United Nations S/2010/91

Security Council Distr.: General

10 March 2010

Original: English

Letter dated 10 March 2010 from the Chairman of the Security

Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and
1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the
President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751

(1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and in accordance with
paragraph 3 (j) of Security Council resolution 1853 (2008), I have the honour to
transmit herewith the report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia.
In this connection, the Committee would appreciate it if the present letter,
together with its enclosure, were brought to the attention of the members of the
Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Claude Heller

Chairman
Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992)
and 1907 concerning Somalia and Eritrea

10-24689 (E) 110310

*1024689*
S/2010/91

Letter dated 26 February 2010 from the members of the

Monitoring Group on Somalia addressed to the Chairman
of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 751 (1992)

We have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Monitoring Group
on Somalia in accordance with paragraph 3 (j) of Security Council resolution
1853 (2008).

(Signed) Matt Bryden

Coordinator
Monitoring Group on Somalia
(Signed) Arnaud Laloum
(Signed) Jörg Roofthooft

2 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to

Security Council resolution 1853 (2008)

Contents
Page

Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
A. Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
B. Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
C. Description of the security-related environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
D. Clan dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
E. Description of major actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
II. Acts that threaten the Transitional Federal Government, AMISOM and the peace process . . . 18
A. Attacks on the Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B. Eritrean support to armed opposition groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
C. Diaspora support networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
D. Armed groups and immigration fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
III. Acts of armed criminal groups that threaten peace and security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A. Maritime militias: recent developments, trends and patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
B. Piracy and armed robbery at sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
C. Pirate militias and networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
IV. Other threats to peace and security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A. Puntland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
B. Somaliland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
V. Violations of the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A. Substantive violations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
B. Support to the Somali security sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
C. Non-compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
D. International, regional and subregional organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
E. Private security companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
VI. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
A. Food aid and diversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
B. Kidnapping of aid workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

10-24689 3
S/2010/91

VII. Cooperation with States and organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

VIII. Observations and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
IX. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
A. Threats to peace and security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
B. Violations of the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
C. Piracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
D. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Annexes
I. Arms and ammunition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
II. Weapons, equipment and other items seized from Somali pirates during anti-piracy
operations in 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
III. Piracy business model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
IV. Correspondence with the Government of Eritrea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

4 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Abbreviations

AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia

ARS Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia
ARS-A Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia-Asmara
ASWJ Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IMB International Maritime Bureau
IMO International Maritime Organization
RPG rocket-propelled grenade
UIC Union of Islamic Courts
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNPOS United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UPDF Uganda People’s Defence Forces
WFP World Food Programme

10-24689 5
S/2010/91

Summary
Somalia has undergone significant political change in 2009/10, but the security
situation has remained largely stagnant. The conflict remains a grim example of
“hybrid warfare”: a combination of conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and
formations, as well as indiscriminate violence, coercion, and criminal disorder —
compounded in the Somali case by the interference of regional powers. Somalia’s
frail Transitional Federal Government has struggled ineffectually to contain a
complex insurgency that conflates religious extremism, political and financial
opportunism, and clan interests. Beneath a superficial ideological overlay, armed
opposition groups have essentially degenerated into clan militias, manifesting the
same kind of fluid alliances and fissile tendencies. As a result, southern Somalia
remains a patchwork of fiefdoms controlled by rival armed groups — a political and
security vacuum in which no side is strong enough to impose its will on the others.
Meanwhile, the relatively stable northern regions of Puntland and Somaliland have
suffered increasing spillover from the conflict to the south in the form of targeted
killings and bombings.
The military stalemate is less a reflection of opposition strength than of the
weakness of the Transitional Federal Government. Despite infusions of foreign
training and assistance, government security forces remain ineffective, disorganized
and corrupt — a composite of independent militias loyal to senior government
officials and military officers who profit from the business of war and resist their
integration under a single command. During the course of the mandate, government
forces mounted only one notable offensive and immediately fell back from all the
positions they managed to seize. The government owes its survival to the small
African Union peace support operation, AMISOM, rather than to its own troops.
Clan militias operating under the banner of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a in Galguduud
region proved far more effective than the Transitional Federal Government on the
battlefield, inflicting serious reverses on Al-Shabaab forces.
Opposition forces, though generally better disciplined, organized and motivated
than their government adversaries, lack popular support and are equally susceptible
to internal divisions. Hizbul Islam — a coalition of four clan-based militia groups
under the leadership of Hassan Dahir Aweys — was founded in February 2009 and
had all but disintegrated by the end of the same year. Harakat al-Shabaab
al-Mujahideen (better known as Al-Shabaab) is a sprawling coalition of jihadists,
business interests and clan militias, which has suffered serious internal frictions over
such issues as the role of foreign fighters, the use of suicide bombers and desirability
of political dialogue.
Persistent, low-intensity warfare between these various groups demands a
steady flow of arms, ammunition and military or dual-use equipment. These items
continue to enter Somalia in violation of the general and complete arms embargo
imposed in 1992, at a fairly steady rate. Primary sources of supply remain Yemen
and Ethiopia, although contributions to the Transitional Federal Government from
the United States, Uganda and other parties have also entered Somali arms markets.
Eritrea — once a major sponsor of armed opposition groups — appears to have
scaled down its military assistance while continuing to provide political, diplomatic
and possibly financial support. There has been little overall change in the types of
arms and ammunition entering Somalia, but the Monitoring Group has observed that
small numbers of heavy mortars and wire-guided anti-tank weapons are now
employed by armed opposition groups.

6 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Efforts to restore peace and security to Somalia are critically undermined by a

corrosive war economy that corrupts and enfeebles State institutions. The limited
ability of the Transitional Federal Government to pay its officials and security forces
is handicapped by entrenched corruption at all levels: commanders and troops alike
sell their arms and ammunition — sometimes even to their enemies. Revenues from
Mogadishu port and airport are siphoned off. Some government ministers and
members of parliament abuse their official privileges to engage in large-scale visa
fraud, smuggling illegal migrants to Europe and other destinations, in exchange for
hefty payments.
The most obvious symptom of the war economy is piracy: attacks on shipping
off Somalia increased in 2009, despite the presence of international naval forces
offshore. The increase has been driven in part by the remarkable success rate of
Somali piracy in 2008 (38 per cent of all ships attacked were hijacked), its high
profitability and relatively low risks. But it is also a reflection of the complicity of
senior figures in the Puntland administration. Several candidates in the leadership
contest of January 2009, which saw Abdirahman Faroole accede to the Puntland
presidency, accepted significant campaign contributions from pirate leaders. Several
notorious pirate leaders remain at liberty in Puntland, and senior officials have at
times intervened to secure the liberty of kinsmen detained during the course of
counter-piracy operations. Meanwhile, international counter-piracy operations have
driven some pirate activity back to ungoverned central Somalia.
The war economy is also an impediment to humanitarian assistance efforts.
Some humanitarian resources, notably food aid, have been diverted to military uses.
A handful of Somali contractors for aid agencies have formed a cartel and become
important powerbrokers — some of whom channel their profits — or the aid itself —
directly to armed opposition groups. The Adaani family, one of the three largest
contractors for the World Food Programme in Somalia, has long been a financier of
armed groups, and a close ally of the Hizbul Islam leader. When the Adaani family
failed to secure concessions from the Transitional Federal Government in exchange
for the closure of the private port at Eel Ma’aan — a move that would have deprived
the government of vital revenue — it turned to Hizbul Islam to reopen the facility.
Other members of the business cartel that dominates food aid deliveries in Somalia
have been involved in more subtle, but no less harmful, manipulation of
humanitarian resources.
The international dimensions of the Somali conflict are expanding at an
accelerated pace. All of Somalia’s immediate neighbours — Djibouti, Ethiopia and
Kenya — are militarily involved in the conflict or plan to become involved in the
coming months. A growing number of countries provide military support to the
Transitional Federal Government, with or without the approval of the Security
Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992). Meanwhile,
Shabaab ideologues, activists and fund-raisers function openly among Somali
diaspora communities, where their influence has acquired a disturbing magnitude.
Small but significant numbers of ethnic Somali youth have been inspired to travel to
Somalia as fighters and suicide bombers, or to engage in acts of violence in their
home countries.

10-24689 7
S/2010/91

I. Introduction
A. Mandate

1. In paragraph 3 of its resolution 1853 (2008), the Security Council conferred

the following mandate on the Monitoring Group on Somalia:
(a) To continue the tasks outlined in paragraphs 3 (a) to (c) of resolution
1587 (2005);
(b) To carry out additionally the tasks outlined in paragraphs 23 (a) to (c) of
resolution 1844 (2008);
(c) To continue to investigate, in coordination with relevant international
agencies, all activities, including in the financial, maritime and other sectors, which
generate revenues used to commit arms embargo violations;
(d) To continue to investigate any means of transport, routes, seaports,
airports and other facilities used in connection with arms embargo violations;
(e) To continue refining and updating information on the draft list of those
individuals and entities who violate the measures implemented by Member States in
accordance with resolution 733 (1992) and paragraphs 8 (a) to (c) of resolution 1844
(2008), inside and outside Somalia, and their active supporters, for possible future
measures by the Council, and to present such information to the Committee as and
when the Committee deems appropriate;
(f) To continue making recommendations based on its investigations, on the
previous reports of the Panel of Experts (S/2003/223 and S/2003/1035) appointed
pursuant to resolutions 1425 (2002) and 1474 (2003), and on the previous reports of
the Monitoring Group (S/2004/604, S/2005/153, S/2005/625, S/2006/229, S/2006/913,
S/2007/436, S/2008/274 and S/2008/769) appointed pursuant to resolutions 1519
(2003), 1558 (2004), 1587 (2005), 1630 (2005), 1676 (2006), 1724 (2006), 1766
(2007) and 1811 (2008);
(g) To work closely with the Committee on specific recommendations for
additional measures to improve overall compliance with the arms embargo, as well
as the measures imposed in paragraphs 1, 3 and 7 of resolution 1844 (2008);
(h) To assist in identifying areas where the capacities of States in the region
can be strengthened to facilitate the implementation of the arms embargo, as well as
the measures imposed in paragraphs 1, 3 and 7 of resolution 1844 (2008);
(i) To provide to the Council, through the Committee, a midterm briefing
within six months of its establishment, and to submit progress reports to the
Committee on a monthly basis;
(j) To submit, through the Committee, for consideration by the Council, a
final report covering all the tasks set out above, no later than 15 days prior to the
termination of the mandate of the Monitoring Group.
2. In paragraph 19 of its resolution 1907 (2009), the Security Council decided to
further expand the mandate of the Monitoring Group in the following ways:
(a) To assist the Committee in monitoring the implementation of the
measures imposed in paragraphs 5, 6, 8, 10, 12 and 13 of resolution 1907 (2009),
including by reporting any information on violations;

8 10-24689
 S/2010/91

(b) To consider any information relevant to implementation of paragraphs 16

and 17 of resolution 1907 (2009) that should be brought to the attention of the
Committee;
(c) To include in its reports to the Security Council any information relevant
to the designation by the Committee of the individuals and entities described in
paragraph 15 of resolution 1907 (2009);
(d) To coordinate as appropriate with panels of experts of other sanctions
Committees in pursuit of these tasks.
3. The Monitoring Group was based in Nairobi and comprised the following
experts: Matt Bryden (Canada), regional expert and Coordinator; Gregory Beals
(United States of America), armed groups expert; 1 Arnaud Laloum (France), arms
expert; Charles Lengalenga (Zambia), 2 finance expert; and Jörg Roofthooft
(Belgium), transportation and maritime expert. The Monitoring Group was assisted
by a consultant, Jarat Chopra.
4. The Monitoring Group travelled to Belgium, Djibouti, Ethiopia, France, the
Netherlands, Somalia, Sweden, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States.
5. Pursuant to paragraph 3 (i) of resolution 1853 (2008), the Monitoring Group
kept the Security Council and its Committee established pursuant to resolution 751
(1992) informed, throughout the period of its mandate, of its activities by submitting
monthly progress reports through the United Nations Secretariat and by providing a
midterm briefing to the Committee on 21 October 2009.

B. Methodology

6. The evidentiary standards and verification processes outlined in the Monitoring

Group’s previous reports apply to work conducted during the current mandate. The
Monitoring Group reaffirmed its methodology pursuant to its previous reports
(S/2008/274 and S/2008/769). The methodology used for the current report is as
follows:
(a) Collection of information on events and topics from multiple sources,
where possible;
(b) Collection of information from sources with first-hand knowledge of
events, where possible;
(c) Identifying consistency in patterns of information and comparing existing
knowledge with new information and emerging trends;
(d) Continuously factoring in the expertise and judgement of the relevant
expert of the Group and the collective assessment of the Group with respect to the
credibility of information and the reliability of sources;
(e) Collection of physical, photographic, video and/or documentary evidence
in support of information collected.

__________________
1 Gregory Beals resigned in June 2009.
2 Charles Lengalenga resigned in January 2010.

10-24689 9
S/2010/91

7. Members of the Monitoring Group travelled to Mogadishu, Hargeysa and

Berbera. Organizational and security constraints, including denial of access to
United Nations Humanitarian Air Service flights, prevented more extensive travel
within Somalia.
8. The Monitoring Group made a deliberate and systematic effort to gain access
to those involved in arms embargo violations by way of individuals who have direct
knowledge or know people who have direct knowledge of details of violations.
9. In line with its mandate, the Monitoring Group has striven to meet the highest
evidentiary standards available to a non-judicial body. In the absence of judicial
recourse, it considers as “beyond a reasonable doubt” the information obtained from
or volunteered by at least three credible and independent primary sources, in
addition to expert observations in situ where available. It has used its best
judgement in assessing the relevance of the information collected from primary and
secondary sources before coming to a considered and unanimous view.
10. The Monitoring Group interviewed government officials in the region and,
where relevant, representatives from diplomatic missions, civil society organizations
and aid agencies. Members of the Monitoring Group met with a number of officials
of the Transitional Federal Government, including the Prime Minister, the Ministers
for Foreign Affairs, Defence, International Cooperation and Planning, Environment,
and Gender, the Director General of the National Security Agency, the Head of
Immigration and the Manager of Mogadishu Port. It also contacted numerous key
members of Somali civil society and political and armed groups.

C. Description of the security-related environment

11. In general terms, the Somali conflict in 2009/10 is perhaps best described in
terms of “hybrid warfare”, which is generally defined as a combination of
conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, and terrorist acts as well
as indiscriminate violence, coercion, and criminal disorder. Northern Somalia
(Somaliland and Puntland) remained relatively stable, but suffered increasing
spillover from the conflict in the south, notably in the form of attacks with
improvised explosive devices. In southern Somalia, the Transitional Federal
Government struggled ineffectually to contain a complex insurgency involving
extremists, political opportunists and clan-based militias. Foreign forces played a
role on both sides of the conflict: the Transitional Federal Government owed its
survival mainly to the support and protection of Ugandan and Burundian troops
operating under the umbrella of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 3
while the opposition benefited from the military contributions of non-Somali
fighters, trainers and advisers.
12. In southern Somalia, conflict between the Transitional Federal Government
and a loose coalition of insurgents was at a stalemate for most of 2009. An offensive
in Mogadishu by opposition forces in May and June failed to dislodge the
government, largely thanks to AMISOM protection and external military and
financial support to government forces. A government counteroffensive in July
demonstrated the weakness of opposition forces in the capital, but failed to sustain
its early achievements. In October 2009, Al-Shabaab successfully resisted an
__________________
3 AMISOM is currently operating under the authority of Security Council resolution 1910 (2010).

10 10-24689
 S/2010/91

attempt by local forces to dislodge them from the port town of Kismaayo, and have
since exercised full control over this major logistical hub and source of revenue.
13. Late in 2009, however, the military balance in south-central Somalia appeared
to be shifting against the opposition as Hizbul Islam had ceased to function as an
integrated force, and Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ) forces, bolstered by their
alliance with the Transitional Federal Government, inflicted a series of defeats on
Al-Shabaab in the Galguduud and Hiraan regions. Opposition forces responded to
the stalemate and growing military pressure inside Somalia by invigorating their
support networks outside the country and, in the case of Al-Shabaab, threatening
acts of terrorism against countries they perceived to be aligned with the Transitional
Federal Government.

D. Clan dynamics

14. On one level, the conflict in Somalia represents a struggle between groups
with competing political and ideological agendas. Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam
both profess Salafi versions of Islam, while ASWJ represents a number of Sufi
branches of the Shafi’i school. The Transitional Federal Government accommodates
a range of views from both sides of the spectrum, as do the authorities in Somaliland
and Puntland.
15. On another level, however, the conflict is a product of the clan dynamics that
have shaped the Somali civil war for the past 20 years. Recent fighting in central
Somalia, for example, has pitted an ASWJ alliance of Habar Gidir Ayr, Marehaan
and Dir clan militias against Al-Shabaab militias drawn heavily from the Murosade
and Duduble. In the Hiraan region, the Hawaadle clan east of the Shabelle River
tends to support the government, while the members of the Gaalje’el and
Gugundhaabe on the western bank serve as foot soldiers for Al-Shabaab. In the Juba
Valley, the battle between Al-Shabaab, Raas Kaambooni and Anoole for control of
Kismaayo has been in many respects a continuation of the multidimensional
struggle between Marehaan, Ogaden and Harti (as well as many smaller
communities) that has destabilized the area for two decades.
16. Analysis of these superimposed conflict dynamics is essential to an
understanding of Somalia’s security environment, in particular to the composition of
various armed groups, their leadership, organization, capabilities and alliances.

E. Description of major actors

Transitional Federal Government

17. The Transitional Federal Government controls several official security forces,
namely:
• Somali National Security Force. The total planned strength of this force during
the transitional period is 8,000. In October 2009, with the assistance of the
AMISOM Force Commander, former Somali National Forces units and the
Somali troops trained in Djibouti were reorganized into battalion-size
formations. As at 1 November 2009, approximately 2,900 soldiers were
estimated to be effective and on the government payroll, and it was believed
there were additional fighters who had not yet been registered.

10-24689 11
S/2010/91

• Somali Police Force. The total planned strength for this force during the
transitional period is 10,000.
• National Security Agency. Headed by General Mohamed Sheikh Hassan, the
National Security Agency is responsible for intelligence collection and analysis,
counter-terrorism and immigration functions.
In addition, the Transitional Federal Government is supported by a variety of militia
groups, some of which operate nominally under the authority of the forces listed
above. An international assessment of the security sector late in 2009 estimated that
some 5,000 to 10,000 Government-aligned militias operate in Mogadishu. 4
18. In practice, the majority of government forces are irregular, clan-based, and
characterized by highly personalized command arrangements. Military and police
functions often overlap. The security sector as a whole lacks structure, organization
and a functional chain of command — a problem that an international assessment of
the security sector attributes to “lack of political commitment by leaders within the
Transitional Federal Government or because of poor common command and control
procedures”, as well as lack of resources. The report observes that “the culture,
mentality and behaviour of ‘militias’ remains extant in the Army”. Although
government officials claim that a national security plan is being formulated to
address these challenges, no such plan appeared to exist when the Monitoring Group
concluded its investigations. To date, the Transitional Federal Government has never
managed to deploy regimental or brigade-sized units on the battlefield.
19. The consequences of these deficiencies include an inability of the security
forces of the Transitional Federal Government to take and hold ground, and very
poor public perceptions of their performance by the Somali public. As a result, they
have made few durable military gains during the course of the mandate, and the
front line has remained, in at least one location, only 500 metres from the presidency.

Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a

20. Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a was established in 1991, in the aftermath of the
collapse of the Barre regime, with the support of General Mohamed Farah Aydiid, in
order to counter the growing influence of militant reformist movements like Al-Ittihad
Al-Islami. Until mid-2008, ASWJ was of marginal importance, lacking a political
profile or military wing. In July 2008, however, clashes broke out between ASWJ
and Shabaab militias in a number of locations in central and south-western Somalia
where Al-Shabaab had attempted to ban Sufi religious practices. In December 2008,
with the support of the Transitional Federal Government headed by then Prime
Minister Nur Adde, ASWJ leaders solicited and obtained military support from
Ethiopia, and embarked upon a campaign to expel Al-Shabaab militias from the
central regions. By late 2009, ASWJ had emerged as the largest and most effective
government-aligned fighting force in southern Somalia. The Monitoring Group
estimates the total strength of these disparate forces at approximately 2,000 fighters.
21. Like most other Somali factions, ASWJ is an umbrella for various local militia
groups, including Sufi sects, clan interests, political opportunists and external
agendas. The largest and most effective wing of ASWJ operates in the western
Galguduud region and is anchored mainly in the Habar Gidir Ayr, Dir and Marehaan
__________________
4 The Monitoring Group believes this figure to be too high.

12 10-24689
 S/2010/91

clans of that region. Affiliated groups also operate in the eastern Galguduud and
Middle Shabelle regions (Abgaal Wa’eysle), in Gedo region (Marehaan) and since
late 2009 in Hiraan region (Hawaadle). Some other militia leaders, including some
serving as proxies for Ethiopian influence (such as Barre Aden Shire “Hiiraale” 5
and Yuusuf Ahmed Hagar “Dabageed” 6) have tried to portray themselves as ASWJ
in order to attract greater domestic and international support. Despite attempts to
unify these efforts, ASWJ lacks a unified chain of command and suffers from a lack
of internal cohesion — in part because of bitter disputes over external resources. 7
22. The relationship of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a with the Transitional Federal
Government has been difficult and at times ambiguous. In July 2008, ASWJ leaders
expressed their support for the preliminary Djibouti agreement and, on 21 June
2009, Abdulqaadir Ma’alin Nuur of ASWJ and the Prime Minister of the
Transitional Federal Government, Omar Abdirashid Sharmarke, signed a joined
declaration pledging full cooperation. By late 2009 the agreement had yet to be
implemented in any meaningful way, however, and the relationship between the two
parties was strained. The government’s selective engagement with ASWJ during this
period further complicated the situation. Late in August 2009, for example, having
failed to provide assistance to ASWJ forces in western Galguduud, the Transitional
Federal Government sent military aid to embattled ASWJ fighters from President
Sharif’s own Abgaal clan near Eel Dheer. 8
23. On 30 November 2009, ASWJ and the Transitional Federal Government signed
a more substantive cooperation agreement, underpinned by a written request from
the Transitional Federal Government to the Government of Ethiopia seeking material
support, including arms and ammunition for ASWJ in Galguduud. Although ASWJ
had been receiving military support from Ethiopia since December 2008 in violation
of the United Nations arms embargo on Somalia (see paras. 200-203 below), these
most recent developments appear to indicate that ASWJ may now be considered a
legitimate local security sector institution, acknowledged and supported by the
Transitional Federal Government, and therefore eligible for external assistance.

Armed opposition groups

24. From 2004 to 2008, opposition to the Transitional Federal Government took
the form of a popular and complex insurgency involving a significant cross section
of Somali society opposed to President Abdullahi Yusuf and Ethiopian occupation.
Since the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces and the election of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh
Ahmed as president, popular opposition to the Transitional Federal Government has
largely subsided and armed opposition is now limited essentially to a small number
of militant groups. However, these groups have effectively exploited clan and regional
grievances in order to establish presence and influence throughout much of Somalia.
25. The structure, organization and membership of armed opposition groups are
fluid. They suffer internal tensions and divisions, they lack clearly defined hierarchies,
and the relationships between them fluctuate rapidly and often unpredictably
__________________
5 Monitoring Group interview, 17 September 2009.
6 http://horseedmedia.net/2010/01/dabgeed-waxaan-ahay-guddoomiyaha-ahlu-sunna-ee-hiiraan/
and http://www.hiiraan.com/news/2010/Jan/wararka_maanta10-8570.htm.
7 ASWJ document, 3 January 2010.
8 Shixnad Hub iyo Saanad Militeri oo Ka Degey Degmooyinka Dhuuso mareeb iyo Ceeldheer,
accessed at http://www.raxanreeb.com/?p=17207; also multiple Monitoring Group interviews.

10-24689 13
S/2010/91

between cooperation, competition and even mutual hostility. Defections of fighters

from one militia to another, which are routinely trumpeted by all sides for
propaganda purposes, are a natural product of this constant fusion and fission.
26. The two main foci of opposition are Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen
(commonly known as Al-Shabaab) 9 and Hizbul Islam. 10 Although they have
cooperated closely at times, and some members of both groups seek to unify them,
they pursue separate political and ideological objectives and the relationship
between them has increasingly been characterized by friction and conflict.

