The Role of Emotions in Marketing

Richard P. Bagozzi
University of Michigan

Mahesh Gopinath
Tulane University

Prashanth U. Nyer
Chapman University

Emotions are mental states of readiness that arise from appraisals of events or one 's own thoughts. In this article, the
authors discuss the differentiation of emotions from affect,
moods, and attitudes, and outline an appraisal theory of
emotions. Next, various measurement issues are considered. This is followed by an analysis of the role of arousal
in emotions. Emotions as markers, mediators, and moderators of consumer responses are then analyzed. The
authors turn next to the influence of emotions on cognitive
processes, which is followed by a study of the implications
of emotions for volitions, goal-directed behavior, and decisions to help. Emotions and customer satisfaction are
briefly explored, too. The article closes with a number of
questions for future research.

This article addresses emotional behavior in marketing.

In comparison to information processing and behavioral
decision research, we know much less about the role of
emotions in marketing behavior. Much of what we do
know is confined to consumer behavior, as opposed to the
behavior of salespeople or marketing managers.
Nevertheless, emotions are central to the actions of
consumers and managers alike. Our goal in this article will
be to present a framework for thinking about emotions; to
discuss the measurement of emotions; to review how emotions function as causes, effects, mediators, and moderators

Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science.

Volume 27, No. 2, pages 184-206.
Copyright 9 1999 by Academy of Marketing Science.

in marketing behavior; and to provide suggestions for

future research.

THEORY AND FUNCTION OF EMOTIONS

Little consistency can be found in the use of terminology related to emotions. For purposes of organization and
discussion, we begin with a definition of emotions and
then turn to a framework for interpreting emotional
behavior.

Definitions
The term affect will be conceived herein as an umbrella
for a set of more specific mental processes including emotions, moods, and (possibly) attitudes. Thus, affect might
be considered a general category for mental feeling
processes, rather than a particular psychological process,
per se.
By emotion, we mean a mental state of readiness that
arises from cognitive appraisals of events or thoughts; has
a phenomenological tone; is accompanied by physiological processes; is often expressed physically (e.g., in gestures, posture, facial features); and may result in specific
actions to affirm or cope with the emotion, depending on
its nature and meaning for the person having it. For a similar perspective, see Lazarus (1991) and Oatley (1992).
The line between an emotion and mood is frequently
difficult to draw but often by convention involves conceiving of a mood as being longer lasting (from a few hours up
to days) and lower in intensity than an emotion. Yet, exceptions to this construal can be found. Still another distinction

Bagozziet al. / THE ROLEOF EMOTIONS 185

between emotions and moods is that the former typically is

intentional (i.e., it has an object or referent), whereas
moods are generally nonintentional and global or diffused
(Frijda 1993). Also, moods are not as directly coupled with
action tendencies and explicit actions as are many
emotions.
Finally, attitudes, too, are often considered instances of
affect, with the same measures used on occasion to indicate
emotions and attitudes (e.g., pleasant-unpleasant, happysad, or interested-bored semantic differential items). However, some authors take a narrower view of attitudes and
define them as evaluative judgments (measured, e.g., by
good-bad reactions) rather than emotional states. Cohen
and Areni (1991), for instance, reserve the term affect for
"valenced feeling states," with emotions and moods as
specific examples. Attitudes are evaluative judgments in
their view. Nevertheless, other researchers do not make a
distinction between affect and evaluative judgments. For
example, Eagly and Chaiken (1993) point out that Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) and other social psychologists have
"regarded affect as isomorphic with evaluation itself and
used the terms interchangeably" (p. 12). Still others propose that attitudes have two distinct, but generally highly
correlated, components: affective and cognitive (or
evaluative) dimensions. Some empirical support exists for
this interpretation (Bagozzi and Burnkrant 1979; Batra
and Ahtola 1990; Breckler and Wiggins 1989; Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty 1994; Eagly, Mladinic, and Otto 1994).
It should be recognized that the terms affect, emotions,
moods, and attitudes have frequently been used inconsistently in the literature. We will revisit this issue when we
consider both measurement issues and customer satisfaction research below. For now, we stress that when reading
the literature, it is important to pay attention to how
authors define affective (and related) terminologies and
how they measure the variables to which the terminologies
refer. One's definition of terms permits an interpretation of
their meaning, but equally important is how the variables
to which the terms refer are operationalized. Some authors
have defined key variables as emotions, moods, or attitudes but have used operationalizations corresponding to
different concepts. Other authors have used operationalizations for a single variable that cut across two or more
instances of affect. To make clear our definition of emotions and how it differs from definitions of mood and attitudes, we present the following point of view.

Organizing Framework
Above we noted that emotions are mental states of
readiness. But so, too, are moods and attitudes. How then
might we distinguish between these affective states? For
one thing, the state of readiness characterized by an emotion tends to be more intense than that characterized by
moods or attitudes. It is more intense in the sense of

strength of felt subjective experience, plus magnitude of

physiological response (e.g., autonomic nervous system
activity) and extent of bodily expression (e.g., facial displays), when these latter reactions accompany an emotion.
Probably the most important factor differentiating
emotions from moods and attitudes is the way emotions
arise. Emotions are said to have a specific referent (e.g., a
consumer becomes pleased when a new detergent removes
grass stains from clothing; he or she is angered by poor service in a restaurant). Specifically, emotions arise in
response to appraisals one makes for something of relevance to one's well-being. By appraisal, we mean an
evaluative judgment and interpretation thereof. By something of relevance, we mean an incident or episode that
happens to oneself (e.g., an unplanned event); a behavior
one performs or a result one produces (e.g., engaging in an
activity or receiving or failing to receive a planned outcome); or a change in an object, person, or thought that has
personal meaning.
It is important to stress that although categories of
events or physical circumstances are frequently associated
with particular emotional responses, it is not the specific
events or physical circumstances that produce the emotions but rather the unique psychological appraisal made
by the person evaluating and interpreting the events and
circumstances. Different people can have different emotional reactions (or no emotional reactions at all) to the
same event or happening. Note, too, that appraisals can be
deliberative, purposive, and conscious, but also unrefiecfive, automatic, and unconscious, depending on the person
and eliciting conditions for emotional arousal. The central
role of appraisals in the formation of emotions has come to
define what are aptly called appraisal theories in psychology (e.g., Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991; Ortony, Clore, and
Collins 1988; Roseman 1991; Smith and Ellsworth 1985).
Appraisal theorists maintain that the critical determinant of any emotion is the resultant evaluation and interpretation that arise after comparing an actual state with a
desired state. Two appraisals are particularly crucial at this
stage of emotion formation: goal relevance and goal congruence (Lazarus 1991). That is, a necessary condition for
an emotional response to an event or happening is that a
person has a personal stake in it and at the same time
judges the event or happening to facilitate or thwart this
stake. Again, the appraisal can occur consciously or
unconsciously.
A distinctive feature of appraisal theories is their specification of the conditions leading to discrete emotional
responses. Forced to be brief, we focus on Roseman's
(1991) version of appraisal theories, which differs in relatively minor ways from other leading theories. Roseman
hypothesized that particular combinations of five appraisals determine which of 16 unique emotions will be experienced in any given situation. Figure 1 summarizes his theory, where the five appraisals are labeled motive

186

JOURNALOF THE ACADEMYOF MARKETINGSCIENCE

FIGURE 1
Roseman's (1991) Appraisal
Theory of Emotions
Posiuve Emotions
Motive-Consistent

NegativeEmotions
Motive-lnconslstent

Circumstance Appetitive [ Averslve Appetitive I Aversive

caused
unexpected
Sur~se
Fear
11ricertaila
Hope
Weak
certain
Joy [ Relief Sadness Distress, Disgust
uncertain
Hope
Strong
Frustratton
eertam
Joy I Relief
Other-caused
Dishke
Weak
uncertain
Ldong
ceruun
I

unee~

Anger

Strong

Shame, Guilt

Weak

Regret

Strong

Self-caused
uncertain
certain
uncertain
c~l'tain

Pride

SOURCE:Roseman(1991:193). Reprintedwithpermission.

consistent/motive inconsistent (i.e., positive emotions versus negative emotions), appetitive/aversive (i.e., presence
of a reward vs. absence of a punishment), agency (i.e., outcome is perceived caused by impersonal circumstances,
some other person, or the self), probability (i.e., an outcome is certain or uncertain), and power (i.e., strong versus weak coping potential).
For example, pride occurs when one evaluates his or her
own performance of an action or achievement of an outcome in a positive light (e.g., a feeling of having done
well). Here the positive emotion is motive consistent,
either appetitive (e.g., having attained a positive goal) or
aversive (e.g., having avoided a punishment), selfproduced under weak or low coping potential, and either
certain or uncertain, depending on the circumstances. Sadness happens when one experiences a loss for which one
recognizes that nothing can be done to restore it. The loss,
which is of something or someone valued, is experienced
negatively and with high certainty under conditions of low
coping power. It is perceived to be caused by impersonal
circumstances.
One value of appraisal theories is that it is possible to
account for most emotions. Indeed, subtle combinations of
appraisals yield discrete emotional responses. Anger and
regret, for example, differ primarily in only one type of
appraisal and share in the other four, namely, anger occurs
when a person sees another person as the source of injury
to oneself or to another person viewed as a victim of injustice, whereas regret results when one's negative outcome
is attributed to actions or inactions of the self.

