THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 188832. April 23, 2014.]

VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA, petitioner, vs. FIFTH (5th) SHARI'A
DISTRICT COURT and ROLDAN E. MALA, represented by his
father Hadji Kalam T. Mala, respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J :
p

Shari'a District Courts have no jurisdiction over real actions where one of the parties
is not a Muslim.
This is a petition for certiorari with application for issuance of temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction to set aside the Fifth (5th) Shari'a District
Court's decision 1 dated June 11, 2008 and order 2 dated May 29, 2009 in SDC
Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200.
The facts as established from the pleadings of the parties are as follows:
On February 15, 1996, Roldan E. Mala purchased a 300-square-meter parcel of land
located in Poblacion, Parang, Maguindanao, now Shari Kabunsuan, from one Ceres
Caete. On March 3, 1996, Transfer Certicate of Title No. T-15633 covering the
parcel of land was issued in Roldan's name. 3 At the time of the purchase, Vivencio
B. Villagracia occupied the parcel of land. 4
By 2002, Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na Titulo Blg. P-60192 issued by
the Land Registration Authority allegedly covering the same parcel of land. 5
On October 30, 2006, Roldan had the parcel of land surveyed. In a report, Geodetic
Engineer Dennis P. Dacup found that Vivencio occupied the parcel of land covered by
Roldan's certificate of title. 6
To settle his conicting claim with Vivencio, Roldan initiated barangay conciliation
proceedings before the Oce of the Barangay Chairman of Poblacion II, Parang,
Shari Kabunsuan. Failing to settle with Vivencio at the barangay level, Roldan led
an action to recover the possession of the parcel of land with respondent Fifth
Shari'a District Court. 7
In his petition, Roldan alleged that he is a Filipino Muslim; that he is the registered
owner of the lot covered by Transfer Certicate of Title No. 15633; and that
Vivencio occupied his property, depriving him of the right to use, possess, and enjoy
it. He prayed that respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court order Vivencio to vacate his
property. 8
cAHDES

Respondent court took cognizance of the case and caused service of summons on
Vivencio. However, despite service of summons, Vivencio failed to le his answer.
Thus, Roldan moved that he be allowed to present evidence ex parte, which motion
respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court granted in its order 9 dated January 30, 2008.
10

In its decision 11 dated June 11, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court ruled
that Roldan, as registered owner, had the better right to possess the parcel of land.
It ordered Vivencio to vacate the property, turn it over to Roldan, and pay
P10,000.00 as moderate damages and P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.
On December 15, 2008, respondent Fifth Shari'a Distict Court issued the notice of
writ of execution 12 to Vivencio, giving him 30 days from receipt of the notice to
comply with the decision. He received a copy of the notice on December 16, 2008.
13

On January 13, 2009, Vivencio led a petition for relief from judgment with prayer
for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. 14 In his petition for relief from
judgment, Vivencio cited Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines 15 and argued that Shari'a District Courts may only hear civil
actions and proceedings if both parties are Muslims. Considering that he is a
Christian, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of Roldan's action for recovery of possession of a
parcel of land. He prayed that respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court set aside the
decision dated June 11, 2008 on the ground of mistake. 16
Respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court ruled that Vivencio "intentionally [waived]
his right to defend himself." 17 It noted that he was duly served with summons and
had notice of the following: Roldan's motion to present evidence ex parte,
respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court's decision dated June 11, 2008, and the writ
of execution. However, Vivencio only went to court "when he lost his right to assail
the decision via certiorari." 18
According to respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court, Vivencio cited the wrong
provision of law. Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines refers to the jurisdiction of Shari'a Circuit Courts, not of Shari'a
District Courts. 19 It ruled that it had jurisdiction over Roldan's action for recovery of
possession. Regardless of Vivencio being a non-Muslim, his rights were not
prejudiced since respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court decided the case applying
the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 20
Thus, in its order 21 dated May 29, 2009, respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court
denied Vivencio's petition for relief from judgment for lack of merit. It reiterated its
order directing the issuance of a writ of execution of the decision dated June 11,
2008.
Vivencio received a copy of the order denying his petition for relief from judgment
on June 17, 2009. 22
On August 6, 2009, Vivencio led the petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance

