Pioneer of Industrial Organization

Pioneers of Industrial Organization
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Pioneers of Industrial
Organization
How the Economics of Competition and Monopoly
Took Shape
Edited by
Henry W. de Jong
Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Amsterdam,
The Netherlands
William G. Shepherd
Professor of Economics Emeritus, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, USA
Edward Elgar
Cheltenham, UK Northampton, MA, USA
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Henry W. de Jong and William G. Shepherd 2007

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior
permission of the publisher.
Published by
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
Glensanda House
Montpellier Parade
Cheltenham
Glos GL50 1UA
UK
Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
William Pratt House
9 Dewey Court
Northampton
Massachusetts 01060
USA
A catalogue record for this book

is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication-Data
Pioneers of industrial organization : how the economics of competition and monopoly took
shape / edited by Henry de Jong and William G. Shepherd.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Industrial organization (Economic theory) 2. EconomistsBiography.
I. Jong, H. W. de. II. Shepherd, William G.
HD2326.P5 2007
338.6'048dc22
2006021904
ISBN 978 1 84376 434 2

Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Ltd, Bodmin, Cornwall
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Contents
Contributors
About the editors
Acknowledgements
ix
xiii
xvii
Introduction to the pioneers and the issues

William G. Shepherd and Henry W. de Jong
xix
PART I
MARKET THEORY AND ITS PIONEERS IN EUROPE
1. Introduction to market theory and its European pioneers

Henry W. de Jong
2. Market theory in Europe
Henry W. de Jong
A. Adam Smith (17231790)
Henry W. de Jong
3. Economists from the German language area (nineteenth and twentieth
centuries)
Henry W. de Jong
A. Heinrich von Stackelberg (19051946)
Peter Oberender and Thomas Rudolf
B. Ernst Heusz (1922)
C. Erich Hoppmann (1923)
D. Erhard Kantzenbach (1931)
4. Market theory in the Low Countries
Henry W. de Jong
A. Henk Wilm Lambers (19162004)
Henry W. de Jong
5. French political economy about industrial matters
Jacques De Bandt
A. Jean-Baptiste Say (17671832)
Jacques De Bandt
B. Franois Perroux (19031987)
Jacques De Bandt
6. Industrial economics in Italy
Patrizio Bianchi
3
6
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78
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95
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Contents
7. The contributions of three English economists to the development of

industrial economics
Michael A. Utton
A. Alfred Marshall (18421924)
Henry W. de Jong
8. Industrial economics in Scandinavia, 18801980
Nicolai J. Foss and Peter Mllgaard
PART II
124
126
PIONEERS OF THE FIELD IN THE USA AND CANADA
9. Introduction to the pioneers in North America

William G. Shepherd
SECTION 1
147
Individual pioneers in the USA and Canada
10. To the 1930s

A. Charles Ellet Jr
F.M. Scherer
B. Henry Carter Adams
Harry M. Trebing
C. John Bates Clark
John Howard Brown
D. Jeremiah Whipple Jenks
John Howard Brown
E. John Maurice Clark
William L. Baldwin
F. George Ward Stocking
Willard F. Mueller
G. Martin G. Glaeser
Harry M. Trebing
11. The 1930s
A. Gardiner C. Means
John Howard Brown
B. Edward Hastings Chamberlin
William L. Baldwin
C. James C. Bonbright
Harry M. Trebing
D. Harold Hotelling
John Howard Brown
E. Edward S. Mason
William G. Shepherd
12. The 1940s and 1950s
A. Joseph A. Schumpeter
F.M. Scherer
B. Morris A. Adelman
William G. Shepherd
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Contents
C.
John Kenneth Galbraith

William G. Shepherd
D. Alfred E. Kahn
William G. Shepherd
E. Walter Adams
James A. Brock
F. Joe S. Bain
Richard E. Caves
G. Willard Fritz Mueller
Bruce Marion
H. Carl Kaysen
William G. Shepherd
I. Donald F. Turner
William G. Shepherd
J. George Joseph Stigler
Sam Peltzman
K. William Jack Baumol
Stephen Martin
L. John Robert Meyer
John C. Spychalski
13. The 1960s to the mid-1980s
A. Richard E. Caves
William S. Comanor
B. Leland L. Johnson
William G. Shepherd
C. Leonard W. Weiss
F.M. Scherer
D. Jacob Schmookler
F.M. Scherer
E. Frederic M. Scherer
John E. Kwoka
F. William G. Shepherd
John Howard Brown
G. Harvey J. Leibenstein
William G. Shepherd
H. William S. Comanor
William G. Shepherd
I. Oliver E. Williamson
William G. Shepherd
J. Harold Demsetz
William G. Shepherd
K. Paul W. MacAvoy
William G. Shepherd
L. Harry M. Trebing
William G. Shepherd
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Contents
M. Dennis Cary Mueller

Stephen Martin
N. Roger G. Noll
William G. Shepherd
O. Sam Peltzman
William G. Shepherd
P. Richard Schmalensee
William G. Shepherd
Q. A. Michael Spence
F.M. Scherer
R. Robert D. Willig
William G. Shepherd
S. Joseph E. Stiglitz
F.M. Scherer
Index
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Contributors
EUROPEAN
Patrizio Bianchi Professor of Economics, University of Ferrara, Italy. He previously
taught and studied at the University of Bologna where from the early 1970s Romano
Prodi developed the field of industrial economics. Bianchi has long been the Director
and Chief Editor of lIndustria Rivista di Economia e Politica Industriale, a Review that
has united Italian researchers in the field since 1978. He has published several books and
scores of articles. Currently he is the Rector of the University of Ferrara.
Jacques De Bandt Director of the French National Research Institute at Sophia Antipolis
and also President of the Revue dconomie Industrielle, the professional publication of
French industrial economists. He has published extensively on theoretical topics such as
scale and optimum output, on French industrial policy and on the worldwide dimensions
of particular sectors of industry such as textiles.
Nicolai J. Foss Professor of Strategic Management and Organization and Director of
the Center for Strategic Management and Globalization at the Copenhagen Business
School. His principal area of research concerns how organizations contribute to
competitive advantage. He also maintains an interest in process approaches to industrial
economics, such as evolutionary and Austrian economics.
Peter Mllgaard Professor of Law and Economics and head of the Department of
Economics at the Copenhagen Business School. His principal area of research is the
application of industrial organization to competition policy. He has done work on
market dominance, market power, horizontal and vertical coordination, innovation
and technology transfer. His empirical studies deal with industries such as automobiles,
cement, concrete and electricity.
Peter Oberender Professor of Economic Theory at the University of Bayreuth. Thomas
Rudolf is his assistant. Oberender is the Chairman of the Competition Policy Section of
the German Association of Economists, the Verein fr Sozialpolitik founded in 1890. He
has edited several volumes on market structures in German industry and for many years
has specialized in health economics.
Michael A. Utton Professor of Economics (Emeritus), University of Reading. His main
interests have been in antitrust economics and policy. He has published on concentration,
diversification and competition; a major book was The Political Economy of Big Business
(Martin Robertson, 1982) which discussed the ambiguities of business size from both a
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Contributors
thematic and a policy point of view. His latest books are Market Dominance and Antitrust
Policy (second edition, Edward Elgar, 2003) and International Competition Policy
(Edward Elgar, 2006). He is currently working on a book concerned with the growth and
prosecution of international cartels.
NORTH AMERICAN
(Those authors who are themselves covered elsewhere as pioneers are merely mentioned
here.)
William L. Baldwin Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New
Hampshire, 195698, now Emeritus. He has written many research papers since the
1950s, and is also the author of numerous books, such as Antitrust and the Changing
Corporation (Duke University Press, 1961), and The Structure of the Defense Market
(Duke University Press, 1967).
James A. Brock Professor of Economics, School of Business, Miami University, Miami,
Ohio. BS, MS University of Wyoming, 1973, 1975, PhD Michigan State University, 1981.
He has been the author of many books, articles and chapters on monopoly power and
antitrust issues.
John Howard Brown Professor of Finance and Economics, Georgia Southern University,
Hattiesburg, Georgia. BA, MA University of Akron, 1977, 1982, PhD Michigan
State University, 1989. He is writing an extensive history of the field of industrial
organization.
Richard E. Caves Professor of Economics Emeritus, Harvard University (see the profile
of him as a pioneer).
William S. Comanor Professor of Economics, University of California at Santa
Barbara, and Professor of Health Economics, University of California at Los Angeles
(see the profile of him as a pioneer).
John E. Kwoka Professor of Economics, Northeastern University, Boston,
Massachusetts. (see the profile of him in the Introduction to Part II).
Bruce Marion Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin,
now Emeritus. BS, MS Cornell University, 1954, 1955, PhD Ohio State University, 1963.
He is the author of numerous books and many articles.
Stephen Martin Professor of Economics, Krannert School of Business, Purdue
University, Lafayette, Indiana (see the profile of him in the Introduction to Part II).
Willard F. Mueller Professor of Economics, Agricultural Economics and Law, Emeritus,
University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin (see the profile of him as a pioneer).
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Contributors
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Sam Peltzman Professor of Economics, Graduate School of Business, University of

Chicago, Chicago, Illinois (see the profile of him as a pioneer).
F.M. Scherer Professor of Economics Emeritus, Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts (see the profile of him as a pioneer).
John C. Spychalski Professor of Economics and Business Logistics, Smeal College of
Business, Pennsylvania State University, College Station, Pennsylvania. BS St. Josephs
College, DBA, MBA Indiana University. He has written extensively on the transport
sector.
Harry M. Trebing Professor of Economics Emeritus, Michigan State University, East
Lansing, Michigan (see the profile of him as a pioneer).
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About the editors

Henry W. de Jong was born in Rotterdam in 1925 where both parents were teachers.
Because of the war, the start of his studies in economics at the Rotterdam School of
Economics (as from 1969: Erasmus University) was delayed until September 1945. But
the guidance of prominent teachers such as Franois de Vries, Jan Tinbergen and Henk
Lambers more than compensated for the lost years. They inspired a lifelong interest in
the theory and practice of economics. A decade of international economic advisory
work, practised in a Dutch multinational firm, producing steel, paper and plastic
containers in the five continents of the world focused de Jongs thinking on markets,
industries and firms. With H.W. Lambers, he wrote a PhD dissertation on market theory
(1972) at Erasmus University. This was preceded by a book on industrial concentration,
dealing with postwar developments in Europe, the United States and Japan (1970) and
by several papers on similar topics in Dutch, German and French publications (196570).
In 1968, de Jong took part in the Hearings on Economic Concentration, held by the US
Senate Committee on Antitrust and Monopoly with a paper titled, Concentration in the
Common Market.
There followed a nomination as reader in market theory at the Faculty of Economics
of the University of Amsterdam in 1969, a professorship in 1977 and a professorate at the
Nyenrode School of Business in 1973. Between 1972 and 1986, de Jong also served as a
member of the Dutch Competition Commission. After doing research work on behalf of
the European Commission (DG 4) during the 1970s and 1980s he was appointed a member
of the Commissions Advisory Group to the Merger Task Force. Jointly with Professor A.
Jacquemin, the introductory lectures were given on the occasion of the Inauguration of
the European Merger Control Law in September 1990. From 1992 to 1993, de Jong was
President of EARIE, the European Association for Research in Industrial Economists.
In 1991 de Jong retired from the University of Amsterdam and was knighted in the
Order of the Dutch Lion by the Queen. He has been a long-term member of the F. de
Vries Foundations Board, an institution to promote the study of theoretical economics
in the Netherlands.
MOST RELEVANT PUBLICATIONS

(1970), Enterprise Concentration, Leiden: H.E. Stenfert Kroese N.V. (in Dutch).
(1972), Dynamic Market Theory, Leiden: H.E. Stenfert Kroese N.V. (in Dutch, with
editions in 1981, 1985, 1989 and reprints in the 1990s).
(1977), European Industrial Organization, London: Macmillan Press (with A. Jacquemin).
(1981), The Structure of European Industry, The Hague/Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1988 and 1993.
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About the editors
(19762004), Editor of the series: Studies in Industrial Organization (with A. Jacquemin

and W.G. Shepherd).
(1997), Monopoliseren of rivaliseren, Weteringbrug: Edclusa (in Dutch).
William G. Shepherd is Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics, University of
Massachusetts at Amherst. From 1963 to 1986 he was on the faculty of the Department
of Economics, University of Michigan, in Ann Arbor.
He was educated at Amherst College, BA 1957, and Yale University, MA 1958 and
PhD 1963. His research has explored most of the technical areas within industrial
organization, and his policy research has dealt with all relevant branches: antitrust,
regulation, deregulation and public enterprise.
From 1990 to 2001 he was the General Editor of the Review of Industrial Organization,
a research journal that fits the technical and policy coverage of this book, including
international research. He expanded the Review from three to eight issues per year.
From 1989 to 1990 he was President of the Industrial Organization Society, which
sponsors the Review of Industrial Organization. From 1990 to 2001 he also managed
the Societys activities and policies. In 2002 the Society designated him as its fourth
Distinguished Fellow.
He has published over 13 monographs, textbooks and joint volumes, and over 90 articles
in professional journals and chapters in books. His textbooks include The Economics of
Industrial Organization (5th edn, Prentice Hall, 2003), and Public Policies Toward Business
(8th edn, Richard L. Irwin, 1991).
From 1967 to 1968 he served as Special Economic Assistant to the head of the Antitrust
Division, Donald F. Turner, in the US Department of Justice. This involved him in many
leading cases and policy decisions dealing with the automobile, computer, petroleum and
other industries, as well as mergers.
In 1976 he was President of the Transport and Public Utilities Group of the American
Economic Association, a professional society focused on regulation and deregulation. In
1996 he was given that groups Distinguished Member award.
He considers himself fortunate to have been acquainted with nearly all of the pioneers
alive in the years since 1955. Some of them, both in North America and in Britain and
Europe, have been close colleagues. Of all the 90 pioneers detailed in this book, he has
known about 80, of all schools and technical skills. He has also known many excellent
scholars who are not included here. To them he apologizes if he has misjudged their
contributions.
MOST RELEVANT PUBLICATIONS

(1965), Economic Performance under Public Ownership, Yale University Press, New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
(1970), Market Power and Economic Welfare, New York: Random House.
(1975), The Treatment of Market Power, New York: Columbia University Press.
(1975), Public Policies Toward Business, 5th and 6th edn (1975, 1980) with Clair Wilcox,
7th and 8th edn (1985, 1990), Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin.
(1982), Microeconomics, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
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About the editors
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(2005), The Economics of Industrial Organization, (1st4th edn, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995,
Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press), 5th edn, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Edited books:
(1965), Utility Regulation: New Directions in Theory and Policy, New York: Random
House.
(1976), Public Enterprise: Economic Analysis of Theory and Practice, Lexington, MA:
Lexington Books.
(1986), Mainstreams in Industrial Organization (with H.W. de Jong), Boston: Kluwer.
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Acknowledgements
This history of scholarly pioneers is itself a pioneering venture, involving us in a
complicated process during the several years it took to design and finish the book. When
Edward Elgar Publishing approached Shepherd in 2002 to do a pioneers in industrial
organization book, they set no rules, format or boundaries to follow. When the need to
cover European and British pioneers became obvious, it was a blessing that Henry W. de
Jong long a close colleague and friend agreed to take over that part.
Although de Jong judged that Europe required separate chapters for each language
area, Shepherd decided to retain the array of individual profiles that he had planned
from the start. Hence the book itself relies on two different literary approaches. We
think that this dual approach nicely fits the distinctive realities on the two sides of the
Atlantic Ocean.
Quite a few gifted colleagues have generously helped us through the process, and it is a
particular pleasure to thank them here.
We sought their advice on the whole design of our coverage, including the right time
periods, the range of innovations that should be included, and our choices between
country chapters and the more detailed write-ups of individual pioneers. We also asked
their advice about the specific people to include and their relative importance.
Henry W. de Jong designed the six-chapter coverage (Chapters 28) of European and
British pioneers; invited colleagues to write the chapters; and guided the process, with
close attention to quality, accuracy and details. William G. Shepherd chose instead to
rely on a unified Introduction to the North American pioneers; invited a wide range of
colleagues to write major profiles on the pioneers; wrote the Introductory chapter; guided
the writing of the individual profiles; and wrote the remaining profiles that complete the
coverage. Actually, he found that the authors needed little guidance beyond the general
format and type of information required. The authors were remarkably effective in
writing fine contributions that needed little editing.
Naturally, our greatest thanks go to those authors of whole EuropeanBritish chapters
and of the individual North American entries.
For the North American section, a large number of colleagues gave thoughtful advice
about coverage and individual pioneers. They included Richard E. Caves, F.M. Scherer,
Leonard G. Schifrin, the late Donald J. Dewey, John Howard Brown, Willard F. Mueller,
William S. Comanor, Harry M. Trebing, John E. Kwoka, William L. Baldwin, Stephen
Martin, Sam Peltzman, James W. Brock and Bruce Marion.
Notably, several colleagues also went well beyond the task of writing one profile.
In particular, F.M. Scherer drew on his encyclopedic knowledge of the field, not only
advising us on the dimensions of our coverage but also identifying some unusual people.
And several times he agreed to write additional profiles, ending with a total of six: Charles
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Acknowledgements
Ellet Jr., Joseph A. Schumpeter, Leonard W. Weiss, Jacob Schmookler, A. Michael Spence
and Joseph E. Stiglitz.
John Howard Brown also drew on his deep knowledge of the field, from his current
writing of a masterful new history of the field. Generously, he wrote important profiles on
five innovators: John Bates Clark, Jeremiah Whipple Jenks, Gardiner C. Means, Harold
Hotelling and William G. Shepherd.
Richard E. Caves gave us our first individual write-up, of Joe S. Bain, done in splendid
style and with lucidity. This provided us with instant momentum and high standards
of quality. Harry M. Trebing wrote on three pioneers specializing in regulation: Henry
Carter Adams, Martin G. Glaeser and James C. Bonbright. William L. Baldwin wrote the
two important profiles on John Maurice Clark and Edward Hastings Chamberlin.
Stephen Martin wrote about two pioneers: William Jack Baumol and Dennis Cary
Mueller. Willard F. Mueller presented George Ward Stocking. William S. Comanor
wrote about Richard E. Caves, the major pioneer since 1960. John E. Kwoka covered the
prolific Frederic M. Scherer, while James A. Brock presented Walter Adams.
Sam Peltzman summarized George Joseph Stigler, the pivotal figure between the old
and new Chicago schools. Bruce Marion wrote on Willard Fritz Mueller, while John
Spychalski presented John R. Meyer.
All other individual write-ups were done by Shepherd, both in the introductory essay
about North Americans and in the set of profiles about individuals. He wishes to thank
the fates that allowed him to know personally nearly all of the pioneers in this book who
were alive after 1955.
From the start, Alexandra OConnell provided the finest level of advice and steadfast
help in arranging the progress of the entire project, from start to finish of our work and
assembling of the books content. David Vince then supervised the books process of
editing and production with exceptional skill and patience. The copyediting by Margaret
Pugh was as thorough and perceptive as possible, with a complex manuscript like
this one.
The two editor-authors of this book have worked together on various books, conferences
and research projects since 1976. This new project has been even more enjoyable than
the others. They wish to thank Els de Jong and Theodora B. Shepherd for the finest
intellectual and practical support, advice and encouragement.
Every effort has been made to trace the copyright holders, but if any have been
inadvertently overlooked the necessary acknowledgement will be made at the first
opportunity.
Henry W. de Jong
Hoorn, The Netherlands
William G. Shepherd
Washington, DC, USA
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William G. Shepherd and Henry W. de Jong
INTRODUCTION
This book is about pioneers, the scholars who have created the economics field known
as industrial organization (it has also been called industrial economics in Britain and
Europe). The fields core is about: (i) competition, the driving force of most modern
markets, and (ii) monopoly power, which interferes with competitions good results.
The field also has a public-policy side. The pioneers have analyzed the policies which
try to prevent monopoly, or to cure or restrain monopoly once it exists. The policies have
mainly included: antitrust, to prevent or reduce monopoly power; regulation to restrain
natural monopolies; deregulation, which removes restraints, in the hope that competition
will take over; and public enterprise, which aims to provide various public interests when
competition will not work.
The field dates from the 1870s, and it has been worldwide in scope. Its best-known
pioneers since the 1870s have worked in Europe, Britain, the United States and Canada.
Americans have developed much of the fields technical content since about 1900. But
some early British and European innovations began before that, and many others
continued during the twentieth century. They too are presented here.
Although the subject has ancient roots, the modern research innovations began
primarily in the 1880s and 1890s, when basic concepts were invented as the new neoclassical microeconomic theory rapidly emerged. The pioneering was also driven by
turbulence in many real industries, where mergers, anti-competitive actions, and new
technology were creating industrial monopolies.
In response to that, American antitrust and regulation policies were also being created,
as ways for the public to prevent or to control the rising monopoly problems. These antimonopoly efforts created spectacular dramas in the US during 1900 to 1920. Antitrust
officials hit most of the very biggest companies with lawsuits, and new regulatory
commissions began to set limits on powerful new electric and telephone monopolies. In
contrast, European and British governments in the 1920s encouraged a massive spread of
cartels, which fixed prices and rigged markets in most industries.
In the 1930s the field began a more modern phase, with new technical ideas, and there
have been many more changes in the decades since then. Some of the new ideas have led
to great progress, while others have ranged down to modest value or little at all, or even
backward steps and detours. All of the innovations have stirred sharp debate, and most
of the new ideas have aimed to increase competition.
As we have developed this book, we have had to create our own format and methods,
and we have tried two different approaches to the BritishEuropean and North American
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parts. We hope that the whole book conveys the excitement of the field, as well as its
unusually broad and diverse content.
Brilliant Writing about Brilliant Pioneers
We present those pioneers here, explaining and assessing their innovations. The main share
of the writing has been done by a group of fine writers in Europe and North America,
drawing on their deep scholarship and familiarity with the fields modern growth.
In the introductory section that follows in this chapter, we review the main lines and
periods of innovation in the entire global field. Then in the Part I, we turn to Britain
and Europe. First there is an introduction, and then a review of the earlier, larger trends
during 12001800. Next come six chapters on major countries: German-language areas,
the Low Countries, France, Italy, Britain and Scandinavia. There are also nine individual
profiles on important pioneers.
Then comes Part II, which covers North America. First there is an introduction to the
fields development in the United States and Canada. It mentions the 43 leading pioneers,
and it also briefly summarizes some 51 other innovators. Then follows the individual
profiles on those 43 prominent North American pioneers.
Our coverage is meant to be concise and readable, perhaps even enjoyable, and not
overly detailed. We focus on the main innovations, rather than on the entire lives and
careers of the innovators.
Controversy is Pervasive
Have no illusions: this field is both important and quite contentious. Capitalisms main
driving force the competitive process attracts intense emotions and arguments about
what is fair, who is really the most creative or efficient, which players should get rich
(or shouldnt), and how society itself is shaped. Large blocs of corporate power and
momentous industrial policies have taken form in Europe, Britain, the US and around
the globe. Many blocs have had sharp effects, often for many decades.
The fields findings about such deep and spectacular events are often controversial. The
conflicting points of view can create high tensions, and the evidence about the blocs and
their impacts is rarely conclusive. Further, the cleft between pure theory and applied realworld research has deepened since about 1970. Theories are often disputed sharply, on
both small and large points, and the scholars debates often shift directions quickly.
Moreover, the companies involved in the issues have often worked ruthlessly to win
the debates and their own legal cases, and to bend national policies their own way. They
have often tried to marshall scholars as their friendly spokesmen and favorable expert
witnesses.
We try to show how even amid these pressures the scholarly innovators have used
new concepts and methods to study competition and monopoly, both in the many real
markets out there and also in purer realms of lonely thought and collegial seminars. Also,
the pioneering scholars have often helped to develop and weigh the policies (antitrust and
regulation, as well as laissez-faire) that might get the best market results.
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The pioneers shown in this book are actually few, compared to the many thousands
of scholars who have tilled the field since the 1870s. Many of those others have labored
productively, but with less impact on the fields ideas.
For each North American pioneer, we aim to focus on the original contributions, with
just enough personal details to set the context and give life to the person. Each writeup is therefore much more concise than would be a rounded biographical review of the
scholars whole life and works. For example, none of the North American pioneers is
given as much as 10 printed pages, even though some major innovators would merit a
book of their own.
Our task here requires care, long experience in the field, technical skill, and a sense
of caution, not to mention humility. We have consulted widely among colleagues about
which pioneers have been important and why. We have sought consensus, but ultimately
this book reflects our best judgments about people, issues and the evolving shape of the
industrial organization field. Each of us brings a half-century of scholarly experience to
this book, and we have actually known most of the pioneers personally.
The next part of this chapter gives a road-map to the changing ideas and debates. We
note the fields very early history, and we explain and interpret the shape of the more
modern field as it grew after the 1870s and again after 1930. We note that some supposedly
new ideas have actually been introduced long before, as often happens in many scholarly
fields. We place the pioneers in context, and we discuss the importance of the innovations
within the whole field.
WHO IS INCLUDED, AND WHY

But first, we explain here this books criteria and methods; why the various pioneers were
included, and how the book is designed.
Criteria for Including Pioneers
In 2002, Mark Blaug invited Shepherd to prepare a comprehensive book on pioneers
in industrial organization, to be issued by Edward Elgar Publishing. Shepherd accepted
with enthusiasm, but also with a sense of great caution. Enthusiasm, because the field is
exciting, important, and packed with fateful issues. Caution, because any presentation of
pioneers is bound to touch on touchy debates and contrasting views.
Shepherd has frequently asked Blaug and Elgars editors for guidance in designing the
book, especially: what whole period to cover, what methods are best for choosing pioneers,
whether to write individual profiles or national chapters, and many other matters of form
and method. No such guidance was given. All dimensions of the book were left entirely
to the author.
Shepherd soon realized he would need to find a co-author to cover the Europe-andBritain side, and he was exceedingly fortunate to secure Henry W. de Jong for that task.
The choice was obvious. An erudite scholar who also sets high and precise standards, de
Jong has long been a prolific and reigning research expert in the Netherlands and Europe
as well as Shepherds close friend and colleague.
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With a free hand from Edward Elgar Publishing, we have taken great care in defining
what pioneers should mean, setting the time coverage, designing the books format,
deciding which types of details to include, and every other dimension. So we have
had to develop our own definitions and designs, while seeking much advice from our
colleagues.
The pioneering in this field has involved research both into the nature and facts of
markets, and into the public policies that might be best. The research pioneering may
enlarge the specific concepts, the underlying research methods, or the information about
real conditions in real markets. Each of those categories has involved a large variety,
with important changes as the decades have passed. An innovation may also involve
the content, specific choices, or methodology of policies, such as antitrust or regulation.
Each of those policies, too, has contained much variety and change over the decades;
think of strict versus lenient periods of antitrust, and of regulation (1920s1960s) versus
deregulation (from 1975 on).
A pioneer does not just explore, but rather in the ideal case creates order, a new
system, and new research capacity. To use homely metaphors, a pioneer does not just
explore a wilderness, but mainly clears the underbrush, sets boundaries, makes fields to
plow, and builds roads, houses and whole farms. That is, pioneers add new research ways
to define reality, to measure its conditions, and to interpret the issues.
The new capacity can be new concepts which come from pure deductions using
abstract theory, or instead come from more practical ideas based on inductive thinking
and experience. Pioneering can involve doing the first work on a new or neglected topic,
on a new set of information, on a little-known sector of the economy, or on a novel idea
for policy devices or methods. The pioneers new research capacity can also create new
evidence, by adding facts or by showing how to process data and interpret the results
in more effective ways.
A few truly protean pioneers have gone on and on, providing decades of substantial
innovations which have lasted well. The other innovators have scaled down by gradations
of importance, and some have made just one or two brief additions to narrow points.
Some have stayed in this field, while others have moved on to other subjects.
New Ideas Can Have Great Value, or Merely Modest Worth, or Even Reduce
Understanding
As in every field, mere novelty in itself is not enough. Some innovations are actually
dead ends, which inject new ideas and methods that unfortunately turn out to be neither
fruitful nor lasting. The resulting detours and false leads can displace good ideas, rather
than genuinely improve the fields content.
A common reason for dubious innovations is the universal dynamic of the career.
Young scholars often advance their careers by publishing whatever new and seminal
ideas they can think up, while disparaging the existing ideas as obsolete or not rigorous.
This activity may often yield real progress, but it may instead replace sound knowledge
and research methods with false leads.
Genuine pioneers are those who really enhance the field, adding superior ideas and
evidence without crowding out effective and important ideas. The judgments about these
true innovations can be debatable. Robust debate and sifting out the superior competing
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ideas is what the literature is supposed to achieve. But the literatures debating process
can be distorted or confused or led astray, at least for a while. Sometimes, many years or
even decades of debate are needed to evaluate new ideas and methods properly.
Time Coverage: Mainly from the 1870s to the Mid-1980s
We could have begun with the 1930s, when the modern twentieth-century analysis of
oligopoly began in a blaze of excited theorizing. To some colleagues, those 1930s seem
ancient, at 70 years ago. A number of young scholars since the 1970s are even more sure
that new is best. They have scorned all pre-1970s ideas, brushing off the 1930s1960s as
dim and shallow. As for the pre-1930s period, that is a hopeless Stone Age. Only the new
IO theory since 1970 is true pioneering.
But that view is, to put it mildly, ignorant and wrong. There was major pioneering
from the 1870s on. The European field has deep roots in even earlier centuries, as de
Jong and his authors explain in Part I. And on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, major
innovations were made in the 1880s and 1890s, when this field was being formed. Many
of the supposedly new ideas in the post-1950s literature were actually debated brilliantly
and extensively well before 1910. In the US, the post-Civil War booms and rising market
warfare involved massive new problems: competition of many kinds, monopoly and
dominance, scale economies, mergers, collusion, tactical price discrimination, predatory
pricing, the blocking of entry, utility pricing, and other classic market actions. All these
had already put the most important market concepts into dramatic industrial practice.
And that sparked intensive discussion, often with great analytical clarity, practical
knowledge and wisdom.1
Newness has often been over-claimed by scholars, especially since the 1950s. A review
of modern pioneers requires us to recognize the earlier true pioneers. Some scholars since
the 1920s have said they were pioneering, but they were in faux jungles that had been
explored, clarified and tamed long before. Later scholars have often added refinements
and nuances, but the really large innovations since the 1930s have been much less than
their advocates have claimed.
So the beginnings of pioneering go back at least to the 1870s; what is the suitable endpoint for our coverage in this book? Today, yesterday, the year 2000, the 1980s? After
debating the choices and consulting with many others, we have ended the main coverage
in the mid-1980s, at about 1985.2 That makes sense, because the ideas and trends since
1985 are still too new, open to question, and ripe for revision. Trying to include all the
recent new research thoughts and claims would be premature. There will be time enough
later to recognize the best ones, perhaps in a new pioneers book.
How Many Pioneers?
Pioneers might seem to be a very few protean giants. But this field has had many important
innovators; over 40 from North America are given individual profiles here, and over 50
more less-prominent innovators are noted. There is also a wide range of European and
British pioneers. Perhaps these numbers may seem high to some of our readers, but there
are many causes at work.
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The field is uncommonly wide and inclusive, and it is unusually diverse and rich in
its differing research methods. Those methods range from pure theory (including
mathematical modeling) and applied theory, all the way over to factual studies of many
kinds on many topics and scores of major industries. There is also a wide array of publicpolicy instruments (antitrust, regulation, deregulation and public enterprise), all subject
to hot debates and big changes since the 1880s. Shepherds Introduction below (to the
North American pioneers), lists no fewer than 16 important topic areas in this field, and
each of them contains further specialized subjects.
Moreover, the research and real-world conditions have stretched over many countries,
including the US, Britain, those in Europe, Japan, Australia and others. The time period
extends well over 100 years, and it contains several distinct eras. The innovations have
been quite numerous, and there have been rapid changes in topics, styles, methods, fact
sources and economic sectors. The sectors alone show dramatic shifts. They began with
industrial metals and railroads and the telephone and electric utilities during 18601900,
to automobiles, chemicals, plastics and medicines during 19001950, then to computers,
communications and space technology during 19501970, and now to internet-related
markets, genetic manipulation and nanotechnology. There have been many contending
ideas, and the research field has not moved smoothly toward concise, universally-accepted
truths. Progress has often been choppy, even chaotic, and given to hot debates.
Economists Only
This book is about economists, creating economic ideas. It is true that some other types,
including lawyers, have sometimes influenced economists and the field.3 But the correct
professional focus is on genuine economic pioneers who were professionally trained in
economics, engaged in the methods and the refereed research literature of economics,
and were under the sustained discipline of professional economic criticism.
The Sequence
This field is very wide-ranging, and moreover the timing of ideas sometimes is complicated.
Some pioneers contributed numerous ideas over several decades, not just once or twice.
Many pioneers cannot be neatly assigned to a short time-period or even to a specific
decade. So a coherent account of those pioneers needs to extend over their pioneering
activities, to reach a rounded assessment of everything they did.
Most North American pioneers are placed at the time when their innovations began
taking hold. That involves some judgment on our part. The North American pioneers are
grouped into a single broad category, which embraces research into markets and theory,
as well as policies including antitrust, regulation and deregulation.
Varying Lengths of Profiles for Varying Pioneering Contributions
A few pioneers have had fundamental effects, or have worked on a variety of topic areas
over several decades, while others have ranged down to creative but highly specialized
work during a brief period. Relying on much consultation and advice from colleagues,
we have tried to fit the write-ups to the pioneers roles and importance. The main method
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is to vary the number of pages: more for big innovations, fewer for the lesser ones. A
uniform length would not fit the true range of pioneering.
In Britain and Europe, some leading pioneers are given specific coverage in profiles.
In the North American coverage, the pioneers relative importance is suggested partly by
the length of the profile. Our authors did not stick rigidly to the suggested page lengths
we gave them. Some came in a little short, or a little long, as economists often do. But
the lengths here do suggest the relative importance. Colleagues and other readers will, of
course, reach their own judgments about these matters of relative importance.
As for the books whole length and the depth of detail, our estimable publisher
was willing to provide up to 500 printed pages for the books length. But we and our
authors have worked to make it more concise and clear, with brevity to appeal to a wider
readership.
Disagreements and Schools, Amid Corporate Pressures
The field has always been tumultuous. New methods and data have frequently come
in abrupt shifts, or irregular waves, some with wide agreement but others with acerbic
debates. And mathematics and pure theory versus applied research have bred fractious
debates for over a century. Even personality can matter; some facile scholars with outsized
personalities have often rattled the field at least for a while more than their cautious
and understated colleagues.
Some of the pioneers have written mainly about their own contributions, but some
other scholars have rebuked others research and methods for being obsolete, while
praising their own for rigor and power. When ideas and scholars have been mobilized
directly on opposite sides of important policy cases, the arguments can grow rough.4
The fields literature is itself supposed to function as a high-class debating society, to
thrash out correct judgments among such claims, some of them quiet, others loud. But
a successful sifting is not guaranteed. We have sought a fair balance among these diverse
contending views, amid the frequent overstatements.
Available Authors
The coverage here has also been affected by our access to first-rate colleagues who were
both interested and available to write these contributions when we invited them. Securing
the authors has been a challenge, as they say, amid the high pressures of modern research
and the attractions of expert-witness work. Both de Jong and Shepherd have chosen to
write some of the profiles, but they have also filled in by writing others when authors
were scarce.
Whats in the Write-ups
For Europe, one scholar deals with each country. Although standard formats were
suggested, the authors have followed their own judgments in dealing with matters of
content.
For the North American innovators, the authors were asked to provide the standard
personal basic facts about the pioneers: birth and death dates and places, their educational
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degrees, their main professional positions, and other details where relevant. On the main
innovations themselves, the authors were asked to describe them and their importance,
their effects on the field, any debates about their nature, and a summary of where the
contributions stand now. At the end of each profile, we asked for a listing of the main
publications where the innovations were presented.
HOW THE FIELDS MAIN TOPICS HAVE EVOLVED