SPRING 1999
Not every emotion is accounted for by Roseman's
framework (or by any other framework for that matter).
For instance, pride is regarded as a positive emotion in
Roseman's framework, yet excessive or exaggerated pride
(sometimes termed hubris) can invite retribution. Likewise, shame and guilt are thought by Roseman to be produced by similar appraisals, but other researchers have
found important distinctions between shame, guilt, and
embarrassment (e.g., Lewis 1993). Likewise, disgust has
been studied extensively and found to differ from distress
(e.g., Rozin, Haidt, and McCauley 1993). Nevertheless, in
contrast to other theories of emotion that conceive of it in
bipolar terms (e.g., pleasure-displeasure and high
arousal-low arousal [Russell 1980] or high negative
affect-low negative affect and high positive affect-low
positive affect [Watson and Tellegen 1985]), Roseman's
framework and other appraisal theories not only allow for
many discrete emotions but specify conditions for their
occurrence.
An elaboration of appraisal theories that is especially
relevant for marketing is the treatment of goals, which may
be defined as "internal representations of desired states,
where states are broadly defined as outcomes, events, or
processes" (Austin and Vancouver 1996:338). Oatley and
Johnson-Laird (1987) proposed what they termed a communicative theory of emotions wherein events are evaluated in relation to a person's goals. Emotions are thought
to function to coordinate parts of one's cognitive system so
as to manage responses to events and in so doing change
from ongoing to new activities or to maintain desired states
or activities. The self-regulation of goals is believed to be
the main function of emotions:
Each goal and plan has a monitoring mechanism that
evaluates events relevant to it. When a substantial
change in probability occurs of achieving an important goal or subgoal, the monitoring mechanism
broadcasts to the whole cognitive system a signal
that can set it into readiness to respond to this
change. Humans experience these signals and the
states of readiness they induce as emotions. (Oatley
1992:50)
According to Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987), emotions
are evoked "at a significant juncture of a p l a n . . , typic a l l y . . , when the evaluation (conscious or unconscious)
of the likely success of a plan changes" (p. 35). Positive
emotions (e.g., happiness, elation, joy) are associated with
the attainment of a (sub)goal, which usually leads to a decision to continue with the plan, whereas negative emotions (e.g., frustration, disappointment, anxiety) result
from problems with ongoing plans and failures to achieve
desired goals (see also Stein, Liwag, and Wade 1996).
Emotions have implications for action and goal attainment. Lazarus (1991) identifies coping responses as

Bagozziet al. / THE ROLEOF EMOTIONS 187

important mechanisms in this regard. When we experience

a negative emotion (e.g., anger, sadness, fear), we are in
disequilibrium and wish to return to our normal state.
Either one or both of two coping processes are typically
used: problem-focused coping, where we attempt to alleviate the sources of distress, or emotion-focused coping,
where we either change the meaning of the source of distress (e.g., deny that a threat exists, distance oneself from
the source of distress) or avoid thinking about a problem.
By contrast, coping with positive emotions often
involves sharing one's good fortune, savoring the experience, working to continue or increase the rewards, and
increasing physical activity. Positive emotions are sometimes accompanied as well by higher levels of physiological arousal, expanded attention, increased optimism,
enhanced recall, and a shift from self- to other-centered
orientations (e.g., becoming friendlier, caring about others), when compared, say, to sadness. Indeed, positive
emotions, particularly happiness, frequently stimulate
helping or altruistic actions. Why? Schaller and Cialdini
(1990) offer two explanations: "First, we may propose that
positive mood leads to enhanced helping via the more
positive outlook and enhanced activity that appear to
spring automatically from the experience of happiness,"
and second, "we argue that happiness is associated with a
motivation toward disequilibrium--toward the possible
attainment of additional personal rewards that transcend
the basic concern over one's mood" (pp. 284-285). The
personal rewards referred to here concern such selfenrichment motives as affiliation, achievement, competence, and esteem.
Closely related to coping responses are action tendencies. An action tendency is "a readiness to engage in or disengage from interaction with some goal object" and
includes "(i)mpulses of 'moving towards,' 'moving away,'
and 'moving against' " (Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure
1989:213). Some theorists maintain that emotions are not
merely reactions to appraisals of events but also include
action tendencies as part of their meaning (Frijda 1986).
Others go further and maintain that action tendencies are
automatic, "prewired" responses connected to emotions
(LeDoux 1996). And in Frijda's (1986) treatment, emotions are conceived as the entire process from stimulus
event to action and arousal:
Stimulus event~event coding~appraisal (evaluationof
relevance, context, and urgency/difficulty/seriousnessof
event)~action readiness

action
" arousal

Much as emotions arise in response to patterns of appraisals, Frijda (1986; Frijda et al. 1989) has shown that patterns of action readiness correspond to distinct emotion

categories (e.g., avoidance with fear, helping with caring,

helplessness with sadness, assault with anger, withdrawal
with shame).
Finally, it has been argued that many coping responses
to emotions are volitional (B agozzi 1992:186-189). The
process begins with outcome-desire units and appraisals
of changes or anticipated changes in goal attainment or
goal progress. Four appraisal classes can be identified.
Outcome-desire conflicts happen when one fails to
achieve a goal or when one experiences an unpleasant
event. One or more emotional reactions occur to
outcome-desire conflicts (e.g., dissatisfaction, anger,
shame, guilt, sadness, disappointment, disgust, regret),
depending on attributions of the source of goal failure or
the unpleasant event (i.e., self, other person, or external
cause). The coping response(s) to these emotions, in turn,
is selected from the following: intent to remove or undo
harm, obtain help or support, decrease outcome, reevaluate goal, or redouble effort, if appropriate, depending on
the specific emotion involved.
Outcome-desire fulfillment takes place when one
achieves a goal, experiences a pleasant event, or avoids an
unpleasant event. One or more emotional reactions come
about when outcome-desire fulfillment happens (e.g., satisfaction, joy, elation, pleasure, pride, relief, caring, love),
again depending on attributions of the source of good fortune. The coping responses to these emotions include an
intention to maintain, to increase, to share, or to enjoy the
outcome.
Outcome-desire conflicts and fulfillment refer to outcomes in the past or present. The following two appraisal
classes go on with regard to planned outcomes. Outcomedesire avoidances transpire in anticipation of unpleasant
outcomes or goals. Fear or its variants (e.g., worry, anxiety, distress) are the emotional reactions to this appraisal.
The coping responses to these emotions entail either an
intention to avoid undesirable outcomes or to reinterpret
the threat.
The final class of appraisals, outcome-desire pursuits,
happen in anticipation of pleasant goals or outcomes.
Hope is the emotional reaction to such appraisals. The
coping response(s) to hope includes intentions to realize or
facilitate outcome attainment and to sustain one's commitment and vigilance.
The theory of self-regulation suggests that unique volitional responses underly coping for each particular emotion or class of emotions (Bagozzi 1992). In addition, the
specific intention enacted depends on one's degree of
self-efficacy in executing the coping responses. Somewhat
analogous (appraisal---~emotional reactions---~coping)
responses occur for outcome-identity conflicts, fulfillments, avoidances, and pursuits in social situations related
to normative expectations (B agozzi 1992:191-194).
Returning to the distinction between emotions and
moods and attitudes, we might say that in addition to the

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JOURNALOF THE ACADEMYOF MARKETINGSCIENCE

things mentioned earlier, emotions differ from moods and

attitudes in the manner in which they arise and in their representation in memory. Emotions occur in response to
changes in specific plans or goal-relevant events. As Oatley (1992) points out, emotions are manifest as "transitions from one sequence of action and another," but moods
occur "when the cognitive system is maintained in an emotion mode for a period" (pp. 64, 91-92). Indeed, moods are
often resistant to changes in events surrounding them. One
reason for this is that moods "depend on the dissociability
of control emotion signals from semantic information
about causation" (Oatley 1992:64). In general, moods are
elicited by "(a) after effects of emotions; (b) organismic
conditions such as illness, fatigue, previous exercise, and
good health, or pharmacological agents; (c) general environmental conditions and side-effects of activities: heat,
noise, environmental variety, stressful conditions" (Frijda
1986:289).
Like emotions, attitudes can arise from changes in
events, but attitudes also occur in response to mundane
objects. In addition, arousal is a necessary part of emotions
but not necessarily attitudes. Moreover, attitudes seem to
have the capacity to be stored during long periods of time
and retrieved, whereas emotions are not experienced in
this way (i.e., emotions are ongoing states of readiness;
they are not stored and retrieved, per se, although it is possible to recreate the conditions originally producing them
in our memory and react emotionally to the thoughts so
generated, at least up to a point; emotions can, however, be
classically conditioned, but it is unclear whether attitudes
can). Finally, the connection of emotions to volition and
action is stronger and more direct than it is for attitudes.
Emotions directly stimulate volitions and initiate action,
but attitudes may require an additional motivation impetus, such as desire (Bagozzi 1992).

MEASUREMENT OF EMOTIONS
The measurement of emotions could focus on a full set
of signs or evidence, including evaluative appraisals, subjective feelings, body posture and gestures, facial expressions, physiological responses, action tendencies, and
overt actions. Whatever measurements one uses should, of
course, be tied to an underlying theory of emotions.
Some authors (e.g., most appraisal theorists) construe
emotions as mental states or processes, and thus it would
be prudent to directly measure the cognitive activities
comprising the emotional content of these states or
processes, from this perspective. Self-reports of one's subjective experiences constitute the most frequently used
procedures in this regard, although other methods for indicating emotional memory processes might be used as well
(e.g., response time, subliminal priming). From the point
of view of mental conceptualizations of emotions,

SPRING 1999
physiological, motor, or biological indicators would be at
best considered correlates or indirect measures of
emotions.
Other researchers who interpret emotions in broader
terms, as either the whole process from the coding of
events to action responses (e.g., Frijda 1986) or as complex patterns of physiological responses (e.g., Cacioppo,
Bemtson, and Klein 1992 maintain that emotional experience is a function of somatoviscerai activation, afferentiation, and cognitive operations; LeDoux 1996 emphasizes
brain processes, especially the role of the amygdala) stress
the need for measurement processes going beyond selfreports. Depending on the theorist, overt behaviors or
physiological reactions may be considered either a part of
what it means to have an emotion or antecedents, concomitants, or possibly even effects of an emotion. More behaviorally or physiologically oriented researchers obviously
employ measures of emotions consistent with these
interpretations.
Marketers have tended to take an empirical approach to
the measurement of emotions and to rely on self-reports
(i.e., either unipolar or bipolar items on questionnaires). In
the typical application, many items cutting across numerous positive and negative emotions are administered to
measure reactions to a stimulus, and such methods as factor analysis, multidimensional scaling, or cluster analysis
are used to identify the underlying emotional dimensions
for the sample at hand. The number of items investigated in
this regard has been as large as 180 (Aaker, Stayman, and
Vezina 1988), while a paper-and-pencil technique (basically a single item measured continuously while viewing
an ad) has even been suggested to register "warmth"
toward a stimulus ad (Aaker, Stayman, and Hagerty 1986;
see also Russell, Weiss, and Mendelsohn 1989).
Two influential studies in the measurement of emotional responses toward advertisements are those by Edell
and Burke (1987) and Holbrook and Batra (1987). Edell
and Burke (see also Burke and Edell 1989) developed a
52-item scale for measuring emotions towards ads, while
Holbrook and Batra worked with a 94-item scale, which
was later reduced to 34 items (Batra and Holbrook 1990).
With so many items measuring emotions, a question
arises whether a small number of basic dimensions underlie people's responses. Edell and Burke (1987) analyzed
the items in their scale and found three factors: upbeat feelings, negative feelings, and warm feelings. Likewise, Holbrook and Batra (1987) used factor analysis, but in a
slightly different way. Their 94 items were first generated
a priori to measure 29 emotional indices. For example,
joyful, happy, delighted, and pleased were hypothesized to
indicate a joy index, and ashamed, embarrassed, and
humiliated were hypothesized to indicate a shame index.
Then, based on factor analyses of the 29 indices, a threefactor solution for emotions was found: pleasure, arousal,
and domination. Similarly, Batra and Holbrook (1990)