of temporary restraining order with this court. 23

In his petition for certiorari, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari'a District
Court acted without jurisdiction in rendering the decision dated June 11, 2008.
Under Article 143, paragraph (2) (b) of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, 24 Shari'a District Courts may only take cognizance of real actions where
the parties involved are Muslims. Reiterating that he is not a Muslim, Vivencio
argued that respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter of Roldan's action. Thus, all the proceedings before respondent Fifth
Shari'a District Court, including the decision dated June 11, 2008, are void. 25
In the resolution 26 dated August 19, 2009, this court ordered Roldan to comment
on Vivencio's petition for certiorari. This court subsequently issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the implementation of the writ of execution against
Vivencio. 27
EACIcH

On September 21, 2011, Roldan led his comment 28 on the petition for certiorari.
He allegedly led the action for recovery of possession with the Shari'a District
Court where "a more speedy disposition of the case would be obtained": 29
1. That SDC Spl. Case No. 07-200 (Quieting of Title. . .) was duly led
with the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato City at the option
of herein private respondent (petitioner below) who believed that a
more speedy disposition of the case would be obtained when the
action is led with the Shariah District Court than in the Regional Trial
Courts considering the voluminous pending cases at the Regional Trial
Courts[.] 30

On Vivencio's claim that respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court had no jurisdiction
to decide the action for recovery of possession because he is a non-Muslim, Roldan
argued that no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines
prohibited non-Muslims from participating in Shari'a court proceedings, especially in
actions where the Shari'a court applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Thus, respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court validly took cognizance of
his action:
2. That the Shariah District Court is not a court exclusively for muslim
litigants. No provision in the Code on Muslim Personal Laws which
expressly prohibits non-muslim to participate in the proceedings in the
Shariah Courts, especially in actions which applies the civil code and
not the Code on Muslim Personal Laws;
3. The Shariah District Courts has jurisdiction over action for quieting of
title led by a muslim litigant since the nature of the action involved
mere removal of cloud of doubt upon one's Certicate of Title. The
laws applied in this case is the Civil Code and other related laws, and
not the Code on Muslim Personal Laws[.] 31

Since respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court had jurisdiction to decide the action for
recovery of possession, Roldan argued that the proceedings before it were valid.

Respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Vivencio upon service on him of summons. When Vivencio failed to le his answer,
he "eectively waived his right to participate in the proceedings [before the Fifth
Shari'a District Court]" 32 and he cannot argue that his rights were prejudiced:
4. That it is not disputed that herein petitioner (respondent below) was
properly served with summons, notices and other court processes
when the SDC Spl. Case No. 07-200 was led and heard in the Fifth
(5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato City, but petitioner (respondent
below) intentionally or without known reason, ignore the proceedings;
5. That the main issue in the instant action for certiorari is whether or
not herein petitioner (respondent below) has eectively waived his
right to participate in the proceedings below and had lost his right to
appeal via Certiorari; and the issue on whether or not the Fifth (5th)
Shariah District Court has jurisdiction over an action where one of the
parties is a non-muslim;
6. That the Fifth (5th) Shariah District Court, Cotabato City acquired
jurisdiction over the case and that the same Court had correctly ruled
that herein petitioner (respondent) intentionally waived his right to
defend himself including his right to appeal via certiorari;
7. That it is humbly submitted that when the Shariah District Court took
cognizance of an action under its concurrent jurisdiction with the
Regional Trial Court, the law rules applied is not the Code on Muslim
Personal Laws but the Civil Code of the Philippines and the Revised
Rules of Procedure, hence the same would not prejudice the right of
herein petitioner (respondent below)[.] 33
AaSIET

In the resolution dated November 21, 2011, this court ordered Vivencio to reply to
Roldan's comment. On February 3, 2012, Vivencio led his manifestation, 34 stating
that he would no longer le a reply to the comment as he had "exhaustively
discussed the issue presented for resolution in [his petition for certiorari]." 35
The principal issue for our resolution is whether a Shari'a District Court has
jurisdiction over a real action where one of the parties is not a Muslim.
We also resolve the following issues:
1. Whether a Shari'a District Court may validly hear, try, and
decide a real action where one of the parties is a non-Muslim if
the District Court decides the action applying the provisions of
the Civil Code of the Philippines; and
2. Whether a Shari'a District Court may validly hear, try, and
decide a real action led by a Muslim against a non-Muslim if the
non-Muslim defendant was served with summons.
We rule for petitioner Vivencio.