Now we turn from this books design to matters of intellectual history. We present a
review of the fields main issues. We review briefly the background and emergence of the
whole field, and then its main shifts from the 1870s to 1985.
Background
The most basic and ancient questions in this field have been: what moves the market to its
actual prices, and are those prices acceptable to the markets participants and to society?
These questions go back at least to the century beginning in 1200, far before the modern
era. A brief summary of those early issues will give depth to this book.
Scholastic price theory developed in Europe after 1200 to assess whether prices are
acceptable or too high, and if government-set prices would be better for the public good.
These questions are still central: how can we explain the prices in the market, and how are
the outcomes valued (value being the balance of advantages and disadvantages to all the
parties)? In those early times, the goods were basic foodstuffs, land and natural resources,
labor, money and other liquid capital. Now of course they also include a vast array of
advanced products and services.
But the issues are still much the same. Monopoly pricing could come in many ways;
by individuals who raised prices by the famous engrossing, forestalling and regrating,
or by using still other illicit agreements, secret pacts or conspiracies. Or various actions
by guilds or other groupings could also fix prices or set minimum prices. Against that,
the free-market process (then often called common estimation; the term competition
did not yet exist) might give the benefits of moving prices down toward costs, or at least
mediating between surpluses and deficits.
In those early times, schools developed. An example is the Parisian school (12001350),
which was almost unanimously in favor of free-market pricing and opposed to monopoly.
The majority in this school favored competition (or common estimation). But a few,
for example, Henri van Ghent (writing about 1280), would allow entrepreneurs some
influence, in an embryonic Schumpeterian idea. Even so, all in the Parisian school would
accept government pricing or related constraints, if the common good required it.
By the 1700s, Adam Smith and Anne Robert Jacques Turgot were seeing competition as
the basis for achieving the public good. They opposed all forms of monopolizing control
and did not mention any entrepreneurial contribution. By contrast, Richard Cantillon
held that entrepreneurs set markets in motion. On the whole, continental theory followed
Cantillon, while the Anglo-Saxon British view fitted Smith (though with exceptions).
Smiths invisible hand did not make valuations, which instead are done by persons
or institutions. If the markets outcome is valued as negative on balance, then its rules
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or structures can be changed. This continental view is seen in the nineteenth century
and later, with Friedrich von Wieser and Robert Liefmann, who were German-area
economists in the 1920s and 1930s. It accorded with the closed markets of the time. Since
the Second World War, world markets have opened and integrated across borders, and
the strong rise of competition rules in the European Union have applied pressure on the
individual governments.
Many new ideas are actually familiar and old
By the 1870s, evidently, some basic ideas had already been debated and clarified down the
centuries. As debate continued further, many more basic issues were illuminated by the
1920s. Some later new ideas were actually superfluous. Some pioneers merely selected
among the various known ideas, to refine and rename one or two of them.
At each moment, the field is not a sum of all previous innovative ideas. Many new
ideas have little merit and usually they do not get accepted at all. Others have some
play but are soon whittled down to a modest role, or they may be displaced entirely.
Sometimes a new idea will replace one or several of the established concepts. So the
pioneers contributions have had a variety of fates; some still retain importance now;
many others have faded, and some are entirely gone; others have faded and then regained
importance. So you should bear in mind that ideas come and go as debates proceed.
The early concepts were pretty simple, as seen from todays technical varieties, but
they were basic and powerful. Later innovations had varied importance. Fundamental
ideas were installed rapidly during 18701910, even though the mail was slow by todays
internet standards. Ideas might take years to emerge among the few scholars in the elite
academic campuses (as with Augustin Cournot in Europe and Charles Ellet in the US).
Some early ideas seemed just to materialize, rather than to appear from one scholars
paper at one precise moment.
Computers and the internet have sped things greatly, but the human brain is still the
source where new ideas emerge and are judged, and it remains both fertile and fallible,
and judgments often take a long time to gel. The best thinkers in this field still take care
and time to assess innovations, and debates can proceed for many years.
The fields main ideas, and the problem of causation
As we noted at the start, the core of the field has been about competition and monopoly,
and how they affect markets and the whole economy. The modern field has divided into
several main subtopics:
1. Degrees of competition and monopoly How much competition or monopoly power is
there in a given market? Market structure is often important in this.
2. Determinants of competition or monopoly What determines the degree of competition?
Technology, and the economies and diseconomies of scale, are important in this.
3. Behavior How do competition and monopoly affect firms behavior? Pricing and
other strategies are important, by one dominant firm or by several oligopolists.
4. Performance How are profits, prices, efficiency, innovation and other elements of
performance affected by the degree of competition and monopoly power?
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Underlying these subtopics is the fundamental question of causation: which way does
causation run, from competitive structure forward to behavior and performance? Or is
it the reverse: from a firms performance back to shape its market position? Mainstream
scholars have urged the first view. Competition (or monopoly power) in a market shapes the
behavior and performance of firms in that market; usually, competition yields excellence,
while monopoly harms performance (raising prices and reducing innovation). When
markets have imperfections, firms can capture monopoly power and exert it harmfully.
An opposite view urged by free-market advocates is that firms can gain market power
only if they truly earn it, by being genuinely more efficient and innovative. For that to
be so, markets would need to be essentially perfect. Free-market advocates do assume
that markets are perfect, and so they argue for the reverse causation: performance shapes
structure and behavior. Strong monopoly occurs rarely, they say. When monopoly does
occur, it is actually good rather than harmful. And it will not last unless government
interferes to protect it.
This question of cause and effect may seem arcane and dry, but it is quite fundamental.
The debate has been intense and divisive from the start and particularly since the 1960s.
Your belief about causation affects whether you believe that monopoly usually causes
trouble (the mainstream view) or usually is beneficial and welcome (by free-market
doctrine). Our pioneers have recognized these opposed possibilities. Some have had neutral
attitudes toward the answers, while others have lined up firmly on one side or the other.
These four subtopics further divide into many specific topics, involving concepts and
measurement. Those detailed points are presented in Chapter 9, introducing the North
American pioneers.
The Beginnings
The basic ideas have been familiar since earliest civilized times, and we have noted how
the 1200s brought scholastic analysis. Competition induces extra efforts and, sometimes,
creativity. Firms that can exert control over markets will raise their prices and restrain
output, aiming to gain riches. They will also take anti-competitive actions to entrench
their power. Richard Cantillon and Adam Smith noted both these points, and installed
the consumers choices in the market, among many or even a few competing suppliers, as
the anchor of efficient economic systems.
During the next 100 years, from the 1770s to the 1870s, a few further concepts were
added. Johann Heinrich von Thnen united thoughts deriving from Smiths dynamic
equilibrium economics with Continental emphasis on entrepreneurial moves. However,
his message, which stressed the productivity growth as the main solution to the social
problem, got lost in the move towards neo-classical static analysis. Some politicians used
crude Manchester school competitive markets ideas to excuse the widespread social
harms of the new industrial capitalism. But a specialized research field did not develop.
Cournot wrote about duopoly in the 1830s, but his work was noted only decades later.
Ellet in the US also developed sophisticated early ideas abut pricing, but he too gained
little notice at the time.
But when neo-classical theory burst forth in the 1870s, perfect competition and its
practical variations began to be analyzed in detail.5 Competitive outcomes became
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defined as a set of precise technical conditions of equilibrium costs and prices. Monopolys
conditions and impacts were also studied, in theory and fact.
Real industrial events reinforced the urgency of research during these formative
18801900 decades. The spokesmen for big business claimed that new economies of
scale made necessary a rising flood of mergers and dominant firms, which threatened
to eliminate competition in hundreds of markets. That pressured the handful of rising
scholars to think and write in detail about the fields central topics. They also were driven
to debate the need for policies like antitrust and the regulation of utilities.
By 1900 most of the big, permanent topics market imperfections, anti-competitive
abuses that created dominant firms, the harms of monopolies as well as their possible
benefits, economies of scale and natural monopolies, price collusion and discrimination,
innovation all of these had been faced and debated, often clearly and wisely. Monopolys
damages were known, but neo-liberal free-market advocates had also arisen to defend
monopoly, both in Europe and Britain and in the US.
Looked at broadly, by 1900 the field ranged from pure theory to highly-applied research,
along with an intense exposure to many important real industries. Applied research was
the fields mainstream activity.
Leading Innovations During the Twentieth Century
It is helpful now to survey briefly the main series of topics that arose during the whole
twentieth century. Next, the European chapters, and then the North American coverage,
will fill in the details about the pioneers and their specific innovations.
19001920
Research activity was moderately active in Europe, as some scholars moved beyond neoclassical theory to study practical features of competition. But there was little research on
policies against monopoly, either in industry or utilities.
In contrast, US research was deeply involved in antitrust policies and new regulation of
the nascent utility monopolies.6 Decisive rulings were made against price fixing (the 1899
Addyston Pipe case) and single-firm dominance (the Standard Oil, American Tobacco
and AT&T cases, among others). But actual trust-busting was moderate, and early
regulation fitted careful and sound economics.
The 1920s
The 1920s brought forth fewer new ideas in both Europe and the US. Amid depression in
Europe, policies there retreated into a widespread encouragement of cartels in thousands
of industries. In the US, both antitrust and regulation receded.7
The 1930s
European thinking still focused on cartels, but in the US this decade erupted with
major innovations, amid the stresses of the Great Depression. The control within large
US corporations was rethought, and oligopoly theory rapidly emerged in 193233,
displacing single-firm dominance as the leading topic. Other pioneering included an
index of monopoly, kinked demand curves, the nature of the firm, and the studies of
major new datasets on industrial concentration, costs and revenues. Other innovations
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involved vertical integration and controls, natural monopolies, economies of scale, and
the structurebehaviorperformance triad.
The 1940s
The US debates intensified further, and they brought in new concepts. Joseph Schumpeter
defended large firms for being engines of innovation, yet the antitrust attacks on major
firms actually increased. Game theory was created, and the mathematizing of theory
took hold. Yet a wave of industry studies also brought new practical research into
oligopolies.
The 1950s
Now began a rich era for research and policy, in both North America and Europe. In
Europe the 1950s began with French innovations of marginal-cost pricing for electric
utilities, soon joined by British economists and policies. By 1956 there were also strong
new research and policy moves against the thousands of entrenched cartels, toward
installing pro-competitive laws and agencies to reduce monopoly in the new European
Union as well as in individual countries.
US scholars developed new methods for defining markets, and these were soon used
in leading antitrust cases. New concepts included countervailing power, the possible
benefits of price discrimination, barriers against new competition, and engineering
estimates and the survivor technique for measuring the economies of scale. Meanwhile
free-market defenses of market power were increasingly asserted. And though this was a
golden era for regulation, early critiques of it were emerging.8
The 1960s
This decade was also highly innovative, and methods grew even more diverse and the
debates grew even more active. In Europe and Britain, research deepened into competitive
conditions and the economies of scale. Also, the antitrust policies toward dominance,
mergers and price fixing were strengthened and refined. Public enterprises in coal,
electricity and telephones improved their pricing and efficiency, especially in France and
the UK.
In the US, new computers enabled large-scale econometric research, covering many
conditions: industrial concentration, entry barriers, prices and profit rates, advertising,
innovation, discrimination in employment, and wages. The concepts and facts of
innovation were studied in unusual depth. There was both much variety and a broad
balance among many research methods.
The economic rigor of US antitrust policies was raised, while the Supreme Court applied
tight criteria to mergers and pricing. New critiques alleged that utility regulation caused
inefficiency and excess investment. There were rising calls for deregulation, especially
in financial markets, the transportation industries (airlines, railroads and trucking), and
telephone service.
In parallel with neo-liberal critics in the UK and Europe, free-market critics at
Chicago, Los Angeles and Rochester increasingly attacked all public policies. They
asserted that markets were virtually perfect, so that public actions could only distort
economic efficiency.
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The 1970s
European and UK research developed further, especially on the economies of scale and
on mergers. In 1979, Britain began to privatize nearly all public enterprises and to remove
public regulations to constrain monopoly power. This created many unregulated private
monopolies, but new competition often failed to develop.
In the US, research proliferated and diverged even more into real-world and puretheory styles. The decade began with two landmark monograph-textbooks: by F.M.
Scherer on mainstream research, and by A.E. Kahn on utility regulation and possible
competition. The 1970s also brought more econometric analysis of monopoly and
performance, individual dominant firms, profitability, innovation, mergers, wages, and
discrimination by race and gender. Mergers and economies of scale also both received
intensive study, as also did transactions costs. Areeda and Turner in 1975 urged testing
for predatory pricing by using marginal costs, and this was quickly accepted by many
colleagues and the courts.
In parallel, pure theory also spread rapidly. Called new IO theory by its advocates,
abstract modeling became popular, especially using game theory. Free-market theorists
asserted an efficient-structure hypothesis, though with little research basis. Major
US antitrust cases challenged AT&Ts telephone monopoly and IBMs dominance of
computers. Deregulation spread to many sectors in the US, especially financial markets,
airlines and railroads.
The early 1980s
European research advanced on many levels in the early 1980s, and pro-competitive
policies in the UK and Europe became comparable or even stronger than US policies.
Europeans joined cautiously in the rising US focus on game theory and mathematical
models.
In the US, game theorys popularity rose to a peak, and a theory of contestable
markets was announced. After 1980, the Reagan Administration cut US antitrust policies
deeply and inserted new IO theory to replace the evidence about market definition and
concentration. They also pressed deregulation into more sectors.
*
These summary points are a framework for the individual innovators and details that
follow. First come the Europeans and British pioneers, and then the North Americans.
We do not imply relative importance or leadership by this sequence. Various Europeans
and British pioneers contributed before 1900, but the North American scholars soon
made large innovations in both research and policies. European governments eased back,
treating monopoly and collusion much more tolerantly until the 1950s, and they quietly
relegated much of the utility-monopoly problems (pricing, efficiency and innovation) to
public firms.
The most important European pioneering came later, beginning in the 1950s. And as
US policies came to be dominated by free-market advocates and theorists after 1970,
European policies to promote and protect competition actually became stronger and
more consistent with the mainstream.
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NOTES
1. Examples include: predatory pricing by Standard Oil in the 1870s, the survivor technique idea by John
Stuart Mill before 1860, Alfred Marshall and the evolution of firms in 1890, and John Bates Clarks
discussion of entry barriers in 1887.
2. It is true that a few of our writers have taken the liberty to discuss a few of their pioneers post-1980s
developments. Some of those later works often relate closely to their pre-1985 innovations.
3. Active lawyers have included Thurman Arnold, A.A. Berle and Walton Hamilton in the 1930s and 1940s,
Aaron Director in the 1950s, and Robert H. Bork and Richard A. Posner from the 1960s on. The legal
scholar Donald F. Turner may seem to be an exception from the 1950s1970s, but he held an economics PhD
from Harvard and much of his work met strict refereed-journal standards.
In some degree of contrast, the Chicago school led by George Stigler and its journals (especially the
Journal of Political Economy and the Journal of Law and Economics) often gave easy acceptance to papers
from its like-minded group of legal writers, including Bork and Posner.
4. For example, many leading scholars were drawn into the huge US antitrust cases toward IBM and AT&T in
the 1970s, and the Microsoft cases in the 1990s and early 2000s.
5. See Almarin Phillips and Rodney E. Stevenson, The historical development of industrial organization,
History of Political Economy, Fall 1974, pp. 32442.
6. William Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America (Random House, New York, 1965); Hans B. Thorelli,
The Federal Antitrust Policy (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1954); Walton Hamilton and Irene Till,
Antitrust in Action, vol. 16, Temporary National Economic Committee, Washington, DC, US, Government
Printing Office, 1940; Philip Areeda and Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law, 7 vols (Little, Brown, Boston,
MA 1978).
7. Though an exception was John M. Clarks Studies in the Economics of Overhead Costs in 1923.
8. Including Walter Adams and Horace Grays Monopoly in America: The Government as Promoter (Macmillan,
London, 1955, and the 1959 attack on railroad regulation by John Meyer, Merton Peck, John Stenason
and Charles Zwick, Competition and the Transportation Industries of the United States (Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA).
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PART I
Market theory and its pioneers in Europe
de Jong 01 intro 1
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de Jong 01 intro 2
21/5/07 12:19:34
1.
Introduction to market theory and its

European pioneers
Henry W. de Jong
This part of the book on pioneers in the theory of industries and markets needs an
introduction to explain the editorial choices and decisions. What did we consider to be
the subject and its boundaries from a European perspective? The subject is competition
and monopoly (or dominance of the market) in real-life markets, the organization of
industries related to both and the application of the acquired knowledge to policy questions.
Obviously, the construction and use of models or theories, abstracting from concrete
details in order to concentrate on essential factors and relationships, is not shunned. On
the contrary, they are indispensable to guide our thinking and to understand the problem.
But a lArt pour lArt approach, whatever its merits elsewhere, is rejected here:
It is in any case not superfluous to remind ourselves that scientific theories aim at stating something
that is true of the world, whatever profitable actions they might enable us to take. This point is at
times forgotten by those who see in theories no more than abstract formal systems, just as they
forget that numbers are used for counting. (Bertrand Russell, Wisdom of the West, 1959, p. 311)
With respect to the question posed in the first paragraph, the old continent, with its long
and divided history, diverging nationalities and different languages presented a particularly
difficult nut to crack. Where to start the story, what to include, how to deal with the various
topics, how many and what type of authors to include?
After consulting a number of colleagues we decided to take the inevitable decision to
ask one from every major language area in Western Europe to contribute his selection of
pioneers. This choice of between five and ten scientific writers on industrial economics
should be related to the period between the early nineteenth century and 1980. The latter
date was agreed with Professor W.G. Shepherd, the editor of the American section.
In a heartening response, Professors Bianchi, De Bandt, Foss, Mllgaard, Oberender
and his assistant Thomas Rudolf, as well as Professor Utton agreed to write a survey of
pioneers in their own language area or to contribute profiles. The editor is most grateful
for their efforts which required an investigation beyond the scenery of persons and ideas
in which they grew up. One will recognize from their contributions how different the
developments in thinking between the various countries were. And, notwithstanding the
tendency for English to prevail, knowledge of the separate languages remains indispensable:
anyone who wants to be accurately informed about the decisions coming from the European
Commission and the Court of Justice should know that only the text of the language of
the addressee is binding in competition policy matters.
3
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Market theory and its European pioneers
But why has a long, general chapter been added? It exposes the fundamentals of market
theory as it developed between 1200 and 1800. Investigations unearthed several pioneering
authors and even schools of economic thinking in those ages, which surpassed by far what
the ancient Greeks and Romans had to say. The reasons are given in the beginning of the
chapter. It became obvious that thinking about the market economy had not started with
the writings of Adam Smith or Jean-Baptiste Say; on the contrary, those economists were
rather the terminal point of a long line of authors who analysed the working of markets
in two, principally different, ways. The one was a disequilibrium economics in which
the entrepreneurial function figured prominently. Within this approach several versions
came forward, only two of which are mentioned here: either the entrepreneur created the
uncertainties of the markets proceedings, for example through innovations. Or he reacted
and adapted to its fundamental presence as a result of external disturbances.
The other was an equilibrium solution. It was postulated that disequilibria would,
rapidly or slowly, but unavoidably revert to a position of natural equilibrium of demand
and supply. The various approaches generated a pattern of different pricing methods,
actors and institutions.
After Adam Smith a cleavage manifested itself increasingly between the two types of
thinking about markets. In Anglo-Saxon writings, the equilibrium theory came to dominate,
issuing into Alfred Marshalls neo-classical and partial analysis. Continental economists
strove to reconcile both approaches while retaining the entrepreneurial emphasis, as is
clearly visible with Johann von Thnen, Say or Jacob Leonard de Bruyn Kops. Or, if they
were of a more active mind, such as Friedrich List or the historical economists, defended
policy-oriented interference by the state. Economists from the Austrian school conceived
the disequilibria to be the result of external disturbances: coming from outside of the
market (technological shocks, discoveries, natural disasters, wars, government measures
and so on) they stirred up the actions of entrepreneurs which brought about a tendency
towards equilibrium of prices, costs and quantities without ever reaching it.
As the chapters on the several language areas show, these lines of thinking about markets
and industries continued as the twentieth century arrived and progressed. Neo-classical
theory was further refined and formalized; and when industrial organization appeared
as an application of that theory, numerous efforts were undertaken to fill the theory of
market structures with empirical contents. But not in Europe. Nor were leading British
economists enticed to make much of such an approach. As Mike Utton shows, Mary and
Alfred Marshalls Industry and Trade (1919, as a sequel to the Economics of Industry, 1879)
provided the guide together with the latters Principles. The principal task of the economist
is to study the behaviour of men and firms within the framework of the institutions; these
change and the behaviour which is largely determined by them, does so too. Two prominent
economists in the field, Sargant Florence and E.A.G. Robinson, devoted much attention
to those institutions, the division of labour and economies of scale, thereby pursuing the
SmithMarshall tradition in their own peculiar ways.
The other countries did not basically differ from this pattern, although national factors
and traditions coloured thinking. In Germany and the Low Countries, size and scale had
not been much of a problem, being located in the heart of the continental market. Only
protectionism was a hindrance to growth. Industrial economists, both in the 1920s and
after the Second World War, focused their attention on the conditions and patterns of firm
and industry growth, and subsequently on dynamic analysis. French and Italian thinking
reflected the particular circumstances of those countries: a relatively large agricultural
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Introduction to market theory and its pioneers in Europe
sector, retarded industrialization, many small firms and fragmented industries, and extended
state interference in the economy. Competition and regulatory policies were not much in
demand. Things changed only with the advent of the Common Market and then rather
gradually. That eminent economist and teacher Jacques Houssiaux, was one of the first
to draw attention to the changes in the industrial structures which economic integration
would bring about and the challenges posed thereby (Houssiaux, 1958 and 1960). As a
special adviser to the EEC Commission, Houssiaux was closely connected with policy
making in the field until his untimely death in the early 1970s. He was succeeded by Alex
Jacquemin and, later on, by others who devoted much time and effort to serve as policy
advisers to European or national governments, or exceptionally, to play a role as decision
makers like Romano Prodi and Mario Monti.
Equally, the industrial economist as an educator was important and continues to
be so. Those who wrote handbooks which gained a wide acceptance have contributed
exceptionably to the development, or dissemination, of the science. Some prominent
examples are listed below but these should not make us forget several others. Indeed, the
concept of the pioneer is multifarious and, most probably, those are right who maintain
that the growth of knowledge is the result of our common adventure.
LITERATURE
George, K.D. and C. Joll (1971 and subsequent editions), Industrial Organization: Competition,
Growth and Structural Change, London: Allen & Unwin.
Houssiaux, J. (1958), Le Pouvoir de monopole, Paris: Sirey.
Houssiaux, J. (1960), Concurrence et march commun, Paris: Genin.
Jacquemin, A.P. and H.W. de Jong (1977), European Industrial Organization, London and Basingstoke:
Macmillan.
Kaufer, E. (1980), Industriekonomik. Eine Einfhrung in die Wettbewerbstheorie, Munich:
Vahlen.
McLachlan, D.L. and D. Swann (1967), Competition Policy in the European Community: The Rules
in Theory and Practice, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schmidt, I. (1981 and subsequent editions), Wettbewerbspolitik und Kartellrecht, Stuttgart: Lucius
& Lucius.
Zwan, A. van der and J. Verhulp (1980), Grondslagen en techniek van de marktanalyse, Leiden:
Stenfert Kroese.
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2.
Market theory in Europe

Henry W. de Jong
INTRODUCTION: THE MEDIEVAL BACKGROUND

Industrial economics or market theory has developed simultaneously with the market
economy in Europe. The latter arose from the beginnings of the twelfth century and went
through a prosperous period until about 1316. However, population growth outran food
production and a collapse had to follow; in 1316 there was the first general famine and this
catastrophe was succeeded by recurrent epidemics of the black death and the devastating
wars of which the Hundred Years War between France and England (13371453) was
the worst. It was only after 1450 that a renewed expansion took place, based on the
upcoming, substitutive maritime trade, which lit the torch of growth for the following
centuries. Initially, the rise of commercial capitalism was linked with the trade fairs of
which those in the Champagne were the most developed. Throughout the year, in market
cycles of six weeks, there was an exchange of Flemish cloth for a large variety of goods
from Italy and southern Europe, furs from Scandinavia and silver from Bohemia, feeding
the coinage. The markets were wholesale markets, new in human history; the contrast with
the local markets of the cities was not simply a difference in size, but a difference in kind
(Pirenne, 1953, pp. 97103). The merchants were exempted from lawsuits, executions and
usury prohibition, that is, of loans at interest and at maximum rates. The Champagne
fairs also became the money market of Europe and from the thirteenth century onwards,
debts were settled there by compensation, that is, clearing arrangements. The drawbacks
of the system, especially the underdeveloped road network, were partially made good by
an absence of political interventions and protectionism. For about two centuries Europe
had a free, internal market in goods, money and credit.1
Naturally, economic thinking was concentrated upon markets, value, pricing, profits and
money; macroeconomic theory made its appearance only with the rise of nation states, the
so-called mercantilism. Market theory flourished particularly in the University of Paris,
located like the fairs between the urbanized centres in north and south. This university
drew scholars, permanently or temporarily, such as Albert Magnus, Thomas Aquinas,
Henry of Ghent, Giles of Lessines, Richard of Middleton, John Duns Scotus, Gilbert
Olivi, Jean Buridan and Gerald Odonis to mention the most important from the economic
viewpoint. Being near contemporaries, knowing each other personally or through their
works, these men developed what is known as scholastic economics.2
As a fortunate prelude, in 1202, Leonardo Fibonacci of Pisa published a work called the
Liber Abaci. It taught merchants and bankers the principles of computing prices and profits
by introducing oriental algebra; in addition, Fibonacci is said to have invented double
bookkeeping. His work may have laid the foundations of the advanced Italian thinking
6
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and practice in money and banking, improving the tools for economic acquisition, one of
the strongest of human motives (Langholm, 1992, pp. 1718; Goetzmann, 2005). In due
time (fourteenth and fifteenth centuries) economic calculation made possible the growth
of companies with a sizeable, multi-market, multi-period organization, led and managed
by the remote control of the owners. The example of the powerful Italian companies in
the thirteenth century had now found followers north of the Alps (Pirenne, 1953, p. 215;
see also de Jong, 1997, esp. pp. 5869).
SCHOLASTIC ECONOMICS: THE PARISIAN SCHOLARS

The concepts and economic arguments introduced by the Parisian scholars were innovative
and, moreover, part and parcel of a system of thinking which covered both positive and
normative aspects. The latter developed out of the confrontation between analysis and the
moral and political views dominant at the time. Henry of Ghent (?1293), an author who
evidently took a personal interest in economic subjects, deserves to be seen as a central
figure. He drew copiously on various elements originating in Greek philosophy, Roman law
and Christian moral theology and united these in a whole close to a scholastic economic
synthesis (Langholm, 1992, pp. 24965). Throughout his Parisian career (127393) a
number of quodlibet questions were disputed in semi-annual sessions relating to property,
exchange, value, prices, money and so on. His views earned him the reputation as the
most liberal writer, defending both goods and money exchange, provided that the terms
are just. For a just price to emerge, parties should move their terms like the arms of the
scales until justice is attained and the tongue of the scales rests in a perpendicular position
between arms carrying equal weights (pp. 2556). This is most likely the first statement
of the principle of equilibrium in the history of economics. Such a price was called the
common estimate of value (that is, the competitive price) and it is based on the actions of
free and understanding sellers and buyers who negotiate to reach agreement. It presumes
freedom of decision, consent and absence of fraud. Fraud covers not only deceit, but
also monopolistic practices, such as price discrimination.
A second contribution is the added-value principle. Something new and different is
added by the artisan who buys materials for making saleable goods which pay for his
labour and skill; likewise, the merchant produces utilities of location, storage, labour and
assumes risk. And he may act on goods which abound at some time whereas they are rare
and valuable at other times.
Third, Henry distinguishes between pricing by means of supply and demand, generating
a fluctuating price and valuation by means of price fixing. Using a secular favourite of
economists the horse market he posits the case of a fleet of ships bringing horses to a
seaport market; suddenly, all head for another town. If then, a horse which was bought for
a low price becomes expensive due to scarcity is this to be considered fraud or monopoly
pricing? Not at all: whether or not the shift was foreseen or due to additional cost, the
just price may be a function of supply and demand. In contrast, suppose a man with
exceptional knowledge about horses and their market. Such a trader will be observed by
others, less knowledgeable, but knowing that he knows better. When he buys and sells they
may profitably imitate him. Thus he sets the price and leads the market, earning something
extra: the work of his industry which he has exercised with regard to those horses by
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buying them. The word industria, used in scholastic economics in connection with the use
of borrowed money expresses not merely diligence but especially business acumen. Thus
Henry recognizes the entrepreneurial function, linking value creation, imitation, credit
giving and price fixing: an embryonic Schumpeterian theory. His economics, including
the advanced views on money, shows all the marks of his descent from the largest city
in the most urbanized region; in 1290, Ghent had some 60,000 inhabitants and nearby
Bruges 40,000.
Somewhat later, Jean Buridan put forward a surprisingly modern demand theory.
Langholm (1355 [1979], p. 139), makes the link between Buridan, Ferdinando Galiani
and Carl Menger through Buridans concept of indigentia, interpreted as effective demand.
However we may think about such a claim, Buridan (130058), a logician and philosopher
of Flemish origin and twice rector of Paris University, had the main contents of demand
theory. He states preference scales (on which trade is also based, he says), discusses the
surplus which the consumer derives from purchases at the going market price, sees the
alternatives which may be considered because of relative scarcities, and disposes of the
notion of an inherent and different usefulness of goods. This comes down to recognizing
their potential economic character. (On Buridans economics, see especially Krop (1988,
pp. 4876) who provides a translation in Dutch of the text with notes on economic
sources.)
There were several other Flemish writers of which Giles of Lessines (12301304) may
have been the first to author a treatise on economics, written between 1276 and 1293. Its
name, De Usuris in communi et de usurarum contractibus, suggests less than it contains
for it discusses not only usury but also value, price, exchange, labour, risk and profits.
In total the book has 20,000 words, packed in 21 chapters and is divided in three equal
parts containing general principles, cases and policy precepts. So, was not the lay-out a
direction indicator?
Not long ago the book of Giles was ascribed to Thomas Aquinas but this has been
corrected (Langholm, 1992, p. 299). It states the central dictum of scholastic economics:
A thing is justly estimated according to the utility which it brings to its possessor, and it
is justly worth as much as it can be sold for without fraud (Giles, as cited by Langholm,
p. 306). Fraud offended the common good.
SCHOLASTIC TERMS: COMPETITION

Scholastic theory had the just price as its main concept. It was derived from Roman law
practice and, moreover, in substance agreed with Aristotles idea of virtuous, good or just
conduct which is the mean or intermediate between excess and deficiency. With respect to
the just price the scholastics were challenged by Aristotle himself for he said: We must,
however, not only make this general statement, but also apply it to the individual facts.
Our statements must harmonize with the facts in these cases (Nicomachean Ethics, Book
2, translation W.D. Ross, Oxford, 1925 and reprints). What more could be said about the
just price?
According to de Roover A bewildering variety of answers have been given to this
question, but it seems clear to me that the just price was nothing more mysterious than
the competitive price, with this important qualification: the Doctors never questioned the
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right of the public authorities to set and regulate prices (de Roover, in Kirshner 1974,
p. 277). Likewise, Schumpeter states that neither Aristotle nor Thomas Aquinas should
be interpreted as clinging to some objective value when they discuss the just price: His
[St Thomass] quantitas valoris is not something different from price but is simply normal
competitive price (ibid., p. 93).
The problem we encounter when explaining the just price in this way is that scholastic
writers rarely mention the word competition. This is not insignificant in view of the fact
that as from Aristotle onwards, they knew the word and substance of what we consider
the contrary, namely monopoly.
The first author to use the word competition in the sense of rivalry was Luis Molina
(15351601). Molina belonged to the SpanishPortuguese school of Salamanca, famous
for its monetary analysis, and was a professor at the University of Evora in Portugal. In
his published lectures of the years 156883, entitled De Justitia et Jure (1593 and following
years published in instalments) he gives an account of his method of investigating a conflict
between Spanish wool growers and Venetian merchants.
The complaint was that the merchants conspired to bring down the purchase price, but
Molina found out that the Spanish king had raised the tax rate on wool sales, increased
the export levy and that only a few percent of the price reduction was due to the Venetian
action. Moreover, he had good reason, he says, for they had advanced money to the
farmers on the next years wool clip. So the just price was not contravened even though
the buying number of merchants was small and they had coordinated the purchases. But
Molina remained an exception for neither the other scholastic authors nor their Protestant
counterparts in the northern European countries such as Hugo Grotius, Johannes Althaus,
Pieter de la Court or Edward Misselden availed themselves of the opportunity to use the
term. In the eighteenth century Montesquieu (16891755) wrote in his Dfense de lEsprit
des Lois (Defence of the Spirit of the Laws) published in 1748, the sentence Cest la
concurrence qui met un prix juste aux marchandises et qui tablit les vrais rapports entre
elles (Book 20, ch. 9). The sentence summarizes the theory by stating that it is competition
which achieves a just and socially acceptable price and also establishes the true price
differences between the several goods.
However, Molina and Montesquieu were the black swans and all the other writers
based themselves upon the free market or free trading when they opposed monopoly
or exclusive dealing.
MONOPOLY
In contrast, monopoly as a term has found an entrance in the literature since Aristotle
exposed its doings in his Politics (1943, pp. 6374). His tales about the Sicilian who bought
up all the iron ore on the island and the philosopher Thales of Milete who acquired the
olive presses of his native city are well known; both sold at very high prices and Aristotle
recommended the monopoly principle to rulers as a device of universal application to amass
riches. Of course, such a precept did not fall on the deaf ears of practitioners. However,
the scholastic academics and their successors rejected the advice almost unanimously
and turned the argument full circle: society should be on guard against the exploitation
of power by the rulers who would indeed use every opportunity to enlarge or replenish
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10
their treasure. Also, they were generally opposed to the monopolizing leanings of guilds
or corporations of merchants, and price and other restrictive agreements did not find
favour, either. Consequently, they required interventions by state and city governments to
prevent and correct monopolies, agreements and conspiracies, exclusive dealings and so
on. Price discrimination was rejected from the point of view of reasonable or just prices
which had to be equal for all buyers or sellers unless justified by objective circumstances.
Because of these broad descriptions and policy requirements, the scholastic economists and
their successors were the first to argue in favour of an active antitrust policy. De Roover
wrote: To my mind there is no doubt that the conspiracy idea of the anti-trust laws goes
back to scholastic precedents and is rooted in the medieval concept of the just price (de
Roover, 1958, pp. 4268). Grotius extended the argument towards the international field
and spoke of the unimpeachable axiom of the Law of Nations, called a primary rule or
first principle, the spirit of which is self-evident and immutable, to wit: Every nation is free
to travel to every other nation, and to trade with it (Mare Liberum, 1609, Introduction).
Adam Smith, who clearly saw the great gap which separates the two prices for did he not
write in The Wealth of Nations (1776 [1976] pp. 789): The price of monopoly is upon every
occasion the highest which can be got. The natural price or the price of free competition,
on the contrary, is the lowest which can be taken, not upon every occasion, indeed, but
for any considerable time together? was more reticent. He underlined the drawbacks
of the restrictions to and the regulations of free trade (ibid. pp. 140ff.) and, as clearly as
his scholastic predecessors pointed out the reason for these impediments, but he did not
share their advocacy of authoritative interference in the markets proceedings. The reason
for the impediments, he remarked, was price: It is to prevent this reduction of price, and
consequently of wages and profit, by restraining that free competition which would most
certainly occasion it, that all corporations, and the greater part of corporation laws, have
been established. And on top of the restrictions to national trade and manufacturing he
seemed not to see merit in the high duties upon foreign goods imported by alien merchants
(ibid. p. 144).
But why did Smith show so much equanimity, not to say indifference, to the inflictions
of economic damage which he recognized as being of nationwide importance? The
famous sentence about the People of the same trade, [who] seldom meet together, even for
merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the publick, or
in some contrivance to raise prices appears in the middle of an extended discussion of this
phenomenon. He remarks that charters to found a corporation that restricts competition have
been readily granted upon paying a fine to the king (ibid., pp. 14041); from continental
countries it was known that the licences to guilds or corporations were given in exchange for
annual taxes (Pirenne, 1953, pp. 18384). Thus the defence of the common liberty against
such oppressive monopolies (The Wealth of Nations, p. 170) came to nothing.
THE JUST PRICE