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen

27. Al-Shabaab was founded by former members of Al-Iltihad Al-Islami, a militant
group active in Somalia between 1991 and 1997. Elements of Al-Shabaab appear to
have been independently active from approximately 2002, but the group first
acquired a public profile in 2005, when it desecrated a former Italian cemetery in
Mogadishu and established a base there. In 2006, the group emerged as the militant
wing of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). Following the defeat of UIC by
Ethiopian forces in January 2007, Al-Shabaab adopted an increasingly independent
trajectory, rejecting the formation in September 2007 of the Asmara-based Alliance
for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), of which UIC was a member.
28. Despite its former alliance with Sheikh Sharif, Al-Shabaab disapproved of the
Djibouti peace process that reconciled one wing of ARS with the Transitional
Federal Government, and in January 2009 saw Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed elected
president. Al-Shabaab leaders describe President Sharif and the Transitional Federal
Government as “apostates” and have continued to attack them with guerrilla tactics,
improvised explosive devices and targeted killings. Nevertheless, while hardliners
within the organization reject dialogue and compromise, the Monitoring Group
believes that other elements of Al-Shabaab appear to be pragmatic and eligible for
political engagement.
29. Organizationally, Al-Shabaab remains a relatively loose and heterogeneous
organization, serving as an umbrella for self-professed “jihadists”, clan militias,
business interests and foreign fighters. Decision-making in Al-Shabaab is
undertaken by a collective leadership structure, including a shura (council) of key
individuals. Some of the most prominent Shabaab figures are:
• Ahmed Abdi aw Mohamud “Godane” (also known as Mukhtar Abdirahman
abu Zubeyr), senior operational commander, designated supreme leader or
emir in December 2007 11
• Ibrahim Haji Jama Mee’aad “Al-Afghani” (also known as Abubakar
al-Seyli’i), regional governor of Kismaayo administration
• Mukhtar Roobow Ali, spokesman and regional commander (resigned and
replaced by Ali Mohamud Raghe “Dheere” in May 2009)
• Ali Mohamud Raghe also known as Ali Dheere, spokesman (since May 2009)

__________________
9 Mujahideen Youth Movement.
10 Islamic Party.
11 On 9 December 2006, a regional court in Hargeysa (Somaliland) sentenced Godane and Ibrahim
Haji “Al-Afghani” in absentia to 25 years in prison on terrorism-related charges.

14 10-24689
 S/2010/91

• Fu’aad Mohamed Khalaf “Shangole”, regional commander

• Hussein Ali Fidow, chief of political and regional affairs, Mogadishu
• Hassan Yaqub Ali, regional spokesman (Kismaayo)
30. Extremists within Al-Shabaab seek, with limited success, to align the
organization more closely with Al-Qaida. 12 Several of the group’s leaders have
trained or fought overseas, principally in Afghanistan, and have introduced tactics
employed in those conflicts to Somalia. 13 From 2003 to 2006, members of
Al-Shabaab were linked to the murders of several foreign aid workers. Since 2007,
the group has targeted government officials, civil society activists and journalists
with targeted killings, improvised explosive devices and suicide bombings.
31. The tensions between these tendencies of the movement were most clearly in
evidence in December 2009, in the aftermath of the bombing of the Shamo Hotel,
when reports circulated about a fracture within the organization and the formation of
a new wing, named Millat Ibrahim, headed by dissidents opposed to such extreme
and indiscriminate tactics. In the light of subsequent public displays of solidarity by
the group’s leadership, however, the Monitoring Group believes that reports of a
split within Al-Shabaab may be overstated. 14
32. Equally overstated is the importance of foreign fighters in Al-Shabaab ranks.
Although there is no question that several hundred foreigners now fight within or
alongside Al-Shabaab units and provide advice and technical expertise at various
levels within the organization, they do not appear to have made a decisive
contribution to any single engagement in recent months, nor to the overall course of
the conflict.
33. Al-Shabaab military forces include three main categories of fighters:
• A core force comprising fewer than 2,500 Somalis and several hundred foreign
fighters
• A larger number of local clan militias aligned with Al-Shabaab, but not readily
deployable for operations outside their home areas
• Irregular fighters engaged for specific operations on a “pay-as-you-go” basis
34. Al-Shabaab compensates for these relatively small numbers, and the variance
in quality of its forces, with the mobility of its forces and its ability to concentrate
them across considerable distances on short notice and to great effect.

__________________
12 In March 2009, Osama bin Laden released an audio message in support of Al-Shabaab entitled
“Fight on, O Champions of Somalia”. On 20 September 2009, Al-Shabaab distributed a
48-minute propaganda video entitled Labayka Ya Usama (Here I am at Your Service, Usama).
Early in 2010, several Shabaab officials claimed a mutually supportive relationship with Al-
Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula.
13 On 29 February 2008, Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen was designated by the United States
State Department as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act. On 29 August 2009, the Government of Australia also designated
Al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization under division 102 of the Criminal Code.
14 On 1 January 2010, Al-Shabaab conducted a parade at the Maslax barracks in northern
Mogadishu, attended by senior Shabaab leaders Ali Dheere, Mukhtar Roobow and Fu’aad
Shangole, among others, in an apparent show of unity.

10-24689 15
S/2010/91

35. The tactical unit of the core Al-Shabaab force is typically platoon-sized
(30-50 fighters), equipped with cold war-era arms, including assault rifles, PK
general purpose machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and when necessary
B-10 recoilless rifles. Like other Somali militias, Al-Shabaab infantry units may be
accompanied by vehicle-mounted machine guns and light anti-aircraft guns adapted
to a ground support role. Al-Shabaab generally reserves its indirect fire weapons —
mortars — for use in Mogadishu. In addition to threatening Transitional Federal
Government and African Union positions, the use of mortars has proved effective in
provoking retaliatory and often indiscriminate responses from AMISOM forces —
precisely the effect Al-Shabaab hopes to achieve.

Hizbul Islam
36. Virtually since its formation in February 2009, Hizbul Islam has been in a
process of slow but inexorable disintegration. At the moment of its inception, Hizbul
Islam was an alliance of four armed opposition groups:
• Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia — Asmara wing (ARS-A) 15
• Somali Islamic Front (SIF, also known as JABISO) 16
• Raas Kaambooni Forces 17
• Anoole Forces (also known as Al-Furqaan Forces) 18
37. The first chairman of the alliance was Omar Imaan Abdulqaadir, a close ally of
Hassan Dahir Aweys, who was still based in Asmara at the time. When Aweys
himself returned to Somalia in April 2009, he assumed de facto leadership of Hizbul
Islam, and the front launched its first major military operations (see section II.A.
below).
38. Despite its religious and nationalist rhetoric, Hizbul Islam was essentially
structured along clan lines. ARS-A and JABISO militias were drawn mainly from
smaller Hawiye sub-clans with little reputation for military proficiency. Anoole
sought support from among the residual Harti communities in the Juba Valley. The
Raas Kaambooni forces, which were composed almost exclusively from the
Mohamed Subeer sub-clan of the Ogaden, represented the most significant fighting
component of the alliance.
39. In October 2009, Hizbul Islam was thrown into disarray when the Raas
Kaambooni group sought to dislodge Al-Shabaab from Kismaayo. Anoole ultimately
opted for neutrality between the two, while ARS-A and JABISO — who cooperated
with Al-Shabaab in operations against the Transitional Federal Government and
AMISOM in Mogadishu — refused to lend their support to Raas Kaambooni. The
refusal of much of Hassan Dahir Aweys’s sub-clan, the Habar Gidir Ayr, to endorse
his anti-government platform left him considerably isolated and without significant
military forces at his disposal. 19
__________________
15 Isbahaysiga Dib-u-Xoreynta Soomaaliya. ARS was described in the December 2008 report of
the Monitoring Group (S/2008/769).
16 Jabhadda Islamiga Soomaaliyeed. SIF was described in the December 2008 report of the
Monitoring Group (S/2008/769).
17 Mucaskar Raas Kaambooni.
18 Mucaskar Caanoole.
19 Some of Aweys’s own Ayaanle sub-clan of the Habar Gidir Ayr continued to support him, giving
his militia a foothold in parts of Galguduud region and Mataabaan district of Hiraan region.

16 10-24689
 S/2010/91

40. By November 2009, Hizbul Islam had effectively been reduced to two of its
constituent parts: ARS-A and SIF — both of them comprising militias drawn from
the smaller Hawiye sub-clans — and its area of operations confined to Mogadishu,
Afgooye and parts of the Hiraan region.
41. Perceiving Hizbul Islam as an increasingly feeble and unreliable ally, at
meetings near Afgooye in October 2009, Al-Shabaab offered Aweys the option of
either joining Al-Shabaab or surrendering to the Transitional Federal Government.
Aweys chose to remain independent, and by early 2010 Hizbul Islam had become of
only marginal relevance to the broader struggle for power in southern Somalia.

Raas Kaambooni forces

42. The Raas Kambooni forces are a clan militia constituted mainly of fighters
from the Mohamed Subeer sub-clan of the Ogaden. Leaders of this group include
Ahmed Mohamed Islaan “Madoobe”, Ibrahim Shukri and Abdinaasir Seeraar. In
October 2009, a faction of the Raas Kaambooni militia headed by commanders
Mohamed Muhumed Ali “Dulyadeen” (see S/2008/769), Abdiqani Mohamed Yusuf
“Kaboje’el” and Isse Kaambooni split with the main force and aligned itself with
Al-Shabaab in Kismaayo. Early in February 2010, led by Hizbul Islam Deputy
Chairman Hassan Abdillahi Hirsi “Turki”, this Raas Kaambooni splinter group
declared it had merged with Al-Shabaab.
43. Raas Kaambooni forces under Ahmed Madoobe’s leadership were
overmatched by Al-Shabaab and its local allies in November 2009, but withdrew in
relatively good order and remain a viable fighting force. They seem likely to
re-emerge in the context of broader Ogaden initiatives to recover control of the
Lower Juba region from Al-Shabaab.

Anoole forces/Al-Furqaan forces

44. Anoole forces are also a clan militia composed of fighters from the Harti
sub-group of the Daarood (Majeerteen/Warsengeli/Dhulbahante), who are often
referred to in the Juba Valley as “Harti Waamo”. The Anoole militia is headed by
Mohamed Mire, a member of the Edegfa’le sub-clan of Majeerteen.
45. Although small in comparison with other militia groups in the region, the
group’s military training camp at Laagta Anoole (Anole estuary) continues to
produce more fighters. Al-Furqaan training camp was founded in October 2007 and
is located between the villages of Buulo Xaaji and Qudhaa, 110 km from Kismaayo.
Anoole forces also control a number of islands and villages in the Lower Juba
region.

United Western Somali Liberation Front

46. An outgrowth of the Ogaden chapter of Al-Ittihad Al-Islami, the United
Western Somali Liberation Front operates mainly in Ethiopia, where it opposes the
current government and seeks to establish an Islamic authority over the Ethiopian
Somali region. Led by Ibrahim Sheikh Muhumed and composed almost exclusively
of fighters from the Ogaden clan, the organization held its Central Committee

10-24689 17
S/2010/91

meeting of March 2009 at an undisclosed location inside Somalia (probably in the

Lower Juba region, under the auspices of Hassan Turki). 20
47. In addition to the better-known Somali factions, the Monitoring Group has
learned that a small number of fighters from the United Western Somali Liberation
Front headed by a commander named Mohamed Arab Hiirey may also be fighting
against the Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu, under the umbrella of
Hizbul Islam.
48. Like other Somali factions, the United Western Somali Liberation Front is
supported by activists in large Somali diaspora communities, including Kenya. The
Monitoring Group has received information indicating that some senior leaders of
the Front may have travelled to and from Nairobi during the course of the mandate.

II. Acts that threaten the Transitional Federal Government,

AMISOM and the peace process
49. Security Council resolution 1844 (2008) underlines three principal threats to
peace and security in Somalia, specifically acts that threaten the Transitional Federal
Government, AMISOM or the Djibouti peace agreement of August 2008 by force. In
this context, both Al-Shabaab and the short-lived alliance known as Hizbul Islam
have committed the most serious violations, conducting sustained military
operations against both the Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM.
50. The Monitoring Group has also investigated a range of other threats to peace
and security not specifically identified by resolution 1844 (2008). These include the
actions of armed criminal groups, such as maritime militias engaged in piracy and
armed robbery at sea, and acts intended to destabilize stable regions of Somalia.
Monitoring Group investigations have encompassed not only the perpetrators of
such acts, but also their financiers, facilitators and active supporters, both inside and
outside Somalia.

A. Attacks on the Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM

51. Throughout the period of the Group’s mandate, the most serious military
threats to the Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM forces were posed by
Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. Both Al-Shabaab and ARS-A publicly rejected the
election of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as President of the Transitional Federal
Government and have since mounted sustained operations against government and
AMISOM positions. Al-Shabaab also employed targeted killings, improvised
explosive devices and suicide bombings. Although Hizbul Islam leaders
occasionally endorsed such tactics, it is unclear whether they were actually
employed by the organization.
52. The formation of Hizbul Islam in February 2009 signalled an escalation in the
opposition’s military efforts. Hizbul Islam was intended to provide a platform for
the return of Hassan Dahir Aweys from Eritrea, where he had been based for more
than one year, and to reinvigorate military opposition to the Transitional Federal
Government. Aweys flew from Asmara to Mogadishu on 23 April and assumed the
__________________
20 Ahmed Nasir Nashaad was elected as Chairman of the Central Committee.

18 10-24689
 S/2010/91

de facto leadership of Hizbul Islam. 21 One week later, two consignments of arms
and ammunition were reportedly delivered from Asmara by air to opposition forces
via Bale Dogle airport west of Mogadishu. 22 During the second week of May,
Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam jointly launched their most vigorous military
operation of 2009.
53. The joint Hizbul Islam-Al-Shabaab offensive of May 2009 initially threatened
to unseat the Transitional Federal Government, which survived defeat largely thanks
to AMISOM protection and deliveries of arms and ammunition from the United
States Government. 23 A government counteroffensive in July, backed by AMISOM,
briefly achieved control of Mogadishu, but government forces failed to consolidate
their gains and the capital reverted to the status quo ante, with opposition forces
roughly 500 m from the presidency. There has been no decisive engagement since
and the military situation has remained a stalemate.

Case study 1
Capital Airlines
On Sunday, 19 April 2009, an unknown Somali man representing
an unregistered company walked into the offices of Captain Himat
Vaghela, Managing Director of Capital Airlines Limited, a Kenyan airline
company based at Wilson airport in Nairobi. The man wanted to enquire
about chartering a flight to collect seven businessmen from Asmara, in
time to catch a connecting flight from Nairobi to Mogadishu with African
Express Airways on 22 April.
The following day, as agreed, the anonymous Somali returned to
Capital’s offices with US$ 25,500 to pay for the flight. Although Vaghela
did not know the individual and claimed that the man had not been
referred to him by anyone he knew, he accepted the money without
signature of any contract and retained for his records no identifying
information about his new client — not even a name or telephone
number. The only record of the transaction was a receipt with an
indecipherable signature on behalf of “Farah Trading and Transport”.
On Tuesday, 21 April 2009, Capital dispatched a Beech/Raytheon
200 (1300 Super King) with registration number 5Y-JAI to pick up its
passengers from Eritrea. Upon arrival in Asmara, the pilots both claim
they were informed by the airport authorities that a fuel shortage made
refuelling impossible, and that a “Notice to Airmen” had been issued to
that effect.a Despite this information, they immediately filed a departure
flight plan indicating a fuel endurance of 5.5 hours for the return trip —
the maximum endurance of the aircraft when fully fuelled. Before
moving to their hotel, the pilots were required to leave their passports
with Eritrean immigration officials.

__________________
21 Various media reports placed this flight on 22 April, but Monitoring Group investigations
indicate 23 April.
22 These deliveries were widely reported in the media and confirmed by reliable intelligence
sources, but the Monitoring Group has been unable to obtain definitive, independent verification
of these flights.
23 Letters from the United States Government to the Somalia sanctions Committee dated 26 May
and 19 June 2009 seeking exemptions from the arms embargo.

10-24689 19
S/2010/91

At their Asmara hotel, the pilots informed their Somali clients that
a direct return trip to Nairobi would not be possible and that they would
have to stop in Djibouti to refuel. The Somali clients categorically
rejected this proposal, and instead demanded to be flown directly to
Mogadishu. Two Eritreans, one of whom worked for the Eritrean Civil
Aviation Authority and possessed a copy of the flight plan that the
Captain had filed on arrival in Asmara, participated in these discussions.
The change of plan implied a delayed departure and additional costs,
which necessitated consultations with Captain Vaghela in Nairobi.
Moreover, given Asmara’s aviation fuel shortage, it must have been
unclear how the aircraft could avoid a stopover in Djibouti. Nevertheless,
without receiving any immediate compensation, Capital assented to the
new flight plan.
The fuel shortage was overcome the following day with the
assistance of the Asmara airport authorities, who arranged for the pilots
and their clients to enter the airport through a special access route. Early
the following morning in the Asmara Palace Hotel, one of the Somali
clients handed the flight crew their passports, and the group was ready to
depart.
On Thursday 23 April at approximately 3.30 a.m., the aircraft left
Asmara airport and flew directly to Mogadishu, K50 airstrip. On board
were five Somali passengers, including Hassan Dahir Aweys and his
close associate Omar Shukri. On its arrival at K50 airstrip, the aircraft’s
passengers were met by a reception committee of Hizbul Islam leaders
and fighters with several Land Cruisers. Just weeks later, Hizbul Islam,
now under the de facto leadership of Aweys, joined forces with Al-
Shabaab in the most aggressive offensive of 2009 against Transitional
Federal Government and African Union forces.
According to Captain Vaghela, Capital never succeeded in
recovering its additional costs — somewhere in the region of $5,000 —
for the mission. The mystery client had simply disappeared and Vaghela
had no name, no telephone number, no contract, and no other record of
the flight through which to track him down. Monitoring Group attempts
to identify Farah Trading and Transport led to a post office box with
multiple clients, including an apparently fictitious motor company
serving as cover for an online child pornography ring.
Multiple requests for cooperation on this issue from the Kenyan
authorities met with no response. Likewise, African Express Airlines
failed to comply with Monitoring Group requests for bookings and
passenger lists, which would have permitted the Monitoring Group to
verify some of the information received.

20 10-24689
 S/2010/91

The Capital Airlines episode is illustrative of several key issues: the

importance of Aweys’s personal leadership in armed opposition to the
Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM; Eritrea’s direct and
overt support for his return and the subsequent reinvigoration of Hizbul
Islam in preparation for its offensive of May 2009; and the degree to
which weak regulatory frameworks in some States of the region — in this
case Kenya — enable sanctions-busting behaviour of the kind Capital
Airlines engaged in.
a
Neither pilot had prior knowledge of such a notice, and ICAO subsequently
confirmed to the Monitoring Group that none had been issued.

B. Eritrean support to armed opposition groups

54. On 15 May 2009, by a presidential statement, the Security Council expressed

concern at reports that Eritrea was providing arms to Somali opposition groups and
called on the Monitoring Group to investigate. On 23 December 2009, the Council,
by resolution 1907 (2009), expanded the mandate of the Monitoring Group and,
inter alia, demanded that all Member States, in particular Eritrea, cease arming,
training, and equipping armed groups and their members including Al-Shabaab, that
aim to destabilize the region. The Monitoring Group has therefore given special
attention to this issue and, in the course of its mandate, made multiple requests to
visit Eritrea, none of which met with the consent of the Government of Eritrea. 24
55. On the basis of its investigations, it is the opinion of the Monitoring Group
that the Government of Eritrea has continued to provide political, diplomatic,
financial and — allegedly — military assistance to armed opposition groups in
Somalia during the course of the mandate, in violation of resolution 1844 (2008).
By late 2009, possibly in response to international pressure, the scale and nature of
Eritrean support had either diminished or become less visible, but had not altogether
ceased.
56. Moreover, the Monitoring Group is aware of past Eritrean support to
non-Somali armed opposition groups in the Horn of Africa, including (but not
limited to) the Oromo Liberation Front, the Ogaden National Liberation Front and
the United Western Somali Liberation Front. Under the provisions of resolution
1907 (2009), paragraphs 15 (b) and (d), such activities are now prohibited.

Eritrean policy towards Somalia

57. Eritrean engagement in Somalia can be understood only in terms of Asmara’s
broader regional policies, most importantly its continuing dispute with Ethiopia.
Since the cessation of hostilities between the two countries in 2000, Asmara has
sought to counter Ethiopian influence in the region and supported armed groups
within Ethiopia who oppose the current government. Since 2006, and possibly
earlier, Eritrea has supported opposition to the Transitional Federal Government,
which it perceives as a proxy for the Government of Ethiopia.
__________________
24 For correspondence between the Monitoring Group and the Government of Eritrea, see
annex IV.

10-24689 21
S/2010/91

58. In this context, it has been the stated policy of the Government of Eritrea to
oppose the Djibouti agreement of 18 August 2008, deny the legality and legitimacy
of the Transitional Federal Government established pursuant to that process, and call
for the expulsion of the AMISOM forces based in Mogadishu. In support of this
policy, the Government of Eritrea has provided significant and sustained political,
financial and material support, including arms, ammunition and training to armed
opposition groups in Somalia since at least 2007.
59. The Government of Eritrea acknowledges that it does not recognize the
Transitional Federal Government, but denies supporting “one party against another
regarding the Somali issue”. 25 This position contradicts previous statements of the
Government of Eritrea that portray the Transitional Federal Government as illegal,
illegitimate and externally imposed, 26 while describing Asmara’s support to Somali
armed opposition groups as a “legal right and moral obligation”. 27 Late in May
2009, during Al-Shabaab’s and Hizbul Islam’s most significant offensive against the
Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM, ARS-Asmara leader Hassan Dahir
Aweys expressed his gratitude to Eritrea: “Eritrea supports us and Ethiopia is our
enemy — we once helped both countries but Ethiopia did not reward us”. 28

Political support
60. During the course of 2007, the Government of Eritrea sponsored the
establishment of ARS as an opposition movement. 29 According to ARS officials
present in Asmara at the time, and who participated in these events, senior
government officials — notably the Minister of Information, Ali Abdou, the head of
political affairs for the ruling People’s Front for Democracy and Justice, Yemane
Ghebreab, and a senior military intelligence officer known as Te’ame 30 — played a
direct role in decisions concerning key ARS appointments. In particular the
Government of Eritrea insisted on several key ARS appointments, namely that Yusuf
Indha’adde become Secretary of Defence (or Military Affairs); that Yusuf Hassan
Ibrahim “Dheeg” become Foreign Secretary, and that Abdifatah Mohamed Ali
become Finance Secretary. ARS leaders resisted these appointments in discussions
with senior government officials, but were overruled. In effect, the senior military
commander for the ARS-Asmara wing, Yusuf Indha’adde, was appointed on
instructions issued by the Government of Eritrea.
61. Between November 2007 and April 2009, Eritrea hosted the senior leadership
of ARS (later the ARS-Asmara faction), including Hassan Dahir Aweys, while its
forces conducted repeated attacks on the Transitional Federal Government and
AMISOM. Since the Somali passport is not considered valid for travel to most
countries, the Government of Eritrea provided Eritrean passports to ARS leaders, as
__________________
25 From Shabait.com (25 November 2009), the website of the Eritrean Ministry of Information,
accessed at http://www.shabait.com/news/.
26 For example, see Government of Eritrea press releases of 24 February, 22 April, 14 May,
26 June and 10 July 2009, and a 20 May 2009 interview with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki
by Shabelle.net.
27 Statement by President Isaias Afwerki to the Asmara Conference on the Reconstitution of
Somalia, as disseminated by the Government of Eritrea Ministry of Information, 12 May 2009.
28 Interview with Reuters, 22 May 2009.
29 Delegates received US$ 60 each from the Government of Eritrea in addition to free
accommodation.
30 Also known as Te’ame Mekelle or Meqelle, believed to be a Colonel or Brigadier General.

22 10-24689
 S/2010/91

well as at least one senior Al-Shabaab leader, Mukhtar Roobow. 31 Following the
split in ARS and formation of the new Transitional Federal Government
administration headed by Sharif Sheikh Ahmed on 31 January 2009, Eritrea
continued to host and support ARS-Asmara headed by Hassan Dahir Aweys, and
subsequently facilitated the formation of a new opposition alliance, Hizbul Islam
(see case study 1, in section II.A above).

Financial support
62. In addition to military support, the Government of Eritrea has consistently
provided financial support to Somali armed opposition groups, including ARS-
Asmara, Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab. Provision of cash permits armed opposition
groups to purchase weapons from government forces, thereby arming themselves
while disarming their adversaries. 32
63. Following the formation of ARS in September 2007, the Government of
Eritrea directed financial support principally via ARS. However, according to ARS
officials, during the course of 2008, Eritrea established direct links with other
opposition groups, including Al-Shabaab and the Raas Kaambooni forces. Colonel
Te’ame told ARS officials: “We have experience of this kind of struggle and we
must have direct relationships with groups in each region”. According to these same
sources, payments to each group are in the order of $40,000-$50,000 per month,
plus additional funds for large-scale operations. During the course of 2009, the
Monitoring Group learned of Government of Eritrea cash contributions to the
following opposition figures:
• Yusuf Mohamed Siyaad “Indha’adde” (ARS-Asmara, central regions,
subsequently joined the Transitional Federal Government as Minister of State
for Defence) 33
• Issa “Kaambooni” (Raas Kaambooni forces, Lower Juba region, arrested in
Kenya late in 2009)
• Mukhtar Roobow (Al-Shabaab, Bay and Bakool regions)
• Mohamed Wali Sheikh Ahmed Nuur (Hizbul Islam, Gedo region)
64. Cash transfers are usually undertaken by Eritrean diplomats or intelligence
officials, often in foreign countries. Intelligence officials of the Transitional Federal
Government informed the Monitoring Group that they had arrested a German
national acting as a cash courier for the Government of Eritrea as he arrived at
Mogadishu International Airport in July 2009. The Monitoring Group has received
numerous mutually corroborating reports from credible Somali sources and foreign
__________________
31 According to the United States Government, Roobow was issued Eritrean passport No. 0310857
on 21 August 2006 (United States Department of the Treasury press release HP-1283, “Treasury
Targets Somali Terrorists”, 20 November 2008, accessed at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
hp1283.htm).
32 See December 2008 Monitoring Group report (S/2008/769) and Amnesty International,
“Somalia: International Military and Policing Assistance Should Be Reviewed”, January 2010.
33 According to African Union officials, when Indha’adde joined the Transitional Federal
Government he was in possession of documentation describing cash transfers from Eritrea to
individual Somali armed opposition leaders which are currently in the possession of the
Transitional Federal Government. The Monitoring Group was unable to inspect these
documents.