Respondent Fifth Shari'a District

Court had no jurisdiction to hear, try,
and decide Roldan's action for
recovery of possession
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and determine cases of
the general class to which the proceedings in question belong." 36 This power is
conferred by law, 37 which may either be the Constitution or a statute. Since subject
matter jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot choose, consent to, or agree as
to what court or tribunal should decide their disputes. 38 If a court hears, tries, and
decides an action in which it has no jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the
judgment rendered, are void. 39
To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action,
the material allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are
examined. 40
The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari'a District Courts is the Code of the
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code,
Shari'a District Courts have concurrent original jurisdiction with "existing civil
courts" over real actions not arising from customary contracts 41 wherein the parties
involved are Muslims:
ART. 143. Original jurisdiction. . . .
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari'a District Court shall
have original jurisdiction over:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph
1(d) 42 wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for

forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Court; and
xxx xxx xxx

When ownership is acquired over a particular property, the owner has the right to
possess and enjoy it. 43 If the owner is dispossessed of his or her property, he or she
has a right of action to recover its possession from the dispossessor. 44 When the
property involved is real, 45 such as land, the action to recover it is a real action; 46
otherwise, the action is a personal action. 47 In such actions, the parties involved
must be Muslims for Shari'a District Courts to validly take cognizance of them.
In this case, the allegations in Roldan's petition for recovery of possession did not
state that Vivencio is a Muslim. When Vivencio stated in his petition for relief from
judgment that he is not a Muslim, Roldan did not dispute this claim.
When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari'a

District Court should have motu proprio dismissed the case. Under Rule 9, Section 1
of the Rules of Court, if it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action based on the pleadings or the evidence on record, the court
shall dismiss the claim:
cHCaIE

Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and

objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived. However, when it appears from the pleadings or the
evidence on record that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter, that there is another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause, or that the action is barred by a prior judgment or by
statute of limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.

Respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court had no authority under the law to decide
Roldan's action because not all of the parties involved in the action are Muslims.
Thus, it had no jurisdiction over Roldan's action for recovery of possession. All its
proceedings in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are void.
Roldan chose to le his action with the Shari'a District Court, instead of ling the
action with the regular courts, to obtain "a more speedy disposition of the case." 48
This would have been a valid argument had all the parties involved in this case been
Muslims. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, the jurisdiction of Shari'a District
Courts over real actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with
that of existing civil courts. However, this concurrent jurisdiction over real actions
"is applicable solely when both parties are Muslims" 49 as this court ruled in
Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong . 50 When one of the parties is not a Muslim, the action
must be filed before the regular courts.
The application of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines by respondent
Fifth Shari'a District Court does not validate the proceedings before the court. Under
Article 175 of the Muslim Code, customary contracts are construed in accordance
with Muslim law. 51 Hence, Shari'a District Courts apply Muslim law when resolving
real actions arising from customary contracts.
In real actions not arising from contracts customary to Muslims, there is no reason
for Shari'a District Courts to apply Muslim law. In such real actions, Shari'a District
Courts will necessarily apply the laws of general application, which in this case is
the Civil Code of the Philippines, regardless of the court taking cognizance of the
action. This is the reason why the original jurisdiction of Shari'a District Courts over
real actions not arising from customary contracts is concurrent with that of regular
courts.
However, as discussed, this concurrent jurisdiction arises only if the parties involved
are Muslims. Considering that Vivencio is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari'a
District Court had no jurisdiction over Roldan's action for recovery of possession of
real property. The proceedings before it are void, regardless of the fact that it
applied the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines in resolving the action.
True, no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines expressly

prohibits non-Muslims from participating in Shari'a court proceedings. In fact, there

