological thinking (many

variations)
Racism (latent, academic, scientic), racial ideology, inferiority, racial proling,
xenophobia
Apartheid, colonialism, genocide, Holocaust, Nazi, Jim Crow segregation, slavery, Southerners
Disenfranchise, dominate, exclude, exploit, justify (various evils), torture, violence
Destruction of social generosity, discriminatory, downtrodden, inequity (& variations), misery

Aggregated, confounded, deterministic, erroneous, illogical, lacks (evidence, validity,

conceptual and empirical merit), seriously awed, statistical artifact, substandard, subjective,
unsophisticated
Absurd, bad biology, biased, contrived, deceptive, diseased, fabricated (races), fascinated by
sexuality of savages, fetishizes the brain, inexcusable anthropology, mischievous speculation,
reactionary, same old lies, self-serving, sorry mess
Alarming, dangerous, destructive, notorious, odious

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L.S. Gottfredson / Personality and Individual Differences 55 (2013) 218223

perfect data and measurement before concluding anything from a

body of evidence. All insulate his factual premise (no evolved differences) from disconrmation by creating ve thou-shall-nots
that selectively handicap researchers who might disagree. Scientists shall not refer to race except as a social construct; not group
people or results by race unless to illustrate environmental effects;
not hypothesize evolutionary differences that contradict reigning
antiracist opinion in anthropology; not infer any genetic differences before ruling out all non-genetic inuences; and not draw
non-reigning conclusions about patterns of racial differences in a
large body of data if any particular datum might be faulty.
Lieberman moves Rushtons work into the political realm by always labeling his hypotheses and results with political terms. It is
hierarchical (because it measures ordinal differences on a trait),
racist (it nds mean racial differences in traits), and a justication for inequities (it predicts social inequality when those traits
matter). Table 1 illustrates this practice by categorizing his terms
of derogation. (Data for detailed categories are available from the
author.) He uses an average of 21 derogations per page, split evenly
between connoting extreme right-wing politics and unacceptable
science. Forty percent (8.4 per page) allege error in politically neutral terms (lacks evidence), but almost as many render his
hypotheses and results politically noxious by relabeling them hierarchical and racist (4.9 and 2.8 times per page).
The lone dissenting commentary, by Henry Harpending, objects
to Lieberman repeatedly attributing notions of inferiority and
superiority to Rushton (56 times, not shown), but Lieberman insists that Rushtons work implies them. He further connotes immoral politics by describing Rushtons research as notorious,
destructive, and socially harmful and situating it within a history of political evils (slavery, genocide, torture, exploitation) and
social harm (misery, poverty, inequality).
3.3. Mob science
Rushton was invited to submit a comment, as was one anthropologist well-known [for his] support of racial differences (p. 90).
The other 6 individuals were already on record as hostile to such
ideas. They are less restrained than Lieberman, their negative
descriptors being more numerous (29 vs. 21 per page) and more
extreme (odious, quackery, same old lies). They less often
use politically neutral terms to allege scientic incompetence,
but are over twice as likely as Lieberman (per page) to associate
Rushton with racist thinking, evil politics, pseudoscience, social
harm, and imminent danger. Their commentaries vary in emphasis