However, let us return to the Schumpeterde Roover interpretation of the just price as
the normal competitive price. Not only was the word competition hardly mentioned
by nearly all authors up to and including Adam Smith (who, as de Roover reminds us,
prefixed it by the article and did not use it as an abstract term). More important are the
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11
substantial arguments which should pass for review. In discussing this issue it may be
helpful to consult the schematic presentation of scholastic price theory and to remind
ourselves constantly of the overriding importance of the concept of the common good,
the compass of scholastic thinking as was mentioned earlier (Table 2.1). The general term
scholastic theory covers the market and price theories developed between 1200 and 1800
(as the rough bounds of the period) and which shared almost unanimously the scheme of a
basic, relatively constant price encircled by a more or less fluctuating price. In this respect
the theories of Cantillon and Smith in the eighteenth century were not different from those
of Molina in the sixteenth century or from those of Henry of Ghent or Giles of Lessines
in the thirteenth century. Terms changed nevertheless, from common estimation or just
price in the earlier times to natural price or free-market price later and even to normal
price in the late nineteenth century when Marshall used it.
Table 2.1
Scholastic price theory: actors, methods and themes
Authoritative pricing
Market pricing
Monopoly pricing
Free-market pricing
By governmental decision By individual persons or Common estimation*

(state, crown, city & town)* groups of persons*
Entrepreneurial estimation*
Engrossing**
*
By an appointed mediator
Costplus pricing**
Forestalling**
Effective demand pricing**
Supervised and/or
Regrating**
Market mediation between
controlled regulation by an Illicit agreements, secret
surpluses and deficits**
*
organization or association pacts, conspiracies,
Target pricing**
bidders rings**
By one-to-one negotiation,
By associations: guild
including in country buying*
regulations on fixed or
minimum prices*
Auctions and other public
sales*
By corporations with an
Bidding-up**
exclusive charter*
Dutch auction (lowering the
price until a bid is made)**
Notes:
*
Who or what institution determines the price?
**
Method of price determination. Fix-price and flexible-price methods were used in several categories.
Subjects priced: Goods, especially basic foodstuffs; land and natural resources; labour services; legal rights;
money, both domestic and foreign (exchange); bills of exchange, loans and other liquid capital.
A second aspect which was shared by the authors of the period was their common
aversion to monopoly and monopolistic pricing, though in varying degrees. For, naturally,
a price deviating to some extent from the common or natural or normal price which
was supposed to reflect the common good had to be investigated and explained. If then
(see Table 2.1) a wide variety of methods of price formation were found, the question
naturally arose whether the results thereof could all be considered acceptable or just.
Opinions soon differed substantially, and they also underwent important changes in the
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12
course of time. If we phrase the question not as What is the just price? but What person
or institution determines the price that best serves the common good and how should this
be done?, we may gain another perspective and have a useful taxonomy for ordering and
comparing the answers.
In the views of the Parisian school, a just price could be fixed by some authority (such
as emperor or king or town rulers), by guild associations, if as was mostly the case
under the control and having a retractable permission of the community, or by licensed
corporations. The literature also admitted as just the pricing by means of free-market
estimations and negotiations. Included in the latter category were the price-fixing actions
by entrepreneurs of the type described by Henry of Ghent, even if done by only a few.
The range of options to arrive at a just price was therefore rather wide. The main
choice was between authoritative or legal pricing and free-market pricing as private
monopolistic price setting was practically unanimously rejected: only a few writers approved
of guild regulations and they said so during the first part of the period covered when
these organizations were not yet strong enough to leave their mark. It is true that some
corporations with an exclusive charter had monopolistic prerogatives (for example, the
Indian companies of the various nations) but their real powers were limited as international
rivalry continued unabated. Also, protectionism against outsiders was motivated with noneconomic and predominantly military arguments. Examples were the Portuguese Carreira
da India in the sixteenth century, the Dutch and English East India Companies in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the British Act of Navigation (1651), rejected by
Grotius and defended by Adam Smith. These creatures of authoritative interference made
their appearance only after the Parisian school had ceased to exist. The strongest opponent
to an authoritative monopoly was probably Nicolas Oresmius (c. 133082) who not only
denounced debasement of the currency by the prince as a tyrannical abuse but extended
this condemnation to commodities like salt, grain and other necessities. It was in the name
and on behalf of the newly arisen class of free burghers that Oresmius protested against
these misuses of royal powers which he compared to the princely authority to misuse the
wives of any of its citizens (Oresmius, ca. 1360 [1956], p. 40). The argument backing up
these condemnations was that the coins, made of precious metals, belonged to the people
like other goods and that the princely stamps on the coins were only a nominal imprint.
Gradually the balance shifted against authoritative pricing, whether inspired by
monopoly considerations or not. The Spanish Salamanca school which embraced a
group of influential theologians and lawyers during the sixteenth century (they taught at
southern European universities and were advisers to Charles V, Philip II and several popes)
was critical of any governmental price decisions. Some prominent authors like Martin
de Azpilcueta (1492/31580, often called Navarro in the literature) rejected legally fixed
prices. The arguments were much more economic than the politically inspired reasoning
of Oresmius. Navarro said that a tasa (a price legally fixed) allows traders to sell goods
of inferior quality at a price defended as rightful in a legal sense. Moreover, a tasa price
was not appropriate; for in times of great urgency and need no supplier would respect
it, whereas in times of plenty the fixed price would be undercut and consequently be
superfluous. Being well versed in market tactics, Navarro also mentioned that a legally
fixed price invited merchants to tie sales of a free good, for example wine, at a high price
to a transaction of a good like wheat which was subject to a legal price that was lower
than the natural price.
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13
Molina, who studied at Salamanca but lectured at the Portuguese universities of Evora
and Coimbra between 1561 and 1591, also expressed an aversion to the tasa, though he
left some room for it by stipulating that a fixed legal price had to follow the natural price
and, in a sense assumes it if the latter moves within some customary band. The natural
price, which is identified with the just price, is so-called because it follows from the things
themselves, without any human law or decree, yet dependent on many circumstances
through which it is changed (De Justitia et Jure, as cited by Hffner, 1941, p. 113). A further
distinction, within the natural price, brings Molina on the trail of Henry of Ghent; he
distinguished between the current market price (if free from fraud) for long-existing goods
such as wheat, wines, cloth and shoes, and the new goods coming from overseas such as
Brazilian wood, Indian spices and so on. While the former rest on common estimation the
latter can be set unilaterally or be negotiated bilaterally. Molina even defends the colonial
trade monopoly of the Portuguese Crown with a reference to the pioneering activities of
King Henry the Navigator (who died in 1460) because he financed the overseas travel at
his own expense. Therefore he was entitled to monopolistic revenues, either directly or by
means of licensing, which moreover saved the country extra taxes. Molina conceals that
In order to help finance the cost of the initial voyages, the Infante Dom Henrique had
received from the Crown a wide variety of commercial monopolies, not only overseas
but domestic too, and: His activities as a monopolist and engrosser provoked reiterated
protests from various sectors of Portuguese society (Boxer, 1969, p. 322).
Authoritative pricing could also be effectuated using mediators, according to scholastic
theory and practice. Already in the thirteenth century brokers had appeared throughout
Europe, and in Venice even earlier. With the rise of cities and detailed regulation of
economic life, one big gap in the system which was left concerned the continued imports
of necessary and worthwhile goods. The traders in such goods escaped the city rules and
about the only measure the town government could take was to appoint a mediator. In this
way the city could use the size of its market to put pressure on the alien merchants and
internalize part of the benefits (if there was sufficient competition among the suppliers).
If successful: the merchant found himself compelled to make all his contracts with the
burgesses through the intermediary of an official broker (Pirenne, 1953, pp. 1778).
Names testify to the widespread occurrence: sensales in Venice, Unterkufer in Germany,
makelaeren in the Low Countries and broker in England. These persons, legally appointed
after the practice had become established, usually earned a high income and often rose
to social prominence. Another type of mediator often mentioned in the scholastic texts
was the good man, incidentally called in to make estimates of risk, cost or loss and in
particular when just or future prices were involved. Price fixing when a credit sale at future
prices under uncertain conditions is at stake was one of those cases where an agreed or
appointed mediator (being knowledgeable and impartial) could be helpful in oiling the
wheels of commerce.
Recently, Henry W. Spiegel (1991, p. 629), notable historian of economic thought, has
voiced the view that: The just price was the market price prevailing at a certain place at
a certain time, as estimated by a fair-minded person. The estimate might be expressed in
the form of a range of prices rather than as a fixed amount. We cannot agree with such
an appreciation: the mediator was only one of the possibilities to determine the just price
and it was not he who fixed the range; in fact there were two ranges. First, the definite
range of the laesio enormis, derived from Roman law, which stipulated that a seller who
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overcharged by more than 50 per cent (over the just price) could be taken to court and if
so, was liable to indemnification; likewise, a buyer who had pushed down the price to a
seller by more than 50 per cent. The second range, within the previous one, had recourse
to what was the deviation from the normal or common competitive price. Langholm (1992,
pp. 58081) has pointed out that the common or normal competitive price may cover two
diverse things: a price which usually obtains in the market and a price which expresses a
joint estimate or a sort of community consensus. The latter price may be out of reach of
poor people but that is a matter of charity not of justice. If common means usual, it is a
matter of market actualities: the price of wheat fluctuated much more than the prices of
oxen or of cheese.3 If common means consensus, it pertains to political or moral standards
which may likewise change or diverge but surely because of other determining factors. A
mediator operating in such a tangle of rules, customs and circumstances might try to find
some range(s) but his task was to fix a price binding on the parties.
MOVABLE AND FIXED PRICES

Among the scholastic authors Henry of Ghent was the first to draw attention to this
distinction in the context of free-market transactions. Roman law in the Digest (the
systematic collection of Roman non-statute law, made by Justinian in 533) formulated the
first principle quite clearly: the prices of things do not work on the basis of the affection or
utility of single persons but commonly, which implied that such a price, movable because
of the many buyers and sellers, could also be a just price alongside a price fixed by some
authority. At the end of the twelfth century, Bolognese lawyers began to restate the maxim
and shifted the emphasis towards the justness of a price reached by the estimations of all
parties in an open market: A thing is worth as much as it can be sold for commonly
(communiter) (Langholm, 1992, pp. 26062; Gordon, 1975, pp. 12831). But Henry also
justified a price fixed by a man with expert knowledge even if such a price was above the
common estimation and if it was imitated by others. That opened the way for an individual
to know better than the market or, by means of adding value, to improve upon the current
price or even to mediate between the diverging relative scarcities of different markets a
practice which not a few earlier writers had frowned upon.
Moreover, wide areas of pricing were withdrawn from the discussion, either because
they were hardly visible, such as was the case with negotiations on a personal basis: people
often went out of town for country buying with farmers. Or the business was probably too
special and technical for the authors who were mostly generalists. Auctions, together with
pandingen (pawnings) and other vendue-sales, are examples. Wagenaar, the Amsterdam
city historian, remarks (1760, Vol. 3, pp. 2431) that auctions and public sales covered
a great variety of goods and he divides these into several categories: ships and parts,
buildings, merchant goods, luxury goods like jewels, paintings, mirrors, wines and liquors,
and so on, and he discusses the city bylaws and other regulations often made in medieval
times. He also points out the techniques of auctions, bidding-up and bidding-down or
Dutch auction together with the moves, undertaken by the players, to bend the market in
their favour. In combined auctions, where the highest bidder-up received money (plok- or
plukpenningen) even before the bidding-down had started or been ended, some people
joined in the process without being able, as it turned out, to make the required deposit
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just to pocket the money and to speculate on a better selling price in case the biddingdown went to the level of the bid-up price. If caught, such persons, called sheep, could
be imprisoned for several months or whipped.
Much bigger transactions, such as those involving Indian spices and peppers, were
initially sold like the Portuguese had done in big lots and, after some preferential
deals had become known, were sold at auction as from 1640. But combinations of brokers
interfered with free pricing at some periods by limiting their jointly agreed bids. And the
strategy of the big merchants vis--vis their international and national competitors, used
targeted prices to hinder them or drive them out of the market. In sum, free-market pricing
was not only of the impersonal, objective variety with fluctuations around a natural or
equilibrium level. Fluctuations could be enormous and have devastating effects, as the
section on the corn market, below, will show. Langholm therefore speaks of the fictive
or hypothetical competitive market: In real life there are all kinds of markets, all degrees
of competitiveness and irregularity (Langholm, 1992, p. 231). To equate the common
estimation with the just price and then with the competitive market price in a normal
situation is a truism, and if it has to have any meaning serves as a standard or measuring
rod. It is an as if price, as we know from the discussions during the 1970s in Europe when,
in order to determine whether a particular price or price level was adequate in a particular
country, reference was made to another country considered to be more competitive (for
example, in pharmaceutical markets). The hypothetical character was recognized and
underlined by various authors of the sixteenth-century Salamancan school. Hffner (1941,
pp. 11316) quotes five writers of that school who ask themselves whether in the price
range usually assumed, there is not an exact price more adequate and just which is only
known to God (for example, John de Lugo). To us, John says, this mathematically just
price is unknown because we do not know, like God, all the determining factors and their
relative weights.
To avoid further digressions it would seem to be opportune to contrast the two main
forms of price determination considered acceptable as a way of valuing transactions, both
by scholastics as well as modern authors, in free markets (Table 2.2).
Table 2.2
Price determination
Movable or mobile prices
Determined by
Submitted to
Parties consider
Competition features &
price formation
Demand and supply

Fluctuations
Price as a datum
Anonymous, everybody is
a price taker and nobody
knows the price before
market opens
Prevailing market price is Result of contest
Performance test
Price = marginal cost =
minimum average cost
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Fixed and stable prices

Supply or demand
Adjustments
Price as a factum
Price makers & takers
Personal and recognizable,
institutional
Price set before market opens
Challenge to contest
Level and growth of net added
value per unit of measurement
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One main reason for distinguishing the two versions of free-market pricing is their
divergence in the course of time since Henry of Ghent presented them as in one breath.
But before the Salamancan school subscribed to the equilibrium paradigm, Buridan laid
the foundations for the entrepreneurial or disequilibrium alternative. This fourteenth
century rector of the Parisian University followed the trail of the nominalists and was, it
is said, responsible for the most interesting dynamical theorising before Galileo (Gordon,
1975, p. 223).
ENTREPRENEURIAL THEORY FOUNDATIONS

As we have seen earlier, Buridans economics was demand oriented: he introduced the idea
(though not the name) of consumer surplus based on effective demand (Langholm, 1979,
pp. 12345). In addition he also has the producers surplus in view. If one focuses on the
value which is added in economic activity both for the producer and the consumer and
which is basically different for individual parties, an explanation is required which puts
human decision making in the centre of things. Man is not intent on adapting to uncontrollable events whether stemming from natural or human forces. Human willpower drives his
reason or at least acts in conjunction with it. Reason is nevertheless essential in spotting
and distinguishing the options. Any man who works and lives through reason only the
perfectly rational man will perish, Buridan maintains, when confronted with situations
where he is unable to choose. In modern language this may be the case when the choice
is between perfectly homogeneous goods or when there is a superfluity of heterogeneous
goods: the embarrassment of choice as the French say (Lembarras du choix).
Buridans ass demonstrates the dilemma: the animal, located equi-distant from two
heaps of hay is unable to make a rational choice between the two identities and perishes
of hunger. In a comment, Murray Rothbard has argued that the ass was not perfectly
rational because it neglected the third choice, namely starving to death (Rothbard, 1995,
p. 74). Having chosen not to opt for that possibility, the animal could have chosen to eat
one of the bundles at random, he says. This objection is unfounded. It ignores the fact that
choosing to opt for not starving means to opt for living, and that choice was as impossible
as the one between the heaps of hay. For death was an unknown. Thus, on the basis of
the assumption of rationality as the exclusive guidance to human action, no choice can
be made. More is necessary.4
Buridan opposes two concepts of freedom, namely the freedom to choose (libertas
oppositionis) and the freedom to set a goal (libertas finalis ordinationis). He also confronts
the latter with universal causality and they seem incompatible. But regressing on experience,
he says there are actors with a will and actors without one. Unavoidable causality does
indeed steer the latter but not the former. Their free will supersedes an impossible or absent
choice. Only if willpower is absent does causality reign supreme; then the actor is out of
control. Freedom to set a goal is rated higher by Buridan than the other freedom because,
though free choice is indispensable and necessary to find the options, it is important to
realize the potentials included in these. If one is prepared to admit that experience plays
a role, Buridans argument sweeps away the basis of the choice theory as it has come to
dominate economic theory.
It hangs in the air as a hypothetical, unable to cope with uncertainty, many cases of
unforeseen change or future development and so on. This means that it cannot see the
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function and role of the entrepreneur as the pivotal figure in economic activity. It legitimizes
a view of economics in which, apart from the entrepreneur, the consumer is also reduced:
to an undistinguished utility sucker. Status, identity and style, or the social influences on
demand are eliminated as if the world needs only consistent rational fools as Sen has
called them (Sen, 1979, pp. 87109). Fortunately, a study has recently appeared which
shows that the incorporation of the wider aspects of consumer behaviour in valid theory
is a distinct but neglected possibility (Mason, 1998).
Buridans logic has cleared the way for the development of European market theory,
but, obviously, the authors who devoted themselves to the study of the entrepreneurial
factor may not have been directly influenced. On the other hand Buridan, who was very
popular in the scientific community, wrote on logic, mathematics, physics and ethics and
there are still known to exist 50 manuscripts and four early printings (in the Paris National
Library) as well as a late printing from Oxford (1637) of his Ethics. The range of his topics
is rather wide, though in this respect he does not deviate much from contemporaries who
also wrote on economics.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
At all times there has been not only opposition between the interests of producers and
consumers but also between various groups of producers. This manifested itself in particular
during the fourteenth century when Buridan wrote. Two types of entrepreneurs began to
make their appearance. The older established artisans and small merchants united, with
the aid of some pressure from the town rulers, into guilds. These craftsmen-entrepreneurs
lived by the local market, owned their tools, had limited personnel and had prices fixed
by the associations or independently but under the control of the guilds. The aim was to
regulate competition within the group and to protect against outsiders. However, it cannot
be denied that as a rule those associations also secured high quality standards, which have
remained throughout the ages, as was testified by Time Magazine in a special issue on
European craftmanship.5
The other group were the export-entrepreneurs. They produced for international
commerce or much beyond their home towns, purveying to the wholesale merchants who
were involved in international trade. From these merchants they received the raw materials
and to them they delivered the finished goods. Capital and labour were divided and the
workers had no contact with the market. The cloth industry was the prototype par excellence
and was represented in all European centres of importance: Florence, Ghent, Ypres, Leyden
and so on. It was closely followed by the metalworking industry (Lucca, Dinant and so on)
and other branches and all these export industries were growing strongly. Conflicts arose
between those groups when the large traders started to interfere with the markets of the
locals or when they complained about the high wage standards inside the manufacturing
towns or the rigid trade regulations. In addition, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
there were conflicts between the large corporations, run by the elite of the merchant class
and other merchants or newcomers who wanted access to the overseas trades secured by
monopoly licences of the corporations.
These conflicts provide the background for the writings of the most important Dutch
economist in industrial matters, Pieter de la Court (161885). His books are interesting to
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read for they paint a picture of the time and they provide a clear view on the role of the
large merchant, such as he was himself, in the textile and cloth manufacturing industry of
his native city, the largest manufacturing centre in the Netherlands. One of his books, The
Interest of Holland (1662 with an extended edition of 1669) was translated into German
(three times, in 1665 and 1668), into French (1709) and into English (in 1702). John de
Witt, the most important politician of the 1660s in the Dutch republic, is given as the
author, but this is an error for de Witt was murdered in 1672. The reason is not clear;
did the publisher want to draw attention to the book or to hide the identity of the real
author? Another book was The Wealth of the City of Leyden, 1659, which circulated
initially in manuscript. These books do not stand out so much because of new concepts
(which were not there) or because, as was to be expected, the author attacks the monopoly
positions of the guilds, the weighing halls, and the East India Company, in the name of
economic freedom. Rather it is the type of argument he uses. This gets a new twist as de
la Court points out the static and dynamic inefficiencies of their construction. The guilds
are reproached for not having regard for the different tastes of their customers but only
to their own members desires. Too high a quality and ditto prices eliminate too many
customers, who defect to other towns and rural industry. Entrepreneurs miss profitable
sales. If qualities are differentiated, for example, by means of labelling, the clients can
weigh the costs against the utilities and production rigidities can be avoided. These also
hamper initiative and prevent new things from making their appearance. In sum, it is
clear that this country can only prosper with those who row best. This translation hides
a quibble, for the term welvaren which is given here as prosper has a double meaning
in Dutch. It may designate economic prosperity or to steer a ship well. In this chapter
(Interest, 1662, 15, p. 41) he argues against the Indian corporations; their exclusive licences
foster the position of the managers, who, being secure, become negligent and exclude more
capable people, and whose monopoly reduces general employment. More companies in
this profitable trade would decrease the profits of the East India Company indeed, but
not total profits and employment for the country as a whole. Smith discusses joint stock
companies having a monopoly with similar arguments but grants them a monopoly of
the trade for a certain number of years like a monopoly of a new machine and that
of a new book to its author. Having a monopoly on a book of his already for 28 years
and hoping for another 14 years, how much is a reproach of a trading monopoly really
worth? (See The Wealth of Nations, 1776 [1976], Vol. 2, p. 754 and note 69.)
Summing up, de la Court was neither a mercantilist nor a free trader; he advocated
a society led by the great, independent entrepreneurs. He favoured a republic of the
type he lived in but also voiced the well-known disdain that big businessmen have for
universities and their research; stressing the demand side again he wryly remarks: if there
are students, one can make as many professors as one wants to have (Wealth of the City
of Leyden, 1659 [1911], p. 31).
COMPETITION AND UNCERTAINTY

With Richard Cantillon (16961734) we arrive at the economist who drew together several
of the distinctive lines of thinking from previous times in a view of the market process
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that was quite unique. It is not suggested that he knew the preceding literature, only that
its main elements were recognized in contemporary society.
First, there was individual property of labour and resources and there were general
as well as special needs among the members of the society. The latter were divided into
landowners, entrepreneurs and those working for wages. The landowners possessed the
land and other natural resources; they did no work and spent their income on the greatest
variety of goods in conformity with their preferences.
Second, the entrepreneurs were the active economic agents, demonstrating the willpower
described by Buridan, for they strive after profits from their operations. These profits
flow from the discharge of their economic function which is to buy or rent at some fixed
price from landowners and workers, land, produce and labour in order to sell the goods
and services to consumers and other entrepreneurs at an uncertain, fluctuating price. The
difference between those two prices is profit or loss. The class of entrepreneurs is the only
one to run a risk in their activities and that risk is basically a profound uncertainty.
Third, the wage earners are hired to work for the other classes but mainly for the
entrepreneur. They do not engage in active decision making, receiving their orders from
the farmers, industrial producers, transporters, middlemen such as wholesale dealers and
retailers and all others who buy fixed and sell movable. Service providers such as lawyers,
doctors, painters, chimney sweepers and even beggars (!) also belong to the entrepreneurial
group. They have certain costs such as expenditures and always have their time as an
alternative cost.
Cantillons entrepreneur therefore reacts to the shifts in demand in markets and the price
differences that continuously widen and narrow. This occurs between city and countryside,
between products and services, and between necessary, convenient and luxury products.
Cantillons entrepreneur is the prime example of the mediating, arbitraging agent in
our scheme. Essential in his operations is the forward-looking, discerning and anticipating
ability of the central figure in this economists view of the market economy. In this respect,
Cantillon differs from his predecessor de la Court who stressed the productive, organizing
function of entrepreneurs. Cantillon takes the analysis one important step further on the
road of theorizing. He embeds the role of his hero within the system of interdependent
markets. The economy is a unified whole; conflicts there are, certainly. But all groups and
classes are submitted through the pricing system to a measure of coordination which limits
their autonomy. The hinges in this apparatus (which is not Cantillons word, he does not
cherish a mechanistic view of the world) are the profit and loss accounts. Through prices,
profits and losses the enterprises are distributed over the branches of economic activity
and regions. Some grow, others decline; prosperity will be unevenly divided.
Cantillon has an interesting example which shows that the number of competitors
is not essential for rivalry to occur. Suppose a village has two tailors who serve the
community. Their income will be different, for, he says, the one will have more clients
than the other. He may be better in winning over the customers; or he works more aptly
or durably or one of them spots the fashions in cutting clothes better than his competitor.
Nevertheless, the prices they quote cannot diverge too much. Suddenly one of the tailors
dies. The other will raise his prices to a monopoly level and there are no other ways to
avoid these but to go to a tailor in a neighbouring village or city or to wait for another
one to establish himself. The first option, costing time and money, has the advantage
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of limiting the level to which the monopolist can raise his prices. This duopoly case is
interesting for a number of reasons.
First, it is a heterogeneous duopoly; as such it is much more of a reality than the
homogeneous cases of the mineral water suppliers, who, having no production costs,
disregard each others pricing manoeuvres, or quantitative adaptations. Duopolies with
a supply of varied goods in a particular market are frequent in the modern world too:
Boeing versus Airbus; chipmachine maker ASML against two smaller Japanese producers;
UnileverNestl in packaged icecream; Microsoft versus Linux and so on.
Second, the case shows that there is a price band between the pure monopoly price and
the competitive price plus the cost which consumers have to incur by going to a distant
supplier. The higher the latter price the smaller the price range will be, given that the
pure monopoly price is there. The latter may be very high if a monopolist has to serve a
market which has the same dimension as previously without any supplies coming from an
alternative producer, and, in addition, if the product is a necessary good.
Third, neither the pure monopoly price nor the competitive price plus cost can be
considered a just or acceptable price if governmental policy measures are possible: one
may think of recruiting another supplier from elsewhere, paying a newcomer for learning
the trade (the case of Airbus), or obliging the monopolist to provide for a coercive licence
(in the case of a technically advanced and essential product).
The conclusion would seem to be that it is not the duopoly which is problematic in a
heterogeneous case but the level to which a quasi-monopoly price can be raised. Further,
all customers benefit from the restoration or continuation of a duopoly, including those
from the country where the monopolist is established, if the relevant market is wider than
a purely national one.
BAUDEAUS INNOVATIONS
If de la Court and Cantillon were the first to propose new and alternative interpretations
of the entrepreneurial function, Nicolas Baudeau (173092) added the third one. He was
a clergyman who was initially opposed to, but in 1766 joined, the group of economists
called the physiocrats. He did so by founding a weekly publication in 1765, to disseminate
physiocratic ideas (Meek, 1962, p. 32). Thus, one may consider him together with Franois
Quesnay and Comte de Mirabeau, as a leading expositor of the doctrines of this school.
He was, however, no more than Anne Robert Jacques Turgot one decade later, a pure representative, for both contributed to the broadening of physiocratic concepts in important
ways. In particular, they extended the entrepreneurial concept to manufacturing and
commerce, making it a general one.
Still more important was Baudeaus incorporation of innovations and inventions in the
entrepreneurial function. By means of new ideas or new techniques, an entrepreneur will
be enabled to reduce the cost of output and to increase the revenues of sales. Through
long-term leases the rents for farmers are fixed and wage levels are depressed to a fairly
stable subsistence standard, Baudeau wrote in his main economic text (Baudeau, 1767
[1910], p. 47). Output, on the other hand, fluctuates as to prices and quantities, and so the
entrepreneurial income is uncertain. It varies with the vagaries of the product markets.
This resembles Cantillons contribution, and, there is direct evidence that Cantillons Essai,
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which was published in 1755, was known to Quesnay, Baudeau and other members of the
school (Meek, 1962, pp. 2678).
Baudeau takes Cantillons position two steps beyond the coping and adaptation to
uncertainty. First, like other members of the physiocratic school he was strongly in favour
of better education and the dissemination of knowledge. That included technological and
agricultural knowledge as well as general and practical education. The information thus
gathered, they believed, would induce action by at least a number of people to undertake
innovations and run their businesses in good order. The country schoolmaster, Quesnay
says in his Maxims, is not to be disparaged by the haughty city men of elevated rank
(who in reality are nothing but hirelings paid by the wealth of the countryside); he is the
one qualified to teach the peasantry to read and write, to bring security and order into
its business and to extend the farmers knowledge of the different aspects of their calling
(Meek, 1962, pp. 247 and 258).
Second, if obstacles to profitable enterprise could be removed and the right incentives
were created, people would take up the opportunities and work towards the improvement
of the results. The entrepreneur, who is an active agent, may apply his acquired knowledge
to the reduction of costs, the improvement of produce, transport and trading arrangements
and raise his income. After deduction of paid-out costs of cultivation or manufacture and
an amount to compensate the advanced capital, a net income or profit would remain; this
would be a just compensation for the entrepreneurial efforts (Baudeau, 1767 [1910], p. 118).
The removal of obstacles had regard to monopolies, regulations and protection such as
had been brought into being by Colberts mercantilistic policy, but was also related to the
pricing system. In an early article, in which Quesnay had exposed his economic principles
(Hommes, 1757, pp. 51178 in INED ed. 1958; extracts in Meek, 1962, pp. 88101) three
price levels were distinguished. There could be chert or an unnaturally high price as a
result of monopoly or an artificial division of markets; or the price could be high due to
good demand in the market (bon prix) or it could be bon march, a vulgar description
for a price which constantly failed to exceed the fundamental price. The fundamental
price of commodities is determined by the expenses or costs which have to be incurred in
their production or preparation (ibid., p. 93). A very low price would be ruinous for the
country, its rulers, population and producers alike and could be prevented by international
trade. If there is unobstructed trade within the nation, price becomes equal to the common
prices which are current in other countries. Also, they will fluctuate much less than is the
case within the internally broken up French market, where regional surpluses and deficits
cannot be equalized.6 And the large and frequent variations in prices are the deadly causes
of poverty and depopulation (ibid., pp. 945).
THE INTERNATIONAL MERCHANT AND TIME