are instances when provisions in the Muslim Code apply to non-Muslims. Under
Article 13 of the Muslim Code, 52 provisions of the Code on marriage and divorce
apply to the female party in a marriage solemnized according to Muslim law, even if
the female is non-Muslim. 53 Under Article 93, paragraph (c) of the Muslim Code, 54
a person of a dierent religion is disqualied from inheriting from a Muslim
decedent. 55 However, by operation of law and regardless of Muslim law to the
contrary, the decedent's parent or spouse who is a non-Muslim "shall be entitled to
one-third of what he or she would have received without such disqualification." 56 In
these instances, non-Muslims may participate in Shari'a court proceedings. 57
Nonetheless, this case does not involve any of the previously cited instances. This
case involves an action for recovery of possession of real property. As a matter of
law, Shari'a District Courts may only take cognizance of a real action "wherein the
parties involved are Muslims." 58 Considering that one of the parties involved in this
case is not a Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court had no jurisdiction to
hear, try, and decide the action for recovery of possession of real property. The
judgment against Vivencio is void for respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court's lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.
That Vivencio raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter only
after respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court had rendered judgment is immaterial. A
party may assail the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over a subject matter at any
stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. 59 The reason is that "jurisdiction is
conferred by law, and lack of it aects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of and to render judgment on the action." 60
In Figueroa v. People of the Philippines , 61 Venancio Figueroa was charged with
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide before the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan. The trial court convicted Figueroa as charged. On appeal with the Court of
Appeals, Figueroa raised for the rst time the issue of jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court to decide the case. Ruling that the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction over the crime charged, this court dismissed the criminal case despite
the fact that Figueroa objected to the trial court's jurisdiction only on appeal.
I n Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin , 62 Johnny Pastorin led a complaint
for constructive dismissal against Metromedia Times Corporation. Metromedia
Times Corporation actively participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.
When the Labor Arbiter ruled against Metromedia Times, it appealed to the National
Labor Relations Commission, arguing for the rst time that the Labor Arbiter had no
jurisdiction over the complaint. According to Metromedia Times, the case involved a
grievance issue "properly cognizable by the voluntary arbitrator." 63 This court set
aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter despite the fact that the issue of jurisdiction was raised only on
appeal.
There are exceptional circumstances when a party may be barred from assailing the
jurisdiction of the court to decide a case. In the 1968 case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy ,

the Spouses Tijam sued the Spouses Sibonghanoy on July 19, 1948 before the
Court of First Instance of Cebu to recover P1,908.00. At that time, the court with
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear civil actions in which the amount demanded
does not exceed P2,000.00 was the court of justices of the peace and municipal
courts in chartered cities under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
64

As prayed for by the Spouses Tijam in their complaint, the Court of First Instance
issued a writ of attachment against the Spouses Sibonghanoy. However, the latter
led a counter-bond issued by Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. Thus, the Court of
First Instance dissolved the writ of attachment.
After trial, the Court of First Instance decided in favor of the Spouses Tijam. When
the writ of execution returned unsatised, the Spouses Tijam moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution against Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.'s bond.
The Court of First Instance granted the motion. Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
moved to quash the writ of execution, which motion the Court of First Instance
denied. Thus, the surety company appealed to the Court of Appeals.
TAECaD

The Court of Appeals sustained the Court of First Instance's decision. Five days after
receiving the Court of Appeals' decision, Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. led a
motion to dismiss, arguing for the rst time that the Court of First Instance had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The Court of Appeals forwarded the
case to this court for resolution.
This court ruled that the surety company could no longer assail the jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance on the ground of estoppel by laches. Parties may be
barred from assailing the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the
action if it took them an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to object to
the court's jurisdiction. 65 This is to discourage the deliberate practice of parties in
invoking the jurisdiction of a court to seek armative relief, only to repudiate the
court's jurisdiction after failing to obtain the relief sought. 66 In such cases, the
court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is overlooked in favor of the public
policy of discouraging such inequitable and unfair conduct. 67
I n Tijam , it took Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. 15 years before assailing the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. As early as 1948, the surety company
became a party to the case when it issued the counter-bond to the writ of
attachment. During trial, it invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance by
seeking several armative reliefs, including a motion to quash the writ of
execution. The surety company only assailed the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance in 1963 when the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. This
court said:
. . . Were we to sanction such conduct on [Manila Surety and Fidelity, Co.
Inc.'s] part, We would in eect be declaring as useless all the proceedings
had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and
compel [the spouses Tijam] to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity
and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting. 68