10-24689 23
S/2010/91

intelligence agencies identifying several Eritrean officials engaged in such

transactions. Payments are delivered either directly to representatives of Somali
armed groups (in Eritrea or in Somalia) or transferred via hawalas (money transfer
companies) or Somali businessmen to field commanders.
65. Cash for opposition groups is also funnelled via Eritrean embassies in Kenya,
Djibouti and Dubai. These monthly payments typically consist of from $40,000 to
$60,000 to each group, plus additional funds for specific operations. An estimated
$1.6 million of such funding may have passed through Kenya alone in 2008. In
September 2008, one such courier (an Eritrean government official) travelled from
Kenya by land to a location in the Lower Juba region, where he handed over an
estimated $60,000 to a senior official of the Raas Kaambooni forces.
66. On 23 April 2009, the Government of Eritrea facilitated the return of Hassan
Dahir Aweys to Somalia in order that he assume the leadership of Hizbul Islam.
Aweys and four other individuals travelled from Asmara to Mogadishu, landing at
K50 airport south-west of the city, where they were met by other Hizbul Islam
leaders and supporters. Aweys left Asmara in possession of an estimated $200,000,
which he subsequently distributed to various Hizbul Islam leaders.
67. The Monitoring Group has received credible information indicating that
Eritrea continues to send arms to Somalia in small vessels via the northern Somali
port of Laasqoray for onward shipment to Shabaab forces in southern Somalia by
Mohamed Sa’iid Atom (see section IV.A below). In May 2009, Eritrea allegedly sent
Ukrainian-made small arms and anti-tank weapons to Hizbul Islam via the port of
Kismaayo.
68. In August 2009, the Kenyan authorities acknowledged that they had expelled
two Eritreans, one of them a diplomat named Negash, on security grounds. Negash
reportedly entered Kenya through a land border, then travelled overland to Somalia
where he met with leaders of both Hizbul Islam/Raas Kaambooni forces and
Al-Shabaab. In justifying the expulsion, a Kenyan Government minister also made
reference to a suicide bomb attack in June 2009 that killed a minister of the
Transitional Federal Government and a former Somali ambassador to Ethiopia,
claiming that the material used for the bomb was supplied by an Eritrean
diplomat. 34

Training
69. Eritrea has maintained training facilities for members of Somali armed
opposition groups since at least 2006, and has at times deployed trainers and/or
military advisers to assist armed opposition groups inside Somalia. Eritrea also
maintains training camps for members of Ethiopian opposition groups, which is
prohibited by resolution 1907 (2009).
70. Multiple Somali and international sources have described to the Monitoring
Group training facilities for ARS fighters near Assab, in eastern Eritrea. In May
2008, when ARS split into two wings, the Government of Eritrea moved nearly two
thirds of its training activities to another camp near Teseney to the west.
Consignments of weapons and ammunitions destined for Somalia were smuggled

__________________
34 Electronic communication, 12 December 2009. The Monitoring Group has not been able to
independently verify this claim.

24 10-24689
 S/2010/91

overland via eastern Ethiopia. Ethiopian soldiers reportedly captured some of the
arms and ammunition near the border.

C. Diaspora support networks

71. The distinction between Somali residents and diaspora communities is
exceptionally blurred. Many Somalis living abroad retain such strong links to their
homeland that they are essentially “binational”, travelling regularly and remaining
active in social or political issues in Somalia. Many Somali Cabinet ministers and
members of parliament hold foreign passports. Several key Shabaab and Hizbul
Islam leaders, as well as a growing number of their foot soldiers, have lived abroad
and retain active linkages to their host countries.
72. Support within the Somali diaspora for armed opposition groups reached its
peak under Ethiopian occupation and has declined considerably since Sheikh Sharif
was elected president. But residual networks, including die-hard extremists with
transnational links, continue to fuel the insurgency. These networks of sympathizers
and activists mobilize political and financial support, serve as forums for
recruitment, and provide advice to prospective recruits and fighters. The importance
of these networks has received unprecedented international attention in the past
18 months, owing to a small number of high-profile terrorism cases, but they are
much broader, better established and serve more purposes than this handful of cases
would suggest.

Kenya
73. Kenya hosts one of the largest Somali communities outside Somalia, although
precise numbers are impossible to determine — in part because of the difficulty in
distinguishing between Kenyan Somalis and long-term refugees or migrants from
Somalia. Kenya’s weak citizenship registration system compounds the problem,
since it is as likely to deny documents to genuine Kenyan Somalis as it is to provide
documents to non-Kenyan Somalis in exchange for bribes or influence.
74. Kenya’s large Somali community, its proximity to Somalia and the notoriously
porous border between the two countries all contribute to Kenya’s emergence as a
major base of support for Somali armed opposition groups. Members of Shabaab
and Hizbul Islam travel with relative freedom to and from Nairobi, where they raise
funds, engage in recruitment and obtain treatment for wounded fighters. A key pillar
of this support network is a community of wealthy clerics-cum-businessmen, linked
to a small number of religious centres notorious for their links to radicalism —
notably the Abubakar as-Saddique mosque on 6th street, the Al-Hidaya mosque,
Beit-ul-Mal Madrassa and the Masjid-ul-Axmar in Nairobi. The networks organized
around these institutions have long provided both ideological leadership and a
resource base for Somali militants.
75. The current imam of Abubakar as-Saddique mosque is Sheikh Mohamed Abdi
Omar “Umal”. Umal, a longstanding associate of Mohamed Sheikh Osman, 35 is an
Ethiopian-born cleric and businessman who served as a vigorous advocate of the
__________________
35 Mohamed Sheikh Osman was formerly the United Kingdom-based spokesman for Al-Ittihad
Al-Islami and is currently an emissary for Hizbul Islam leader Hassan Dahir Aweys. Other
Kenyan-based founders, including Adan Garweyne and “Boqolsoon”, were killed in Somalia
fighting for Al-Ittihad Al-Islami in the early 1990s. Operating out of an Eastleigh mosque, they
engaged in regular fund-raising drives for their cause.

10-24689 25
S/2010/91

Union of Islamic Courts in 2006-2007. When UIC split in 2008 over the Djibouti
peace process, Umal stridently opposed the peace talks, and subsequently rejected
Sheikh Sharif’s election as President of the Transitional Federal Government in
January 2009. His opposition to the Transitional Federal Government also involved
community mobilization and fund-raising. The Monitoring Group has received
credible, detailed and specific information concerning Umal’s participation early in
2009 in meetings with representatives of armed groups from Somalia, together with
prominent members of the Eastleigh business community, in order to discuss
logistical issues and raise funds for the armed struggle.
76. Under the spotlight of Kenyan and international media attention, however, in
mid-2009 Umal began to change his tone and has ostensibly become an advocate of
the Transitional Federal Government. In January 2010, he took a step further and
denounced the takfiri practice of designating other Muslims as apostates in order to
justify spilling their blood, posing a direct challenge to Al-Shabaab. 36
77. Other radical figures have since succeeded Umal as advocates and ideologues
of jihad — notably Umal’s nephew and protege, Hassan Mahad Omar — better
known to his audience as Sheikh Hassaan Hussein Adam and to his followers in
Al-Shabaab as Abu Salmaan. Hassaan and his associates at the informal religious
centre known as Masjid-ul-Axmar are not simply sympathizers of Al-Shabaab, but
actually key figures in their outreach efforts to recruit new members and solicit
funds. Hassaan’s approach to fund-raising is remarkably aggressive: in a sermon on
4 February 2008, he stated:
Funding the Jihad is an individual duty for every Muslim. If you cannot
physically join the Jihad, then it is mandatory that you finance it. The small
amounts of money collected from you for the Jihad are not donations for
charity but an individual duty incumbent upon you. It is mandatory unlike the
funds of alms collected for the Mujahidin. If the funds of alms for the
Mujahidin become insufficient, then it is permitted to forcefully collect more
funds. It is also permitted to shoot any obstructionist with five bullets. 37
78. In April 2009, Hassaan headed a list of clerics invited to participate at an
Internet discussion promoted by the Al-Shabaab-affiliated website alqimmah.net and
the Dacwatutawxiid online forum; the discussion also headlined Shabaab leaders
Mukhtar Roobow and Fu’aad Shangole, as well as Hizbul Islam leaders Omar Imaan
Abubakar and Abdullahi Ali Hashi. 38

Case study 2
Masjid-ul-Axmar (The Red Mosque)
Masjid-ul-Axmar (The Red Mosque) is a small, informal centre
near Al-Hidaya mosque in Eastleigh, Nairobi. The leaders of Masjid-ul-
Axmar actively engage in propaganda, fund-raising and recruitment on
behalf of Al-Shabaab, together with known Shabaab leaders. The
Monitoring Group has also received information that Shabaab leaders
from Mogadishu were hosted by the leaders of this group on several
occasions in 2009.

__________________
36 http://www.halgan.net/view_article.php?articleid=13012.
37 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YO32tllVTpM&feature=related.
38 http://www.alqimmah.net/archive/index.php?t-4742.html.

26 10-24689
 S/2010/91

One of the key leaders of the centre is Sheikh Hassaan Hussein, a 31-
year-old cleric believed by the Government of Kenya to have obtained
Kenyan nationality under false pretences. Hassaan vociferously opposed
the Djibouti peace talks, denouncing participants as apostates.a
On 12 February 2009, following the signature of the Djibouti peace
agreement and the election of Sheikh Sharif to the presidency, Hassaan
issued a religious ruling (fatwa), calling for attacks on the newly
constituted Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM troops. The
ruling was initially posted in a Shabaab chat room on 17 February 2009,
and subsequently to the Al-Shabaab-affiliated website, alqimmah.net.
In March 2009, Al-Shabaab leaders were deeply divided over the
actions of Mukhtar Roobow in the Bay and Bakool regions. When
Al-Shabaab had taken control of the Bay and Bakool regions two months
earlier, they had also managed to capture Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade, a
member of the Transitional Federal Government parliament and a
member of the Mirifle/Leysaan sub-clan, like Roobow. Whereas
Al-Shabaab’s top leadership called for Habsade to be beheaded publicly,
Roobow released him and allowed him to depart unharmed. Moreover,
Roobow ignored appointments of regional government officials by the
Al-Shabaab leadership, and named loyalists of his own to these posts.
Some Shabaab leaders sought Roobow’s dismissal and military action
against him but, late in February, the group reached a common decision
to dispatch a five-member team to meet with Sheikh Hassaan Hussein in
Nairobi.
Hassaan ruled that Roobow’s decision to release Habsade was
correct to the extent that it prevents more serious dissension and strife
between the Rahanweyne clan and the Mujahideen. In so doing, he was
revealed to be not only an ideological leader of Al-Shabaab, but also one
with direct engagement in their internal political and operational
decisions.
Another key leader of Masjid-ul-Axmar is Mohamed Ma’alin
Nahar, brother of the late Shabaab commander known as Abu Uteyba,
who travels freely between Nairobi and Mogadishu. Nahar regularly
engages in joint online forums with their counterparts at the Markaz-al-
Salahudiin, the principal Shabaab recruiting and training centre in
Mogadishu.
One such session audited by the Monitoring Group raised $20,000,
to be remitted to a bank account in the United Arab Emirates. One
particularly generous donor was rewarded with a promise that the next
suicide bomber in Somalia would pray for her before going to his death.
During other sessions, held in the aftermath of the twin suicide bombings
of the AMISOM forces headquarters on 17 September 2009, Nahar kept
listeners informed of the casualty toll and thanked them for their
contributions to the struggle.
a
http://www.xog-waran.com/xog-waran02Juley2009Gothenburg.html.

10-24689 27
S/2010/91

European connections
79. Early in July 2009, Hassaan visited another hub of opposition support activity,
Sweden, where he attended the seventeenth Somali Islamic Convention hosted by
the Bellevue mosque in Gothenburg. Hassaan’s participation triggered
demonstrations by Somalis in Sweden opposed to Al-Shabaab, but was defended by
the mosque administration and conference organizers. 39
80. Another high-profile participant at the Somali Islamic Convention was Yasiin
Baynah, Secretary-General of ARS-Asmara and a founding member of Hizbul
Islam. Baynah and Omar Shukri, a close aide to Hassan Dahir Aweys, were among a
group of Somalis arrested by the Swedish authorities in February 2008 on charges of
terrorism financing, but subsequently released for lack of evidence. Baynah and
Shukri both returned to Somalia where they played key roles in the establishment of
Hizbul Islam. 40 Late in April 2009, Shukri reappeared in the company of Hassan
Dahir Aweys whom he accompanied on his return trip from Asmara to Mogadishu
(case study 1, in section II.A above). 41 Meanwhile, Baynah continued to operate a
successful travel agency in Stockholm specializing in transporting pilgrims to
Mecca for the annual Hajj, but late in 2009 he was convicted by a Stockholm district
court on charges of tax evasion, linked to the operation of an underground money
transfer service.
81. The Monitoring Group has also learned that Hizbul Islam leaders, including
Baynah, engaged in fund-raising for armed opposition groups on the sidelines of the
Gothenburg conference. Likewise, on the sidelines of the first Somali Islamic
Convention in Belgium on 27 and 28 June 2009, Hizbul Islam supporters organized
a fund-raising drive, which collected over €25,000 for the organization.

Internet activism
82. The Internet continues to play an important role in propaganda, recruiting and
fund-raising by Somali armed groups (see S/2008/769). The Monitoring Group has
continued to watch and investigate some of the most salient websites and forums,
which include:
Al-Shabaab 42 alqimmah.net
somalimemo.com
ansarnet.info
halganka.wordpress.com
dacwatutawxiid.wordpress.com
youtube.com/user/QolkaDacwatuTawxiid

__________________
39 See, for example, “Gothenburg: Xasaan Xuseen speaks at ‘Islam and peace’ conference”
(http://islamineurope.blogspot.com/2009/07/gothenburg-xasaan-xuseen-speaks-at.html).
40 Both Baynah and Shukri possess Swedish travel documents.
41 Shukri reportedly still travels freely between Somalia and Sweden.
42 Websites cited in the December 2008 Monitoring Group report (S/2008/769) that have since
become dormant or defunct include kataaib.net, baraawecity.wordpress.com and
abushabaab.wordpress.com.

28 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Hizbul Islam jabiso.net

somalimirror.com
cadaalada.com

halgan.net
Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a shaaficiyah.com
www.ahlusunna.org

83. The most active online Al-Shabaab outlet is alqimmah.net, which was
established in September 2007 as a forum for Golaha Ansaarta Mujaahidiinta (the
Council of Supporters of the Mujahideen. Alqimmah not only disseminates Shabaab
materials, but also participates in their production, making it an integral part of
Al-Shabaab’s da’awa (propagation) apparatus.
84. On 22 July 2009, alqimmah.net posted a 42-minute audio tape entitled Sharif
Muslim, Sharif Murtad (Sharif the Muslim, Sharif the Apostate), for which it claims
credit for writing and production. 43 The recording casts President Sharif as the
leader of a heretical regime, and AMISOM forces as infidel invaders, and urges
listeners to support jihad against them. The propaganda section of Al-Shabaab
subsequently claimed to have distributed this widely throughout Somalia.
85. Less than one month later, on 15 August 2009, alqimmah posted a link to a
book entitled The Science of Explosions and Explosives written by a man by the
name of Abu Hafs al-Lubnaani. 44 The intention of the posting was apparently to
make available to Shabaab supporters and sympathizers knowledge pertinent to
bomb-making.
86. On 30 August 2009, alqimmah posted a 47-page religious ruling 45 (fatwa)
issued in Arabic by Sheikh Hassaan Hussein (see case study 2 above) against the
outcome of the Djibouti peace process. The fatwa has provided the Somali Islamist
groups in general and Al-Shabaab in particular with alleged religious justifications
for waging a jihad against the Government of Somalia as an apostate regime.
87. On 20 January 2010, alqimmah posted a six-minute jihadist nasheed (religious
song or chant) entitled Nairobi Tutafika 46 by Al-Shabaab militants threatening to
enter Kenya and march on Nairobi. In an introduction to the song, alqimmah stated
that the song was motivated by the arrest three weeks earlier of the Jamaican
preacher, Abdulla al-Faisal, in Nairobi, who was convicted and imprisoned in
Britain for inciting racial hatred. Chanted in Swahili and interspersed with speeches
and the sound of gunfire, the posting was apparently intended to incite and inspire
greater militancy among Al-Shabaab supporters in Kenya.
88. The alqimmah.net website is registered in Sweden in the name of Abdu-Raouf
(Ralf) Wadman (also known as Usama el-Swede), a Swedish convert to Islam based
__________________
43 Alqimmah.net, 23 July 2009, “Sharif Muslim, Sharif Murtad” (http://www.alqimmah.net/
showthread.php?t=6600).
44 http://www.alqimmah.net/showthread.php?t=8793.
45 http://www.alqimmah.net/showthread.php?s=518dd346c94c9e71d3963fc6e25a71db&t=9498.
46 “We will arrive in Nairobi”; accessed at http://www.alqimmah.net/showthread.php?p=25882#post25882.

10-24689 29
S/2010/91

in Gothenburg, who has been linked to a variety of extremist figures and causes.
One of its administrators is Musa Said Yusuf “Godir”. On 28 May 2008, Godir was
arrested in London, together with Ahmed Said Mohamed “Faarax-Deeq”,
administrator of another Al-Shabaab-affiliated website, and charged with a variety
of offences under British anti-terrorism legislation.
89. Both men were subsequently cleared of the charges and released. 47 On the
night of 28 July 2009, participants in an Al-Shabaab online forum celebrated the
release of Faarax-Deeq and he briefly addressed the group. On 9 August 2009, a
group of Somalis including members and supporters of ARS-Asmara hosted a
reception for Faarax-Deeq and Godir in Leicester, United Kingdom. One objective
of the party was to express gratitude to a “core team”, including ARS-Asmara
spokesman Zakaria Mohamud Haji Abdi, for their efforts towards the release of two
men. 48
90. Such “virtual” cooperation between armed opposition groups is not unusual.
Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam have regularly conducted joint forums, achieving a
greater degree of cooperation in cyberspace than they do on the ground. For
example, a forum late in March 2009 included Sheikh Fu’ad Mohamed Khalaf
(Al-Shabaab), Ma’allin Burhan (Al-Shabaab) and Abdullahi “Khadaab” Haji Yusuf
(Secretary-General of Hizbul Islam). Likewise, a three-day, live fund-raising event
late in May 2009 involved Abdullahi “Khadaab” (Hizbul Islam), Abdullahi Ali
Hashi (Hizbul Islam) and Mukhtar Roobow (Al-Shabaab).
91. Al-Shabaab have also used such Internet forums to highlight their cooperation
with the Muhaajirun — foreign fighters who have joined their struggle. During the
second week of July 2009, for example, Fu’aad Shangole and Ma’allin Burhan
related to participants of an online forum the proceedings of a ceremony held at the
Salahudiin Islamic Centre to thank the foreigners and, reportedly, to celebrate the
marriage of some 50 of them to Somali women as a way to integrate them into
Somali society. The message was unmistakably to assure potential foreign
volunteers that they could expect a similarly warm welcome if they joined the cause.

Fund-raising
92. On the night of 30 August 2009, Al-Shabaab commenced in its online forum a
two-week fund-raising event for its fighters in the regions of Hiraan, Bay/Bakool
and Gedo. Al-Shabaab’s Salahudiin Centre in Mogadishu directly coordinated and
facilitated the event, which was attended by hundreds of participants in the diaspora.
The Al-Shabaab Governor of Bay/Bakool, Mahad Omar Abdikarim, the Governor of
Hiraan, Abukar Ali Aden, and the Deputy Governor of Gedo, Ma’allin Osman,
briefed the forum on the hardships facing the mujahideen and their families in those
regions as victims of drought and conflict. The forum participants made pledges
totalling over $40,000.
93. Further, Al-Shabaab leaders requested the forum participants to spread the
news of the fund-raising among the Somalis in the diaspora by word of mouth and
that the cash contributions be sent through a hawala to a name and telephone
number they had provided as their point person in Mogadishu.

__________________
47 The prosecution has appealed and the case was still ongoing at the time of writing.
48 See article and images at alcarab.com, 10 August 2009, accessed at http://alcarab.com/warka/?id=3741.

30 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Recruitment
94. Internet activism and diaspora support networks are also used for recruitment
purposes. Over the course of the Monitoring Group’s mandate, international
attention was especially drawn to the recruitment of young men and women of
Somali origin from Western countries into the rank and file of Al-Shabaab — some
of whom were subsequently deployed as suicide bombers. Other cases involved the
inspiration or incitement to conduct terrorist activities on foreign soil.
95. Al-Shabaab sought to exploit such publicity by displaying young people from
the diaspora for propaganda purposes. On 5 April 2009, a group of roughly a dozen
Al-Shabaab fighters claiming to be returnees from Europe and North America held a
press conference in Kismaayo. 49 One such individual, calling himself Abdifatah,
claimed to be a returnee from the United States who studied at Markaz-al-Salahudiin
in Mogadishu and personally knew the suicide bombers in Boosaaso and Hargeysa.
The Monitoring Group believes that Abdifatah, who is still in Somalia and now goes
under a new pseudonym, has since risen to become a senior figure in the ranks of
Al-Shabaab.
96. Recruitment into the ranks of the Union of Islamic Courts, of which
Al-Shabaab was a part, began at least as early as 2006, when a group of young
British Somalis travelled to fight in Mogadishu. According to multiple sources the
leader, named Magan Mohamed Haashi “Abu Maryam”, died fighting for
Al-Shabaab in Hodan district. 50
97. By 2007, possibly earlier, recruitment had also started among ethnic Somali
youth in the Minneapolis-Saint Paul area of the United States. But the trend went
largely unnoticed until the death of the first known American suicide bomber,
Shirwa Ahmed, in Boosaaso in October 2008.
98. By the time of Shirwa’s death, other Somali-American recruits were already in
Somalia. According to United States court documents, Salah Osman Ahmed
travelled to Somalia in December 2007, where he trained with Al-Shabaab.
Following his return to the United States, he was indicted in February 2009, where
he pleaded guilty to one count of providing material support to terrorists. 51 Similar
indictments were handed down against Abdifatah Yusuf Isse.
99. The flow of recruits continued throughout 2008. A 17-year-old, Burhan
Hassan, left Minneapolis for Somalia on 4 November 2008 to train with and fight
for Al-Shabaab, and was killed on 5 June 2009 in Mogadishu. Zakaria Ma’ruf, a
relative of Somali politician Ali Khalif Galaydh, left Minneapolis for Somalia in the
spring of 2008, where he joined Al-Shabaab. Between May and June 2009 he was
reportedly sighted in Nairobi, attending the Abubakar as-Saddique Islamic centre in
Eastleigh. Zakaria returned to Mogadishu where he was killed in July 2009.
100. On 3 December 2009, an ethnic Somali from Denmark detonated an explosive
vest while taking part at a graduation ceremony for medical students from Banaadir
University. The bomb killed 24 people, mainly students. The other fatalities
included two doctors, three journalists and four ministers of the Transitional Federal
Government. Approximately 60 people were reported injured. Although the
__________________
49 http://www.alqimmah.net/showthread.php?t=4619.
50 One version is presented at http://www.alqimmah.net/showthread.php?t=3988.
51 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/14/us/14somalis.html.

10-24689 31
S/2010/91

spokesman for Al-Shabaab, Ali Mohamud Raghe, publicly denied responsibility for
the blast, the Monitoring Group has listened to online forums at which Shabaab
leaders have claimed the suicide attack as a victory, and informed participants that
the bomber’s wife, who is also trained for suicide operations, was held back at the
last moment due to pregnancy, but for a future opportunity.
101. The Government of Sweden estimates that at least 20 Swedes of Somali origin
have joined armed opposition groups. One of them, Shu’ayb Ali Hassan, from the
Stockholm suburb of Rinkeby, was initially recruited into the Anoole faction of
Hizbul Islam, he reportedly requested a transfer to Al-Shabaab, where there were
more young people from the diaspora for him to socialize with. He was killed on
2 July 2009 while fighting for Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu.
102. Similar disappearances have now been reported from ethnic Somali families in
Canada and the United Kingdom, and others will no doubt come to light.

From support to operations

103. During the course of 2009, there were indications that some of Al-Shabaab’s
supporters in the diaspora were beginning to take an interest not only in support but
also in operations.
104. In Australia, a group of young men charged with planning to attack a Sydney
military base sought encouragement and support from a man the Monitoring Group
believes to be Ahmed Abdirahman Siiro, then Shabaab Governor of the Lower
Shabelle region and now a senior adviser to Al-Shabaab leaders. In Sweden, a
cartoonist reportedly received threatening telephone calls from a Swedish-speaking
man calling from Somalia. 52 The United States embassy in South Africa briefly
closed in September 2009 in response to a threat involving Somali extremists. On
1 January 2010, another Somali with alleged ties to Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaida East
Africa was shot and arrested in Denmark in connection with an attack on a Danish
cartoonist; the same man had reportedly been detained in Kenya because police
suspected that he was planning an attack on a visiting delegation headed by the
United States Secretary of State. 53
105. The Monitoring Group believes that this trend will continue in the near future,
as Al-Shabaab frustration with the ongoing stalemate — or possible political and
military reverses — induce them to externalize the conflict and strike at perceived
backers of the Transitional Federal Government, Puntland or Somaliland.