Most probably, Quesnay or the other physiocrats will not have read him, but the principles
of the international corn market had already been exposed more than a century before,
and in some respects even more clearly. The Dutch economist Dirck Graswinckel showed
in a book how the international markets in relatively homogeneous goods, especially
corn, work and why government interference is, in all but the most dire circumstances, a
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common nuisance. Nevertheless, he also pointed to the conditions and the time element
which have to be considered.
Graswinckel (160060) was sworn in as a lawyer and rose to the position of advocatfiscaal, managing extensive property of the states of Holland. He published a book in
1651 containing the Edicts, Decrees, Regulations and so on concerning the subject of wheat
and corn. The book dealt with the possible consequences of food shortages and measures
such as import and export regulations and the prohibition of advance purchases or price
measures. Grains were very important in Dutch trade: they came from the countries around
the Baltic sea, amounted to between 50 and 65 per cent of total imports from that area
during the hundred years from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century, had to
feed a fast-growing population and were an input to industries such as beer brewing and
cattle-feeding.
But Graswinckel, in a lengthy commentary on the regulations (1651) showed nearly all
of them to be harmful or superfluous. Describing Amsterdams market as the warehouse
of grains for the whole of Christendom (pp. 1245) because of the re-exports abroad,
he argued that, in general, the prohibition of imports or exports would undermine the
staple market and thereby Dutch food security. Domestic and foreign merchants would
be loath to ship grains to this market and store it there if they could no longer be sure to
benefit from the best prices to be had, either in foreign countries or in the home market.
Analytically this seems obvious though politically it was far from generally accepted, even
in his own country.
What made Graswinckel, at least from the point of view of market economics, an
outstanding writer, was his keen sense of the price system as Schumpeter remarked. Let
me summarize the following points:
1. A societys wealth is, given the erratic fluctuations of resource prices, dependent on high
prices and abundance of goods. Though the lower classes would be the beneficiaries
of low prices, especially of foods, labour and its products will have a ready market
in prosperous times. Nothing better than dearness in abundance, Graswinckel says
(p. 122) because fertility (he uses the word in the sense of productivity of land, labour
and inventions) is at the basis of an abundance of goods, to be sold at high prices.
2. The grain and similar markets cannot be easily monopolized because trade in corn is
in a thousand hands which are not dependent upon each other (p. 146); monopoly is
not to be feared when there are many, but few (p. 158).
3. But suppose the merchants make a treaty among each other of a certain price not to
sell below that price (p. 115): they can be penalized under Article 1.6 D of the Law.
However, he knows such regulations are of limited value; without such treaties they
may preserve a silent intelligence (that is: a tacit agreement) and be assured of each
others private interest to join in a common price rise. What should the rulers do?
4. Graswinckel says that a price control measure is useless, except in the case of the most
dire circumstances (for example, war). He realizes that price increases are not brought
about by treaties but are caused by scarcities and can only be made to hold by means of
supply or transport restrictions. In the case of natural market developments: the one
who stocks on the expectation of a price increase is not the cause of the rise, but the
expected rise is the reason he keeps his stocks (p. 117). And, if the market development
is an artificial one, the high price will draw supplies from every corner of the world.
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23
5. This is sustained by advance purchases and sales, which should not be opposed, as is
often the case, for they span longer time periods and stimulate output with the producers
by means of financing them. This will stabilize markets.
6. If governments are nevertheless apprehensive of scarcities and high prices they should,
first, make an investigation of stocks in the warehouses and publish the statistics: one will
invariably find that stocks are a multiple of annual consumption; second, government
should buy in the market and sell at cost price to the bakers and other retailers, but
intermittently and in a controlled fashion, otherwise there will be losses when the
market turns. In other words: market transparency is of primary importance.
In sum, Graswinckels theory of the grain market is imbued by considerations of time:
the expectations of the markets actors, their behaviour over short and long periods and
the intention to manipulate prices if they can, which, however, is not often the case. If it
occurs at all, it will be short-lived.7
NOTES
1. For a very useful collection of documents relating to this period (texts, tables, charts, graphs, pictures and so
on), see Aerts et al. (1985).
2. The new vision on scholastic economics, opened by Raymond de Roover (see Kirshner, 1974, Part 4) and
Joseph Schumpeter (see Schumpeter, 1954, Part 2, Ch. 2, pp. 9699) in the 1950s has found a confirmation
and extension through the painstaking research of Odd Langholms various publications. I refer to his
monumental Economics in the Medieval Schools (1992) for chapters on most of the authors mentioned in
the text. In addition, see his Price and Value in the Aristotelian Tradition (1979).
3. Postan (1972, p. 242) gives the seven-year moving average of the prices of wheat (per quarter), of cheese (per
wey) and of oxen during the period 12081325 as based on Farmer (1956). Wheat prices fluctuated more
than oxen prices which, in turn, moved more than cheese prices.
4. Rothbard seems to confuse omniscience with rationality. Apart from that, one is reminded of Pascals wisdom:
Le coeur a ses raisons que la raison ne connait pas.
5. (The quest for quality: a journey to the heart of craft, Time, vol. 158, no. 8, 2001, pp. 50123).
6. There is no need to go into the debates concerning the French famines of 176470. Hutchison (1988, pp. 2659,
2924, 3025, 3456) reviews the contributions of the main economists in the eighteenth century to the debate
about free corn markets. His assessment of the work of the physiocrats (pp. 2957) has much to recommend.
But it becomes insufficiently clear that Quesnay, like Graswinckel (1651) earlier, had stressed the need for
free domestic trade alongside unrestricted international exchange. From this point of view Galianis severe
criticisms seem overrated and too late: he published the Dialogues on the Corn Trade only in 1770 when the
famines had ended.
7. It is noteworthy that the British made the same mistake as the French policy makers when they refused to
repeal the Corn Laws in 1845. A potato blight wrought a disaster in Irelands food supply; behind the import
tariff on corn, England appropriated Irelands wheat output at rising prices. Notwithstanding David Ricardos
cogent proposals much earlier (1822) and Robert Peels timely pleas in 1845 to lift the import restrictions,
both men lost out against the great landowners in Parliament. The complicated disaster which followed is
well described by Helen Litton in The Irish Famine (1994).
LITERATURE
Aerts, E., W. Dupon and H. van der Wee (1985), De economische ontwikkeling van Europa, Leuven:
University of Leuven.
Aristotle (1943), Politics, translation B. Jowell, New York.
Aristotle (1972), Nicomachean Ethics, translation by W.D. Ross, London (World Classics).
Baudeau, N. ([1925] 1767), Premire introduction la philosophie conomique, ed. A. Dubois, Paris
1910.
Boxer, C.R. (1969), The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 14151825, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
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24
Buridan, J. (1355), Ethics, Latin editions in Paris 1489, 1518 and in Oxford 1637.
Cantillon, R. (1952), Essai sur la nature du commerce en gnral, Text of the original 1755 edn,
Paris: INED.
de la Court, P. (1659), Het welvaren der stad Leyden, Ed. F. Driessen, The Hague, 1911.
de la Court, P. (166269), Het interest van Holland ofte gronden van Hollands welvaren, Various
editions.
de Jong, H.W. (1997), The European corporation, in P.H. Admiraal (ed.), The Corporate Triangle:
The Structure and Performance of Corporate Systems in a Global Economy, De Vries Lectures on
Economics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 5869.
de Roover, R. (1958), The concept of the just price, Journal of Economic History, vol. XVIII,
pp. 41834.
Farmer, D.L. (1956), Price fluctuations in Angevin England, Economic History Review, ix.
Goetzmann, W.N. (2005), Fibonacci and the financial revolution, in W.N. Goetzmann and K.G.
Rouwenhorst, The Origins of Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 12345.
Gordon, B. (1975), Economic Analysis before Adam Smith, London and Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Graswinckel, D. (1651), Aenmerkingen en betrachtingen bij t Placaetboek op t Stuck van de Lyftocht
(Comments on the edicts concerning the trade in corn), Leyden.
Grotius, H. (1609), Mare Liberum or Freedom of the Seas, Introduction, various editions.
Hffner, J. (1941), Wirtschaftsethik und Monopole im fnfzehnten und sechszehnten Jahrhundert,
Jena: Verlag Fischer.
Hutchison, T. (1988), Before Adam Smith: The Emergence of Political Economy, 16621776, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Kirshner, J. (ed.) (1974), Business, Banking and Economic Thought in Late Medieval and Early Modern
Europe, Selected studies of Raymond de Roover, Chicago and London: University of Chicago
Press.
Krop, H. (1988), Johannes Buridan, in De Ethiek, Baarn: Ambo.
Langholm, O. (1992), Economics in the Medieval Schools, Leiden: Brill.
Langholm, O. (1979), Price and Value in the Aristotelian Tradition, Bergen: Universitetsforlaget.
Litton, H. (1994), The Irish Famine: An Illustrated History, Dublin: Wolfhound Press.
Mason, R. (1998), The Economics of Conspicuous Consumption: Theory and Thought since 1700,
Cheltenham, UK and Lyme, USA: Edward Elgar.
Meek, R.L. (1962), The Economics of Physiocracy, London: Allen & Unwin.
Molina, L. (1593 and later), De Justitia et Jure, Discussion by Hffner, pp. 6771 and 11346.
(Molinas life and views on prices, taxes, competition, monopoly, agreements and policies to be
applied.)
Oresmius, N. (ca. 1360), A Treatise on the Origin, Nature, Law and Alterations of Money, Translated
by C. Johnson, Camden, NJ, 1956.
Pirenne, H. (1953), Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe, London: Routledge.
Postan, M.M. (1972), The Medieval Economy and Society, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.
Quesnay, F. (1958), Franois Quesnay et la Physiocratie, Annotated text, Vols 1 and 2, Institut
National dEtudes Demographiques, Paris: INED.
Ricardo, D. (1822), On Protection to Agriculture: The Works and Correspondence of David Ricardo,
Vol. 4, Pamphlets and Papers, 18151823, ed. P. Sraffa, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1951.
Rothbard, M.N. (1995), Economic Thought before Adam Smith, Vol. I, Aldershot, UK and Brookfield,
US: Edward Elgar.
Schumpeter, J.A. (1954), History of Economic Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sen, A. (1979), Rational fools. A critique of the behavioural foundations of economic theory,
in F. Hahn and M. Mollis (eds), Philosophy and Economic Theory, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, pp. 87109.
Smith, A. (1776), The Wealth of Nations, 2 vols, ed. by 1976, Oxford.
Spiegel, H.W. (1991), Scholastic economic thought, in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman (eds),
The World of Economics. The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, London and Basingstoke:
Macmillan, pp. 62733.
Wagenaar, J. (1760), Amsterdam in zijne opkomst, aanwas, geschiedenissen, 4 vols, Amsterdam: Isaac
Tirion.
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A.
25
ADAM SMITH (17231790)
Henry W. de Jong
A Scotsman born in Kirkcaldy, Adam Smith spent most of his life in Glasgow and
Edinburgh, where he died in 1790. He was one of the greatest polyhistors of the eighteenth
century. He wrote extensively on astronomy, logic and metaphysics, language and the arts,
law and government, moral theory and history as well as economics. It is opportune to
point towards the Glasgow edition of the Works and Correspondence which covers all
Smiths writings, so eminently readable in the elegant eighteenth-century style. This edition,
commissioned by the University of Glasgow to celebrate the bicentenary of The Wealth
of Nations in 1976, contains the best and most comprehensive text of the various works,
complete with references, cross-references and elucidations.
Smiths market theory is exposed in Book 1 of The Wealth of Nations (WN). His views
are of the scholastic equilibrium type, but the analysis is more encompassing and more
elaborated than that of any of his predecessors. In two respects, Smith puts a different
order and emphasis on his treatment of the market economy: first, he discusses a moving
equilibrium. Although there is a natural level of all prices, wages, interest rates, profits
and rents (which are in fact ordinary or average rates), these are regulated by the general
circumstances of the society concerned, its riches or poverty, its advancing, stationary or
declining condition, and partly by the particular nature of each employment. Market prices
move above and below these natural levels in accordance with the forces of demand and
supply and it is the competition between sellers and buyers which makes the prices of all
commodities continually gravitate towards the natural or central price. Richard Cantillon
had called this the perpetual ebb and flow of market prices around the intrinsic value
(that is, the quantity of land and labour which enter into the production of a commodity)
Thus, prices move in a double sense, namely both with and within the system.
Second, Smith differs from most earlier scholastics in that he presumes that human
beings display in contrast to animals the propensity to truck, barter and exchange one
thing for another. Human beings are seen by Smith in the WN primarily as commercial
people; their inclinations occasion the division of labour which is the unintentional result
of human endeavours but also the main lever of societys wealth.
Scholastic theory had departed from the idea of private property owned by people
which requires them to specialize and exchange. The difference is that the earlier view
accommodates production as antecedent to exchange whereas Smith has difficulty in
explaining where the trucking propensity derives from if it is not an innate faculty. And
this is debatable.
The double approach outlined ensures that the invisible hand of the market brings
about the best possible (or in modern terms the optimal) result of free human actions
in terms of the common or publick good. In WN, pp. 4556, that result is related to the
annual revenue of society. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS, pp. 1845) Smith
also makes the claim that:
[People] are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of
life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its
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26

inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society
and afford means to the mutiplication of the species.
That obviously, is a big claim and when he says the beggar, who suns himself by the side
of the highway, posesses that security which kings are fighting for (TMS, p. 185), one is
apt to ask whether Smith thinks this applies too when it rains cats and dogs or when the
ice cracks.
The impartial spectator
The commercial orientation of people does not exclude their taking up a position with
respect to the propriety of action. In the first part of TMS, Smith discusses extensively
the passions, ambitions and corruptions of our moral sentiments but also the feelings of
sympathy we have and how far they go in explaining our behaviour. Indeed, the opening
paragraph in TMS reads:
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which
interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he
derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the
emotion we feel for the misery of others ...
Smith is not an economist who defends or advocates peoples behaviour on the basis of a
presumed egoistic rationality. In TMS he makes the crucial distinction between self-interest
(mostly called self-love in the book) and selfishness. The latter is spoken of in a pejorative
sense when harm is done to others; the former is approved as naturalor harmonious if it
fits in with the views of the impartial spectator. At the end of TMS he severely reproaches
Dr Mandeville for not having seen the difference (another system which seems to take
away altogether the distinction between vice and virtue, and of which the tendency is, upon
that account wholly pernicious, pp. 30614). Who is this impartial spectator and what is
his function or role? The concept runs through the whole of TMS.
It cannot be exposed here in its fullness, so a pertinent quotation from Immanuel Kant,
the German philosopher who had read the translated version of 1770, must suffice: the man
who goes to the root of things and who looks at every subject not just from his own point
of view but from that of the community ... (der Unpartheyische Zuschauer). (Cited by D.D.
Raphael and A.L. Macfie in their Introduction to the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Oxford,
1976, p. 31. Apparently the quotation is taken from Kants Reflections in Anthropology.)
With this theory, which was developed in the course of the successive editions of TMS,
Adam Smith not only had a view of human behaviour which distinguished him from
his contemporaries David Hume and Francis Hutcheson. According to an expert in the
field, [Smiths] theory can certainly stand comparison with the best known of modern
psychological explanations of conscience, Freuds account of the super-ego (D.D. Raphael
in his article The impartial spectator, in Essays on Adam Smith, edited by Andrew S.
Skinner and Thomas Wilson, Oxford, 1975, p. 97).
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3.
Economists from the German language area

(nineteenth and twentieth centuries)*
Henry W. de Jong
INTRODUCTION
At the end of the eighteenth century there occurred a double methodological shift in
economics.
First, it went the way of abstraction and model building in the exposition of its doctrines.
The physiocrats had already done this in an original way but had restricted their attention
to macroeconomics as was also the case with David Ricardo.
In 1826, Johann Heinrich von Thnen (17831850) published a stylized version or
model of a market economy complete with extensive numerical illustrations, even more
than those of his French predecessors. Such endeavours had been outside the view of
scholastic economics which is best typified as methodological realism.
Second, the earlier economists had neglected the distribution problem; what determines
wages, interest, rents and profits? Von Thnen opened a new vista on this question which
commanded the attention of the profession during the rest of the century and beyond.
Third, von Thnen encompassed the elements of the entrepreneurial function as they
had been developed until the beginning of the nineteenth century in an integrative theory
which also added the spatial dimension.
Von Thnen was therefore a pioneer in several respects though he was not raised in
academic circles and did not spend his working life there. Born in northwestern Germany, he
probably inherited his inquisitive, pragmatic attitude from his father who was a landowner
in the neighbourhood of Jever in eastern Frisia. During the years when young von Thnen
grew up, agricultural colleges were founded in northern Germany: near Rostock (1793),
near Hamburg (1798) and in Celle (1802). Von Thnen went to Hamburg in 1802 and the
next year to Celle where he found inspiring teachers and made connections with advanced
agricultural owners. One of these, Baron von Voght, had laid out his estate in accordance
with a quasi-industrial model practised in England. This was the Norfolk system standing
as the prototype of the new husbandry, as it was called at the time. It was introduced
by Sir Richard Weston in the late seventeenth century on the basis of intensive studies
carried out in the Low Countries (A discourse of husbandrie used in Brabant and Flanders,
1652).1 What astonished Weston was the high agricultural productivity achieved on rather
meagre soils in those areas since medieval times. The solution seemed to reside in the high
degree of manure applied. This was only feasible in densely populated areas, however.
The English solution was to keep cattle in large stalls from which the manure could be
spread efficiently.
27
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28
Thus, agricultural methods were adapted to the ever-present problem of exhaustion of

the soil in its varying degrees; basically there were three:
1. Letting land lie fallow every other year or with intervals of more years, thereby raising
the intensity of cultivation. This might have damaging consequences if practised too
far.
2. The coupling or exchange system which allowed for alternative cultivations of tillage and
cattle breeding, practised in Flanders since the fourteenth century in rolling periods of
six, but mostly of nine years. The emphasis was on the latter to get sufficient manure.
3. The products were alternated: mainly fodder plants serving animal production and
commercial crops like hops, rapeseed, mustard seed, hemp, madder and so on. Various
trades were thereby stimulated in their expansion, such as beer brewing, textile colouring
and others.
Now, agronomists, including von Thnens revered teacher A.D. Thaer, were devotees to
one of the systems referred to, which allowed for variations, but which nevertheless differed
substantially in their basic characteristics. The merits and demerits of the methods were,
in other words, argued on the basis of technical qualifications.
Von Thnen rejected such an approach, having read Adam Smiths Wealth of Nations,
which linked production systems with the extension of the market. In 1803, he published
an embryonic version of his theory, later to be published in The Isolated State (1826). In
the earlier version, entitled Description of agriculture in the village of Groszflottbeck
near Hamburg, the young author wrote that if one assumes that in a country with a
diameter of 40 miles there lies a city where this country can only sell its products and
that its agriculture is on the highest levels of cultivation, then one can deduce that the
production systems around this city will be divided into four classes. This introduces the
relativity of systems of agricultural production, varying in intensity of output processes
that change with the data and especially the size of the market. This the author expresses
with the dictum: As the wealth and the population of a state increase, so a more intensive
agricultural system of production will be of advantage (cited after the second German
edition of 1842, p. 262). He thinks of the successive intensities linked with the three-year
fallow system, the coupling and the product-alternation systems, more finely differentiated
into seven types. Not only transport costs and difficulties of movement of the produce
towards the city are considered but also the costs of carrying manure in the other direction
are acknowledged to be influential. Thus,
[There] will develop pretty definite and distinct concentric circles around the town in which either
this or that crop will be the main one. In so far as we consider the production of a particular crop
the main goal of economic activities, we shall find in each of the different circles radically different
economic arrangements since the whole character of economic life changes with the cultivation
of a different crop. (Hall, 1966, p. 8)
THE PRODUCTION CIRCLES

We cannot survey the circles in detail so let us focus on some general characteristics.
Perishable products and those having high transport costs will be produced, bought and
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29
sold in the first circle: garden products, fresh milk, clover to feed cattle in the barn, savings
on labour cost, manure acquired from the city, hay and straw to be sold, whereas grains will
play a subordinate role. In addition, potatoes, cabbage, turnips and so on will be cultivated
also, being too voluminous for the wider circles. Rents in this circle will be high and no
land will be left fallow; in addition, ample amounts of manure will be spread. There may
be crop rotation, but here too, pricecost considerations are dominant and no generalizations as to systems of rotation are possible. This circle is called the free economy because
it provides so many options.
The second circle will begin where own production of manure is more advantageous
than buying it in the city. In general, rents decline in the higher circles with the distance
from the city until the margin of cultivation is reached which determines the boundaries
of the isolated state. Rent there will be zero for the estate where production and shipping
costs are just equal to the price of grains in the city: it is the marginal supplier. This
position changes only when demand from the city increases or decreases. Von Thnen,
like Ricardo, expressly acknowledges the influence of soil fertility (alongside distance and
transport costs) on rents. In sum, the price based on market demand will determine the
type of output, the area under cultivation and the surplus, if any, which is rent. The last
is a differential advantage measuring location and the quality of the soil.
THE PRODUCTIVITY OF CAPITAL AND LABOUR

In the second volume (paragraph 8) of his Isolated State, published for the first time in
1850, von Thnen examines the manner in which capital comes into existence and the
question whether an increase in output, resulting from the use of capital instruments,
will be proportional to such use. The first is a matter of saving from current output and
devoting the time gained from using up these savings in the construction of the instruments.
The second is denied,
for not every amount of capital in the form of tools, machines and buildings will make labour
proportionally more effective there is always a limit beyond which a further addition of the
implement ceases to be useful and to yield a rent. Once this limit has been reached, labour devoted
to the creation of capital has to be diverted to the production of other valuable commodities.
(Dempsey, 1960)
Von Thnen realizes that capital deepening runs into limits; he figures out a series of a
geometrical nature which declines progressively with a fraction of the base number of 9/10.
The conclusion is that the rent which the total capital yields if it is lent is determined by
the use of the last unit of capital still applied. But capital widening opens only initially
another track; so, the same process will make itself felt, to be sure with a fraction of
another dimension.
In other words, von Thnen has discovered the marginal productivity principle which
governs the application of increasing amounts of a production factor when other cooperating
factors remain constant. And he recognized that it was competitively supplied demand that
ruled the limiting price. Agricultural production evolved into an optimizing problem. For
this insight he was rightly praised by John Bates Clark, Alfred Marshall, Joseph Schumpeter
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30
and others in later times. Moreover, his mid-nineteenth-century agricultural estate was
ideally suited to test these principles as we shall also see in the last section.
ENTREPRENEURIAL ROLES
The German economist was deeply convinced that increasing applications of the production
factors, and in particular land and capital, would yield increasing output only up to a
maximum. After that, stagnation would occur and no further progress in income and
wealth was to be expected: Capital will give results and is in the strict sense of the term
capital only if used productively; on the degree of this usefulness depends the rate of
interest at which we lend capital. The hidden assumption underlying productive capital
is, naturally, that someone moves it and combines it with labour and land. Academic
economists might slide-over such an assumption by looking at the economic process as
something that proceeds by itself, but for an estate owner and practitioner like von Thnen
the message was: Productive use presupposes an industrial enterprise and an entrepreneur.
The enterprise gives the entrepreneur a net yield after compensating for all expenses and
costs. This net yield has two parts, business profits and capital use. Three pages earlier he
had distinguished interest on capital invested, insurance against business losses, the wages
of managing the enterprise and a residual called uninsurable risk. The last is the part of
business risk which no insurance company will ever take on and which the entrepreneur will
have to bear himself. The result of enterprise that is, the probability of gain being greater
than that of loss, a positive expectation of profit cannot be insured, for it is primarily
of a subjective nature and, in so far as objective circumstances are determinant, they are
of a general nature. The distinction between the manager and the entrepreneur is relevant
here: whereas the former fulfils an allotted task, the latter will have the persistent troubles
of running the enterprise the cares and sleepness nights, the doubts about investments,
the measuring up of competitors, the loyalty of the workmen, and so forth. The manager
can work according to a system; the entrepreneurs work cannot be systematized. But such
uncertainties are far from being unproductive. They stimulate the entrepreneur to think
of improvements and innovations:
Necessity is the mother of invention; and so the entrepreneur through his troubles will become an
inventor and explorer in his field what the entrepreneur brings about by greater mental effort
in comparison with the paid manager is compensation for his industry, diligence and ingenuity.
(Von Thnen, 1850, Dempseys translation, pp. 24550).
In this way the author links Richard Cantillons uncertainty explanation of profits with
Nicholas Baudeaus innovation theory and, moreover, also succeeds in distinguishing and
linking the managerial and organizational elements, stressed by Jean-Baptiste Say in the
early nineteenth century, with the previously discovered features. Von Thnens explanation
was a tremendous step forward in the foundation of a unified entrepreneurial theory. It
only needed the addition of Jacob Leonard de Bruyn Kopss fundamental element, brought
forward in the same year 1850 (see Chapter 4, Market theory in the Low Countries)
that entrepreneurial cost reductions, based on innovations and improvements and also
comprising quality improvements, or alternatively, new products, hit upon broadening
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31
income layers. Then the innovating entrepreneur will reap the profits, benefit consumers
and extend the market at the same time. Imitators will ultimately destroy the advantage
and generalize the gains. Here the origin of the economists views becomes manifest:
de Bruyn Kopss was an industrial one whereas von Thnens agricultural background
focused his attention not on such breakthroughs but on other issues, in particular on the
uncertainties of an agricultural origin.
LABOUR AND WAGES

Finally, von Thnens theory of labour and wages has raised eyebrows though it shows
a similar originality as his other writings. It maintains that labours compensation is not
determined by supply and demand in the market and comes down to the subsistence
wage of the classical economists but will also reflect the productivity (increases) of
labour. Von Thnen thought up a formula to express his view and which so impressed
him that he had it inscribed on his tombstone: the natural or just wage W = ap; in
this formula, a represents the necessary living standard of the labourer who is considered
to be of a common homogeneous quality while p denotes the value of the products made
by labour. Both could be expressed in money or produce (von Thnen, 1850, Vol. 2, para.
15, pp. 15056).
How should the formula be interpreted? Is it an ideal or normative expression saying
what a just wage should be? Or does it indicate a relationship to be found in reality, but of
course, on the basis of the assumption that free land, as some critics said, or free access
to new products or new markets should be available?
The first interpretation need not bother us even if it cannot be excluded that von Thnen,
who was socially engaged with his workers, meant it that way. Economically, the validity
of the formula hinges on the second interpretation, however. As it stands, the formula
says that labour does not claim its full output but neither is it or need it be satisfied with a
subsistence wage. Results achieved by economic progress must of necessity also be partially
distributed to workers.
In this form the formula can be upheld in modern times, too, provided we drop von
Thnens assumption of homogeneous labour. In his own model this assumption was
already difficult to accept. His model of progress departed from the assumed division
of the labour force working on the marginal farms to be established on free land, in two
sections: one cultivating the farm in a normal way as was done elsewhere, the other section
of workers manufacturing the capital goods to be used on the production farm (let us
call this the firm). Von Thnen maintained that all workers would earn the same wage
rate because any discrepancy between the farms and the firms rate would be equalized
by labour moving to the location with the highest compensation.
But this is hardly convincing. The capital instruments made by the firm need skilled,
more qualified labour (engineers, designers, craftsmen and so on) especially if progress is
to be continuous; the increased productivity benefits the farms but only on the condition
that the firms workers earn a rent rewarding their ingenuity and skills. Thus the workers
on the farms and the firms are not homogeneous and there are wage differentials.
However, von Thnens formula is valid if interpreted in the second way as stated above.
It then means the following.
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32
An economy needs a group of firms making capital instruments to be applied in other,

more conventional businesses, if it is to make economic progress. The making of the
instruments is an activity requiring special skills and ingenuity and is rewarded above
average. As such it is an attraction for the workers who are able and willing to devote
themselves to the acquisition of the required qualifications. Government policies with
respect to education and training as well as the promotion of saving may strongly promote
the growth. Then, even in a situation of classical unlimited labour supply, wages need not
stay at a general subsistence level but can be raised above this in widening circles. Is not
the fast expansion of the Chinese economy with its high investment share and ditto mass
schooling of the population in both advanced and practical skills an illustration of this
adapted von Thnen model?
PRACTICAL EXPERIMENTS
From 1 July 1847, von Thnen ordered the wages on his Tellow estate near Rostock in
north Germany to be paid in accordance with his wage formula, and no longer follow
the prevailing competitive standards. Profit participation was continued after his death
in September 1850 until 1896. Every year, as per the end of June, total revenue of the
estate was calculated, expenditure deducted and a fixed share was allotted to the owner.
Initially 16,500 marks, later 18,000 marks. Of the remaining surplus all employees got a
proportional share, amounting to 68.46 marks on average per family during those 49 years
or 3354 marks in total. Looked at from another point of view, the average family earned
an extra 15 to 20 per cent of its wage or salary, which was between 300 and 500 marks per
annum (Damaschke, Vol.1, pp. 3816, 13th edn, 1922). The system was discontinued when
the estate was sold in 1896. A well-known Dutch entrepreneur, J.C. van Marken, a social
industrialist, who, as his socialist opponents acknowledged, paid above-average wages and
replenished several social funds with important contributions, also ran a profit-sharing
system in his firm. In the quarter-century 187095, labours share amounted to nearly
60 per cent; he himself retained some 40 per cent of the 5 million guilders made during
the period, net of interest on loans, depreciation and reservations including bonuses (de
Jong, 1988, p. 57).
Dobb (1946, pp. 825) recounts some early British instances of profit sharing; but mostly
these schemes had conditions attached such as the abstinence of membership of a trade
union, no participation in collective bargaining, the renunciation of strike action and so
on. Moreover, the benefits were rather meagre: On the average the profit-bonus amounts
to some 56% of the workers wage, and seldom exceeds in all 10% of the total profits
(ibid., p. 84).
CARL MENGER (18401921): THE PRIMACY OF THE

CONSUMER
This well-known economist and founder of the marginal utility school of value (together
with William Stanley Jevons) was not a great contributor to market theory in the sense
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33
of Cantillon, Smith or von Thnen. These men had matched an explanatory scheme of
the functioning of markets with many concrete and practical insights and deductions
and thereby secured for themselves a wide public audience. Menger was the analytical,
theoretical economist who brought original points of view into the discussion, though at
the same time there were some curious lapses.
Within the row of nineteenth-century German economic thinkers, Menger was the one
who emphasized most persistently the role of the final consumer in economic decision
making; who also stressed the time element in the progress of society and who added to
these elements, almost necessarily, the uncertainty prevailing in economic transactions. This
may have a different impact on various economic activities, but will be almost universally
increasing with the lapse of time. These elements found their place in Mengers theory,
which emerged in 1871 when he published his Grundstze der Volkswirtschaftlehre, or
Principles of Economics. The book was meant to throw a new light on the market process, in
particular to stress the character of the economic system as a system of dependent prices
(Schumpeter, 1952, pp. 845). Mengers aim is to discover the laws of price formation,
starting from the recognition that people produce and exchange goods to satisfy their
needs. The basic tool was the Grenznutzenlehre or the marginal utility principle as one
of Mengers pupils, Friedrich von Wieser (18511926) later called it. Schumpeter stated
(not without exaggeration) that once this solution to the pricing problem had been found:
the whole complex mechanism of economic life suddenly appeared to be unexpectedly
and transparently simple (ibid., p. 84).
Menger himself, in the Preface to the Principles (Menger, 1968, edited by F.A. von
Hayek) submitted a large claim when he took up the problem raised by Jean Buridan in
the fourteenth century, namely the relationship between universal laws and the human
freedom of will-power to realize set goals. It will suffice to give two citations from this
Preface which make clear the principles upon which Mengers book is built:
If and under what conditions something is useful to me, if and under what conditions it is a good,
if and under what conditions this will have value to me and how large the measure of this value
is to me, if and under what conditions an economic exchange of goods between two subjects will
take place and within what limits, etc., all this is so independent from my will power as a law of
chemistry is from the will and consent of a practical chemist. (Principles, 1968, Preface, p. 11)
On the same page Menger writes:

[T]he reference to the freedom of human will power may indeed be understood as an objection
against the full law-submitted character of economic acts, but never as one against the lawsubmitted events, which, being independent of human will power, condition the result of human
economic activity. It is the latter which are the subject of our science, however. (Ibid.)
These passages were meant to sustain Mengers claim that economics is an exact science
and that this cannot be denied by referring to the freedom of human beings to decide
otherwise: because economics as an exact science is thereby neglected (ibid.).
Alongside exact laws Menger distinguished empirical laws. These are the first type of
laws mentioned above and they may be changed by human interference. Such laws are, in
contrast to exact laws, not always true for all nations and all times which have a traffic in
goods (Menger, 1985, p. 72). They allow for exceptions and are to be determined only by
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34
observation. Exceptions may be induced by impulses, other than the economic ones, by
errors or ignorance and so on. The exact orientation of theoretical research will, on the
other hand, reduce human phenomena to the most original ones and to the most general
forces and impulses of human nature. This theory teaches us to follow and understand the
efforts of humans aimed at the provision of their material needs (ibid., pp. 867).
At this stage in the argument it seems opportune to draw the attention to some remarkable
points:
1. Menger still clings to the material concept of economics: the provision of material
goods, though he later on in his book dubs the efforts of middlemen in markets as
productive. Post-Mengerian Austrians have corrected this, but the lapse throws a curious
blot on the exact economics that would be valid for all times and places.
2. Methodologically Menger is an Aristotelian, that is, one who wishes to discover the
essence of the phenomena he studies, or to expose their real nature. The discussion of
this position is best left to writers who specialize(d) in this field (Hutchinson, 1981,
ch. 6; White Introduction to the New York University Press edition of 1985; and W.
Meyer, Grundlagen, 2002, ch. 9). But it seems relevant to point out that Menger argued
causally, that is, from cause to effect, and neglected the aspect of interdependency. A
review in 1872 had already remarked that the relevant economic relationship between
goods and needs is one of means and goals, not of causes and effects (Hayek in the
Introduction to the Principles, 1968, note 12).
3. From the point of view of market theory, the distinction between exact and empirical
laws seems without merit: it may be considered superfluous or untrue or confusing. In
market theory the institutional structure is necessarily linked up with the process in a
mutually interdependent way.
4. It is Mengers radical consumer orientation which remains. Goods are classified by him
according to their directness in satisfying human needs. This follows from the utility or
usefulness which they have for the ultimate consumer. Higher-order goods have only
an indirect importance, in contrast to the lower-order goods which have an immediate
want-satisfying potential. Naturally, the transformation of goods from higher- into
lower-order ones, which is what production is concerned with, is a time-consuming
and uncertain process. Mengers entrepreneur is the one who copes with the problems
arising from these uncertainties and, in particular, aligns the vertically disintegrated
productive resources.
Throughout this time-consuming transformation process the entrepreneurial function
comprises: the procurement of all necessary information; the calculation of economic
magnitudes; the will to organize and assign the economic goods to their most efficient
places, and finally, to supervise the process and bring it to a successful close. Note that
such an entrepreneur is, for all his activities, only one who executes the final consumers
desires by responding to his wishes and whims. For this, markets are all-important and
constitute the core of economics.
5. His Chapter 16 (Principles, 1968, pp. 21224) on the nature, relationships and the
changes therein of use values and exchange values is an illustrating example. Use value
is all but forgotten in modern economics. But Menger shows its importance if both
kinds of valuation are relevant.2 Then the highest of the two is decisive: to appreciate
the economic value of goods whether their use value or their exchange value is the
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35
more economical, belongs to the most important tasks of economically active humans.
This decision depends on the determination of economic advantage: what goods to keep
and which to sell (Principles, 1968, p. 219). He lists and discusses the changes in the
nature of goods, of social relationships, of lifestyles and emotional involvements, but,
above all, the effect that the quantities of goods and assets (including fixed property and
businesses) have on the satisfaction of needs and the decisions to buy and sell goods.
The growth of eBay-type firms amid the disasters of so many internet firms underlines
this view in our times.
COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: THE AUSTRIAN VIEWS