Bagozzi et al. / THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS

FIGURE 2
Watson and Tellegen's Two-Factor
Structure of Affect

factor analyzed 12 emotional indices (largely a subset of

those revealed in Holbrook and Batra, with a few exceptions) and discovered three factors corresponding closely
to those discovered by Edell and Burke. Other researchers
(e.g., Oliver 1994; Westbrook 1987), also using factor
analysis, have found emotional items to load on two factors: positive affect and negative affect.
Richins (1997) recently argued that consumptionrelated emotions are more complex than the two- and
three-factor solutions observed in studies of reactions to
ads or customer satisfaction. Moreover, because exploratory factor analyses often yield a small number of factors,
she used a multidimensional scaling procedure, in conjunction with examination of clusters based on location
and semantic similarity of emotional descriptors in twodimensional space. Sixteen clusters of emotions were
identified, each measured by 2 to 8 indicators (in Study 4):
anger, discontent, worry, sadness, fear, shame, envy, loneliness, romantic love, love, peacefulness, contentment,
optimism, joy, excitement, and surprise.
Although the approaches used by marketers to date
have been largely empirically driven (e.g., Edell and Burke
1987; Holbrook and Batra 1987; Oliver 1994; Richins,
1997; Westbrook 1987), they are consistent in certain senses
with leading perspectives on emotions in psychology. For
example, Holbrook and Batra's (1987) three-factor
pleasure-arousal-domination findings are somewhat similar to Russell and Mehrabian's (1977) three-factor
pleasure-arousal-dominance model. However, some differences can be pointed out. The most important are the
high loadings of sadness and fear on the domination factor
in Holbrook and Batra's study, in contrast to the more common outcome of sadness loading on or near the negative
pole of a pleasure-displeasure factor, and fear loading
about 45 degrees away from displeasure and toward
greater arousal (e.g., Russell, 1997).
Similarly, the three factors found in Edell and Burke's
(1987) study (i.e., upbeat feelings, negative feelings, and
warm feelings), correspond roughly to the high positive
affect-low positive affect, high negative affect-low negative affect, and pleasantness-unpleasantness dimensions,
respectively, of Watson and Tellegen's (1985) circumplex
model; the positive-affect and negative-affect factors
observed by Oliver (1994) and Westbrook (1987) also
align to a great extent with factors on the circumplex
model (see also Mano and Oliver 1993).
The circumplex structure of emotions is shown in Figure 2. This representation of emotions has also been called
the two-factor model, because, based on the techniques
used to generate it (e.g., factor analysis or multidimensional scaling), emotions can be arranged around two
orthogonal axes. Russell (1997) terms the axes pleasuredispleasure and arousal-sleepiness, while Watson and Tellegen (1985) label them high positive affect-low positive

189

CONSENSUALMOODSTRUCTURE
~Gt4 pOSItIVE AFF~CCT
a~ve
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enthu~bc
excited
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"kindly

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Ist~d
warmhearted

J
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lit rlist

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rli~xed

~ , , <;
, ~Z

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9 111111

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SOURCE: Watson and Teilegen (1985:225). Copyright 9 1985 by the
American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission.

affect and high negative affect-low negative affect. Russell's interpretation is essentially the same as Watson and
Tellegen's pleasantness-unpleasantness and strong
engagement-disengagement axes, which are rotated 45
degrees from their primary axes (but see Larsen and
Diener 1992).
The idea behind the circumplex model is that emotions
exist in bipolar categories (e.g., happy-sad, nervousrelaxed) and can be arranged in a continuous order around
the perimeter of a two-factor space. The closer emotions
are to each other on the perimeter, the more similar they
are. For example, excited and aroused are more similar
than are content and aroused (see Figure 2). The origin or
center of the circumplex is thought to represent a neutral
point or adaptation level.
The circumplex model is appealing because it is intuitive, simple, and provides a description of which emotions
are similar and which are dissimilar. However, it has drawbacks. The most serious limitation is that it is based on
empirical associations among experienced emotions and
has nothing to say about the conditions (e.g., appraisals)
producing emotions. Then, too, the circumplex model can
obscure subtle differences in emotions. Depending on
eliciting conditions and people's appraisals, each of the
emotions grouped together within any particular category
on the circumplex can be distinct from its cocategory
members. For example, it is possible to feel fearful without

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JOURNALOF THE ACADEMYOF MARKETINGSCIENCE

SPRING 1999

feeling hostile (see "high negative affect" in Figure 2).

Then, too, the circumplex contains categories that may not
correspond to emotions. For instance, surprised, drowsy,
and sleepy do not seem to reflect emotions. On the other
hand, the circumplex fails to represent well instances of
emotion important in everyday life and marketing. It does
not accommodate love, disgust, pride, hope, guilt, shame,
or embarrassment very well, to name a few. The various
two- and three-factor summaries of emotions disclosed in
marketing also include variables not reflective of emotions
and exclude instances generally recognized as emotions.
Richins's (1997) Consumption Emotions Set (CES)
with its 16 descriptors is appealing because it covers most
emotional reactions one encounters in consumption, and
its measures achieved satisfactory reliability (except for
measure of envy, loneliness, peacefulness, and contentment). The CES would be best used within the context of a
particular theory of emotions to operationalize specific
categories of emotions hypothesized to serve as antecedents, consequences, or moderating variables. The CES
could also be used to operationalize emotions in more
empirically oriented studies, but whether measures of each
dimension would achieve discriminant validity is problematic. Most studies incorporating multiple instances of
both positive emotions and negative emotions find that the
measures load on two factors corresponding to positive
and negative emotions (e.g., Bagozzi, Baumgartner, and
Pieters, 1998; Oliver, 1994).
This raises the question of when one can expect discrete
emotional reactions versus amalgamated groupings of,
say, positive emotions and negative emotions (e.g., highly
correlated feelings of anger, sadness, and fear). The advantage of a theory-based approach to emotions is that specific conditions can be specified for the occurrence of distinct emotions, and these hypotheses can be tested. It is for
these reasons that we used appraisal theories as our organizing framework for looking at emotions. Discrete emotional reactions are likely to happen when one manipulates
conditions producing specific appraisals or when naturally
occurring events correspond to unique appraisal conditions. Gopinath and Bagozzi (1999), for example, were
able to induce independent emotional reactions toward
three targets in a moviegoing context. On the basis of
Roseman's (1991) theory, distinct emotional reactions
were produced as a function of three-way interactions
between motive consistency-inconsistency, appetitiveaversive, and self-other agency conditions. For example,
admiration, affection, dislike, and contempt resulted
toward a group member in decision making with regard to
movie choice, and pride, shame/guilt, and regret resulted
toward the self in group decision making, depending on
the three appraisal conditions. Likewise, happiness, satisfaction, annoyance, or frustration occurred toward the

movie, and pleasure, contentment, irritation, or anger

occurred toward the theater, depending on the three
appraisal conditions. Scenarios were used to create the
appraisal conditions.
By contrast, research not based on manipulations of
appraisal conditions or based on reactions to a single
stimulus frequently finds that emotions cluster in two and,
on occasion, three factors (e.g., Edell and Burke 1987;
Holbrook and Batra 1987; Oliver 1994; Westbrook 1987).
Furthermore, research examining the construct validity of
measures of discrete emotions obtained in nonexperimental survey settings shows that discriminant validity is often
lacking among measures of different positive or different
negative emotions (e.g., Bagozzi 1993) or between measures within a particular subcategory of positive or negative
emotions, such as among measures of elation, gladness,
and joy (Bagozzi 1991a).
What accounts for the differences in findings between
experimental research based on appraisal theories and survey research or research based on reactions to a single
stimulus measured by inventories of emotional items? One
possibility may be that discrete emotional reactions are
short-lived or, once activated, stimulate other emotional
reactions closely related to them. Consider, for example,
sadness: "[W]hen we experience loss, we rarely feel a single emotion such as sadness. We grieve, are angry, anxious, guilty, envious, even hopeful, and defensive" (Lazarus
1991:250). A reason why these emotions may go in tandem is that coping processes for sadness may involve
active struggle or even protest against loss, which results in
other emotions. Alternatively, the absence of discrete
emotions may simply reflect how difficult it is to create
them. As Izard (1972) noted, pure emotions are "virtually
impossible to obtain in the laboratory or in any research
setting" (p. 103). However, as noted above, researchers
have recently found that the use of scenarios in an experimental context can generate discrete emotional responses
(e.g., Gopinath and Bagozzi 1999; Roseman 1991).
Another factor that might account for a coalescence of
multiple positive emotions and multiple negative emotions
in two corresponding groupings is the nature of the stimulus under study. Most stimulus ads, products, or brands are
complex, and the appraisals engendered are typically
variegated, but related. Also the way in which items are
presented on some questionnaires makes it difficult to
uncover discrete emotional components. When multiple
measures of a single discrete emotional response (e.g.,
happy, pleased, and joyful for "joy") are interspersed
throughout a questionnaire, this tends to reduce correlations among items purported to indicate the same response
and to increase correlations of these items with measures
of other responses. The result is predictably a reduction in
discriminant validity and high correlations among items

Bagozziet al. / THE ROLEOF EMOTIONS 191

measuring positive emotions and among items measuring
negative emotions. The alternative is to group items by the
emotional response they are intended to tap, which tends to
increase correlations among measures of the same thing
and decrease correlations among measures of different
emotional responses. Thus, a trade-off is entailed by use of
either practice.
An issue that has received little attention in marketing is
whether to use unipolar or bipolar items to measure emotions. The choice can influence findings and their interpretation in fundamental ways. Some leading scholars claim
that emotions are in the final analysis bipolar states or
processes. We are either happy or sad, for example, and
any other pattern (e.g., independence or concomitance) is
thought to be an artifact of measurement error. Although a
number of studies have shown that pleasant and unpleasant
emotions are independent (e.g., Bradburn 1969; Diener
and Emmons 1985; Zevon and Tellegen 1982), Green,
Goldman, and Salovey (1993) and Barrett and Russell
(1998) argue and present findings demonstrating that emotions are bipolar, once random or both random and systematic errors are taken into account.
Bagozzi, Wong, and Yi (1998) challenge the conclusions made by Green et al. (1993) and Barrett and Russell
(1998). They hypothesize that bipolarity, independence,
and concomitance depend on gender, culture, and the target of one's emotions. Briefly, Bagozzi, Wong, and Yi
found that positive and negative emotions were highly
negatively correlated for American women but highly
positively correlated for Chinese women. The former pattern is evidence for bipolarity (i.e., either positive or negative emotions occur but not both), the latter for concomitance (i.e., both positive and negative emotions occur at the
same time). For men, the correlations between positive and
negative emotions were much smaller in magnitude but in
the same direction across ethnicity, that is, slight negative
correlations were found for American men, slight positive
correlations for Chinese men. Thus, the relationship
between positive and negative emotions for men was
nearly independent. Bagozzi, Wong, and Yi argued that
differences in culture (i.e., a tendency for Americans to
view things in dichotomies or discrete categories, i.e., in
opposition; and a tendency for Chinese to view things dialectically, i.e., in balance or harmony) interact with gender
differences (i.e., a tendency for women to be more knowledgeable and skilled in the use of emotions than men) to
produce the divergent patterns. The above findings
resulted when people were asked to express how they felt
at the moment according to their idiosyncratic reasons,
which is the standard procedure used in the literature. That
is, the stimulus for each person could be considered heterogeneous across individuals. However, when Americans
and Chinese were asked to give their emotional reactions