Recruitment, kinship and fraud

106. Although Somalis from a wide variety of clans have been recruited in this way,
there is little doubt that recruiters are taking advantage of kinship in order to
identify prospective recruits, win their trust and exploit community solidarity to
escape the attention of the authorities.
107. In Minneapolis, for example, Monitoring Group investigations indicate that
more than half of the 20 young people known to be missing had at least one parent
__________________
52 http://www.thelocal.se/24198/20100104/.
53 At an online forum entitled Huda-Wa-Nuur (Guidance and Light) on 6 February 2010, Hassaan
Hussein praised the suspect for his actions. The forum was hosted by alqimmah.net and the Somali
Islamic Dacwatutawxiid Center (accessed at http://alqimmah.net/showthread.php?p=26677#post2667).

32 10-24689
 S/2010/91

from the Harti sub-clan of the Daarood. Three of the five Somali Minnesotans killed
while fighting for Al-Shabaab belonged to the Omar Mohamud sub-clan of the
Harti/Majeerteen, and the fourth’s mother was also from the Harti. In Sweden,
Shu’ayb Ali Hassan, himself a member of the Rahanweyne clan, was initially
recruited into a Harti fighting force by maternal relatives from the Siwaaqroon
sub-clan of the Harti/Majeerteen.
108. The selective clan trend in the recruiting patterns investigated by the
Monitoring Group appears to have been compounded by circumstances of social or
familial dislocation. In at least four of the cases investigated by the Monitoring
Group, young people had been granted entry into the United States on false
pretences, including being lodged with families not their own.

D. Armed groups and immigration fraud

109. The activities of Somali armed groups beyond Somalia’s borders are facilitated
by the widespread practice of immigration fraud. The Monitoring Group has learned
that members of Al-Shabaab, Hizbul Islam and pirate militias have taken advantage
of this practice in order to gain entry into various European countries, and probably
several destinations in North America and Asia also.
110. The practice of visa fraud represents an extraordinary abuse both of official
privilege and of international goodwill towards Somalia. Many foreign governments
accept visa requests from Somali officials as a diplomatic courtesy, and in order to
assist the Transitional Federal Government in its efforts to solicit support from the
Somali diaspora and the international community. Others offer visas to help war-
affected families or needy students to seek a better life. In exchange for this
privilege, Somali ministers, members of parliament, diplomats and freelance
“brokers” have transformed access to foreign visas into a growth industry matched
possibly only by piracy, selling visas for $10,000 to $15,000 each. Among those
who can afford to pay such sums are individuals who profit from piracy, and leaders
of armed groups.

How it works: ministers, members of parliament, diplomats and brokers

111. Visa fraud involving Transitional Federal Government officials and members
of parliament is among the most brazen. Politicians claim that they need to travel on
official business, such as an invitation to address a diaspora group or attend a
conference, accompanied by a bogus delegation of government officials (and
occasionally family members). Such requests are typically accompanied by a note
verbale or other introductory document from the Somali Embassy, often with a
supporting letter from a minister, the Speaker of Parliament or one of his deputies. If
the request meets with approval, the other members of the delegation pay as much
as $15,000 each for the opportunity to travel. Many do not return.
112. Officials at the Somali Embassy in Nairobi, including Ambassador Mohamed
Ali Nur “Ameriko”, reportedly play a central role in this scheme. One senior
embassy official has acknowledged to the Monitoring Group that the problem exists,
but blames senior government officials including the Prime Minister and the
Speaker of Parliament for imposing such requests upon the Embassy. Ambassador
“Ameriko” has denied any personal involvement in fraud, and emphasized that the
Embassy has no authority to screen visa requests from Transitional Federal

10-24689 33
S/2010/91

Government ministers or members of parliament. But he confirmed to the

Monitoring Group that he has received complaints about the practice from other
embassies, which he has conveyed to his Government.
113. The Italian Embassy in Kenya has also been implicated in this practice. Many
Somali emigrants use Italy only as a gateway to Europe, settling in third countries.
Although costs may vary, the average fee for a visa to Italy is reportedly from
$12,000 to $13,000 for a man and $15,000 for a woman. Payment is put in an
escrow account with a money transfer organization until the client arrives at his or
her destination in Rome. The proceeds are roughly evenly shared between the
broker and concerned embassy officials. 54 Upon the client’s arrival in Italy, a
secondary smuggling network takes over, often providing a falsified Italian
residence document (for an additional $3,000) and arranging onward travel to
another European country: cases investigated by the Monitoring Group suggested
Sweden as a popular destination.
114. In response to a Monitoring Group query, the Italian Ambassador to the
Transitional Federal Government, Stefano Dejak, described measures he has taken
to try to curb the practice. In February 2009, he conveyed his concerns in a letter to
the Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government, and in May 2009
proposed a meeting of the European Union task force on immigration issues to
specifically address the Somali issue — both to no effect. In September 2009, he
again addressed an e-mail to the Prime Minister, complaining that the number of
illegitimate visa requests presented by Somali members of parliament continued to
grow, and that he had recently rejected 50 of them. Ambassador Dejak says his
authority, however, is limited to requests of a political nature, not to routine visa
requests fielded by the Italian Embassy to the Kenyan consular section, where the
majority of applications are processed.
115. Monitoring Group investigations have linked a number of senior officials of
the Transitional Federal Government to the practice of visa fraud, including the
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Fisheries, Abdirahman Ibrahim Adan Ibbi,
the Minister for Women’s Affairs and Gender, Fowsiya Mohamed Sheikh, and the
Minister of Constitutional Affairs, Madoobe Nunow Mohamed. 55 The Constitutional
Minister is a repeat offender: in April and June 2009 he organized delegations to
attend a constitutional training workshop in Germany convened by a prestigious
institution, as part of the UNDP-coordinated constitution-building activities in
Somalia. The delegations included members of the Independent Federal
Constitutional Commission, private individuals masquerading as ministry officials,
and relatives of the Minister. At least eight of these individuals, including Nunow’s
son, subsequently “disappeared”. With the exception of his relatives, the Monitoring
Group has learned that those who did not return paid the Minister $14,000 per visa.
Subsequently, five of the individuals claimed political asylum in the Netherlands.
Nunow has since submitted similar requests to other European embassies in Nairobi.
116. One of the most prominent “brokers” is a Somali member of parliament and
former member of the African Union Parliament named Abdiaziz Abdullahi
__________________
54 Multiple Monitoring Group sources have identified a female consular officer at the Italian
Embassy as the principal point of contact for fraudulent visa requests.
55 Other Transitional Federal Government and Puntland ministers have been involved in cases
where fraud was suspected but, since visas were denied, it is not possible to ascertain whether
there would actually have been fraud.

34 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Mohamed “Abdi-hukun”. 56 A Kenyan resident since 1997 and Somali member of

parliament since 2004, Abdiaziz possesses an African Union passport, despite
having lost his seat in the African Union Parliament more than five years ago, as
well as a Swedish travel document. Together with another Swedish Somali resident,
formerly based in Kismaayo with Al-Shabaab, Abdiaziz facilitates the movement
through Kenya of Somali diaspora youth seeking to join Somali armed opposition
groups. 57
117. In April 2009, Abdiaziz requested visas from the Italian Embassy for two
members of his family. The visas were issued and the men travelled to Milan, but
subsequently left Italy with fraudulent papers for a third country. Monitoring Group
investigations offer grounds to believe that both men were in fact members of an
armed opposition group — allegedly Al-Shabaab.
118. The Monitoring Group has learned of several other cases in which members of
armed opposition groups have obtained visas to Europe on fraudulent grounds,
including at least one member of Al-Shabaab and seven members of Hizbul Islam.
In addition, a Hizbul Islam commander relocated his family to Sweden in mid-2009,
and could potentially join them at some future time under a family reunification
programme. The Al-Shabaab figure reportedly facilitated the movement of foreign
fighters out of Somalia early in 2007, after the Ethiopian intervention, and has since
settled in Sweden.
119. Pirates have also exploited immigration fraud. The Monitoring Group is aware
of several members of a Puntland-based pirate militia who obtained asylum and
travel documents in Europe during the course of 2009. One obtained asylum in
Sweden, one travelled via Italy to the Netherlands and one reportedly obtained entry
into the United Kingdom. All three subsequently returned to the region to resume
their involvement with pirate militias.
120. These cases represent just a glimpse of a far larger phenomenon. Information
obtained by the Monitoring Group indicates that a large number of countries beyond
Western Europe, including Turkey, the Russian Federation, South Africa and
Ukraine are also affected by this phenomenon. The scope for exploitation by
members of Somali armed opposition groups and criminal networks is equally vast.

III. Acts of armed criminal groups that threaten peace

and security
A. Maritime militias: recent developments, trends and patterns

121. Despite the coordinated efforts of 45 countries and 7 international

organizations, acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea launched from Somalia have
increased since the Monitoring Group described the phenomenon in its report of
December 2008 (S/2008/769). During the course of 2009, the International Maritime
Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre registered a total of 217 attacks by Somali pirates

__________________
56 The Monitoring Group is also investigating other “brokers”, including the wife of a prominent
Somali businessman resident in Nairobi who reportedly operates with the female consular
officer at the Italian Embassy.
57 Both are from the minority Galgale clan.

10-24689 35
S/2010/91

around the Horn of Africa, an increase of 95 per cent over the previous year. 58 Of
the vessels attacked, 47 were successfully hijacked, representing an estimated
$82 million in ransom money. 59 As 2009 came to a close, 12 vessels and 263
crewmembers were still being held captive.
122. Arguably the main effect of international counter-piracy efforts has been to
shift pirate areas of operation away from the Gulf of Aden into the Indian Ocean,
and towards hunting grounds increasingly distant from the Somali coast. Pirate
assaults up to 800 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia have now become
common, as the use of “mother ships” permits pirates to stay at sea for longer
periods. In 2009, six ships were attacked and three hijacked beyond 800 nautical
miles from the Somali coast. With their extended reach, pirates have also
demonstrated their proficiency in attacking larger and faster vessels, such as the MV
Asian Glory, a United Kingdom-flagged vehicle carrier with a 23-m freeboard,
hijacked 600 nautical miles (1,111 km) off the Somali coast on 1 January 2010,
during the north-east monsoon.
123. Another shift in pirate operating patterns has been the declining importance of
Eyl as a harbour and hostage holding ground, in favour of Gara’ad (also in
Puntland), Xarardheere and Hobyo (central Somalia), and to a lesser extent
Laasqoray (in eastern Sanaag region, which is territory contested by Somaliland and
Puntland).
124. These advancements in piracy operations, while disturbing, are less dramatic
than often portrayed. The Monitoring Group has found no evidence to support the
widespread reports of sophisticated weaponry, boarding equipment or intelligence. 60
On the contrary, most pirate attacks appear to be random and opportunistic: on at
least three occasions known to the Monitoring Group, pirates have mistaken naval
vessels for merchant ships. 61

B. Piracy and armed robbery at sea

125. It has become conventional wisdom that piracy off the Horn of Africa can only
be comprehensively defeated only on land, not at sea. Considerable attention has
been devoted to the socio-economic drivers of piracy, as well as the grievances of
Somali fishing communities against foreign vessels engaged in illicit and damaging
exploitation of Somali marine resources. Although the Monitoring Group does not
deny the legitimacy of these arguments — and has indeed cited them in its reports of
November 2003 and December 2008 — investigations over the course of the
__________________
58 However, the number of pirate attacks resulting in successful hijackings in 2009 was only 22 per
cent, a decrease of 16 per cent over 2008.
59 Ransom payments are generally confidential and accurate figures are difficult to obtain.
However, military sources estimate that the average ransom payment per ship increased to
$1.75 million in 2009, compared to $1.25 million in 2008. The highest reported ransom payment
during the course of the mandate was $5.5 million; the lowest $100,000.
60 An illustrated description of pirate arms and equipment may be found in annex II.
61 The three incidents involved the German naval tanker FGS Spessart (29 March 2009 in the Gulf
of Aden), the French light surveillance frigate Nivôse (3 May 2009 in the Indian Ocean,
620 nautical miles east of Mombasa) and the French naval command and supply ship La Somme
(7 October 2009 in the Gulf of Aden, 250 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia). In all three
cases, the attacks were repelled, pirate skiffs and equipment were seized, and some of the pirates
were arrested.

36 10-24689
 S/2010/91

mandate leave no doubt that they are at best of secondary, and in some cases of
peripheral, importance in understanding and curbing the piracy phenomenon.
126. Piracy operations continue to be anchored in two principal locations: the coast
of Puntland and the central Somalia littoral east of Xarardheere and Hobyo. These
areas are unique neither in their proximity to shipping channels nor in the poverty of
their communities. Were these the principal factors, pirate bases should have
emerged along the Somali coast from Loy’addo, near Djibouti, to Kaambooni on the
Kenyan border. The fact that it has not happened requires some analysis.
127. Exploitation of Somali marine resources is a reality, but it is by no means a
preoccupation of Somali pirates or their backers. In 2009, only 6.5 per cent of
Somali pirate attacks were aimed at fishing vessels, of which only one — the
Artxa — is confirmed to have been in Somali territorial waters at the time. 62 This is
a surprisingly low figure, given that fishing vessels are generally easier to seize than
cargo vessels, but may be explained by the fact that they generally generate a
smaller ransom. 63 However, it is also explained in part by the fact that many of the
foreign fishing vessels engaged in illicit and excessive exploitation of Somali
marine resources are in fact “authorized” to do so by local authorities, and therefore
enjoy a degree of protection from pirates.
128. The Somaliland coastline is closest to international shipping lanes through the
Bab-el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden, and should therefore offer better hunting
grounds for pirates, but unlike Puntland, the Somaliland authorities and community
leaders have adopted a firm and decisive posture against piracy. Visiting Hargeysa
and Berbera in October 2009, the Monitoring Group had the opportunity to observe
the counter-piracy efforts of the Somaliland authorities. Despite very limited
means, 64 the coastguard patrols 850 km of coastline and maintains a dozen manned
observatories, which are alerted and informed by the local community of any
suspicious activity in the area.
129. Moreover, the Monitoring Group has found no evidence to support allegations
of structured cooperation between pirate groups and armed opposition groups,
including Al-Shabaab. To the extent that such linkages may exist, the Monitoring
Group believes that they represent highly localized, small-scale arrangements
between individuals, such as Abdulrisaaq Sheikh Ahmed Geedi, who is suspected of
involvement in a number of hijackings, as well as of personal links to Al-Shabaab.
The Monitoring Group does not believe that such a case is evidence of a wider
pattern.
130. In sum, the Monitoring Group considers Somali-based piracy to be a
fundamentally criminal activity attributable to specific militia groups and
“families”. In central Somalia, the Afweyne family has succeeded in co-opting
__________________
62 According to International Maritime Bureau figures, 14 fishing vessels were attacked of which
11 were successfully hijacked. The European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) records
15 attacks on fishing vessels, of which 12 were hijacked. IMB believes that two other fishing
vessels, the Mumtaz 1 and the Samara Ahmed, were also seized in Somali waters, but EU
NAVFOR is unable to provide positions for these vessels.
63 Somali pirates apparently prefer to use captured fishing vessels as mother ships, rather than to
ransom them.
64 The Somaliland coastguard was established at the end of 2005 and falls under the Ministry of
the Interior of Somaliland. It has 350 personnel, 3 vehicles, 10 to 15 small speedboats with
outboard engines and 3 larger patrol boats with anti-aircraft guns mounted on the bow.

10-24689 37
S/2010/91

elements of the local community, mainly from the Habar Gidir Saleebaan sub-clan,
through the distribution of wealth. In north-eastern Somalia, pirate leaders have
compromised State institutions at both the local and central levels by co-opting and
corrupting government officials.

C. Pirate militias and networks

131. At the end of 2008, the Monitoring Group identified two major piracy
networks operating along the Somali coastline: one from Puntland (north-eastern
Somalia) and one from central Somalia near Xarardheere and Hobyo. The
Monitoring Group described in great detail how these pirate networks are organized
and structured, identified their leaders, their bases, where they are operating from
and the modus operandi of their operations (see S/2008/769).
132. Over the course of the current mandate, these militias have expanded their
membership and extended their operations to new areas. 65 In central Somalia,
pirates have reportedly launched missions from coastal areas further south, but they
continue to anchor their hijacked vessels near Xarardheere and Hobyo. In north-
eastern Somalia, international counter-piracy operations and a limited degree of
domestic pressure from local authorities and community leaders have displaced
some piracy activity from the former hub at Eyl to Gara’ad further south and
Laasqoray to the west.

Central Somalia
133. Since October 2009, the main focus of pirate attacks has shifted from the Gulf
of Aden to the Indian Ocean. This shift has reinforced the importance of piracy hubs
at Xarardheere and Hobyo in the southern Mudug region. Xarardheere, located
about 18 km from the coast of the Indian Ocean, is inhabited predominantly by
members of the Habar Gidir Saleebaan sub-clan and serves as the home base of one
of the most influential pirate leaders in central Somalia, Mohamed Hassan Abdi
“Afweyne”. 66 Afweyne, a founder of the central Somalia piracy network, has been
cited in previous Monitoring Group reports for his lead role in pirate operations
based in Xarardheere and Hobyo from 2004 to 2007 (see S/2006/229 and
S/2008/274).
134. While Afweyne has been less visible during the course of the current mandate,
his leadership role in operations appears to have been adopted by his son
Abdiqaadir. Credible sources have confirmed Afweyne’s and Abdiqaadir’s
involvement, individually or jointly, in the hijackings of at least seven vessels
during the course of the mandate: the passenger cruise ship Indian Ocean Explorer
(2 April 2009), the container ship Hansa Stavanger (4 April 2009), the dredger
Pompei (18 April 2009), the bulk carrier Ariana (2 May 2009), the fishing vessel

__________________
65 The pirates’ typical “business model” has also evolved. For a description of a current model, see
annex III.
66 Afweyne is a nickname meaning “big mouth” in Somali.

38 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Alakrana (2 October 2009), the container ship Kota Wajar (15 October 2009) and
the bulk carrier Xin Hai (19 October 2009). 67
135. The Monitoring Group is concerned by reports that Afweyne, and possibly
other pirate leaders, may have attracted the sympathy of the Government of the
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Multiple media sources, as well as Monitoring Group
contacts, reported Afweyne’s presence in Tripoli as an invited guest at a four-day
celebration in honour of the President of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 1 to
4 September 2009.
136. On 23 September 2009, in his statement before the General Assembly of the
United Nations in New York, the President of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Mu’ammar Qadafi, acknowledged that he had met with Somali pirates, spoke in
their defence and called upon States to respect Somalia’s exclusive economic zone.

Piracy and the Puntland administration

137. In contrast with central Somalia, where piracy may be accurately described as
a product of statelessness and warlordism, in north-eastern Somalia it benefits from
the patronage and protection of State institutions. After 12 years of relatively
positive evolution in Puntland, the newly established administration of Abdirahman
Mohamed “Faroole” is nudging Puntland in the direction of becoming a criminal
State. Monitoring Group investigations, involving interviews with sources
possessing first-hand knowledge of piracy operations, ransom negotiations and/or
payments, have confirmed that senior Puntland officials, including President Faroole
and members of his Cabinet, notably the Minister of the Interior, General Abdullahi
Ahmed Jama “Ilkajiir” (see case study 3 below) and the Minister for Internal
Security, General Abdillahi Sa’iid Samatar, have received proceeds from piracy
and/or kidnapping.
138. There have been some indications during the course of the mandate that
Puntland has made increased efforts in the battle against piracy. During the course
of 2009, President Abdirahman Mohamed “Faroole” has publicly condemned piracy
on several occasions and the authorities have arrested and convicted a number of
pirates, seizing weapons and equipment. In spite of these gestures, however, pirate
activity off the coast of Puntland has increased, senior pirate leaders remain at
liberty and without apparent fear of arrest, and in some cases the Puntland
authorities have extended protection to pirate militias.

__________________
67 Hijackings in which the Monitoring Group believes Afweyne’s militia to have been involved
include: MV Semlow (26 June 2005), MV Feisty Gas (currently named Gaz Zael, 10 April
2005), MV Rozen (25 February 2007), MV Danica White (2 June 2007), FV Playa de Bakio
(20 April 2008), MV Stella Maris (20 July 2008), MV Bunga Melati Dua (18 August 2008),
MV Centauri (17 September 2008), MV Captain Stefanos (21 September 2008), MV Faina
(25 September 2008), MV Stolt Strength (10 November 2008), FV Tian Yu No 8 (15 November
2008) and MV Sirius Star (15 November 2008).

10-24689 39
S/2010/91

Case study 3
The eastern Sanaag pirate militia
The rugged, mountainous terrain of eastern Sanaag region,
inhabited mainly by members of the Warsengeli sub-clan of the Harti
Daarood, has long been associated with smuggling and arms trafficking.
In its report of December 2008, the Monitoring Group described the
emergence of a Shabaab-affiliated militia headed by a Warsengeli former
arms dealer (see section IV.A. below). Since 2008, eastern Sanaag has
also become associated with another threat to peace and security: piracy.
On 23 June 2008, a German sailing yacht named Rockall was
seized by pirates in the Gulf of Aden and anchored at the port village of
Laasqoray. The retired German couple who owned and crewed the yacht
were taken ashore and force-marched into the mountains, where they
were held for 52 days before being released in exchange for ransom
alleged to have been $1 million.a
The man responsible for the hijacking of the Rockall was named
Fu’aad Warsame Seed, also known as “Hanaano”, a 45 to 50-year-old
member of the Warsengeli/Reer Haaji sub-clan who learned his piracy
skills while operating from Eyl. His earnings enabled him to return home
and establish a militia of his own, approximately 50 to 60 men equipped
with several gun-mounted “technical” vehicles, PK general purpose
machine guns, RPG launchers, a combination of Heckler and Koch G-3
semi-automatic rifles, AK-47s and SAR-80 assault rifles. Other senior
members of the militia include Hanaano’s son, Omar Hassan Osman
“Baqalyo”, and Ali Dhego-Libaax.
Following the release of the Rockall, Hanaano and his militia went
on to hijack the Turkish chemical tanker Karagöl (12 November 2008),
two Egyptian fishing vessels, Mumtaz 1 and Samara Ahmed (10 April
2009) and the Italian tugboat Buccaneer (11 April 2009).
After this string of successes, Hanaano’s pirates were due for some
bad luck. On 29 April 2009, 13 men armed with two G-3 and five AK-47
assault rifles set out into the Gulf of Aden in two skiffs, in search of a
vessel to attack. After a few days, the failure of one outboard engine
obliged them to head for home, but on the way back they ran out of fuel.
On 5 May 2009, after six days at sea and drifting to the east of Berbera,
they were spotted by the Somaliland coastguard and, after a brief
exchange of fire in which two pirates were injured, they were taken into
custody.
On 15 October 2009, Hanaano’s luck apparently ran out altogether.
Having set out to sea two days previously in a skiff and two dhows,
Hanaano and seven of his militia were reportedly arrested in Yemeni
waters and eventually imprisoned in Sana’a. However, at the time of
writing the Government of Yemen had yet to respond to a Monitoring
Group request for confirmation of this information.

40 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Hanaano’s best hope for release from Yemeni jail probably lies with
the Puntland Minister of the Interior, General Abdullahi Ahmed Jama
“Ilkajiir”, a former military officer and a member of the Warsengeli
sub-clan, like Hanaano. Ilkajiir returned to Somalia from the United
States late in 2008 to contest the Puntland presidency. According to
multiple independent sources, Hanaano contributed over $200,000 to
Ilkajiir’s political campaign. Ilkajiir ultimately lost the election to
Abdirahman Mohamed “Faroole” — who benefited from much larger
pirate contributions to his political war chest — and was awarded the
post of Minister of the Interior.
The relationship between the two men has since served Hanaano
and his men well. Shortly after his appointment, Ilkajiir reportedly
proposed Hanaano for the position of “Eastern Sanaag Coastguard
Commander”. In August 2009, the Egyptian crew of the Mumtaz 1 and
the Samara Ahmed revolted and overpowered their pirate captors, whom
they subsequently handed over to the Egyptian authorities. Ilkajiir
immediately spearheaded efforts by the Puntland authorities to have the
pirates — all members of Hanaano’s militia — released, and in
September 2009 the Government of Egypt repatriated the prisoners to
Puntland.b
On 30 November 2009, Puntland security forces reportedly arrested
Omar Hassan Osman “Baqalyo” in Boosaaso on charges unrelated to
piracy. Once again Baqalyo was allegedly released on 5 December 2009,
by order of Puntland’s Minister of the Interior, General Abdullahi Ahmed
Jama “Ilkajiir”.c

a
According to independent, corroborating sources interviewed by the
Monitoring Group, over 30 per cent of the ransom payment was retained by
Puntland government officials.
b
Monitoring Group requests to obtain additional information were unsuccessful,
in part because, according to the Government of Egypt, all communications
related to this issue were verbal in nature.
c
The Monitoring Group believes that Baqalyo was apprehended together with
Hanaano and is currently in Yemeni custody.

139. Probably the most notorious pirate leader in Puntland goes by the name Abshir
Abdillahi “Boyah”, who is approximately 44 years old and originally from the
coastal town of Eyl. 68 In previous reports, the Monitoring Group has identified
Boyah as a principal organizer and financier of pirate activity in 2008. Independent
and intelligence reports received by the Monitoring Group have confirmed his
involvement in piracy. Boyah himself has publicly admitted to being the commander
of a maritime militia consisting of approximately 500 pirates. By Boyah’s own
account, his militia is responsible for hijacking between 25 and 60 shipping vessels
since the mid-1990s, including the Japanese-owned chemical tanker Golden Nori
__________________
68 Boyah has numerous aliases and was identified in the Monitoring Group’s report of December
2008 (S/2008/769) as Farah Hirsi Kulan. Like President Faroole, Boyah is a member of the
Majeerteen/Issa Mohamud/Musa Issa sub-clan.