Austrian theory has inspired continental economists with the idea that markets evolve in
time, and develop, as Menger maintained, from bilateral monopoly to trade between more
parties and ultimately to large-scale competitive markets. Monopoly comes first when a new
market arises, and only with time does the growth of markets make competition possible
(Menger, 1981, pp. 191225). All markets start with monopoly and move towards becoming
more and more competitive. If markets grow larger, monopoly is reduced and competition is
broadened. Varying Adam Smiths famous dictum, one could say that competition is limited
by the extent of the market. The economic progress of civilization leads to competition
(ibid., pp. 2245), for market forces break down monopoly. If the monopolist behaves in
the traditional way, by undersupplying the total market, potential buyers are not satisfied
when demand increases and the market grows, and the monopolist will bring about his
own demise. This is not because competition reverts to a state of perfection, which does
not exist. Menger denies that a good in a state of competition has a unique price; instead,
prices are varied and dispersed (ibid., pp. 1913 and 23685). Von Wieser extended this
analysis to what he called the monopoloid constructions, such as public and private
groupings like cartels and trusts, in which monopoly and competition do meet not only
externally, but one and the same construction unites both, so that theory is posed with a
new problem. Here again, it is the consideration of time which colours the analysis and
thereby supports the previous point, namely, that the market organization forms stand in
a dynamic, even dialectical relationship (von Wieser, 1927, pp.15862).
Schumpeter and Levy rounded off the analysis by arguing that the Mengerian view
of declining prices if the number of competitors increases, implies that both the level
of the extra profit rate and the duration of that rate diminish with market growth and
make structural changes necessary (Schumpeter, 1926, pp. 99103; Levy, 1936, pp. 615,
85, 1567). Monopoly can only persist in exceptional circumstances, for monopoly is at
once the first and the unique seller. The idea, entertained by Karl Marx, Marshall and
later on Piero Sraffa and Joan Robinson that monopolists exist because of a continuously
declining long-run average cost curve is not accepted by Austrian theory. When demand
increases, new product varieties and new processes can be introduced in accordance with
the Smithian principle, and the chances that a monopolist will be able to realize these better
than competitors are extremely small. Figure 3.1 demonstrates the sequence. Revenue
curves R1, R2 and R3, both shift to the right and become more elastic. Cost curves C1, C2
and C3 (representing improved and more varied products as well as lower cost processes)
are pushed downward and the profit rate declines continually. In addition, Schumpeter
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36
solved the basic question implied in Figure 3.1: why do entrepreneurs come forward, either
as initiating monopolists or as imitating competitors?
Pricecost P0
per unit
R1
P1
C1
R2
C2
P2
R3
C3
P3
Q0
Q2
Q1
Q4
Q3
Time/quantity dimension
Figure 3.1
The Mengerian process
In the second edition of his Theory of Economic Development, Schumpeter clarified

the points made by Menger and von Wieser by defining the entrepreneur as the economic
agent who exerts leadership through setting different goals and behaving differently from
the common run of economic decision makers. Such entrepreneurs are generated by an
ethnically homogeneous population according to a frequency curve: entrepreneurial
capacities are distributed like the capacities for singing, playing chequers, tennis and so
on. This position explains at once:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
why the number of competitors cannot explain competition;

why a developed society generates a continuous stream of entrepreneurs;
why there are small and big entrepreneurs;
why entrepreneurs are always a minority of the population; and
why entrepreneurs are different from normal businessmen (Wirte schlechtweg und
Unternehmer).
To do different things in a different way, however, encounters three obstacles: it is

objectively difficult, it requires subjective capacities for initiating change and it meets
social resistance. Economic leadership (innovation) overcomes these obstacles because
it is motivated by the plus ultra: to found an empire, to battle and succeed and to create
something new (Schumpeter, 1926, pp. 12239). This view of the entrepreneur perhaps
somewhat exalted is not debased when one includes material motives. The German
definition: Durchsetzung neuer Kombinationen expresses it pointedly.
Levy3 while being fundamentally in agreement with the above carried the pre-war
analysis an important step further by discussing concentration that takes the form both
of trusts and cartels. In Figure 3.1, the initial monopolist would like to restrict supply to
Q0 and fetch the high price P0. He cannot. Competition will force the price down to P1,
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37
where no profit is left. New product varieties and processes have to come forward (C2) and,
again, after an interval, competition reduces the price to P2. The process is repeated until
P3 is reached. No profits (apart from normal profits required to attract able managers
and risk capital) are made by the numerous competitiors in the larger-sized market.
This situation, according to Levy, may persist. But if some enabling conditions prevail,
it may be changed towards concentration and even monopoly. In that case, output would
have to be diminished to Q4 (Figure 3.1) and that could be achieved by a cartel, buying
out some competitors or a trust rationalizing production and/or sales.
Here, it is not simply a matter of reducing the number of competitors. For the suppression
of competition depends not, as classical economists maintained, on the number of
competitors, but on the relationship between number of suppliers and the anticipated
monopoly advantages accruing from combination (Levy, 1911, pp. 2912). The greater
the number of competitors, the higher must be the anticipated increase in extra profits and
the longer their prospective duration (t) in order to make effective combination (cartel or
trust) worthwhile. A combination among a small number of competitors can be achieved
if the rewards are modest and/or limited in time whereas high extra profits on a long-term
basis are required to unite numerous competitors.
What can be accomplished by means of concentration, depends, according to Levy, on
five enabling conditions, and their degree of fulfilment:
1. Whether the national market is protected by import duties or not. Pre-1914, this was
more applicable to many industries under British free-trade conditions than to US or
German markets which were protected; similar considerations apply to other protective
institutional arrangements.
2. Whether the scale of optimal plant or firm in relation to market demand is large or
small. The higher the relative scale, the more the risk of excess capacity for an intruder
is enhanced. Even with a higher anticipated profit level, he will not enter.
3. Inelastic supply of (essential) inputs is again a factor moving a rewarding combination
to exploit the market situation.
4. Another factor is vertical integration, which can be achieved with reductions of average
cost per unit.
5. Finally, the reputation of an established firm, with its own accustomed markets or
regular clientele, or the inherited skill of a special class of operatives, forms in certain
circumstances, an element in a monopoly which must not be undervalued (ibid.,
pp. 3034).
At first, the Mengerian competitive process exerts a pressure towards (but probably never
arriving at) the state of equilibrium, both by increasing the number of competitors and
by shifting market demand to the right. But because both factors interact, entrepreneurs
can hardly determine at what location they are. Only if demand growth stabilizes, and the
growth rate becomes predictable, can an entrepreneur spot an opportunity for combination,
and see what form this combination should have and how stable it may be.
All this means that entrepreneurial action (the process) determines the market structure,
and, vice versa, given structures may (provided the enabling factors prevail) prompt
entrepreneurs to start a process of combination. Process and structure are seen as interdependent.
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38
Thus, in Levys model the formation of a combination and its possible and tenable
profitability depends on:
the supplydemand relationships during market development;
the intensity of competition, only partially given by the number of competitors;
and
a set of objective, enabling factors, partly of technical and partly of an institutional/
political nature.
However, the moving agent is always an entrepreneur, spotting the opportunities inherent
in the situation.
The widely read German economist Robert Liefmann, for example, distinguishing
between the absolute monopoly of a single seller (mostly based on legal privileges) and
the relative monopoly (a dominant firm with a few, mostly smaller suppliers having some
disadvantages) and introducing a new term, remarks that latent competition is always in
the background and will be activated by price increases.4 In reverse, competition, which in
the modern economy is fiercely stimulated by the progress of technology, by the extension
of communications and the reduction of transport costs and by the growth of capital, so
that new firms are founded, may become so intense that monopolistic combinations like
cartels and trusts arise. Economic reality is therefore pictured as a dialectical process of
competition moving towards loose and tight combinations of firms (including monopolies)
and vice versa.5 The background of this process is also the power of the other side of the
market: the choosing consumer. The possibility of creating cartels and monopolies that
work, depends on the relationships prevailing on the demand side; for, says Liefmann:
production costs do not determine prices, but prices determine the upper level of costs. He
goes on to list the alternatives which consumers can command (Liefmann, 1930, pp. 1336).
The picture drawn up is far removed from the static, neo-classical market forms. It explains
rising concentration (in the sense of larger firms) as the result of market extension, and
the accompanying mass production and mass distribution.6
The culmination of research into the concentration problem found expression in the
publication of the two volumes of Economic Concentration in 1960 (2nd edn, 1971), edited
by H. Arndt. Arndt said in the introduction that concentration had become an all-embracing
phenomenon in modern society, with far-reaching implications for various domains. It
needed a broad approach, taking into account not only the economic, but also the many
non-economic aspects (legal, fiscal and so on). At the same time he noted a trend in thinking
towards theoretical explanations. No doubt, the many contributions by international
authors to the volumes were partly responsible for this, as well as the attractions the new
field offered to theoretically minded economists. More important, the concept of dynamic
competition started to make headway, as we shall see in the next sections.7
With regard to the policy inferences to be drawn from the growth of trusts and
combinations, economists parted company. Some, like Levy argued that planning by the
state comes near to compulsory cartelization and should be avoided because it would (i)
expose the state to many risks and responsibilities it could not bear, and (ii) might lead to
overconcentration, which might have just as fatal results as had had the rationalization
craze (Levy, 1936, p. 265) because the natural tendencies towards concentration are not
present, everywhere and at all times and sometimes not at all (ibid., p. 267). Others, like
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39
Franois de Vries and Jean Marchal, insisted that the structure of the economy which
had been determined by individualistic principles was being fundamentally transformed
under the influence of associationist movements and that both theory and policy had to
be radically transformed.8
In the immediate postwar period a very influential line of thinking emerged with the
writings of the so-called Eucken school. It added another dimension to the problem. Walter
Eucken maintained that one of the central points is the possible divergence in market
economies between private and social interests. The treatment of monopoly power requires
competition and other policies on behalf of the state which has the obligation to maintain
a competitive order. Eucken was less fortunate in postulating as a norm for such a policy
the concept of full competition, by which he understood, not a market structure but
the behaviour of firms even of oligopolists who accept the market price as given. The
criticisms in the following decades by neo-Austrians on this concept, in which they rightly
pointed out that firms in dynamic competition also set prices in the game, nevertheless erred
in simultaneously equating private and social interests, as long as those dynamic firms are
free to act as they please. That means, as Lenel pointed out, a retrogression from Smith
to Franois Quesnay, with his dubious philosophical concept of a natural order (Lenel,
1975). There is no doubt that the views expressed by the Eucken school contributed to the
inauguration of competition policies in West Germany (Lenel, 19621, 19682) as well as in
the European Community, a historical breakthrough on the continent.
THE FLOWERING OF DYNAMIC MARKET THEORY SINCE 1960

Levys was not a bad piece of analysis, already formulated in 1911, even in comparison
with Schumpeters which appeared in 1912. It might be argued that the model is not
specific enough; although this is true, it has to be balanced against other advantages. If one
opts for a dynamic analysis, the gains in realism carry the price of some indeterminism.
Also, dynamic analysis can provide for a theoretical framework, encompassing the market
process, which is lacking from static analysis. Into such a dynamic framework, market
situation models can be inserted and given their place. This is what European economists
have done in the postwar period and what differentiated them from the Anglo-Saxon
approach using the structureconductperformance paradigm. Indeed, many continental
Europeans have followed the market growthdecline paradigm, distinguishing between
phases of development and the market situations prevailing during those phases.9 The
plausibility of this was strongly underlined by the course of many European industries,
which started their growth curves in the postwar years, adopting new products and new
technological and organizational processes often originating in the United States. After
fast expansion in the 1950s and 1960s, maturity was reached in the 1970s and decline
followed in the early 1980s. Naturally, the expansion paths differed in the timing between
the sectors. In general, the approach led to the idea that market development phases
show different forms and intensities of competition, as firms use alternative competitive
parameters (price, advertising, product innovation and variation, takeovers, diversification and so on) suited to differing conditions of demand growth and demand elasticities.
Processes of concentration had to be explained by falling back on the specific development
conditions of an industry or market sector, because a durable growth advantage of large
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40
units in all sectors cannot be proved historically. Concentration processes thus have to be
seen as industry specific (Brandt, 1971, p. 280).
These basic ideas were worked on in Germany and the Netherlands starting from the
Schumpeterian innovator, and in this way a truly entrepreneurial economics arose. The
Schumpeterian view had the great advantage that it freed economic theory from the homo
economicus, who was central in neo-classical theory. In one stroke, the shackles of the
mechanistic view of economic life were broken. But, as Heusz (1965, pp. 916) noted, the
Schumpeterian entrepreneur has two important limitations:
first, that he acts only within the context of the economy as a whole, giving rise to
innovations and clusters of these, investment waves and various types of cycles,
relevant to the total economy; and
second, that the Schumpeterian entrepreneur was contrasted only with the traditional
type of businessman the non-pioneer.
In addition to this, my main point was that whatever Schumpeterian theory said about
motives and types, the continuity and the directions of entrepreneurial moves are left
in the dark, whereas this is of fundamental importance for the problems of industrial
organization. This naturally leads to research into horizontal, vertical and diversification
strategies of firms.
So two routes were chosen. Heusz, in West Germany, developed a typology of
entrepreneurs, dividing them into four types:
1. the innovator pioneer;
2. the imitative entrepreneur, showing initiative like the first type but not in a pathbreaking
way;
3. the conservative entrepreneur, adapting to the changing market circumstances, initiated
by others; and
4. the immobile businessman not even adapting, but simply doing the usual things until
he is ousted from the field.
These four types were not meant to be a general typology, reflecting innate human characteristics, but conceptual, analytical instruments, used for explaining the stages of market
development. For, as Heusz underlined, entrepreneurial acts are mirrored in the making
and unmaking of markets. Production, costs, demand and so on are not simply given, as is
maintained in traditional theory, but are the parameters of action, through which market
types arise. In one and the same person, therefore, different conceptual types may occur
at different times, as for example, with Henry Ford and Heinz Nordhoff in motor cars,
who were one-time pioneers, but thereafter remained dedicated to old-fashioned products
or methods. Now, two general propositions follow:
1. The entrepreneurial type changes with market development phases.
2. The relationships between these entrepreneurial types shift with either complementary
and reinforcing effects or with substitutive consequences.
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41
The first proposition is supported by a probability analysis, in which the supposition is

made that among 10 entrepreneurs, one will be of the initiating type and nine will be of the
conservative type. Depending on whether the entry of new firms to the industry is supposed
to occur (and this is linked to the development phase) and the likelihood that initiating
entrepreneurs will shift to successive stages, it follows that sooner or later, the conservative
type will come to prevail, and market behaviour will show different characteristics in the
course of time. With respect to the second proposition, Heuszs analysis of a number of
combinations of similar and different entrepreneurial types shows that, depending on the
stage of market development, entrepreneurs may stimulate or block each others actions. I
cannot discuss the intricate analysis here in all its complexity, but one example may suffice:
the action of imitative entrepreneurs during the expansion stage will reinforce the pioneers
behaviour, extending the market, bringing prices and costs downwards and so on, whereas
the same type will block innovative behaviour during the maturity phase.10
There is not enough market room during maturity to accommodate imitation. If, in
contrast, the pioneer rivals with conservative and a fortiori, immobile types of businessmen,
he may continue introducing innovations because these types afford him competitive
room.
The picture which emerges from this analysis is that a complementary relationship will
prevail if there is sufficient room, whereas a substitutive relationship between firms occurs
if that is not the case. The room provided depends on market and competitive factors,
and both are linked to the development stages of a market. If firms have a tendency to
block each other, cartels, mergers and other combinatory moves will follow. But suppose
the types diverge very much (for example, one pioneer among many conservative firms),
the expansion phase will be held back in its development, whereas the declining phase will
be speeded up. This analysis, based on types of entrepreneurs, is preceded by a penetrating
research of each development stage and rounded off by bringing into the game the demand
and cost factors in one- and multi-product firms (Heusz, 1965, Ch. 5).
One important objection against the Heussian type of analysis may be that it easily
gets too complicated, not resulting in testable hypotheses. In fact, the analysis is rich in
deductive, probabilistic and mathematically oriented derivations, but short of empirical
content. This objection was met by later research, analysing sectors and firm cases (Schlgl,
1972; Kaufer, 1980; Oberender, 1984) from the point of view of a simpler model of market
development.
Another objection might be that it leaves the development directions of firms in the
dark. The Dutch analysis was oriented towards the directions entrepreneurial moves
take, inspired by the growth of large firms like Shell, Unilever, Philips, St Gnrale,
and the like.11
The basic fact about a market economy is that firms do have relationships with each
other, because they cannot avoid each others actions. Entrepreneurial acts determine the
timing and direction of these relationships in order to combine resources with a view to
future production and sales. If markets develop according to growth cycles, entrepreneurial
acts of a greater or lesser importance are required in every stage of development and not
only when founding a new firm or plant, as Schumpeter assumed in his model of 1939. With
such acts, responding to new opportunities, entrepreneurs leave their imprint on both the
market process and the required structures. The right moves generate profits, the wrong
ones losses: both are residuals, arising out of performances, windfalls and power positions.
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42
Market structures are composed out of the working of three basic principles of coordinative
behaviour between firms, namely those of a rivalrous, competitive nature, of cooperatively
and collusively oriented behaviour, or of a dominating nature (de Jong, 1971b). These
principles operate along horizontal, vertical and diagonal lines as entrepreneurs direct their
creative and imitative activities towards the improvement of their firms market position.
However, entrepreneurs freedom of action and their choice of directive strategy are
limited by the stages of market development and the related characteristics. This means,
for example, that competitive, horizontal rivalry increases during the expansion phase, but
subsides and/or changes substantially during the maturity phase of a market, whereas a
market in decline normally shows so-called ruinous competition (which should be taken
literally, not morally: capacities have to be reduced to a lower level, or scrapped). Similarly,
vertical integration and diversification is pursued when the firms reach maturity in their
previous activities and are sufficiently profitable to finance takeovers. In expansion there
is no need to diversify; in decline there are usually no resources available.
It is worthwhile to underline a few qualifying comments:
1. The theory only predicts tendencies, because individual firms may do nothing, or make
the wrong decisions, or be late in adapting themselves. Being a thruster or a sleeper
affects performance.
2. Major innovations may distort the sequence of market phases. For example, an
important innovation may mean renewed growth for an industry after maturity, or
may prolong the expansion phase.
3. The use of action parameters (pricing, advertising, merger activity, location and so on)
will shift during market phases, and will be chosen by entrepreneurs in accordance with
the prevailing type of market organization.
4. Policy measures as well as general cyclical movements are influential in retarding
or accelerating the tendencies and may occasionally shift the direction of market
development.
5. Welfare considerations can be applied to this version of the growth-cycle theory. Two
examples may illustrate this:
a. Dynamic market theory implies that governmental policies which sustain mature
and/or declining industries by means of protection, subsidies or the permitted
formation of structural cartels are seriously mistaken, because they bring about
wastage of scarce resources and lead to industrial senility. Economists of the growthcycle orientation have fiercely opposed such aid. Support for innovative industries
can, on the contrary and under certain conditions, be defended as being more
sensible (Wijers, 1981. For contrary views see Hindley, 1983).
b. Kaufer has argued that mergers in the introductory and expansion phases practically
always are per se opposed to the achievement of a net welfare benefit, whereas
mergers in the late maturity phase, particularly during stagnation, may well achieve
these. He bases this conclusion on the possibility that the latter type of mergers
can reduce costs through rationalization and the closing of suboptimal plants
(Kaufer, 1980, pp. 30510). This is what Levy maintained in the 1920s. The main
considerations are that introductory phase mergers between market participants
(diversification mergers is another matter) do not achieve scale advantages faster
de Jong 01 intro 42
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43
than internal growth, whereas the interdependency between the investment decision
of oligopolists in maturity/stagnation, which threatens deadlock, can be avoided
by merger. On the basis of reasonable assumptions, the maturity mergers bringing
small savings in costs would be a net benefit, even if the monopolistic price increases
were substantial (ibid.).12
Analytically, dynamic market theory is an extension of the previously described Mengerian
process and of the Levy model. From an innovatory monopoly, the market expands towards
fierce competition, ending in the reorganization of the industry by entrepreneurs, who
devise combinations (cartels, syndicates, dominating firms through takeovers and mergers)
during maturity. When market decline enters, the dialectical pendulum gets reversed: from
concentration to ruinous competition, with reorganizations, and, sometimes, splitting-up
of firms and de-mergers. Basic innovations are necessary to start the wheel turning again.
Mostly, these will imply new growth cycles, either in the same or in different industries.
However, growth-cycle theory is not a perfect description of economic reality. No
theory can achieve that. Its main advantage is that it teaches economists that markets
are dynamic and that process, structure and performance are interrelated, because of
entrepreneurial action.
OPTIMAL COMPETITION DEBATED13

Another dynamic theory which has found adherence among European economists is
the theory of workable competition, of which the most prominent representation was
due to Erhard Kantzenbach14 (Kantzenbach, 1966). Fierce discussion has followed the
introduction of the concept of workable competition in Europe, following the trail set by
John Maurice Clark in the United States. Rejecting static equilibrium theory, Kantzenbach
described competition as an evolutionary and disequilibrium process, in which rivalry
prevails. The rivalrous competition is only an instrument to achieve social welfare goals,
of which three are outstanding: the growth of the social product, the optimal distribution
and composition of the social product, and the promotion of a flexible adaptation of the
economy to changing circumstances.
These goals are not served equally by the two main functions (technical progress and
flexible adaptation) which require substantial degrees of monopoly and market imperfection.
Consequently, optimal competition is a compromise between the two extremes, and, though
difficult to quantify or to measure, is to be found when loose oligopolistic market structures
with some degree of product differentiation and market intransparency prevail.
For Kantzenbach, the distinction between potential and effective intensity of competition
is decisive. Oligopoly is not general interdependency of sellers, but the dependency of
a particular seller on the behaviour of an individual competitor, who may threaten
his existence. This creates a high degree of insecurity, which is at a maximum in a
homogeneous duopoly situation and very low in polypolistic markets. (Compare the
Stackelberg-leading firm.)
The insecurity depends on the divergence of cost functions, relative liquidity reserves as
between companies and the short-term demand shifts in the market, which are all difficult
to know. Both owner- and management-controlled firms strive for long-term security (be
de Jong 01 intro 43
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44
it for different reasons). Potential and effective competitive intensity diverge more strongly
the fewer the number of competing oligopolists and the more homogeneous the products
sold become.
Stated simply: potential competition intensity rises when fewer and fewer sellers of
homogeneous goods threaten to wipe out one of them by means of unforeseen actions. The
same facts induce restraints on competition though, because nobody wants to be wiped
out. A duopoly will have unlimited potential competition, but the effective degree will be
very low. Between six and 12 competitors there might be workable competition, and the
optimal degree could be nine competitors.
The six competitors who have effective competition among themselves have a much
higher degree of potential competition, so that either they will have some product differentiation or they will practise some restraints of competition that are tolerable. Beyond 12
competitors, the degree of effective competition sinks below the tolerable, and gradually
mergers or other restraints of competition would become desirable (obviously, the chosen
numbers are artificial and depend on the specific sector). Oligopolistic interdependency
is not restricted to horizontal relations between firms, but also relates to vertical liaisons.
Schematizing the intensity and the direction of controls between firms, one arrives at the
presentation of competitive restraints depicted in Table 3.1 (Kantzenbach, 1966, p. 101),
which are further discussed by the author.
Table 3.1
Competitive restraints
Intensity
Coordinated
behaviour
Agreements
Interlocking
relationships
Mergers, takeovers
Source:
Direction
Horizontal
Vertical
Group discipline,
concerted action
Cartels, agreed
business conditions
Capital participations,
syndicates, interlocking
directorates
Trusts, concerns
Traditional business
relationships
Long-term delivery
agreements
Capital participations,
interlocking directorates,
co-direction
Vertical concerns
Kantzenbach (1966, p. 101).
It follows that real markets may have either over- or underoptimal degrees of competition.
Competition policys task is therefore to counter both situations and tendencies in which the
intensity of competition potentially is suboptimal (for example, promotion of concentration,
the raising of scale of operations and an increase in product differentiation or particular
cartel types) or overoptimal (some splitting up of trusts, the prevention of some mergers, or
the prevention of oligopolistic price wars in order to avoid the formation of uncontrolled
monopolies). Essentially, polypolistic competition lacks dynamic progress, while tight
oligopoly carries the dangers of non-functional power battles and/or collusion. Typically,
ruinous competition occurs in polypolistic situations, according to the workability theory,
de Jong 01 intro 44
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45
because firms are too small, do not have financial means to undertake innovations and
behave only traditionally (recall that in the growth-cycle theory, ruinous competition also
occurs in recessionary stages between large firms).
As stated before, the workability theory was criticized from various sides.
One criticism of the workability concept (by Erich Hoppmann and others) has pointed
out that the inherent antithesis between perfect competition (polypoly), in which there
is no progress and monopoly/tight oligopoly in which there is no optimal allocation or
distribution, is wrong. There is a dilemma in the goals that competition has to serve only
if competition is seen as an instrument to serve general economic goals. If, in contrast,
competition is conceived of as a discovery process (Friedrich von Hayeks term), the
freedom (equated to an atomistic market structure) to compete and the achievement of
desirable results is identical: there will be no dilemma. Exceptionally, Hoppmann says,
some natural barriers (economies of scale, exit barriers and so on) may prevent competition
altogether. However, this objection assumes an identity of private freedom of action and
the resulting advantages with social advantages. Such an assumption is difficult to sustain;
by means of competition firms may discover worthwhile economic advantages as well as
ways to reduce or eliminate competition itself.
Second, the Dutch Competition Law of 1956 was also based on the theory of workable
competition. Reviewing the achievements of 25 years of Dutch competition policy, the
President of the Competition Commission remarked that the concept is rather vague: if the
intensity of competition is judged by the speed with which a sellers advantage is spoiled,
the reactionary move may not be too fast, otherwise the creation of the advantage will not
be undertaken, or too slow, so that monopoly will last longer than necessary. But what is
too in both cases? In addition, the judgement can only be made ex post, which is too late
for policy actions. And, finally, what is wanted in present times is the stimulation of price
competition, and this is not served by meticulous considerations of optimality (Van der
Weijden, 1981). While it is true that in inflationary times more emphasis could be given
to price competition in competition policy, the objection with respect to vagueness would
not seem to dismantle the structural version of the workability theory. For the theory
maintains that in the right structural composition of a market that is, loose oligopolies
advantages will be created and competed away. As long as both types of action occur, the
system does work. The difficulty is to keep the oligopolies in a loosely constructed form,
so that no welfare losses occur. In general one could say that analyses of welfare losses
due to concentrated market structures (how great are the quantitative losses deriving from
concentrated industry structures?) have not been pertinent in Europe.15
NOTES
*
Some paragraphs, Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 (on pages 3545) were taken from Mainstreams in Industrial
Organization, Book 1, Chapter 3 with kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media. This book
was published in 1986 by Kluwer Academic Publishers and edited by W.G. Shepherd and H.W. de Jong.
1. B.H. Slicher van Bath, De agrarische geschiedenis van West-Europa (5001850), 3rd edn, 1976, Utrecht/
Antwerp, pp. 1978 and 2726.
2. For large-scale producers only exchange valuations are relevant. But it seems opportune to remind ourselves
that consumer decisions depending on the determination of the economic gravitation point (Menger), that
is, the decision to keep or sell, are pervasive and growing in rich and restless societies: think of secondhand
de Jong 01 intro 45
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46
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
de Jong 01 intro 46

markets in cars, houses, boats, stamps, coins, animals, clothes, artistic products and so on. Professors who
cultivate their own libraries should be the first to concur.
Hermann Levy was professor of economics for several decades at the University of Heidelberg in Germany
and wrote books on industrial economics between 1909 and 1940. He was, to my mind, a very perceptive
economist, who anticipated several points that others came to develop later, for example, the lesser
importance of the number of competitors in comparison with their behavioural dynamics, the difference
between technical and economic concentration, entry barriers, product differentiation and so on.
With cartels, in contradistinction to legal monopolies like patents, the rise of new competition by means
of the founding of new firms, is never excluded, but always in the background. And it is the more the
prospect, that this latent competition, this possibility to compete, becomes a fact, the more the cartel exploits
its monopoly position by means of high prices and through higher profits gives a special stimulus to the
foundation of new firms (Liefmann, 1930, p. 10, italics added). Before the war (First World War), Liefmann
says one could observe that even a small rise in profits led to the formation of new competitive firms. But this
could not last either, because the more efficient cartel members, willing to remain fully occupied, extended
their output, at the cost of weaker rivals All longer existing cartels have called forth a very important
increase in output and supply, (pp. 1312).
In fact both extremes of exchange, monopoly and competition (freie Konkurrenz) were never achieved, but
both, carried to an extreme, turn into its contrary. Competition carried to its extreme leads to monopoly
of the remaining strongest. But the same applies in reverse to monopoly, in so far as it is not legally secured:
when monopoly positions are exploited and lead to monopoly effects, they attract new competition in the
field. One cannot say that one organizational form is better than another or that economic life has ever been
carried on by the one or other principle exclusively; there was always a combination of both (Liefmann,
1930, p. 59). The same idea pervades the works of H. Levy. See his Monopoly and Competition: A Study
in English Industrial Organization (1911); Industrial Germany, Cambridge (1935); and The New Industrial
System: A Study of the Origins, Forms, Finance and Prospects of Concentration in Industry (1936).
Levy (1911, pp. 208ff): that an increasing demand is satisfied by a continually decreasing number of firms,
the greater productive power of the single unit reducing from decade to decade the aggregate number of
firms. The same arguments, but more broadly worked out, are advanced in The New Industrial System,
Part III (1936).
Both Schumpeter and Kirzner have discussed many aspects of the entrepreneurial role in an illuminating
way. Apart from pointing to an absence of recognition of the entrepreneurs role in classical and neoclassical economics, and pursuing the line of thinking of French and German economists in this respect
(Schumpeter, 1954), Kirzner discussed the entrepreneurial role in Mengers system. He disagrees with E.
Streissler and W. Jaff, who saw Menger as underlining entrepreneurial activity. Instead he points to the
entrepreneurial gap in Mengers principal work. But I fail to see the point, for as Kirzner (1979, pp. 6970)
argues, it is Mengers position that men, by converting goods from a higher order into those of a lower order,
create additional value. The first man to do so is, obviously, an entrepreneurial monopolist, expanding the
value of goods and their variety. Increasing competition reduces the monopolists profits in the course of
time, until Mengers law (that the value of ends comes to be attached to the means) applies again. This is
what Kirzner himself argues in Chapter 10 (especially pp. 1628). The picture of a market developing from
monopoly, via imperfect competition to a state of no profitability, is entirely Mengerian.
In the Netherlands, the most prominent economist in the 19201950 period, de Vries shifted during the
depression from freedom of enterprise towards ordening (that is, private and public regulation of business).
And in France, Marchal called for a fundamental revision of theory. See Dullaart (1984) and Marchal
(195051).
A great number of publications have followed this line of thinking, for example, in Germany: Arndt (1952);
Heusz (1965); K. Brandt, Concentration and economic growth, in Arndt (ed.), (1960/611 and 19712,
pp. 28088); Krsselberg (1969); Schlgl (1972); Kaufer (1980); Schmidt (1981). In the Netherlands: de Jong
(1971b; 19721, 19894), Wijers (1981); van Duijn (1979); Webbink (1984). In France and Belgium: Piatier
(1984); Teissier du Cros (1976); de Bethune and Heyvaert (1976); Chevalier (1977). In Italy: Prodi (1971);
Aquino (1977).
See the analysis of a homogeneous, duopolistic market with a pioneering and imitating firm, that is, a
conservative type of firm on pp. 11517 of Heusz (1965).
See de Jong (1971a), chapter on concentration developments in Benelux for an empirical analysis of these
firms. I first encountered the growth cycle concept in the late 1950s, when working for a multinational
container firm that experienced maturity in the US market, but not in Europe.
An important question is whether mergers do indeed lead to rationalization and cost reductions, and if
so, do they do so faster than internal growth? On the basis of Dutch evidence, assembled by the Central
Statistical Bureau, I previously doubted this and found, on the contrary, that the overwhelming majority
of mergers are initiated for market strategic reasons. See Theory and evidence concerning mergers: an
international comparison, in Jacquemin and de Jong (eds) (1976). An empirical West German research
21/5/07 12:19:42
47
among 100 firms, taking over other companies during the 1970s, came to similar conclusions: merger
intensity rises with the size of the firm; the majority (7175 per cent depending on the size of firm class)
are of a horizontal nature; successes and partial successes of the mergers are severely limited and depend
on the type (Mller, 1983, p. 170).
13. This section benefited from remarks submitted by Professor Oberender.
14. Among the numerous writings by Kantzenbach and others only three need be mentioned here, because
the first two references contain an extensive literature, in particular with respect to the debates between
Kantzenbach and E. Hoppman, inter alia, who defend in Germany the sort of freedom of competition
approach, reminiscent of the Chicago school in the US: (i) Kantzenbach and Kallfass (1981); (ii) Clapham
(1981); (iii) in the Netherlands the Competition Law of 1956 took up a simular position, as Van der Weijden
(president of the Dutch Competition Commission) underlined (1981). A good survey of the German
discussions is also provided by Schmidt (1981, Part 1). The concept of ruinous competition was extensively
discussed by Tolksdorf, both for concentrated and unconcentrated markets (Tolksdorf, 1971).
15. Among the 13 studies, based on branch researches, cited by Bbel (1984, pp. 192201) only one applies to
a European country. For West Germany, Bbel found an efficiency loss of only 1.28 (1.89) per cent for the
196573 period, depending on whether sales or added values were used, occasioned mainly by five leading
branches (70 per cent) or 10 corporations (66 per cent).
REFERENCES
Aquino, A. (1977), Innovazione technologica, spezializazione internationale e politica industriale,
Rivista di econimia e politica industriale, no. 3, pp. 41753.
Arndt, H. (1952), Schpferischer Wettbewerb und Klassenlose Gesellschaft, Duncker & Humblot,
Berlin.
Arndt, H. (ed.) (1960/611 and 19712), Die Konzentration in der Wirtschaft, Schriften des Vereins fr
Sozialpolitiek, new series, vol. 20, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin.
Bbel, I. (1984), Wettbewerb und Industriestruktur, Springer Verlag, Heidelberg.
Brandt, K. (1971), Concentration and economic growth, in H. Arndt (ed.), vol. I, pp. 252301.
Chevalier, J.M. (1977), Lconomie industrielle en question, Calmann-Lvy, Paris.
Clapham, R. (1981), Das wettbewerbspolitische Konzept der Wettbewerbsfreiheit, in H. Cox, K.
Jens and K. Markert (eds), Handbuch des Wettbewerbs, F. Vahlen, Munich, pp. 12949.
Damaschke, A. (1922), Geschichte der Nationalkonomie, 13th edn, Verlag Gustav Fischer, Jena,
de Bethune, A. and Heyvaert, H. (1976), Linnovation dans la politique industrielle, Anales des
Science conomiques, no. 2, Louvain.
de Jong, H.W. (1971a), Ondernemingsconcentratie: De ontwikkelingen in Europa, de Verenigde Staten
en Japan, Stenfert Kroese, Leiden.
de Jong, H.W. (1971b), Marktanalyse en markttheorie, Stenfert Kroese.
de Jong, H.W. (19721, 19894), Dynamische markttheorie, Stenfert Kroese, Leiden.
de Jong, H.W. (1988), Ondernemerschap in Nederland, 18401940 [Entrepreneurship in the Netherlands,
18401940], Yearbook of History of Business and Technology, Vol 5. Foundation for the History
of Business and Technology, Utrecht.
Dempsey, B.W. (1960), The Frontier Wage, Loyola University Press, Chicago.
Dobb, M. (1927), Wages, Nisbet & Co.: London; (1948) 3rd edn, Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge.
Dullaart, M.J.H. (1984), Regulation or freedom: Dutch economic thinking in the interwar period,
Dissertation, Erasmus University, Rotterdam.
Hall, P. (1966), Von Thnens Isolated State, Pergamon Press, Oxford.
Heusz, E. (1965), Allgemeine Markttheorie, J.C.B. Mohr, Tbingen and Zurich.
Hindley, B. (ed.) (1983), State Investment Companies in Western Europe: Picking winners or backing
losers?, Macmillan, London and Basingstoke.
Hutchinson, T.W. (1981), Carl Menger on philosophy and method, in The Politics and Philosophy
of Economics, Basil Blackwell: Oxford, ch. 6, pp. 176202.
Jacquemin, A.P. and de Jong, H.W. (1976), Markets, Corporate Behaviour and the State, M. Nijhoff,
The Hague.
de Jong 01 intro 47
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48
Kantzenbach, E. (1966), Die Funktionsfhigkeit des Wettbewerbs, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,

