Canon 1-3
Canon 1-3
Canon 1-3
PER CURIAM:
In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held
on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC), the following were
elected by the House of Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and
proclaimed as officers:
NAME
POSITION
President
Executive Vice-President
The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4,1989, before the
Supreme Court en banc. However,disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members
of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse
comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the intensive electioneering and
overspending by the candidates, led by the main protagonists for the office of president of the
association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use
of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting,
all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The Supreme
Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the
oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.
It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of
votes on June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato
Puno of the Court of Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be
above board. For Justice Puno took it upon himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with,
and marking of, the ballots.
What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance
that characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP.
I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.
Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard, Sunday, June
17, 1989), Luis Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10,
1989) and "The Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an article,
entitled "Pam-Pam" (The Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and the editorial, entitled 'Wrong
Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989), were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and
pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by the three principal candidates: Attys. Violeta
C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured heart, soul, money and
influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates."
Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a disadvantage because Atty.
Drilon allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing
Bigay Puso donations, and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor
arbiters of the Department of Labor and Employment (who had been granted leaves of absence by
her husband, the Labor Secretary) campaigning for her. Jurado's informants alleged that there was
rampant vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's
fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz, Regala and Abello
Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that government positions were promised to others
by the office of the Labor Secretary.
Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition, mentioned "talk of
personnel of the Department of Labor, especially conciliators and employers, notably Chinese
Filipinos, giving aid and comfort to her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town
delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly "wined and dined continuously, womened and
subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes x x x" which allegedly "ranged from
Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the election, some twelve to twenty votes which were
believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000."
In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary allegedly involved
himself in IBP politics on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their
election strategy in a room of the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where the
convention/election were held) during a recess x x x."
Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's reports with some
embellishments.
II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.
Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated June 15, 1989, directed
the outgoing and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors, the principal officers and
Chairman of the House of Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock
p.m., and there to inform the Court on the veracity of the aforementioned reports and to recommend,
for the consideration of the Court, appropriate approaches to the problem of confirming and
strengthening adherence to the fundamental principles of the IBP.
In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of existence, is
that the IBP shall be non-political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in
the choice of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP
officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates
and governors would be chosen on the basis of professional merit and willingness and ability to
serve."
The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in connection with the
election of members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, there is a
widespread belief, based on reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that
there was extensive and intensive campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well as
expenditure of considerable sums of money by candidates, including vote-buying, direct or indirect."
The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes,
attended the dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel and advice. The meeting
between the Court en banc on the one hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the
other, was an informal one. Thereafter, the Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to determine
whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in the IBP By-Laws were committed before
and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national officers.
The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R.
Narvasa, as Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F.
Sarmiento, and Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court,
Atty. Daniel Martinez, acted as the committee's Recording Secretary.
A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by the
Court to shed light on the conduct of the elections. The managers of three five-star hotels the
Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and
Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective headquarters and where they billeted their supporters
were summoned. The officer of the Philippine National Bank and the Air Transport Office were called
to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP presidential candidate and the members of her slate
used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win the votes of delegates. The
Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge that some candidates gave free air
fares to delegates to the convention. Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable
the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the
election of Atty. Drilon.
The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado were
subpoenaed to determine the nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP elections.
Their stories were based, they said, on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons
who claimed to have knowledge of the facts, but whom they, invoking the Press Freedom Law,
refused to identify.
The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing and assessing
evidence given by such persons as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of the
relevant facts; and the Court, after deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the
same.
III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.
Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, thus:
"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every
activity tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized
accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory
office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall
be eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any
Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or
an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any
elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or
prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality
thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP
elections:
SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. The following acts
and practices relative to election are prohibited, whether committed by a candidate
for any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly or
indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or through another person:
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;
(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a statement
of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of
paper; or causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than
those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections;
(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective, judicial,
quasi-judicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof;
(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as the
advertisement thereof;
(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to
vote for or against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any
member; (2) giving of food, drink, entertainment, transportation or any article of
value, or any similar consideration to any person; or (3) making a promise or causing
an expenditure to be made, offered or promised to any person."
Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules:
(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the
prohibited acts and practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices
relative to elections) of the by-laws of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the
disqualification of a candidate or his removal from office if elected, without prejudice
to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member pursuant to the By-laws of the
Integrated Bar.
At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee, the following
violations were established:
(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president, executive vicepresident, the officers of candidate the House of Delegates and Board of Governors.
The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began travelling around the
country to solicit the votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President,
Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July 13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in
Cotabato in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, p. 123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga, and in Baguio
City (during the conference of chapter presidents of Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113;
t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47) where they announced their candidacies and met the
chapter presidents.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP chapter officers,
soliciting their votes, and securing their written endorsements. He personally hand-carried
nomination forms and requested the chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to
formalize their commitment to his nomination for IBP President. He started campaigning and
distributing the nomination forms in March 1989 after the chapter elections which determined the
membership of the House of Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents (t.s.n., June 29,
1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted photocopies of his nomination
forms which read:
"Nomination Form
I Join in Nominating
RAMON M. NISCE
as
National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
______________ _______________
Chapter Signature"
Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr.,
Conizado V. Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo,
Feliciano F. Wycoco, Amor L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo
C. Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G. Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo
Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel C. Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr.,
Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C. Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas,
Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar C. Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel
Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo, Antonio G. Nalapo
Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S. Person.
Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the commitments he had
obtained (t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he
obtained only 14 votes in the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that.
some of those who had committed their votes to him were "manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or
remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit "M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).
(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.
The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show that
Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of Environment & Natural Resources (DENR)
borrowed a plane from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for
Regional Development) Assistant, Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane manifest (Exh. C-2Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu), Assistant Secretary for Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of
the passengers were IBP candidates.
Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that she was informed by
Atty. Tiu about the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).
Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the Drilon ticket, testified that
sometime in May 1989 he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of
his group to Bicol. He went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While at the
DENR, he learned that Assistant Secretary Tria was going on an official business in Bicol for
Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria
is his fraternity brother, he asked if he, together with the Drilon group, could hitch a ride on the plane
to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to assess their chances in the
IBP elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet, Naga, and
Legaspi, and asked for their support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).
Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her group.
He recalled that on May 23,1989, DENR Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor
certain regional development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit the region
in the middle of May. On the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the
Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu)
could be allowed to hitch a ride on the plane. Assistant Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group
which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong, Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the
Domestic Airport bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the Drilon group had lunch with Atty.
Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).
(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.
The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed their own slates for the
election of IBP national officers on June 3, 1989.
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive Vice-President;
and for Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon),
Mario C.V. Jalandoni (Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C.
Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B. Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern Visayas),
Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao), Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).
The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice President,
Salvador Lao for Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern
'Luzon), Acong Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern
Tagalog), Teodoro Almine (Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern Visayas), Joelito Barrera
(Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco (Eastern Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao)
(Exhibit M-1-Nisce).
Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano Benjamin B. Bernardino,
Antonio L. Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr.,
Oscar C. Fernandez, Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban,
Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite and Oscar V. Badelles.
(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.
Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the convention. He
mentioned Oscar Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan
City to Manila and back. Badelles was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written
commitment from him because Atty. Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan, h'wag mo
nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-arms, not in Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.
Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he Badelles said that he did not use
them, because if he did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to be
committed (t.s.n., July 4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).
Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and another ticket to Mrs.
Linda Lim of Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the
plane tickets of Vicente Real, Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica
(Exh. D-2-Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte (Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3- Calica), and
Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).
In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of Manila
4, as Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p. 161).
(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to delegates.
(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO
Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the Holiday Inn, which
served as his headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the
IBP delegates. The three suites were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar
Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He paid P150,000 for the hotel bills of his delegates at the
Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with breakfast.
Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C. Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan
Judge Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro,
Restituto Villanueva, Serapio Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem
Arbolado, Ricardo Teruel, Shirley Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy Manito
Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian Ocampo, Francisco Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla,
Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero
Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno Flores, Dennis Rendon,
Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos, Tiburcio Edano
James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza, Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime
Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven Zach, and
Benjamin Padon.
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not 24)
rooms, including the presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat. The group bookings were
made by Atty. Gloria Paculdo, the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total
sum of P227,114.89 was paid to Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.
(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON
The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her
campaign manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to
Ms. Villanueva, Philippine Plaza banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta
signed with the Philippine Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty. Callanta."
Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it was Mr. Mariano
Benedicto who first came to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She suggested that he obtain a
group (or discounted) rate. He gave her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the
arrangements with her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the Assistant Secretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE).
The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages
consumed by the Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel
Martinez's last telephone conversation with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding
account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.
Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He made a
downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet' showed that the following persons contributed for
that down payment:
P 25,000
20,000
10,000
10,000
20,000
10,000
20,000
15,300
was a candidate who paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued in the
name of the member for whom payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).
She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March, April, May during any
election year. This year, the collections increased by P100,000 over that of last year (a non-election
year from Pl,413,425 to Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).
(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of
paper (Sec. 14[a], IBP By-Laws).
On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to be distributed his bio-data
and copies of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce
similarly distributed their tickets and bio-data.
The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They were printed by his
own printing shop.
(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the
officer presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).
Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials on the convention floor.
Atty. Carpio noted that there were more campaign materials distributed at the convention site this
year than in previous years. The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).
Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a candidate for
chairman of the House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket, testified that campaign materials were
distributed during the convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law firm
campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).
(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec.
14[e], IBP BY-Laws).
Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him to withdraw his
candidacy for chairman of the House of Delegates and to run as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate,
but he declined (t.s.n. July 3,1989, pp. 137, 149).
Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio and president of the
Baguio-Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of
the Department of Labor & Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met
Atty. Drilon, together with two labor officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala
Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote and invited her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a
room would be available for her. Atty. Paculdo also tried to enlist her support during the chapter
presidents' meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July
13,1989, pp. 43-54).
Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who had earlier committed
his vote to Nisce changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is
admittedly hearsay). When Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied that
there was such an offer. Nisce's informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP candidate who also
withdrew.
Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to be nominated (t.s.n.
June 29, 1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's candidate for Governor became
Paculdo's candidate instead (t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104).
Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro
went around saying, "I am not campaigning, but my wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the
presidents of several IBP chapters informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon
(t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 109-110). He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly campaigned in
La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)
Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the Western Visayas, expressed
his disappointment over the IBP elections because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to
another. He testified that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an assistant
regional director of the DOLE who offered to bring him to the Philippine Plaza, but he declined the
offer. During the legal aid seminar, Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a
room had been reserved for him. He declined the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 102-106).
Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew that the three candidates
had their headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine
Plaza; and Nisce, at the Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the elections,
representatives of Atty. Drilon went to Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil
Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by Atty. Julve the Assistant Regional Director of
the Department of Labor in Dumaguete City. These two, he said, offered to give him two PAL tickets
and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-104). But he declined the
offer because he was already committed to Atty. Nisce.
Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a businessman, Henry Dy,
approached him to convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already
committed to Nisce.
He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two companions (Atty.
Eltanal and Atty. Ruperto) had earlier bought their own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).
SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED
BY THE CANDIDATES
Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this
amount, the Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed about
P150,000. The Capitol Bar Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City
lawyers.
He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces,
Pampanga, Abra, Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).
Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses
for his campaign which began several months before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of
airplane tickets for some delegates.
The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her
campaign rang up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food,
and beverage consumed by Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at
convention's end.
FINDINGS.
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national
positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3,
1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly nonpolitical" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and
Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them
to corral and entertain the delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the
chapter presidents who comprise the 120-member House of Delegates that elects the national
officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the
other elective positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the procurement
of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the delegates; the
reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential candidates;
the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their
chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets
and bio-data of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to
P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their
campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the
Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at
the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and
hotel accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied them) in exchange for
their support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or "flipflop" from one ticket
to another for some rumored consideration; all these practices made a political circus of the
proceedings and tainted the whole election process.
The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP
but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their
obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and
legal processes" and to abstain from 'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect
for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law,
engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated for
their observance.
The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted
from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one
way or another, certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's
esteem.
The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright
prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during
the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent
investigation conducted by this Committee has revealed that those parties had been less than
candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least
withhold vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the campaign.
CONCLUSIONS.
It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art.
VIII) providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a
representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for
appointment to vacant positions in the judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president
has attracted so much interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously
perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections. To
impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the misconduct which
attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the nonpolitical character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the
top positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned
unethical practices which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the
practitioners of a noble and honored profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:
1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled.
2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates (approved by
this Court in its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national officers:
(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;
(b) the IBP president; and
(c) the executive vice-president,
be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under
Section 77, Art. XI of said By-Laws.
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the
Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP regions) from among
themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of
automatic succession by the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their
two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No.
287) should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically
succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive
Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated
among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as
Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation of the presidency among
the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a
President and Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of Governors
from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis.
The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-President for their respective regions. There
shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board of Governors to be appointed
by the President with the consent of the Board.
6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:
(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the Chairman and
Vice-Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer,
and Sergeant-at-Arms shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
House of Delegates.'
7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, SecretaryTreasurer and Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed
8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 37. Composition of the Board. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall
be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine
(9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation
basis of one (1) Governor for each region to be elected by the members of the House
of Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated
among the different Chapters in the region.
9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:
Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1) month before
the national convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for
their region, the choice of which shall as much as possible be rotated among the
chapters in the region.
10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following provision as part of the first
paragraph:
No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be
held prior to any election in an election year.
11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they are hereby
deleted.
All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court
of July 9, 1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.
12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three
(3) months, after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days
thereafter, the Board of Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among
themselves the IBP national president and executive vice-president. In these special elections, the
candidates in the election of the national officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in SubHead 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those
identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the irregularities attendant upon that election,
are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any position.
13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court to administer
the affairs of the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are without prejudice to
its adoption in due time of such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 6408
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro for
deceit and non-payment of debts.
A letter-complaint dated May 21, 2001 was filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
under the names of Isidra Barrientos and Olivia C. Mercado, which was signed, however, by Isidra
only. It states that: sometime in September of 2000, respondent issued several Equitable PCIBank
Checks in favor of both Isidra and Olivia, amounting to P67,000.00, and in favor of Olivia,
totaling P234,000.00, for the payment of a pre-existing debt; the checks bounced due to insufficient
funds thus charges for violation of B.P. 22 were filed by Isidra and Olivia with the City Prosecutor of
Cabanatuan; respondent sent text messages to complainants asking for the deferment of the
criminal charges with the promise that she will pay her debt; respondent however failed to fulfill said
promise; on May 16, 2001, respondent, through her sister-in-law, tried to give complainants a title for
a parcel of land in exchange for the bounced checks which were in the possession of complainants;
the title covered an area of 5,000 square meters located at Bantug, La Torre, Talavera, Nueva Ecija,
registered in the name of Victoria Villamar which was allegedly paid to respondent by a client;
complainants checked the property and discovered that the land belonged to a certain Dra. Helen
Garcia, the sole heir of Victoria Villamar, who merely entrusted said title to respondent pursuant to a
transaction with the Quedancor; complainants tried to get in touch with respondent over the phone
but the latter was always unavailable, thus the present complaint.1
On July 13, 2001, in compliance with the Order2 of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD),
respondent filed her Answer alleging that: she issued several Equitable PCIBank checks amounting
to P234,000.00 in favor of Olivia but not to Isidra; said checks were issued in payment of a preexisting obligation but said amount had already been paid and replaced with new checks; Isidra
signed a document attesting to the fact that the subject of her letter-complaint no longer exists; 3 she
also issued in favor of Olivia several Equitable PCIBank checks amounting to P67,000.00 for the
payment of a pre-existing obligation; the checks which were the subject of the complaint filed at the
City Prosecutors Office in Cabanatuan City are already in the possession of respondent and the
criminal case filed by complainants before the Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City Branch 3
was already dismissed; the Informations for Violation of B.P. 22 under I.S. Nos. 01-14090-03 4 were
never filed in court; Olivia already signed an affidavit of desistance; respondent did not send text
messages to Isidra and Olivia asking for deferment of the criminal complaints neither did she present
any title in exchange for her bounced checks; she never transacted with Isidra since all dealings
were made with Olivia; and the present complaint was initiated by Isidra only because she had a
misunderstanding with Olivia and she wants to extract money from respondent. 5
Attached to said Answer is an affidavit signed by Olivia C. Mercado which states as follows:
1. That I am one of the complainants for the Disbarment of Atty. Elerizza Libiran-Meteoro
filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines National Office in Pasig City, Philippines
docketed as CBD case no. 01-840;
2. That the filing of the said complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines was
brought about by some misunderstanding and error in the accounting of the records of the
account of Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro;
3. That I was the one who transacted with Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro and not my cocomplainant Isidra Barrientos;
4. That all the pieces of jewelry were taken from me by Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro and the
corresponding checks were given to Isidra Barrientos through me;
5. That my name was indicated as co-complainant in a letter-complaint filed by Ms. Isidra
Barrientos against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro but I am not interested in pursuing the complaint
against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro since the complaint was brought about by a case of some
mistakes in the records;
6. That I, together with Isidra Barrientos had already signed an affidavit of desistance and
submitted the same before the Municipal Trial Court Branch III of Cabanatuan City w(h)ere
Criminal Case Nos. 77851 to 56 for violation of BP 22 were filed against Atty. Meteoro;
7. That with respect to I.S. nos. 03-01-1356 to 1361 the case was not filed in court and I
have also executed an affidavit of desistance for said complaint;
8. That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of all the foregoing and to prove that
I have no cause of action against Atty. Elerizza L. Meteoro.6
On August 9, 2001, the IBP-CBD issued a Notice of Hearing requiring both parties to appear before
it on September 6, 2001. On said date, both parties appeared and agreed to settle their
misunderstanding.7
On November 27, 2001, the parties agreed that the balance of P134,000.00 which respondent
acknowledged as her indebtedness to complainant will be settled on a staggered basis. Another
hearing was then set for February 5, 2002. Respondent failed to appear in said hearing despite due
notice. It was then reset to February 28, 2002 with the order that should respondent fail to appear,
the case shall already be submitted for resolution.8
Respondent appeared in the next two hearings. However, this time, it was complainant who was
unavailable. In the hearing of July 31, 2002, respondent was absent and was warned again that
should she fail to appear in the next hearing, the Commissioner shall resolve the case. On said date,
respondent did not appear despite due notice.9
On August 1, 2002, respondent filed with the Commission a motion for reconsideration of the July 31
order stating that: she got sick a few days before the scheduled hearing; she had already paid
complainant the amount ofP64,000.00; in March of 2002, respondents father was admitted to the
Intensive Care Unit of the University of Santo Tomas Hospital thus she was not able to settle her
remaining balance as planned; and because of said emergency, respondent was not able to fully
settle the balance of her debt up to this date. Respondent prayed that she be given another 60 days
from August 1,2002 to finally settle her debt with complainant.10
On April 30, 2003, the IBP-CBD issued an order granting respondents motion and setting aside the
order dated July 31, 2002. It noted that while respondent claims that she already paid
complainant P64,000.00, the photocopies of the receipts she submitted evidencing payment amount
only to P45,000.00.11 A hearing was then set for May 28, 2003 at which time respondent was
directed to present proof of her payments to the complainant. The hearing was however reset
several times until August 20, 2003 at which time, only complainant appeared. Respondent sent
somebody to ask for a postponement which the commission denied. The commission gave
respondent a last opportunity to settle her accounts with complainant. The hearing was set for
October 7, 2003 which the commission said was "intransferrable."12
On October 7, 2003, only complainant appeared. The commission noted that respondent was duly
notified and even personally received the notice for that days hearing. The case was thereafter
submitted for resolution.13
On October 24, 2003, the Investigating IBP Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan submitted his report
pertinent portions of which read as follows:
The issue to be resolved is whether or not Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro has committed a
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This Office holds that she has. More
particularly, the respondent, by initially and vehemently denying her indebtedness to herein
complainant and then subsequently admitting liability by proposing a staggered settlement
has displayed a glaring flaw in her integrity. She has shown herself to possess poor moral
characters. In her motion for reconsideration, seeking the reopening of this case, the
respondent made a false assertion that she had settled up to P64,000.00 of her
indebtedness but the receipts she submitted total only P50,000.00. What is more
disconcerting is that while she is aware and duly notified of the settings of this Office
respondent has seemingly ignored the same deliberately. Finally, the respondent has not
offered any satisfactory explanation for, nor has she controverted the complainants charge
that she (respondent) had tried to negotiate a transfer certificate of title (TCT) which had
been entrusted by a certain Dra. Helen Garcia to her relative to a transaction which the
former had with the Quedancor where respondent was formerly employed. Based on all the
foregoing findings and the deliberate failure of the respondent to come forward and settle her
accountabilities, inspite of several warnings given her by the undersigned, and her failure to
attend the scheduled hearings despite due notice, this Office is convinced that Atty. Elerizza
Libiran-Meteoro has committed a glaring violation not only of her oath as a lawyer but also
the dictates of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 which mandates that a worthy member of the Bar must
constantly be of good moral character and unsullied honesty.14
He then recommended that Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro be suspended from the practice of law
for two years and meted a fine of twenty thousand pesos. 15
On October 29, 2003, respondent filed another motion for reconsideration stating that: she was not
able to receive the notice for the October 7 hearing because she was in Bicol attending to pressing
personal problems; she only arrived from the province on October 25, 2003 and it was only then that
she got hold of the Order dated October 7; from the very beginning, respondent never intended to
ignore the Commissions hearings; as much as she wanted to pay complainant in full, the financial
crisis which hit her family since 2001 has gravely affected her ability to pay; until that day, the
expenses incurred by respondent due to the hospitalization of her father has not been paid in full by
her family; the family home of respondent in Cabanatuan has already been foreclosed by the bank;
respondents husband has been confined recently due to thyroid problems and respondent herself
had sought medical help on several occasions due to her inability to conceive despite being married
for more than five years; if not for said reasons, respondent could have already paid the complainant
despite respondents knowledge that the amount complainant wanted to collect from her is merely
the interest of her debt since she already returned most of the pieces of jewelry she purchased and
she already paid for those that she was not able to return. Respondent prays that the resolution of
the case be deferred and that she be given another 90 days from said date or until January 19, 2003
to settle whatever balance remains after proper accounting and presentation of receipts. 16
On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2003-67
CBD Case No. 01-840
Isidra Barrientos vs. Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with
modification, and considering respondents glaring violation not only of her oath as a lawyer
but of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Elerizza A.