After this court had rendered the decision in Tijam , this court observed that the
"non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction" 69 has been ignored, and the Tijam
doctrine has become more the general rule than the exception. In Calimlim v.
Ramirez, 70 this court said:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in
decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the
subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by
consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has
been qualied by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from
the ruling in the cited case of [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy] . It is to be regretted,
however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which
were obviously not contemplated therein. . . . . 71

Thus, the court reiterated the "unquestionably accepted" 72 rule that objections to a
court's jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal. This is because jurisdiction over the subject matter is a
"matter of law" 73 and "may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the
parties." 74
I n Figueroa, 75 this court ruled that the Tijam doctrine "must be applied with great
care; " 76 otherwise, the doctrine "may be a most eective weapon for the
accomplishment of injustice": 77
. . . estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to
be applied rarely only from necessity, and only in extraordinary
circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with great care and the equity
must be strong in its favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel may
be a most eective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice. . . . a
judgment rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. . . . .
No laches will even attach when the judgment is null and void for want of
jurisdiction . . . . 78
THCASc

In this case, the exceptional circumstances similar to Tijam do not exist. Vivencio
never invoked respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court's jurisdiction to seek
armative relief. He led the petition for relief from judgment precisely to assail
the jurisdiction of respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court over Roldan's petition for
recovery of possession.
Thus, the general rule holds. Vivencio validly assailed the jurisdiction of respondent
Fifth Shari'a District Court over the action for recovery of possession for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Roldan's action.
II

That respondent Fifth Shari'a

District Court served summons on
petitioner Vivencio did not vest it
with jurisdiction over the person of

petitioner Vivencio
Roldan argued that the proceedings before respondent Shari'a District Court were
valid since the latter acquired jurisdiction over the person of Vivencio. When
Vivencio was served with summons, he failed to le his answer and waived his right
to participate in the proceedings before respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court. Since
Vivencio waived his right to participate in the proceedings, he cannot argue that his
rights were prejudiced.
Jurisdiction over the person is "the power of [a] court to render a personal judgment
or to subject the parties in a particular action to the judgment and other rulings
rendered in the action." 79 A court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
plainti once he or she les the initiatory pleading. 80 As for the defendant, the
court acquires jurisdiction over his or her person either by his or her voluntary
appearance in court 81 or a valid service on him or her of summons. 82
Jurisdiction over the person is required in actions in personam 83 or actions based on
a party's personal liability. 84 Since actions in personam "are directed against
specic persons and seek personal judgments," 85 it is necessary that the parties to
the action "are properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be
heard." 86 With respect to the defendant, he or she must have been duly served
with summons to be considered properly impleaded; otherwise, the proceedings in
personam , including the judgment rendered, are void. 87
On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person is not necessary for a court to validly
try and decide actions in rem . 88 Actions in rem are "directed against the thing or
property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect thereto as against
the whole world." 89 In actions in rem , the court trying the case must have
jurisdiction over the res, or the thing under litigation, to validly try and decide the
case. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either "by the seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or as a
result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is
recognized and made eective." 90 In actions in rem , summons must still be served
on the defendant but only to satisfy due process requirements. 91
Unlike objections to jurisdiction over the subject matter which may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings, objections to jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; otherwise, the objection to the
court's jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is deemed waived. Under Rule
9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, "defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived."
In this case, Roldan sought to enforce a personal obligation on Vivencio to vacate his
property, restore to him the possession of his property, and pay damages for the
unauthorized use of his property. 92 Thus, Roldan's action for recovery of possession
is an action in personam . As this court explained in Ang Lam v. Rosillosa and
Santiago, 93 an action to recover the title to or possession of a parcel of land "is an
action in personam , for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the
right to a tangible thing." 94 Also, in Muoz v. Yabut, Jr. , 95 this court said that "a

judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in

personam . It is binding only against the parties and their successors-in-interest by
title subsequent to the commencement of the action." 96
This action being in personam , service of summons on Vivencio was necessary for
respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court to acquire jurisdiction over Vivencio's person.
However, as discussed, respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action, with Vivencio not being a Muslim. Therefore,
all the proceedings before respondent Shari'a District Court, including the service of
summons on Vivencio, are void.
cCaDSA