Gttingen.
Kantzenbach, E. and Kallfass, H. (1981), Das Konzept des funktionsfhigen Wettbewerbs-workable
competition, in H. Cox, K. Jens, K. Markert (eds), Handbuch des Wettbewerbs, F. Vahlen, Munich,
pp. 10329.
Kaufer, E. (1980), Industriekonomik, F. Vahlen, Munich.
Kirzner, I.M. (1979), Perception, Opportunity, and Profit, Studies in the Theory of Entrepreneurship,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London.
Krsselberg, H.G. (1969), Marktwirtschaft und konomische Theorie, Verlag Kombach, Freiburg
im Breisgau.
Lenel, H.O. (19621, 19682), Die Konzentration in der Wirtschaft, J.C.B. Mohr, Tbingen.
Lenel, H.O. (1968), Die Bedeutung grosser Unternehmen fr den technischen Fortschritt, J.C.B. Mohr,
Tbingen.
Lenel, H.O. (1975), Walter Euckens ordnungspolitische Konzeption: die wirtschaftpolitische Lehre
in der Bundesrepublik und die Wettbewerbstheorie von heute, Ordo, vol. 26, pp. 2276.
Levy, H. (1911), Monopoly and Competition: A Study in English Industrial Organization, Macmillan,
London (translated from the German edition of 1909).
Levy, H. (1935), Industrial Germany, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Levy, H. (1936), The New Industrial System: A Study of the Origins, Forms, Finance, and Prospects
of Concentration in Industry, G. Routledge & Sons, London.
Liefmann, R. (1930), Kartelle, Konzerne und Trusts, 8th edn, E.H. Moritz, Stuttgart.
Marchal, J. (195051), La crise contemporaine de la science conomique, Annales de lconomie
Politique.
Menger, C. (1871, 1968) Grundstze der Volkswirtschaftslehre, 2nd edn, Herausgegeben von F.A.
Hayek. J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tbingen.
Menger, C. (1883, 1963, 1985), Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences with Special
Reference to Economics. Translated by Francis J. Nock from the German Untersuchungun ber die
Methode der Socialwissenschaften (1963). Edited with a new introduction by Lawrence H. White
(1985). New York University Press, New York.
Menger, C. (1981). Principles of Economics, New York University Press, New York (translated by
J. Dingwall and B.F. Hoselitz).
Meyer, W. (2002) Grundlagen des konomischen Denkens, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Herausgegeben
von Hans Albert und Gnter Herre, Tbingen.
Mller, W.P. (1983), Der Erfolg von Unternehmenszusammenschlssen, Minerva, Munich.
Oberender, P. (ed.) (1984), Markstruktur und Wettbewerb in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Verlag
F. Vahlen, Munich.
Piatier, A. (1984), Barriers to Innovation, Francis Pinter, London.
Prodi, R. (1968), Concorrenza dinamica e potere di mercato, Franco Angeli Editore, Milan.
Prodi, R. (1971), La diffusione delle innovazioni nellindustria italiana, Il Mulino, Bologna.
Schlgl, H. (1972), Mehrproduktunternehmung, Marktentwicklung und Wettbewerb, Atheneum Verlag,
Frankfurt/M.
Schmidt, I. (1981), Wettbewerbstheorie und politik, G. Fischer Verlag, Stuttgart.
Schumpeter, J. (1952), Ten Great Economists. From Marx to Keynes, George Allen & Unwin Ltd,
London.
Schumpeter, J. (1912, 1926), Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, 5th edn, Duncker & Humblot,
Berlin.
Schumpeter, J. (1954), History of Economic Analysis, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Teissier du Cros, A. (1976), La recherch dactivits et de produits nouveaux, Editions dOrganisation,
Paris.
Tolksdorf, M. (1971), Ruinser Wettbewerb, Duncker & Humbolt, Berlin.
Van der Weijden, C.J. (1981), Toestaan of verbieden: een beschouwing rond de wet economische
mededinging, Economisch-statistische Berichten, 23/3012.
van Duijn, J.J. (1979), De lange golf in de economie, Stenfert Kroese, Leiden.
von Thnen, J.H. (1826, 18422, 1850, 18753, 19664), Der isolierte Staat in Beziehung auf Landwirthschaft und Nationalkonomie, Berlin. The German editions ran between 1826 and 1966 and differ
de Jong 01 intro 48
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49
according to volume and parts as well as place of publication. Von Thnens work, accessible in
English, is in two volumes: vol. 1 of The Isolated State, was translated by Carla M. Wartenberg
and edited by Peter Hall, Pergamon, Oxford, 1966; vol. 2 has been translated by Bernard W.
Dempsey in The Frontier Wage, Loyola, Chicago, 1960. Because of this variety I will be restrictive
and eclectic in the use of citations.
von Wieser, F. (1927), Theorie der gesellschaftlichen Wirtschaft,2nd edn, J.C.B. Mohr, Tbingen.
Webbink, I. (1984), Innovatie en het midden-en kleinbedrijf, E.I.M. Publications, Zoetermeer.
White, L.H. (1985), Introduction to Carl Mengers Investigations into the Method of the Social
Sciences with Special Reference to Economics, New York University Press, New York and
London.
Wijers, G.J. (1981), Industriepolitiek, Stenfert Kroese, Leiden.
de Jong 01 intro 49
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50
A.
HEINRICH VON STACKELBERG (19051946)

For a long time von Stackelberg justified National Socialism. He belonged to the many
scientists of all disciplines who accommodated themselves with the political relationships
of the pre-1945 period. His scientific rank is not disputed, however, in particular with
respect to the further development of the theory of market structures.
Von Stackelberg taught in Berlin (193540), Bonn (194143) and Madrid where he died
while working as a guest professor. In 1934 he published Marktform und Gleichgewicht
(later translated under the title The Theory of the Market Economy, 1952). At the heart
of von Stackelbergs research was the analysis of oligopolies. He denies the reality of the
model of full competition which is at the basis of the general equilibrium theory of Lon
Walras and Vilfredo Pareto and which assumes perfect knowledge about products and
prices of all market participants. Von Stackelberg maintains that a market is anything but
perfectly tranparent. Mostly, one encounters the behaviour of businessmen who influence
the market process purposively; equilibrium on these markets is very unlikely because
businesspeople link up, make price agreements, form cartels or carry on price wars.
But there might be a market type with equilibrium. Taking Antoine Augustin Cournots
model of a duopoly of mineral water producers as a departure, von Stackelberg supposes
not a trial and error process which ends with a market price and a volume of sales which
satisfies both contenders but rather he assumes that the one follows the other. The first
business will bring that volume to market which assures him, considering the reaction
of the second firm, the highest profit. That volume of the first duopolist is called the
independency supply. The second supplier will be in a position of dependency: he adapts
himself with the sales volume. But he may also choose an independent position with a
lower price.
Suppose both duopolists will know all the details, then they will compare the independent
and the dependent positions and strive for the one with the highest profit. In the authors
model that is the independent position and if both are unwilling to give up, then a ruinous
competition will develop. Equilibrium therefore occurs only in von Stackelbergs world of
oligopoly if one of the suppliers is independent and the other is satisfied with a followers
position. But why should he do so if he is to earn less?
That will be the case when the independent supplier is much stronger than the dependent
one: an asymmetric relationship in von Stackelbergs terminology. The dependent firm will
have more profits and a more secure position than if open and fierce price battles are the
outcome of (desired or undesired) independent behaviour. The leading firm is called the
Stackelberg leader in the literature. The model may influence the strategic decisions of
a country in its international trade policy. The higher the number of Stackelberg leaders
in a country the more profits will be transferred to the domestic market if the firms are
of an international stature. During the 1980s, American economists recommended the
payment of export subsidies to leading domestic firms to acquire the leader position and
to shift foreign profits to the home country. European countries have sometimes likewise
defended a policy of national champions.
Von Stackelberg drew a somewhat different conclusion in his publications. He assigned
the role of market leader to the state in agreement with his National Socialistic views.
de Jong 01 intro 50
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51
The state is entitled to interfere with pricing in the market, to change market structures,
to order firms to join a cartel and to pursue other goals such as to establish a corporative
state. Benito Mussolinis Fascistcorporative state was his lodestar. He considered a
democracy unfit to achieve a uniform economic policy; this is prevented by the need to
reach compromise in a parliamentary system of democracy. He had already discussed this
in his book published in 1934, referred to above.
It is unclear whether von Stackelberg could still be called a National Socialist as time
progressed. During his Berlin period he helped a Jewish advanced student; he also tried
unsuccessfully to get out of the SS (Schutzstaffel). He was a friend of Jens Jessen and
participated with him in a wartime class for the study of the economy. The class was
closed down in 1943 and Jessen was put to death the following year for having taken part
in resistance activities. One of von Stackelbergs teachers, Erwin von Beckerath, became
the centre of an independent working group in which many later members of the Freiburg
school, which advocated democracy and a free economy, were also active. And in this group
he lectured in 1943 on The possibilities and limits of state direction of the economy. This
lecture was published in ORDO, the yearbook of the Freiburg school in 1949, three years
after von Stackelbergs death.
Walter Eucken mentioned this publication in a positive sense in his Grundstze der
Wirtschaftspolitik [Principles of Economic Policy] (3rd edn, 1952, p. 271). Apparently,
there had grown some understanding.
de Jong 01 intro 51
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52
B.
ERNST HEUSZ (1922)

The effort to mark Ernst Heusz as a representative of a particular school of economics
can only fail. Both his academic roots and his life work as an economist are too diversified
for this to succeed. But he should be included in this volume because his contributions to
oligopoly theory have greatly enriched the discussions about the adequate behaviour of
firms in such types of markets. Alongside this area of research, the name of Heusz should
also be linked with work in the theory of international economics and with the study of
market theory in general.
Heusz studied economics in Leipzig, Berlin and Freiburg from 1940 to 1945. In Freiburg
he wrote his PhD thesis with Walter Eucken on The rate of interest as a monetary
phenomenon. The book to qualify him as a private lecturer at the university had to be
finished in St. Gallen, Switzerland because of the untimely death of Eucken in 1950. He
duly qualified in 1954 with the publication of Economic Systems and International Trade,
delivered on the basis of work on case studies at two Swiss institutions for research on
problems of foreign trade and payments.
A Rockefeller stipend brought Heusz to the United States in 1956, where he became
acquainted with the problems of antitrust policy in Washington before visiting several
universities and meeting leading economists. Returning to Europe he was successively
nominated as a private lecturer at St. Gallen, and professor at Nrnberg-Erlangen and
Marburg (1966). Ten years later he returned to Nrnberg-Erlangen where he stayed until
his retirement in 1990.
Heuszs work always stands in a historical context, the result of his having lived through
the last days of the Historical school. The preoccupation with facts from economic history
was for him a better approach to the complexity of economic relations as well as creating
an enhanced understanding of economic interactions.
The concept of understanding plays a characteristic role in Heuszs way of thinking.
Conscious human action presupposes an interpretation of circumstances, relationships
and the factors relevant to these, which leads to the building of hypotheses. Following
Max Weber, understanding is linked with explanation and an explicit model would clarify
the problem. But application to the oligopoly problem is hindered by the multiple number
of possible interpretations which can be given to the actionreaction interdependency of
oligopolistic situations.
Heinrich von Stackelberg had come to the conclusion that such markets are without
equilibrium. However, Heusz says that businessmen act on the basis of experiences they
have gone through and will adapt their behaviour to what they may have learned the
more so because it would be unrealistic to assume that business leaders will misinterpret
the objectively given actionreaction interdependency. If it is further assumed that there
will be a sufficient degree of market transparency to make a rapid reaction possible, it
seems unacceptable to agree with Joseph Bertrand that price competition in a duopoly is
excluded. Price reductions among the duopolists change expectations and, on the basis
of these, behaviour in the market. Suppliers come to understand what division of the
market shares is objectively durable; at the end of the learning process they will establish
not only ex post what has happened but also what is to be anticipated ex ante. Oligopoly,
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53
a determined process was the title of Heuszs article in the 1960 edition of Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv.
The background to Heuszs thinking was made clear in his Allgemeine Markt-theorie
(1965) which developed the oligopolistic interdependency in the successive stages of the
evolutionary market process. The market structures and the conditions which guide the
behaviour of the individual firms are seen as the result of the processes in the market
which are differentiated in accordance with types of businessmen (innovators, imitators,
adaptors and inert movers) and four characteristic market stages. The starting point is
an exogenous product innovation which creates a market, and Heusz investigates the
competitive processes until their disappearance from the economy. Market development
is endogenously explained. The many partial models which are exposed in the book are
clothed in verbal, graphical and mathematical presentations and the author also exerts
himself to deliver historical evidence. The Allgemeine Markt-theorie or general market
theory was a landmark in German thinking about the market processes and inspired many
younger economists to investigate the consequences of this new approach for a variety of
other fields such as business finance, the business cycle, institutional structures and others
right to the end of the century.
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54
C.
ERICH HOPPMANN (1923)

Competition theory in the German language area owes much to Erich Hoppmann. Born in
Gelsenkirchen, he wrote a PhD dissertation on Trading margins as an economic problem.
His Habilitationsschrift, Period Analysis as the Theory of General Economic Dynamics, was
delivered in 1955 (Both were in German.)
Teaching at the university brought Hoppmann successively to Nrnberg-Erlangen
(196062) and Marburg (196268) and finally to Freiburg im Breisgau, where he succeeded
F.A. von Hayek. He taught economic policy there until his retirement in 1989, but continued
on a more short-term basis at Bayreuth, Jena and Dresden.
Hoppmann was dedicated to the interdisciplinarity of the sciences and valued in
particular the exposition of the cohesion of economics and law. In 1993, the University of
Tbingen awarded him an honorary degree in law for his work relating to this interest.
For many years the two focus points of Hoppmanns research work as an economist
were competition theory and economic organization. Several of his important essays were
brought together in the Collected Works. The latest to appear was Wirtschaftsordnung
und Wettbewerb [The Economic System and Competition] (1988), whose title expressed
the double focus.
Increasingly, Hoppmann distanced himself from neo-classical and welfare-theoretical
ideas and it is due to him that these are no longer the guiding principles in current
competition policy. Market processes occupy the central position. And it is due to his
meritorious influence that the cartel law is more oriented towards freedom of competition
than towards desired market results. Again, his publications on firm mergers have diverted
attention from all efforts to achieve desired market forms.
According to Hoppmann the market is a complex phenomenon, the results of which
are not predictable. Interdependencies between the economic and the political order
make a planning of the economy or of market processes illusory. It may even distort the
free order of society. Market organization is a self-organizing process and competition
policy should grow within the context of market and law. That is, it should abstain from
arbitrarily overburdening the law and from distancing itself beyond the value preferences
of acting persons.
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D.
55
ERHARD KANTZENBACH (1931)

As with Erich Hoppmann, the investigation of competition is central to Kantzenbachs
research work. After studying economics at the University of Gttingen, the Free
University of Berlin and in North Carolina, Kantzenbach enrolled for a PhD under
Professor Andreas Predhl in Mnster. The dissertation was finished in 1959 and entitled
Mglichkeiten und Grenzen der Konjunkturpolitik in der Europischen Wirtschaftgemeinschaft (On the possibilities and limits of business-cycle policies in the European
Economic Community).
His Habilitationsschrift, Die Funktionsfhigkeit des Wettbewerbs [The Workability of
Competition] (1965) became a very influential piece of work. Not only was it one of the
most widely read books on economic policy in Germany; it also put its stamp on the
scientific discussions relating to practical policy. After a stay in Princeton to carry out
research into problems of US antitrust policy, Kantzenbach went to Frankfurt in 1967.
This was followed by an appointment at the University of Hamburg where he combined
teaching with the directorship of the Institute for Industrial Policy. In his endeavour to
engage in the field of competition and competition policy, Kantzenbach was always intent
on drawing conclusions for society with a high practical content, derived from theoretical
research. This was especially visible in his work on behalf of the Monopolies Commission
whose president he was between 1979 and 1986.
In 1994, Kantzenbach became the chairman of the association of German-speaking
economists, the Verein fr Sozialpolitik (now known as Gesellschaft fr Wirtschaftsund Sozialwissenschaften). This was an expression of the high scientific and personal
esteem which his colleagues entertained for the man who soon afterwards retired from
the University of Hamburg which he had served since 1975.
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4.
Market theory in the Low Countries

Henry W. de Jong
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Napoleonic times were rather disastrous for Dutch industry and commerce though not for
the then most important sectors of the economy: agriculture, horticulture, cattle breeding
and the dairy and meat industry. Belgian manufacturing, on the contrary, benefited from
the so-called continental system, introduced by the French emperor to exclude British
industrial exports, and became the first business to industrialize on the continent. After 1815,
when Restoration followed the European wars, things had fundamentally changed: East
European exports depressed grain prices to the detriment of the Amsterdam corn market,
the East India Company had failed and the triangular trade pattern of previous centuries,
whereby north and east European raw materials, together with Dutch manufactures were
sold in southern Europe, Africa and Asia in return for spices, tea, porcelain, gold and other
luxury goods, was upset. Consequently, conditions in the Dutch economy were depressed,
especially in the cities which claimed a restoration of the guilds and associations. These
had been abolished by a Royal Decree of 1818 after a tussle which had lasted for more than
20 years. In France, the guild system was ended in 1791 and the manner in which this was
done was the classic one: in the Middle Ages, the cities that wanted permission to institute
guilds, paid the Crown an appreciable sum of money; at the dawn of the Revolution the
French Republic, being again in dire financial straits, gave freedom of entry to non-guild
members to exercise a trade or profession on the payment of a patent tax. In 1818 the Dutch
did likewise; but intellectually, this was not a satisfactory solution. One of the scientific
associations therefore offered a prize for the best essay on the question of whether the
previous guilds were indeed propitious for trade and handicrafts (as it was maintained)
and whether a revival of them would counter the prevailing depressed conditions. Professor
H.W. Tydeman (17871863) won the contest. He was one of the first to teach political
economy and descriptive statistics in the Netherlands. At Leiden University, Tydeman
was the successor of Adrian Kluit, who lectured in history and diplomatic problems
besides political economy between 1778 and 1806. Soon Tydeman had a colleague at the
University of Utrecht, J. Ackersdijck, who introduced statistics as a separate discipline
and together they founded economics as a distinct academic subject; they were both very
good teachers.
Tydemans Essay
The essay consists of four parts. First, the sources are discussed; these are the Amsterdam
Laws and Statutes, which are the most complete and extensively compiled documents
56
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57
relating to the subject in Holland. Second, he makes a comparison of the advantages and
disadvantages of the associations, and third, the question is raised whether the dissolution
of the associations can be held responsible for the depressed conditions prevailing at the
time. This is denied, like the fourth question: can a resurrection contribute to an economic
improvement. This approach clearly distinguishes a consideration of the static and the
dynamic factors. In the first parts Tydeman gives extensive information about the wages
and salaries of the masters and fellows of 30 or so guilds out of the 51 existing at the time,
according to a later, painstaking research by Dr van Eeghen (1965).1 These are compared
to the payments which had to be made on entry to the association and the time required
for learning the trade. With respect to these, Tydeman recognizes their importance as
possible impediments to entry for both youngsters and aliens. But his survey does not
bring out such an effect: except for a handful of occupations (brewers, surgeons, pewterers,
ribbon-weavers, confectioners) the payments to be made ranged from 4 to 15 per cent of
one annual salary and the learning periods were limited to between one and four years
(surgeons had an exceptional five years). The surgeons were relatively well paid, but poorly
in comparison with the members of the Collegium Medicum, who were the medical doctors
qualified at university level.
Entrance to the Collegium was denied to the surgeons who also earned money from
beard-shearing and wig-making or had fellows doing the work under their supervision.
Frictions between the groups occurred frequently, for example about who was allowed to
test and make medicines to cure serious illnesses or to attend confinements using a pair
of tongs. One successful surgeon in this skill, Johannus De Bruyn, with a record of 600 out
of 900 live births during 38 years of practice was challenged by the Collegium to undergo
an examination and (of course) failed. But then Alderman Watrin of the Amsterdam City
Board simply changed the rules, installed a mixed examination committee and permitted
De Bruyn and a colleague with similar complaints, to be sworn in without further tests.
(Van Eeghen relates the story in detail, pp. 935.)
The story is symptomatic of the attitude of the rulers towards the guilds. Tydeman
refers twice to Philip of Leyden (fourteenth-century author) when he says that the policy
of the authorities in the Netherlands of old was to contain the associations. And he points
out two other factors limiting the power of associations: first, the public markets which
were held at least once per week in cities and towns and where the goods for basic needs
could be bought; second, the merchants ordering the ships, equipment and victuals for
their business, not only in overseas trade but also for traffic on the extensive Dutch inland
waterways system, would restrain the guilds market power. For the rest, the equanimity
with which Tydeman views the associations he recognizes their usefulness as guardians of
quality standards and of social support for poor and/or old members makes it acceptable
that he would have agreed with van Eeghen when she emphasized the strong role of
competition from outsiders. Of these, two types could be distinguished: the fellows, living
in the towns who, for various reasons could not rise to a mastership; and especially the
interlopers or dabblers, living outside of town (and therefore not to be penalized by the
guilds) who were favoured by consumers because of their low prices and even taken into
employment by guild masters, who pocketed the price difference. Stiff penalties limited
these practices, however.
As was said earlier, Tydeman sees no merit in the argument about the macroeconomic
role of the associations. They are not a cause of the depressed economic circumstances nor
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58
will they be able to change them: this he rates as an example of the post hoc ergo propter
hoc fallacy. Reduced spending by the merchant class because profits and interest receipts
are lower, combined with heavy taxation due to the wars are the factors responsible, he
says. There may have been some additional labour supply following the abolition of the
guilds. But this cause is not an independent factor for its importance depends on the first.
Here he is true to the Buridan theory that effective demand is the decisive hinge, though
he admits to having to rely on a deductive argument only because the required statistics
are not available. Interestingly enough, Tydeman specifies a list of statistical questions, the
answers of which were necessary to settle the matter. After all, he was the first professor
of statistics in the country.2
The Two-handed Economist
Jacob Leonard de Bruyn Kops (182287) published the first Principles of Economics exactly
in the middle of the nineteenth century, in January 1850.3 He was 27 years old and, by
writing this first original book on economics which covered the whole field (in 455 pages),
he started a lifelong commitment. Not only did he publish the Principles in five editions
until the year 1873; he also founded the first scientific journal in economics, De Economist,
in 1852. It still exists as the official publication of the Dutch Economic Association. De
Bruyn Kops was the chief editor of the monthly for 36 years until his death in 1887. As
Henk Wilm Lambers wrote on the occasion of its centennial this may have been the most
fascinating period of the first hundred years because it showed a persuasion which rang
through (De Economist, 1952). In 1864 he was nominated to the chair of political economy
at Delft Technical University, and in 1857 was one of the founders of the Association
for Statistics and its president from 1880 to 1883. Following his election to the Dutch
parliament in 1868, where he soon came to be known as the economist par excellence,
de Bruyn Kops withdrew from his professorship after a collision with the minister for
education who considered a professorate incompatible with a parliamentary position.
Although this decision was overturned by the ministers successor in 1871 it seems that de
Bruyn Kops had had enough, and he left the university two years later. Such a decision fits
in with his character which was of a modest, straightforward type, intent on disseminating
the truth (as he saw it) in social and economic matters and being of an independent mind.
He hailed from a wealthy family of manufacturers and merchants, though he often sided
in public behaviour with the lower classes and especially with the poor. De Bruyn Kops
criticized the local excises and the taxes on basic necessities throughout the 1850s; to his
satisfaction, they were scrapped in 1865.
The Dualistic Economic Science
De Bruyn Kops defines economics as the science that teaches how wealth in society
originates and is being destructed (Principles, see note 3). He expressly leaves out
distribution, in contrast to most handbooks of the time because, he says, distribution or
diffusion of wealth is really one of the ways of production if the latter is defined as the
increase of exchangeable values. The chain of acts from taking the raw material to delivery
to the ultimate consumer of riches is nothing but such an increase, and no room is left for
distribution as a separate economic and main constituent. It is in fact related to a set of
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59
policy rules and measures; it is a part of the art of governing which is closely connected
with the science of economics but should be sharply distinguished. The last 115 pages
of the book are devoted to the discussion of topics such as population, wages, poverty
and proposals for a different organization of society and the author tries to make it clear
what room is left for discretionary measures taking into account the laws of economics
exposed in the previous pages.
But de Bruyn Kops is not a classical economist. He is not one who equates wealth or
riches with material objects. This is made clear by the maxim on the title page: The true
wealth of a people is not in the gold and silver, but in the reason, the hearts and the labour
of the thousands of rational beings who compose the nation. There and only there is an
inexhaustible goldmine. Following the French economists of his time, de Bruyn Kops
includes services as well as physical objects among the varieties of wealth; all labour,
which ultimately is the only active producing agent, is differentiated into three types:
(i) the productive services of scientists, technologists, engineers and so on who produce
knowledge to the benefit of social production, (ii) the services of the entrepreneurs whose
function it is to organize the production process and to mobilize the required capital,
and (iii) the labourers who bring forth the goods and services. This division is seen as a
functional one and will be encountered in all economic branches of activity though in a
different composition.
The Right Hand: Competition
The really interesting characteristic of the Principles is the contrast between competition
on the one hand and monopoly on the other. The first is the dynamic, wealth-producing
principle whereas the other is responsible for either the destruction or the retardation
of wealth creation (alongside consumption which also destroys produced values). The
explanation of the wealth-producing effect of competition rests on a phenomenon which
in de Bruyn Kopss Principles acquires a compelling force. Income layers in society always
form a pyramidical structure. At the top, the income earners are restricted in number
although personal incomes are high, and they can buy high-priced goods. The lower
layers are more numerous and widen the market substantially if prices can be reduced.
The existence of such an income pyramid with layers of purchasing power generates a
continuous incentive for producers to save on costs, increase efficiency and lower production
prices, for successful producers pocket the difference between the prevailing market price
and the reduced production price. The latter may be achieved in various ways: efficiencies
of scale, or mass production as can be seen in the production of textiles, furniture, kitchen
utensils, basic foodstuffs and so on; or, it may rest on the introduction of new tools,
machinery and other aids, such as fertilizers. Also, new needs will arise continuously (people
learning to read, creating a book market), transport and communications are improved
and so on. Several chapters are used to enlarge on what the author calls the resources of
production, such as the division of labour, machines, tools, money, credit and banks. This
grouping underlines his productivistic bent.
The efficient producer can also share part of the profits with consumers. If he lowers
the sales price he gains consumers as his clients by capturing them from competitors as
well as attracting new entrants from the next lower income layers. He thereby rewards
both consumers and himself:
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This remains so for some time until the improvement is generalized; the efficient producer shares
for some time the gains with part of the public until the current price is brought down to the new
position of the reduced production costs by the competition and then the advantage is finally
secured for the consumers. (Principles, p. 46)
De Bruyn Kops clearly distinguishes the initiating, dynamic moves of the efficient firm
from the equalizing, imitating actions of competitors and stresses the necessary role of
both types: the former causes the advantage, the latter secures it. In the meantime the
profits of the initiator are multiplied and that is the lure which spurs him on. Also, the
process will not work immediately because there may be time lags: the closing down of a
loss-making business will be postponed; suppliers in an overcrowded trade look to each
other to give up first; financial resources may delay closures just like the availability of
capital is no guarantee that new firms or factories will soon be founded: One will first
have to be assured that there is a long-term prospect of advantageous prices; and it may
be that there is not much idle capital or that, to start the new business, one has to give up
other rewarding investments, etc. (p. 43). The equalizing tendency of profits by means of
competition is, properly speaking, never perfect and is only a long-term orientation. Still,
it leaves room for the prospect of a large profit, especially for those who come forward with
an improvement in the manufacture of a generally used and necessary product. De Bruyn
Kops underlines the latter observation by means of italics and an extended paragraph
in which the fickleness of luxury and fashion trades is contrasted with the constancy of
necessary products; this relates to demand, profits, risks and external events such as wars
or natural disasters.
Apart from the long-term face of the competitive process de Bruyn Kops also discusses
the short-term movements of demand and supply which influence pricing. Market clearing
is exposed by starting from the supply side: a manufacturing firm calculating a production
price of a yard of cotton including a managerial reward, and a market where ducks are
traded starting from an initial price asked by one of the sellers. It depends on the balance
of quantities supplied and demanded at those initial prices (emphasized by the author)
whether a sellers or a buyers market develops.4 This initial price will then be traded up
or down until the market is cleared for all those who want to do business at the stated
prices. Competition from both sides of the process is involved and the resulting price
will not benefit everyone: there may be loss makers on the supply side and dissatisfied
persons on the demand side. In particular, our author focuses on expectations and the
calculations necessary to anticipate future market prices. This is noteworthy: whereas
price anticipations are required in a current market, the producer in a long-term market
who wants to be successful should not speculate on future prices but compare the lowest,
current production price with the cost price he may be able to secure on the basis of the
improved product or process he intends to introduce. This distinction is crucial. The late
twentieth-century, neo-Austrian entrepreneur lives and thrives from anticipated price
differences in a going market but the Schumpeterian entrepreneur makes a quantum leap,
especially if the innovations are in produced means of production with general-purpose
applications. De Bruyn Kops makes the comparison: a new lace-producing machine may
increase efficiency substantially and lower the price of lace. But book printing on a faster
machine will not only reduce the book price; the productivity of all those who apply the
knowledge spread through the book itself will be multiplied. This is the reason, he says, why
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the inventions in telegraphy, steam engines, metallurgy, transport, fertilizers and so on have
such wealth-raising effects. They increase incomes but also employment, life expectancy
and social standards, be it mostly in the long run only. To cope with the inevitable social
costs of the competitive process, later in his book he develops proposals for dealing with
poverty and unemployment in which state support for health, retraining and return to the
labour process figure prominently.
The Left Hand: Monopoly
The second part of the Principles is called Hindrances to competition and is the left hand
of the economic process which the author also dubs monopoly in its various forms:
guilds and similar associations, government interference with the production process,
protection against foreign competition and the promotion of domestic power, colonies
and their government, and, finally a chapter on the monopolization of labour services in
history through robbery and suppression, slavery, serfdom, forced services. This broadly
conceived chapter exemplifies the principle of monopoly which the author traces behind
the diverging forms mentioned above: monopoly interferes with the fruits of free labour
and trade by appropriating them for the benefit of the rulers and/or excludes economic
agents from gainful activity by restricting it to the powerful only. It reaps where it has not
sown and it excludes others from sowing so that it alone may reap.
This, however, is against the natural order of things under which man works to
appropriate the produce for his own use or for exchanging it against the output of other
people. The consequences of those hindrances are far-reaching and negative if one keeps
to the basic principle that goods and services are always exchanged against other produce.
For then one can see that the arresting in its development of whatever branch of activity
has lower output as a result, first in those branches which supplied the raw materials
and other essential products to the prohibited industry, and second, in the trades which
handled the final products of the impeded business. And, indirectly, exchange between
sectors is hindered and reduced because the lacking output destroys buying power. Thus
direct damage is combined with stunted progress.
A final point: the author acknowledges the exclusive effect of patents though they
are awarded to promote inventions and their applications. But he doubts very much the
underlying supposition because many of the important inventions have been made without
there being a prospect on the acquisition of monopoly (Principles, p. 172). His doubts with
respect to the necessity of patents were vindicated, at least in the Dutch case, when between
1869 and 1912 the country abolished its patent law and no invention from whatever origin
was protected. It was this period which saw the birth and fast growth of the firms and
industries which dominated the Dutch economy during the twentieth century: Royal DutchShell, Philips, Unilever, Akzo, DSM, the sugar and textile industries and so on. The effects
of the absence of a patent law were different, however. Philips escaped a costly and probably
deadly patent litigation in the 1890s, the sugar industry avoided inventor and patent charges
of up to 42 per cent when the diffusion process in sugar refining was introduced during the
1870s and the Dutch steel foundry started its business in 1902 on the basis of an exclusive
contract with a German inventing firm; this firm was too afraid of revealing its secrets
and unduly stimulating the competition.5 De Bruyn Kopss monopoly theory would seem
to be a little too general and dogmatic when he summarizes it as the exclusive right by
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62
the strong or rulers to sell or labour for gain (pp. 1623). The strictures of Tydeman to
the formal position of the guilds, for example, were real: alternative institutional markets,
outside competition, countervailing power on the demand side, and, last but not least,
the mistrust by the rulers of state and cities, mostly prevented an effective exploitation of
apparently dominant positions.
Refinement of the Analysis
Following De Bruyn Kops, several economists discussed production cost and market
price in their general theories of price and market but, curiously enough, neglected the
downward trend of the production cost based on the pyramidical structure of incomes
in society. Simon Vissering, for example (181888), professor at Leiden University, wrote
a two-volume Manual for Practical Economics (186065) in which a downward-sliding
long-run cost curve is depicted together with an oscillating short-run market price (which
is applicable to most articles of general use, in particular manufactured products, he says)
without telling his readers why that is so. Also, Nicolas Gerard Pierson (18391909), the
best-known Dutch economist around the turn of the century, discussed the relationship
between production cost and market price and stated simply: I think that a reduction in
production costs in the end always has to reduce the value of goods if there is sufficient
competition. This competition is a downward-levelling force which equalizes the profits,
achieved in the various firms.6 No further explanation is necessary he said, and continued
to consider the influence of a rise in cost. Here he differentiated between long-lived, durable
goods of an infrastructural type such as houses, factories, canals, railroads and so on, and
goods of daily use. In the second category the law of cost prevails but not in the first, he
maintains, because the wearing out of such durable goods on a non-profitable basis may
prevent their renewal but not their use, provided that the maintenance costs are met.
But these remarks have no general validity, not even in the nineteenth century. First,
firms practically never have equal profit rates, notwithstanding fierce competition, if only
because the level and structure of costs differ. Second, Vissering pointed out that bakers
and butchers seem to work under very special circumstances which create a sort of
monopoly. Consumers have special preferences with regard to some products (the fresh
bread) as well as to the seller (our own butcher or baker); when they buy other goods
to satisfy their domestic or daily needs our housewives are clever enough to find the
shopkeepers who supply the best goods at the lowest prices (Manual, pp. 3313). Demand
regulates the relationship between market price and production cost even though free
competition, as the nineteenth-century economists understood it, prevails. Pierson, in
1864, did not perceive the hybrid sort of monopolistic competition, though Vissering, three
years earlier had smelled trouble for established theory. Third, neither saw the dramatic
impact of the new industrial competition in the way de Bruyn Kops did, who refused to
restrict it to current consumption goods.
Enter the Cartels and Trusts
The final quarter of the nineteenth century saw the rise of the great business combinations: the
cartels, syndicates and trusts. In 1883, when the German economist Friedrich Kleinwchter
published his well-known book Die Kartelle, little was known about their existence, their
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63
names, locations, activities or the persons that guided them, as Kleinwchter states. He
therefore organized a survey among the leading industrialists in Austria and Germany but
was seriously disappointed: the information given was scarce, respondents were reticent
with respect to pertinent facts and processes and nearly all insisted on secrecy.
But with their growth during the 1880s and the rising public interest in their activities,
a need for apologetics arose. The associations started to publish in order to inform and
justify their behaviour. However, to explain is to reveal and a Dutch economist used the
German weekly Die Industrie (issued by them) and other sources to write a dissertation in
1891 at Leiden University. In his book Over ondernemers-verenigingen (Kartels en Trusts),
Willem van der Schalk (1891, pp. 38) dealt analytically and reservedly with the available
information, acknowledging possible shortages and one-sidedness, but maintained: the
secrecy practised relates more to the details, which, however important, will have little
influence on the conclusions. The book of some 190 pages was simply divided into two
chapters, one on cartels and one on trusts, with a subdivision of 14 paragraphs followed
by two appendices on cartel statistics and the deed of the US Sugar Trust (1887). He used
many other sources, particularly in the second part.
Types and Origins
Cartels, the author argues, have to restrain production and/or supply so that prices can be
raised or a possible decline stopped. Not all cartel types are equally successful in this and
the five types distinguished namely, the price-and quantity-fixing cartels, those who do
both, the regionally sales-distributing organizations and the organizations that allocate
sales and practise output sharing by means of a central bureau show different degrees
of effectiveness: the last are the best and comparable to the trusts. However, to bring order
to an overcompetitive market, import protection is nearly always unavoidable and the
domestic price, rewarding even the highest-cost producer required to satisfy demand at
the price aimed at by the cartel must include an import duty sufficiently high to keep out
foreign suppliers. If no further organization is accomplished, the cartel will mostly succumb
because of its own dynamics: efficient producers have an incentive to expand on the highprice domestic market instead of getting rid of the output surpluses abroad at cut-rate
prices. German iron wire, quoted at 220 marks per 1000 kilograms on the home market,
was sold at 180 marks beyond the borders. Domestic consumers pay for the difference, are
victims of monopoly and the foreign processing industry gets an unnatural boost.
Suppose that the protective duties are withdrawn will the domestic price level revert to a
world-market level? Not necessarily, for producers/sellers of various nationalities may unite
in an international cartel. But van der Schalk points out the difficulties: of the 11 existing
international cartels in 1888, several of them ended in disaster within three years, others
disappeared from view and only two proved successful, above all the Nobel Dynamite
Trust-Company, a cartel of British and German companies. Cartelized companies in
low-tariff Britain such as the Salt Union, United Alkali and the Metropolitan Bread
Company have tried to raise prices in vain.
Among the reasons why the less-organized types were not likely to succeed were the
long preparation time to get joint activity off the ground, the lack of honesty in keeping
to the cartel rules and the absence of an effective control procedure. State action at the
German coalmines, where inspectors investigate on a monthly basis, or beer brewing where
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excise-revenues are accurately reported, proved to be cartel friendly. Industries operating