10-24689 41
S/2010/91

(28 October 2007) and the French luxury yacht Le Ponant (4 April 2008), for which
Boyah received $1.5 million and $2 million respectively in ransom payments.
140. The Puntland leaders not only are well aware of Boyah’s activities but also
tolerate them. In April 2009, two foreign journalists separately interviewed Boyah,
one of whom acknowledged the assistance of President Faroole’s son Mohamed
(now the President’s media adviser) in arranging the meeting. 69 For the other
interview, Boyah was obliged to “cut right through a crowd of Puntland soldiers” in
order to enter a local restaurant. 70 In an interview in August 2008 with Garoowe-
online, a website affiliated with the current Puntland administration, Boyah claimed
that Puntland leaders were complicit in piracy and received 30 per cent of ransom
payments. In May 2009, Boyah attended a ceremony with local government officials
in Eyl, where he claimed that, together with 180 of his militia, he had realized that
piracy was unlawful and had ceased his activities. The Puntland authorities have
since made no move to apprehend him and declined to respond to a Monitoring
Group request for information concerning measures taken to curb his activities.

Case study 4
Mohamed Abdi Garaad and the obstruction of humanitarian
assistance
Another notorious Puntland pirate leader cited in the Monitoring
Group’s December 2008 report is Mohamed Abdi Garaad.a He is a well-
known figure in Puntland, who has since given at least two media
interviews in which he described himself as a pirate leader with
responsibility for 13 maritime militia groups comprising at least 800
pirates. Among the hijackings for which the Monitoring Group believes
Garaad bears responsibility, or shares involvement and control with other
pirate leaders such as Afweyne, are the Panama-flagged, Japanese-
operated bulk carrier Stella Maris (20 July 2008), the MV BBC Trinidad
(21 August 2008), the MV Iran Deyanat (21 August 2008), and the
MV Bunga Melati Dua (18 August 2008).
On 8 April 2009, pirates under Garaad’s command also attacked the
Maersk Alabama, a United States-flagged container ship carrying food
aid destined for Somalia. United States naval forces intervened and a
three-day stand-off ensued, during which Garaad conducted two media
interviews by satellite phone, identifying himself as commander of the
pirates. Following a United States military action in which three Somali
pirates were killed, Garaad threatened to take revenge against American
vessels and crews.b

__________________
69 Jay Bahadur, “I’m not a pirate, I’m the saviour of the sea”, Times, 16 April 2009, accessed at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article6100783.ece.
70 Jeffrey Gettleman, “For Somali Pirates, Worst Enemy May Be on Shore”, New York Times,
9 May 2009, accessed at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/09/world/africa/09pirate.html.

42 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Five days later, on 13 April 2009, pirates from Garaad’s militias

unsuccessfully attempted to hijack the MV Liberty Sun, a United States-
flagged vessel also carrying food aid destined for Somalia. In an
interview with Agence France Presse, Garaad acknowledged
responsibility for the attack and stated that the aim was revenge: “The
aim of this attack was totally different. We were not after a ransom. We
also assigned a team with special equipment to chase and destroy any
ship flying the American flag in retaliation for the brutal killing of our
friends.”c
The following day, 14 April 2009, the Togolese-flagged MV Sea
Horse was hijacked by pirates while en route to Mumbai, India, where it
was due to load 7,327 tons of food destined by the World Food
Programme (WFP) for Somalia. Although reported chartered, WFP
informed the Monitoring Group that, at the time of hijacking, an official
contract for transportation of the food had not yet been signed. The ship
remained hijacked for only three days as it was released on 17 April
2009. The Monitoring Group has received contradictory reports as to
whether ransom was eventually paid.
In addition to posing a threat to peace and security in the region,
the Monitoring Group considers Garaad and his militia to have
committed multiple violations of Security Council resolution 1844
(2008), which prohibits the obstruction of humanitarian assistance. The
Puntland authorities have yet to take any action to apprehend Garaad or
curb his activities.

a
In its report of April 2008, the Monitoring Group identified Garaad as “Garaad
Mohamud Mohamed”. Like Puntland President Faroole and Boyah, Garaad is a
member of the Majeerteen/Issa Mohamud/Musa Issa sub-clan.
b
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/04/13/70528.html and
http://mobile.france24.com/.
c
Agence France Presse, “Pirates stage rocket attack on US freighter”, 13 April
2009, accessed at http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/.

IV. Other threats to peace and security

141. The influence of armed opposition groups is not limited to southern Somalia.
Both Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab have sympathizers in Puntland and Somaliland,
and Al-Shabaab has mounted operations in both regions. In a long sermon at Abu
Hureyra Mosque in Bakaaraha market (Mogadishu) on 29 September 2009,
Al-Shabaab leader Fu’aad Shangole confirmed that his movement was already
engaged in operations in Puntland and Somaliland and planned to wage further
“jihad battles”. 71

__________________
71 Gobolada.com, 30 September 2009.

10-24689 43
S/2010/91

A. Puntland

142. During the course of 2009, Puntland’s security and stability has been marred
by a rise in violent crime including assassinations and the use of improvised
explosive devices. Three members of parliament, a judge, a minister and a senior
intelligence officer have been killed, and another member of parliament narrowly
escaped assassins during an attack on his home in November.
143. Attacks with grenades and improvised explosive devices attacks have become
alarmingly common. There have been at least seven significant grenade attacks of
which four have reportedly targeted Puntland security forces. Major attacks using
improvised explosive devices include:
• 13 December 2009: A roadside bomb targeted the vehicle of Puntland Vice-
President General Abdisamad Ali Shire at Laag village, some 30 km south of
Boosaaso. 72
• 15 December 2009: At least three Somali police officers were reported killed
by a roadside bomb in the port city of Boosaaso as their vehicle drove past on
a routine patrol.
• 21 December 2009: A roadside bomb in Garoowe targeted the vehicle of the
Puntland Speaker of Parliament; his driver was killed and others wounded.
• 4 January 2010: Puntland’s Internal Security Minister claimed that security
forces had foiled a plot to bomb the port of Boosaaso.
• On 30 January 2010, the Police Commander of Qardho town reported that
security forces had seized a cache of explosives and arrested two suspects
believed to have links with Al-Shabaab. 73
144. Not all of these cases can be attributed to Al-Shabaab: some have been simple
criminal acts or revenge killings. However, the killing of security officers and civic
officials has been a hallmark of Shabaab operations in southern Somalia, and the
group is suspected by the Puntland authorities of involvement in several cases. 74
For example, Mohamed Abdi Aware, a senior judge at Boosaaso High Court, was
killed on 11 November 2009 by two masked gunmen while leaving a mosque after
evening prayers. 75 He had recently handled a case in which five Al-Shabaab
suspects were sentenced to from 5 to 10 years’ imprisonment. 76
145. Ibrahim Elmi Warsame, a member of the Puntland parliament, was killed the
same evening by three masked gunmen in Garoowe. Warsame was reputed to be
critical of radical Islamic groups and had tabled a motion that would require
religious schools to register with the Ministry of Education and to ban any that did
not conform to the teachings of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a. 77

__________________
72 The Monitoring Group has also received reports that a militia group aligned with Mohamed
Sa’iid Atom operates in the Laag area.
73 Text of report by Somali independent Radio Gaalkacyo on 30 January 2010.
74 Radio Gaalkacyo, 12 November 2009.
75 Garowe Online, 13 November 2009.
76 http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Wararka_19/
Gudoomiyaha_Maxkamada_Puntland_Xildhibaan_la_diley.shtml.
77 http://www.hiiraan.com/news/2009/Nov/wararka_maanta11-8002.htm.

44 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Mohamed Sa’iid “Atom” and the “Eastern Sanaag Mujahidicen”

146. Several recent incidents have been specifically attributed to Mohamed Sa’iid
“Atom”, 78 described in the Monitoring Group’s report of December 2008
(S/2008/769), whose activities pose a growing threat to peace and security in both
Puntland and Somaliland.
147. Although he remains essentially a Warsengeli clan warlord, Atom reportedly
calls his militia the “Eastern Sanaag Mujahidicen” 79 and has strengthened ties with
Al-Shabaab during the course of 2009. A significant number of non-Warsengeli
militia are reported to have recently joined his group. His training camp at Galgala
remained active in 2009, and the Monitoring Group has received reports about two
related training centres in the Bari region. Numerous sources indicate that there are
several non-Somali instructors at the Galgala camp, and according to eyewitness
reports delegations from southern Al-Shabaab groups have been regular visitors.
148. The Monitoring Group has received eyewitness reports that Atom continues to
import arms from Yemen and to receive consignments from Eritrea, including
120-mm mortars, which may have been transferred to southern Somalia. He has also
embarked on an expansion of his influence and infrastructure, attempting to build an
access road to his main training camp near Galgala. Local Warsengeli elders have
reportedly tried to discourage him from this effort. 80 In January 2010, Monitoring
Group sources and local media reported that Atom had also completed construction
of an airfield near his Galgala base.
149. Meanwhile, Atom appears to be preparing to confront both the Puntland and
the Somaliland authorities more directly. In March 2009, he issued a press statement
in which he demanded that the Puntland authorities release several Warsengeli youth
from prison or his forces would liberate them and take unspecified action against the
administration. 81 Late in 2009, Atom personally visited the town of Laascaanood,
where he reportedly established an operational cell. There have since been several
attacks with improvised explosive devices against Somaliland forces in the town,
although it is unclear whether these may be Atom’s responsibility or the work of an
autonomous Dhulbahante clan militia.
150. Talks in Galgala district between Puntland officials and Warsengeli clan elders
about the fate of Atom and his militia were suspended late in January without
agreement. 82

__________________
78 Atom is reportedly a suspect in the January 2010 killings of a Qur’anic schoolteacher in
Garoowe, and of Abdullaahi Ali Karaad, a member of the Puntland parliament. See, for example,
http://somalifans.net/2010/01/05/wararka-1762/ and http://allidamaale.com/Rayiga-138.htm.
79 http://xamartimes.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=84&Itemid=2.
80 Monitoring Group interview, 13 December 2009.
81 http://xamartimes.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=84&Itemid=2.
82 Monitoring Group sources; http://www.raxanreeb.com/?p=35756 and
http://www.galgalanews.com/node/490.

10-24689 45
S/2010/91

B. Somaliland
151. Shabaab operations in Somaliland date from at least 2003, when members of
the group killed four foreign aid workers in three separate operations. 83 In 2006, a
Shabaab team with arms and explosives was apprehended while plotting a campaign
of assassinations and bombings to disrupt parliamentary elections. In October 2008,
Al-Shabaab deployed suicide bombers in simultaneous attacks against the
Somaliland presidency, the Ethiopian liaison office and the UNDP office, killing
25 people. 84
152. In September 2009, Shabaab emir Ahmed Abdi “Godane” (Abu Zubeyr) issued
a recorded statement entitled “A Message to Somaliland”, in which he described the
administration as anti-Islamic, denounced the electoral process, and called on the
public to rise up against the authorities. 85 The message was widely interpreted as a
warning that Al-Shabaab would turn greater attention to Somaliland, and the
Somaliland authorities have since thwarted a number of Shabaab operations,
intercepting consignments of arms, ammunition and explosives.
153. Late in September 2009, the Somaliland authorities arrested Mohamed Omar
Abdirahman, a suspected bomb maker. 86 In November 2009, the authorities
unsuccessfully attempted to arrest in Bur’o two suspected senior Shabaab leaders
named Sa’iid Ahmed Abdi “Jaar” and Adan Ahmed Arreh (also known as Adaan
“Jihad”). Late in December 2009, the Somaliland Interior Minister briefed the press
that the police had recovered a sack of explosives planted at a bridge on the main
road between Berbera and Bur’o. 87 In January 2010, Somaliland authorities
recovered high explosive projectiles apparently intended to bomb a mosque in
Hargeysa, whose imam had been outspoken against Al-Shabaab. 88

V. Violations of the arms embargo

154. Somalia continues to receive inflows of arms and ammunition in violation of
the general and complete arms embargo. In general, arms imports are of a low
volume and consist principally of ammunition, small arms and light weapons. Some

__________________
83 In December 2006, a Somaliland court sentenced Ahmad Abdi Godane and Ibrahim Haji
“Al-Afghani” in absentia for their role in the attacks.
84 According to the Somaliland Minister of the Interior, investigations “revealed that of the six
suicide bombers involved in the October 29 attacks, only one was from Somaliland, while the
other five hailed from Somalia proper” (http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=
1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34239).
85 Accessed at http://www.alqimmah.net/showthread.php?t=7647.
86 Mohamed’s personal notes suggested that he was either a member or a sympathizer of
Al-Shabaab and indicated that he had been in contact with a wide range of people from various
armed groups. However, a brief inspection of his personal effects offered by the Somaliland
authorities left the Monitoring Group in doubt as to whether Mohamed possessed the requisite
materials, skills and motivation to manufacture explosives.
87 Somaliland Times, December 19-25, 2009, accessed at http://www.somalilandtimes.net/sl/
2009/412/3.shtml.
88 http://allafrica.com/stories/201001110503.html and http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSLDE608072.

46 10-24689
 S/2010/91

heavier, crew-served infantry weapons also continue to arrive, including some

relatively sophisticated anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. 89
155. The Monitoring Group distinguishes between two categories of arms embargo
violations, namely, technical and substantive violations. Technical violations
involve support for Somali security sector institutions, which are eligible for
exemptions under paragraph 11 (b) of resolution 1772 (2007), but for which no
exemption has been requested in advance and on a case-by-case basis from the
Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992).
Substantive violations involve contraventions of the embargo that would under no
circumstances be eligible for exemptions. Arms and ammunition provided with
authorization from the Committee, or in technical violation of resolution 1772
(2007), represent a growing proportion of arms flows to Somalia. As noted in the
Monitoring Group’s report of December 2008, much of this assistance ends up in the
hands of armed opposition groups or on the open market.
156. Non-State and intergovernmental actors mentioned in this section fall beyond
the scope of the Monitoring Group’s mandate: namely, regional and international
organizations, aid agencies and private security companies. The absence of any
provision for them to obtain exemptions under resolution 1772 (2007) creates
ambiguities with respect to their compliance with the arms embargo. In the past, the
Monitoring Group has approached this problem by encouraging international
organizations to notify the Committee of their intentions, and for private sector
actors to obtain the sponsorship of their host Governments vis-à-vis the Committee.
As the number of non-State actors involved in Somalia increases, there is an urgent
need to clarify and formalize these arrangements.
157. Yemen remains Somalia’s principal commercial market for weapons, and
Ethiopia is a principal State supplier of arms, ammunition and training. Eritrea’s
role has diminished relative to previous years as its Government places greater
emphasis on political and financial support for armed opposition groups. During the
course of the mandate, Uganda and the United States also provided significant
military assistance to the Transitional Federal Government.

A. Substantive violations

Southern Somalia
158. The persistent, low intensity conflict in southern Somalia requires the various
parties to the conflict to supply themselves with a constant, albeit low-level, flow of
arms and — more importantly — ammunition. Somali armed forces, including the
Transitional Federal Government, and militia groups utilize a wide variety of
ammunition ranging from cartridges for different types of assault rifles, handguns
and machine guns (PKMs, DShKs) to anti-tank weapons (RPG 2 and 7, Carl
Gustavs and B-10s), mortar rounds of different calibres (60-mm, 81-mm and
120-mm) and light anti-aircraft guns. 90 Towards the end of 2009, the Monitoring
__________________
89 For an illustrated description of weapons commonly employed in the Somali conflict, see annex I.
90 Heavy mortars are rarely used on the Somali battlefield. However, on 20 December 2009,
120-mm mortar rounds fired at AMISOM positions landed in Hamarjajab and near the seaport.
To date, the Monitoring Group has not been able to verify the model and origin of the mortar
rounds.

10-24689 47
S/2010/91

Group observed a significant upgrade in the anti-tank weaponry used by armed

opposition groups. Early in October 2009, for the first time on record, Saxhorn type
anti-tank guided missiles were fired at AMISOM positions. 91 The Monitoring Group
has not yet been able to trace the origin of these items or determine how they
entered Somalia.
159. Although some parties to the conflict, notably the Transitional Federal
Government and Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a, benefit from direct external military aid,
most factions procure their supplies from internal markets nourished by commercial
brokers. As indicated in a previous Monitoring Group report (S/2008/274, paras.
113-116), arms markets have become more fragmented since the Ethiopian
intervention, when the weapons trade was driven “underground”. Overall, this
pattern remains valid.
160. Monitoring Group investigations indicate that armed opposition groups in
Mogadishu received most of their supplies via road from Kismaayo and/or central
Somalia (through Puntland). Al-Shabaab receives supplies through the port of
Kismaayo, as well as smaller beach ports along the Lower Juba coastline. The
southern axis between Kismaayo-Jamaame-Jilib-Baraawe-Marka and up towards
Mogadishu along the coastline is a very important supply line. Al-Shabaab also
receives weapons via Mohamed Sa’iid “Atom” in Puntland, who trans-ships
supplies southwards via Gaalkacyo. In Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab operations are
divided into combat zones with local supply bases in the Dayniile and Suuq Baad
areas.
161. Armed opposition groups also received military supplies between 10 and
15 December 2009 via beach ports to the north of Mogadishu between Hobyo and
Eel Ma’aan. Although the Monitoring Group has also received reports from sources
on the ground of arms deliveries via the airfields at Bale Dogle and Dayniile, lack of
access to these facilities makes verification extremely difficult.
162. Armed opposition groups also claimed that they obtain arms, ammunition and
equipment from Transitional Federal Government forces and affiliated militias,
either by seizing them on the battlefield or by purchasing them. 92 These claims are
supported by routine reports of corruption in the security forces, including the sale
of arms and ammunition by soldiers and unit commanders. 93 In some cases, leaders
affiliated with the Transitional Federal Government may simply hand supplies
directly to the opposition: in October 2009, for example, relations between the
Transitional Federal Government and the Governor of Hiraan region, Abdullahi
Ma’ow, were becoming increasingly strained, and Ma’ow extended to Hizbul Islam
his military support before eventually joining Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a.

__________________
91 The Soviet-made Saxhorn first appeared in 1978 and has since been in service in numerous
countries, including Afghanistan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Republic of Korea, the Russian
Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic.
92 See for example, Shabaab spokesman Ali Mohamud Raghe’s BBC interview of 17 January 2010,
accessed at http://www.bbc.co.uk/somali/news/story/2010/01/100117_afhayeenka.shtml.
93 In December 2009, AMISOM forces arrested three Transitional Federal Government soldiers
trained in Djibouti on suspicion of selling arms and intelligence to insurgents. The soldiers were
handed over into government custody.

48 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Puntland
163. Puntland remains the primary gateway for arms and ammunition into Somalia,
owing to its Gulf of Aden coastline, historical arms trading relationship with dealers
in Yemen, and largely unpoliced territory. The Monitoring Group has learned that
arms markets still exist in most major towns, although — as elsewhere in Somalia —
they are generally fragmented, informal and run by businessmen with connections to
Yemen. Transactions in these markets are of limited financial scale, involving mainly
small and medium weapons and ammunition. However, the activities of large pirate
militias along the Puntland coast, and the escalation of violence in the Galguduud and
Hiraan regions during 2009 have generated additional demand in Puntland arms
markets.
164. Although the bulk of arms flows from Puntland are towards the south, the
Monitoring Group has also learned of small-scale northwards flows. One notable
example involved the arrival in Puntland markets of AK-47 type assault rifles, still
crated, allegedly from Transitional Federal Government weapons stocks. 94
Monitoring Group sources inspected and priced the weapons — locally known as
“Sheikh Sharifs” — on several occasions.

Somaliland
165. Somaliland also hosts an arms trade involving small-scale, informal markets
concentrated in larger towns, and arms are widely available. However, recent
attempts by the authorities to regulate arms sales and ownership are beginning to
have some impact. A growing number of Somaliland residents have registered their
firearms, and the price of arms and ammunition has increased relatively to other
parts of Somalia.
166. Weapons in Somaliland come mainly from arms markets in Yemen. By
disrupting arms trafficking across the Gulf of Aden, counter-piracy operations have
reportedly contributed to a significant increase in the cost of weapons. Many remain
in the territory, where there is a lively domestic arms market: according to a recent
survey, 74 per cent of Somaliland households own small arms: mainly assault rifles
and pistols. 95 Other arms are destined for trans-shipment to eastern Ethiopia, where
the Ogaden National Liberation Front remains active, or to southern Somalia.
167. Arms trafficking is more prevalent in the disputed regions of eastern Sanaag
and Sool, where there is no effective governmental authority. This is in part because
traffickers have freedom of movement from the Gulf of Aden coast to southern
Somalia, encountering no regional or local administration. It is also due to the
presence of various armed groups operating in those areas, including clan militias,
Al-Shabaab affiliates and militia aligned with sections of the Dhulbahante clan who
seek autonomy for their region.
168. Lastly, both Somaliland and Puntland maintain significant military forces in
the Sool region, where they face off against one another to the east of Laascaanood.
Any escalation in the dispute between them would probably be accompanied by an
arms build-up on both sides.
__________________
94 Reliable sources believed that these weapons had been part of a consignment delivered to the
Transitional Federal Government by the Uganda People’s Defence Forces, but the Monitoring
Group has been unable to obtain specimens and serial numbers to verify this information.
95 Danish Demining Group, “Community, safety and small arms in Somaliland”, 2009.

10-24689 49
S/2010/91

Man-portable air defence systems

169. The small number of man-portable air defence systems available to armed
opposition groups in Somalia continues to be a serious security concern. The
Monitoring Group received information that new systems were delivered to Somalia
from Eritrea early in 2009.
170. In October 2008, AMISOM forces based at Mogadishu International Airport
observed a small group of opposition fighters take up positions near the south end of
the runway. They successfully attacked the group, one of whom was equipped with
an SA-7b surface-to-air missile. 96 The grip stock and launcher were removed by the
Ugandan military for intelligence purposes, but the Monitoring Group was able to
inspect the missile and battery in Mogadishu.
171. The Government of the Russian Federation has confirmed to the Monitoring
Group that the items recovered in Mogadishu were manufactured in the Soviet
Union in 1979 at the Degterev and Kovrov plants. 97 However, neither the Russian
nor the Ugandan Government has provided additional information that could assist
in tracing the chain of custody through which the weapon arrived in Somalia. 98
172. Early in 2009, the Somaliland authorities recovered 10 SA-7b launchers from a
Somali arms dealer. The weapons had been part of a total consignment of
18 missiles delivered by air from Eritrea to Guuri’eel in central Somalia, where 8 of
the missiles were handed over to a group of Habar Gidir Ayr militia from
Al-Shabaab. The remaining 10 were retained by the broker for his own profit, and
eventually arrived in Somaliland where they were seized. According to the
Somaliland authorities, all but one of the launchers was subsequently transferred to
Ethiopian custody for intelligence purposes. The Government of Ethiopia has not
responded to the Monitoring Group’s request for additional information. 99

Improvised explosive devices

173. The weapons and tactics of armed opposition groups in Somalia have remained
relatively unchanged in recent years. One notable exception, however, is in the field
of improvised explosive devices, where tactics and technology have evolved rapidly
over a relatively short period of time. The Monitoring Group believes that this trend
is the result of foreign fighters and Somalis trained abroad bringing new skills and
techniques to the battlefield.
174. Primitive improvised explosive devices inspected by the Monitoring Group
included anti-tank mines or artillery shells modified for remote detonation, possibly
with some additional metal objects (bolts, metal filings) welded to the casing to
enhance the fragmentation effect. Others comprised mundane objects (milk powder
tins, oil jerry cans, fire extinguishers, etc.) filled with explosives and wired for
remote detonation. The most common explosive in Somalia is TNT, which can be

__________________
96 This shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missile was manufactured in the USSR and other Eastern
Bloc countries. A modernized version of the SA-7a, it was first put into service in 1968.
97 Letter from the Government of the Russian Federation, 24 September 2009.
98 In a letter dated 10 December 2009 regarding the weapons recovered in Hargeysa, the
Government of the Russian Federation stated that it was impossible “to determine a customer
and a final user of the items” due to the destruction of the relevant documentation after the
expiration of the weapon’s 17-year service lifetime.
99 Letter to the Government of Ethiopia, 16 December 2009.

50 10-24689
 S/2010/91

found in mines and high explosive shells, and can be recycled in powdered form to
produce improvised explosive devices. 100
175. Such basic improvised explosive devices have increasingly given way to more
sophisticated devices, including the use of mobile phones as trigger mechanisms,
and suicide bombers to deliver vehicle-borne or person-borne improvised explosive
devices. Tactics have also improved considerably, notably in terms of multiple,
simultaneous or sequential blasts.
176. The first recorded suicide attack in Somalia occurred in 2006. From 2006 to
December 2009 there were 21 confirmed suicide attacks, as well as several other
alleged cases. 101 Four of the attacks occurred during the course of the mandate:
• February 2009: attack on AMISOM Burundian force headquarters in
Mogadishu (11 AMISOM soldiers were killed).
• June 2009: attack on Medina Hotel, Beledweyne (assassination of Minister of
Security Omar Haashi; 35 people were killed).
• September 2009: attack on AMISOM force headquarters in Mogadishu
(17 soldiers and 4 civilians were killed).
• December 2009: attack on Shamo Hotel (24 people, including 4 ministers,
were killed).
177. The two attacks on AMISOM forces, at the Burundian force headquarters on
22 February 2009 and AMISOM headquarters on 17 September 2009, were carefully
planned and executed, requiring considerable intelligence collection and prior
reconnaissance of the target. Both consisted of complex, dual-suicide attacks
involving vehicle-borne and person-borne improvised explosive devices and indirect
fire. Although claimed by Al-Shabaab, the attacks bear the hallmarks of Al-Qaida
operations elsewhere in the world, suggesting that Al-Shabaab either relied on the
expertise of foreign-trained explosives experts, or have recently acquired such
skills.