III

The Shari'a Appellate Court and the

Office of the Jurisconsult in Islamic
law must now be organized to
effectively enforce the Muslim legal
system in the Philippines
We note that Vivencio led directly with this court his petition for certiorari of
respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court's decision. Under the judicial system in
Republic Act No. 9054, 97 the Shari'a Appellate Court has exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari of decisions of the Shari'a District Courts. He
should have filed his petition for certiorari before the Shari'a Appellate Court.
However, the Shari'a Appellate Court is yet to be organized. Thus, we call for the
organization of the court system created under Republic Act No. 9054 to eectively
enforce the Muslim legal system in our country. After all, the Muslim legal system
a legal system complete with its own civil, criminal, commercial, political,
international, and religious laws 98 is part of the law of the land, 99 and Shari'a
courts are part of the Philippine judicial system. 100
Shari'a Circuit Courts and Shari'a District Courts created under the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines shall continue to discharge their duties. 101 All cases
tried in Shari'a Circuit Courts shall be appealable to Shari'a District Courts. 102
The Shari'a Appellate Court created under Republic Act No. 9054 shall exercise
appellate jurisdiction over all cases tried in the Shari'a District Courts. 103 It shall
also exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, habeas corpus, and other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction. 104 The decisions of the Shari'a Appellate Court shall be nal
and executory, without prejudice to the original and appellate jurisdiction of this
court. 105
This court held in Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong 106 that "until such time that the
Shari'a Appellate Court shall have been organized," 107 decisions of the Shari'a
District Court shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals and "shall be referred to a
Special Division to be organized in any of the [Court of Appeals] stations preferably
composed of Muslim [Court of Appeals] Justices." 108 However, considering that

Tomawis was not yet promulgated when Vivencio led his petition for certiorari on
August 6, 2009, we take cognizance of Vivencio's petition for certiorari in the
exercise of our original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari. 109
Moreover, priority should be given in organizing the Oce of the Jurisconsult in
Islamic law. A Jurisconsult in Islamic law or "Mufti" is an ocer with authority to
render legal opinions or "fatawa" 110 on any questions relating to Muslim law. 111
These legal opinions should be based on recognized authorities 112 and "must be
rendered in precise accordance with precedent." 113 In the Philippines where only
Muslim personal laws are codied, a legal ocer learned in the Qur'an and Hadiths
is necessary to assist this court as well as Shari'a court judges in resolving disputes
not involving Muslim personal laws.
All told, Shari'a District Courts have jurisdiction over a real action only when the
parties involved are Muslims. Respondent Fifth Shari'a District Court acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of Roldan E. Mala's action for recovery of possession
considering that Vivencio B. Villagracia is not a Muslim. Accordingly, the proceedings
in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200, including the judgment rendered, are
void.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. Respondent Fifth Shari'a
District Court's decision dated June 11, 2008 and order dated May 29, 2009 in SDC
Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are SET ASIDE without prejudice to the ling
of respondent Roldan E. Mala of an action with the proper court.
ScCEIA

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 18-19.

2.Id. at 22-23.
3.Id. at 42.
4.Id. at 6.
5.Id. at 43.
6.Id. at 19.
7.Id.
8.Id. at 38-41.
9.Id. at 44.

10.Id. at 18.
11.Id. at 18-19.
12.Id. at 28.
13.Id. at 33.
14.Id. at 33-36.
15.MUSLIM CODE, Art. 155, par. (2) provides:
ART. 155. Jurisdiction. The Shari'a Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or have been
married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes relating to:
(a) Marriage;
(b) Divorce recognized under this Code;
(c) Betrothal or breach of contract to marry;
(d) Customary dower (mahr);
(e) Disposition and distribution of property upon divorce;
(f) Maintenance and support, and consolatory gifts, (mut'a); and
(g) Restitution of marital rights.
16.Rollo, p. 33.
17.Id. at 23.
18.Id. at 22.
19.Id. at 23.
20.Id.
21.Id. at 22-23.
22.Id. at 4.
23.Id. at 2-44.
24.MUSLIM CODE, Art. 143, par. (2) (b) provides:
ART. 143. Original jurisdiction. . . .