with large quantities, and/or under general transparency (because of auctions) such as
iron and steel, locomotive works, building and construction may see the rise of cartels.
However, a necessary condition may not be a sufficient one, for auctions spread public
knowledge about an industry and yet firms collude in the bidding process and entry is
made more difficult if they are badly organized. (One hundred and ten years later some
Europeans seemed to have forgotten this advice when they held the auctions for mobile
telecom licences. Industrial economics needs long memories!)
Wibauts Contribution
The merit of van der Schalks analysis can be seen by comparing it with the Dutch
monograph which commanded the widest audience during the period from 1900 to 1930:
Wibauts Trusts en Kartels (1903). The book asserted as its central theme that modern
capitalism is incompatible with competition, because cartels and trusts, being a necessary
phenomenon in the development of industry, restore the profitability which competition
has eliminated. And these profits are the very rationale of capitalistic industry. Wibaut
was a rather prolific writer, his works including a prominent paper on the subject at the
meeting of the Dutch Economic Association in 1928. There he repeated his argument that
to make a distinction between good and bad trusts or cartels (and still less to condemn them
totally) is economically useless: these organizations are an unavoidable accompaniment of
present-day capitalism; the challenge is to have their price behaviour guided and controlled
by societal power to the benefit of all.7
Discussing the trusts, Wibaut referred to the United States, where tough anti-cartel
legislation had only furthered the consolidation movement; tough corporate legislation
was evaded by the trusts choosing to incorporate in the easygoing states and the tough
political rhetoric of President F.D. Roosevelt and others had watered down the longer
they were in office. Wibaut a strong leader himself in the socialist movement and in the
governance of the city of Amsterdam also expressed his long-term outlook for the future.
It was a mixture of realism (trusts will also capture the distribution sector and cooperative
enterprise is an inadequate response), dogmatism (public firms will in due time improve the
distributive imbalance) and, above all, a one-sided view of competition. Competition not
only wiped out profits but, as de Bruyn Kops had argued, makes modern industry thrive
by the grace of improvements and innovations that serve widening layers of consumers
through price reductions in industry after industry.
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Nevertheless, as the decades of the new century passed, Wibauts pertinent question: who
or what is going to ensure that the actions of the big corporations or combinations will
be to the benefit of society?, was increasingly echoed, and eventually, also by academic
economists. Wibaut had argued that cartels and trusts are unavoidable because their
efficiency far surpassed that of the small, unorganized firms of the nineteenth century.
His advice was therefore: do not abolish them or reduce them to smaller proportions but
hand them over to society, implicitly assuming that nationalized industries would remain
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equally efficient. Even the control by cooperative buyer or seller organizations would not
suffice, he said: at best, as buyers, they can do away with the often large remunerations
of middlemen; if they get a grip on the efficiencies of large-scale business by means of
producer cooperatives they will, likewise, become profit-maximizing organizations having
the same common interests as their rivals. And, these interests are not limited to the
pursuit of profits by means of price fixing but extend also to the corruption and bribery
of the political and legal system. Typical of his many cases was his reference (1903) to the
petroleum murders: the low fixation of the inflammation point of petroleum by the oil
corporations (pp. 2012), and pressure on the legislator which had already prevented, for
more than 20 years, the further purification which raised costs of processing. Unnecessary
deaths and injuries were the result; in London one per week, in England one per day and
countless injuries as in other European countries.
Alfred Marshall had included such things (using child exploitation as an example) under
his definition of real costs and argued that the nominal price paid for the product or
service did not cover such costs, but in a note he immediately skipped the topic as not very
closely connected with the subject of this Book.8 Dutch economists were still less accessible:
Verrijn Stuart, one of the leading Austrians in the field, commenting on a Prussian survey
of 1912 in which it was found that industrial workers, especially in heavy industry, had a
low chance of surviving past 40 years of age, said that this underlined the urgency for those
workers to save from their incomes against the time that the productive power because of
old age or disability would fail. What one would expect of an economics professor, even
if he had no great fellow-feeling, was at least some sense of elementary logic.9
The Pricing Model Discredited
During the first decades of the century the attention of Dutch economists was focused
on the model of price formation under competitive conditions. When Franois de Vries
(18841958) was appointed at the Rotterdam School of Economics (in 1913 as a reader
in industrial economics and in 1918 as a professor) this was changed by his interest in
the problem of economic power, especially of business and the trade unions. Initially,
de Vries was inspired by Austrian theory, in particular Bhm-Bawercks article of 1914:
Macht oder konomisches Gesetz?10 Whereas Bhm-Bawerck focused on the possession
of scarce resources and the combinations on the labour market, de Vries extended the view
towards business combinations. These, he said, are not so much motivated for gaining a
monopoly position or for achieving the cost savings which cartels and big corporations
may secure. What prompts them is the divergence between the enlarged, fixed production
capacity and the insufficient absorption capacity of the market. Fixed, relative to variable,
costs have risen as a result of the drive for technical optimum and the required response
is the limitation of production capacity to given demand by the combinations. Otherwise,
entrepreneurs will extend output with every decline of the product price. On top of that,
existing capacity of failing firms will be cheaply acquired by financially strong firms,
disturbing the market equilibrium still further. The rise of trusts and combinations does
not mean the end of free competition, he wrote in 1928. Competition will change its nature:
more long-term, stability-oriented, rationalization of output and control of pricing will
emerge, but be limited by the ever possible competition of outsiders (new firms, substitute
products), insiders and by production deviation (a concept formulated by his colleague
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Jan Wisselink). The last, although not so visible, occurs frequently because many smaller
firms have a flexible production system which allows them to produce articles or services
deviating from those goods for which they are optimally equipped. If the combinations raise
prices, their market entrance at higher cost may nevertheless be rewarding and endanger the
quasi-monopolists. Examples are fine and coarse fabrics, steel container sheets to be used
as boiler bodies and the road and shipping services in the transport sector in competition
with the monopolistic railways. It is a form of latent competition as de Vries called it.11
But he lost faith in the free competitive system relatively quickly, and in 1935, he pleaded
for more regulation by central government, ostensibly because of failing social support for
it. No rationalization for this turnaround by means of a new theory was given; nor was it
explained whether such regulation should be seen as durable or crisis-induced only; in his
lectures de Vries argued that traditional price theory had lost its central position and had
fallen apart in a casuistry of cases depending on the conditions prevailing within firms
and sectors. Mobility of production factors could not be assumed to bring about market
equilibrium; prices in one and the same market could diverge because of preferences and
sales costs, or stimulation costs (as he called them); market organization could quickly
change with thoroughgoing consequences for pricing and the type of pricing: there might
be movable prices and prices fixed by the combinations; even the government might
improve the operation of markets by means of price regulation. The paradox of modern
markets is that intensifying competition reduces the free competition, he maintained.
After the Second World War, de Vries continued as the grand old man of Dutch industrial
economics, having educated scores of academic economists including many professors, but
retiring into the prestigious function of being the first president of the Social and Economic
Council, the cornerstone of the Dutch postwar Poldermodel. If the game could no longer
be called harmonious, at least the players could be harmonized under his guidance.
Business Organization and Oligopoly Problems
During the postwar period, competition was long neglected and/or considered to be a
self-evident phenomenon. In politics, the debate raged about nationalization of important
industries, demanded by the socialists, and the organization of industry, the ideal of the
Roman Catholic and Protestant political parties and of many trade unionists. The latter
type of organization was reminiscent of the ancient guild system with its regulations
relating to products, prices and wages, social relations and so on. As we have seen, this topic
had been debated recurrently during the previous seven centuries with mixed, and generally
speaking, meagre results. The reasons are not difficult to find: the Low Countries have
always had an open economy, embedded between the competitors of the large, surrounding
countries of Western Europe, and, second, throughout the ages they have had large, internationally oriented firms of their own which were averse to sector organizations that they
could not control. So, once again, little eventuated from requests for nationalization or the
legally prescribed organization of industry: when de Vries died in 1958, no important firms
(with the exception of the Central Bank) had been nationalized and only a few sectors of
trade and primary industry, harbouring small- and medium-sized firms, had found ways
to organize themselves according to the Law of Business Organization (1950). Yet, these
developments were not so innocent as might appear at first glance because they fostered
the pro-cartel and anti-competitive mentality of important segments of the population.
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This was covered up during the quarter-century of fast economic growth (194570: 5 per
cent volume growth per annum on average); however, with increasing stagnation during
the 1970s and 1980s, this mentality became a supporting pillar of industrial rigidities.12
Competition policy did not offer a sufficient counterweight. For one thing there was no
support in public opinion or in parliament for tough measures; for another, the handful of
academic economists who studied competition and the related policies had not developed
a market theory suitable to analyse problems of competition or combination in periods
of fast growth or long-term stagnation. The void left by de Vriess agnostics was not
filled up.
In the 1940s and 1950s a group of young, brilliant economists rose to prominence and
concurred in the study of the theme of acceptable or workable or effective competition.
That meant the rejection, following the trail of de Vries, of the model of perfect competition
as the expression of a natural economic order. At best, this model was, because of its
catalogue of required conditions a description of a harass which in order to make it
impervious has been so stiffened that it can only serve as an ornament (Lambers, 1950,
p. 8).13 Lambers said that the introduction of the concepts of pure and monopolistic
competition (Edward Chamberlin in 1933) was useful but not substantial: the impartial
observer had always taken competition to be rivalry between different market partners.
More important is oligopoly, but not in the Cournot/Bertrand sense because their models
leave out the interdependency between the few. And the problems of oligopoly are those
of a group of firms, each of which it may be assumed with Marshall and Friedrich von
Wieser will strive to realize the integrating principle of continuity in its market strategy.
In which the interdependent oligopolistic price is the focus point.
One might ask: are these (official) prices the bastions surrounded by the entrenchments
to be extended or given up in line with the course of the battle, as K.W. Rothschild thought?
That would imply a primary ranking of internal security, meaning the keeping of mutual
relations between the oligopolists. Or is the aim a price meant to keep out the external
intruders by setting a limit price just preventing entrance as Joe Bain thinks? Oligopolists
will then sacrifice short-term profits in order to safeguard the long-term average profitability.
Both positions seem to assume a synchronized behaviour of the oligopolists which may be
at odds with their often observed conduct. Why is not every oligopoly the entrance to a
cartel agreement, a merger or some other permanent, structural solution? To some extent
Lambers sided with the conclusion reached earlier that same year by Fellner: In the real
world spontaneous coordination shades over into explicit agreement by gradations.14
Ultimately, the limit in such a spectrum of possibilities lies in the entrepreneurial acumen;
the desire to remain independent in order to realize cost-saving innovations, product differentiation and new sales stimulation. These are the essential characteristics of competition
as rivalrous behaviour.
Yet, even such competition is not without its problems: There is an impressive list of
factors which hamper the mobility on which competition leans (Lambers, 1950, p. 20).
Such mobility barriers are to be found with entry, exit and the movement of resources
within sectors. Governments contribute to them through legally supported arrangements.
Friedrich von Hayeks theory of prices in markets, pointing to that wonder of telecommunications through which in one symbol a row of economic changes can be signalled
in all directions of the economy, is admirable. But we also know that the signals are
often veiled, not so much because of the receivers but also because of the broadcasters.
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Published prices do not coincide with transaction prices, quality competition supplants
price rivalry and, often, complexes of factors overhang the ephemeral movements of
demand and supply.
Schumpeters theory that the progress of technology requires in a number of cases
monopolistic positions may be questioned from two sides (Lambers, 1950, p. 25). First, a
large firm may be so devoted to the technology or the product which earlier made it successful
that it will have no eye for new developments. Second, there are numerous sectors where
technology is not progressive; nevertheless, the alternatives of competition are excluded by
the agreements which include the competitors. P. Hennipmans investigation of the same
problem a few years later led him to the threefold conclusion that: first, the possibility of
conquering a monopoly position provides a powerful and often indispensable incentive to
adopt innovations; second, that in so far established, as distinct from potential monopoly
is concerned, it can plausibly be argued that its net effect is negative; and third, that the
monopolies most dangerous for progress are those that deliberately restrict and suppress
competition, including that from the innovating activity of outsiders and newcomers.
In this way, Hennipman joined the views of the other Dutch competition economists that
a strictly determinate connection between market structure and performance should
rightly be denied.15
Competition Policy: The Law of 1958
When no explanatory theory of the ways in which competition and monopoly influence
performance could be found, Dutch economists turned to the other side of the equation and
asked whether government could, by means of its intervention in the market, improve the
outcomes. Jelle Zijlstra, one of the group of young economists who rose to prominence in
the early postwar period, introduced the Law on Economic Competition during his term of
office as minister of economic affairs (195258). He was also prime minister and governor
of the Dutch Central Bank, thus completing a successful career in public office when he
retired in 1988. The law was based on the concept of acceptable or workable competition,
and incited by the theoretical discussions: if no causal relation between market structure
and pricing performance could be upheld and unimpeded entry could not be relied upon
to secure acceptable prices, competition policy and pricing control had to be introduced.
The general picture being one of a kaleidoscopic variety, the importance of empirical
studies to support decision making became manifest.
Looking back in his Memoirs (1992),16 Zijlstra wrote:
The Law on Economic Competition was, properly speaking, the most beautiful law I have ever
been at work on. It was an effort to bring modern views on pricing into practice. The central idea
was that free price formation in the market economy should be accepted as the leading principle
but that it does not always give acceptable results. Especially through cartelization and other
forms of economic power concentration, buyers of products or services may experience great
disadvantages. Governments should therefore dispose of corrective means. The law was really
well constructed and in the parliamentary debates economists could assail one another with
citations from learned manuals. But, unfortunately, the law has not been very effective. Dealing
with economic power positions proved to be legally unruly. The fight against unwanted cartel
formations is very difficult in our country because the habit, particularly in trade and services, to
make agreements on prices, conditions of delivery and so on is deeply rooted.
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Because retailers are often involved these things are politically sensitive and the minister has to
operate cautiously. By way of a joke I have sometimes said that a visit from bakery employers, with
demands regarding the price of bread, worries me more than a visit from the Philips management.
There might be parliamentary questions about the bread price, which, if handled carelessly, might
be dangerous for the minister. The Philips management or that of other large firms would not
be able to achieve that. It is better that the European Economic Commission has also acquired
powers in this field, for an effective cartel policy would probably never have materialized in
our good country. The law was intellectually a precious toy but policywise a disappointment.
(Memoirs, p. 46)
In Search of the Culprit

Was it really the cartel behaviour of the small firms which undermined the Competition
Law? Or was the law itself an ineffective creature because it was based on the abuse principle
which obliged the government to detect and prove illicit behaviour? Arguments about
correct behaviour, and in particular about pricing, are mostly endless and ephemeral as
cases show.17 Moreover, the criterion for judging abusive behaviour, namely, the general
interest, is notoriously vague and will be interpreted differently by the parties concerned
as well as by avenues of appeal such as parliament or an administrative court. That the
Dutch law (of 1958) contained such criteria, rather than the prohibitions of EEC law
(1956) or the more limited German law (1958), was not accidental. They followed from
the theoretical view discussed above that government should supervise the formation of
acceptable prices and intervene if necessary.
On top of that, decision making was not helped by profound empirical studies. The
Department of Economic Affairs barely undertook any, economists of the Competition
Advisory Commission had no right of initiative to propose cases and had to get their
data material of underlying cases from the department, and university researchers were
not encouraged to discuss decisions (which were few) publicly. Whether a case was to
be published after a decision was a matter for the ministers discretion. Finally, Zijlstra
acknowledged in the second part of the quotation that he was personally involved in
negotiations with business interests and no longer felt free to decide objectively. At the
time it was known, at least within the Competition Commission, that the civil servants,
charged with the execution of the departments decisions would anticipate these: they
tried to guess what the head of the department would decide in order not to lose face
with their business counterparts in the preparatory talks. Thus, the view that competition
policy, when in political hands, is used for political purposes, is not far from the truth.
Disappointed, I left the Commission in 1986.
Freedom regained opened up the possibility of writing an article in the widely-read
Economics Weekly ESB: The Netherlands, the cartel paradise of Europe?. The contents
suggested that the question mark should be replaced by a note of exclamation. The article
was a bombshell, cartel paradise became buzz words and its impact was soon amplified
by the decision of the EC Commission to condemn and fine the nationwide building and
construction cartel. Within two years the government proposed a new and remodelled
Competition Law which was approved by the Dutch parliament in 1996. Five years earlier,
Belgium had modernized its Competition Law of 1960 by changing the abuse principle
into a prohibition of conduct preventing, restricting or distorting competition.18
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Empirical Research
A pioneering study was the first econometric approach to the effects of industrial
concentration in the countries of the Common Market, though Germany had to be
omitted because of incomparable data (Phlips study).19 Even for the countries included, the
authors acknowledged [a] heavy burden on empirical work in the field of business pricing
problems due to an absence and a heterogeneity of national price and production statistics.
Nevertheless, they came to the conclusion that the degree of concentration appeared to
have no influence on upward price flexibility: Prices tend to follow increases in unit costs,
while market structure does not appear to have any particular influence (pp. 345). But that
may have been a premature conclusion and, moreover, only true for the period reviewed
(195865, using the concentration statistics of 1962).
Between 1958 and 1968 there was rapid economic growth inside the Common Market
with increasing interpenetration of trade, due to disappearing tariffs and quantitative
restrictions. There was a high proportion of industrial goods and energy in the composition
of this trade, rising from 77.5 per cent in 1958 to 81 per cent in 1967. Consequently, export
values of the Common Market countries rose hardly at all when the German and Dutch
revaluations of 1961 are taken into account: 0.3 per cent on average per annum, much
less than consumer, wholesale and domestic industrial goods price increases. The only
explanation which fits these facts is the declining effective concentration, as a result of
which more intensive competition forced down the sales price of the goods, in particular
motor cars and other durable consumer goods, the production costs of which fell per unit
because of scale economies and new techniques. After the middle of 1969 this suddenly
changed with the cyclical upturn; industrial domestic and export prices rose in tune at
the rate of 3.3 per cent on average per annum. In the meantime the merger wave of the
second half of the 1960s had changed market structures profoundly in many industrial
sectors; the oligopolization of markets enabled large firms to act in concert with regard
to their pricing behaviour. The drawback of a cross-section analysis, applied to a dynamic
development of growth and structural change as characterized by the institution of the
Common Market, is visible here.20
Nevertheless, pioneering studies are often valuable as much for the lacunae they lay
bare as for what they have discovered and the Phlips study spurred on others to improve
industrial statistics and to conduct sector research. With the growth of dominant positions
on important EC markets during the 1970s, this proved to be opportune: the first book
to appear on industrial economics in the European Community as a whole, after the
inclusion of Britain, Ireland and Denmark, could draw on a much improved base in
both respects.21
Market Size and Growth
The expansion of the Common Market economy and the opening of national markets led
Phlips and others to observe that Concentration is a decreasing function of relative market
size (see note 19 Phlips et al., 1971, p. 172). Effective concentration, or the intensity of
competition could therefore be substantially different from the statistically available ratios.
A correction of these being required for adequate measurement, the implication of market
widening went much further theoretically. A realistic market theory incorporates both spatial
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and temporal elements which are influential in determining entrepreneurial behaviour

consisting of competitive moves and structural interventions. The causality of structural
variables on the dependent performance variables is called into question if widening markets
are involved. One is irresistibly reminded of one of Adam Smiths pertinent remarks:
To widen the market and to narrow the competition, is always the interest of the dealers. To widen
the market may frequently be agreeable enough to the interest of the public; but to narrow the
competition must always be against it, and can serve only to enable the dealers, by raising their
profits above what they naturally would be, to levy, for their own benefit, an absurd tax upon the
rest of their fellow-citizens.22
However, widening markets and narrowing competition do not run simultaneously. A

widening market stimulates expansion by established firms, entry by new firms and vertical
forward and backward moves as well as diversifying growth by firms from other sectors.
Competition is bound to intensify, prices decline and profits dwindle or, depending on the
relative position of firms, disappear altogether. The process is substantially influenced by
type of product and the successive innovations in it, by capital intensity, the structure of
demand and other factors. It is only when the widening of the market stops or slows down
that competition narrows through overt or tacit coordinative actions, and/or mergers and
takeovers meant to relieve competitive pressure. Thus, competition for growth widens the
market but a market widened to saturation kills the competition just like protection and
partition: the urge to merge is fed by the need to compete.23
The analytical tool to discuss dynamic markets was found to be the growth or innovation
cycle, replacing in the Netherlands the workable competition theory; as we have seen in
a previous section, the causal impact of structure on performance being questioned by
Dutch economists, some opted for government intervention on (price) performance. But
growth-cycle theory denied that this could be successful because it went against the grain
of a saturated market where price fixing and price stickiness are the order of the day. Much
better would be the prevention of concentrative mergers, the dissolution of nationwide
cartels, the refusal of public financial support for (mostly) large firms being phased out
and, positively, to create the conditions for new firms to be established and grow in new
sectors. Thus, the scenery partially shifted to the meso-economic field and in particular
to industrial policy, as we shall see in the last section.
Growth-cycle Theory
There were a number of analytical advantages of growth-cycle theory in comparison with
static market theory, though, like every theory, it had to make abstractions. Thus, it was
able to explain the economic logic of sector developments.24
First, it distinguished various market stages or phases according to rates of growth of
sales by competing firms. These were the accelerating and decelerating marginal increases
in the innovative and expansionary stages, rising average receipts during saturation and
declining absolute sales in the final stage. This method brought market theory much closer
to real market proceedings than equilibrium theory would permit. The separate stages
could also be distinguished according to structural characteristics, behavioural parameters
and performance outcomes. Thereby, distinctions which traditional theory had neglected
and which agreed with real processes could be made, for example: the contrasting pricing
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behaviour of firms in expansionary and stagnationary oligopolies; the different meanings of

monopoly in innovative and declining markets and their diverse treatment in competition
policy; the rise and types of multi-market firms; and so on.25
Second, Schumpeters brilliant insights into the function of the entrepreneur, applied by
him mainly to the explanation of the business cycle, could also, and maybe even better, be
applied to the analysis of sector markets. One of the pertinent findings related the surplus
capacities arising from decelerating growth of sales after the expansion phase to continuous
growth of fixed investments. This proved to be nearly unavoidable because it could not
be anticipated. Likewise, a sectoral decline, though partly predictable, if due to substitute
products or the rise of a new industrial country, could not be stopped if receding demand
occurs.26 And surely, part of the problem of aging industries has to do with lagging entrepreneurial capabilities as firms grow larger: size necessitates long-term decisions and the
uncertainties inherent in these drive managers towards organizational control, the process
of internal and external institutionalization, as Lambers had called it in 1958.27 If market
parties are not satisfied with the outcomes of the market process they will substitute it
for the creation of institutions, that is agreements, procedures, rules and habits: It is
an effort to add an instrument so that the market can be steered into the direction of
desired goals (p. 766). The institutionalization is internal if it is due to the initiatives of
the managers; external if the government or other authorities are involved or take the
initiative. Managers conceive their function as one of conserving the existing potential
instead of creating new sources of surplus value as entrepreneurs do. So cartelization,
merger activity, subsidization of weak firms and calls for an industrial policy were voiced
during the 1970s when one sector after another matured or ended in decline.
Third, the theory offered an explanation for the recurrent merger waves which
characterized the industrially developed world since the last quarter of the nineteenth
century. When sectors mature, competition becomes more intense, which is a major reason
for horizontal and partly also vertical mergers. Diversification is stimulated by more
adventurous managers and was a growing segment in the postwar period. But sectors
mature unevenly; they diverge with respect to duration, scale and regularity of development.
So sectoral mergers, takeovers and concentrated joint ventures do not run synchronously,
and if events are added an irregular but tendentious wave-like cycle results. Obviously, the
importance of leading industries which comprise the merger waves changes in the course
of time, and there is no systemic link with the general business cycle.28
Fourth, the approach is conducive to the construction of an economys sector profile in
which net or gross added value is used as a measuring rod. If sufficient data are available
such as the EC Commission increasingly provided in the late 1970s and 1980s the
method can be used to gauge the modernity and competitive power of an economy.29
The Management of Corporations
Finally, the pathbreaking work of A.A. Berle and G.C. Means on the managerial firm (1932)
found an echo and further development in the Low Countries through the contributions
of Herman Daems.30 Daems investigated the reasons why managerial hierarchies replaced
market mechanisms and coordinating agreements between firms, first in a joint publication
with economic historian van der Wee and later specifically applied to the Belgian form of
financial holdings. Those corporations act as financial intermediaries but they were also
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shown to be able to exert intra- and intersectoral control. The question was raised whether
such control had retarded economic development in Belgium (which could not yet be
confirmed) or whether other effects in European countries and the United States could be
detected. While the verdict remained open (No easy answer exists, Chandler and Daems,
1980, p. 215; see note 30) at least the problem had been made much more transparent. Also,
several penetrating firm studies were made during the 1970s, among others by R. de Lange
and A. Wassenbergh on failing firms in the construction and shipbuilding industries.
Restructuring the Economy
With the increasing problems visible since the mid-1960s in industries such as textiles, cloth,
shoe and leather production, coal mining, shipbuilding and (later on) steel, another view
on economic development seemed to be required. Initially, the reaction had been one of ad
hoc measures which were sometimes successful because the parties concerned (employers,
trade unions and the government) united in a concerted action to restructure the industry
or even close it down as in coal. But mostly, the measures lacked sufficient results because
the problems had an international origin for which no national solution was available.
Nevertheless, these particular industry problems had a limited effect on the Dutch
economy until the end of the 1970s because it could rely on a good number of expansive
industries, which paid higher wages than the recessive trades and partly also increased
employment. Uneasiness was rather fed by similar problems, but on a much larger
scale, in the surrounding countries. Belgium and northern France had troubles in their
long-established steel, coal and heavy chemicals trades and Britain experienced deindustrialization on a massive scale, primarily in the large staples trades but also partly, it seemed,
due to mishandling more modern industries such as motor cars and electronics. A more
comprehensive theory was needed in the view of several economists.
Two candidates were available, namely, the real labour cost theory, developed as a macroeconomic theory by economists from the Central Planning Bureau (CPB) who could use
the statistical base gradually built up since Jan Tinbergen founded the institution in the
1940s. This theory held that employment in business (including government firms) is a
function of real labour costs; it seemed to seek its foundation mainly on the neo-classical
theorem of substitution of production factors in relation to their relative prices.
Growth-cycle economists were opposed to this view and argued that market growth,
derived from innovative goods and services, determines employment opportunities in
firms, though not necessarily in a strictly proportionate way. Real cost containment, for
example by means of wage or price restraint, offers no solution when stagnation strikes
or substantially cheaper international competition occurs. It may even worsen things by
subdueing expenditures; productivity growth without an increase in market demand wipes
out labour and employment opportunities. The Ministry of Economic Affairs sided with
this view.31 Its implied, but also articulated policy design was that, if the overall goal is to
increase net added value per employee and to raise the number of gainfully employed, a
conditioning policy will be necessary for the innovation and growth phases, encompassing
measures such as the elimination of bureaucratic obstacles, the promotion of development
credits, the adaptation of the tax system and so on. Second, for maturing industries,
policy could investigate and anticipate problems relevant to them in a general sense; for
example, environmental, educational or energy questions. Third, the decline phase leaves
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74
few other possibilities than consolidation with lower levels of employment and added value.
Protectionism is very contestable and does not generate the desired future structures.32
One of the main backgrounds to the restructuring crisis of the 1970s was the rise of
the service industries. In many quarters, this phenomenon was not recognized. The CPB
authors too, held that a rise of productivity through disembodied investments in existing
business would be improbable. By extension, the vertical disintegration of those services
would not help either. But growth-cycle theorists and the Economics Ministry strongly
upheld the value-adding capacity of service industries.
Finally, by using the data of the CPB study for the 23 sectors upon which it was based,
but rearranging them in two tables of employment-creating and -expelling industries, it
became clear that real cost increases could not be a good explanation of output, changes
in the competitive position or price developments. A comparison of two periods, 195363
and 196373, showed that changes in the capital coefficient did not correspond with wage
increases or decreases in the required, inverse way. The CPB itself found for the 1950s
a rise in the capital coefficient, though wages were low; since 1963, the coefficient has
fallen slightly, but wages exploded (this was the term used for developments during the
1960s). The CPB economists pointed towards a change in the industrial composition
which had taken place but had apparently forgotten that their model did not allow for
such an explanation (all machines, equally manned, cost the same, it was assumed). The
oppositional theory had no problem in explaining these phenomena, for an expansive
industry will utilize large-scale production methods and the more capital-intensive processes
will go hand in hand with output growth and wage increases. This pattern was repeated
in the newer industries of the ensuing decades, for example, production of compact discs
or mobile telephones.
Nevertheless, politicians and most macro economists continued to rely on wage restraint
as a solution to temporary crises in the next 30 years and the reason is evident: whereas
a wage standstill can be negotiated, achieved soon and written on the account of policy
makers, a successful innovation policy requires consistency and the application of scarce,
intelligent resources. Although the theory battle was won by the market theorists they lost
the prize: innovation policy did not get off the ground.
NOTES
1. Henrik Willem Tydeman won the contest and prize, offered by the Zealand Association, with an Answer to
the Question on the Institutions of Guilds or Corporations. The Question dated from 1818 and the prize
for the 124 pages of the Essay was awarded in May 1821. The essay was published in Middelburg (Eeghen,
1965). The 51 guilds existed in the second half of the eighteenth century, but declined to 37 in 1798. There
had been a continuous rise since 1400 (a few); 1486 (19, according to an official count); 1570 (idem: 25); and
1688 (45), a growth partly caused by splitting-ups. The figures are interesting, for they show that the rise
and decline of the guilds went hand in hand with fluctuations in Dutch prosperity. See I.H. van Eeghen De
gilden. Theorie en praktijk. [The Guilds: theory and practice], Fibula reeks No. 5, Van Nishoeck, Bussum.
2. There were, of course, several others who wrote about this subject, some with more pronounced opinions.
See C. Wiskerke, De afschaffing der gilden in Nederland, H. Paris, Amsterdam, 1938, pp. 9096.
3. J.L. de Bruyn Kops, Beginselen van Staathuishoudkunde, Gebhardt & Co., Amsterdam, 1850. The third
edition of 1860 was an extended and revised one and is used here. The book had first and foremost an
educational goal: to spread the knowledge of economic principles among the public and the colleges where
economics became a compulsory subject. The notes are used mainly to enlarge on topics dealt with in
the text, not to refer to other literature. Probably because of this, de Bruyn Kops has been criticized and
neglected by academics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries until the two foremost market theorists at
de Jong 01 intro 74
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4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
de Jong 01 intro 75
75
the centennial of De Economist (1952), P. Hennipman and H.W. Lambers, recognized his balanced approach
and originality.
De Bruyn Kops stated this condition in the third edition (p. 44) or earlier. William Thornton presented it
as a novelty in his On Labour (first chapter), London, 1869.
M. Bakker, Ondernemerschap en vernieuwing. De Nederlandse bietsuikerindustrie 18581919, NEHA-Serie
III, 6, Amsterdam, 1989, pp. 17491. The book by Bakker about entrepreneurship and innovation in the
beet sugar industry, accurately shows the dramatic decline in costs and the inverse rise in output for an
industry which stood as an example of de Bruyn Kopss theory and on which he wrote himself in De
Economist (1877). J.C. Westerman, Geschiedenis van de ijzer en staalgieterij in Nederland, Demka, Utrecht,
1948, pp. 19094. The Dutch firm, De Muinck Keizer paid Fl. 20,000 for the exclusive rights on the use of
this invention in the foundry industry, but, of course, had only a monopoly position in the formal sense,
because there were solely fiscal import duties.
S. Vissering, Handboek van Practische Staathuishoudkunde, 2 vols, Van Kampen, Amsterdam, 186065.
N.G. Pierson, Waarde en productiekosten, in Verspreide economische geschriften, Vol. 1, F. Bohn, Haarlem,
1910, pp. 10426 (from De Economist, 1866).
F.M. Wibaut, Trust en Kartellen, A. Soep, Amsterdam 1903; De betekenis van trusts en kartels voor de
volkswelvaart, Gravenhage, The Hague, 1928, pp. 53118.
A. Marshall, Industry and Trade, Macmillan, London, 1919, p. 183.
C.A. Verrijn Stuart, Hoofdtrekken van de leer der maatschappelijke voortbrenging, 1931, cited from the
second edition 1945, F. Bohn, Haarlem, p. 57.
E. von Bhm-Bawerck, Macht oder konomisches Gesetz?, Zeitschrift fr Volkswirtschaft, Socialpolitik
und Verwaltung, 1914, Vol. 23, no. 34, pp. 20571. Translated into English as Control or economic law?,
in Shorter Classics of Bhm-Bawerck, Libertarian Press, 1962.
De Vries chaired several investigative commissions, including one about tariffs of the Dutch railway system
in the 1930s and one about cartels in the building and construction sector (1956). The assumption that price
fixing would be the result of cost rigidities, based on (relatively) higher fixed costs was tested several years
later by Verdoorn, who published his findings in 1943. No general increase in the rigidity of production costs
was found, but he did not exclude that a rise in constant costs, as seen per firm, works in this direction,
P.J. Verdoorn, De ontwikkeling en druk der constante kosten, F. Bohn, Haarlem, 1943, p. 72. For a summary
of de Vriess work and publications, see M. Dullaart, Regeling of Vrijheid, Kanters, Alblasserdam, 1984.
Macroeconomic policy commanded the attention of politicians and economists because there was a
nearly general agreement that the economy could be steered or guided by means of the econometrically
clothed models fabricated by Jan Tinbergens Central Planning Bureau. The fast economic growth was
often attributed to the policy prescriptions (including wage restraint) derived from such models. Harold
Wincott, a lead writer of the Financial Times, during a visit to Holland remarked that in the UK, the dogs
[he meant the trade unions] bite the economists, in Holland the economists bite the dogs. With the onset
of the stagnation during the 1970s the unanimity disappeared, however.
H.W. Lambers, Marktstrategie en mededinging, F. Bohn, Haarlem, 1950, pp. 1824. Lambers, who was a
prolific writer on problems of competition, concentration, industrial and competition policy during his
long professorship at the Rotterdam School of Economics, was also the first chairman of the Competition
Committee, prescribed with the Competition Law of 1958. He died in 2004, 88 years old.
W. Fellner, Collusion and its limits under oligopoly, American Economic Review, May 1950, p. 54. Bains
article was also in the American Economic Review of May 1950 and K.W. Rothschild wrote Price theory
and oligopoly in the Economic Journal of September 1947.
P. Hennipman, Monopoly: impediment or stimulus to economic progress?, in E.H. Chamberlin, Monopoly
and Competition and their Regulation, Macmillan, London, 1954, pp. 42156. Other economists of the
workable competition school were W.L. Snijders, who was the first director of competition policy at the
Ministry of Economic Affairs and who wrote Beschouwingen over de theorie der monopolistische concurrentie
(Kemink, Utrecht 1945), and P.B. Kreukniet, professor of economics at the University of Leiden who argued
in his Aanvaardbare mededinging (F. Bohn, Haarlem, 1951), that such acceptable competition would only
be realized if prices were equal to the lowest possible production costs necessary to satisfy demand in a
free market. Free entry is indispensable, should be secured by government and, if this were impossible, the
authorities should change the market structure. He did not enlarge upon the ways to achieve this goal,
however; nor did he apparently see the inconsequence of his precept since the theory stated that causal
relationships between structure and price performance did not prevail.
J. Zlstra, Per slot van rekening. Memoires, Amsterdam/Antwerpen, 1992.
In the mid-1950s Zijlstra also introduced a new price law meant to counter price increases which were
considered to be against the general interest. So the legal apparatus was available. It was mainly used to
prevent price wars in small business or to align the pricing behaviour of those firms in times of inflation
to the wage restraint imposed on the trade unions. See note 12. Those laws were seldom used against big
business and several times proved to be ineffective, for example in the famous case against HoffmannLa
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76
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
de Jong 01 intro 76