Libiran-Meteoro is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months
and Restitution ofP84,000.00 to complainant.17
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP except as to the alleged matter of
respondent offering a transfer certificate of title to complainants in exchange for the bounced checks
that were in their possession.
We have held that deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the
practice of law.18 Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal
system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality,
honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured.19 They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to
their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves
in a manner that reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility.20 Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitly states that:
CANON 1 -- A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 -- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In this case, respondent in her answer initially tried to deny having any obligation towards Isidra
Barrientos. Upon appearing before the IBP-CBD, however, respondent eventually acknowledged her
indebtedness to Isidra in the amount of P134,000.00, promising only to pay in a staggered basis.
Her attempt to evade her financial obligation runs counter to the precepts of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, above quoted, and violates the lawyers oath which imposes upon every
member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice.21
After respondent acknowledged her debt to complainant, she committed herself to the payment
thereof. Yet she failed many times to fulfill said promise. She did not appear in most of the hearings
and merely submitted a motion for reconsideration on August 1, 2002 after the IBP-CBD
Commissioner had already submitted the case for resolution. She claimed that she got sick days
before the hearing and asked for sixty days to finally settle her account. Again, she failed to fulfill her
promise and did not appear before the Commission in the succeeding hearings despite due notice.
After the case was submitted anew for resolution on October 6, 2003, respondent filed another
motion for reconsideration, this time saying that she was in the province attending to personal
matters. Again she asked for another ninety days to settle her entire debt. This repeated failure on
her part to fulfill her promise puts in question her integrity and moral character. Her failure to attend
most of the hearings called by the commission and her belated pleas for reconsideration also
manifest her propensity to delay the resolution of the case and to make full use of the mechanisms
of administrative proceedings to her benefit.
She also could not deny that she issued several checks without sufficient funds, which prompted
Isidra and Olivia to file complaints before the prosecutors office in Cabanatuan City. Her only excuse
is that she was able to replace said checks and make arrangements for the payment of her debt,
which led to the dismissal of the criminal complaints against her.
We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account indicates a lawyers unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her.
It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public
confidence.22 The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of
respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order.23 It
also manifests a lawyers low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined
her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high
esteem.24
Mere issuance of worthless checks by a lawyer, regardless of whether or not the same were issued
in his professional capacity to a client, calls for appropriate disciplinary measures. As we explained
in Co vs. Bernardino:25
The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not
ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or
private capacity. Where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyers professional
dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in
suspending or removing him from the office of attorney.
The evidence on record clearly shows respondents propensity to issue bad checks. This
gross misconduct on his part, though not related to his professional duties as a member of
the bar, puts his moral character in serious doubt26 (Citations omitted).
She also claims that her father was hospitalized in March 2002 and that she and her husband also
had to seek medical help which greatly affected her ability to pay. She however did not present any
proof to substantiate such claims. She also did not appear personally before the complainant and
the commission, in spite of the many opportunities given her, to make arrangements for the payment
of her debt considering the circumstances that befell her family. Instead, she waited until the case
was submitted for resolution to allege such facts, without presenting any proof therefor.
We cannot uphold the IBP in finding that since respondent has not offered any explanation for, nor
has she controverted the complainants charge that she tried to negotiate with them a transfer
certificate of title that had been entrusted to her by a client, she should be held liable therefor. Basic
is the principle that if the complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving her cause of action,
fails to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which she bases her claim, the respondent is
under no obligation to prove her exception or defense. 27 Simply put, the burden is not on the
respondent to prove her innocence but on the complainants to prove her guilt. In this case,
complainants submitted a photocopy of a TCT in the name of Victoria Villamar together with their
letter-complaint, which according to complainants was the title respondent tried, through her sisterin-law, to negotiate with them in exchange for the bounced checks in their possession. 28 No other
evidence or sworn statement was submitted in support of such allegation. Respondent in her
answer, meanwhile, denied having any knowledge regarding such matter and no further discussion
was made on the matter, not even in the hearings before the commission. 29 For this reason, we hold
that respondent should not be held liable for the alleged negotiation of a TCT to complainants for
lack of sufficient evidence, but only for the non-payment of debts and the issuance of worthless
checks which were sufficiently proved and which respondent herself admitted.
We reiterate that membership in the legal profession is a privilege and demands a high degree of
good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing
requirement for the practice of law.30
Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondents misconduct. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months.
In Lao vs. Medel,31 which also involved non-payment of debt and issuance of worthless checks, the
Court held that suspension from the practice of law for one year was appropriate. Unlike in
the Lao case however, respondent is this case paid a portion of her debt, as evidenced by receipts
amounting to P50,000.00. Thus we deem that six months suspension from the practice of law and
the restitution of P84,000.00 to complainant Isidra Barrientos would be sufficient in this case.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-Meteoro is found guilty of gross misconduct and is hereby
SUSPENDED for six months from the practice of law, effective upon her receipt of this Decision, and
is ordered to pay complainant Isidra Barrientos the amount of P84,000.00, as balance of her debt to
the latter, plus 6% interest from date of finality of herein decision.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP as well
as the court administrator who shall circulate herein Resolution to all courts for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
A.C. No. 4256
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case filed in 1994 by Jovita Bustamante-Alejandro charging respondents
Atty. Warfredo Tomas Alejandro and Atty. Maricris A. Villarin with bigamy and concubinage.
Complainant alleged that respondent, Atty. Warfredo Tomas Alejandro, is her husband; that they
were married on March 3, 1971 at Alicia, Isabela, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract; 1 that she
bore him three (3) sons, namely, Dino, Eric, and Carlo, born in 1971, 1973, and 1978, respectively,
as evidenced by their respective Certificates of Live Birth;2 that respondent abandoned her and their
children in 1990 to live with his mistress, respondent Atty. Ma. Cristina Arrieta Villarin, 3 at 27-C
Masbate St., Quezon City; that respondents have since then been publicly representing themselves
as husband and wife; that respondent Atty. Villarin gave birth to Paolo Villarin Alejandro on January
17, 1992 as a result of her immoral and scandalous relationship with complainants husband whom
she named as the father of her son in the latters Certificate of Live Birth; 4 and, that in said Certificate
of Live Birth, respondent Atty. Villarin identified herself as "Ma. Cristina V. Alejandro" having been
married to Atty. Alejandro on May 1, 1990 at Isabela Province. Complainant alleged that she filed this
administrative complaint when she learned that her husband has been nominated as a regional trial
court judge. She insists that he is not fit to be a judge considering that he, and co-respondent Atty.
Villarin, do not even possess the basic integrity to remain as members of the Philippine Bar.
We required respondent to comment on the administrative complaint in our Resolution dated July 4,
1994. When copies of our resolution and of the complaint and its annexes addressed to respondent
Atty. Alejandro at 27-C Masbate St., Quezon City were returned unserved with notation "moved," we
required complainant to submit the correct and present address of her husband. 5 No similar return of
service with respect to respondent Atty. Villarin appears on the record.
In an Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion dated December 5, 1994, complainant insisted that her
husbands correct address remains to be 27-C Masbate St., Quezon City; that it was him who told
the postman that he had already moved; and, that any subsequent service by mail will result in the
same failure as respondent will either refuse service or misrepresent a change of address again.
Complainant therefore asked that copies of the complaint and Court resolution requiring comment be
served personally upon her husband by the Courts process servers. We noted and granted the
prayer.6 However, when the Courts process server attempted to effect personal service on February
16, 1995, respondent Atty. Alejandro was allegedly out of the house and his house helper refused to
accept service. Consequently we considered the copies as having been served upon respondent
Atty. Alejandro in our Resolution of July 31, 1996,7 and required him to show cause why he should
not be disciplinary dealt with or held in contempt for his continued failure to file comment, and to file
such comment, considering the considerable length of time that has lapsed since he has been first
required to do so. Respondent Atty. Alejandro failed to comply. Hence, we fined him P1,000.00 and
directed that he file the required explanation and comment on the administrative complaint. 8
When copies of both resolutions were again returned unserved with postal notations "moved," we
required complainant anew to submit the correct and present address of respondents, within ten (10)
days from notice, under pain of dismissal of her administrative complaint. 9 In a handwritten letter
dated September 10, 1998, complainant disclosed respondents present address as "12403 Dunlop
Drive, Houston, Texas."10
We referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation, within ninety (90) days from notice, in our Resolution of March 17, 2003.
In a Report dated August 26, 2003, IBP Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan recommended that
both respondents be disbarred on the following rationalization:
In its Resolution dated 31 July 1996, the Supreme Court (Second Division) ruled that respondent
Atty. Alejandro was deemed served a copy of the instant administrative complaint and of the Courts
Resolution dated 4 July 1994, by substituted service pursuant to Rule 1, Section 6 of the Rules of
Court.
In the earlier Resolution of the Supreme Court dated 4 July 1994, respondents Atty. Alejandro and
Atty. Villarin were directed to file their Comment on the instant Complaint within ten (10) days from
notice of said Resolution. To date, no Comment has been filed by either respondent Atty. Alejandro
or Atty. Villarin. x x x
Complainant submitted a photocopy of the Marriage Contract (Annex A of the letter-complaint)
between herself and respondent Atty. Alejandro executed on 3 March 1971. Complainant also
submitted photocopies of the Birth Certificates (Annexes B to D of the letter-complaint) of the
children born out of her marriage to respondent Atty. Alejandro. These documentary evidence
submitted by complainant clearly show that there was and is a valid and subsisting marriage
between herself and respondent Atty. Alejandro at the time she filed the instant administrative
complaint against said respondent, her husband.
In support of her charge of bigamy and concubinage against respondents Alejandro and Villarin,
complainant submitted a photocopy of the Birth Certificate (Annex E of the letter-complaint) of one
Paolo Villarin Alejandro. The said Birth Certificates states that the mother of said Paolo Villarin
Alejandro is "Ma. Cristina Arrieta Villarin", while his father is one "Warfredo Tomas Alejandro". Said
Birth Certificate also states that the parents of Paolo Villarin Alejandro were married on May 1, 1990
in Isabela Province.
Given the Birth Certificate of Paolo Villarin Alejandro (Annex E of the letter-complaint), and
considering the failure of respondents Atty. Alejandro and Atty. Villarin to deny the charges of
complainant, it is submitted that there is sufficient evidence on record which establishes the
immoral/illicit relationship between respondents Atty. Alejandro and Atty. Villarin. However, there is
no evidence on record which would establish beyond doubt that respondent Atty. Alejandro indeed
contracted a second marriage with Atty. Villarin while his marriage to herein complainant was
subsisting. Thus, it is recommended that as prayed for by complainant, respondents Atty. Alejandro
and Atty. Villarin be disbarred for willful violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted and approved the above report and
recommendation in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-169 dated September 27, 2003.
We agree with the IBP recommendation with respect to respondent Atty. Alejandro.
Indeed Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Thus we have in a number of cases11 disciplined members of the Bar whom we found guilty of
misconduct which demonstrated a lack of that good moral character required of them not only as a
condition precedent for their admission to the Bar but, likewise, for their continued membership
therein. No distinction has been made as to whether the misconduct was committed in the lawyers
professional capacity or in his private life. This is because a lawyer may not divide his personality so
as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another.12 He is expected to be competent,
honorable and reliable at all times since he who cannot apply and abide by the laws in his private
affairs, can hardly be expected to do so in his professional dealings nor lead others in doing so.
Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and
dishonor in other relations.13 The administration of justice, in which the lawyer plays an important role
being an officer of the court, demands a high degree of intellectual and moral competency on his
part so that the courts and clients may rightly repose confidence in him. 14
In the instant case, sufficient evidence was presented to show that respondent Atty. Alejandro, while
being lawfully married to complainant, carried on an illicit relationship with another woman, corespondent Atty. Villarin. Although the evidence presented was not sufficient to prove that he
contracted a subsequent bigamous marriage with her, the fact remains that respondent Atty.
Alejandro exhibited by his conduct a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a
member of the Bar. We have already held that disbarment proceedings is warranted against a
lawyer who abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman 15 who
had borne him a child.16 We can do no less in the instant case where respondent Atty. Alejandro
made himself unavailable to this Court and even fled to another country to escape the
consequences of his misconduct.
The same penalty however cannot be imposed on respondent Atty. Villarin. I is noted that our
Resolution dated July 4, 1994 requiring comment on the administrative complaint was never
"deemed served" upon her, in the same way that it was upon Atty. Alejandro. In fact, it does not
appear that copies of the administrative complaint, its annexes, and of our resolution requiring
comment were even sent to her. Although sent at the address she allegedly shared with corespondent Atty. Alejandro, the envelope bearing the copies was addressed to the latter only.17 That
was why when both service by registered mail and personal service failed, the copies were deemed
served solely upon Atty. Alejandro.18
The IBP for its part attempted to serve copy of the complaint upon Atty. Villarin with directive for her
to file answer. It is noted however that the same was sent to respondents old address at 27-C
Masbate St., Quezon City, not "12403 Dunlop Drive, Houston, Texas," which was respondents new
address on record supplied by the complainant. The return of service therefore showed the postal
notation "moved." Considering the serious consequences of disbarment proceedings, full opportunity
upon reasonable notice must have been given respondent to answer the charge and present
evidence in her behalf. It is only in clear cases of waiver that an administrative case be resolved
sans respondents answer.
WHEREFORE, for Gross Immorality, respondent Atty. Warfredo Tomas Alejandro is DISBARRED
from the practice of law, to take effect immediately upon his receipt of this Decision. Let copy of this
Decision be attached to Atty. Alejandros personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and a
copy thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
The complaint against respondent Atty. Maricris A. Villarin is REFERRED BACK to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for further appropriate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4762. June 28, 2004]
vs. ATTY.
PEPITO
C.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
[2]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
such road-right-of-way required the consent of four other land owners, and the
expense would be considerably more than he was made to believe. According
to respondent, he and Mr. Espino had agreed that the latter would not encash
the checks or demand the equivalent of the same until the right-of-way
problem of the land had been resolved. Respondents position is that until the
problem of obtaining a right-of-way to the land has been resolved, nothing has
yet accrued against him or Mrs. Ares (his partner), as it would be very unfair
and unjust for them to pay Mr. Espino when the land could not be developed
and sold.
[8]
[9]
Respondent also alleged that he was entitled to set-off against the amount
he owes Mr. Espino or his heirs from the purchase of the land, the advances
he made to Mr. Espino, and the cost he incurred when he defended Mr.
Espinos son in a criminal case. He later on manifested that he has fully paid
the portion of the land which had been titled in his name through the same
advances and incurred expenses.
[10]
In a resolution dated November 26, 1997, the case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation/decision, and assigned to the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD).
[11]
[14]
ground that he needed more time to prepare his evidence. We note that
respondent was first scheduled to present his evidence on December 14,
1998. Two years - five resettings, and three orders submitting the case for
resolution - later, respondent still had not proffered testimonial or documentary
evidence.
Respondent claims that his failure to present evidence was due to his
financial difficulties, i.e., he could not afford to spend for travel expenses of his
witnesses. We are not persuaded. First, it boggles the mind how financial
constraints could have prevented respondent from presenting the originals of
the documents attached to his comment, proving, among others, the alleged
advances and costs on Mr. Espinos behalf. The originals of these documents
are presumably in his possession. Second, with respect to the absence of
testimony, respondent could have submitted the affidavits of his witnesses the taking of which he could have done himself in Cagayan de Oro to keep
down the cost. The records are clear that he was allowed this option. But he
did neither.
[16]
[17]
allegations and remain unsubstantiated. Besides, respondent and Ares took risks in the
business venture and are now the titled owners of the property. The seller cannot be
blamed for any failure in the project. Respondents actuations in the whole transaction
is [sic] not at par with the standards demanded of him as a member of the
bar. Respondent is lacking in fairness and candour [sic] and honesty. The fact that he
has unreasonably delayed and failed to account with complainant for a long time and
the fact of his having allowed the checks he issued to bounce is [sic] unacceptable and
censurable behavior for a member of the bar. [citations omitted]
[19]
[22]
of the bar. A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or
private capacity, that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court.
Thus, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
[23]
[24]
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Given the foregoing, and in line with jurisprudence involving lawyers who
issued worthless checks - Lao v. Medel, Co v. Bernardino, and Ducat v.
Villalon, Jr., - we find respondents reprehensible conduct warrants
suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
[25]
[26]
[27]
EN BANC
JOSELANO GUEVARRA,
Complainant,
versus
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR., and
NACHURA, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 1, 2007
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for
Disbarment[1] before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar
Discipline
(CBD)
against
Atty.
Jose
Emmanuel
M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated
violation of the lawyers oath.
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainants) thenfiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was
married to Marianne (sometimes spelled Mary Ann) Tantoco with whom he had
three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that
from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone
calls, as well as messages some of which read I love you, I miss you, or Meet you
at Megamall.
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night
or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from
work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her
parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together
on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which
Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday
celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and
friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue
immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled
off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household
appliances.