 (2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari'a District Court shall have
original jurisdiction over:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d)
wherein the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Municipal Circuit Court.
25.Rollo, pp. 8-10.
26.Id. at 45-46.
27.Id. at 70-72.
28.Id. at 27-30.
29.Id. at 27.
30.Id.
31.Id. at 27-28.
32.Id. at 28.
33.Id. at 28-29.
34.Id. at 33-36.
35.Id. at 33.
36.Reyes v. Diaz , 73 Phil. 484, 486 (1941) [Per J. Moran, En Banc].
37.Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip , 506 Phil. 407, 415 (2005) [Per Acting C.J.
Panganiban, Third Division].
38.Calimlim v. Ramirez , 204 Phil. 25, 34-35 (1982) [Per J. Vasquez, First Division].
39.Figueroa v. People, 580 Phil. 58, 78 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division], citing Heirs
of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz , G.R. No. 162890,
November 22, 2005, 475 SCRA 743 [Per J. Callejo, Second Division].
40.Id.
41.MUSLIM CODE, Art. 175 provides:
ART. 175. How construed. Any transaction whereby one person delivers
to another any real estate, plantation, orchard, or any fruit-bearing property by
virtue of sanda, sanla, arindao, or similar customary contract, shall be construed
as a mortgage (rihan) in accordance with Muslim law.
42.MUSLIM CODE, Art. 143, par. 1 (d) provides:

 ART. 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction over:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are
Muslims, if they have not specified which law shall govern their relations[.]
xxx xxx xxx
43.CIVIL CODE, Art. 428.
44.CIVIL CODE, Art. 428.
45.CIVIL CODE, Art. 415 provides:
Art. 415. The following are immovable property:
(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or form
an integral part of an immovable;
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a xed manner, in such a way that it
cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of
the object;
(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or ornamentation, placed
in buildings or on lands by the owner of the immovable in such a manner that it
reveals the intention to attach them permanently to the tenements;
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner
of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on for an industry
or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which
tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, sh ponds or breeding places of
similar nature, in case their owner has placed them or preserves them with the
intention to have them permanently attached to the land, and forming a
permanent part of it; the animals in these places are included;
(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;
(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms part of the
bed, and waters either running or stagnant;
(9) Docks and structures which, though oating, are intended by their nature
and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast;
(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over
immovable property.
46.RULES OF COURT, Rule 4, Sec. 1 provides:

 SEC. 1. Venue of real actions. Actions aecting title to or possession of real

property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court
which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated.
Forcible entry and detainer actions shall be commenced and tried in the municipal
trial court of the municipality or city wherein the real property involved, or a
portion thereof, is situated.
47.RULES OF COURT, Rule 4, Sec. 2 provides:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. All other actions may be commenced and
tried where the plainti or any of the principal plaintis resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
48.Rollo, p. 27.
49.Tomawis v. Hon. Balindong , G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 354, 369
[Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
50.G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 354 [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
51.MUSLIM CODE, Art. 175.
52.MUSLIM CODE, Art. 13, par. (1) provides:
ART. 13. Application. (1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage
and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a
Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code
in any part of the Philippines.
53.B. I. ARABANI, SR., COMMENTARIES ON THE CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS OF
THE PHILIPPINES 258 (2011).
54.MUSLIM CODE, Art. 93 provides:
ART. 93. Disqualications to succession. The following shall be disqualied to
succeed:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Those who are so situated that they cannot inherit under Islamic law.
55.Under Islamic law, a Muslim may not inherit from a non-Muslim, and a non-Muslim
may not inherit from a Muslim. This is based on the Hadith of Muhammad that "the
people belonging to two (dierent) faiths do not inherit from each other." See B. I.
ARABANI, SR., COMMENTARIES ON THE CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS OF
THE PHILIPPINES 608 (2011).
56.MUSLIM CODE, Art. 107 provides:
ART. 107. Bequest by operation of law. Should the testator die without