to eating in fast-food restaurants (a common, singular

stimulus), positive and negative emotions were independent for men and women alike.
It is perhaps too early to give definitive recommendations on which emotional scales to employ in empirical
work, but for now, we think that it is advisable to recommend use of unipolar scales that ask respondents to
express to what extent each emotion describes their own
subjective feelings, rather than bipolar scales that can
obscure differences in emotional responses across the
various dimensions. Also, at least five, preferably seven to
nine, scale steps should be used for each item to enhance
the chances that optimal distributional properties of measures will be achieved. In addition, at least three, preferably more, items should be used for each emotional
subcategory.
A final measurement issue we wish to raise is the following. To what extent are emotions blends of categories?
For ease of discussion, we consider the categories of emotions presented on the circumplex. Pleasantnessunpleasantness might combine, for instance, with arousal
to produce different kinds or intensities of emotion. To take
a particular example, consider happiness, an instant of
pleasantness on the circumplex. Intense forms of happiness
occur when pleasantness combines with high arousal:
elated, excited, enthusiastic, euphoric, gleeful, joyous, ecstatic, and exultant are examples. Mild forms of happiness
occur when pleasantness combines with low arousal:
peaceful, calm, serene, or quietude of mind are examples.
Happiness, itself, might be at an intermediate level of
arousal. Other perspectives on blended emotions, based
not on a blend of arousal with emotion categories but
rather on combinations of "basic" emotions, can be found
in Izard (1991, 1992) and Plutchik (1980).
What more general role, if any, does arousal play in
emotions (Bagozzi 1991b)? We turn to this issue next.

AROUSAL
An early, influential point of view on emotions was professed by James ([1890] 1950) who claimed that "bodily
changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact,
and.., ourfeeling of the same changes as they occur lS the
emotion" (p. 449, emphasis in original). For James, different stimuli lead to different bodily responses (e.g., sweaty
palms, racing heart, etc.), these physiological responses
are then detected as bodily sensations in our mind, and the
result is interpreted by us as emotional experiences. But it
is important to note that James reserved this interpretation
for what he termed the "coarser" emotions (e.g., "grief, fear,
rage, love"), which involve strong bodily perturbations; he
was less clear about what he termed the "subtler" emotions

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(e.g., "moral, intellectual, and aesthetic feelings" (James

[1890] 1950:468).
An equally influential theory of emotions was proposed
by Schachter and Singer (1962), who argued that emotion
is essentially bodily arousal plus a cognitive label one provides to diagnose his or her felt arousal, a perspective consistent with James's point of view. The idea is that we first
experience physiological arousal, and, especially when we
are unaware or uncertain of the origin of the arousal, we
look for evidence in the physical and social situation
accompanying the arousal to label our emotional state.
Although this theory had considerable impact in psychology for nearly three decades, it has largely been discredited and has not received much supporting evidence
beyond Schachter and Singer's original experiment (e.g.,
Manstead and Wagner 1981; Reisenzein 1983). One
exception to the above observation is the frequently
repeated finding that arousal misattributed to an extraneous source intensifies emotions (e.g., Cantor, Bryant, and
Zillman 1974; Dutton and Aron 1974; Zillman 1971).
An important contribution of James ([1890] 1950) and
Schachter and Singer (1962) was the recognition that
arousal plays an essential role in emotion. Before we
address arousal more fully, we should mention research in
marketing that addresses the acquisition of affect, without
necessarily involving concepts of arousal or information
processing. Both in the practice of marketing and marketing research, considerable emphasis has been placed on
the effects of various stimuli on consumer behavior. Retail
store environment cues, advertising, background music,
brand names, packages, celebrity endorsers, and other
stimuli are frequently administered to produce emotional
reactions in consumers. The premise is that emotions or
moods trigger buying responses (e.g., Gardner 1985; Hill
and Gardner 1987).
If not by appraisal processes or direct arousal, per se,
how does presentation of a stimulus under repetitive conditions induce affect? A seductively simple explanation
was provided by Zajonc, who argued that "when objects
are presented to the individual on repeated occasions, the
mere exposure is capable of making the individual's attitude toward these objects more positive" (Zajonc and Markus 1982:125). This "mere exposure" effect has been
found primarily when the stimulus is simple and previously unknown or else has little or no semantic content
(e.g., nonsense syllables, foreign words of Chinese characters). One mechanism that has been offered to explain
the mere exposure effect is familiarity: we come to like
things that are familiar to us, perhaps because of feelings
of security (Zajonc 1968). However, a full theoretical
explanation for the mere exposure effect has not been
developed. When a person is exposed to meaningful stimuli, it has been more difficult to produce the mere exposure
effect (e.g., Obermiller 1985). This is, in part, a consequence of the cognitive processing that occurs in response

to awareness of the meaningful stimuli. Repeated exposure to a meaningful stimulus can lead to increased or
decreased positive or negative feelings, depending on its
meaning. Mere exposure, thus, loses its utility in such
cases, both as a theory and a practical tactic.
Based loosely on the notion that emotions or moods
induced by one stimulus become attached to another, some
researchers have investigated the effects of (a) music on
length of stay and money spent in supermarkets and restaurants (e.g., Milliman 1982, 1986) and (b) affective tone
of stores on purchase intentions (e.g., Donovan and Rossiter 1982) and evaluations (e.g., Gardner and Simokos
1986). How can the observed attachment of affect from
one stimulus to another be explained? Shimp (1991)
reviews seven studies in consumer research that test various facets of classical conditioning explanations. The idea
behind classical conditioning is that the repeated pairing
of a conditioned stimulus (e.g., a new brand name) with an
unconditioned stimulus (e.g., an attractive spokesperson)
will eventually lead to the new brand name, on its own,
stimulating the unconditioned response (e.g., positive
affect) originally induced by the unconditioned stimulus.
Very few studies have been performed in marketing that
conform to the conditions required to test classical conditioning. It is unclear whether classical conditioning studies
can be designed to rule out such rival explanations as
demand characteristics or cognitive interpretations of the
results. Allen and Janiszewski (1989) provide some evidence that at least one type of cognitive mediation is necessary for classical conditioning to occur: namely, subject
awareness of the contingency between the conditioned
stimulus and unconditioned stimulus. On the other hand,
classical conditioning, particularly for fear responses, has
been shown to involve unconscious arousal processes connected with the amygdala (LeDoux 1996).
Another way to explain the observed attachment of
affect from one stimulus to another is by Zillman's (1971)
excitation-transfer model. Briefly, Zillman proposed that
exposure to one stimulus may produce arousal. If a second
stimulus is presented close on that also is capable of producing arousal on its own, the two sources of arousal may
combine to produce intensely experienced arousal. Under
certain conditions (e.g., unawareness of the source of
arousal from the first stimulus, recency of the second), a
person may attribute the arousal to the second stimulus.
Zillman (1983) interpreted arousal as undifferentiated
sympathetic activation.
An issue in need of resolution is whether emotions can
occur without arousal. Cognitive theories of emotions
(e.g., appraisal theories) seem to allow that emotions can
be produced by cognition alone, without arousal (e.g., Parrott 1988). But does arousal always accompany the experience of emotions?
Recent research suggests that arousal is an essential
component of emotion and is manifest in neural systems in

Bagozziet al. / THE ROLEOFEMOTIONS 193

the brain. LeDoux (1996) reviews evidence suggesting
that there are at least five arousal systems in the brain contributing complexly to emotional experience. Four of these
are in regions of the brain stem and rely respectively on
acetylcholine, noradrenaline, dopamine, and serotonin for
activation. A fifth (the nucleus basalis) is in the forebrain
and also relies on acetylcholine to arouse cortical cells.
LeDoux notes that the arousal systems act in nonspecific
ways throughout the forebrain to make cells more sensitive
to incoming signals. In a sense, the nonspecific arousal
interacts with the information processing of a particular
stimulus. The amygdala acts as a kind of central processor
and interacts with the prefrontal cortex (working memory
and attention), hippocampus (long-term explicit memory),
and sensory cortex (perception and short-term storage) to
influence emotional responses. The amygdala not only
influences cortical areas of the brain but also receives input
from arousal networks (which themselves also influence
the forebrain) and feedback from bodily expression of
emotions. In addition, signals from the amygdala are sent to
muscles and internal organs and glands.
Most of the research to date into the role of arousat systems and the amygdala in emotional behavior has been
limited to a small number of emotions (e.g., fear). But it is
believed that each emotional response is mediated by separate neural systems, although each may overlap or resemble each other in many respects. In sum, LeDoux (1996)
and other brain researchers (e.g., Damasio 1994) construe
emotions as biological functions of the nervous system
(see also Zajonc 1998).
To our knowledge, there has been little work to either
integrate or reconcile cognitive theories of emotions with
neural and biological theories. Much remains to be done in
psychological research before we can make definitive
statements about the precise role of arousal in emotional
experience and behavior.
At least three studies have examined limited aspects of
arousal in marketing-related contexts. Sanbonmatsu and
Kardes (1988) found that arousal may govern attitude formation in persuasive message settings. Attitudes were
based on peripheral cues when respondents were highly
aroused but on argument strength when they were moderately aroused. It is unclear whether arousal functioned
here to reduce information-processing capacity of external
arguments or focused attention on internal reactions.
Bagozzi (1994) found that consistent with predictions
by knowledge-assembly theory (Hayes-Roth 1977),
arousal transformed a two-dimensional, affectivecognitive representation of evaluations of giving blood
into a one-dimensional, unitized representation. Likewise,
arousal increased the association between attitudes and
positive beliefs about the consequences of giving blood
and decreased the association between attitudes and negative beliefs. These predictions on the associations between

attitudes and beliefs were explained by the implications of

spreading activation effects of arousal and coping
responses, wherein individuals attempt to avoid negative
and facilitate positive associations of beliefs with attitudes. In another study, Bagozzi (1996) found that for attitudes toward giving blood, high arousal tends to enhance a
halo effect from attitudes to positive beliefs and reduce the
halo from attitudes to negative beliefs about the consequences of giving blood.
Clearly, arousal is a fundamental aspect of behavior
related to emotions. We must acknowledge that appraisal
theories have not done a good, or at least complete, job of
incorporating arousal into their frameworks. In their
defense, however, we should mention the following.
Appraisal theorists recognize that the intensity of emotional experience consists of two components: arousal and
self-control (e.g., Frijda 1994:120). Likewise, researchers
accept that "autonomic nervous system and other physiological processes" at least accompany subjectively felt
emotions (e.g., Oatley 1992: 21) and that"[i]f the criterion
of physiological activity was eliminated from the definition, the concept of emotion would be left without one of
the important response boundaries with which to distinguish it from nonemotion" (Lazarus 1991:58-59). But is
there more to arousal in emotion than this?
Some psychologists and marketers have been quick to
dismiss Zajonc's (1980) claim that "preferences need no
inferences" (see Cohen and Areni 1991:215-216; Lazarus
1982; Marcel 1983; Zajonc 1984). However, we believe it
is important, at the present, to recognize that emotional
meanings can be processed subconsciously, emotions can
be activated automatically, and responses to emotions
(e.g., coping, action tendencies, actions) also can occur
automatically. We leave open the possibility that "emotion
and cognition are best thought of as separate but interacting mental functions mediated by separate but interacting
brain systems" (LeDoux 1996:69; see also Oatley 1992,
chap. I). It appears that arousal is a key part of emotional
functions in the brain that underlies much of its automaticity. Cognitive appraisals and arousal need to be better
incorporated into our theories of emotion.