Complainant later found, in the masters bedroom, a folded social card
bearing the words I Love You on its face, which card when unfolded contained a
handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,
By the time you open this, youll be moments away from walking down the
aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what
youre about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting
happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love
but then lose it again? Or is it because theres a bigger plan for the two of
us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done
everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you make your
vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes
on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final moments of your
single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is
gone and until we are together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us
to last me a lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my
mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE
YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS
IM LIVING MY TWEETIE YOULL BE![2]
Eternally yours,
NOLI
Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked at
No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April
2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends
saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert,
she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,[3] respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card
on which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR
ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions
together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the
couple attended the launch of the Wine All You Can promotion of French
wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B
at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of
the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page
21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was
captioned: Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala.A photocopy of the report
is attached as Annex C.[4] (Italics and emphasis in the original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase flaunting their adulterous relationship
supplied),
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed
the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED
AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled
case for lack of merit.[20] (Italics and emphasis in the original)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his
relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a
competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction
where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his
disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the
acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary
agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or
suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse
with a woman elsewhere.
Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the
benefit of marriage should be characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends on
the surrounding circumstances.[35] The case at bar involves a relationship between a
married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether
the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of
this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:[36]
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he
had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet,
and which act is not so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act
or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree in order to
merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of
sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to
warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so
with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not
all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal
law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and
immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws.[37] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not
the respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that
the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors,
i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with
a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an
extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his
profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit
and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his
license confers upon him.[39] (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyers oath he took before admission
to practice law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of
law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme
authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I
will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this
constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.[40]
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest,immoral or deceitful conduct, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same
Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law.
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of
the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation [41] on March 22, 2005
informing the IBP-CBD that complainants petition for nullity of his (complainants)
marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against
respondent and Irene based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case,
which was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of
complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justices Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting
complainants Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final
resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same
pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3,
2000, which provides that notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal,
the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is finally
resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though
no appeal has been taken.[42] (Emphasis supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared
void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage
was declared null and void.[43] As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless
proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [44] In carrying
on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her
marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself
being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And
he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainants withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ,
respondent glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed his December
23, 2003Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already
promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by
the Quezon City Prosecutors Office of complainants complaint for adultery. In
reversing
the
City
Prosecutors
Resolution,
DOJ
Secretary
Simeon Datumanong held:
Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant
would, in the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all
the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both
respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant
that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did
when complainant confronted her about Ealas frequent phone calls and
text
messages
to
her. Complainant
also
personally
witnessed Moje and Eala having
a
rendezvous
on
two
occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to
be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to
another woman. Moreover, Mojes eventual abandonment of their
conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her
about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both
respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Mojes subsequent
relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was
a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital
vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently
cohabited. Especially since Ealas vehicle and that of Mojes were always
seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address
whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The
happenstance
that
it
was
in
that
said
address
that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had
formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address
appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all
throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both
respondents love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out
there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the
nearby hospital of St. Lukes Medical Center. What finally militates
against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of
birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the
father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning
nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainants
supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly
beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not
denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child
Samantha Irene Louise Moje.[45] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,[48] held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil
and criminal cases.
PER CURIAM:
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales
was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath. Required by
this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of
particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges
more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted respondent's motion and
required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, complainant submitted an
amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts:
Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November 18,
1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent's answer on
December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent filed a rejoinder.
In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General, complainant presented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP", while
respondent appeared both as witness and counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to "11". The parties
were required to submit their respective memoranda.
On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming that the
long delay in the resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his constitutional
right to due process and speedy disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the Solicitor General
filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining that the delay in the
investigation of the case was due to the numerous requests for postponement of scheduled hearings
filed by both parties and the motions for extension of time to file their respective memoranda."
[Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent filed a reply to the Solicitor
General's comment on October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court required
the Solicitor General to submit his report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice.
On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that Atty.
Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that respondent
committed the following acts of misconduct:
a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency
of the case where the properties were involved;
b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land
development agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to the
execution of said agreement; and
c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where two
signatories who had not signed the original (or even the xerox copy) were made to
appear as having fixed their signatures [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor
General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404].
Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of
Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit more evidence before the IBP. Finally, on
November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental motion to refer this case to the IBP, containing
additional arguments to bolster his contentions in his previous pleadings.
I.
Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is respondent's
contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General was limited to the
determination of whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed with the case and that under
Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an administrative complaint against him. Respondent
claims that the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that:
This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139
entitled DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases pending
investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and disposition
as provided in this Rule except those cases where the investigation has been
substantially completed.
The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent's claim,
reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988].
Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of
the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may
conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring cases for
investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court.
In such a case, the report and recommendation of the investigating official shall be reviewed directly
by the Supreme Court. The Court shall base its final action on the case on the report and
recommendation submitted by the investigating official and the evidence presented by the parties
during the investigation.
Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of Rule 139B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had been
substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the
investigation of which has not been substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor General,
shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General was terminated
even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his motion to dismiss that
the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986, the date when respondent
submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353].
Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already
made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to the IBP, as
prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in duplication of the proceedings conducted by the
Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition of the present case which has lasted for
more than thirteen (13) years.
Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the referral of
the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General
respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce additional
evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial of procedural due process. The
record shows that respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented no less than eleven
(11) documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the complainant
who appeared as a witness against him.
II.
The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed the acts of
misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista.
After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Solicitor
General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise
by this Court of its disciplinary power.
The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was
signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half (1/2)
of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm.,
and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal services to
the latter. At the time the document was executed, respondent knew that the abovementioned
properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said case [See Annex
"B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document transferring one-half (1/2)
of the subject properties to himself, respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from
acquiring his client's property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue
of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of
his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes
malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248
(1940)].
However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states
that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is
conducting," does not appear anymore in the new Code of Professional Responsibility. He therefore
concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the
Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary action under the new Code of
Professional Responsibility.
This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process"
(Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every
lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. All of
these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The transgression of
any provision of law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not
countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be
held accountable both to his client and to society.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are
prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust relationship
with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation
because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as with the client. And it
cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has failed to emphasize the
nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." On the other
hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that
may come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision on the
matter in the new Code, the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of the new Code in
relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the
purchase by a lawyer of his client's property in litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics
for which a disciplinary action may be brought against him.
Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really implemented,
because the land development agreement on which the transfer depended was later rescinded, is
untenable. Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer of Rights that the assignment of the properties of
the Fortunados to respondent was subject to the implementation of the land development
agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides that:
... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES,
Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila,
Quezon City, rendered to our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by these presents, do
transfer and convey to the said ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, his heirs,
successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights and interests in the
abovedescribed property, together with all the improvements found therein [Annex D
of the Complaint, Record, p. 28; Emphasis supplied].
It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to respondent to
be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land development agreement
was implemented.
Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at the time
the land development agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had
already been sold at a public auction. The land development agreement was executed on August 31,
1977 while the public auction was held on June 30, 1971.
Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for the
complainant in an anti-graft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon the
request of complainant and was understood to be only provisional. Respondent claims that since
complainant was not his client, he had no duty to warn complainant of the fact that the land involved
in their land development agreement had been sold at a public auction. Moreover, the sale was duly
annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves as constructive notice
to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part.
The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was annotated
at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform the complainant of
the sale of the land to Samauna during the negotiations for the land development agreement. In so
doing, respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which
place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant was not a
former client of respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an
important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a party to the
land development agreement, respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the
land at a public auction so that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the
project they were jointly undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and
fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against
him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517].
Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents purporting to
be true copies of an addendum to the land development agreement.
Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the document filed
by respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the addendum to
the land development agreement namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T.
Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautistawere made to appear as having signed the
original document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters (SGD.) before each of their
names. However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant who signed the original
and duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado,
never did. Even respondent himself admitted that Edith and Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox
copy (Exh. 2-A) after respondent wrote them on May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xerox
copyattached to the letter and to send it back to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply,
pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover, respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado
had merely agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed, the alleged true copy of the
addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of
the addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly misled the Court into believing that the original addendum
was signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of
his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should
never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule
138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code
of Professional Responsibility].
Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was committed
by respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados [Report and
Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court, however, finds that the agreement between the
respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that:
We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent
Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees.
Alfaro
T.
Fortun
ado
[signed
]
Editha
T.
Fortun
ado
[signed
]
Nestor
T.
Fortun
ado
[signed
]
CONFO
RME
Ramon
A.
Gonzal
es
[signed
]
[Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p. 4].
is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not
properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of
Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation,
the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the
Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid
by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the
client's rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements
are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the
action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See
Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts
violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur
administrative sanctions.
The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as counsel for
Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the Fortunados against the
same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143. The Court, after considering the record, agrees
with the Solicitor General's findings on the matter. The evidence presented by respondent shows
that his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge and consent of the
Fortunados. The affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they gave
their consent when respondent accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados,
dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the recognized exceptions to the rule against
representation of conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly consent to the dual
representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics;
Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the Court of
First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of harassing him.
The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this case, Civil Case No.
Q-18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, while the complaints for
libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury (I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed by the City Fiscal for
insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest, respectively [Report and Recommendation, pp. 16-17;
Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for holding that the complaints for libel and
perjury were used by respondent to harass complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-18060, considering
that it was still pending resolution, the Solicitor General made no finding on complainants claim that
it was a mere ploy by respondent to harass him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in
Civil Case No. Q-18060 was left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was
pending resolution.
The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly holds that there is
no basis for holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing the aforementioned cases was to
harass complainant.
Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the above
discussion on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds.
The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated the law
and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in the
administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the
standards expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29,
1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering the nature
of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent
lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious misconduct,
the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6) months effective
from the date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts
of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty.
Gonzales.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
ROSARIO T. MECARAL,
Complainant,
- versus -
ATTY. DANILO S.
VELASQUEZ,
Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Rosario T. Mecaral (complainant) charged Atty. Danilo S. Velasquez (respondent)
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline
(CBD)[1] with Gross Misconduct and Gross Immoral Conduct which she detailed in
her Position Paper[2] as follows:
After respondent hired her as his secretary in 2002, she became his lover and
common-law wife. In October 2007, respondent brought her to the mountainous
Upper San Agustin in Caibiran, Biliran where he left her with a religious group
known as the Faith Healers Association of the Philippines, of which he was the
leader. Although he visited her daily, his visits became scarce in November to
December 2007, prompting her to return home to Naval, Biliran. Furious,
respondent brought her back to San Agustin where, on his instruction, his followers
tortured, brainwashed and injected her with drugs. When she tried to escape on
December 24, 2007, the members of the group tied her spread-eagled to a bed.
Made to wear only a T-shirt and diapers and fed stale food, she was guarded 24
hours a day by the women members including a certain Bernardita Tadeo.
Her mother, Delia Tambis Vda. De Mecaral (Delia), having received
information that she was weak, pale and walking barefoot along the streets in the
mountainous area of Caibiran, sought the help of the Provincial Social Welfare
Department which immediately dispatched two women volunteers to rescue her.
The religious group refused to release her, however, without the instruction of
respondent. It took PO3 Delan G. Lee (PO3 Lee) and PO1 Arnel S. Robedillo (PO1
Robedillo) to rescue and reunite her with her mother.
Hence, the present disbarment complaint against respondent. Additionally,
complainant charges respondent with bigamy for contracting a second marriage to
Leny H. Azur onAugust 2, 1996, despite the subsistence of his marriage to his first
wife, Ma. Shirley G. Yunzal.
Biliran, for Serious Illegal Detention against respondent and Bernardita Tadeo on
complaint of herein complainant.
Despite respondents receipt of the February 22, 2008 Order[10] of the
Director for Bar Discipline for him to submit his Answer within 15 days from
receipt thereof, and his expressed intent to properly make [his] defense in a
verified pleading,[11] he did not file any Answer.
On the scheduled Mandatory Conference set on September 2, 2008 of which
the parties were duly notified, only complainants counsel was present. Respondent
and his counsel failed to appear.
Investigating Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III of the CBD, in his Report and
Recommendation[12] dated September 29, 2008, found that:
[respondents] acts of converting his secretary into a mistress; contracting two
marriages with Shirley and Leny, are grossly immoral which no civilized society
in the world can countenance. The subsequent detention and torture of the
complainant is gross misconduct [which] only a beast may be able to do.
Certainly, the respondent had violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which reads:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.
xxxx
In the long line of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently imposed
severe penalty for grossly immoral conduct of a lawyer like the case at bar. In the
celebrated case of Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Manuel Eala, the [Court]
ordered the disbarment of the respondent for maintaining extra-marital relations
with a married woman, and having a child with her. In the instant case, not only
did the respondent commit bigamy for contracting marriages with Shirley Yunzal
in 1990 and Leny Azur in 1996, but the respondent also made his secretary
(complainant) his mistress and subsequently, tortured her to the point of death. All
these circumstances showed the moral fiber respondent is made of, which [leave]
the undersigned with no choice but to recommend the disbarment of Atty.
Danilo S. Velasquez.[13] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors of Pasig City, by Resolution [14] dated December
11, 2008, ADOPTED the Investigating Commissioners findings and APPROVED
the recommendation for the disbarment of respondent.
As did the IBP Board of Governors, the Court finds the IBP Commissioners
evaluation and recommendation well taken.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the state upon
those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege.[15] When a lawyers moral
character is assailed, such that his right to continue
In fine, by engaging himself in acts which are grossly immoral and acts
which constitute gross misconduct, respondent has ceased to possess the
qualifications of a lawyer.[21]
WHEREFORE,
respondent,
Atty.
Danilo
S.
Velasquez,
is DISBARRED, and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. This Decision is immediately executory and ordered to be part of the
records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of
the Philippines.
Let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
WILSON CHAM,
Complainant,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus -
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
Respondent.
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RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The IBP Board of Governors, however, passed Resolution No. XVII2006-585[8] dated 15 December 2006, amending the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
approving the dismissal of the Complaint, thus:
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
ALFREDO B. ROA,
Complainant,
PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Complainant then filed a criminal case against respondent in the Municipal Trial
Court (Branch 2) of Antipolo City. On 26 September 2003, the trial court rendered
a decision[4]convicting respondent of the crime of other forms of swindling under
Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The MTC sentenced
respondent to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for one month and one day and
ordered him to return the amount of P70,000 to complainant.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (Branch 74) of Antipolo City set aside the
lower courts ruling. For lack of evidence establishing respondents guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the RTC acquitted respondent in a decision [5] dated 20 December
2005. The decision further stated that the remedy of complainant was to institute a
civil action for the recovery of the amount he paid to respondent.
On 23 February 2006, complainant filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) an Affidavit-Complaint[6] against respondent.
In his Answer,[7] respondent explained that what he sold to complainant was merely
the right over the use of the lot, not the lot itself. Respondent maintained he never
met the complainant during the negotiations for the sale of said right. Respondent
claimed it was a certain Benjamin Hermida who received the purchase price.
Respondent further alleged that it was one Edwin Tan, and not the complainant,
who paid the purchase price.
At the hearing set on 14 October 2008, complainant narrated that respondent
personally sold to him the lot in question. Complainant stated respondent assured
him that the papers would be processed as soon as payment was made.
Complainant claimed he duly paid respondent P70,000, but when he followed up
the sales documents, respondent just dismissed him and denied any transaction
between them. For his part, respondent did not appear at the hearing despite receipt
of notice.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the present case to this Court as provided
under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B[11] of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of this Court
We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendation in part.
Complainant and respondent presented two different sets of facts. According to
complainant, respondent claimed to be the owner of the lot and even offered to be
his lawyer in case of any legal problem that might crop up from the sale of the lot.
On the other hand, respondent denied ever meeting complainant, much less selling
the lot he insisted he did not even own. In his answer, he presented the affidavits of
Benjamin and Cepriano Hermida who claimed that upon receipt of the payment for
the right to use the lot, they immediately removed the improvements on the lot.
The Hermidas also claimed they received the payment from one Mr. Edwin Tan,
not from complainant.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court gives credence to
complainants version of the facts.
Respondents credibility is highly questionable. Records show that respondent even
issued a bogus Certificate of Land Occupancy to complainant whose only fault was
that he did not know better. The Certificate of Land Occupancy has all the badges
of intent to defraud. It purports to be issued by the Office of the General Overseer.
It contains a verification by the Lead, Record Department that the lot plan
conforms with the record on file. It is even printed on parchment paper strikingly
similar to a certificate of title. To the unlettered, it can easily pass off as a
document evidencing title. True enough, complainant actually tried, but failed, to
register the Certificate of Land Occupancy in the Register of Deeds. Complainant
readily parted with P70,000 because of the false assurance afforded by the sham
certificate.
The innocent public who deal in good faith with the likes of respondent are not
without recourse in law. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
In the present case, respondent acted in his private capacity. He misrepresented that
he owned the lot he sold to complainant. He refused to return the amount paid by
complainant. As a final blow, he denied having any transaction with complainant.
It is crystal-clear in the mind of the Court that he fell short of his duty under Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We cannot, and we
should not, let respondents dishonest and deceitful conduct go unpunished.
Time and again we have said that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege.
It is enjoyed only by those who continue to display unassailable character. Thus,
lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, not just in their
dealings with their clients but also in their dealings with the public at large, and a
violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition
of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and even disbarment.[13]
Respondents refusal to return to complainant the money paid for the lot is
unbecoming a member of the bar and an officer of the court. By his conduct,
respondent failed to live up to the strict standard of professionalism required by the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondents acts violated the trust and
respect complainant reposed in him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the
court.
SECOND DIVISION
MARJORIE
SAMANIEGO,
Complainant,
Present:
- versus -
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
ATTY.
ANDREW
FERRER,
Respondent.
V. Promulgated:
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RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For resolution is the Complaint of Marjorie F. Samaniego against
respondent Atty. Andrew V. Ferrer for immorality, abandonment
and willful refusal to give support to their daughter, filed before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and docketed as CBD
Case No. 04-1184.
The facts are as follows:
Early in 1996, Ms. Samaniego was referred to Atty. Ferrer as a
potential client. Atty. Ferrer agreed to handle her cases [1] and
soon their lawyer-client relationship became intimate. Ms.
Samaniego said Atty. Ferrer courted her and she fell in love with
him.[2] He said she flirted with him and he succumbed to her
temptations.[3] Thereafter, they lived together as husband and
wife from 1996 to 1997,[4] and on March 12, 1997, their daughter
was born.[5] The affair ended in 2000[6] and since then he failed to
give support to their daughter.[7]
Before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Ms. Samaniego
presented their daughters birth and baptismal certificates, and
the photographs taken during the baptism. She testified that she
knew that Atty. Ferrer was in a relationship but did not think he
was already married. She also testified that she was willing to
compromise, but he failed to pay for their daughters education as
agreed upon.[8] Atty. Ferrer refused to appear during the hearing
since he did not want to see Ms. Samaniego. [9]
In his position paper,[10] Atty. Ferrer manifested his willingness to
support their daughter. He also admitted his indiscretion; however,
he prayed that the IBP consider Ms.Samaniegos complicity as she
was acquainted with his wife and children. He further reasoned
that he found it unconscionable to abandon his wife and 10
children to cohabit with Ms. Samaniego.
In Resolution No. XVII-2005-138[11] dated November 12, 2005, the
IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner, and imposed upon Atty. Ferrer the
penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law for
his refusal to support his daughter with Ms. Samaniego. The IBP
also admonished him to be a more responsible member of the bar
and to keep in mind his duties as a father.