Foreign fighters
178. Al-Shabaab work hard to attract non-Somali recruits to their cause.
Al-Shabaab propaganda is widely disseminated in at least three languages —
Somali, English and Arabic — and a small number of specialized websites also
carry propaganda in other languages. Al-Shabaab Internet forums (see section II.C
above) have also attempted to engage non-Somalis, providing information and
instruction on how to join the armed struggle. 102

__________________
100 One notable exception was the vehicle-borne improvised explosive device suicide bombing in
Hargeysa in October 2008, which employed 250-300 kg of ammonium nitrate fuel oil. This low-
grade explosive can be homemade and is produced with fertilizer. In Afghanistan, 95 per cent of
the improvised explosive devices are fabricated with ammonium nitrate fuel oil, prompting
NATO forces to launch a buy-back programme for fertilizers (accessed at
www.globalsecurity.org).
101 Based on Stig Jarle Hansen, “Revenge or reward; the case of Somalia’s suicide bombers”,
unpublished paper, June 2009.
102 For example, in March 2009 the Monitoring Group learned of a dialogue between senior leaders
of Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, and individuals claiming to represent the Pakistani Taliban.
Among the issues addressed were the number of potential recruits from among Somali students
in Pakistani madrassas, and the question of secure routes into Somalia from foreign countries.

10-24689 51
S/2010/91

179. Despite these efforts, the presence of foreign fighters in Somalia among the
ranks of Al-Shabaab has been routinely overstated. Transitional Federal Government
reports of foreign fighters appear to be tainted by political considerations. In July
2009, the Transitional Federal Government displayed the bodies of four foreign
fighters, three of whom were subsequently identified as Somalis. In various
communiqués reporting on the military clashes with armed opposition groups, Alhu
Sunna wal Jama’a has claimed to have fought and killed foreign fighters but has not
yet provided evidence to substantiate this. 103
180. One of the most widely cited sources with respect to foreign fighters among
Al-Shabaab is Mohamed Sheikh Abdullahi, also known as Bakistaan, 104 an
Al-Shabaab commander of the Maymana Brigade who defected to the Transitional
Federal Government on 9 November 2009. Both in government debriefings, and to
the international media, Bakistaan provided names and nationalities of a number of
foreigners allegedly operating with Al-Shabaab. According to his statements,
Kenyan nationals, including Kenyan Somalis, account for half of all foreign
fighters, and about 450 other foreign nationals have come from Bangladesh,
Chechnya, Pakistan, the Sudan and the United Republic of Tanzania — assertions
that the Monitoring Group has generally found to be corroborated by a variety of
other credible sources, including Monitoring Group contacts on the ground. 105
However, Bakistaan’s assertions that the total number of foreign fighters is in the
thousands and that Al-Shabaab operations are directly controlled by Al-Qaida are
less credible.
181. The Monitoring Group estimates the total number of foreign fighters with
armed opposition groups in Somalia to be under one thousand, of which a much
smaller proportion possesses relevant training and experience. It has been reported
that foreign fighters are present not only in Mogadishu, but also in the Bay and
Bakool, Lower Juba and Middle Juba regions. Their contribution to Al-Shabaab’s
efforts is threefold: ideological, training (explosives, infantry tactics), and — on
occasion — as shock troops.
182. Small numbers of foreigners have played key advisory and leadership roles,
and the training and technical expertise they provide has served as a force multiplier
for Al-Shabaab. They are also of disproportionate propaganda value. However, there
is no evidence that the overall impact of the foreign fighters on the battlefield has
been decisive.

Presence of the Ethiopian National Defence Force on Somali territory

183. Throughout the course of the mandate, the Ethiopian National Defence Force
has routinely entered Somali territory, notably in the Hiraan and Galguduud regions,
and established temporary bases. Late in August 2009, Ethiopian forces stationed at
the border town of Ferfer also engaged in joint operations with ASWJ against
Al-Shabaab.

__________________
103 The most recent example obtained by the Monitoring Group is an ASWJ report on the fighting
that took place between 25 and 27 January 2010 in Galguduud and in Hiraan.
104 Somali for Pakistani.
105 The Monitoring Group has also received reports of foreign fighters from Algeria, the Comoros,
Egypt, Iraq, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan and Yemen.

52 10-24689
 S/2010/91

184. The Monitoring Group has also learned of Ethiopian force sorties into Gedo
region, apparently for reconnaissance purposes.
185. The Monitoring Group does not believe that operations of foreign military
forces on Somali soil correspond with the definition of support to the Somali
security sector under Security Council resolution 1772 (2007), and therefore
constitute a substantive violation of the arms embargo.

B. Support to the Somali security sector

186. Security Council resolution 1772 (2007) requires support to Somali security
sector institutions to be authorized by the Committee established pursuant to
resolution 751 (1992) in accordance with stipulated procedures. The Monitoring
Group has attempted to monitor all inputs in this regard with a view to assessing
compliance with Security Council requirements. This task has been complicated by
two main factors: the disorganization of the Somali security sector, and the failure
of several international partners to fulfil their obligations under resolution 1772
(2007).

Authorized support to the Somali security sector during the Group’s mandate
187. Several countries submitted requests to provide support to Somali security
sector institutions in accordance with paragraph 11 (b) of resolution 1772 (2007),
which were subsequently approved by the Committee. These countries are: Djibouti,
France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States.
188. Djibouti trained 463 Somalia soldiers for three months in Djibouti at the Hol-
Hol camp. This unit was sent back to Somalia on 18 October 2009. Although
Djibouti initially failed to notify the Committee in advance of its intentions, as
required by resolution 1772 (2007), it did so after the fact in response to a query
from the Monitoring Group and received approval from the Committee in October
2009.
189. France notified the Committee in July 2009 of its intent to train a battalion-
sized unit (510 soldiers) in Djibouti.
190. At the International Conference in Support of Somali Security Institutions,
held at Brussels on 23 April 2009, Italy pledged €2 million for the security forces of
the Transitional Federal Government, earmarked to provide salaries and food to
3,274 registered personnel of the government military forces, as well as for
maintenance and fuel for their vehicles. The Monitoring Group has since received
information indicating that the Government of Italy has pledged a further $4 million
in assistance, as well as various forms of technical assistance.
191. To date, Italy has notified the Committee, in December 2009 and January
2010, of its intention to provide financial support totalling €4 million for payment of
government force salaries, to be channelled via AMISOM.
192. The United Kingdom notified the Committee in October 2009 that it intended
to provide logistical support to the Somaliland police. The Government of the
United Kingdom also requested an exemption on behalf of a humanitarian mine
action non-governmental organization, the Halo Trust, in connection with its
operations in Somaliland.

10-24689 53
S/2010/91

193. The United States requested authorization to provide cash, as well as arms and
ammunition, in May and June 2009. The United States support consisted chiefly of
ammunition for light and medium-sized weapons and was purchased from on-hand
stocks of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces. The overall amount notified by the
United States Government was 94 tons of weapons and ammunition and $2 million
in financial assistance. No sophisticated or heavy weapons were delivered. 106

Observations on authorized support

194. In its report of December 2008, the Monitoring Group commented on the
unintended consequences of security sector support to the Transitional Federal
Government, notably the defection or desertion of roughly 80 per cent of trainees,
together with their arms, ammunition, equipment, uniforms and skills. Although the
consequences of authorized assistance to the Transitional Federal Government
during this mandate have been less dramatic, there are some noteworthy issues.
195. The selection, recruiting and training of Transitional Federal Government
forces, while essential to the reorganization and improvement of the security sector,
continues to pose problems. For example, although government soldiers sent for
training by the French army in Djibouti were to have been chosen from a broader
cross-clan pool, in practice most were selected from among Hawiye/Abgaal and
Hawaadle clans considered to be supportive of the Transitional Federal Government.
196. The loyalty of these trainees is nevertheless in doubt. Many appear to have
been motivated by the promise of food and payment, and some deserted
immediately upon their return. Military sources also suspected that some trainees
had been planted by Hizbul Islam or Al-Shabaab. Those who remained do not
appear to have significantly altered the performance of the Transitional Federal
Government on the battlefield.
197. United States contributions to the Transitional Federal Government appear to
have been informed in part by past experience. Most of the American consignment
was ammunition, and only a limited supply of infantry weapons in order to
minimize losses. Nevertheless, there are widespread reports of government forces
selling ammunition, and weapons from the same consignment appear to have ended
up on the market. 107

C. Non-compliance

198. The majority of assistance to the Somali security sector has not been
authorized by the Committee. Although the Monitoring Group has attempted to keep
track of such contributions, it has not always been able to do so. While some States
appear to be unaware of their obligations, others seem to resist transparency and
accountability. Whatever their reason or intentions, those States are in technical
violation of the general and complete arms embargo on Somalia.
199. The Monitoring Group is aware of several States that have not met their
obligations under resolution 1772 (2007). In several cases, they have also failed to

__________________
106 Monitoring Group correspondence with United States Government official, 22 July 2009. The
heaviest ammunition delivered was for 82-mm mortars.
107 The price of an AK-47 type rifle in Mogadishu reportedly fell from $600 to $300 the same week.

54 10-24689
 S/2010/91

provide clarification to the Monitoring Group when requested to do so. Those States
include Ethiopia, Kenya, the Sudan, Uganda and Yemen.

Ethiopia
200. During the course of the mandate, the Monitoring Group has received
numerous reports of Ethiopian assistance to both the Transitional Federal
Government and ASWJ, without authorization in either case. On 20 August 2009,
the Ethiopian Government spokesman, Bereket Simon, acknowledged his
Government’s actions in this regard when he told the media: “We have openly told
the world that we will support the [Transitional Federal Government]. We have been
training their forces and will continue to do so because they are forces of peace.” 108
201. Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a has also acknowledged that some of its fighters
received training in Ethiopia in mid-2009 in preparation for an offensive against
Al-Shabaab based at Eel Buur. 109 In August 2008, some of those fighters were
engaged in clashes with Al-Shabaab in the Galguduud region.
202. Prior to 21 June 2009, Ethiopian assistance to ASWJ arguably constituted a
substantive violation of the embargo rather than a technical one. However, since the
signature of a cooperation agreement between ASWJ and the Transitional Federal
Government on 21 June 2009 (subsequently reinforced by the agreement of
30 November 2009), the Monitoring Group accepts that the definition of a Somali
security sector institution could be extended to include ASWJ. 110
203. On 6 October 2009, the Monitoring Group sent a letter to the Government of
Ethiopia requesting clarification of “its operation on the Ethiopian-Somali border
and adjacent areas as well as Ethiopian relations with Somali armed groups in Gedo
and Galguduud regions”. No reply has been received to date.

Kenya
204. There has been considerable confusion concerning the training of forces
aligned with the Transitional Federal Government in Kenya by the Government of
Kenya. Kenyan Government officials have publicly acknowledged that it had
accepted a request from the Transitional Federal Government to train government
police officers, but initially denied any other type of training. Monitoring Group
field investigations have confirmed the existence of a military training programme,
in the absence of authorization from the Committee. In December 2009, the Kenyan
Minister of Security, George Saitoti, reportedly confirmed to foreign diplomats the
existence of a “Jubaland policy” intended to establish a “buffer zone” bordering
Kenya in the Juba Valley.
205. The training programme was initiated early in 2009 at the request of President
Sharif and under the auspices of his then Minister of Defence, Mohamed Abdi
Mohamed “Gandhi”. Kenya hosted the programme, and Ethiopia has been closely
involved. Approximately 2,500 youth were recruited by clan elders and
commissioned agents, both from within Somalia (exclusively the Juba Valley) and
__________________
108 Agence France Presse, “Al-Shabaab, Pro-Government Forces Battle for Southern, Central
Somalia Heightens”, 20 August 2009.
109 From report at Wadanka.com, 18 August 2009.
110 The Monitoring Group has also learned that in December 2009 the Transitional Federal
Government specifically requested that the Government of Ethiopia provide assistance to ASWJ.

10-24689 55
S/2010/91

north-eastern Kenya, including the Dadaab refugee camps. Two training centres
were established, one at the Kenya Wildlife Service training camp at Manyani, the
other near Archer’s Post at Isiolo. A total of 36 Somali officers were recruited to
assist in the training, under the leadership of General Abdi Mahdi (Daarood/
Ogaden) and Abdullahi Sheikh Ismail “Fartaag” (Daarood/Marehaan). The officers
assembled at Manyani in August and completed a one-month seminar in September
2009. 111
206. Despite official claims of recruitment on the basis of a national
“4.5 formula”, 112 Monitoring Group investigations have confirmed that the greatest
number of recruits are from the Ogaden clan, with the Marehaan in second place.
This has reportedly engendered some anxiety among other clan groups along both
sides of the common border.
207. Media reports and international non-governmental organizations have alleged
numerous irregularities in the management of the training programme, including
recruitment of underage youth, of Kenyan citizens, false promises of financial
remuneration, and recruitment of refugees. Independent Monitoring Group
investigations, including interviews with trainers and trainees from Manyani, have
confirmed that all of these practices did indeed take place, but the Group cannot
assess the scale of the irregularities.
208. The Monitoring Group is unaware of any notification to the Security Council
concerning this training programme. In a reply dated 23 February 2010 to a
Monitoring Group query on this subject, the Government of Kenya denied that it has
provided training for Somali troops.

Uganda
209. The Uganda People’s Defence Forces trained a battalion-sized unit in Uganda
early in 2009, which was redeployed to Mogadishu in May 2009. The Government
of Uganda has informed the Monitoring Group that this training took place within
the context of the AMISOM mission. 113 However, since the training was conducted
by Ugandan army units that are not part of AMISOM, the Monitoring Group
considers the training to have been conducted on a bilateral basis and therefore to
require authorization from the Security Council.

Sudan
210. On 12 November 2009, a group of 70 recruits took off from Mogadishu
International Airport for Khartoum for a VIP protection course. They travelled in an
official Sudanese aircraft with registration number AN 74 ST-GFF.
211. The Monitoring Group is unaware of any notification to the Security Council
concerning this training programme, and on 19 November 2009 sent a letter to the
Government of the Sudan requesting clarification and additional information. No
reply has been forthcoming.

__________________
111 Monitoring report, 4 November 2009, based on multiple interviews.
112 The “4.5 formula”, upon which representation in the transitional federal institutions is currently
based, assigns equal representation to each of four major clan groups: Daarood, Digil-Mirifle,
Dir and Hawiye. Minority groups collectively receive half the share of the major clans.
113 Pursuant to paragraph 9 (c) of Security Council resolution 1772 (2007).

56 10-24689
 S/2010/91

United Arab Emirates

212. International Civil Aviation Authority records received by the Monitoring
Group mention six United Arab Emirates military flights to or from destinations in
Somalia between 6 January and 27 July 2009. All of those flights were conducted
with a DHC6 Twin-Otter aircraft (registration 2255).
213. In correspondence with the Monitoring Group, the Government of the United
Arab Emirates does not acknowledge any military flights to Somalia in 2009 with
such an aircraft. On 28 January 2010, the Monitoring Group sent a letter to the
Government of the United Arab Emirates requesting clarification and additional
information.

D. International, regional and subregional organizations

United Nations
214. The United Nations system is engaged in a range of programmes and projects
involving support to Somali security sector institutions. 114 Like the European
Union, cited below, resolution 1772 (2007) makes no provision for the United
Nations to obtain exemptions for these activities.
215. In November/December 2009, intelligence personnel of the Transitional
Federal Government received training in Uganda by a Ugandan private security
company. The training programme was reportedly financed from a United Nations
Trust Fund for Somalia administered by the United Nations Political Office for
Somalia (UNPOS).
216. At the time of writing, the Monitoring Group had yet to receive a response
from UNPOS to queries about the training programme.

European Union
217. The European Union is currently planning to provide training to Somali forces
in Uganda. The planning phase should end by the end of February so that the
mission can be launched in May 2010. The stated objective is to contribute to the
strengthening of the Somali security forces through the provision of initial military
training up to platoon level. A programme to identify potential non-commissioned
officers and junior officers would also be put in place. Overall, at least 1,000 Somali
combatants would be concerned.
218. Paragraph 11 (b) of resolution 1772 (2007) makes reference only to States and
not to international, regional and subregional organizations. It is therefore not
possible under current circumstances for the European Union to obtain an
exemption from the Committee for its activities.

E. Private security companies

219. Another feature of Somalia’s war economy is the increasing activity of private
security companies. Most private security companies are currently focused on
__________________
114 United Nations Development Programme support to the Somali Police Force figured
prominently in the Monitoring Group’s report of December 2008 (S/2008/769).

10-24689 57
S/2010/91

water-borne services and counter-piracy measures, such as providing armed

protection for merchant vessels, and they do not necessarily conduct operations on
Somali territory. A small but growing number, however, are prepared to tackle the
challenges of onshore security services, including support to AMISOM, support to
the Transitional Federal Government, and protection for private enterprises.
220. Few private security companies are aware of the arms embargo, and may
therefore be operating in violation of its provisions. As mentioned above, resolution
1772 (2007) is silent on whether non-State actors providing support to Somali
security sector institutions or private militias might be eligible for waivers or
exemptions.

Bancroft Global Development

221. Bancroft provides technical expertise to AMISOM, principally related to
counter-improvised explosive device capabilities, and operates under the auspices of
AMISOM.

Dyncorp International
222. Dyncorp provides logistical support to AMISOM. Its facilities and personnel
were specifically targeted during the suicide attack on 17 September 2009 at
AMISOM force headquarters.

CSS Global Inc.

223. According to media reports, 115 a United States-based company named CSS
Global, an affiliate of CSS Alliance, has secured a contract with the Transitional
Federal Government for services relating to counter-piracy and counter-terrorism.
These reports were corroborated by an official of the Transitional Federal
Government, Ali Hassan Gulaid, on 14 October 2009.
224. The Monitoring Group is unaware of any authorization of this activity by the
Committee and sent a letter on 16 December 2009 to CSS Global seeking
clarification. CSS has provided no response to date.

Physical Risk Solutions

225. Physical Risk Solutions is a private security company registered in Somaliland
and managed by a South African citizen. The company operates with the
authorization of the Somaliland Ministry of the Interior and provides guard services
to private companies and non-governmental organizations. The company is not
permitted to bring firearms or military equipment into Somaliland.

The Saladin Group

226. During the mandate, the Monitoring Group received information pertaining to
the activities in Puntland of the Saladin Group, a United Kingdom-based company.
The information received could not be fully corroborated.

__________________
115 See for example, “CSS Global Inc wins contract to protect government from terrorism, pirates”,
The Grand Rapids Press, 15 October 2009.

58 10-24689
 S/2010/91

227. Contacted by the Somalia Monitoring Group, Saladin acknowledged that it

conducted brief assignments in Somaliland and Puntland in 2008, involving close
protection services. In January 2009, Saladin also deployed two personnel to extract
two journalists who had been taken hostage. According to Saladin, it has not
conducted any operations in Somalia since 4 January 2009.

Threat Management Group

228. The Monitoring Group has received information indicating that the Kuwait-
based Threat Management Group has been engaged by the Puntland authorities in
north-eastern Somalia to provide support for local Somali security forces. Neither
the Threat Management Group nor the Government of Kuwait has notified the
Committee.

Triton International Ltd.

229. The Monitoring Group has received information indicating that Triton
International Ltd., a United Kingdom-based company, is providing assistance to the
Somaliland coastguard. Following a query from the Monitoring Group, Triton has
confirmed that it has a contract to this effect. The Monitoring Group has requested
additional information.

VI. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance

230. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance takes multiple forms in Somalia. The
country is considered to be one of the most hostile environments in the world for aid
workers; 10 were killed in 2009 and 10 are still held in captivity. 116 Across much of
the south, Al-Shabaab have declared aid agencies unwelcome, accusing them of
acting as spies for hostile Governments. United Nations and non-governmental
organization offices have been raided and looted by Shabaab fighters, and United
Nations vehicles have been used by Al-Shabaab for suicide bombings.
231. Even where aid agencies can function, monitoring and delivery of assistance is
often difficult or even dangerous, creating opportunities for diversion and fraud.
Some aid agencies routinely pay off local authorities for their own “protection”. Aid
convoys are “taxed” or forced to surrender some of their cargo at checkpoints. As in
other conflict zones, armed groups not only control access to needy populations but
also seek to exert a degree of control over aid resources for their own purposes.
232. Under such circumstances the aid community has come to accept a certain
level of risk, loss, theft and diversion as “the cost of doing business” in Somalia.
The Monitoring Group has therefore focused its investigations not on such routine
practices but on large-scale, egregious and systematic obstruction of humanitarian
assistance.

__________________
116 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Somalia, Weekly Humanitarian Bulletin,
Issue No. 48, 18-31 December 2009 (http://www.reliefweb.int/).

10-24689 59
S/2010/91

A. Food aid and diversion

233. The Security Council in resolution 1844 (2008), paragraph 8 (c), prohibited
acts that obstruct the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, or access to, or
distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Somalia. The Monitoring Group
interprets this definition to include the diversion of assistance away from its
intended beneficiaries, whether to the advantage of an armed group, or simply for
the purpose of profit.
234. The vast majority of humanitarian assistance to Somalia consists of food aid,
which is particularly vulnerable to diversion. The largest single provider of food aid
is WFP, which accounted for just under 60 per cent of the total United Nations
assistance budget in 2009, or about $485 million out of $850 million. WFP
transportation contracts to Somali businessmen constitute the greatest single source
of revenue in Somalia and just three contractors receive 80 per cent of this
business. 117 The transportation budget for WFP in 2009 was approximately
$200 million. According to WFP transporters and other sources involved in food aid
distribution interviewed by the Monitoring Group, the system offers a variety of
opportunities for diversion all along the supply chain.
235. Diversion involving collusion between ground transporters and implementing
partners is a common form of fraud — especially where transporters and
implementing partners are actually owned or controlled by the same people. 118 WFP
requires that implementing partners certify the delivery of food as proof that ground
transporters have fulfilled their contracts. Implementing partners and transporters,
as well as other interested parties, may therefore agree to divert food aid and share
the proceeds. Percentages vary, but sources interviewed by the Monitoring Group
describe an approximate division of 30 per cent for the implementing partner and
local WFP personnel, 10 per cent for the ground transporter, and 5 to 10 per cent for
the armed group in control of the area (according to a WFP spokesman, Al-Shabaab
controls 95 per cent of the WFP areas of operation). 119 The remainder of the
consignment is distributed to the recipient population.
236. Some implementing partners possess protected warehouses located near
Somali markets where diverted food can be readily sold, and instruct transporters to
deliver food directly to those warehouses rather than to specific distribution points.
Transporters may feel compelled to comply in order to obtain the implementing
partner certification that they have fulfilled their contract with WFP.
237. All of these ruses — and others — are business-as-usual in the so-called
“Afgooye Corridor”, where there is the single greatest concentration of internally
__________________
117 Multiple Monitoring Group interviews with WFP officials.
118 In some cases, implementing partners may actually be owned or controlled by national WFP
staff, further complicating the picture. When Channel 4 News (United Kingdom) issued a report
on diversion of food destined for internally displaced persons in June 2009, an unknown entity
calling itself the Somali IDPs Protect Committee issued an “indictment letter” in September
against the Somali journalist involved, and circulated photographs of internally displaced
persons demonstrating in support of WFP. Many credible Monitoring Group sources claimed the
letter was written and photographs taken by local WFP staff acting on behalf of the
non-governmental organizations they have established to act as WFP implementing partners, and
that the women and children who took part in the demonstrations were paid to do so.
119 Widely reported; see for instance Scott Baldauf, “UN suspends food aid to southern Somalia”,
Christian Science Monitor, 5 January 2010 (http://www.csmonitor.com).

60 10-24689
 S/2010/91

displaced persons in Somalia. 120 As in other conflict zones around the world, the
high volume of food deliveries to a disoriented population in a zone of contested
military control makes it a conducive environment for diversion. Access to some
camps is effectively controlled by armed groups, who oversee food distribution in
order to take credit for aiding the people under their control. The families of
combatants are routinely registered as internally displaced persons in order to
receive rations, inflating the numbers of those in need.