EMOTIONS AS MARKERS, MEDIATORS,

AND MODERATORS OF CONSUMER
RESPONSES
Based on content, most advertisements can be divided
into two categories: (a) thinking ads, where focus is placed
on either factual information (e.g., product attributes) or
utilitarian consequences of product/service use (e.g., savings in time or money) or (b) feeling ads, where concentration is placed on the emotions one wiI1experience through
use or ownership of a product (see Puto and Wells's [ 1984]
similar distinction between informational and

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transformational advertising). Rather than focusing on the

stimulus, per se, it is more important to emphasize the
processes and experiences comprising a person's response
to ads, to better understand the emotional meaning of ads
(e.g., Friestad and Thorson 1986).
Paralleling the above differentiation between types of
ads and the emotional-cognitive division in mental
processes mentioned earlier, Batra and Ray (1986) developed a framework and coding scheme for classifying
affective responses to ads, as a complement to cognitive
responses. Specifically, Batra and Ray (1986) identified
three positive affective response categories: surgencyelation-vigor/activation (SEVA), deactivation, and social
affection feelings. The SEVA feelings refer to upbeat,
happy mood reactions (e.g., "the ad's music was 'catchy,'
the ad was 'fun to watch or breezy,' o r . . . a likable use of
humor"); deactivation includes soothing, relaxing, quiet,
or pleasing reactions; and social affection encompasses
feelings of warmth, tenderness, and caring (Batra and Ray
1986:241). The three positive affective responses were
used along with six cognitive responses (i.e., support arguments, counterarguments, execution discounting, execution bolstering, neutral distracters, and other reactions) in
a study of the impact of television commercials on consumers. A total of 12 percent of reactions to ads were classified as positive affect: SEVA (3.7%), deactivation
(2.5%), and social affect (6.1%).
One use of emotional reactions in the above sense
might be as markers or indicators of the effectiveness of
advertising copy, particularly with respect to the overall
persuasiveness of the ad, the appeal of spokespersons,
evaluation of particular product claims, and appraisals of
other aspects of the execution (Wiles and Cornwell 1990).
Also, the program surrounding an ad (e.g., happy versus
sad content) has been found to have main effects on one's
evaluation of an ad and recall (e.g., Goldberg and Gorn
1987). Future research is needed to identify how program
content and advertising appeals interact to influence consumer emotional responses.
A research question that has received quite a bit of
attention in recent years is how and to what extent emotional reactions to ads influence consumer decision making. Most often these reactions have been measured as attitudes (e.g., liking) toward the ad (e.g., Brown and Stayman
1992; Mitchell and Olson 1981; Shimp 1981).
Attitude toward the ad (A d) is thought to be a function
of feelings (and thoughts) about the ad itself (e.g., Batra
and Ray 1986; MacKenzie, Lutz, and Belch 1986). In fact,
Batra and Ray (1986) found that the three affective
responses discussed above significantly predicted A deven
after controlling for the effects of cognitive responses. A
number of researchers have examined the conditions
under which emotions influence A~. For instance, under
low-involvement viewing conditions, feelings about the
ad have been found to be more important determinants of

A~ than thoughts (e.g., how informative or useful the ad

is), but under higher involvement viewing, both feelings
and thoughts may be important (e.g., Miniard, Bhatla, and
Rose 1990). Presumably, high involvement promotes cognitive processing of the usefulness of the ad and its
content.
A majority of research has addressed the effects of A~,
especially on attitudes toward the brand (Ab). Classic attitude theory maintains that A bis a function of beliefs about
brand attributes or consequences of product use. Mitchell
and Olson (1981) and Shimp (1981) were the first to find
that A~ provided additional explanatory power for A bover
and above brand beliefs (see also Edell and Burke 1987).
Batra and Ray (1986) found, however, that affective
responses toward the ad influenced A b only indirectly
through Am.
Some research has addressed the conditions under
which Aadinfluences A~. For example, Brown and Stayman
(1992) revealed in their meta-analysis that the effects of
Aadon Abare greater for novel than well-known brands and
for durable and other goods versus nondurables. Some evidence also exists showing that Aadinfluences A bindirectly
through its effect on beliefs about the brand (MacKenzie et
al. 1986). Finally, Stayman and Aaker (1988) showed that
repetition governs the feelings to Aa~ relationship. Under
levels of low versus high repetition, feelings have a
stronger effect on Aad. This may be a consequence of
greater information processing under high versus low
repetition.
In addition to the transfer of affect from ad emotions to
A d, research shows that brand names and feelings toward
ads can become linked in memory. Stayman and Batra
(1991) found that respondents exposed to an affective, as
opposed to an argument, ad were able to retrieve brand attitudes faster, when primed with the brand name. In addition, the positive retrieved affect had a stronger influence
on choice in low- than in high-involvement contexts. In a
second study, Stayman and Batra demonstrated that viewers of an ad who were in a positive affective state more
strongly evoked the affect when given the brand name as a
subsequent retrieval cue than viewers exposed to the ad
while not in a positive affect state.
Olney, Holbrook, and B atra (1991 ) investigated a hierarchical model explaining advertising viewing time. The
effects of ad emotions (i.e., pleasure and arousal) were
mediated by A d and reactions to ad content. Interestingly,
arousal had both indirect and direct effects on viewing
time, even after controlling for ad content and Aad.Arousal
was measured by self-reports.
Emotions have been found to serve as moderators in
their impact on A b. Batra and Stayman (1990), in one of the
few studies to examine mood and print ads, found that
positive moods enhance A b through their interaction with
two cognitive processes: "(1) a bias against the generation
of negative thoughts (such as evoked by weak arguments),

Bagozziet al. f THEROLEOF EMOTIONS 195

leading to a more favorable evaluation of message arguments, and (2) a reduction in total cognitive elaboration,
making processing more heuristic than systematic" (pp.
212-213). An interesting finding was that positive moods
seem to reduce counterargumentation when weak arguments are used in ads (see also Worth and Mackie 1987).
Batra and Stephens (1994) also investigated the moderating effects of mood on A~. Specifically, they showed that
mood and motivation (the latter conceived as degree of
relevance of the product category for consumers) interacted to govern A b when consumers watched television
ads. The greatest impact on A~ occurred when positive
moods ensued under conditions of low motivation. The
rationale is that positive moods and low motivation suppress counterargumentation (and therefore lead to more
favorable Ab) in comparison with high-motivation
conditions.
Following the elaboration likelihood model (ELM)
(e.g., Petty and Cacioppo 1986), we might expect emotions to have one or both of two effects. Emotions might
operate centrally to influence cognitive processes (e.g.,
with regard to argumentation), or emotions might function
peripherally (perhaps through associative or affect transfer
mechanisms). Early predictions under the ELM took an
either-or perspective and stressed that when the processing
of information in a communication is low (e.g., due to low
motivation, distraction, low need for cognition, weak arguments), emotional content in the communication (e.g., an
attractive spokesperson) is processed directly and transfers to, or influences, attitude toward the product or message. When issue-relevant thinking is high, attitude
change is thought to be a function of the balance of pros
and cons in the communication, a largely rational process,
and emotion may not be a factor.
Over time, the role of emotion in persuasive communication has been found to be more complex than the simple
central versus peripheral processing alternatives specified
in the ELM (e.g., Wegener and Petty 1996). For example,
when the likelihood of information processing is moderate, emotions have been found to affect the extent to which
arguments in a communication become elaborated. Positive (versus neutral) moods tend to lead to less processing
of arguments (e.g., Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, and Strack
1990; see also discussion below on the effects of emotions
on cognitive processes). By contrast, when people process
the arguments in a message closely, mood might bias
information processing or even function as an argument
itself (Forgas 1995). Another explanation for mood effects
is that sad or neutral (versus happy) moods lead to more
effortful processing, which is believed to be done spontaneously (e.g., Bohner, Chaiken, and Hunyadi 1994). Note
that this prediction seems to conflict with the observations
made by Schaller and Cialdini (1990), who analyzed
mostly nonpersuasive communication studies. Some clarification for the discrepancy in interpretations can be seen

in a study by Wegener, Petty, and Smith (1995). Wegener

et al. (1995) discovered that happy (versus sad) moods
lead to the processing of more arguments in a message
when a "proattitudinal/uplifting" position was taken, but
happy (versus sad) moods lead to less processing of arguments when a "counterattitudinal/depression" position
was taken. Wegener et al. (1995) explain the findings, in
part, by suggesting that when in a happy mood, people try
to maintain their mood and thus process less of the counterattitudinal/depression content.
In addition, interactions of emotions sometimes occur
with other variables, such as motivational or ability factors. For instance, Wegener, Petty, and Klein (1994) found
that for people high in need for cognition, messages
framed positively (i.e., good things will happen if people
adopt the advocacy) were more persuasive when the audience was happy (versus sad), but messages framed negatively (i.e., bad things will happen if people do not adopt
the advocacy) were more persuasive when the audience
was sad (versus happy). Wegener et al. (1994) explained
these findings by claiming that good outcomes seem better
and more likely to occur while in a good (versus sad)
mood, and bad outcomes seem worse and more likely to
occur while in a sad (versus happy) mood.
Finally, even when the likelihood of information processing is low (due, e.g., to low need for cognition or low
relevance of a product for a consumer), the mood of the
audience can have a direct effect on A b,but when the likelihood of information processing is high, the mood of the
audience affected message-generated thoughts consistent
with the mood (Petty, Schumann, Richman, and
Strathman 1993). Mood was induced by a television program or music.

THE EFFECTS OF EMOTION 1:

INFLUENCES ON COGNITIVE
PROCESSES
A person's emotional state can influence various
aspects of information processing including encoding and
retrieval of information, different strategies used to
process information, evaluations and judgments, and creative thinking. In this section we examine the influence of
affective states on various aspects of cognitive processes.
Emotion/Mood Effects on Memory
The influence of mood states on memory can be
broadly classified into three categories: retrieval effects,
encoding effects, and state-dependent learning effects. In
the following section, we review some of the studies that
have investigated these effects and discuss the mechanism
by which affect influences memory.