On February 1, 2006, Atty. Ferrer filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[12] with prayer for us to reduce the penalty, to
wit:
Without passing judgment on the correctness or incorrectness of the
disposition of the Honorable Commission on Bar Discipline, herein
respondent most humbly and respectfully begs the compassion of the
Honorable Court and states that the gravity of the penalty imposed
and meted out, depriving herein respondent to earn a modest living for
a period of six (6) months, will further cause extreme hardship to his
family of ten (10) children.[13]
2. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraph 2 of the complaint to the effect that Maria
Victoria Ventura filed a complaint against him for Rape at the Provincial Prosecutors Office
with qualification that the said complaint for Rape was dismissed. Respondent, however, has
no knowledge or information as to the truth of the allegation that she was 13 years.
xxxx
5. Respondent vehemently denies the truth of the allegations in paragraph 8 of the complaint
to the effect that the acts of respondent in having sex with complainant constitute grossly
immoral conduct. The truth is that the act of respondent in having sex with complainant was
done with mutual agreement after respondent gave money to complainant. Respondent
respectfully submits that his act of having sex with complainant once does not constitute
grossly immoral conduct.
There is no human law that punishes a person who has sex with a woman with mutual
agreement and complainant accepts compensation therefore. Having sex with complainant
once with just compensation does not amount to immoral conduct.
xxxx
6. The complaint is instigated by Corazon Ventura who was an employee at the Law Office of
respondent herein. The said Corazon Ventura entertained hatred and had a grudge against
the herein respondent who terminated her services due to misunderstanding.
7. The filing of the Criminal Case against respondent as well as this Administrative Case is a
well orchestrated and planned act of Corazon Ventura as vengeance against respondent as
a result of her separation from the employment in the Law Office of the respondent. This
claim is supported by the Affidavit of Natividad Ruluna, the former Office Clerk at the Law
Office of respondent.
8. To show that Corazon Ventura desires to get back at respondent, she demanded from
respondent to settle with her and demanded the payment of the amount of P2,000,000.00;
otherwise she will file a case against him in Court for Rape and for disbarment. Respondent
did not come across with Corazon Ventura, the latter made good her threats and filed the
criminal case for Rape. [sic] When the case for rape did not prosper because the Prosecutor
dropped the Rape Case, Corazon Ventura sent word to respondent that she is amenable for
the amount of P400,000.00. In effect, Corazon Ventura wanted to extort from respondent so
that she can get even with him and his wife for separating her from the employment;
9. Complainant is a woman of loose moral character. This is supported by the Affidavit of
Patronio Punayan, Jr. which is hereto attached as Annex "3". And Corazon Ventura can
afford to utilize Maria Victoria Ventura as her instrument in putting down the respondent
herein because Maria Victoria Ventura is not her biological daughter and she knows before
hand that her ward has a questionable reputation. The fact that Corazon Ventura is not the
biological mother of Maria Victoria Ventura is shown by the pre-trial order in Criminal Case
No. 5414.
xxxx
Respondent has not violated any grounds mentioned in this rule. Respondent respectfully submits
that his having sex with complainant with just compensation once does not amount to immoral
conduct. For who among men will not yield to temptation when a woman shall invite him for sex?
Attached to respondents Answer is his Counter-Affidavit6 which he submitted to the Provincial
Prosecutor. He alleged therein that complainant usually stayed late at night with her male friends
when her mother was out of the house. He claimed that he heard rumors that complainant had
sexual affairs with different boys. Respondent narrated that on March 19, 2002, he saw complainant
with some of her classmates near their rented house. Complainant told him that they wanted to go
out to swim but they did not have money. When she asked if he could spare some amount, he gave
her money. He told her in jest that he wanted to see her that afternoon and go to a place where they
could be alone, and he was surprised when she agreed. He just thought that for complainant, sex is
a common thing despite her age. At around 5:00 p.m., he fetched complainant at her house. She
casually walked towards the car and boarded it. He told her that they will not check in a lodging
house because people might recognize him. Upon reaching his poultry farm, respondent met his
farm worker and asked him if he could use the latters hut. The farm worker agreed and they went
straight to the hut.
Inside the farm workers hut, complainant did not hesitate in entering the room. Respondent did not
notice any involuntariness on her part as she undressed herself. He asserted that they had sexual
intercourse based on their mutual understanding. Thereafter, the complainant dressed up and
walked back to the multi-cab where she waited for him. He told her not to tell anyone about what had
happened, to which she replied "natural buang kay motug-an" meaning, shes not crazy as to tell
anyone. He alleged that she accepted the money he gave because she needed to buy some things
but her mother did not give her any allowance. Respondent insisted that what happened between
them was the first and the last incident. He claimed that he was able to confirm that complainant is
no longer a virgin.
It likewise appears that the Investigating Prosecutors found that probable cause exists for
respondent to stand trial for qualified seduction.7 The charge of rape, however, was dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence. An Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del
Sur, Branch 6, but complainant who was not satisfied with the dismissal of the rape charge, filed a
motion for reconsideration. When said motion was denied, complainant filed a petition for review with
the Department of Justice (DOJ). However, the DOJ sustained the findings of the prosecutor.
Then, on December 14, 2006, complainant and her mother appeared before the public prosecutor
and executed their respective Affidavits of Desistance.8 Complainant stated that what happened
between respondent and her in March 2002 was based on mutual understanding. Thus, she was
withdrawing the complaint she filed against respondent before the RTC as well as the one she filed
before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. Accordingly, the criminal case against respondent was
dismissed.9
In its Report and Recommendation10 dated October 10, 2007, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of one year from the practice of law for
immorality with the warning that repetition of the same or similar act will merit a more severe penalty.
On November 10, 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2007-237, to
wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the aboveentitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that
respondent is found guilty of immorality, the victim is a minor, respondent and his wife was victims
guardians and for being a married man, Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for five (5) years with Stern Warning that repetition of the same or similar act in the
future will be dealt with more severely.11
Complainant now moves to reconsider the IBP Resolution. She argues that the penalty imposed by
the IBP is not commensurate to the gravity and depravity of the offense. She contends that
respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by forcing himself to have sexual intercourse with a
young and innocent lass of 13 years of age. He also took advantage of his moral ascendancy over
complainant considering that she was then staying at respondents residence. Moreover, there was a
betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity considering that respondent was a married man. She insists
that this detestable behavior renders respondent unfit and undeserving of the honor and privilege
which his license confers upon him.Thus, complainant prays that the penalty of disbarment be
imposed.12
Meanwhile, respondent also filed a Motion for Reconsideration 13 of the IBP Resolution. He asserts
that complainant has not presented any proof of her minority. Likewise, during the sexual encounter,
complainant was not under their custody. He contends that complainants mother even testified that
her daughter stayed at respondents house only until February 2002. He further stresses that
because of his admission and remorse, and since this is the first time he has been found
administratively liable, he is entitled to a reduction of the penalty to one year suspension from the
practice of law.
The pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
xxxx
Rule 7.03. - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of
the legal profession.
As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,14 the possession of good moral character is both a condition
precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in
the legal profession. It is the bounden duty of members of the bar to observe the highest degree of
morality in order to safeguard the integrity of the Bar.15 Consequently, any errant behavior on the part
of a lawyer, be it in the lawyers public or private activities, which tends to show said lawyer deficient
in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, is sufficient to warrant suspension or
disbarment.
Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.16 Immoral
conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of decency.17
From the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of respondent himself,
we find that respondents act of engaging in sex with a young lass, the daughter of his former
employee, constitutes gross immoral conduct that warrants sanction. Respondent not only admitted
he had sexual intercourse with complainant but also showed no remorse whatsoever when he
asserted that he did nothing wrong because she allegedly agreed and he even gave her money.
Indeed, his act of having carnal knowledge of a woman other than his wife manifests his disrespect
for the laws on the sanctity of marriage and his own marital vow of fidelity. Moreover, the fact that he
procured the act by enticing a very young woman with money showed his utmost moral depravity
and low regard for the dignity of the human person and the ethics of his profession.
In Cordova v. Cordova,18 we held that the moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of
the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards
of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage.
Respondent has violated the trust and confidence reposed on him by complainant, then a 13-yearold minor,19who for a time was under respondents care. Whether the sexual encounter between the
respondent and complainant was or was not with the latters consent is of no moment. Respondent
clearly committed a disgraceful, grossly immoral and highly reprehensible act. Such conduct is a
transgression of the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be disciplined
accordingly.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court expressly states that a member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any
deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the oath that he is required to take before admission
to the practice of law. It bears to stress that membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can
be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyers lack of the essential qualifications
required of lawyers.20
Likewise, it was held in Maligsa v. Cabanting21 that a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct,
whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in
honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. Similarly, in
Dumadag v. Lumaya,22 the Court pronounced:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules
of the legal profession are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the
bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law.
The fact that complainant filed an Affidavit of Desistance during the pendency of this case is of no
moment. Complainants Affidavit of Desistance cannot have the effect of abating the instant
proceedings in view of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of
disbarment proceedings as a public interest concern. A case of suspension or disbarment is sui
generis and not meant to grant relief to a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse
the ranks of the legal profession of its undesirable members in order to protect the public and the
courts. A disbarment case is not an investigation into the acts of respondent but on his conduct as
an officer of the court and his fitness to continue as a member of the Bar.23
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Illicit sexual relations have been previously punished with disbarment, indefinite or definite
suspension, depending on the circumstances.24 In this case, respondents gross misbehavior and
unrepentant demeanor clearly shows a serious flaw in his character, his moral indifference to sexual
exploitation of a minor, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the
legal profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the
need for strict but appropriate disciplinary action. 25
The Court is mindful of the dictum that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as
an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Thus, where a lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. 26 However, in
the present case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar as it
appears to be the most appropriate penalty.27
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Danilo S. Samson is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Immoral
Conduct, Violation of his oath of office, and Violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of
respondent in the Office of the. Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of
the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 10576, January 14, 2015
ARCATOMY S. GUARIN, Complainant, v. ATTY. CHRISTINE A.C. LIMPIN, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Arcatomy S. Guarin against Atty. Christine Antenor-Cruz
Limpin for allegedly filing a false General Information Sheet (GIS) with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) thus violating Canon 12 and Rule 1.013 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
The facts are culled from the pleadings.
In 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and thereafter as
President of OneCard Company, Inc., a member of the Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned from his
post effective August 11, 2008 and transferred to St. Lukes Medical Center as the Vice President for
Finance.
On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another
corporation under the Legacy Group, filed with the SEC a GIS for LCI for updating purposes. The
GIS4 identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of Directors (BOD) and President.
Mired with allegations of anomalous business transactions and practices, on December 18, 2008, LCI applied
for voluntary dissolution with the SEC.
On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly
listing him as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI when she knew that he had already
resigned and had never held any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of
LCI. He also never received any notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment as Chairman would be
taken up. He has never accepted any appointment as Chairman and President of LCI.
Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC listing Guarin as a stockholder, the Chairman of the
BOD and President of LCI. She argued that the GIS was provisional to comply with SEC requirements. It
would have been corrected in the future but unfortunately LCI filed for voluntary dissolution shortly
thereafter. She averred that the GIS was made and submitted in good faith and that her certification served
to attest to the information from the last BOD meeting held on March 3, 2008. 5
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She asserted that Guarin knew that he was a stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that on October 13, 2008, she
sent Guarin a text message and asked him to meet with her so he may sign a Deed of Assignment
concerning shareholdings. Guarin responded in the affirmative and said that he would meet with her on
Friday, October 17, 2008. Guarin, however, neglected to show up at the arranged time and place for
reasons unknown to Atty. Limpin. On the strength of Guarins positive reply, Atty. Limpin filed the GIS on
November 27, 2008.
To belie the claim that LCI never held any board meeting, Atty. Limpin presented Secretarys Certificates
dated May 16, 20066, May 22, 20067, and June 13, 20078 bearing Guarins signature.
Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending criminal complaints against the directors and officers
of LCI, where she and Guarin are co-respondents: Senator Roxas, et al. v. Celso de los Angeles, et
al.9 and SEC v. Legacy Card, Inc.10 In those proceedings, Guarin raised as a defense that the November 27,
2008 GIS was spurious and/or perjured. She averred that this Court held that when the criminal
prosecution based on the same act charged is still pending in court, any administrative disciplinary
proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid contradictory
findings.11 During the mandatory preliminary conference, however, both parties stipulated that the
complaint filed by Senator Roxas was dismissed as to Guarin. 12
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Lastly, Atty. Limpin contends that Guarin failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant disbarment. She
stated that merely presenting the GIS does not constitute as proof of any unethical conduct, harassment
and malpractice.
In its Report,13 the IBP CBD found that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 14 of the CPR and
thus recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for three months. It noted that based on
the submissions of the parties, Guarin was never a stockholder of LCI consequently making him ineligible to
be a member of the BOD. Neither was there proof that Guarin acted as the President of LCI but was a mere
signatory of LCIs bank accounts. This made the verified statement of Atty. Limpin untrue. 15
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Moreover, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de los Angeles had the authority to appoint or designate directors
or officers of Legacy. Atty. Limpin was aware that this procedure was not legally permissible. Despite
knowing this to be irregular, she allowed herself to be dictated upon and falsely certified that Guarin was a
stockholder, chairman and president of the company. The Secretarys Certificates with Guarins signature
Atty. Limpin presented were of no moment since in these Guarin merely acceded to become a signatory of
bank accounts and these do not show that Guarin was a stockholder.
The IBP Board of Governors in its April 15, 2013 Resolution16 adopted in toto the CBD Report. Atty. Limpin
moved for reconsideration17 but was denied in the March 21, 2014 Resolution18 of the IBP Board of
Governors.
We adopt the report and recommendation of the IBP. Atty. Limpin has violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Rule
1.02 of the CPR.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to comply with the rules of procedure, rather than
seek exceptions as loopholes.19 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in
violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.20
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Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and can proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. As
Justice Malcolm stated [t]he serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where
there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is
innocent of the charges pr[o]ferred and has performed his duty as an officer of the court in accordance with
his oath.21
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Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer may be found in Section 27, 22 Rule 138 of theRules
of Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office
and (2) any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice.
After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we agree with the IBP that there is no
indication that Guarin held any share to the corporation and that he is therefore ineligible to hold a seat in
the BOD and be the president of the company.23 It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that
Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she posits that she had made the same in good faith, her
certification also contained a stipulation that she made a due verification of the statements contained
therein. That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of Assignment is inconsequential: he
never signed the instrument. We also note that there was no submission which would support the allegation
that Guarin was in fact a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a GIS that contained false information, Atty.
Limpin committed an infraction which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and
Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the business practice of having Mr. de
los Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of the corporation despite the rules enunciated in
the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of
the CPR.
However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpins action in submitting a false document we see it fit to
increase the recommended penalty to six months suspension from the practice of law.
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WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Christine A.C. Limpin GUILTY of violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01
and Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty.
Christine A.C. Limpin from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents
personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
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EN BANC
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015
DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E.
BAYDO, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar O. Perez (Dr. Perez) with
the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty.
Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Facts
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960s when
they were both students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation.
Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty.
Catindig started to court Dr. Perez.2
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Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having
married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by
a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.3 Atty. Catindig however claimed that
he only married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make a scandal
out of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could have jeopardized his scholarship in the
Harvard Law School.4
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Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve
his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed.
Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican
Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid
and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage. 5
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Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of
America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic. 6
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Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree
that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws.
When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize
their union once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the
Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their son.7
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Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by filing a petition
to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have to get the consent of Gomez
to the said petition.8
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Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter 9 in the mail informing her of
Atty. Catindigs scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love
letter10 written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty.
Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his impediment is removed.
Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their
affair until such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty.
Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez. 11
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On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale
condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen. 12
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In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their respective
comments, which they separately did on November 25, 2002. 14
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Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however,
that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying with her
marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and that while their union was blessed with four
children, their relationship simply deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They then consulted Atty.
Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the agreement to separate and live apart could be
implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt a property regime of complete separation of
property. She likewise advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for
whatever value it may have and comfort it may provide them. 16
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Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to a
Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute
a divorce action under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was
ratified by the Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint
Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133,
which was granted on June 23, 1984.17
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Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed by
the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew
that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry
her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA. 18
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Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous marriage to
Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he was afraid
of losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their relationship. 19
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Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in
October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing.20
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He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez
started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in September
1999; and that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He
likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001. 21
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For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig
began courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindigs romantic
overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he was married and that he was too
old for her. She said that despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason
why she resigned from his law firm.22
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On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from notice. 23
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On June 2, 2003, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order 24 setting the mandatory
conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later reset to August 29, 2003. During the
conference, the parties manifested that they were already submitting the case for resolution based on the
pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their respective position
papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on
October 17, 200325 and October 20, 2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper27 on October 24,
2003.
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a Report and
Recommendation,28 which recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner
pointed out that Atty. Catindigs act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous
marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate
penalty of disbarment. The Investigating Commissioner further opined that:
In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Catindig
established a pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct
was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.
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There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his official and personal conduct,
must display exemplary behavior. Respondents bigamous marriage and his proclivity for extramarital
adventurism have definitely caused damage to the legal and teaching professions. How can he hold his head
up high and expect his students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a model worthy of
emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of morality? In contracting a second marriage notwithstanding
knowing fully well that he has a prior valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an
otherwise inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the generally accepted moral standards of the
community.29
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo be
dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear and preponderant evidence in support of
the alleged affair between the respondents.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors
On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, 30 which adopted and approved the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors, claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr. Perezs
uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a
complaint for disbarment must be supported by affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts therein
alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts. He said that despite the absence of any
corroborating testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez testimony.
He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he never concealed the
status of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had always been transparent
with both Gomez and Dr. Perez.
The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution32 dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty. Catindigs motion for
reconsideration.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their
disbarment.
Ruling of the Court
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this case, the
Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board
of Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
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Canon 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
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Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral
conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindigs own
admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and
unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice a wedding in the Central Methodist Church in 1968,
which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when their
paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed
that his first marriage was then already falling apart due to Gomez serious intimacy problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their
conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in the Dominican Republic, and
married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that
time that he moved heaven and earth just so he could marry her right away a marriage that has at least a
semblance of legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the
Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at
that time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his
previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This
notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindigs sense
of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA.
Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion is that
he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by
entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindigs claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their
marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to render a
faade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled
that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he resorted to in
order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that
time that he finally decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was
then already entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot
be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his propensity towards
immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Courts finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on
Atty. Catindigs desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.
The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct
that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes
a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage. 37 In various cases, the Court has held that
disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with
another woman who has borne him a child.38
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Atty. Catindigs subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of
marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of
morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an
officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension,
could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the
seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to be the most
appropriate penalty.
Atty. Catindigs claim that Dr. Perezs allegations against him are not credible since they are uncorroborated
and not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, deserves scant
consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed married Dr. Perez in
1984 while his previous marriage with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides ample
basis for the Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.
There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.
The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to prove
the claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr.
Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were
indeed having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.
The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer
enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the
allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is
preponderance of evidence.39
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The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter indeed
received a letter informing her of the alleged relations between the respondents; it does not prove the
veracity of the allegations therein. Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all, only proves that Atty. Catindig
wrote Atty. Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a
relationship with Atty. Catindig.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan
A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyers Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7
and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARREDfrom the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this
Decision shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator
to all appellate and trial courts.
The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
JUANITA MANAOIS, ADM. CASE No. 5364
Complainant,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE,
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 20, 2008
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
MARILI C. RONQUILLO,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
represented by their
Attorney-in-Fact
PUNO,
SERVILLANO A. CABUNGCAL,
Complainants,
QUISUMBING,
*YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
-versus-
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
Respondent.
x----------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Johnson Lee and Bonny Moreno filed with this Court a verified complainant dated June 8, 1992, docketed as
Adm. Case No. RTJ- 863, charging respondent Judge Renato E. Abastillas with a violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act for soliciting a bribe in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 pending in his sala
entitled "People v. Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno," serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming a member
of the Bench, gross ignorance of the law, rendering unjust interlocutory orders and manifest partiality,
oppression and inordinate delay in the administration of justice "which may result or has resulted in
In his comment dated September 28,1992, Judge Abastillas vehemently denied the charges against him. He
averred that Atty. Chua had an axe to grind against him because of a prior incident between them. Judge
Abastillas pointed out that on September 28, 1992, Atty. Chua as counsel for the accused in Criminal Cases
Nos. 10010 and 10011, filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration where he made statements which were
highly contemptuous of Judge Abastillas. Hence, according to Judge Abastillas, he issued an order on March
2, 1993 requiring Atty. Chua to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court and
recommended for suspension from the practice of law. After due proceedings, Judge Abastillas issued an
order on March 11, 1993 finding Atty. Chua guilty of contempt of court and imposing upon him a fine in the
amount of P500.00. Judge Abastillas then recommended Co this Court that Atty. Chua be suspended from
the practice of law. This order of March 11, 1993 became the basis of Adm. Case No. 3815 entitled "Judge
Renato Abastillas v. Enrique S. Chua."