The World Food Programme and the Eel Ma’aan group

238. In theory, access to WFP contracts is subject to open tender and competitive
bidding. In practice, the system offers little or no scope for genuine competition.
Preliminary investigations by the Monitoring Group indicate the existence of a de
facto cartel, characterized by irregular procedures in the awarding of contracts by
the WFP Somalia country office, discriminatory practices and preferential treatment.
Although these internal WFP procedures fall beyond the scope of the Monitoring
Group’s mandate, they create an environment conducive to large-scale diversion of
food aid and warrant further, independent investigation.
239. One of the consequences of these practices is that, for more than 12 years,
delivery of WFP food aid has been dominated by three individuals and their family
members or close associates: Abukar Omar Adaani, Abdulqadir Mohamed Nur
“Enow” and Mohamed Deylaaf. In 2009, these three individuals secured 80 per cent
of WFP delivery contracts as part of the WFP transportation budget of
approximately $200 million. On account of their contracts with WFP, these three
men have become some of the wealthiest and most influential individuals in
Somalia. Previous Monitoring Groups have referred to their activities in several
reports. 121
240. Since WFP requires Somali businessmen to arrange for their own protection
when delivering food aid to those in need, transporters have built the costs of
protection into their contracts. The provision of food aid has thus become a
militarized business, with businessmen maintaining their own militias in order to
protect their warehouses, convoys and distribution points. Not surprisingly, WFP
contractors have maintained some of the largest private militias in southern Somalia.

__________________
120 Diversion in Afgooye has also been the subject of news reports, including the story by Jonathan
Rugman of Channel 4 News: “UN probe after aid stolen from Somalia refugees”, 15 June 2009
(www.channel4.com/news/article.jsp?id=3208557) and “Inside Somalia’s Afgoye Corridor”,
15 June 2009 (http://blogs.channel4.com).
121 Deylaaf for facilitating armed conflict and currency production (S/2003/223, paras. 112-117);
involvement in the sugar-for-arms trade (S/2004/604, para. 96); and arms purchases
(S/2005/625, p. 43, and S/2006/229, p. 51). Adaani for funding armed groups and facilitating
conflict (S/2004/604, paras. 76-77 and 100); arms shipments to opposition groups (S/2005/153,
para. 29); armed support of opposition and arms purchases (S/2005/625, para. 18 and p. 40);
fighting over Eel Ma’aan port (S/2006/229, para. 136); financing of the Union of Islamic Courts,
establishment of training facilities and arms shipments (S/2006/913, paras. 12 and 143); and
ousting by the Transitional Federal Government (S/2007/436, paras. 64-65). Enow for alleged
arms purchases (S/2008/274, pp. 70-71); and his wife Khadija Ossoble Ali in connection with
money printing (S/2003/1035, paras. 163-164).

10-24689 61
S/2010/91

241. Moreover, in addition to providing services to WFP, those contractors have

also long exercised de facto control over two of southern Somalia’s most strategic
and lucrative ports: Eel Ma’aan, to the north of Mogadishu, in which Enow and
Adaani are partners; and Marka, to the south of Mogadishu, which Deylaaf operated
for over a decade. In both a literal and figurative sense, these three individuals have
long been “gatekeepers” of WFP food aid to Somalia.

Diversion of food aid

242. Abdulqadir Nur “Enow” is Chairman and CEO of Deeqa Construction and
Water Well Drilling Co. Ltd. in Kenya and Somalia. It is incorporated in the United
States as Deeqa Enterprise LLC, based in Annandale, Virginia, and it is incorporated
in the United Arab Emirates as SAMDEQ General Trading Company LLC. 122
Enow’s wife, Khadija Ossoble Ali, is a registered agent for Deeqa Co. She is also
the President of an international non-governmental organization in Mogadishu
named SAACID. 123
243. While Deeqa operates as a transporter for WFP across much of south-central
Somalia, SAACID regularly acts as an implementing partner for WFP in
Mogadishu, and the Middle Shabelle and Lower Shabelle regions — including some
of the densest concentrations of internally displaced persons. Since WFP relies upon
the signature of an implementing partner as verification of a delivery by a
transporter, the verification by SAACID of food aid deliveries by Deeqa involves an
apparent conflict of interest and a potential loophole in a very limited mechanism of
accountability. It may also offer considerable potential for large-scale diversion.
244. On 25 September 2008, a convoy operated by Deeqa Co., bearing 1,229.55
tons of food aid, entered the Suuqa Xoolaha (livestock market) area of northern
Mogadishu en route to Tiyeglow and Huddur in central Somalia. 124 The livestock
market is known to WFP transporters as a particularly difficult and high-risk area —
a fact subsequently confirmed by Enow to WFP. 125 The standard practice of
transporters interviewed by the Monitoring Group is to send only 5 or 10 trucks at a
time on this route to minimize the risk. Deeqa, however, opted to send all 35 trucks
of its convoy through the area at the same time during a volatile period.
245. At about 10 a.m., fighters from an armed opposition group, under the
command of Abdikariim Haashi “Qoslaaye”, allegedly a former associate of Deeqa
Co., 126 stopped the convoy. Initially, members of the public were invited to help
__________________
122 www.deeqa.com.
123 Deeqa and SAACID, founded by Enow and his wife Khadija, share similar organizational
structures and are intertwined entities at a number of levels. For instance, they share the same
address and office facilities in Annandale, Virginia, in Westlands, Nairobi, and in Karaan,
Mogadishu. Yusuf Hassan Mohamed is the Secretary of SAACID International and a local
representative of SAACID in Somalia, while he is also a representative of the shareholders of
Deeqa in Kenya and Somalia, and the contact person for SAMDEQ’s and Deeqa’s transportation
services in the region. In addition, Khadija’s brother, Abdulqadir Ossoble Ali, acts as a
representative of SAMDEQ, with contractual authority.
124 The livestock market incident occurred before the adoption of resolution 1844 (2008) and
therefore does not constitute a violation of the resolution. However, the Karaan warehouse case
can be fully understood only in the context of this prior incident.
125 Enow correspondence with WFP, 26 September and 2 October 2008.
126 Qoslaaye, a member of the Duduble sub-clan of the Hawiye, is a former commander of the
Union of Islamic Courts who later joined Al-Shabaab. According to confidential Somali sources,

62 10-24689
 S/2010/91

themselves to some of the food. The majority of the consignment was offloaded by
Qoslaaye’s militia and sold to retailers. After the food had been offloaded, Deeqa’s
trucks were allowed to go free. Enow maintains that the incident represented a case
of looting, and publicly blamed UIC for the incident. However, multiple,
independent Somali and international sources believe and have told the Monitoring
Group that the attack on the Deeqa convoy was staged.
246. Another apparent episode of large-scale diversion occurred in the Karaan
district of northern Mogadishu, where Enow owns and operates a large private
warehouse. Located next to the warehouse in a shared compound is a house with the
offices of both Deeqa and SAACID. According to WFP, for much of 2009, SAACID
was the only WFP implementing partner in Karaan district, often certifying
deliveries conducted by Deeqa. 127
247. From 19 to 21 June 2009, fighting erupted in Karaan between the Transitional
Federal Government and the combined opposition forces of Al-Shabaab and Hizbul
Islam. As government forces fell back from the area, Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam
fighters together surrounded the Deeqa-SAACID compound and Enow’s warehouse,
which by then contained approximately $5 million worth of food aid. 128 The Hizbul
Islam forces comprised largely local militia, and many of their leaders and fighters
were from the same Abgaal sub-clan as Enow.
248. Opposition militia looted all the surrounding properties, but did not attack the
warehouse or the Deeqa-SAACID house and permitted SAACID staff to move the
organization’s assets to a safe location in Wabeeri district (under AMISOM
control) — allegedly in exchange for a cash payment of several thousand dollars.
The opposition forces also permitted Enow’s security guards to remain in place. 129
249. On 25 August 2009, SAACID, the non-governmental organization headed by
Enow’s wife, Khadija Ossoble, certified that a consignment of food from the Karaan
warehouse was delivered to Afgooye. The value of the consignment is estimated to
be about $600,000.
250. Between August and October 2009, the remaining contents of the Karaan
warehouse — less a percentage handed over to opposition militias — were gradually
moved by truck from Karaan to another of Enow’s warehouses in Hamar Weyne
district (under AMISOM control).
251. Both Enow and WFP officials have told the Monitoring Group that the food
was delivered to its destination. However, multiple independent sources on the
ground, including eyewitnesses, have informed the Monitoring Group that the food
was subsequently delivered to Bakaraha market. Their version of events is
consistent with other reports of diversion received by the Monitoring Group as well
as practices described in a news report by Channel 4 News on 15 June, which

__________________
Deeqa Co. had previously relied on Qoslaaye to facilitate passage through this area and to
provide security. The Monitoring Group is not certain of his actual affiliation at the time of this
incident.
127 The only other implementing partner in the area at the time was Keysaney Hospital, which
receives but does not distribute assistance.
128 Monitoring Group interviews with Abdulqadir Nur Enow, 13 July 2009 and 22 January 2010.
129 Monitoring Group interview with Abdulqadir Nur Enow, 13 July 2009.

10-24689 63
S/2010/91

appeared to document other large-scale diversions of WFP food aid to Mogadishu

markets. 130
252. In the light of eyewitness accounts, there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the contents of the Karaan warehouse may have been diverted to local markets.
Furthermore, the episode illustrates the potential for manipulation and diversion
when the same actors — in this case Enow, his family and associates — control the
food aid pipeline from warehousing to distribution. The Monitoring Group
recommends that investigations into this incident should be pursued further.
253. The contracting and food recovery practices of WFP and its transporters are
beyond the scope of the Monitoring Group’s current mandate. There is no question,
however, that irregularities prevailing in the contracting environment and
deficiencies in the certification of delivery facilitate opportunities for large-scale
diversion. For example, under the terms of their contracts with WFP, transporters
are required to post a security bond of 30 to 35 per cent of the value of shipments in
an escrow account, from which WFP can recover the value of the food if it does not
reach its destination. In fact, no bond has ever been used to recover losses. 131 In
Deeqa’s case, an ad hoc repayment scheme involved an implied — and arguably
improper — WFP guarantee of future contracts and offered an opportunity for
potential abuse.

Abukar Omar Adaani and Hizbul Islam

254. Abukar Omar Adaani is a businessman from the Warsengeli branch of the
Abgaal sub-clan of the Hawiye, and a principal partner in the Eel Ma’aan port. With
his three sons (Abdulqadir Haji Abukar Adaani, Ali Haji Abukar Adaani and
Abdullahi Haji Abukar Adaani) and his brother (Mohamud Omar Adaani), he
operates a number of trading and import/export companies, as well as other
concerns in Somalia, Kenya and the United Arab Emirates. These include the
Ramadan Hotel in northern Mogadishu, the Ramadan Trading Company involved in
the sugar trade through Kismaayo and, most prominently, one of the main WFP
contracting firms, Swift Traders Ltd. He also maintains direct or indirect interests in
other WFP contracting firms bidding for the same tenders, including Banadir
General Services (part of the Banadir group of companies through which Adaani and
Enow in partnership managed Eel Ma’aan port) and Banadir Gate East Africa
General Trading Company (a spin-off from the Banadir group).
255. The Banadir group of companies (including such entities as the Lower
Shabelle Business Committee holding company, Banadir Maritime and Port
Operation, and Banadir Maritime Import Operations) managed Eel Ma’aan port
from 1999 to 2007. Adaani and Enow held various titles in the partnership,
including, respectively, CEO and Chairman, and President. 132 Enow’s brother-in-
law, Abdulqadir Ossoble Ali, was responsible for the routine operations of the
__________________
130 “UN probe after aid stolen from Somalia refugees”, 15 June 2009
(www.channel4.com/news/article.jsp?id=3208557); and “Inside Somalia’s Afgoye Corridor”,
15 June 2009 (http://blogs.channel4.com).
131 If a consignment is lost, the value of the food is supposed to be recovered from the transporter’s
bond. In principle, therefore, transporters have a financial incentive to ensure that WFP cargo
reaches its destination safely (multiple Monitoring Group interviews with WFP officials).
132 Stig Jarle Hansen, “Civil War economies, the hunt for profit and the incentives for peace: The
case of Somalia”, AE working paper No. 1 (2007) (http://www.regjeringen.no/Upload/UD/
Vedlegg/Humanitært%20arbeid/somaliadraft.pdf); and letter from Abdulqadir Nur to Peter
Goossens, WFP Somalia Country Director, 23 February 2009.

64 10-24689
 S/2010/91

port. 133 As with other businesses in Mogadishu, part of the profits of the Banadir
group was spent on building a militia force to guard the port facilities that
eventually numbered close to 2,000. 134
256. Adaani served as a principal financier of the Union of Islamic Courts in the
lead-up to its June 2006 takeover of Mogadishu, in which the Eel Ma’aan militia
served as the core fighting force of UIC. For Adaani, the investment in UIC was
both ideologically motivated as well as a financial gamble in which he hoped to reap
the benefits of a UIC takeover of the country. Initially, as Enow publicly announced
at Eel Ma’aan, the Islamic takeover was good for business. 135 However, Adaani’s
gambit failed when Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia, reaching Mogadishu on
29 December 2006, and Adaani emerged as a patron of opposition forces in northern
Mogadishu.
257. When Sheikh Sharif became President of a reconstituted Transitional Federal
Government in January 2009 as a result of the Djibouti peace process, Adaani
sought to reclaim his earlier investment in UIC and political support of Sharif, either
through influence in the formation of the Cabinet and the running of the government
or through compensation that he reportedly valued at $50 million. President Sharif
refused both.
258. Rebuffed by President Sharif, Adaani tried to recoup his investment by
reopening Eel Ma’aan port at the beginning of 2009 with the support of WFP, which
favoured the improvement of Eel Ma’aan ostensibly as a contingency plan in case
Mogadishu port was closed. 136 The move was forcefully opposed by President
Sharif and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who perceived
Adaani’s manoeuvre as a direct challenge to the authority of the Transitional Federal
Government, and a threat to its potential to generate revenue via Mogadishu port.
WFP eventually abandoned the Eel Ma’aan venture, but not before awarding Adaani
a significant contract that included building a road from Eel Ma’aan to Isilay
airstrip. Adaani claims that the road was intended to circumvent a risky
transportation route through northern Mogadishu, where his partner Enow claimed
that a food aid convoy he operated had been looted (see above), and had the blessing
of President Sharif. 137 But according to government port officials, the new road
does not correspond with any known humanitarian delivery route and was intended
to provide armed opposition groups access to the airstrip.
259. Thereafter, a combination of Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam forces remained in
control of the Eel Ma’aan area, apparently with Adaani’s tacit approval. On 24 and
25 March 2009, Hizbul Islam forces (mainly from Adaani’s Abgaal/Harti/Warsengeli
sub-clan) launched two attacks on government forces (mainly from President
Sharif’s Abgaal/Harti/Agoonyar sub-clan) in the Yaqshiid district of northern
Mogadishu. In a briefing with senior United Nations officials the following day
(26 March), Transitional Federal Government leaders described the clashes as

__________________
133 Susan Linnee, “Capitalism is Thriving Unfettered in Somalia”, Associated Press, 5 December
2003.
134 See further Hansen, “Civil War economies”.
135 Andrew Cawthorne, “Islamic takeover seen good for Somalia business”, Reuters, 18 June 2006.
136 In an interview with the Monitoring Group on 27 May 2009, Adaani claimed that he opposed the
reopening of Eel Ma’aan, which “was WFP’s idea”.
137 Interview with Sid Ali, Adaani’s representative in Nairobi, 31 September 2009.

10-24689 65
S/2010/91

Adaani challenging President Sharif’s decision not to permit WFP use of Eel
Ma’aan.
260. Early in April 2009, African Union intelligence sources further reported that
Adaani was “raising a militia composed of members of the Warsengeli clan to fight
the government with Hizbul Islam”. One month later, Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab
jointly launched a major offensive against Transitional Federal Government and
AMISOM forces, beginning in Yaqshiid district through preparations undertaken
since February by a militia commander — and former fuel vendor at Eel Ma’aan —
named Ahmed Sheikh Muhyadiin “Laashin”. Although Laashin fought under the
banner of Hizbul Islam, AMISOM forces on the ground identified him as
commander of Adaani’s personal militia. 138 Similarly, AMISOM considered Eel
Ma’aan as an entry point for Hizbul Islam military supplies.
261. After several months of inactivity, on 23 November 2009, Hizbul Islam
declared both Eel Ma’aan and Isilay open. Adaani’s long-time political and military
partner, Hassan Dahir Aweys, personally presided over the opening ceremony. A
Hizbul Islam-affiliated website announced that “business supporters of Hizbul Islam
in Mogadishu” had reopened the facilities, but did not identify those businessmen
by name. 139

B. Kidnapping of aid workers

262. Although the number of kidnappings of aid workers in 2009 was less than half
of the 26 abductions in 2008, overall the phenomenon of taking hostages has
increased over recent years. It is fundamentally motivated by financial gain through
ransom demands, analogous to piracy, and only secondarily ideologically based.
Both Somali and international workers fall victim to gunmen operating freelance, in
gangs or as part of armed groups. Though not historically a Somali tradition per se,
kidnapping gained ground as one of a number of organized crimes that followed the
subsiding of clan warfare in the 1990s. Non-Somali targets can be preferable since
their capture does not incur the wrath of a Somali victim’s clan and entails a higher
ransom demand. Some kidnappers, however, operate in multi-clan gangs to
minimize inter-clan conflicts and the pressure of elders seeking a release to restore
calm.
263. Governments, the United Nations and non-governmental organizations
maintain a public position of non-payment of ransom as a matter of principle and to
prevent an increase in the number of incidents. Yet releases invariably entail an
exchange of funds, directly or indirectly. A dilemma exists between the human
drama and urgency of an individual case and, in the grip of a crisis, the seemingly
more abstract proliferation of the kidnapping phenomenon that will follow payment
of a ransom. While the families of Somali victims may resort to the clan for help,
families of international victims, in the absence of alternatives, may engage private
security firms specializing in kidnap negotiations. Since release of the victims
becomes the overriding objective in each case, perpetrators or facilitators of
kidnapping enjoy impunity after the fact and may even continue to do business with
__________________
138 A source close to Adaani told the Monitoring Group that Laashin had also acted as an arms
broker for Adaani’s militia in 2006-2007 (Monitoring Group interview, 10 November 2009).
139 Ganacsatada taageerta garabka Ururka Xisbul Islaam ee Muqdisho oo dib u furtay Garoonka iyo
Dekada Cisaley (Halgan.net, 23 November 2009).

66 10-24689
 S/2010/91

the international community. At a minimum, anyone involved or associated with the

kidnapping of aid workers should be identified, designated by the United Nations
country team as ineligible for grants or contracts from United Nations agencies,
and — where possible — surrendered by Somali authorities to third countries for
prosecution.

Case Study 5
Kidnapping of Action contre la Faim workers
On the night of 17 July 2009, three foreign aid workers with the
French non-governmental organization Action contre la Faim were
snatched by some 10 gunmen from the northern Kenyan town of
Mandera and taken across the nearby Somali border. After more than two
months of negotiations, the release of the hostages was secured by a
ransom payment of over $1 million.
According to the kidnappers’ instructions, payments totalling
$1,361,668 (including a bank charge of $27,065) were made on
3 October 2009 to an account with the money transfer company
Dahabshil in Baidoa. The account belonged to an individual named
Abdullahi Ali “Luway” a member of the Luway sub-clan of the
Rahanweyne.
A prominent businessman, Luway serves as a contractor for WFP
and UNICEF in the Baidoa area. He rents vehicles to both those entities
through his company, Alkhalil, and his water company Gargarwadag
often works for UNICEF. He also receives $3,000 per month in rent from
UNICEF for a building that is used to house the Somali parliament.
Luway has also been a local financier of the Al-Shabaab authority
in Baidoa since the organization took control of Baidoa in January 2009,
and a close associate of the Al-Shabaab leader and former spokesman,
Mukhtar Roobow “Abu Mansuur”. On 20 July 2009, according to
multiple Somali and international sources, Luway was also involved in
the Al-Shabaab looting of the United Nations compound in Baidoa, when
United Nations vehicles were stolen and taken to Mogadishu.
Luway has successfully exploited his social and political
connections into an intermediary role between Al-Shabaab leadership in
Baidoa and the United Nations — a situation that has evoked formal
protest from clan elders of the Digil and Mirifle community in Baidoa.a
a
“Allegation letter” regarding United Nations contractor Sheikh Ibrahim
Abdullahi Ali, signed by the Chief Elders of the Digil and Mirifle Council,
Baidoa.

VII. Cooperation with States and organizations

264. The Monitoring Group placed great value on cooperation with States and
international organizations, with special emphasis on the Horn of Africa region.
During the first two months of its mandate the Monitoring Group met with the

10-24689 67
S/2010/91

authorities in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti and briefed representatives of the

diplomatic communities in Nairobi and Addis Ababa. On 31 May 2009 the
Monitoring Group formally briefed the Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal
Government. 140 The Government of Eritrea denied several Monitoring Group
requests to visit on the grounds that key officials would not be available.
265. Through these initial contacts, the Monitoring Group learned that very few
concerned government officials and diplomats were conversant with relevant
Security Council resolutions on Somalia, or with the mandate of the Monitoring
Group. In addition to providing briefings on these issues as required, the Committee
established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) issued a note verbale to Member
States on 24 September 2009, reminding States of their responsibilities and
obligations.
266. During the course of the mandate, the Monitoring Group sent 56 letters on a
wide range of issues to States, international organizations and several private
companies. Of this total, 22 letters related to security and weapons-tracing issues,
17 to Monitoring Group missions, 10 to piracy and 7 to flights in and out of
Somalia. As at 2 February 2010, only 27 replies had been received.
267. The Monitoring Group received the greatest cooperation with respect to piracy.
Several Member States, as well as the International Maritime Organization and the
International Maritime Bureau, the European Union Naval Force and INTERPOL
provided valuable assistance. It is recommended that the Monitoring Group seek to
develop similar relationships with NATO and with the United States-led Coalition
Maritime Force (TF 151) and other coordinating bodies of naval forces active in the
region in the future. The International Civil Aviation Organization also provided
invaluable assistance with respect to flight information.
268. Overall, cooperation from Governments with respect to weapons identification
and tracing has been insufficient.
269. Cooperation in other respects was even more limited. States and organizations
involved in support to Somali security sector institutions were generally reluctant to
notify the Committee as required by resolution 1772 (2007), or to share information
with the Monitoring Group.
270. With the exception of Djibouti, cooperation with Somalia’s neighbours was
especially disappointing. The Governments of Kenya and Ethiopia failed to respond
to Monitoring Group requests for information that would have contributed
significantly to investigations. 141 The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia
also provided very little useful information. The Monitoring Group strongly
recommends that future cooperation with these three Governments be improved and
strengthened.

__________________
140 A member of the Monitoring Group visited the Office of the President on 2 August 2009 and
was received by officials of the National Security Agency. On other occasions, the Monitoring
Group met with the Ministers of Defence and National Security of the Transitional Federal
Government, as well as the Director-General of the National Security Agency, the Commissioner
of Police and the Head of Immigration, among others.
141 One notable exception was the Kenya Police Criminal Investigations Division, which provided
valuable assistance to the Monitoring Group. Somaliland’s Criminal Investigation Department
(Berbera) also provided exceptional assistance to the Monitoring Group’s piracy investigations.

68 10-24689
 S/2010/91

271. In its investigations into the principal contractors of humanitarian assistance,

the Monitoring Group experienced obstructionist non-cooperation by the WFP
Somalia office. This was somewhat mitigated only by the direct intervention of the
WFP Inspector-General in the course of his own investigations into diversion.
Furthermore, the Monitoring Group has not been made aware of follow-up action
regarding issues it has raised with WFP nor received the full report of the
investigations it undertook in 2009.

VIII. Observations and conclusions

272. The current military stalemate in southern Somalia is less a reflection of
opposition strength than of the weakness of the Transitional Federal Government.
Since the nomination of Sheikh Sharif to the presidency and the withdrawal of
Ethiopian forces from Somalia early in 2009, armed opposition groups —
Al-Shabaab in particular — have lost their popular support base and been gravely
weakened. Through necessity, they have also become more self-reliant. Where the
Transitional Federal Government depends on foreign assistance and African Union
forces for its survival, the opposition relies on “taxation”, extortion, and a
sophisticated international network of activists and propagandists to raise funds for
the struggle. Foreign fighters still represent an important resource for Al-Shabaab,
despite their small numbers. But the skills those foreigners once contributed to the
fight are increasingly being acquired by Somalis.
273. The reluctance of the Transitional Federal Government to forge effective
partnerships with potential local allies is the result of internal political caution
rather than external pressures. Despite infusions of foreign training and assistance,
government security forces remain ineffective, disorganized and corrupt — a
composite of independent militias loyal to senior government officials and military
officers who profit from the business of war and resist their integration under a
single command. As a result, external assistance to the Transitional Federal
Government continues to function as a major loophole in the general and complete
arms embargo, through which arms, ammunition, equipment and skills all flow to
armed opposition groups. Although difficult to verify, it is increasingly plausible
that the Transitional Federal Government represents a more important source of
arms and ammunition than foreign sponsors for its adversaries. The Transitional
Federal Government seeks to mobilize additional external resources, but the success
of the military effort hinges far more on courting domestic allies, enhancing the
cohesion of the security sector, improving discipline and reducing corruption.
274. Likewise, provision of counter-piracy support to the Puntland authorities is not
only rewarding bad behaviour, but also risks passing on counter-piracy tactics and
equipment to pirate militias themselves. The battle against piracy can most
effectively be advanced by holding the current leaders of Puntland individually and
collectively responsible for their complicity in the piracy phenomenon, and holding
them to the same standard as neighbouring Somaliland, which pursues and
prosecutes pirates with genuine vigour. The central Somali piracy networks
operating from Xarardheere and Hobyo would of course continue to present a
challenge, but a reliable counter-piracy ally in Puntland would be incalculably more
valuable than committing more naval assets to the fight.