having made a bequest in favor of any child of his son who predeceased him, or
who simultaneously dies with him, such child shall be entitled to one-third of the
share that would have pertained to the father if he were alive. The parent or
spouse, who is otherwise disqualied to inherit in view of Article 93 (c), shall be
entitled to one-third of what he or she would have received without such
disqualification.
57.MUSLIM CODE, Arts. 155 (2) and 143 (1) (b).
58.MUSLIM CODE, Art. 143 (2) (b).
59.Ibrahim v. Commission on Elections , G.R. No. 192289, January 8, 2013, 688 SCRA
129, 145 [Per J. Reyes, En Banc], citing Republic v. Bantigue Point Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 162322, March 14, 2012, 668 SCRA 158 [Per J. Sereno,
Second Division]; Figueroa v. People of the Philippines , 580 Phil. 58, 76 (2008) [Per
J. Nachura, Third Division]; Mangaliag v. Catubig-Pastoral, 510 Phil. 637, 648 (2005)
[Per J. Austria-Martinez, Second Division]; Calimlim v. Ramirez , 204 Phil. 25, 35
(1982) [Per J. Vasquez, First Division].
60.Francel Realty Corporation v. Sycip , 506 Phil. 407, 415 (2005) [Per Acting C.J.
Panganiban, Third Division].
61.580 Phil. 58, 76 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
62.503 Phil. 288 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
63.Id. at 294.
64.131 Phil. 556 (1968) [Per J. Dizon, En Banc].
65.Id. at 563.
66.Id. at 564.
67.Id. at 563-564.
68.Id. at 565.
69.Calimlim v. Ramirez , 204 Phil. 25, 35 (1982) [Per J. Vasquez, First Division].
70.204 Phil. 25 (1982) [Per J. Vasquez, First Division].
71.Id. at 34-35.
72.Id. at 34.
73.Id.
74.Id. at 34-35.
75.Figueroa v. People of the Philippines , 580 Phil. 58 (2008) [Per J. Nachura, Third
Division].

76.Id. at 77.
77.Id.
78.Id. at 77-78.
79.Macasaet v. Co, Jr. , G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 187, 198 [Per J.
Bersamin, First Division].
80.Id. at 201.
81.RULES OF COURT, Rule 14, Sec. 20.
82.Macasaet v. Co, Jr. , G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 187, 201 [Per J.
Bersamin, First Division].
83.Id. at 198.
84.Id. at 199, citing Domagas v. Jensen , 489 Phil. 631, 641 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr.,
Second Division].
85.Ang Lam v. Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447, 451 (1950) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].
86.Id. at 450, citing Patriarca v. Orate , 7 Phil. 390, 393-394 (1907) [Per C.J. Arellano, En
Banc].
87.Domagas v. Jensen, 489 Phil. 631, 645 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division].
88.Macasaet v. Co, Jr. , G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 187, 198 [Per J.
Bersamin, First Division].
89.Ang Lam v. Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447, 451 (1950) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc],
citing 1 C.J.S., 1148.
90.Macahilig v. Heirs of Magalit , 398 Phil. 802, 817 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third
Division].
91.Macasaet v. Co, Jr. , G.R. No. 156759, June 5, 2013, 697 SCRA 187, 198 [Per J.
Bersamin, First Division].
92.Rollo, p. 40.
93.86 Phil. 447 (1950) [Per J. Ozaeta, En Banc].
94.Id. at 451.
95.G.R. No. 142676, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 344 [Per J. Leonardo-de Castro, First
Division].
96.Id. at 367.
97.An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An

Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," as amended.

98.B. I. ARABANI, SR., COMMENTARIES ON THE CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS OF
THE PHILIPPINES 245 (2011).
99.MUSLIM CODE, Art. 2.
100.MUSLIM CODE, Art. 137.
101.Republic Act No. 9054, Art. VIII, Sec. 5.
102.MUSLIM CODE, Art. 144 (1).
103.Republic Act No. 9054, Art. VIII, Secs. 7 and 9.
104.Republic Act No. 9054, Art. VIII, Sec. 9.
105.Republic Act No. 9054, Art. VIII, Sec. 10.
106.G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010, 614 SCRA 354 [Per J. Velasco, Jr., En Banc].
107.Id. at 361.
108.Id.
109.CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5 (1).
110.The singular form is "fatwa".
111.MUSLIM CODE, Art. 166 (1).
112.MUSLIM CODE, Art. 166 (1).
113.B. I. ARABANI, SR., COMMENTARIES ON THE CODE OF MUSLIM PERSONAL LAWS
OF THE PHILIPPINES 855 (2011).