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The two administrative cases were consolidated and referred to Associate Justice Alfredo J. Lagamon of the
Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation in a resolution of this Court dated May 6,
1993.
After hearing of the two cases, Justice Lagamon submitted his report recommending the dismissal of the
administrative complaint against Judge Abastillas in Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92-863 and the imposition of
appropriate disciplinary measures against Atty. Enrique 5. Chua in Adm. Case No. 3815.
Evidence in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-563.
Complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 sought to prove their charges of violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming a magistrate against Judge Abastillas,
through the affidavits and testimonies of Johnny K.H. Uy, Johnson Lee and Atty. Enrique S. Chua.
The testimony of Atty. Chua who claimed to have delivered the bribe money of P20,000.00 to Judge
Abastillas on May 2 or 3, 1991 as down payment of the consideration for the dismissal of the criminal cases
against his clients, is summarized in the report of Justice Lagamon, to wit:
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"Atty. Enrique S. Chua as counsel for the complainants and also as their principal witness declared in his
Affidavit that when criminal cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 were raffled to RTC, Br. 50, Bacolod City, presided
by the respondent, he was heartened because the respondent was among the few judges he was
comfortable with. Consequently, Atty. Chua allegedly approached the respondent in his chambers and
apprised him of the background of the cases and requested that the warrants of arrest be held in abeyance
because of the irregularity in the conduct of the preliminary investigation. That the respondent accordingly
instructed the docket clerk not to release the warrants of arrest. After the clerk left, the respondent
allegedly said, Ike, dont worry toe much, anyway, that is not your personal problem. They are just cases of
your clients. What is important is that you are assured of your attorneys fees. Why, how much is your fee
there? P50,000.00? Make it double, so that I can have a share there and I will take care of everything
(Affidavit of Atty. Chua; Exh.H).
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Atty. Chua then apprised his client Johnson Lee of what happened and told him not to worry but at the same
time informed him that the judge is asking for P50,000.00 to take care of everything. Johnny K.H. Uy
advised Atty. Chua that they are willing to give P50,000.00 to the respondent because of their sad
experience with the Department of Justice and insisted that the amount be given over the objections of Atty.
Chua. That Mr. Uy sent a check in the amount of P20,000.00 to Atty. Chua, which the latter should in turn
give to respondent as initial payment for the bribe. In the meantime, Atty. Chua deposited the check in his
account.
Sometime in the second week of April, 1991, the criminal docket clerk of the respondent informed Atty.
Chua that the bail bond for his clients was increased from P18,000.00 to P100,000.00 each, upon ax paste
motion filed by the private prosecutor. Aware of the adverse development, Johnny Uy blamed Atty. Chua for
not giving the money yet to the Respondent. Atty. Chua again went to the chambers of the respondent
where accordingly he was advised by the latter to file a motion to strike out the ex-parte motion for the
reduction of the bail and at the same time moved for the reduction of the bail provided it shall be in cash.
The motion was filed and the respondent granted it the following day. The respondent instructed Atty. Chua
that the bail bond should be in cash to facilitate the collection of his attorneys fees so that both of them can
receive their respective compensation for their efforts (Exh.H, par. 9).
Again, in his Affidavit Atty. Chua stated that on May 2, 1991 at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon he
delivered P20,000.00 to the respondent and before he left the chambers, the respondent jestingly said
where will they celebrate that evening.
Moreover, he indicated therein that on January 29,1992, Johnson Lee and Atty. Chua appeared before the
Judicial and Bar Council and briefly related the delivery of the P20,000.00 to the respondent where he was
rebuked by Dean Palma for allowing himself to be used as a conduit for illegal and immoral act. Dean Palma
asked Atty. Chua if he was not as guilty as the respondent (Affidavit, par. 16).
During the cross examination of Atty. Chua, he affirmed that his first meeting with the respondent was
between April 10 to 15, 1991 in his chambers when the criminal docket clerk was instructed not to release
the warrants of arrest (p. 52, TSN, Sept. 16, 1993; p. 41, TSN, Sept. 15, 1993). He further testified that it
was also at that time when the respondent solicited P50,000.00 when he said, why, how much is your fees
there? P50,000.00? You double it. (p. 54, TSN, Sept. 16, 1993). The second meeting was when Atty. Chua
discussed the reduction of the bail bend which he said could be on April 17, 18 and 19, 1991, but most
probably on the 18th (pp. 85, 86, TSN, Sept. 15, 1993), and the third meeting was when he delivered the
P20,000.00 which he said was on May 2, 1991 but which he rectified during cross examination that he
withdrew the amount on May 2, 1991 and the delivery of P20,000.00 to the respondent was on May 3, 1991
at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon (pp. 63-64, TSN, Sept. 15, 1993).
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"In the Memorandum filed by Atty. Chua on Dec. 28, 1993, he pointed out the following facts which were
either admitted or undisputed and which he believes established the misconduct and the impropriety of the
respondent as follows:
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a) Respondent Judges admission that he met complainant Lee ahead of witness Johnny Uy, whom he tagged
as the financier of the herein complainants on May 29, 1991; while he met Uy only on October 7, 1991 (p.
11, Comment dated September 28, 1992 of respondent).
b) Respondent Judges admission that, indeed, on May 29, 1991, he and complainant Lee saw each other at
the Quezon City Sports Center, during the meeting of the Philippine Judges Association (p. 11, Comment,
supra).
c) As to witness Uy, respondent Judge admitted that it is true that respondent met with Johnny N.H. Uy on
October 7, 1991 at the residence of respondent at Unit A-2, 157 Katipunan Road Quezon City . . . (p. 7,
Comment, supra).
Atty. Chua is of the opinion that the meeting of the respondent with the accused who were charged with two
(2) criminal cases before his sala will render him liable for gross misconduct or conduct unbecoming of (sic)
a magistrate."
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Atty. Chua further declared that after he delivered the P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas, the latter told him
that the accused (in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011) could see the Judge at the forthcoming
convention of Philippine Judges Association to be held at the Quezon City Sports Center.
Johnson Lee, one of the accused in the Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, narrated on the witness
stand that he received a long distance call from Atty. Chua advising him that Judge Abastillas wanted to see
him (Johnson Lee) at the Quezon City Sports Center on May 29, 1991 where the Philippine Judges
Association was to hold a convention. Johnson Lee went to the place on said date. Alter introducing himself
to Judge Abastillas, they repaired to a function room where they had a private conversation for about twenty
minutes. During the meeting, Johnson Lee naked Judge Abastillas if he had received what they sent to Atty.
Chua. Judge Abastillas said yes, but added, "I cannot give you what you are asking. It will take a little time
to study." Johnson Lee responded by saying, "Judge, the balance later on na lang." Judge Abastillas replied,
"Okay, okay. Anyway, I know they have no case against you."
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On the same occasion, Johnson Lee took the opportunity to ask Judge Abastillas why he approved three exparte motions of the private prosecutor in the criminal cases, one, for issuance of a warrant of arrest of the
accused and, another, for increase of their bail bond, without giving the accused an opportunity to oppose
the same. Judge Abastillas assured Johnson Lee that there was nothing to worry "because that is my style. I
will just give them a little favor. Anyway, the case will be decided in your favor."
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Before they parted, Johnson Lee told Judge Abastillas that one Johnny Uy, a brother of Ban Hun Flores, who
had a hand in the filing of the criminal cases, wanted to see the judge. Judge Abastillas said yes. "You just
give him my telephone number and call me." Judge Abastillas had earlier given Johnson Lee his calling card
bearing his telephone number 7222968.
The meeting of Judge Abastillas with Johnson Lee at the Quezon City Sports Center became the basis for the
charges of "gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of (sic) a magistrate."
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Johnny K.H. Uy testified that he was concerned with the two cases pending before Judge Abastillas where
the accused were charged with embezzlement of the funds of Neugene Marketing Corporation. According to
Uy, he was interested in the outcome of the cases, more particularly in the acquittal of the accused, for the
reason that the pendency of the criminal cases had adversely affected the operation of the corporation, 75%
of which stocks had been assigned to him. Uy declared that he visited Judge Abastillas at his residence in St.
Ignatius Village, Quezon City, on October 7, 1991 at about 11:30 in the morning. Before going to Judge
Abastillas house, Uy called him by telephone and Judge Abastillas gave him the direction of his place.
During that visit, where the background and merits of the criminal cases were discussed, Judge Abastillas
assured Uy that he would take care of the cases. Before they parted Judge Abastillas told Uy to ask Johnson
Lee if he could help Judge Abastillas with 5,000 U.S. dollars. Uy replied that he would talk to Johnson Lee
about the matter and would inform Judge Abastillas by telephone of the result. On October 16, 1991 at
about 7:00 oclock in the evening, Uy called up Judge Abastillas telling him that there will be no problem
about the 5T (meaning US $5,000.00) as long as the cases of Johnson Lee will be cleared first. Judge
Abastillas told Uy to take up the matter with Al Simbulan. Al Simbulan, a lawyer, was a mutual friend of Uy
and Judge Abastillas. The telephone conversation was taped by Uy (Exh. "B").
Going back to the testimony of Johnson Lee, said witness further declared that sometime in the middle of
June, 1991, Atty. Simbulan called his office and left a note that they would have dinner with Judge Abastillas
at six oclock in the evening at Manila Hotel. Johnson Lee obliged. Towards the end of the dinner, Judge
Abastillas told Johnson Lee and Atty. Simbulan in a low voice: "Johnson, dont worry," Huwag kang magalala. Nakatimbre na ang kaso nyo sa akin.
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After some waiting and obviously realizing that Judge Abastillas was giving the accused a runaround, not
having done anything relative to the criminal proceedings to indicate that he would perform his part of the
bargain, Johnson Lee appeared before the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) sometime in the middle of 1992 to
oppose Judge Abastillas application for transfer to Manila as RTC Judge on the ground of his lack of good
moral character. Johnson Lee saw Justice Loreno Relova to whom he cited the incidents where the Judge
allegedly solicited money in the sums of P50,000.00 and $5,000.00 and accepted the amount of P20,000.00
in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011. Justice Relova advised him to come back together
with Johnny Uy and bring with them the tape containing the conversation between Johnny Uy and Judge
Abastillas in the evening of October 16, 1991. A week later or on January 29, 1991 Johnson Lee, together
with Johnny Uy and Atty. Chua, returned to JBCs office where the tape was replayed before then JBC
member Calcetas-Santos. Atty. Calcetas-Santos obtained an English translation of the taped conversation
and gave it to Justice Relova and Dean Rodolfo Palma, another JBC member. Both extensively interrogated
Johnson Lee, Johnny Uy and Atty. Chua. At one point, Dean Palma sternly reprimanded Atty. Chua for having
allowed himself to be a conduit in the bribery, pointedly reminding Chua that by delivering himself the
advance payment of P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas, he was as guilty as the judge.
As specifics in support of their other charges against Judge Abastillas, complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ92-863 averred and sought to prove the following:
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1.) When complainants Filed a Consolidated Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010
and 10011, Judge Abastillas, instead of acting on the same, issued an order for their arrest and confiscation
of their bailbonds in view of their failure to appear at the arraignment scheduled for that day;
2.) Likewise, although complainants had already posted bail, Judge Abastillas still insisted that they be
present at their arraignment. Judge Abastillas gave preferential treatment to some cases, particularly
Criminal Cases Nos. 8846 and 8847, entitled "People v. Espinosa" for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Acts
and for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions, which were heard and the accused acquitted in just
five (5) months, and in which the accused were not required to be present at the hearing of the Motion to
Quash the Information; whereas in connection with complainants Consolidated Motion to Quash the
Information, their presence was required in a "full-blown type of hearing" and the motion was denied in
open court in a "trifling manner.
3.) Complainants Urgent Motion to Reset Arraignment and to Set Arraignment, Pre-trial and Continuous Trial
dated June 2, 1991 was arbitrarily denied, their bonds were declared forfeited and the bondsmen were
asked to show cause why no judgment shall be rendered against them for the amount of their bonds. In
addition, Judge Abastillas issued an order for complainants arrest and fixed an excessive bond of
P50,000.00 each for their provisional liberty.
4.) In Criminal Case No. 8847, Judge Abastillas issued an order posthaste requiring the delivery to court of
the illegally possessed firearm and ammunition, which order was not necessary because the items should
have been forfeited in favor of the Government and deposited in Camp Crame.
5.) Two of complainants motions in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 had remained unresolved beyond
the 90-day reglementary period.
In his verified Comments dated September 28, 1992 and Sworn Affidavit of October 22, 1993, as well as in
his testimony in his own behalf, Judge Abastillas denied having solicited P50,000.00 from Atty. Chua or
having received P20,000.00 from him as initial payment at 4:00 p.m. on May 2 or May 3, 1991. To prove his
defense, Judge Abastillas obtained a joint affidavit from the personnel of his sala, namely, Pablo D. Juguan
(Branch Clerk of Court), Estanes A. Alvior (Legal Researcher), Aurora Leda S. Exito, Alma M. Ronato, Wilma
B. Cepeda and Julieta D. Jarce (Stenographers), Diana B. Lamur (Interpreter), Amando N. Eso (Deputy
Sheriff), Maribec B. Alvior (Staff Asst. 2) and Edwin O. Navaja (RTC Aide) stating, in essence, that during
the incumbency of Judge Abastillas of RTC Branch 50 in Bacolod City, they had never seen Atty. Chua enter
the judges chambers.
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While on direct examination, Atty. Chua declared that he delivered the P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas either
on May 2 or May 3 of 1991, on cross-examination Atty. Chua at one point adverted when pressed to give the
exact date that:
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"Q Now, we go back to your allegation that sometime either on May 2 or the next day, you delivered
P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas?
"A Yes. Correct.
"Q Can you please be a little bit more specific. Was it May 2 or May 3?
"A Because as far as I can recall, when I appeared before the JBC I had then with me my old bank
passbook. I traced the deposit and withdrawal in that passbook. There was a withdrawal on May 2, 1991 of
the sum of P20,000.00. So most probably, its either on that very same day or immediately the next day
that I delivered the money.
"A I think most probably it would be May 3 because if I am not mistaken, the next day is either a nonworking day or a Saturday and I remember that. Yes, yes. Correct. when I placed the P20,000.00 in my
attache case, I remember my kid commenting that Papa, you have so much money in your attache case.
So the money stayed overnight with me. Yes, Correct. It was May 3." (TSN, p. 11, Sept. 15, 1993.)
Seizing upon Atty. Chuns above-quoted assertion that the delivery of the money "most probably was on
May 3,1991, Judge Abastillas argued that he could not have received the money in the afternoon of May 3
as he left Bacolod City early in the morning of that day by ferry boat for Iloilo City and then proceeded by
car to Roxas City where he stayed up to the following day to attend a testimonial in honor of Justice
Bellosillo who was appointed as Court Administrator. To prove his alibi, Judge Abastillas submitted an
affidavit of Judge Bernardo T. Ponferrada (then Presiding Judge of Branch 42, RTC, Bacolod City) certifying
that he and his wife were with Judge Abastillas in their journey to Roxas City. Judges Sergio Pestano, Ramon
B. Berjamin and Jose V. Alovera of the Regional Trial Court at Roxas City also executed a joint affidavit to the
effect that Judge Abastillas arrived at Roxas City just before noon of May 3, 1991 where he stayed up to the
following day.
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Judge Abastillas admitted that he met Johnson Lee on May 29, 1991 at the Quezon City Sports Center
during the convention of the Philippine Judges Association. But he denied having asked Johnson for a
meeting there or having talked to him privately regarding the criminal cases. Judge Abastillas said that RTC
Judge Joselito de la Rosa of Manila, was introduced to him by Judge Ponferrada. Judge de la Rosa, a friend of
Johnson Lee, in turn introduced Lee to him. According to Judge Abastillas, he gave his calling card to Judge
de la Rosa who must have handed it to Johnson Lee afterward. This was the same calling card that was
introduced as evidence by the complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863.
Judge Abastillas, likewise, confirmed the fact that he met Johnson Lee at the Manila Hotel in the evening of
June 7, 1991 but that the latter was never invited by him to be there on that occasion. This is the account of
Judge Abastillas in his sworn affidavit (Exh. "27") of the meeting:
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"23. It is true that Lee attended the dinner which I and my wife had with my cousin and his wife, Mr. and
Mrs. Arturo Sena, at the Manila Hotel on the evening of June 7, 1991. He was a gatecrasher on that
occasion. what happened was this: My cousin and I agreed to a foursome at the Manila Hotel on June 7,
1991. When my wife and I were already on our way to the Manila Hotel, Atty. Simbulan called me up and
said he wanted to see me. I told him that I was going to a dinner at the Manila Hotel. He insisted in seeing
me; and I had an inkling it was because of the above-mentioned criminal cases, so I told him, I was willing
to see him, as long as he did not bring along either or both Lee or Moreno. (Prior to this, he informed me
that Lee and Moreno were clients of his partner, Atty. Pineda), and I made this condition because I did not
want to meet Lee and/or Moreno outside of the court and especially not during a social occasion; I was
willing to see Atty. Simbulan because his brother is a friend of mine, and he was counsel for one of my
brothers-in law (bilas-husband of my wifes sister). Atty. Simbulan agreed that he would not take with him
either of his clients, so I told him to join us at the Manila Hotel. Much to my surprise and anger, Lee was at
the Manila Hotel Lobby, when he reached the place. So, when I saw Atty. Simbulan, I asked him: Bakit ba
nandito iyan? (Why is that person here?). Atty. Simbulan answered: Ewan ko ba diyan. Pasensiya ka na;
Huwag ka nang magalit. Hayaan mo na siya (I dont know. Please be patient; dont get angry. Let him join
us). I contained my irritation. My cousin and his wife, and my wife were civil and hospitable. We, Filipinos,
are a hospitable people. Unlike Americans, we tolerate gatecrashers, as in this instance of gatecrashing by
Johnson Lee, who is a very pushy person, as indeed he also gatecrashed during the Judges Convention.
Furthermore, as indicated by their attempts to see and talk to Justice Alfredo Lagamon, the Investigating
Justice in this proceeding.
"24. During the dinner, altho my wife, my cousin and his wife tried to be cordial to Lee, I showed my
displeasure by not addressing him. It is not true that I told him I will take care of the two criminal cases."
(At pp. 13 and 14.)