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Retrieval effects. Affect has been shown to influence retrieval of information, whereby persons in a positive mood
state at the time of retrieval have been found to show superior recall of positive material learned during encoding,
relative to neutral or negative material (Isen, Shalker,
Clark, and Karp 1978; Laird, Wagener, Halal, and Szegda
1982; Nasby and Yando 1982; Teasdale and Russell 1983).
For example, Isen et al. (1978) had respondents study positive, negative, and neutral words. Either positive, neutral,
or negative mood states were induced in these respondents. Respondents in the positive-mood condition retrieved more positive words compared with neutral or
negative words. Isen et al. (1978) suggest that thinking
about mood-incongruent material involves shifting one's
focus, which is cognitively taxing, and therefore people
are more likely to focus on mood-congruent material. Another mechanism proposed to explain the retrieval effects
of positive affect suggests that positive mood at the time of
retrieval functions as a cue that primes the positive material in memory, making these material more accessible
(Isen 1989; Isen et al. 1978; also see Tulving and Pearlstone 1966 for a discussion on the effects of priming on accessibility). The easier accessibility of positive material
may then influence other cognitive processes such as
evaluations and decision making, and also subsequent behaviors. While retrieval effects have been replicated by
many researchers using different mood induction and testing techniques, a few prominent studies have failed to detect retrieval effects (Bower, Monteiro, and Gilligan 1978;
Bower, Gilligan, and Monteiro 1981), leading Isen (1984)
to speculate that this failure may have been caused by the
specific material and induction methods (such as hypnosis) used in these studies.
Encoding effects. Mood states have also been shown to
exhibit encoding effects whereby the affective state at the
time of learning is associated with superior memory for
similarly valenced material (Bower and Cohen 1982; Forgas and Bower 1987). Nasby and Yando (1982) found that
positive mood at the time of learning led to an improved recall of positive material at a later point in time regardless of
the mood state at the time of recall. Bower et al. (1981)
found evidence for the encoding effect of both positive and
negative affect. Respondents were made to feel happy or
sad and then read descriptions of various psychiatric interviews. Happy respondents learned many more happy facts
than sad facts, while sad respondents learned many more
sad facts than happy facts.
How can the encoding effects of mood be explained?
Bower and colleagues (e.g., Bower and Cohen 1982) have
suggested that mood-congruent material is likely to be
more semantically elaborated relative to moodincongruent material. Forgas and Bower (1987) found that
in impression formation situations, sad individuals spent
more time examining negative rather than positive

SPRING 1999
information, and they subsequently recalled the negative
information better. Conversely, happy individuals spent
more time on the positive information and recalled that
better at a later time. The greater levels of associations
evoked by mood-congruent material may have caused a
more extensive elaboration, which, in turn, requires more
time. However, Isen et al. (1978) and Srull (1983) failed to
find any encoding effects of affect.

State-dependent learning effects. A third memory effect of mood is the state-dependent learning effect of affect, where any material regardless of its affective valence
learned under a particular mood state is recalled better
when the person is again in that affective state (Bartlett,
Burleson, and Santrock 1982; Bartlett and Santrock 1979;
Bower, Monteiro, and Gilligan 1978; Bower, Gilligan, and
Monteiro 1981). Bower et al. (1978) had respondents learn
two sets of words, one while they were in a positive affective state and the other in a negative mood. When respondents who learned the two lists in different moods recalled
the words in the wrong mood (e.g., when words learned in
a positive mood were recalled while respondents were in a
negative mood), they experienced interference and the average recall rate was less than 50 percent. When respondents who learned two lists in different moods recalled the
words in the correct mood, the average recall rate was
more than 70 percent. Control respondents who learned
and recalled both lists while in the same mood showed an
average recall rate between 50 and 60 percent. Bower and
Cohen (1982) suggest that the respondents' mood at the
time of learning becomes associated with the learned material and that these associations facilitate the recall of
learned material when the mood state at recall matches the
mood state at encoding (also see Bower 1981 for a description of his semantic-network theory).
Evidence for mood state-dependent learning has been
ambiguous. Many studies have failed to find any statedependent effects of mood state (Bower and Mayer 1985;
Isen et al. 1978; Laird et al. 1982; Nasby and Yando 1982).
Eich and Birnbaum (1982) and Isen (1984, 1989) have
suggested that when the material to be learned has semantic meaning, the stimulus will be encoded according to this
meaning, and the influence of the mood state in the encoding and subsequent retrieval processes will be minimal.
However, when the stimulus lacks meaning, contextual
cues such as affective states at the time of learning may be
more strongly encoded with the learned material. At the
time of retrieval, these memory items, which have few
semantic associations, are more primed by the matching
affective state at recall.
Asymmetric effects of positive and negative moods.
While positive affective states have been shown to have
significant influences on recall, negative affect has sometimes been found to have either no effect or a much smaller

Bagozziet al. / THE ROLEOF EMOTIONS 197

effect on the recall of negative material from memory.

Asymmetric effects of positive and negative moods have
been found for retrieval effects (Isen et al. 1978; Nasby and
Yando 1982; Teasdale and Fogarty 1979), encoding effects
(Nasby and Yando 1982), and state-dependent learning effects (Bartlett and Santrock 1979; Bartlett et al. 1982). Isen
(1984) speculated that positive affect is structured in a
broad and extensive manner (i.e., highly interconnected
with other memories), while negative affect is more narrowly and less well connected with other material, and that
specific negative affective states such as anger and sadness
may be organized separately in memory. This, in turn,
would make it difficult for any given negative mood to act
as an effective retrieval cue. It is not readily apparent why
negative affect would be less well connected in memory
and positive affect more widely interconnected as Isen
suggests, considering that negative affect usually signals
problematic environmental conditions that may require
problem solving (Schwarz and Clore 1983; Wegener et al.
1995). One of the side effects of this hypothesized interconnectedness of positive memories is the greater creativeness and cognitive flexibility demonstrated by people
in positive moods, a topic we review briefly later in this
article.
Mood maintenance and repair have also been put forward as explanations for the asymmetric effects of positive
and negative moods. Isen (1984) has suggested that happy
individuals attempt to prolong their positive affective state
by focusing on the positive aspects of their stimulus (mood
maintenance), while individuals in a negative mood try to
improve their situation by not focusing on negative memories (mood repair). Isen (1989) noted that in some of the
studies showing symmetrical effects of positive and negative mood (Bower et al. 1978, 1981), respondents were
instructed to maintain their induced moods, and this may
have discouraged them from engaging in mood repair
strategies. However, the mood repair explanation is not
without problems. If sad respondents engage in mood
repair, why is there no evidence for mood-incongruent
recall effects? After all, an effective strategy to improve a
depressed mood state is to engage in pleasant thoughts and
memories. Yet, evidence seems to show that negative
mood inhibits the recall of positive memories (e.g., Isen et
al. 1978). The competing explanations of memory structure differences and mood maintenance/repair have also
been used to explain differences in informationprocessing strategies of happy and sad individuals, a topic
we discuss later in this article.

Mood, Categorization, and Creativity

Various studies investigating the influence of mood on
categorization have found that people in positive mood

states, compared with those in neutral or negative mood

states, tend to be better at integrating information, finding
relationships among stimuli, and at finding creative solutions (Isen and Daubman 1984; Isen, Daubman, and
Nowicki, 1987; Isen, Johnson, Mertz, and Robinson 1985;
Isen, Niedenthal, and Cantor 1992; Murray, Sujan, Hirt,
and Sujan 1990). For example, respondents in positive
mood conditions tended to group a wider range of neutral
stimuli together (Isen and Daubman 1984). They also
rated words such as cane, ring, and purse as being better
exemplars of the category "clothing," than did the neutralmood respondents. Murray et al. (1990) found that
positive-mood respondents, compared with respondents
in other mood states, formed broader categories when
focusing on similarities among exemplars and narrower
categories when focusing on differences, prompting them
to suggest that what positive mood promotes is not broader
categorization but rather cognitive flexibility. Isen et al.
(1985) found that positive-mood respondents tended to
give more unusual responses to neutral words in word
association tests. For example, in response to the word
house, positive-mood respondents were more likely than
were neutral-mood respondents to mention unusual first
associates such as security, residence, and apartment, suggesting that positive-mood states may influence cognitive
organization, resulting in more flexible interpretation of
relationships among stimuli. This cognitive flexibility also
results in enhanced creativity. Isen et al. (1987) found that
respondents in positive-mood states outperformed those in
neutral- and negative-mood states on tests requiring creative solutions. These researchers suggest that positivemood respondents were better at creative problem solving
since such tasks required the ability to see relatedness
among seemingly unrelated stimuli, and as we have seen
earlier, positive affect results in more flexible cognitive
organization.

Mood Effects on Evaluation

One of the best-recognized and most robust effects of
mood is its influence on evaluation. Individuals in
positive-mood states have been shown to evaluate stimuli
more positively than individuals in neutral- or negativemood states, whether the stimuli being studied are other
people (Clore and Byrne 1974; Forgas and Bower 1987),
consumer goods (Isen et al. 1978; Srull 1983), life satisfaction (Schwarz and Clore 1983), or past life events
(Clark and Teasdale 1982). The reliability of mood effects
on evaluation is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that
evaluations of the pleasantness of neutral/ambiguous
stimuli are used as checks for mood manipulation (e.g.,
Isen et al. 1985, 1987). Isen et al. (1978) found that respondents in whom positive mood was induced were more
likely to rate their cars and televisions more favorably

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compared with respondents in neutral-mood states. In the

case of memory-based evaluations, if the recalled information is biased by the mood (as discussed in the following section), then evaluations that follow will be biased
too. On-line processing of evaluations can also be influenced by mood states through the retrieval of information
congruent with the mood (Clore, Schwarz, and Conway
1994).
A competing explanation based on the feelings-asinformation model (see Schwarz 1990; Schwarz and Bless
1991; Schwarz and Clore 1983) suggests that individuals
may assume that their mood states are affective reactions
to the object being evaluated and thus base their evaluations on their affective states. For example, a happy individual when asked to evaluate a painting may ask the question, "How do I feel?" and infer that his or her positive
mood is a reaction to the painting and therefore come to the
conclusion that he or she likes the painting. The feelingsas-information hypothesis suggests that when individuals
attribute their mood state to something else other than the
object being evaluated, the effect of mood on evaluation
should disappear. Schwarz and Clore (1983) found support for this hypothesis when they showed that although
people called on sunny days reported more life satisfaction
than people called on cloudy days, the differences disappeared when the interviewer casually mentioned the
weather to the individuals. Presumably, the casual mention
of the weather made people attribute their mood to the
weather, and hence the mood lost any diagnostic value in
evaluating life satisfaction. In other words, people may use
their moods as the basis for forming evaluations of objects
unless the diagnostic value of the mood is discounted.
Clore et al. (1994) compared the two explanations for
mood effects on evaluation and suggested that individuals
may use feelings as information when the evaluation task
is affective in nature, when other information is lacking,
when the information is complex, or when there are time
constraints.
Although mood effects on evaluation have been replicated often, a few prominent studies have shown that mood
states will not influence evaluation when the object being
evaluated is highly familiar and for which past evaluations
exist in memory (e.g., Salovey and Birnbaum 1989; Srull
1983, 1984). Srull (1984, Experiment 3) found that the
evaluations of a car made by novices, but not by experts,
were influenced by mood state. Novices, by definition, are
unfamiliar with the product category and are more likely to
engage in on-line evaluations, which are more susceptible
to mood influences. Experts, on the other hand, have prior
evaluations available in memory and so do not engage in
on-line evaluations and are less likely to be influenced by
mood. Similar findings have been obtained by Salovey and
Birnbaum (1989, Experiment 3) and Schwarz, Strack,

SPRING1999
Kommer, and Wagner (1987). We discuss this and other
related issues in greater detail later in this article.