and personal abuse, as such commentaries usually do: Loring Brace

(inexcusable anthropology), Fatimah Jackson (diseased,
twisted, same old misrepresentations), Jonathan Marks (modern creationism, quackery), John Relethford (resurgence of racial classication), Audrey Smedley (so-called science), Verena
Stolke (continuity of racist thought, persisting exclusions),
and Fredric Weizmann (strong claims, relationships of minimal
importance).
Taken as a whole, the symposium illustrates what happens
when high talk and low blows is practiced collectively: unrestrained mob action to destroy a purportedly vile member of the
group, invite a single defender to speak from the sidelines, and allow the target to say a few words which the crowd will ignore or
ridicule.
3.4. Resolute ignorance
The rst rule in science is to consider the totality of evidence;
the second is to make alternative hypotheses compete in explaining it. Rushton has done both, but Lieberman and commentators do
neither. Table 2 helps illustrate how a hostile crowd can circumvent these rules yet still appear scientic in order to maintain resolute ignorance about some stubborn, unwelcome fact, as the late
sociologist William Beer dubbed itin this case mean racial differences in general intelligence.
The table lists the seven common rebuttals, ranging from intelligence doesnt exist to racial differences are unthinkable. Most
critics accept some of the foundational ndings (second column)
but seldom the same ones, meaning their yes-buts often clash.
One may discredit the notion of racial gaps in intelligence by rst
accepting some of the evidence (Yes, intelligence exists) but then
rejecting the next link in the chain of evidence (but it cant be
measured fairly). Another may concede that Yes, it can be measured, but reject a different link in the evidentiary chain (but it
isnt important in real life), yet both stand arm-in-arm to denounce the evidence. All that matters in mob science is that critics
howl together at the target.
Lieberman and fellow critics likewise jab haphazardly at different nodes in Rushtons network of evidence. All dismiss his
hypothesis of evolved racial differences in intelligence on the
grounds that races dont exist. But the evidence does not melt away
for being relabeled, ignored, or characterized in nasty terms. Therefore, in yes-but fashion, some of the 7 add that intelligence
doesnt exist either; others that it exists but isnt important, or isnt
as heritable as it seems; yet others contend that the race-IQ gap is

Table 2
Yes-but gambits commonly used to ignore evidence on mean racial differences in intelligence (g).
Yes-but gambits:
Racial gaps in
intelligence are. . .

Yes-A bedrock nding is

conceded

But-A false claim is pressed to

justify ignoring the bedrock nding

Because-Fallacious evidence is used to support the false

1. Nonexistent

Yes, there is a black-white gap

in IQ scores
Yes, IQ tests do measure
(developed) intelligence
Yes, black-white IQ gap reects
gap in average intelligence
Yes, intelligence has practical
importance
Yes, differences in intelligence
are stubborn (resistant to
intervention)
Yes, IQ differences within a race
are quite heritable

But, there is no such thing as

intelligence (or g)
But, tests are culturally biased
against blacks
But, its trivial or lacks practical
importance
But, intelligence is malleable

Why? Disagreement over its denition (I); Only a cultural (or

statistical) artifact (D); Undemocratic (E)
Why? Tests created by whites (I); Require cultural knowledge (I);
Ruse to justify discrimination (E)
Why? Important only when treated as such (D); Narrow
academic ability (D); Not a measure of human worth (I, E)
Why? Brains, skills, & knowledge change with age & experience
(I); Must not give up on less able persons (E)
Why? Abilities not xed (I); Genes & environments interact (I);
Differences explained by social advantage (D)

2. Mismeasured
3. Unimportant
4. Malleable
5. Environmental

6. Disproved

7. Unthinkable

claim. Examples for: Disproved hypotheses; Irrelevant truths;

Emotional appeals

Yes, a 5080% genetic blackwhite IQ gap ts the evidence

But, intelligence is not genetically

determined
But, the average differences
between races have been proved not
to be genetic
But, we must not let anyone suggest
the gap is partly genetic

Why? There is no gene for race (I); Race is a social not

biological phenomenon (D); Racists are hereditarian (E)
Why? Dangerous if hypothesis is false (E); Even more dangerous
if true (E); Hitler thought the gaps genetic (E)

L.S. Gottfredson / Personality and Individual Differences 55 (2013) 218223

trivial, or will be washed away by the Flynn Effect, or that Gould

discredited the whole business of measuring intelligence and brain
size. They reunite again in suggesting that no credible scientist
could possibly agree with Rushton. Yet it is Goulds work on cranial
capacity, not Rushtons, that we now learn was fudged and falsied
(Lewis et al., 2011)just as Rushton said it was.
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Jensen, A. R. (1998). The g factor. Westport, CT: Praeger.

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