Again, Judge Abastillas did not deny that Johnson Lee, one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and
10011, went to his residence at Quezon City on October 7, 1991. But the visit, according to Judge Abastillas,
was not at his own initiative and the amount of $5,000.00 was never discussed on that occasion. This is his
version of the meeting:
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"25. It is not true that on October 7, 1991 that I asked for $5,000.00 from Johnny Uy. He did come to my
residence on that date, but that was not on my initiative. Prior to October 7, 1991, I had been getting word
from our maid and from my son, that a certain Mr. Uy had been calling up asking for me, but refused to
leave any message. And then on October 7, 1991, just as I was preparing to go out for a luncheon meeting,
our maid informed me a certain Mr. Uy wanted to talk to me over the phone. When I answered the phone
Johnny Uy introduced himself and insisted that I let him come over to my house; he said he wanted to talk
to me and explain his S.E.C. Case where his sister Banhua is opposing party. He did not say outright that he
was going to discuss the Criminal Cases against Lee and Moreno; if he had, I would have refused to see him,
because I did not want to talk with or about Lee, at this time, I was getting fed up with the pushiness and
aggressive behavior of Uy, who plainly wanted to establish a close relationship with me. Uy was very
insistent that I see him, so just to accommodate him, I agreed to see him. And he came to my house on
said date, October 7, 1991. He did talk about the S.E.C. case and also about Commissioners. I never asked
him for $5,000.00. I never asked him for money, Philippine or American currency, on that occasion, or over
the phone. Uy was lying when he testified that when he came to see me at home, I asked for $5,000.00
from him and/or Lee. He was likewise lying when he said that in a telephone conversation with me on
October 16, 1991, said $5,000.00 was discussed. That is not true. It is possible I may have talked with him
over the phone, but I categorically declare that I have never mentioned, nor have we ever discussed
$5,000.00. Also, I have never consented to the taping of any conversation, with him, or with anybody else."
(Sworn Statement, Exh. "27", pp. 14 and 15.)
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1.And at the risk of incurring the ire of the Court, defense counsel regrets to say that in denying the six (6)
incidents in the manner above-described, the Court acted no better than a pre-school kid who murmurs a
favorite nursery rime (sic) (Page 3, par. 5 of the Motion).
2.To put it bluntly, Accused have the feeling that these cases are being railroaded against them (Page 5,
2nd par. of the Motion).
3.Inasmuch as this motion not only seeks to reconsider the various palpable erroneous actuations of the
Court, which have gone so far out of hand, but also cries for prompt extraordinary remedies or corrective
disciplinary sanctions urgently required, so as to restore order and sanity in the entangled situations created
by the series of plainly and outrageously, if not maliciously, erroneous orders of His Honor, which are highly
prejudicial to the rights of the accused and injurious to the administration of justice and in effect, constitute
a desecration of our entire judicial system, which have therefore rendered the President Judge RENATO E.
ABASTILLAS unfit to continue wearing the judicial robe and sitting any second longer in the Bench, a copy of
this Motion is made under oath and furnished the Supreme Court thru the Hon. Chief Justice Andrea R.
Narvasa; Judicial and Bar Council and the Court Administrator, without prejudice to the impending formal
administrative complaint the accused will in due time institute with the Supreme Court (Page 12, No. (7) of
the Motion)."
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In the course of the joint hearing of the administrative cases, Judge Abastillas expanded his charges against
Atty. Chua to include the following:
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A.) Atty Chua does not have the good moral character required of a member of the Bar and he violated his
oath of office for the reason that:
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1. He admitted during cross-examination that in his conspiracy with Lee, Moreno and Uy, he committed the
crime of bribery which is penalized in Articles 210 and 212 of the Revised Penal Code;
2. He has been charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document in People of the Philippines versus
Enrique B. Chua, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12036 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City;
3. An administrative case has been filed against him in Adm. Case No. 1425, entitled "J. Bautista Rabago v.
Atty. Enrique S. Chua;"
4. Atty. Chua committed perjury in conspiracy with Lee, Moreno and Uy, by testifying in the proceedings
under oath that he gave P20,000.00 as a bribe to Judge Abastillas on May 3, 1991, when he knew that he
never gave any bribe money to Judge Abastillas; and that Atty. Chua also made other false statements in
the proceedings to harass Judge Abastillas.
B. Atty. Chua violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows:
1. Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 for falsely testifying under oath that he gave P20,000.00 bribe money to
Judge Abastillas on May 3, 1991;
2. Canon 8, Rule 8.01 for using abusive and offensive language in his pleadings and memoranda against
Undersecretary Bello of the Department of Justice;
3. Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03, for not only by perjuring himself in declaring that be gave
P20,000.00 bribe money to Judge Abastillas, but also by offering false evidence in the form of a taped
conversation, indicating lack of candor, fairness and good faith with the Court, and which acts of Atty. Chua
violate his duties not to do any falsehood to mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice; and
4. Canon 12, Rule 12.04 for advising his client the two (2) accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and
10011 not to attend the scheduled arraignment.
Atty. Chua categorically testified on cross-examination during the proceedings before Justice Lagamon that
he gave P20,000.00 as bribe to Judge Abastillas. Thus:
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"Q In this particular case, with a solicitation bribe allegedly made by Judge Abastillas, what was your advise
to your clients?
"A I admonished them that the defense in these two cases are intrinsically meritorious. So I do not see any
reason giving money or bribing any Judge. And that I am not in the habit doing that.
"Q Did you agree with your clients that you would not give the bribe?
"Then in (sic) October 7, 1991 in the morning, our aforesaid maid Beth informed me that Mr. Johnny Uy
wanted to talk to me. When respondent answered the phone, Mr. Uy introduced himself and asked that he
be allowed to see respondent in his house. Respondent demurred because he was in a hurry because he had
a 2 p.m. appointment in the Court of Appeals. But Uy was very insistent, so, just to get rid of him,
respondent agreed to see Uy for a few minutes. So Uy went to see respondent at the latters house. After
introducing himself, Uy started discussing the criminal cases against complainants herein.
"What respondent repeatedly told Uy is that he (Uy) should rely on the counsel of Lee and Moreno to do all
that need to be done in the case." (pp. 6-7.)
Since Judge Abastillas had already heard Johnny Uys voice on the phone and in fact they had a face-to-face
conversation on October 7, 1991 in the Judges house, it is highly unbelievable that Judge Abastillas could
not say definitely whether he had a talk with Johnny Uy on the phone on October 16, 1991. His lame and
shallow stance only serves to emphasize the obvious.
There is no doubt in the mind of the Court that the voices in the telephone conversation as recorded in the
tape by Johnny Uy on October 16, 1991 were those of Uy and Abastillas. The taped conversation was
replayed at the hearing before Justice Lagamon with the consent of both parties. Johnny Uy identified and
recognized the voices in tape as belonging to him and Judge Abastillas.
In the taped conversation already adverted to, Johnny Uy told Judge Abastillas that there will be no problem
about the 5T (meaning US $5,000.00) as long as the (criminal) cases of Johnson Lee will be cleared first.
Judge Abastillas response was to advise Uy to take up the matter with Al Simbulan.
It may be argued that that would not prove that Judge Abastillas solicited US$5,000.00. However, the taped
conversation as the evidence of the complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-93-863 would show, was just a
sequel of a series of interlinked events that had earlier taken place, starting with the solicitation by Judge
Abastillas of P50,000.00 of which he received P20,000.00 as initial payment, followed by the meeting
between Judge Abastillas and Johnson Lee at the Quezon City Sports Center and at the Manila Hotel, and
the meeting between Johnny Uy and Judge Abastillas at the latters house at St. Ignatius Village, Quezon
City where the judge asked for US $5,000.00. All the interrelated events ineluctably point to the conclusion
that Judge Abastillas knew that the "5T" meant $5,000.00 he tried to solicit.
Besides, if Judge Abastillas during the telephone conversation had no idea at all about the "5T" mentioned
by Johnny Uy, he should have expressed surprise and inquired from Uy what he meant by it. He did not,
which goes to show he filly understood what the "5T" stood for.
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It is, likewise, suggested that when Johnny Uy mentioned "5T" to Judge Abastillas, the latters reply did not
appear to be responsive because he mentioned something like Take up the matter with Al Simbulan." The
theory is advanced that it would be illogical for a person who is soliciting a bribe to involve a third party and
a lawyer at that referring to Atty. Al Simbulan. We do not agree. Atty. Simbulan is a mutual friend of Judge
Abastillas and Johnny Uy. He could serve as a convenient conduit between the two, thus avoiding the direct
personal involvement of the taker in the payoff.
In this connection, Judge Abastillas cannot now question the admissibility of the taped conversation (Exh.
13) as evidence. He offered no objection to its replay at the hearing before Justice Lagamon.
We do not believe that Judge Abastillas meeting with Johnson Lee at the Quezon City Sports Center was not
pre-arranged. Neither do we accept his explanation that Johnson Lee was a "gate crasher" at the judges
party at Manila Hotel. On this point, we find the discussion in complainants memorandum in Adm. Case No.
RTJ-92-863 dated December 3, 1993 convincing. We quote:
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"2. The circumstances as narrated by respondent Judge under which he first met complainant Lee by way of
his justification in meeting the said Complainant, should he taken with a grain of salt, so to speak.
Respondent Judge seems to heap the blame on his fellow Judges Ponferrada and de la Rosa, as being
instrumental in paving the way for his meeting complainant Lee, but neither of these two judges was
presented by him to substantiate his version. Worse, if respondent was able to secure the affidavit of Judge
Ponferrada (Annex 4 of his sworn affidavit dated 27th October, 1993) to support the fact that on May 3,
1991, he was in Roxas City, then, there is no reason why he cannot at least secure a similar affidavit from
Judge Ponferrada to bolster the circumstances under which he met complainant Lee."
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Hence, that respondent Judge and complainant Lee met under mutually conducive and cordial circumstances
which subsequently led to the latters (sic) solicitation of bribe from witness Uy, is very probable.
3. Moreover, the pretension of the respondent Judge that after that meeting of May 29, 1991 with
complainant Lee at the Judges convention, he did not give him the opportunity to see respondent again
and that he took all steps necessary so that he could not have to talk again to Lee, is a pure lie, and thus
cannot be believed, because when respondent Judge, without his slightest expectation, was confronted with
a calling card (EXH.D) of his own cousin Mr. Arturo Sena, given by said Mr. Sons to complainant Lee, in the
presence of respondent Judge and his wife, at a dinner at the Manila Hotel on June 7, 1991 or barely a weck
after respondent Judge, realizing that he could no longer pretend to be that resolute in avoiding
complainant Lee, vainly set up the pretext that complaint (sic) Lee was a gatecrasher on that occasion.
This, by itself is extremely difficult to believe.
Even respondent Judges explanation about the presence of complainant Lee at that Manila Hotel dinner is
silly, if not childish and ridiculous. According to respondent Judge, he already had an inkling on what was in
Arty. Simbulans mind when the latter insisted in seeing him at the time he and his wife were already on
their way to the Manila Hotel for a foursome dinner. That inkling according to respondent Judge, are the
two criminal cases where complainant Lee is one of the accused, but respondent Judge nonetheless willingly
allowed Atty. Simbulan to join them in the dinner, notwithstanding the fact that, in his own words, prior to
this, he (Atty. Simbulan) informed me that Lee and Moreno were clients of his partner, Atty. Pineda. Thus if
indeed respondent Judge is so determined in not seeing complainant Lee again and so resolute in avoiding
at all costs complainant Lee as what he wants to impress upon the Investigating Justice, then, he could have
easily set up an alibi to mislead Atty. Simbulan.
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Thus, there was indeed a prior understanding on where and when to meet Lee again after their meeting at
the Judges convention.
Besides, why did not respondent call on his own cousin Mr. Sons to prove that complainant Lee was really a
gatecrasher or request Atty. Simbulan to substantiate his version that Lee was the most unwanted guest
during that Manila Hotel dinner. Worse, respondent Judge did not offer an explanation regarding Lees having
his calling card (EXH.C), which witness Uy subsequently used in calling him up by telephone prior to their
seeing each other on October 7, 1991 at the residence of respondent Judge."
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The three (3) meetings by Judge Abastillas with interested parties who had a stake in the outcome of
Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 100~I and the recorded telephone conversation where said cases were
discussed manifested Judge Abastillas willingness, nay, propensity to ester into deals with motivations
incongruous to the merits of the cases pending before him. Judge Abastillas committed serious misconduct
no less.
The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge should be the embodiment of competence, integrity and
independence (Rule 1.01). He should administer justice impartially and without delay (Rule 1.02). He should
so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Rule
2.01).
It is peculiarly essential that the system for establishing and dispensing justice be developed to a high
degree of proficiency, to gain the absolute confidence of the public in the integrity and impartiality of its
administration, because appearance is as important as reality, so much so that a judge, like Cesars wife,
must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. The actuations of Judge Abastillas transgressed against the
high standard of moral ethics required of judges.
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We find, however, the rest of charges of the complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 against Judge
Abastillas without merit. We quote with approval the pertinent portions of Justice Lagamons report relative
to said accusations:
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The undersigned finds nothing irregular when the Court issued an Order of Arrest when the accused
Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno failed to appear during the scheduled arraignment on Sept. 26,1991. Atty.
manifested that he instructed his clients not to appear in Court because a day before the date set for
arraignment he allegedly filed a consolidated motion to quash which he requested that the same be heard
on Oct. 11, 1991. Both accused and counsel were duly notified of the arraignment. They should have
displayed their respect for the Court by appearing personally and prayed for the deferment of the
arraignment. There was nothing that could have prevented the Court from orally denying the motion to
quash and proceeding with the arraignment. It appears that the motion which was filed only one day before
the scheduled date of hearing was intended to delay and derail the speedy trial of the case, taking into
account that the Sept. 16, 1991 date of arraignment was originally agreed in open court in the presence of
Atty. Chua as early as August 5, 1991 and set for Sept. 3, 1991 but reset to Sept. 26.
The undersigned finds nothing untoward in the proceedings of People v. Espinos (Crim. Cases 8846 and
8847) where the respondent ordered that the firearms involved in the case be delivered to the custody of
the Court for proper disposition.
The complainants maintain that the respondent treated the cases in a favored manner just because counsel
for the accused Atty. Roger Z. Reyes is close to him. Accordingly, a full-blown trial type hearing was
conducted in a motion to quash and, eventually, the case was dismissed. Whereas, in the cases of the
complainants the accused were ordered arrested upon their failure to appear on Sept. 26, 1991 arraignment
notwithstanding the pendency of a motion to quash. It is our observation that the two cases cannot be
equated because in the first place the complainants failed or refused to appear in court notwithstanding
notice to them and counsel. In the Espinos case the accused consistently appeared in court. Moreover, the
Order of the Court directing the delivery of the firearms in the custody of the police is properly and in order.
We are fully aware of the evil practice of irresponsible policemen who hold on to the possession of the
firearms for their personal use. The Court, therefore, has to issue an Order for the delivery of the firearms
for proper disposal. In fact, Atty. Chua is guilty of deliberately misquoting the Order of the Court changing
the phrase to this Court to to him, thereby creating an implication that the respondent entertained
personal interest in the firearms.
The records show that the public prosecutor also moved that the firearm in question be delivered to the
court and after an Order of Forfeiture be forwarded and deposited with the Firearms and Explosives Unit, PC
Headquarters, Bacolod City (Exh.15, p. 143, records).
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The charge that the respondent failed to decide Civil Case No. 2423 (Susana Lim v. Lim) within 90 days
cannot be given much consideration taking into account the Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the
branch to the effect that the case was partially tried by the respondent and that the stenographer who took
down the stenographic notes left for the United States without transcribing the same. There is. therefore, a
need for the retaking of the testimonies of the witnesses.
The failure of the respondent to resolve the motion to disqualify private prosecutor dated April 20, 1991 as
well as the motion for reinvestigation dated July 3, 1991 which were resolved in open court only on February
5, 1992 is rather a minor violation in the face of the series of motions filed by Atty. Enrique S. Chua.
Respondent lost track of what motions are due for resolution until he was reminded on January 20, 1992
through a supplemental motion filed by Arty. Chua, however, sixteen days thereafter the pending motions
were all resolved."
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However, we take note that Atty. Chua during the investigation before Justice Lagamon humbly expressed
his genuine regrets for having acted the way he did. He said: "I considered that particular moment of my life
as one of the human weaknesses." He felt sorry for "a lapse in my life." "I was not strong enough to resist,"
he added (TSN, Oct. 27, 1983, pp. 11-12).
Atty. Chua declared that while he believed that his clients case was meritorious, his clients prevailed upon
him to offer bribe money as the practical way to obtain justice.
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Under the circumstances, and in addition to Atty. Chuas profound expression of remorse, we do not find it
difficult to mitigate his liability when we consider his willingness to come forward, at the risk of being
administratively penalized himself, to expose what we considered illegal and immoral acts perpetrated by the
very ones tasked with the sacred duty to uphold the law and dispense justice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Renato E. Abastillas, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50 Bacolod City, is hereby
found GUILTY of serious misconduct in Adm. Matter No. RTJ-92863 for having met with persons involved
and/or interested in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People v. Johnson Lees and Sonny
Moreno" of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, for the purpose of discussing or soliciting bribe in
connection said cases and is hereby DISMISSED from office, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and
accrued leave credits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of government,
including government owned or controlled corporations.
This Court holds Atty. Enrique S. Chua administratively liable in Adm. Case No. 3815 for violation of Rule
1.01 of the Code of professional Responsibility for allegedly bribing Judge Abastillas.
Respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar act or acts or violation
committed by him in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 3452
1. Falsification of documents, when Atty. Abellana made it appear that he had filed Civil Case
No. CEB-6970 on June 10, 1988, conformably with their agreement, although the complaint
was actually filed on June 14, 1988;
2. Dereliction of duty, when Atty. Abellana failed to: (a) file the reply vis--vis the answer with
counterclaim, with his omission having delayed the pre-trial of the case; (b) inform the trial
court beforehand that Samonte could not be available on a scheduled hearing, thereby
incurring for the plaintiffs side an unexplained absence detrimental to Samonte as the
plaintiff; and (c) submit an exhibit required by the trial judge, only to eventually submit it three
months later;
3. Gross negligence and tardiness in attending the scheduled hearings; and
4. Dishonesty for not issuing official receipts for every cash payments made by Samonte for
his court appearances and his acceptance of the case.
To support his administrative complaint, Samonte attached the following annexes, namely:
1. Comparative photocopies of the cover page of the complaint on file in the RTC and of the
cover page of the complaint Atty. Abellana furnished him;
2
2. A photocopy of the order issued on January 16, 1989, and a photocopy of the order issued
on January 19, 1990 in which the RTC observed that "[t]he formal offer of plaintiffs exhibits
is rather very late;" and
3
3. The motion to change counsel, in which Samonte stated that Atty. Abellana had failed to
promptly attend court hearings and to do other legal services required of him as the counsel.
In the lower left portion of the motion, Atty. Abellana noted the motion subject to the
reservation that his attorneys fees should still be paid.
4
On March 12, 1990, the Court required Atty. Abellana to comment on the administrative complaint.
In his comment dated April 6, 1990, Atty. Abellana denied the charge of falsification of documents,
clarifying that the actual filing of the complaint could be made only on June 14, 1988 instead of on
June 10, 1988 because Samonte had not given enough money to cover the filing fees and other
charges totaling P5,027.76; and that Samonte shelled out only P5,000.00, contrary to their
agreement in April 1988 on paying to him P10,000.00 as the acceptance fee in addition to the filing
fees. He asserted that the charge of dereliction of duty was baseless, because he had filed the reply
on December 2, 1988 after receiving the answer with counterclaim of the defendants on August 2,
1988, attaching as proof the copies of the reply (Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his comment); and that it
was the RTC, not him, who had scheduled the pre-trial on January 16, 1989. Anent his
nonattendance at the hearings in Civil Case No. CEB-6970, he explained that although he had
informed the RTC of his having been either stranded in another province, or having attended the
arraignment of another client in another court, the presiding judge had opted not to await his arrival
in the courtroom. He blamed Samonte for his inability to submit the formal offer of exhibits on time,
pointing out that Samonte had failed to give the duplicate originals of the documentary exhibits
despite his request because of the latters absence from the country. He countered that it was
Samonte who had been dishonest, because Samonte had given only the filing fees plus at
least P2,000.00 in contravention of their agreement on the amount of P10,000.00 being his
acceptance fees in addition to the filing fees; that the filing fees paid were covered by receipts issued
by the Clerk of Court; that no receipts were issued for the P200.00/appearance fee conformably with
the practice of most lawyers; and that Samonte had not also demanded any receipts.