Mood Effects on Information Processing

It has been suggested that the mood maintenance strategy used by people in positive moods may also cause them
to avoid investing cognitive effort in tasks unless doing so
promises to maintain or enhance their positive mood (e.g.,
Isen 1987; Wegener et al. 1995). Consequently, people in
positive-mood states may not be motivated to engage in
systematic processing of information and may use heuristic processing instead. Positive affect usually denotes a
benign environment that does not require any action. On
the other hand, negative affective states act as information
signaling that the environment poses a problem and may
motivate people to engage in systematic processing, which
is usually better suited to handling threatening situations
(Schwarz 1990; Schwarz and Clore 1983). Various studies have found evidence suggesting the use of heuristic
processing by people in positive moods and systematic
processing by people in negative moods (e.g., Bless et al.
1990, 1996; Mackie and Worth 1989). Bless et al. (1990)
presented happy and sad individuals with either strong or
weak counter-attitudinal arguments. Sad individuals were
influenced only by strong arguments, while happy individuals were equally influenced by strong and weak arguments. These effects have been consistently replicated and
have been interpreted as providing evidence for reduced
systematic processing by individuals in positive affective
states. The two major mechanisms that have been used to
explain mood effects on information-processing strategies
are the same as those used to explain the asymmetric
effects of mood effects on memory, namely, the highly
interconnected nature of positive memories and mood
maintenance.
In discussing the asymmetric effects of positive and
negative affect on memory, we had briefly discussed Isen's
(1984) contention that positive concepts are more highly
interconnected in memory relative to negative ideas. Isen
(1987) and Mackie and Worth (1989) have argued that
since positive memories are highly interconnected, positive mood will prime and activate some related and many
unrelated positive memories, thus leading to cognitive
capacity constraints. Because individuals do not have the
cognitive resources to engage in systematic processing,
they resort to the less demanding heuristic processing.
A second explanation for mood effects on cognitive
processing is based on the concept of mood maintenance.
Isen (1987) has suggested that individuals in a positive
affective state are motivated to maintain their mood and
may avoid cognitive activity that could interfere with their
positive mood. Thus, individuals in a happy mood are

Bagozziet al. / THEROLEOFEMOTIONS 199

unlikely to engage in systematic processing of information
(also see Bohner, Crow, Erb, and Schwarz 1992).
Another motivation-based explanation for the reduced
processing under positive mood has been offered by
Schwarz and colleagues (e.g., Schwarz and Clore 1983)
using their feelings-as-information hypothesis. Negative
affective states inform people that they may be facing a
problem and this may provoke systematic processing of
information that is better suited to problem solving. Positive mood, on the other hand, informs the individual that
the environment is benign and thus he or she may not be
motivated to engage in effortful cognitive processing. A
fourth hypothesis suggests that the motivation to simplify
processing is not what causes the reliance on heuristic
processing; rather, it is the increased use of heuristic processing by these happy-mood individuals that results in
simplified processing (e.g., Bless et al. 1996).
Although the increased reliance on heuristics by individuals in positive moods has been replicated many times,
there have been studies that have shown that positive
moods could lead to both increased or diminished levels of
cognitive processing (e.g., Martin, Ward, Achee, and Wyer
1993). Wegener et al. (1995) have presented empirical
support for their hypothesis that positive moods could lead
to either lesser or greater levels of information processing,
depending on whether happy individuals believe that systematic processing will lead to the maintenance or destruction of their positive mood. People in a positive-mood
state, who believe that systematic processing of a message
would help maintain their mood, may engage in more
detailed processing. However, if they view systematic
processing of that message as a threat to their positivemood state, they would avoid elaborate processing. This
hedonic contingency mood management is especially
likely to be seen in positive-mood individuals who have
the most to lose by incorrectly engaging in systematic
processing. Sad individuals, by contrast, have less to lose,
since processing messages might make them feel better
(Wegener and Petty 1994). Wegener et al. (1995) suggest
that most of the previous research in which positive moods
have been shown to lead to reduced message processing
have involved counterattitudinal or otherwise unpleasant
cognitions (e.g., Mackie and Worth 1989). Since the systematic processing of counterattitudinal or unpleasant
messages is unlikely to help maintain a positive mood,
individuals choose not to use systematic processing.
Forgas (1994, 1995), building on Fiedler's (1990)
dual-force model, has recently presented the affect infusion model, which suggests that the various explanations
for mood effects on memory and information processing
(such as mood maintenance, feelings as information,
affect priming) are not necessarily competing models but
could rather be complementary explanations. He suggests
that affect infusion into judgmental processes takes place

when the judgments require a high degree of constructive

(on-line) processing. Affect does not influence those judgments that call for the retrieval of preexisting evaluations
or for information processing that is highly specific and
not requiring constructive processing. Forgas (1994,
1995) suggests that direct-access processing (a low-affect
infusion strategy) is used when the evaluative target is
familiar and when there are no strong cognitive, affective,
or situational factors that call for systematic processing.
Accordingly, individuals who evaluate very familiar
objects would be using direct-access processing, and
hence mood effects would not be found in such cases (cf.
Srull 1984). Another low-affect infusion strategy is motivated processing, where the information search and the
evaluative outcome are guided by prior motivational goals
such as mood repair (see Forgas 1995 for a detailed discussion). When the evaluative target is simple, the personal
relevance is low, the individual has limited cognitive
capacity, or the accuracy requirements are not high, the
individual may resort to heuristic processing, a high-affect
infusion strategy. Under these circumstances, evaluations
may be based on the existing mood, as in the feelings-asinformation hypothesis (cf. Schwarz and Bless 1991).
When the judgmental situation requires the individual to
learn and process novel information, and when he or she
has adequate cognitive capacity and motivation to process
the information, substantive processing is predicted to
take place. According to Forgas (1995), this default strategy, which is used if other less effortful strategies are
inadequate, involves constructive processing and is one
that is susceptible to affect infusion (cf. Srull 1984).

THE EFFECTS OF EMOTIONS 2:

INFLUENCE ON VOLITIONS,
GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR,
AND DECISIONS TO HELP
Sometimes emotions spur one onto action; at other
times emotions inhibit or constrain action. But only
recently have researchers devoted much attention to studying how this occurs.
Bagozzi, Baumgartner, and Pieters (1998) investigated
the role of anticipatory emotions in goal striving. In a
panel study of consumers' efforts to lose or maintain their
body weight, people first reacted to the possibility of
achieving or not achieving their goals with well-defined
positive and negative anticipatory emotions. The anticipatory emotions then energized volitions in the form of
intentions, plans, and the decision to expend energy in the
service of goal striving. Volitions, in turn, were shown to
influence goal-directed behaviors related to exercising
and dieting. Next, the intensity of execution of these
behaviors contributed to degree of goal attainment. Goaloutcome emotions subsequently followed.

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Anticipatory emotions functioned in the following

manner. Respondents indicated which emotions they
anticipated they would experience if they were to achieve
their goal (i.e., excitement, delight, happiness, gladness,
satisfaction, pride, and self-assurance) and which emotions they anticipated they would experience if they were
to fail to achieve their goal (i.e., anger, frustration, guilt,
shame, sadness, disappointment, depression, worry,
uncomfortableness, and fear). The key processes are similar to forward-looking counterfactual thinking processes
(e.g., Roese and Olson 1995) or what Gleicher et al. (1995)
term "prefactuals" The decision maker begins by "imagining the possible" (i.e., identifying and evaluating the
consequences occurring if one were to achieve one's goal
or not). The alternative consequences to imagined goal
success and goal failure serve as input to appraisal
processes and felt emotional experiences. People are then
motivated to choose actions promoting the positive affect
and avoiding the negative affect associated with goal
attainment and goal failure, respectively.
Four other studies support the above role for prefactuals
in decision making. Boninger, Gleicher, Hetts, Armor, and
Moore (1994) discovered that prefactuals with regard to
the purchase of insurance in a laboratory game influenced
subsequent action to take insurance. Gleicher et al. (1995)
found that prefactuals concerning condom use affected
positive attitudes; however, intentions to use condoms
were not influenced by prefactuals, although the difference in means between experimental and control groups
was in the predicted direction. Perugini and Bagozzi
(1998) also showed that anticipated emotions were instrumental in influencing desires, volitions, and behavior in a
study of exercising and an investigation of studying behaviors (see also Parker, Manstead, and Stradling 1995; Richard, van der Pligt, and de Vries 1995). Finally, Brown,
Cron, and Slocum (1997) replicated the model proposed
by Bagozzi, Baumgartner, and Pieters (1998) in a study of
goal pursuit by salespeople.
Although emotions often function in broad categories
of positive and negative affect, specific subcategories may
have special relevance in certain contexts. Verbeke and
Bagozzi (1998) studied the behavior of 458 salespeople in
Europe who sold financial services and found that two
negative emotions were particularly important: shame and
embarrassment. These self-conscious emotions encompass personal standards with regard to acceptable
thoughts, feelings, and actions. Shame occurs when one
fails to live up to an ideal and another person whose
approval is important to oneself judges this failure critically. Embarrassment is generated either when the self
does something inappropriate in public or the other with
whom one interacts does something inappropriate, but in
contrast to shame, the threat under embarrassment is less
fundamental and involves relatively trivial and even
humorous behaviors (e.g., passing gas audibly while in a