10-24689 69
S/2010/91

275. The suspension of WFP operations in much of southern Somalia, while

dramatic, offers an opportunity to assert greater accountability and control over the
food aid pipeline. The move must not become, however, simply a realignment of
operations from Al-Shabaab to Hizbul Islam-controlled areas, such as Afgooye,
which will reinforce the existing dynamics between WFP, its principal contractors
and armed opposition groups. Rather, WFP should take immediate steps to
dismantle the de facto cartel that has monopolized its Somali operations for so many
years, and to distance itself from those business interests and individuals manifestly
aligned with armed groups or criminal activities. A more diverse, transparent
network of contractors will serve not only to enhance competition and possibly
reduce costs but also to spread financial benefits more equitably through the Somali
economy.
276. Lastly, the growing internationalization of the Somali conflict, especially
through extremist infiltration of diaspora communities, poses a new and complex
problem. Part of the solution requires the more vigorous pursuit of individual
leaders, recruiters or fund-raisers using available domestic legislation, or
designation for targeted measures under resolution 1844 (2008). A far greater
challenge involves understanding why so many ethnic Somali youth have become so
susceptible to radicalization and recruitment in their home countries, and beginning
to address the root causes.

IX. Recommendations
277. The Monitoring Group recommends that the Security Council remind all
United Nations agencies working in Somalia that they should provide all necessary
assistance to the work of the Monitoring Group, including access to United Nations
Humanitarian Air Service flights.

A. Threats to peace and security

278. The Monitoring Group recommends that:

(a) The Committee should proceed without further delay to designate
individuals and entities proposed by the Monitoring Group or Member States for
targeted measures under Security Council resolution 1844 (2008) and/or resolution
1907 (2009);
(b) Further to the provisions of resolutions 1844 (2008) and 1907 (2009), the
Government of Eritrea should cease any subsidies to members of the Alliance for
the Re-Liberation of Somalia-Asmara and any other armed opposition groups
currently based in Asmara, cancel and/or revoke any Eritrean passports issued to
members of those groups and permit international inspection of any facilities
alleged to be employed for training of armed groups from Somalia and the region;
(c) The European Union Governments take urgent steps to investigate
incidents of immigration fraud and take measures to better coordinate consular
functions among their embassies in East Africa. Recommended actions include
information-sharing with respect to visa requests; and a ban should be placed on
Somali ministers, members of parliament and officials who make fraudulent
requests for travel.

70 10-24689
 S/2010/91

B. Violations of the arms embargo

279. The Monitoring Group recommends that:

(a) The Committee should review the arms embargo exemption regime,
taking into account the Monitoring Group’s observations in the present report;
specifically:
(i) Provisions regarding exemptions to the arms embargo should be clarified
with respect to the responsibilities of international, regional and subregional
organizations;
(ii) Private security companies operating in Somalia should be required to
request exemptions for their operations from either their host government or
the government that contracts them to provide services;
(iii) The Committee should request the Member States to bring to the
attention of defence and security companies registered in their territories the
existence of an arms embargo on Somalia and relevant Security Council
resolutions;
(b) The Committee should exercise greater diligence in enforcing
compliance with the arms embargo exemptions regime; specifically:
(i) The Chair should send letters on behalf of the Committee to all States
cited above for substantive or technical violations of the arms embargo,
namely, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Sudan, Uganda and the United Arab
Emirates, reminding them of their responsibilities under relevant Security
Council resolutions and bringing to their attention the possible consequences
of non-compliance;
(ii) The Security Council should request AMISOM to inspect inventories of
weapons and ammunition obtained in accordance with Council resolution 1772
(2007), paragraphs 11 (b) and 12, in order to ensure that all such weapons and
ammunition are accounted for, and to share such information on a regular basis
with the Monitoring Group;
(c) The Committee should remind Member States of their obligations under
the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and
Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, adopted by the General
Assembly in its decision 60/519;
(d) The Security Council require States and international organizations that
come into possession of weapons, ammunition or military material that is either on
Somali territory or is destined for Somalia or has originated in Somalia to record the
identifying characteristics of those items and report them to the Monitoring Group,
in accordance with paragraph 6 of Council resolution 1425 (2002);
(e) The Security Council authorize international naval forces in the Gulf of
Aden and the Indian Ocean, including the United States-led Coalition Maritime
Force (TF 151), the European Union Naval Force (Operation Atalanta — TF 465)
and the NATO maritime force (Operation Ocean Shield — TF 508), to seize any
weapons encountered in the course of their operations and to actively interdict arms
trafficking in accordance with their capabilities;

10-24689 71
S/2010/91

(f) That the Committee act upon its decision to send a mission to the Horn of
Africa region, led by the Chair, to raise awareness among Member States,
international and regional organizations and the private sector with respect to the
provisions of resolutions 1844 (2008) and 1907 (2009), specifically the expanded
mandate of the Monitoring Group.

C. Piracy

280. The Monitoring Group recommends that:

(a) The Security Council request international naval forces in the Gulf of
Aden and the Indian Ocean, including the United States-led Coalition Maritime
Force, the European Union Naval Force (Operation Atalanta) and the NATO
maritime force (Operation Ocean Shield), to transmit any information in relation to
seizures of weapons and pirate paraphernalia to the Monitoring Group;
(b) The Security Council call upon the Puntland authorities to demonstrate
their sincerity in combating piracy by apprehending and surrendering for
prosecution in foreign countries known pirate leaders, their supporters and
financiers; to consider possible targeted measures against individual leaders who aid
or abet the commission of acts of piracy or who benefit from the proceeds of piracy;
and to prohibit the provision of security sector support to the Puntland authorities
unless and until there is measurable improvement;
(c) The Security Council encourage Member States to provide capacity-
building and training and other relevant forms of support for the operations of the
Transitional Federal Government and the Somaliland coastguard forces, as well as
other branches of the security services engaged in the fight against piracy;
(d) All Member States engaged in counter-piracy operations off the coast of
Somalia consider deployment on vessels of trained military forensic teams or
trained coastguard policemen to improve the collection, registration and
preservation of evidence.

D. Obstruction of humanitarian assistance

281. The Monitoring Group recommends that:

(a) The Security Council urge the Secretary-General to initiate a genuinely
independent investigation of the WFP Somalia country office, with authority to
investigate contracting procedures and practice, including any discriminatory
practices and preferential treatment, to undertake an accurate ground assessment of
delivery operations, and to make recommendations for action;
(b) WFP revise its internal procedures to truly diversify the issuance of
contracts, and to ensure meaningful oversight of the Somalia country office and
transparency in the organizational adjustments it makes;
(c) The United Nations Somalia country team empower the new position of
Risk Management Officer to conduct rigorous due diligence with regard to
companies to be awarded major contracts and their subcontractors, with specific
reference to who is actually in control of a business as opposed to who is formally
presented as responsible;

72 10-24689
 S/2010/91

(d) The United Nations Somalia country team, the United Nations Support
Office for AMISOM and the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, with the
Monitoring Group, develop a means of information-sharing regarding the Somali
business community contracted by the United Nations, with due regard to
social/clan, business and political affiliations;
(e) The United Nations Somalia country team, in consultation with the
United Nations Support Office for AMISOM, the United Nations Political Office for
Somalia and the Monitoring Group, should establish a database of businessmen,
their associates and subcontractors involved in supporting or financing armed
groups, or who have engaged in corrupt practices in the context of United Nations
contracting. Financial audits are only one means of identifying corruption, and
regular investigations beyond formal paperwork are necessary and feasible;
(f) The Department of Safety and Security of the Secretariat, in
collaboration with the United Nations Somalia country team and the NGO
Consortium, establish a database of individuals identified as perpetrators or
facilitators of kidnapping of aid workers for the purposes of blacklisting or taking
further action.

10-24689 73
S/2010/91

Annex I
Arms and ammunition
The types of weapons employed in the Somali conflict have not altered a great deal
over the past two decades — a legacy of the Siyaad Barre regime and the Cold War —
consisting principally of light and medium weapons produced in the 1950s-60s in
Eastern Bloc countries. These weapons are common to all the warring parties and are
widely shared through constant trading at the local level. Arms procured or delivered
to Somalia during the course of the conflict have replaced or expanded existing
stocks; they have generally not upgraded the quality or sophistication of the weapons
in use on the battlefield.
Smaller quantities of Western-made weapons from approximately the same period
are also are still in use. However, the absence of readily available ammunition for
these weapons makes them less popular with armed groups.
Tracing these weapons is extremely challenging. Many weapons designed and
produced in the ex-USSR have been widely licensed and copied. Records relating to
their manufacture, sale and export have been destroyed. And the chain of custody
through which they have arrived in Somalia can be all but impossible to establish.

Assault Rifles
The most common types of assault rifles found in Somalia are:
– AKM (Russia)
– Type 56 (China)
– Heckler and Koch G3 (Germany)
– SAR 80 (Singapore)
– M16 (USA)
In combat situations, the AK-type assault rifle is the primary weapon used by armed
forces and groups in Somalia. The Monitoring Group believes that this may be
explained by the fact that the AK cartridge type M 43 ammunition is more widely
manufactured, and therefore easier to obtain and to acquire on the black market than
other calibres of ammunition, such as the 5.56mm NATO rounds for the M-16.
Based on observation of numerous photographs and videos, in addition to on-site
inspections, the Monitoring Group believes that the Type 56 is the most common
assault rifle currently in service in Somalia. This is probably explained in part by
the fact that the Type 56 is less expensive (approx. US$350) than the Russian AKM
(between US$1000-2000). It uses the same M43 type cartridge — 7,62 mm/39 — as
the Soviet made AK 47 or AKM.

Light Machine Guns

The Monitoring Group has not observed the extensive use of light machine guns,
such as the type RPK or RPD, derived from the AK assault rifle, despite the fact that
these weapons use the same cartridge (M 43) as the AK type.

74 10-24689
 S/2010/91

General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMG)

The PK-type GPMG is the only GPMG that the Monitoring Group has observed in
common use in Somalia, where it is favoured by armed opposition groups for street
fighting. It is a reliable weapon, relatively light (9 kg), and uses a 7,62 mm / 54
cartridge, with an effective range of 600m. Ammunition belts can be held in 250-
round ammunition boxes, in special large-capacity boxes on tanks (for the PKT) or
in a 100-round assault magazine attached to the underside of the gun’s receiver. In
Somalia, fighters generally do not use magazines, but carry the belts of ammunition.
The PK machine gun has been widely copied and manufactured. China and
Bulgaria, Romania, Kazakhstan and Serbia are among the countries that have
manufactured this weapon.

Anti-tank weapons
Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs)
The RPG-7 and its imitations (notably the Chinese-made RPG 69) are well adapted
to the Somali battlefield. Efficient against armoured vehicles in urban areas, this
shoulder launched anti-tank propelled grenade is easy to transport. Famous for its
ruggedness and low cost, this weapon, requiring a basic training, has been widely
used in the Somali conflict.
The RPG is a widely produced weapon and is listed on more than 40 countries’
TO&E (table of Organization and Equipment). Besides Russia, manufacturers
include Bulgaria, China, Iran, Iraq, Romania and Pakistan. 142 During the mandate,
the Monitoring Group has inspected Russian, Chinese and Bulgarian versions of this
weapon in Somalia.
Most of the RPG grenades observed in Somalia are HEAT type PG 7 V, PG 7 VL or
PG 7 VM grenades. The market price per unit of the PG 7V grenade in Somalia is
estimated as US$50.

PG-7VL PG-7VR
PG-7V
Year of adoption 1961 1977
Warhead calibre, mm 85 93
Weight, kg 2.2 2.6
Effective range, metres 500 500
Armour penetration, mm 260 500

The RPG 7 ammunition is sensitive to moisture and temperature and needs to be

properly stored and handled. A well-manufactured grenade with good packaging can
be used for up to five years. Average-quality grenades, even with excellent
packaging, last only up to 2 years. In the Somali context, where handling procedures
and storage conditions are basic, these characteristics mean that there is a steady
need for replenishment of stocks from external sources.

__________________
142 Janes Defence, article on RPG 7.

10-24689 75
S/2010/91

Carl Gustav 84 mm
This weapon was initially manufactured in Sweden in 1948, and derived from the
German Panzerschreck. Widely exported and used, the Carl Gustav has been
expanded beyond its initial anti-tank role by the use of high explosive fragmentation
rounds. The main drawback of this weapon is its bulk and weight, 143 which is
significantly greater than its competitor, the RPG-7. However, experts consider the
Carl Gustav to be reliable and ‘‘tailored for long operational life under adverse
conditions.” 144
The picture below shows a model M2 and ammunition observed in central Somalia.

The following picture, taken during a military parade on 1 January 2009, shows an
insurgent equipped with a Carl Gustav M2. 145

__________________
143 The initial version M2C weighs14,2 kg which reduces the mobility of the fighter.
144 Janes Defence, article on Carl Gustaf recoilless rifle.
145 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v3pwOMAV_qc

76 10-24689
 S/2010/91

B10 Recoilless Rifle

The B10 is widely used in Somalia. It first entered service in the USSR in 1954 and
was copied by China as the Type 65 and Type 65-1. This rifle is an 82 mm calibre
and can fire 5 to 7 rounds per minute.
Although the B-10 was phased out of the Soviet military in the 1960s, it remained in
service in many other countries. The model displayed in the image below is a
Chinese version, carried by al-Shabaab militia at a parade on 1 January 2009.

10-24689 77
S/2010/91

Towed and Crew-Served Weapons

DShK (Degtyarev-Shpagin) Heavy Machine Gun (HMG), 12.7mm
The DShK 12.7mm HMG is used by all parties to the conflict, and is often mounted
on ‘technical’ vehicles.
Conceived before World War 2, this weapon was widely exported during the Cold
War and is no longer in production. Variations on the DShK have also been — and
still are — manufactured in countries such as China (Type 54), Iran (Ammunition
Industry Group type MGD 12,7), Pakistan (Pakistan Ordnance Factory Typed 54
licensed from China), Romania (RomArm) and the former Yugoslavia.
This HMG uses the 12.7mm/108 cartridge which has been manufactured in a
number of countries, including Bulgaria, China, the former Czechoslovakia, the
former East Germany, Egypt, Hungary, India, Iran, North Korea Poland, Romania,
Russia, Syria and the former Yugoslavia (continued by Serbia). 146
No comprehensive database of factory markings for this ammunition exists, which
greatly complicates the task of tracing.

__________________
146 http://www6.janes.com.

78 10-24689
 S/2010/91

KPV (Krubnokalibernyj Pulemet Vladimirova) 14.5 mm Heavy Machine Gun (HMG)

Like the DShK, the KPV is often mounted on vehicles and deployed in a support
role for dismounted infantry, by all parties to the conflict.
The KPV 14.5 mm model is an old-fashioned weapon, first produced in the 1950s.
This weapon had infantry, anti-aircraft and tank versions. In the Somali context, this
weapon has often been recycled from the pre-war arsenal of the Somali
Government.
Like many other Soviet weapons, the KPV has been widely copied — notably by
China which produces a Type 56 version.
The picture below was taken during an al-Shabaab military parade in northern
Mogadishu on 1 January 2010.

10-24689 79
S/2010/91

Light Anti Aircraft Guns (LAAG) and Self Propelled Anti Aircraft
Guns (SPAAG)
Although conceived to be effective against aircraft, these items can be used also
against armoured vehicles. The most common varieties in Somalia are the ZSU-23
and the 37mm.
According to Janes, the ZSU-23 was developed in the late 1950s in order to engage
low-flying targets at a range of 2.5 km as well as armoured vehicles at a range of up
to 2.5 km. 147 Initially designed with twin barrels (the ZSU-23-2), a further
development led to a 4-barrelled version known as the ‘Shilka’ (ZSU-23-4). Since
1983, the Bulgarian Arsenal Joint Stock Company (JSCo) has also been
manufacturing the Russian twin 23mm towed anti-aircraft gun as well as its
associated ammunition.
The cannon normally fires two types of fixed 23 × 153 mm ammunition; High
Explosive Incendiary Tracer (HEI-T) and Armour Piercing Incendiary Tracer
(API-T). Muzzle velocity is 970 m/s and the cyclic rate of fire is 1,600 to 2,000
rounds/min, although the maximum effective rate of fire is closer to 400
rounds/min.
Somali armed forces and groups also use the M 1939 37mm anti-aircraft gun, which
was initially produced in Russia prior to World War 2 and has also been
manufactured in Poland, China (as the Type 55) and North Korea. According to
Jane’s, the former Somali National Army possessed 180 of these weapons.

__________________
147 ZSU-23-4

80 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Mortars
All parties to the conflict have extensively used mortars in combat, mainly of the
60mm and 82 mm variety. In December 1009, AMISOM forces observed for the
first time the use of 120mm calibre rounds by armed opposition groups.
Armed opposition groups tend not to use mortars in a combat support role, but
rather to harass and provoke retaliatory fire from TFG and AMISOM forces.
Moreover, the Monitoring Group believes that opposition stocks of mortar
ammunition are fairly low, since their ‘barrages’ rarely involve more than 10 rounds,
and often as little as 3-5.
Videos footage indicates that insurgents use their mortars without sights — probably
because the tubes are old and have been poorly maintained, but also possibly
because of a lack of training. As a result, shelling is rarely accurate and often results
in civilian casualties.
The picture below, taken during a January 2009 al-Shabaab military parade, shows a
60 mm mortar without base plate or sight.

10-24689 81
S/2010/91

The picture below show 82 mm mortar rounds found in South Central Somalia in
2007-2008.

82 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Improvised Explosives Devices (IEDs)

Although they can vary widely in shape and form, IEDs share a common set of
components: an initiation system or fuze; explosive fill; detonator; a power supply
for the detonator; and a container. Some IEDs — especially those carried by suicide
bombers — may also be fitted with a secondary or ‘failsafe’ trigger to allow remote
detonation.
As shown in the pictures below, IEDs in Somalia can be derived from military
ammunition such as mortar rounds (picture 1) or anti tank mines (picture 2).

Picture 1.

10-24689 83
S/2010/91

Picture 2.

Over time, Somalia has witnessed the use of more sophisticated IEDs, such as the
example shown below (picture 3), which is contained in a former fire extinguisher,
and employed a cell phone to detonate the device. The imprint of the telephone is
still clearly seen in the cement seal. The use of keyless motorcycle starting systems
to initiate IED detonation is increasingly common, since cell phone networks in
Somalia can be unreliable.

84 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Picture 3.

Monitoring Group sources affirm that most IEDs recovered and inspected in
southern Somalia employed powdered TNT, suggesting that the explosive was
recycled from high explosive shells and mines. Powdered TNT produces a lower
order explosion than cast TNT, rendering IEDs less effective.
One notable exception to the use of TNT was the suicide attack in Hargeysa on 29
October 2008. At least some of the explosives employed in this attack were
constituted of Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil (ANFO) — a liquid explosive often
produced with fertilizer. The attackers exploited the fact that jerry cans filled with
liquid would not attract attention.
Other developments in the use of IEDs in Somalia include the use of sequential or
simultaneous explosives, such as the five parallel attacks in Hargeysa and Bosaaso
on 29 October 2008, or the twin VBIEDS deployed against AMISOM Force
Headquarters on 17 September 2009. The latter attack unsuccessfully attempted to
combine VBIEDs with pedestrian bombers with explosive vests, but the foot-borne
bombers were killed by the VBIED explosion before they could detonate their vests.
Secondary triggers on their vests (“chicken switches”) intended for remote
detonation apparently also failed to function.

10-24689 85
S/2010/91

Annex II
Weapons, equipment and other items seized from Somali
pirates during anti-piracy operations in 2009
During its mandate the Monitoring Group conducted several inspections of weapons
and equipment seized from pirates. 1 With the exception of the outboards motors,
most equipment and weapons found on pirates are outdated and in poor condition. 2

MG inspection at Mombasa police station, 09 October 2009:

Sample of weapons and ammunition seized from pirates during the course of anti-pirate operations
in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin.

__________________
1 The following types of weapons were regularly found with Somali pirates during seizures in
2009: AK-47 type assault rifles, SAR-80 and Heckler and Koch G3 assault rifles, Tokarev
pistols, RPG grenades and launchers. Equipment routinely recovered from Somali pirates during
seizures in 2009 included attack skiffs, supply skiffs, outboard engines, ladders, fuel, and cell
phones. Also found during seizures, but less common, were GPS units, binoculars, documents
and explosives.
2 All seized outboard engines were Yamaha Enduro types, fairly recent models and in good
condition.

86 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Two Tokarev pistols

Three Kalashnikov-type assault rifles

10-24689 87
S/2010/91

Monitoring Group inspection at Berbera: Somaliland Coast Guard HQ and CID

HQ, 11 October 2009

Admiral Osman Jibril Haggar, Commander of the Somaliland Coastguard, next to a seized attack
skiff

Two rusty, old RPG anti-tank grenades

88 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Pirate weapons: a Type-56 Chinese assault rifle, a German Heckler & Koch G3, rocket propelled
grenade launcher type RPG-2, and an MG42 machine gun or equivalent.

Thin, detachable steel ladder with metal arc welded on top at district CID Headquarters, Berbera.

10-24689 89
S/2010/91

Inboard motorboat used by pirates to carry provisions and fuel (seized from Fu’aad Hanaano’s
militia).

90 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Monitoring Group inspection, Mombasa port and Coast Guard HQ,

27 October 2009:

Two skiffs (Arabian model) used by pirates to carry provisions and fuel

White attack skiff used by pirates to attack a maritime vessel

10-24689 91
S/2010/91

Three outboard engines type Yamaha Enduro (type of outboard engine most commonly used by
Somali pirates)

EU NAVFOR seizures, December 2009:

Two Kalashnikov-type assault rifles

92 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Shoulder holster and chargers

Two Kalashnikov-type assault rifles

10-24689 93
S/2010/91

Mortar rounds

Rocket propelled grenade launcher, type RPG-7

94 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Anti-tank Rocket Propelled Grenades

Web pouches for magazines

10-24689 95
S/2010/91

Arsenal of weapons and ammunition seized from a ‘mother ship’

White attack skiff with Yamaha Enduro outboard engine

96 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Thin steel ladder with metal arc welded on top, used by pirates to board vessels.

Seized pirate documents — 2009

Important Notice: Notice:

This is to notify all the ship’s staff of the following This is to notify all the ship’s staff that the
warning: company has given out a merit-based reward:

1. Any man, who takes something off the ship during 1. Gaanburi (pirate name) has qualified for it and
the period before the (our) disembarkation from the the company has promised him $2000. Likewise,

10-24689 97
S/2010/91

ship, without prior permission and authorization, shall similar awards for Cadiin (pirate name) and Ina
be fined $1500 dollars. Cabdulqaadir Dhuxyaweyn (pirate name) will be
announced soon. The company will continue its
2. Any man, who enters the office without permission, reward system and it is open to all. As the saying
shall be fined $500. goes ‘the parents initially love their children
equally but it is the children who make them love
some more than the others’. So does the company.
It is up to your abilities to qualify this easy-to-
earn reward.

98 10-24689
 S/2010/91

Annex III
Piracy business model
The typical piracy ‘business model’ has evolved since the Monitoring Group’s
December 2008 report (S/2008/769). The success and expansion of pirate militias
has necessitated new organizational arrangements and practices. Although
leadership of pirate networks remains anchored in Puntland and central Somalia,
participation in maritime militias and investment in pirate operations is open to a
broad cross-section of Somali society. The refined business model guarantees every
participant in the operation, if successful, a well-defined percentage or share of the
ransom money.
A basic piracy operation requires a minimum eight to twelve militia prepared to stay
at sea for extended periods of time, in the hopes of hijacking a passing vessel. Each
team requires a minimum of two attack skiffs, weapons, equipment, provisions, fuel
and preferably a supply boat. The costs of the operation are usually borne by
investors, some of whom may also be pirates.
To be eligible for employment as a pirate, a volunteer should already possess a
firearm for use in the operation. For this ‘contribution’, he receives a ‘class A’ share
of any profit. Pirates who provide a skiff or a heavier firearm, like an RPG or a
general purpose machine gun, may be entitled to an additional A-share. The first
pirate to board a vessel may also be entitled to an extra A-share.
At least 12 other volunteers are recruited as militiamen to provide protection on land
if a ship is hijacked, In addition, each member of the pirate team may bring a
partner or relative to be part of this land-based force. Militiamen must possess their
own weapon, and receive a ‘class B’ share — usually a fixed amount equivalent to
approximately US$15,000.
If a ship is successfully hijacked and brought to anchor, the pirates and the
militiamen require food, drink, qaad, fresh clothes, cell phones, air time, etc. The
captured crew must also be cared for. In most cases, these services are provided by
one or more suppliers, who advance the costs in anticipation of reimbursement, with
a significant margin of profit, when ransom is eventually paid.
When ransom is received, fixed costs are the first to be paid out. These are typically:
• Reimbursement of supplier(s)
• Financier(s) and/or investor(s): 30% of the ransom
• Local elders: 5 to 10 %of the ransom (anchoring rights)
• Class B shares (approx. $15,000 each): militiamen, interpreters etc.
The remaining sum — the profit — is divided between class-A shareholders.

10-24689 99
S/2010/91

Annex IV
Correspondence with the Government of Eritrea

100 10-24689
 S/2010/91

10-24689 101
S/2010/91

102 10-24689
 S/2010/91

10-24689 103
S/2010/91

104 10-24689
 S/2010/91

10-24689 105
S/2010/91

106 10-24689
 S/2010/91

10-24689 107
S/2010/91

108 10-24689
 S/2010/91

10-24689 109
S/2010/91

110 10-24689