5
Atty. Abellana branded as unethical Samontes submission of a motion to change counsel, stating
that the latter did not thereby exhibit the courtesy of informing him beforehand on the intention of not
meeting his obligation to him as the counsel; that Samonte had been forced to issue to him a check
after the Branch Clerk of Court had told him that his motion to change counsel would not be acted
upon unless it carried Atty. Abellanas conformity as the counsel; and that he had duly acknowledged
the check.
8
On May 23, 1990, the Court received Samontes letter dated May 8, 1990 embodying additional
charges of falsification of documents, dereliction of duty and dishonesty based on the reply and the
annexes Atty. Abellana had filed. Samonte noted in the letter that the reply attached to the comment
of Atty. Abellana was not authentic based on the categorical statement of the Branch Clerk of Court
of Branch 5 of the RTC in Cebu City to the effect that no such reply had been filed in behalf of
Samonte; and that the rubber stamp affixed on the reply supposedly filed by Atty. Abellana in
Samontes behalf was not also the official rubber stamp of Branch 5. Samonte denied being the
10
11
cause of delay in the submission of the formal offer of exhibits, and reminded that the documentary
exhibits concerned had been shown to the trial court during his testimony, with the opposing party
not even objecting to their authenticity.
Samonte declared that his agreement with Atty. Abellana on the fees for all his legal services
stipulated the equivalent of 20% of the awarded damages; that the amount demanded was P1.12
Million; that he paid Atty. Abellana a total of P7,027.00 for filing expenses, plus P5,000.00 that he
gave as a token payment for Atty. Abellanas services after discovering the latters inefficiency and
fraudulent practices.
12
On May 30, 199013 and July 30, 1990, the Court referred the administrative complaint to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation.
14
16
18
19
On February 7, 2005, the IBP received a motion to quash dated January 7, 2005 from Atty.
Abellana, seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint because of the lack of interest on
the part of Samonte. Atty. Abellana observed therein that Samonte had always sought the
postponement of the hearings.
20
Reacting to the motion to quash, Samonte requested an early hearing by motion filed on February 9,
2005, declaring his interest in pursuing the administrative complaint against Atty. Abellana.
21
On March 22, 2005, IBP Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De Los Reyes set the mandatory
conference on June 22, 2005. In that conference, only Samonte appeared; hence, the IBP just
required the parties to submit their verified position papers within 30 days from notice. Nonetheless,
the IBP scheduled the clarificatory hearing on August 18, 2005.
22
23
24
Samonte submitted his position paper on August 2, 2005. On August 9, 2005, Atty. Abellana
requested an extension of his period to submit his own position paper allegedly to allow him to
secure relevant documents from the trial court.
25
26
On August 18, 2005, the parties appeared for the clarificatory hearing. The case was thereafter
deemed submitted for resolution.
On August 29, 2005, Samonte presented a verified amended position paper, reiterating his
allegations against Atty. Abellana.
27
Also on August 29, 2005, Atty. Abellana submitted his verified position paper dated August 17,
2005, in which he represented that although he had been at times late for the hearings he had
nonetheless efficiently discharged his duties as the counsel for Samonte; that he had not caused
any delay in the case; that it was Samonte who had been unavailable at times because of his work
as an airline pilot; that the complainant had discharged him as his counsel in order to avoid paying
his obligation to him; and that the complainant filed this disbarment case after he lost his own civil
case in the RTC. He attached all the pleadings he had filed on behalf of the complainant, except the
above-stated replies.
28
On May 1, 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Abellana negligent in handling
certain aspects of his clients case, like not filing a reply to the defendants answer with
counterclaims in order to deny the new matters raised in the answer; resorting to falsehood to make
it appear that he had filed the reply; and being considerably late in submitting the formal offer of
exhibits for Samonte, as noted even by the trial judge in the order dated January 19, 1990. It
observed that although the negligence of Atty. Abellana did not necessarily prejudice his clients
case, his lack of honesty and trustworthiness as an attorney, and his resort to falsehood and
deceitful practices were a different matter; noted that he had twice resorted to falsehood, the first
being when he tried to make it appear that the complaint had been filed on June 10, 1988 despite
the court records showing that the complaint had been actually filed only on June 14, 1988; and the
second being when he had attempted to deceive his client about his having filed the reply by
producing a document bearing a rubber stamp marking distinctively different from that of the trial
courts; that he did not dispute the pieces of material evidence adduced against him; that he had
explained that the reason for his delay in the filing of the complaint had been the complainants
failure to pay the agreed fees on time; and that he had only stated that he had filed a reply, without
presenting proof of his having actually filed such in court.
29
30
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the disbarment of Atty. Abellana, observing as
follows:
x x x Apart from his negligent handling of portions of the civil case, said respondent has shown a
facility for utilizing false and deceitful practices as a means to cover-up his delay and lack of
diligence in pursuing the case of his client. Taken together as a whole, the respondents acts are
nothing short of deplorable.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Atty. Gines
Abellana be disbarred from the practice of law for resorting to false and/or deceitful practices, and for
failure to exercise honesty and trusthworthiness as befits a member of the bar.(Bold emphasis
supplied)
On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, suspended Atty. Abellana from the practice of law for one year, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED,
with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for resorting to
falsehood and/or deceitful practices, and for failure to exercise honesty and trustworthiness as befits
member of the Bar, Atty. Gines N. Abellana is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one
(1) year. (Bold emphasis supplied)
31
On September 25, 2008, Atty. Abellana moved for reconsideration based on the following grounds:
32
A. That the imposition of sanction for the suspension of the undersigned from the practice of
law for one (1) year is too stiff in relation to the alleged unethical conduct committed by the
respondent;
B. That the findings of the investigating commissioner is not fully supported with evidence;
C. That the complaint of the complainant is not corroborated by testimonial evidence so that
it is hearsay and self-serving.
In support of his motion, Atty. Abellana rehashed most of his previous arguments, and stated that the
"enumerations of failures are belied by the existence of Reply to counterclaims, which were attached
as Annexes "8" and "9" of the Position Paper of respondent." It is noted, however, that Annex 8 and
Annex 9 of Atty. Abellanas position paper were different documents, namely: Annex
8 (Manifestation and Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Change Counsel); and Annex
9 (Manifestation). Nonetheless, he argued that both documents were already part of the records of
the case, and that anyway Atty. Geronimo V. Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court, did not execute
any affidavit or certification tothe effect that both documents were inexistent. He reminded that
Samonte had only said that both documents "seemed to be falsified documents" based on the
certification of Atty. Nazareth on the official rubber stamp of the court.
33
34
35
The IBP required Samonte to comment on Atty. Abellanas motion for reconsideration.
36
In his comment dated October 21, 2008, Samonte reiterated his allegations against Atty. Abellana;
insisted that Atty. Abellana did not refute the charges against him; and noted thatthe reply that Atty.
Abellana had supposedly filed in the case was not even annexed either to his position paper and
motion for reconsideration.
37
On December 16, 2008, Atty. Abellana filed a motion requesting to be allowed to submit certified true
copies of his exhibits, i.e., the pleadings he had submitted in the RTC.
38
39
On September 15, 2009, Atty. Abellana filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration.
40
On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for reconsideration of Atty.
Abellana.
41
Ruling
We adopt and approve the findings of the IBP Board of Governors by virtue of their being
substantiated by the records.
In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be honest, imbued with
integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and
ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in
the Lawyers Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide
member of the Law Profession, thus:
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will
not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis supplied)
By the Lawyers Oath is every lawyer enjoined not only to obey the laws of the land but also to
refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court,
and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as
well to the courts as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the Law, and has to observe and
maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means
a coincidence, therefore, that honesty, integrity and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by
the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
42
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall
he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within
a reasonable time to clients request for information.
Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity and trustworthiness in his dealings
with Samonte as the client, and with the RTC as the trial court. He resorted to outright falsification by
superimposing "0" on "4" in order to mislead Samonte into believing that he had already filed the
complaint in court on June 10,1988 as promised, instead of on June 14, 1988, the date when he had
actually done so. His explanation that Samonte was himself the cause of the belated filing on
account of his inability to remit the correct amount of filing fees and his acceptance fees by June 10,
1988, as agreed upon, did not excuse the falsification, because his falsification was not rendered
less dishonest and less corrupt by whatever reasons for filing at the later date. He ought to
remember that honesty and integrity were of far greater value for him as a member of the Law
Profession than his transactions with his client.
Atty. Abellanas perfidy towards Samonte did not stop there. He continued misleading Samonte in
explaining his mishandling of the latters civil case. Worse, he also foisted his dishonesty on the
Court no less. To counter Samontes accusation about his not filing the reply in the civil case, he
knowingly submitted two documents as annexes of his comment during the investigation by the IBP,
and represented said documents to have been part of the records of the case in the RTC. His
intention in doing so was to enhance his defense against the administrative charge. But the two
documents turned out to be forged and spurious, and his forgery came to be exposed because the
rubber stamp marks the documents bore were not the official marks of the RTCs, as borne out by
the specimens of the official rubber stamp of Branch 5 of the RTC duly certified by Atty. Geronimo V.
Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court. He defended his dishonesty by lamely claiming that "court
personnel were authorized to accept filing of pleadings even without the usual rubber stamp." In
these acts, he manifested his great disrespect towards both the Court and his client.
43
44
The finding on Atty. Abellanas neglect in the handling of Samontes case was entirely warranted. He
admitted being tardy in attending the hearings of the civil case. He filed the formal offer of evidence
in behalf of his client way beyond the period to do so, a fact that he could not deny because the RTC
Judge had himself expressly noted the belated filing in the order issued in the case. Atty. Abellana
was fortunate that the RTC Judge exhibited some tolerance and liberality by still admitting the
belated offer of evidence in the interest of justice.
In the motion for reconsideration that he filed in the IBP Board of Governors, Atty. Abellana
challenged the sufficiency of the proof presented against him by Samonte, contending that such
proof had consisted of merely hearsay and self-serving evidence.
The contention of Atty. Abellana is bereft of substance. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers,
clearly preponderant evidence is required to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the
respondent lawyers. Preponderant evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a
whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other. In order to determine if the evidence
of one party is greater than that of the other, Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court instructs that
the court may consider the following, namely: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the
witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to
which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability
of their testimony; (c) the witnesses interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so
far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does
not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater number.
45
The complainants evidence preponderantly established the administrative sins of Atty. Abellana. To
start with, Atty. Abellana admitted superimposing the "0" on "4" but justified himself by claiming that
he had done so only because the complainant had not given to him the correct amount of filing fees
required. Secondly, Atty. Abellana filed a spurious document by making it appear as one actually filed
in court by using a fake rubber stamp. His misdeed was exposed because the rubber stamp imprint
on his document was different from that of the official rubber stamp of the trial court. He defended
himself by stating that court personnel accepted papers filed in the court without necessarily using
the official rubber stamp of the court. He well knew, of course, that such statement did not fully justify
his misdeed. Thirdly, Atty. Abellana did not present any proof of his alleged filings, like certified
copies of the papers supposedly filed in court. His omission to prove his allegation on the filings
conceded that he did not really file them. And, lastly, Atty. Abellana misrepresented the papers he
had supposedly filed by stating that he was attaching them as Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his comment,
but Annex 8 and Annex 9 turned out to be papers different from those he represented them to be.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the
privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyers Oath. Only thereby can
lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood
or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up ones misdeeds committed against clients and
the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice
law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty
lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.
The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana, being aimed at misleading his client and the Court to
bolster his unworthy denial of his neglect in the handling of the client's case, were unmitigated. Still,
the Court must not close its eyes to the fact that Atty. Abellana actually finished presenting his
client's case; and that the latter initiated the termination of Atty. Abellana's engagement as his
counsel only after their relationship had been tainted with mistrust. Thus, we determine the proper
sanction. In Maligaya v. Doronilla, Jr., the respondent lawyer was suspended for two months from
the practice of law for representing in court that the complainant had agreed to withdraw the lawsuit
when in truth the complainant had made no such agreement. The respondent admitted the falsity of
his representation, but gave as an excuse his intention to amicably settle the case. In Molina v.
Magat, the respondent had invoked double jeopardy in behalf of his client by stating that the
complainant had filed a similar case of slight physical injuries in another court, but his invocation was
false because no other case had been actually filed. He was suspended from the practice of law for
six months for making the false and untruthful statement in court. For Atty. Abellana, therefore,
suspension from the practice of law for six months with warning of a more severe sanction upon a
repetition suffices.
46
47
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution dated June 22, 2013 of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Board of Governors subject to the MODIFICATION that Atty. Gines N. Abellana is
SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW effective upon receipt of this
decision, with the stern warning that any repetition by him of the same or similar acts will be
punished more severely.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of Atty. Gines N. Abellana as a
member of the Philippine Bar, and copies furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts
in the country.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
A.C. No. 6313
September 7, 2006
On 14 February 2001, respondent allegedly advised complainant that Aquino gave him P150,000.00
cash andP58,000.00 in two (2) postdated checks to answer for the medical expenses of her
daughter. Instead of turning them over to her, respondent handed her his personal check 6 in the
amount of P150,000.00 and promised to give her the balance of P58,000.00 soon thereafter.
However, sometime in April or May 2001, respondent informed her that he could not give her the
said amount because he used it for his political campaign as he was then running for the position of
Provincial Board Member of the 2nd District of Pampanga.
Complainant maintains that inspite of their sexual relationship and the fact that respondent kept part
of the money intended for her daughter, he still failed in his promise to give her a job. Furthermore,
he did not file the case against Aquino and referred her instead to Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr.
("Atty. Tolentino").
Sometime in 2002, assisted by Atty. Tolentino, complainant filed a criminal case for child abuse as
well as a civil case against Aquino. While the criminal case was dismissed, the civil case was
decided on 30 August 2004 by virtue of a compromise agreement. 7 It was only when said cases
were filed that she finally understood the import of the Affidavit.
Complainant avers that respondent failed to protect her interest when he personally prepared the
Affidavit and caused her to sign the same, which obviously worked to her disadvantage. In making
false promises that all her problems would be solved, aggravated by his assurance that his marriage
had already been annulled, respondent allegedly deceived her into yielding to his sexual desires.
Taking advantage of the trust and confidence she had in him as her counsel and paramour, her weak
emotional state, and dire financial need at that time, respondent was able to appropriate for himself
money that rightfully belonged to her daughter. She argues that respondent's aforementioned acts
constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility
("Code"), particularly Rule 1.01, Rule 1.02, Rule 16.01, Rule 16.02, and Canon 7. 8 Hence, she filed
the instant complaint9 dated 2 February 2004.
Expectedly, respondent presents a different version. According to him, complainant needed a lawyer
who would file the aforementioned action for support. Complainant's former high school classmate
Reinilda Bansil Morales, who was also his fellow barangay official, referred her to him. He admits
sending a demand letter to her former lover, Aquino, to ask support for the child. 10 Subsequently, he
and Aquino communicated through an emissary. He learned that because of Aquino's infidelity, his
relationship with his wife was strained so that in order to settle things the spouses were willing to
give complainant a lump sum provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino is not
the father of her daughter.
Respondent relayed this proposal to complainant who asked for his advice. He then advised her to
study the proposal thoroughly and with a practical mindset. He also explained to her the pros and
cons of pursuing the case. After several days, she requested that he negotiate for an out-of-court
settlement of no less thanP500,000.00. When Aquino rejected the amount, negotiations ensued until
the amount was lowered toP200,000.00. Aquino allegedly offered to issue four postdated checks in
equal amounts within four months. Complainant disagreed. Aquino then proposed to rediscount the
checks at an interest of 4% a month or a total ofP12,000.00. The resulting amount was P188,000.00.
Complainant finally agreed to this arrangement and voluntarily signed the Affidavit that respondent
prepared, the same Affidavit adverted to by complainant. He denies forcing her to sign the document
and strongly refutes her allegation that she did not know what the Affidavit was for and that she
signed it without even reading it, as he gave her the draft before the actual payment was made. He
notes that complainant is a college graduate and a former bank employee who speaks and
understands English. He likewise vehemently denies pocketingP58,000.00 of the settlement
proceeds. When complainant allegedly signed the Affidavit, the emissary handed to her the sum
of P150,000.00 in cash and she allegedly told respondent that he could keep the
remainingP38,000.00, not P58,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. Although she did not say why, he
assumed that it was for his attorney's fees.
As regards their illicit relationship, respondent admits of his sexual liaison with complainant. He,
however, denies luring her with sweet words and empty promises. According to him, it was more of a
"chemistry of (sic) two consensual (sic) adults,"11 complainant then being in her thirties. He denies
that he tricked her into believing that his marriage was already annulled. Strangely, respondent
devotes considerable effort to demonstrate that complainant very well knew he was married when
they commenced what was to him, an extra-marital liaison. He points out that, first, they had met
through his colleague, Ms. Morales, a friend and former high school classmate of hers. Second, they
had allegedly first met at his residence where she was actually introduced to his wife. Subsequently,
complainant called his residence several times and actually spoke to his wife, a circumstance so
disturbing to respondent that he had to beg complainant not to call him there. Third, he was the
Punong Barangay from 1994 to 2002, and was elected President of the Association of Barangay
Council ("ABC") and as such was an ex-officio member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Guagua,
Pampanga. He ran for the position of Provincial Board Member in 2001. Thus, he was known in his
locality and it was impossible for complainant not to have known of his marital status especially that
she lived no more than three (3) kilometers away from his house and even actively helped him in his
campaign.
Respondent further alleges that while the demand for support from Aquino was being worked out,
complainant moved to a rented house in Olongapo City because a suitor had promised her a job in
the Subic Naval Base. But months passed and the promised job never came so that she had to
return to Lubao, Pampanga. As the money she received from Aquino was about to be exhausted,
she allegedly started to pester respondent for financial assistance and urged him to file the Petition
for Support against Aquino. While respondent acceded to her pleas, he also advised her "to look for
the right man"12 and to stop depending on him for financial assistance. He also informed her that he
could not assist her in filing the case, as he was the one who prepared and notarized the Affidavit.
He, however, referred her to Atty. Tolentino.
In August 2002, respondent finally ended his relationship with complainant, but still he agreed to give
her monthly financial assistance of P6,000.00 for six (6) months. Since then, they have ceased to
meet and have communicated only through an emissary or by cellphone. In 2003, complainant
begged him to continue the assistance until June when her alleged fianc from the United States
would have arrived. Respondent agreed. In July 2003, she again asked for financial assistance for
the last time, which he turned down. Since then he had stopped communicating to her.
Sometime in January 2004, complainant allegedly went to see a friend of respondent. She told him
that she was in need of P5,000.00 for a sari-sari store she was putting up and she wanted him to
relay the message to respondent. According to this friend, complainant showed him a prepared
complaint against respondent that she would file with the Supreme Court should the latter not
accede to her request. Sensing that he was being blackmailed, respondent ignored her demand.
True enough, he alleges, she filed the instant complaint.
On 21 July 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") for
investigation, report and recommendation.13 After the parties submitted their respective position
papers and supporting documents, the Investigating Commissioner rendered his Report and
Recommendation14 dated 2 September 2005. After presenting the parties' conflicting factual
versions, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to that of complainant and concluded that
respondent clearly violated the Code, reporting in this wise, to wit:
Respondent, through the above mentioned acts, clearly showed that he is wanting in good
moral character, putting in doubt his professional reputation as a member of the BAR and
renders him unfit and unworthy of the privileges which the law confers to him. From a lawyer,
are (sic) expected those qualities of truth-speaking, high sense of honor, full candor,
intellectual honesty and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which
throughout the passage of time have been compendiously described as MORAL
CHARACTER.