sales negotiation). With embarrassment, the threat is to the

"presented self," and one feels foolish and awkward; with
shame, the threat is to the "core self," and one feels quite
pained, perhaps even humiliated or devastated. Verbeke
and B agozzi (1998) found that salespersons' propensity to
experience shame and embarrassment led to particular
protective or coping responses: the greater the shame and
embarrassment, the greater the impulse to hide, to withdraw, and to avoid contact with customers. These coping
responses, in turn, negatively influenced sales
performance.
The study by Verbeke and Bagozzi (1998) illustrates
dysfunctional effects of negative emotions (see also Verbeke and Bagozzi 1999). Yet, negative emotions can have
pro-social consequences in certain instances. Bagozzi and
Moore (1994) investigated the role of negative emotions
and empathy on decisions to give help to abused children.
In Study 1, the effects of a negative emotional-appeal ad
were compared with those of a rational-appeal ad; in
Study 2, the effects of three levels of intensity of negativeemotion appeals were examined. The negative emotional
ads featured a young boy in his home running away from
his father in terror. Both studies demonstrated that four
negative emotions (anger, sadness, fear, tension) and four
aspects of empathy (perspective taking, compassion/pity,
protection motivation, fantasy elaboration) mediated the
effects of viewing negative emotional ads on decisions to
help. Stronger felt negative emotions in the audience led to
greater feelings of empathy, and this, in turn, enhanced the
decision to help victims of child abuse.
A final area where emotions play a key role in promoting action is in goal setting. We can think of goal setting in
terms of a hierarchy of three classes of goals (Bagozzi and
Dholakia 1998; Pieters, Baumgartner, and Allen 1995). A
focal or basic-level goal answers the question, "What is it
that I strive for?" For example, a consumer may have a goal
to lose body weight. The means for achieving this goal can
be interpreted as subordinate goals and answer the question, "How can I achieve that for which I strive?" Various
types of exercising behaviors and dieting activities are
examples of subordinate goals for the focal goal of losing
weight. Superordinate goals constitute reasons for pursuing a focal goal and answer the question, "Why do I want to
achieve that for which I strive?" Bagozzi and Edwards
(1998) investigated the hierarchical structure for superordinate goals governing body weight maintenance and
found that happiness was an important goal toward which
the focal goal and other more concrete superordinate goals
pointed (other superordinate goals included, for example,
social acceptance, self-esteem, look good, feel good, and
fit into clothes). Happiness, or more generally personal
welfare, seems to be a central motive spurring one onto
action. We turn now to the role of happiness and other
emotions in customer satisfaction.

Bagozzi et al. / THE ROLEOF EMOTIONS 201

EMOTIONS AND CUSTOMER

SATISFACTION
Early research viewed customer satisfaction as a key
outcome of product/service purchase, whereby a comparison is made between expectations of performance and
actual performance, and satisfaction arises when actual
performance is greater than or equal to expected performance, and dissatisfaction occurs otherwise (e.g., Oliver
1980; Yi 1990). Westbrook (1987) explored the influence
of positive affect and negative affect on satisfaction, along
with expectation beliefs and disconfirmation beliefs. Satisfaction with automobiles was a function of positive
affect, negative affect, expectations of receiving benefits
and liabilities, and disconfirmation beliefs. Satisfaction
with cable television was determined by positive affect,
negative affect, and disconfirmation beliefs. Westbrook
and Oliver (1991) found that three emotional responses
were important antecedents of satisfaction of newly purchased automobiles: pleasant surprise, interest, and
hostility.
Oliver (1993) expanded the determinants of satisfaction to include positive affect (interest and joy) and negative affect (anger, disgust, contempt, shame, guilt, fear,
sadness), as well as disconfirmation beliefs. In addition,
attribute satisfactions and attribute dissatisfactions were
hypothesized as direct determinants of satisfaction, as well
as indirect (through positive and negative affect) determinants. Satisfaction with automobiles was found to be a
function of attribute satisfaction, attribute dissatisfaction,
positive affect, negative affect, and disconfirmation. Satisfaction with a required university course was also found to
be determined by these antecedents, except attribute
dissatisfaction.
The investigation of the impact of emotions on postpurchase reactions is an important development in marketing. However, it is unclear whether satisfaction is phenomenologically distinct from many other positive emotions.
Satisfaction is neither a basic emotion nor a central
emotional category in leading theories of emotions (e.g.,
Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991; Oatley 1992; Roseman 1991;
Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Furthermore, Shaver,
Schwartz, Kirson, and O'Connor (1987) found that satisfaction shares much common variance with such positive
emotions as happiness, joy, gladness, elation, delight, and
enjoyment, among others. Likewise, Nyer (1997b) discovered that measures of joy and satisfaction loaded on one
factor.
Although we leave open the possibility that measures of
satisfaction can achieve discriminant validity from measures of joy, happiness, and other positive emotions, we
believe that this will be very difficult to produce in practice. Also, no theory exists for specifying the conditions

under which satisfaction exists uniquely from many other

positive emotions. We suspect that previous studies finding discriminant validity for measures of satisfaction can
be explained by the way items were presented on the questionnaire (e.g., separation of measures of satisfaction from
measures of other positive emotions) or the lack of inclusion of a sufficient number of positive emotions. No study
to date has performed either a rigorous experimental or
survey (e.g., multitrait-multimethod) examination of construct validity of measures of satisfaction, joy, and related
positive emotions.
The centrality of satisfaction in marketing studies is
perhaps more due to being the first emotion to receive
scrutiny in postpurchase behavior research than to constituting a unique, fundamental construct in and of itself.
Indeed, it is likely that---depending on the situation, product, and person---other positive and negative emotions are
more important outcomes of purchase. Under certain conditions, frustration, anger, disappointment, alienation, disgust, anxiety, alarm, guilt, shame, joy, happiness, hope,
pride, jubilation, excitement, relief, amusement, and
pleasure, among many other negative and positive emotions, might be more valid reactions consumers have to
purchases. By the same token, the implications of emotional reactions in purchase situations on complaint
behaviors, word-of-mouth communication, repurchase,
and related actions may differ for various positive and
negative emotions and be of more relevance than reactions
to satisfaction or dissatisfaction, per se.
Research by Nyer (1997a, 1997b) addresses appraisal
theories and their role in postconsumption responses.
Nyer found that such postconsumption responses as repurchase intentions, word-of-mouth intentions, and other
reactions are predicted best by using measures of satisfaction plus measures of other emotions. Other studies of note
investigating the role of specific emotions in customer satisfaction include those done by Dubt, B~langer, and
Trudeau (1996); Folkes, Koletsky, and Graham (1987);
and Taylor (1994).
We are uncertain whether a single, summary emotional
response such as satisfaction is feasible or even desirable.
But if one is to be discovered, it may lie more in emotions
more closely connected to human welfare or emotional
well-being (e.g., Diener and Larsen 1993). In this regard,
for example, a case could be made for happiness as a fundamental emotion related to the purchase of goods and services, in particular, and emotional well-being, in general
(Bagozzi forthcoming).

SOCIAL BASES OF EMOTIONS

Although people can experience emotions privately,
such as in response to physical danger, a case can be made

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that emotions are most often interpersonal or group-based

responses. Unfortunately, the vast majority of research
into emotional behavior has had an individualistic slant to
it (e.g., Parkinson 1995). Marketing relationships seem to
be contexts where more social conceptualizations of emotions would be worth pursuing. For example, Ruth, Otnes,
and Brunel (1998) review studies where discrete emotions
are central in gift exchanges, and they show how appraisals
lead to emotions and how emotions relate to interpersonal
relationships and disposition of gifts. A related area in
need of study is the management of emotions by organizations and by the self (e.g., Bagozzi 1992; Hochschild
1983; Locke 1996). Finally, cultural aspects of emotions
deserve further inquiry (e.g., Markus and Kitayama 1994).

CONCLUSIONS
Emotions are ubiquitous throughout marketing. They
influence information processing, mediate responses to
persuasive appeals, measure the effects of marketing stimuli, initiate goal setting, enact goal-directed behaviors, and
serve as ends and measures of consumer welfare. Yet, we
are only beginning to understand the role of emotions in
marketing.
The following areas constitute opportunities for future
research:
Area No. 1. Exactly how are appraisals conducted and
how do they lead to emotional reactions in consumers? In
what sense are appraisals conscious and purposive versus
automatic? What is the role of the amygdala, hippocampus, and other neural systems in appraisals? What are the
essential elements of cognitive appraisals in emotional
behavior and how can they be influenced by marketing
stimuli?
Area No. 2. Related to No. 1, but also more generally
throughout the processes involved in emotional responses,
what role does arousal play? What is physiological arousal
and how does it relate to appraisals, coping responses,
action tendencies, and behavior? What do self-reports of
arousal really indicate? Is arousal an essential component
of emotions? If so, how can marketers develop theories of
emotions, better incorporating arousal, and how should
arousal be measured?
Area No. 3. How do emotions affect information processing in consumer decision making? In what ways do
emotions influence the encoding, storage, and retrieval of
information? What contribution do emotions make to consumer decision making and choice?
Area No. 4. Are emotional reactions universal? In what
ways do emotions differ across cultures? What role do
socialization, ethnicity, and culture play in the representation, experience, and effects of emotions?
Area No. 5. Under what conditions do emotions function in discrete categories and what are the implications of

SPRING 1999

discrete emotions for consumer behavior? When do emotions function in clusters or as homogeneous groups, such
as positive and negative categories?
Area No. 6. How do emotions function to influence the
behavior of salespeople and managers? When are they
functional or dysfunctional?
Area No. 7. How do consumers and managers control
their emotions to advantage? What role do emotions play
in self-regulation?
Area No. 8. How should emotions be measured in marketing? When are self-reports appropriate and inappropriate? How can physiological measures be incorporated?
What are the consequences of treating emotions as unipolar versus bipolar responses?
Area No. 9. What are the distinctions between and relationships among emotions, affect, feelings, evaluations,
moods, and attitudes?
Area No. 10. How are distinct emotions related to each
other? Under what conditions, for example, does frustration lead to dissatisfaction? Shame lead to anger? Or love
lead to happiness?
Area No. 11. An area neglected by marketers, but at the
heart of the discipline, is the role of emotions in marketing
exchanges and relationships. How do emotions initiate,
maintain, or sever marketing relationships? Can emotions
and marketing relationships be studied more dynamically
as they evolve in real time and in context? What are the
implications of treating emotions in marketing as social
p h e n o m e n a as opposed to strictly intrapsychic
phenomena?
Area No. 12. Finally, is customer satisfaction a unique
phenomenon or is it a subcategory of positive emotions?
Likewise, is dissatisfaction a unique phenomenon, the
polar opposite of satisfaction, or a subcategory of negative
emotions? How do satisfaction/dissatisfaction and other
emotions relate to customer loyalty, complaint behavior,
and word-of-mouth behavior? What role do emotions play
in the diffusion of innovations?

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank Professor Julie Ruth
for her comments on this article.

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ABOUTTHEAUTHORS
is the Dwight F. Benton Professor of Behavioral Science in Management at the University of Michigan Business School. He is a graduate of Northwestern University and has
been a faculty member at the University of California-Berkeley,
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Stanford University. He is currently doing research in emotions, goal-directed behavior, and social identity theory.
Richard E Bagozzi

Mahesh Gopinath is an assistant professor of marketing in the

A. B. Freeman School of Business at Tulane University. He is a
graduate of the University of Michigan Business School and is
doing research in emotions and customer satisfaction.
is an assistant professor of marketing in the
School of Business and Economics at Chapman University. He is
a graduate of the University of Michigan Business School and is
doing research in emotions and customer satisfaction9

Prashanth U. Nyer