Respondent, unfortunately took advantage and (sic) every opportunity to entice complainant
to his lascivious hungerness (sic). On several occasions[,] respondent kept on calling
complainant and dropped by her house and gave P2,000.00 as aid while waiting allegedly
for the reply of (sic) their demand letter for support. It signals the numerous visits and regular
calls all because of [l]ewd design. He took advantage of her seeming financial woes and
emotional dependency.
xxxx
Without doubt, a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the
impositions (sic) of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. x x x 15
It was then recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months
and that he be ordered to return to complainant the amount of P58,000.00 within two months. The
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the said Report and Recommendation in a
Resolution16 dated 17 December 2005, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and "considering Respondent's obviously taking
advantage of the lawyer-client relationship and the financial and emotional problem of his client and
attempting to mislead the Commission,"17 respondent was meted out the penalty of suspension for
one (1) year with a stern warning that a repetition of similar acts will merit severe sanctions. He was
likewise ordered to return P58,000.00 to complainant.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory
Questioning18 ("Motion") dated 9 March 2006 with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for
Clarificatory Questioning dated 22 March 2006 with the Supreme Court. He reiterates his own
version of the facts, giving a more detailed account of the events that transpired between him and
complainant. Altogether, he portrays complainant as a shrewd and manipulative woman who
depends on men for financial support and who would stop at nothing to get what she wants. Arguing
that the IBP based its Resolution solely on complainant's bare allegations that she failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence, he posits the case should be re-opened for clarificatory questioning
in order to determine who between them is telling the truth.
In a Resolution19 dated 27 April 2006, the IBP denied the Motion on the ground that it has no more
jurisdiction over the case as the matter had already been endorsed to the Supreme Court.
While we find respondent liable, we adjudicate the matter differently from what the IBP has
recommended.
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" 20 in order to merit disciplinary
sanction. We disagree.
One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral
character. Said requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of
law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. 21 As officers
of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community.22 The Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.23 A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree.24 It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act that shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the
good and respectable members of the community.25
While it is has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two
unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior,26 it is not
so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.27 Even if not all forms of extra-marital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. 28
By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. The next question to consider is whether this act is aggravated by his alleged deceitful
conduct in luring complainant who was then in low spirits and in dire financial need in order to satisfy
his carnal desires. While the IBP concluded the question in the affirmative, we find otherwise.
Complainant's allegations that she succumbed to respondent's sexual advances due to his promises
of financial security and because of her need for legal assistance in filing a case against her former
lover, are insufficient to conclude that complainant deceived her into having sexual relations with her.
Surely, an educated woman like herself who was of sufficient age and discretion, being at that time
in her thirties, would not be easily fooled into sexual congress by promises of a job and of free legal
assistance, especially when there is no showing that she is suffering from any mental or physical
disability as to justify such recklessness and/or helplessness on her part. 29Respondent's numerous
visits and regular calls to complainant do not necessarily prove that he took advantage of her. At
best, it proves that he courted her despite being a married man, precisely the fact on which the
finding of immorality is rooted. Moreover, the circumstance that he gave her P2,000.00 as aid does
not induce belief that he fueled her financial dependence as she never denied pleading with, if not
badgering, him for financial support.
Neither does complainant's allegation that respondent lied to her about his marital status inspire
belief. We find credence in respondent's assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of
his subsisting marriage. She herself admitted that they were introduced by her friend and former
classmate, Ms. Morales who was a fellow barangay official of respondent. She admitted that she
knew his residence phone number and that she had called him there. She also knew that
respondent is an active barangay official who even ran as Provincial Board Member in 2001.
Curiously, she never refuted respondent's allegations that she had met and talked to his wife on
several occasions, that she lived near his residence, that she helped him in his campaign, or that
she knew a lot of his friends, so as not to have known of his marital status. Considering that she
previously had an affair with Aquino, who was also a married man, it would be unnatural for her to
have just plunged into a sexual relationship with respondent whom she had known for only a short
time without verifying his background, if it were true that she preferred "to change [her] life for the
better,"30 as alleged in her complaint. We believe that her aforementioned allegations of deceit were
not established by clear preponderant evidence required in disbarment cases. 31 We are left with the
most logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered into an illicit and immoral relationship
with respondent sans any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.
Next, complainant charged respondent of taking advantage of his legal skills and moral control over
her to force her to sign the clearly disadvantageous Affidavit without letting her read it and without
explaining to her its repercussions. While acting as her counsel, she alleged that he likewise acted
as counsel for Aquino.
We find complainant's assertions dubious. She was clearly in need of financial support from Aquino
especially that her daughter was suffering from a heart ailment. We cannot fathom how she could
abandon all cares to respondent who she had met for only a couple of months and thereby risk the
welfare of her child by signing without even reading a document she knew was related to the support
case she intended to file. The Affidavit consists of four short sentences contained in a single page. It
is unlikely she was not able to read it before she signed it.
Likewise obscure is her assertion that respondent did not fully explain to her the contents of the
Affidavit and the consequences of signing it. She alleged that respondent even urged her "to use her
head as Arnulfo Aquino will not give the money for Alexandra's medical and educational support if
she will not sign the said Affidavit of Disclaimer."32 If her own allegation is to be believed, it shows
that she was aware of the on-going negotiation with Aquino for the settlement of her claim for which
the latter demanded the execution of the Affidavit. It also goes to show that she was pondering on
whether to sign the same. Furthermore, she does not deny being a college graduate or that she
knows and understands English. The Affidavit is written in short and simple sentences that are
understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is that she signed the Affidavit
voluntarily and without any coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent.
The question remains as to whether his act of preparing and notarizing the Affidavit, a document
disadvantageous to his client, is a violation of the Code. We rule in the negative.
It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after
explaining all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of
pending cases but also of disputes which might otherwise be filed in court. 33 Moreover, there is no
showing that he knew for sure that Aquino is the father of complainant's daughter as paternity
remains to be proven. As complainant voluntarily and intelligently agreed to a settlement with
Aquino, she cannot later blame her counsel when she experiences a change of heart. Besides, the
record is bereft of evidence as to whether respondent also acted as Aquino's counsel in the
settlement of the case. Again, we only have complainant's bare allegations that cannot be
considered evidence.34 Suspicion, no matter how strong, is not enough. In the absence of contrary
evidence, what will prevail is the presumption that the respondent has regularly performed his duty in
accordance with his oath.35
Complainant further charged respondent of misappropriating part of the money given by Aquino to
her daughter. Instead of turning over the whole amount, he allegedly issued to her his personal
check in the amount ofP150,000.00 and pocketed the remaining P58,000.00 in violation of his
fiduciary obligation to her as her counsel.
The IBP did not make any categorical finding on this matter but simply ordered respondent to return
the amount of P58,000.00 to complainant. We feel a discussion is in order.
We note that there is no clear evidence as to how much Aquino actually gave in settlement of
complainant's claim for support. The parties are in agreement that complainant received the amount
of P150,000.00. However, complainant insists that she should have received more as there were two
postdated checks amounting toP58,000.00 that respondent never turned over to her. Respondent
essentially agrees that the amount is in fact more than P150,000.00 but only P38,000.00 more
and complainant said he could have it and he assumed it was for his attorney's fees.
We scrutinized the records and found not a single evidence to prove that there existed two
postdated checks issued by Aquino in the amount of P58,000.00. On the other hand, respondent
admits that there is actually an amount of P38,000.00 but presented no evidence of an agreement
for attorney's fees to justify his presumption that he can keep the same. Curiously, there is on record
a photocopy of a check issued by respondent in favor of complainant for P150,000.00. It was only in
his Motion for Reconsideration where respondent belatedly proffers an explanation. He avers that he
cannot recall what the check was for but he supposes that complainant requested for it as she did
not want to travel all the way to Olongapo City with a huge sum of money.
We find the circumstances rather suspicious but evidence is wanting to sustain a finding in favor of
either party in this respect. We cannot and should not rule on mere conjectures. The IBP relied only
on the written assertions of the parties, apparently finding no need to subject the veracity of the
assertions through the question and answer modality. With the inconclusive state of the evidence, a
more in-depth investigation is called for to ascertain in whose favor the substantial evidence level
tilts. Hence, we are constrained to remand the case to the IBP for further reception of evidence
solely on this aspect.
We also are unable to grant complainant's prayer for respondent to be made liable for the cost of her
child's DNA test absent proof that he misappropriated funds exclusively earmarked for the purpose.
Neither shall we entertain complainant's claim for moral damages and attorney's fees. Suffice it to
state that an administrative case against a lawyer is sui generis, one that is distinct from a civil or a
criminal action.36 It is an investigation by the Court into the fitness of a lawyer to remain in the legal
profession and be allowed the privileges as such. Its primary objective is to protect the Court and the
public from the misconduct of its officers with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise
this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men and women in whom courts
and clients may repose confidence.37 As such, it involves no private interest and affords no redress
for private grievance.38 The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
lawyer's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. 39
Respondent's misconduct is of considerable gravity. There is a string of cases where the Court
meted out the extreme penalty of disbarment on the ground of gross immorality where the
respondent contracted a bigamous marriage,40 abandoned his family to cohabit with his
paramour,41 cohabited with a married woman,42 lured an innocent woman into marriage,43 or was
found to be a womanizer.44 The instant case can be easily differentiated from the foregoing cases.
We, therefore, heed the stern injunction on decreeing disbarment where any lesser penalty, such as
temporary suspension, would accomplish the end desired. 45 In Zaguirre v. Castillo,46respondent was
found to have sired a child with another woman who knew he was married. He therein sought
understanding from the Court pointing out the polygamous nature of men and that the illicit
relationship was a product of mutual lust and desire. Appalled at his reprehensible and amoral
attitude, the Court suspended him indefinitely. However, in Fr. Sinnott v. Judge Barte,47 where
respondent judge consorted with a woman not his wife, but there was no conclusive evidence that
he sired a child with her, he was fined P10,000.00 for his conduct unbecoming a magistrate despite
his retirement during the pendency of the case.
We note that from the very beginning of this case, herein respondent had expressed remorse over
his indiscretion and had in fact ended the brief illicit relationship years ago. We take these as signs
that his is not a character of such severe depravity and thus should be taken as mitigating
circumstances in his favor.48 Considering further that this is his first offense, we believe that a fine
of P15,000.00 would suffice. This, of course, is without prejudice to the outcome of the aspect of this
case involving the alleged misappropriation of funds of the client.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and
impose on him a FINE of P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The charge of misappropriation of funds of the client is REMANDED to the IBP for further
investigation, report and recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt of this Decision.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as an attorney and as a
member of the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.C. No. 6210. December 9, 2004]
vs.
ATTY.
PATRICIO
A.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
[2]
the adverse judgment and asked for the additional amount of P3,850.00 and
another P2,000.00 on September 26, 2000 as allowance for research made.
[3]
per appearance, 1,000 sq. m. of land from the land subject matter of the case,
if they win, or from another piece of property, if they lose. In addition,
complainant also offered to defray the expenses for transportation, meals and
other incidental expenses. Respondent accepted the complainants offer.
Respondent claims that after the trial court dismissed Civil Case No. SCC
2128, he filed a timely notice of appeal and thereafter moved to be discharged
as counsel because he had colon cancer. Complainant, now assisted by one
Johnny Ramos, implored respondent to continue handling the case, with an
offer to double the 1,000 sq. m. piece of land earlier promised and the
remaining balance of P20,000.00 acceptance fee. Johnny Ramos made a
written commitment and gave respondents secretary P2,000.00 of the
P3,850.00 expenses for the preparation of the appellants brief.
On July 18, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a favorable decision
ordering the return of the disputed 2-hectare land to the complainant and his
siblings. The said decision became final and executory on January 18, 2002.
Since then complainant allegedly failed to contact respondent, which
compelled him to send a demand letter on January 29, 2003.
On February 14, 2003, complainant filed a complaint before the IBP
charging his former counsel, respondent Atty. Ngaseo, of violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility for demanding the delivery of 1,000 sq. m.
parcel of land which was the subject of litigation.
In a report dated July 18, 2003, IBP Commissioner Rebecca VillanuevaMaala found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for 1 year.
[4]
On August 30, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.
XVI-2003-47 the full text of which reads:
[5]
laws and rules, with modification, and considering that respondent have violated the
Code of Professional Responsibility for grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming of
a lawyer Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
six (6) months.
On December 11, 2003, respondent filed a petition for review assailing IBP
Resolution No. XVI-2003-47 for having been issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction.
[6]
Respondent argues that he did not violate Article 1491 of the Civil Code
because when he demanded the delivery of the 1,000 sq. m. of land which
was offered and promised to him in lieu of the appearance fees, the case has
been terminated, when the appellate court ordered the return of the 2-hectare
parcel of land to the family of the complainant.
Respondent further contends that he can collect the unpaid appearance
fee even without a written contract on the basis of the principle of quantum
meruit. He claims that his acceptance and appearance fees are reasonable
because a Makati based legal practitioner, would not handle a case for an
acceptance fee of only P20,000.00 and P1,000.00 per court appearance.
Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from
acquiring either by purchase or assignment the property or rights involved
which are the object of the litigation in which they intervene by virtue of their
profession. The prohibition on purchase is all embracing to include not only
sales to private individuals but also public or judicial sales. The rationale
advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in
view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and
confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these persons. It is founded
on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take
advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich
himself at the expense of his client. However, the said prohibition applies only
if the sale or assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of
the litigation involving the clients property. Consequently, where the property is
acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article
1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
[7]
[8]
[9]
Invariably, in all cases where Article 1491 was violated, the illegal
transaction was consummated with the actual transfer of the litigated property
either by purchase or assignment in favor of the prohibited individual.
In Biascan v. Lopez, respondent was found guilty of serious misconduct and
suspended for 6 months from the practice of law when he registered a deed of
assignment in his favor and caused the transfer of title over the part of the
estate despite pendency of Special Proceedings No. 98037 involving the
subject property. In the consolidated administrative cases of Valencia v.
Cabanting, the Court suspended respondent Atty. Arsenio Fer Cabanting for
six (6) months from the practice of law when he purchased his client's
property which was still the subject of a pending certiorari proceeding.
[10]
[11]
SECOND DIVISION
Promulgated:
ATTY. ESTEBAN Y. MENDOZA,
Respondent. January 31, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
Rental
Agreement
No.
97206,[2] which
the
respondent
respondent
rented
another
Toyota
Camry
from
the
complainant on September 28, 2001, this time with Plate No. WRT
557, and was, likewise, fetched at his residence in accordance
with the Rental Agreement No. 97420.[3] This second contract was
also personally signed by the respondent. The statements of
account[4]were, thereafter, sent to the respondent at his office and
business address at Martinez & Mendoza Law Office, Cityland
It
was,
thus,
recommended
that
the
respondent
be
profession.[12] Thus,
lawyers
must
promptly
pay
their
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO,
Complainant,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for
violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
for defying the prohibition against private practice of law while
working as government prosecutor.
The Facts
Ruthie Lim-Santiago (complainant) is the daughter of Alfonso Lim
and Special Administratrix of his estate. [1] Alfonso Lim is a
stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. [2]
Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio (respondent) was the former
Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries,
Inc.[3] until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992.[4]
Taggat Industries, Inc. (Taggat) is a domestic corporation
engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the
government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government
sequestered it sometime in 1986, [5] and its operations ceased in
1997.[6]
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat (Taggat
employees) filed a criminal complaint entitled Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et
al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago, docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 (criminal
complaint).[7] Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who
took over the management and control of Taggat after the death
of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages
without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997.[8]
xxxx
Prosecutor,
this
matter
had
long
been
settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited to
engage in the private practice of law (see Legal and
Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647).
The act of being a legal consultant is a practice of law. To
engage in the practice of law is to do any of those acts
that are characteristic of the legal profession (In re:
David, 93 Phil. 461). It covers any activity, in or out of
court, which required the application of law, legal
principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105
Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111; Cayetano v.
Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).
The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager
and Retained Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as
government prosecutor was labor-related is not a sufficient basis
to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests. A
lawyers immutable duty to a former client does not cover
transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with
the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the
duty to protect the clients interests only on matters that he
previously handled for the former client and not for matters that
arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.
Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of
evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty
of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code.
xxxx
d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross
violation of his oath of office and in his dealings with the public. [54]
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government
employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of
profession is suspension for six months and one day to one year.
[56]
We find this penalty appropriate for respondents violation in
this case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
FIRST DIVISION
TAN TIONG BIO a.k.a. HENRY
TAN,
Complainant,
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
- versus -
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
ATTY. RENATO L. GONZALES,
Respondent.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
documents for our behalf of the President [of Fil-Estate] with buyers [she] had
never (even) met.[5]
Respondent, in his Verified Answer,[6] was less than categorical on the matter
of whether or not complainant and Ms. Bondoc, vis--vis Deed 1108, indeed
appeared before him and attested to the contents and the truth of what are stated in
the deed. Instead, he alleged as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
The respondent parlays in his answer the idea of laches, arguing that the
transaction in question took place in 2001, while complainant initiated the
disbarment charge only in November 2003.
[T]he Deed of Absolute Sale No. 1108 was duly executed by Mr.
Henry Tan and Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc as authorized signatory of
the seller; that the subject document was notarized by respondent as
document no. 367, page no. 74, book no. 8, series of 2001 of his notarial
register; that respondent admits that his notarial appointment covers
Quezon City and that the subject document was notarized in Pasig City,
specifically, at the Renaissance Tower; and that the parties admit that
Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc and Henry Tan Tan were not present at the
same time when the subject document was notarized xxx (Underscoring
added.)
We agree.
For all legal intents and purposes, respondent, by performing through the
years notarial acts in Pasig City where he is not so authorized, has indulged in
deliberate falsehood. By such malpractice as a notary public, respondent likewise
violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs every
lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.
In Zoreta v. Simpliciano,[21] the Court meted the penalty of two (2) years
suspension from law practice on Atty. Simpliciano as well as his permanent
disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for notarizing several
documents after his commission as notary public had already expired.
WHEREFORE,
respondent
Atty.
Renato
L.
Gonzales is PERMANENTLY BARRED from being commissioned as Notary
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land, through
the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and let the Office of the Bar Confidant be notified of this Decision
which is hereby ordered duly recorded in the personal files of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
DOLORES L. DELA CRUZ, A.C. No. 7781
MILAGROS L. PRINCIPE,
NARCISA L. FAUSTINO, Present:
JORGE V. LEGASPI, and
JUANITO V. LEGASPI, QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
Complainants, CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
- versus - BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
ATTY. JOSE R. DIMAANO, JR.,
Respondent. September 12, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In their complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Jose R. Dimaano,
Jr., Dolores L. Dela Cruz, Milagros L. Principe, Narcisa L. Faustino, Jorge V.
Legaspi, and Juanito V. Legaspi alleged that on July 16, 2004, respondent notarized
a document denominated as Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate with Waiver of
Without the appearance of the person who actually executed the document in
question, notaries public would be unable to verify the genuineness of the signature
of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the document is the partys free act
or deed.[3] Furthermore, notaries public are required by the Notarial Law to certify
that the party to the instrument has acknowledged and presented before the notaries
public the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate)
and to enter its number, place, and date of issue as part of certification. [4] Rule II,
Sec. 12 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice[5] now requires a party to the
instrument to present competent evidence of identity. Sec. 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity.The phrase competent evidence of
identity refers to the identification of an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency
bearing the photograph and signature of the individual, such as but not limited to,
passport, drivers license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National
Bureau of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voters
ID, Barangay certification, Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) e-card,
Social Security System (SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seamans book, alien
certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of registration, government office
ID, certificate from the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons
(NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare and Development certification [as
amended by A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC dated February 19, 2008]; or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the
instrument, document or transaction who is personally known to the
notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two
credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document
or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to
the notary public documentary identification.