Roche in the 1970s. To determine the firms market share in the tranquillizer market (valium and librium)
the Competition Commission had asked the minister to make the quarterly surveys of International Medical
Statistics (IMS) accessible: the IMS was the European-wide organization assembling and providing the
sales statistics from and to the pharmaceutical industry. The answer was that this was considered to be
unnecessary. Shortly afterwards the case was lost exactly on this point!
The change had already been proposed in 1986 but dissolution of the Belgian parliament caused delays. See
EC Reports on Competition Policy nos 16, chs 4 and 20, Appendix, Competition Policy in Member States
(resp. of 1987 and 1991). The article on the cartel paradise was in ESB or Economic and Statistical Reports
of 7 March 1990, published by the Nederlands Economisch Instituut, Rotterdam; the Decision by the EC
Commission was dated 5 February 1992.
L. Phlips and assistants, Effects of Industrial Concentration: A Cross-section Analysis for the Common
Market, North-Holland, Amsterdam, London 1971. The book was based on a report submitted to the
European Commission in 1969.
H.W. de Jong, Industrial structure and the price problem, in J.M. Blair (ed.), The Roots of Inflation: The
International Crisis, New York, Burt Franklin & Co., 1975, pp. 165211. Figures in the text were taken from
the tables on pp. 189 and 198.
A.P. Jacquemin and H.W. de Jong, European Industrial Organisation, London and Basingstoke, Macmillan,
1977. The impact of market structure on price performance was discussed in this book on pp. 14648.
A. Smith, Wealth of Nations, Oxford edn 1976, Vol. 1, p. 267.
By the middle of the 1970s, European economists from various countries had come to share the view that
size and concentration were much less important for achieving good performance than politicians and
industrialists thought. See the studies by Phlips, Jacquemin, Linda, George, Prais and others in Part Two
of Markets, Corporate Behaviour and the State, Nijenrode Studies in Economics, Vol. 1, The Hague, Mart.
Nyhoff, 1976, edited by A.P. Jacquemin and H.W. de Jong. That, at least, removed the main objection against
the tightening of EU competition policy with respect to mergers which was finally achieved in 1989.
Growth-cycle theory was prepared by van de Woestijnes demonstration that the Marshallian demand curve
is not representative but has to be replaced by a backward-bending curve at the low price level typical of the
saturation phase. Empirically, Bus found a growth cycle even in an industry as typical as the Dutch bulbgrowing sector with its manifold varieties. W.J. van de Woestijne, Een algemene vorm van de vraagfunctie,
Leiden, Stenfert Kroese, 1953. H.J. Bus, De markteconomie van het bloembollenbedrijf, Nijmegen, De
Gelderlander, 1962 (Dissertation, University of Amsterdam).
H.W. de Jong, Marktanalyse en markttheorie, De Economist, 119, no. 2, 1971, pp. 182205. Dynamische
markttheorie, Leiden, Stenfert Kroese, 1972. Chapter 4 discussed the effect of widening markets on market
structures in a dynamic setting, a topic which attracted the attention of European economists in those
years.
Marginal revenues of the sector will recede as the income elasticity of total demand and the price elasticity
of product demand decline, whereas cross-elasticities between suppliers rise. Interdependencies then drive
towards the control of competition and a reorganization of the sector. See de Jong (1972, pp. 11620),
note 25.
H.W. Lambers, Over de institutionele markt, De Economist, no. 11, 1958, pp. 75375.
See the articles on merger waves in Part Two of Markets, Corporate Behaviour and the State, op.cit. in note
23, pp. 53 ff. and De Jong (1972, ch. 7); see note 25. No systemic link does not deny that there are mutual
influences, sometimes very strong. But the simple proof is that several sectors had no or scant merger events
for long periods, notwithstanding the business cycle.
See M. Geldens, De Vennootschap Nederland, Den Haag 1979, who found a disquieting profile for Dutch
industry. This had an echo in the fundamental report organized by A. van der Zwan, (The Future of
Manufacturing [Plaats en toekomst von de Nederlandse industrie], staats-uitgeverij, Den Haag (1980). Together
with the Wassenaar Agreement between employers and trade unions (1982) this accomplished a revolutionary
change in economic policy. A similar profile was made for the European economy in the 1980s.
A.A. Berle and G.C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Macmillan, New York, 1932.
H. Daems and H. van der Wee (eds), The Rise of Managerial Capitalism, Louvain University Press and M.
Nyhoff, Louvain/The Hague, 1974; H. Daems, The Holding Company and Corporate Control, M. Nyhoff,
Leiden/Boston, 1978, A.D. Chandler and H. Daems (eds), Managerial Hierarchies: Comparative Perspectives
on the Rise of the Modern Industrial Enterprise, Cambridge, MA and London, Harvard University Press,
1980.
It is impossible to give an adequate survey of this debate within the confined space here available. With
numerous variations and intensities it returned when periods of recession became manifest, down to the
aftermath of the new economy bubble. Probably the best overview of the various theoretical and policy
approaches can be found in A. van der Zwan (ed.), Investeren, winst en werkgelegenheid, a collection of
essays and articles under the general title: Nederland in zaken, Veen, Utrecht/Antwerpen. (The Netherlands
in business; investments, profits and employment), 1985. Professor A. van der Zwan was the economist
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77
who, more than anybody else, focused attention on the persistent restructuring task. In addition he wrote
a comprehensive volume, Grondslagen en Techniek van de Marktanalyse [Foundations and Techniques of
Market Analysis] (Leiden, Stenfert Kroese, 1980).
32. The ministry had published a policy document, Nota Selectieve Groei, in 1976. J.W. Hillege, one of its senior
officials elucidated the theory of this document in A.W.M. Teulings (ed.), Herstructurering van de industrie,
Alphen, Samson, 1978, pp. 199221. In the same volume, M. Brouwer and H.W. de Jong gave the critique
of the market theorists against the macro views of H. den Hartog and H.S. Tjan in the CPB Occasional
Paper, no. 2, 1974 and the report De Nederlandse economie in 1980, by rearranging the data for the set of
23 sectors used by the CPB. In 1976, both van der Zwan and de Jong had voiced their doubts about the
real labour cost theory in articles republished by W. Driehuis (ed.) in a collection: Economische theorie en
economische politiek in discussie, Leiden, Stenfert Kroese, 1977, pp. 163205 and 13361.
33. Liefman, R. (1930), Kartelle, Konzerne und Trusts, 8th edn, E.H. Moritz, Stuttgart.
34. Robinson, J. (1969), The Economics of Imperfect Competition, 2nd edn, Macmillan, London.
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78
A.
HENK WILM LAMBERS (19162004)
Henry W. de Jong
When Henk Lambers arrived at the Rotterdam School of Economics in 1935, the economy
was nearly in ruins and economics nearly completely so. The first had prompted him to
study economics instead of his beloved classical literature: I was a spirited admirer of
Tacitus and the Latin language because one may construct so perfecly in that language.
But his father had died in those years of unemployment and poverty and, moreover, the
inquisitive youth was moved to question why so many able people were condemned to
obtaining their sustenance from the dole instead of from useful work. This led him into
the domain of economics.
The leading theoretical economist of his day, Professor Franois de Vries, became his
teacher and discovered within two years his extraordinary intelligence. De Vries, apart
from stimulating Lamberss thinking about the merits and failings of the market economy,
also arranged his appointment as a research fellow of the Netherlands Economic Institute
in 1937. Although war brought a standstill to his career it could not stop Lamberss
intellectual development.
Indeed, it permitted him to prepare for the postwar tasks which followed in quick
succession: Reader (1946) and Professor in Economics (1947), Rector of the Rotterdam
School of Economics (1950) and President of the Competition Commission (1955). Lambers
occupied the position of rector for a total of seven years out of the 41 he spent at the school
until his retirement in 1981. He declined the invitation to become the Burgomaster of the
city of Rotterdam. This course of events showed him as the economist and educator who
generated more than a dozen professors of economics among his pupils, many more who
wrote dissertations with him and even more who took the full course of market theory in
his doctoral seminars. His lectures, according to a colleague were a feast to attend; being
fluent, witty, associative of ideas, illustrating complex problems with realistic examples such
as the production planning and locational choice of the ice-cream seller or the cunning
tactics of the saleswoman breaking an oligopolistic stalemate. The grand vision did not fail
either. Lambers taught, inspired by his favourite authors Adam Smith, Alfred Marshall
and Friedrich von Wieser, a meta-economics of markets in which interconnected layers
of the pricing process, market structures and the institutional conditions were exposed
and shown as the outcomes of acquisitive human behaviour. He called this the New
Institutional Economics in an essay in De Economist (No. 11, November, 1958). The essay
was his favourite means of expression; he was the unequalled master of this style in which
he formulated the gist of the problem, contributed rivalling explanations while coining
new words or concepts and anticipating possible solutions as he went along.
In a solid article of January 1942, Coherence between organizational structures and
pricing, Lambers, carefully distinguishing between price formation and price effects,
used the words potential supply; purposely as it seemed in contrast to Liefmanns latent
competition (1930, p. 10)33 and Joan Robinsons potential competition(1933, p. 81)34
because it covers not only the potential but also the actual suppliers. Control of the market
depends upon the control of supply whatever the form cartel, collusion or trust the
number of suppliers or their insider or outsider position may be; without such control
the prices of commodities will (in Smiths terms) be continually gravitating towards the
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79
central price. But a distinction is necessary between the equilibrium price of a model and
the equation price of reality.
Moreover, the latter is not a point but a band, embracing fluctuating market price
dispersions. By focusing on the conditions of the model, Lambers prevented his students
from confusing theory and actual behaviour. His formulation of the methodological
dilemma elucidated the tension: The paradox of economics is that only by means of a
simplification of reality, economic relationships can be demonstrated whereas on the other
hand it has to be shown what reality does in fact do (Lambers, 1963, p. 271). This double
requirement prevents both an attitude to be best characterized as lart pour lart as well as
the measurement without theorizing. He was, together with his contemporary and colleague
Jan Tinbergen, the educator who inspired this balanced approach to economic problems at
the Rotterdam School of Economics. Its rise to be (by far) the largest supplier of economists
in the country was no doubt the unintended but inevitable result. Fortunately, this increased
supply did not drive the price of economists to a continuously lower level, but it did raise
the prize Lambers was awarded on the occasion of his retirement to the highest level that
Dutch society is able to give: Commander in the Order of the Netherlands Lion.
Some of Lamberss main publications were (titles translated): Market Strategy and
Competition (Haarlem, 1950, see note 13); On the Institutional Market (De Economist,
1958, see note 27); The tough competition, in The Trading World and World Trade,
Rotterdam, 1963, pp. 26180 (published in Dutch and English). In this article we find
one of Lamberss typical phrases: The ubiquity of competition is the protection of the
efficiency of the economic process (p. 275).
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5.
French political economy about industrial

matters
Jacques De Bandt
INTRODUCTION
A preliminary question is, what is industrial economics about, or, more precisely what was
industrial economics about, from 1880 to 1980? The answer of course, is a lot of quite
different things, over such a long period of time. This century-long period has experienced
several rather fundamental changes, with regard to both the economy the economic
system, and more particularly the productive system and economic thinking. Some of these
changes are obviously of some importance from the standpoint of industrial economics.
As far as the economy is concerned, the period has known exceptional secular growth,
with at least two Kondratieff growth phases (and two transition or consolidation phases)
not only growth in general, but industrial growth in particular: industrial activities leading
the game in terms of growth (both production and productivity) and employment and thus
being the main driving force. Ways of doing (and producing value and profits) have been
changing continuously. Consumption (mainly mass consumption), production (phenomenal
technological progress, cheap energy, economies of scale, automation and so on) and
organizational modes (large-scale, self-contained firms, mergers and acquisitions and so on)
have been changing dramatically, leading to unprecedented degrees of concentration and
levels of market power. The period has also experienced different degrees and modalities
of state intervention in industrial affairs, from different forms of industrial policies and
different kinds of public enterprise to the strictest forms of central planning. But the period
under review ends with some kind of total defeat of the plan rationality model.
In the particular case of France, although some important industrial developments had
taken place in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, it still remained an agricultural
country for the major part of the period under study, and strong industrial growth came
only after the Second World War. Growth indeed, a catching-up process (industrial
growth rates were the highest among OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development) countries, except for Japan) then became exceptional, which justifies
the fact that this growth period is often referred to as the trente glorieuses. This happened
within the framework of the specific French planning system, with substantial state
intervention.
One interesting question, but one that is quite difficult to answer, is to what extent and
how these evolutions in the real sphere of economic activities have been affecting, in the
French case, the representations of the industrial system and the ways it has been analysed
and theorized. Of course, the opposite question may also be raised about the possible
80
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French political economy about industrial matters
81
influence of economic thinking on real economic evolutions: in the previous period, the
influence of the Comte de Saint Simon on important economic and, more so, industrial
developments in France had been, for a few decades, quite significant.
Other important changes such as demographic (life expectancies, age structures), geopolitical (end of the European empires, rise of the American empire, the emergence of the
Third World, the oil shock and so on) and environmental could of course be added.
More important changes still with regard to both the economy and economic thinking
occurred progressively in the 1970s and even more so since then, for example: at the global
level, the development of transnationals and globalization, or the end of the growth of
the share of industry and the rise of services and, more so, of informational activities; at
the firm level, cooperation agreements among competing firms; at the level of economic
thinking, game theory, evolutionary economics and contract theories; and so on. All these
changes are here considered as coming only after our period under review.
The century-long period under review has also known different, quite divergent,
evolutions with regard to economic thinking. Major economic theories, doctrines and
ideologies were developed during this period, even if some of them had emerged earlier.
Suffice to mention here Marxism, neo-classical economics, later Keynesian macroeconomics, but also at some lower level of elaboration and influence a series of schools
of economic and socio-political thinking (such as, in the case of France, protectionism,
cooperation, planning and so on). Strong disagreements have been made explicit between
various more or less parallel or successive developments.
Speaking of different, or even divergent evolutions, with regard to economic thinking, one
could add, at another level, a conflict of opinion which is more directly related to industrial
economics, between those who care about industrial realities in all their complexity and
concrete diversity (between countries or systems and over time), and those who mainly
care about formal modelling and abstract models.
The interesting question again is whether and how these developments in the field
of economic thinking have come to influence thinking in the specific field of industrial
economics sensu lato, in general and more particularly in the French case.
Taking account of all the changes which have characterized our period under review,
industrial economics is understood here, in the wider sense of the term, as meaning any
kind of economic thinking about industrial affairs. Services are obviously excluded (they
will emerge essentially in the 1980s). The distinctive criterion is the object under study:
the functioning and the performances of industry and, within the industry, of industrial
firms.
The criterion could also be the industrial way of doing, standardizing and rationalizing
the production process. It is true that, at that time, whatever criteria we use, we are usually
referring to the same domain. But this is no longer the case. In the last decades of the
twentieth century it become fashionable to speak of the service industries (for example,
the banking, and tourism industries) in order to put the emphasis on the application of
industrial methods to service activities. But during the same period, several service or
informational activities which had been integrated within industrial firms in the previous
period have become progressively externalized.
The presentation of the pioneers in industrial economics (18801980), is somewhat
paradoxical in the French case. While there existed some strong traditions, with an
undisputed worldwide reputation, inherited from the previous period, nothing outstanding
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82
happened during the long period under review. However, a distinction has to be made
between the periods before and after the Second World War: new, promising, developments
have indeed emerged in the period after the war.
TRADITIONS INHERITED FROM THE PREVIOUS PERIOD

The heritage from the previous period (the previous century-long period, from 1780 on, had
been very active with regard to economic thinking), consists of three major quite distinct
traditions, whose impact both at the time or in the period following immediately, and
on the later evolution of economic thinking has been totally different.
The Free-market Tradition
The first tradition is the one initiated by Jean-Baptiste Say (17671832) the French
classical economist, sometimes called the French Adam Smith, even while his work rested
on a solid French base, particularly of Turgot,1 but also, indirectly, of Cantillon,2 whom
he did not know and never mentions diffusing the basic principles of the free-market
economy. Besides his emphasis on utility (as opposed to labour as the basis of value)
and his much debated loi des dbouchs (law of markets) pretending to demonstrate the
automaticity of full-employment equilibrium (supply creating its own demand), from our
standpoint, he is well known for his emphasis on the entrepreneur, as distinct from both
the inventor3 and the capitalist, and (in his last period) on entrepreneurship.
He was himself a businessman (for part of his life), meaning that he had some direct
intimate knowledge of such realities himself. He had been impressed by the technological
and industrial evolution of England (he stayed in Croydon for some time, at the age of
19), and was convinced of the importance of technological change: for him, the industrial
revolution meant the application of science to production activities, and of the division
of labour. He was also a proponent and from that standpoint certainly a pioneer of
industrialism, systematically putting much emphasis on industrial activities.
Therefore, because of his business or industrial orientation, Say proposed that his lectures
in the Conservatoire would bear the title industrial economics and this was accepted.4
While Say was obviously a pioneer with respect to the importance of the role played
by the entrepreneur, the exact nature of his entrepreneur is still being debated. Is he
mainly a risk taker or a manager? The emphasis seems clearly to be on the management
aspects of his role: he uses the terms superintendence and administration, which require
judgment, perseverance, and a knowledge of the world, as well as of business. Even while
some indications, like for instance what he says about the variability of the income of
entrepreneurs as opposed to the fixed income of capital, would tend to suggest the opposite,
the emphasis is not on risks or uncertainties, but on management and coordination.
Say was at the origin of a long tradition extending well into the next century which
can be called official, as its representatives were really the mainstream economists of their
time, controlling the relevant journals (like the Journal des Economistes) and associations
(like the Socit dconomie Politique). Say was succeeded at the Collge de France by
Rossi5 and later by Chevalier,6 who transmitted this tradition faithfully. As we shall see, the
strong liberal or free-market tradition,7 initiated by Say, continued in the next period.
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The Socio-economic and Interventionist Tradition

The second tradition is pursued by the work of both Sismondi and Saint Simon. Simonde
de Sismondi,8 is known historically for criticizing David Ricardo whose writings were
labelled as chrematistics, the science of wealth and in turn being criticized by Ricardo and
his followers.9 But his work, which was more or less ignored, has only been recognized much
later as containing many useful insights. In addition to his main merit to have introduced
dynamics based on the so-called period analysis of out-of-equilibrium transitions (implying
more or less severe social disruptions) his work contains a rather systematic criticism of
the providential Smithian optimism, and called for state intervention.
Parallel to Sismondi, Saint Simon10 was constantly glorifying and exalting industry
(in the rather extensive sense which includes all industrialized producing activities). With
reference to a well-known book (Cohen and Zysman, 1987), one could say that his central
theme was that manufacturing matters. His industrialism meant that a strong voluntary
approach was needed for the development of industrial activities. He was against private
ownership, considered as the main cause of the lack of financial resources for the producers,
and became a major advocate of banking credit and state intervention. France is seen as
one big manufacturing unit (he invented the term industrial system) and policy as the
science of production aimed at making things as easy as possible for producers. He can
be said to have been the originator of industrial policy.
Saint Simons greatest influence was exerted not through his writings, but by his personal
authority on a (progressively well-organized) group of influential men, known as the
Saint-Simoniens,11 who became very active in major industrial developments (railroads,
banking, the Suez Canal and so on) in the second part of the nineteenth century.
The Mathematicians
A third tradition, of rather secondary importance at the time, but which was much more
influential later on, is the one initiated by Dupuit,12 Cournot,13 and Joseph Bertrand.
Dupuit, an engineer, was rather close to the liberal school (he published in the Journal
des conomistes), while Cournot was simply ignored by them.14 Together they are at the
origin of much of modern theoretical developments on utility and prices and can be said
to be the real forerunners of neo-classical economics.
But the influence of Cournot on industrial organization theory is equally clear. Cournot
(contrary to Lon Walras) started from the monopoly case (all suppliers are monopolists),
and successively added more suppliers. Cournots developments on either pure competition,
which he called indfinie (indefinite), or monopoly, oligopoly and bilateral monopoly had
a longlasting influence in industrial organization theory. The term Cournot equilibrium
has become a very symbolic catchword in game theoretical developments, although what
game theorists, after John von Neumann/Oskar Morgenstern and John Nash, made of
it was substantially different (see Magnan de Borgnier, 2000). We should also mention
Cournots insistence on taking account of the whole economic system, thus suggesting
the usefulness of macroeconomics. Bertrand is mainly known for his commentaries on
Cournot and Walras (two successive articles in Journal des Savants, 1883), raising objections
against the use of mathematics in economics.
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Of course, there were other names and influences, such as mile Cheysson (18361910),15
in what can be called the engineering vein,16 or the very influential Pierre Joseph Proudhon
(180965) in the socialist vein (against private ownership),17 or Frdric Le Play in the
socio-economic vein (for his consumption budgets), but such additions are not very useful
for our purpose here.
Summarizing, one could say that this initial period up to 1880 produced quite
an abundant literature on industrial realities. While they shared strong views about the
necessary promotion of industrialization (the development of industrial activities), these
economists, all more or less directly involved with concrete industrial matters, and while
representing liberal, interventionist or more technical views, put the emphasis, respectively,
on the entrepreneur, on big industrial developments and on competition.
18801940
This period must be said first to be characterized by the progessive emergence of Cournots
work from oblivion. This was per se important enough, from the standpoint of contributions
to industrial economics. Cournot had laid the foundation for most of the partial analysis
which Alfred Marshall was to diffuse. But, besides this late recognition of Cournot, the
other direct contributions to industrial economics, in this period, cannot be considered
as very significant. Nevertheless, some of those contributions were important, even from
the standpoint of industrial economics.
Let us consider, successively, the three lines of thought which have been sketched
above:
1. The free-trade tradition This is an interesting, but somewhat sad, story. We observe
a clear continuity in the transmission, from one generation to the other, of classical
economics la Say. The Paris group was clearly dominating the scene. Chevalier was
succeeded, in the Collge de France, by his son-in-law, Leroy-Beaulieu.18 They were
strongly liberal economists, opposed to any state intervention, very policy oriented,
well known for their lectures, but neither of them outstanding economists. They knew
business realities better than they were able to analyse them. Joseph Schumpeter insists
on the fact that when they wrote on practical questions they, like their predecessors and
like Marshall, knew what they were writing about. But, even while they were very close
to real industrial matters, they were so obsessed by the dangers of socialism, and, for
that reason, so ideologically oriented, that their contributions to industrial economics
have been negligible.
2. The socialist tradition The scene was completely dominated by Marxist theories, and
as far as France was concerned, very little happened during this period that may be of
interest, at least from the standpoint of industrial economics.
3. The neo-classical tradition Of course the French scene (with regard to economic
thinking) at that time was somewhat dominated by the development of Lon Walrass
general equilibrium theory,19 even though Walras never succeeded in obtaining a
teaching position in France. Although his successor in Lausanne was Vilfredo Pareto
and the term Ecole de Lausanne has often been used Walras did not leave a real
school as such as a legacy.20
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What is Walrass contribution to industrial economics, if any? General equilibrium

is supposed to rest on microeconomic mechanisms, but there is no consideration of
possible alternative organization of (production) units. It is well known that in the
long-run equilibrium situation, which is static, the firm has neither profits nor losses.
But this is due to the central role of the competitive process, which is supposed to
eliminate both losers and profits.
We shall now present three economists who can be seen as having contributed more
effectively to parts of industrial economics, though not strictly to industrial organization.
Their writings all belong essentially to the late nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth
centuries: Franois SIMIAND (18731935); Charles GIDE (18471932); and Clment
COLSON (18531939).
Franois Simiand 21 is very original and not reducible to any clear-cut category of
economists, even while he belongs rather clearly to the socio-economic or interventionist tradition. As a strong opponent of neo-classical economics, he insists on
positive economics22 his approach being mainly empirical (he is, one could say,
a radical empiricist) and on disequilibria. He has studied facts and figures very
systematically, and in much detail.
His main contributions concern long-term wage and price evolutions, and their
impact both on economic and social structures and on progress and secular growth.
He shows, quite convincingly, that long waves are a necessity from the standpoint of
economic progress. This is very close to both Schumpeters and N.D. Kondratieffs
analyses.
But he may be said to have contributed to industrial economics in the sense that
in order to analyse long-term wage and price movements, he feels it necessary to
look systematically into the inner workings of the productive system. In order to
understand the economy, he typically moved from the micro to the macro level. His
analysis starts with the working of enterprises productive agents then moves
towards the analysis of the workings of industries of different kinds, then finally
to the analysis of the global production system, characterized by different market
structures or forms of competition. Much of his work here is taxonomic.
Simiands empirical work strongly influenced later work of a similar kind by
Dupriez23 in attempts to disentangle and understand the various more or less long
(secular), medium (Kondratieff) or short (cyclical) term movements of economic
activities. The main emphasis was on price and production evolutions.24 Following
the same type of rather radical empiricism (within a rather Walrasian general
framework), some followers were induced to develop monographic analyses of
particular industrial realities or specific industrial sectors, including of course the
industrial organization aspects.25
Charles Gide26 has contributed, significantly to the study of what he called the
organization of production, that is, the analysis of competition and concentration.
While remaining in the tradition initiated by Say, at the same time he amended the
very liberal orientation of this tradition, by taking account of market imperfections
and rigidities. Against the strong theoretical and liberal positions, he opposed
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more balanced views with regard to both the relative merits and disadvantages of
competition and monopoly, and the concentration and development of big firms,
recognizing their advantages in terms of cost reductions and innovations. But,
because of the disadvantages of concentration, he had a clear preference for small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and also for cooperatives. Gide was the founder of
the French cooperatist school,27 which has been quite influential in the development
of production and consumption cooperatives in different sectors of the economy. He
may even be said28 to be, with some others, at the origin of the conomie solidaire
(economy based on solidarity principles), which, after a long period of decay, is being
resurrected to a significant degree.
The name of Charles Rist is usually closely associated with that of Gide, because
together they wrote a well-known and quite successful book on the history of
economic thought (see Gide and Rist, 1947). But Rist was mainly a specialist in the
field of money and credit.
Clment Colson29 was an engineer and may be said to belong to the French engineering
tradition, going back, as we have seen above, to Dupuit and Cheysson. His major
work is on transportation,30 but he also published lectures on political economy.
Colson was a point of convergence of different evolutions: the liberal tradition
and marginalism, from both the methodological and theoretical points of view.
And industrial economics did belong to the domain of applied economics, aiming,
inductively, at understanding the complexity of economic reality. His analysis
also starts with the firms, as business units, in order to rise to the global economic
analysis of society. At the firm level, he develops a kind of multidimensional analysis
of production, starting with forms of ownership. He then develops both sectoral
studies (transport as already mentioned) and typologies of firms according to
levels of concentration. On that basis, it is then possible to study the impact of
concentration on enterprise performances. With his theory of market forms, Colson
can be said to have assembled many of the basic elements of industrial organization:
pure competition, economies of scale, economies of scale with monopoly, natural
monopoly, cartels. Optimistically, he considers that monopolies are exceptional and
that there are natural limits to the suppression of competition by concentration, thus
confirming the superiority of liberalism.
Going one step further, to the macroeconomic level as it were, he develops a kind
of dynamic analysis of industrial structures, showing that technical progress is leading
to more concentration. However, notwithstanding his liberalism, he acknowledges
that the intervention of the state may be required in the matter of restructuring.
To conclude, these three men may be considered outstanding, very professional,
economists, whose contributions have been of much interest and were quite influential.
They have contributed, one would say significantly, to industrial economics and even
directly, for two of them, to industrial organization and this was before the industrial
organization revolution of the 1930s.
But, while recognizing this, it cannot be said that the contributions of French economists
to industrial economics, in this period, have in any sense been remarkable, in that very
little has survived.
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This raises some interesting questions. After the strong emphasis on industrial realities
in the economics literature of the early nineteenth century, these seem to have been largely
neglected or ignored in the 18801940 period. Why is that so? There are many different
explanations, but none of them seems to be totally satisfactory. As already indicated, the
leading Parisian group was so obsessed by the dangers of socialism, that they never really
tried to do more than to teach one should say proclaim free-trade principles. Another
interesting explanation is that after the period up to 1870, in which industrial developments
were very significant, not much happened in the next period, in a context of rather modest
growth. There are again several reasons for this, among which some of a more sociopolitical type. Another explanation has to do with the diversion of many economists away
from mainstream economics towards both socialism and social economics. Interestingly
enough, and notwithstanding Cournot, who was rediscovered only much later, there was
little sense either of the dangers of economic concentration and market power, or of the
necessity and possibility of implementing competition (or market structure) policies.
Quite apart from this but still in the mathematical or engineering vein which has been
highlighted several times a few words must be said about a very special case, that of
Robert Gibrat,31 whose law of proportional effect (la loi de leffet proportionnel) explains
the lognormal distribution, that is, the normal distribution of the logs of the variable which
is being measured: the completely asymmetric distribution becomes normal when logs
are used. Size distributions of firms (as measured by number of employees) are typically
lognormal (but so are income distributions, and others as well). The proportional effect
means that the multiple factors at work are influencing their size proportionately. The rate
of variation is independent of their size.
This very original piece of work has attracted continuous interest.32 The questions
whether SMEs or big firms are performing better in terms of growth or whether
concentration necessarily increases, continuously or not, have always been much debated,
and still are; explaining the lognormal distribution by the proportional effect seems
to give a simple empirical answer. But things are of course not that simple, and new
phenomena do arise (such as new divisions of labour, or new activities, or mergers and
acquisitions and so on).
I have suggested (De Bandt, 1970) that the parameters of the lognormal size distribution
of firms can best be used for measuring absolute sizes, both representative and small
(within a size distribution of firms, the boundary between big and small sizes is defined
as the one below that which, when (smaller) firms grow, is reducing the representative
size), and concentration, with applications to the evolution of the German mechanical
industry. This tends to confirm the earlier insights of Solomon Fabricant (with regard
to the median worker for measuring the representative size), and Orris Herfindahl (with
regard to concentration or relative sizes).
THE MIDDLE OF THE CENTURY

One has to mention here the very specific contribution of Franois Perroux (190387), who
has occupied a central role in French economic thinking for a major part of the twentieth
century. He was a powerful, heterodox thinker, quite opposed to neo-classical economics,
and particularly to the reductionism of general WalrasoParetian equilibrium. He has been
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very influential, not only in the field of economic thinking as such, but also in the field of
economic policy thinking and policies (including in many developing countries).
Perrouxs contributions to industrial economics or industrial organization can be said
to be much more significant. For him, the central issue in economics is economic power
or dominance, which is thus given much prominence, but which has a much wider scope
than just market power in the usual industrial organization sense of the term. Industrial
organization has indeed to do with the ways market structures affect exchanges (or terms of
trade) of particular products (goods or services). In the case of Perroux, economic power or
dominance concerns not only the exchange (prices and quantities) of particular products,
but encompasses the wider complex system of relations and interrelations between the many
actors who are more or less directly involved, and which conditions the dynamics of such
a system. This was a systematic attempt indeed, a first attempt at integrating market
structures and power relations within the whole set of interrelations which characterize
productive systems, whose obvious multidimensionality is thus highlighted. There are many
different dimensions with reference to which power relations can exist: not only price/
quality/quantities of products, but also technological and technical knowledge, different
types of information, the set of buyerseller (or inter-industrial) relations, competencies,
networks, international links and so on.
His objective being to build a general theory of power or dominance in the economics
sphere, Perroux considered both the level of the firm (the case of dominant firms, and/or of
monopolies) and the level of countries (the case of dominant countries in the international
sphere). In addition, the study of power or dominance implies both the analysis of the
links with competition and with monopolistic situations, and the analysis of the dynamics
of dominance. On the basis of such developments, he tends to show the paradox of
competition without dominance, that is, without strategies, without fighting or without
arbitration, or to show alternatively that Edward Chamberlins theory is a general theory
of economic activity.
This tends to show that Perroux did not believe in pure competition not only because of
asymmetries and power relations, but also because of the idea put forward and which was
completely original at that time according to which relations between actors are made
of luttes-concours, that is, combinations of competition and cooperation. Cooperation
(mainly in combination with competition) is indeed seen as an important dimension of
economic life and, more so, of development.
His ideas about development have indeed been interesting. He rightly put forward
the concept of development itself (as compared to the concept of growth), insisting on
the human or social dimensions: development is the combination of mental and social
transformations of a population creating its capacities to make the real global product
grow cumulatively and over time (conomie du XX sicle, Presses Universitaires de
Grenoble, 1991). But as well, his contributions have highlighted important aspects of the
development processes. Starting with economic spaces or territories, Perroux insisted on
both driving forces and spatial cooperative dimensions. With regard to driving forces, he
came to attribute much weight to propulsive firms or industries (a translation suggested
by himself). And with respect to spatial cooperative relations, he put forward the idea of
cooperative interrelations on the basis of proximity and developed the concepts of growth
and/or development poles. He may be said to have originated the idea of local systems (of
production, or of innovation).
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Perrouxs theoretical contributions mainly his theory of power relations and dominance
and his theory about poles and cooperative interactions as bases of development have had
a considerable influence, for at least three decades, on the French economics profession (and
beyond pure economics on some other social sciences as well). In addition to the industrial
organization aspect, his contributions have also been quite influential on development
thinking (for example, in Latin America).
THE EMERGENCE OF A FRENCH SCHOOL IN INDUSTRIAL

ECONOMICS
In relation to the development of industrial economics, both in the US and in Britain,
before and after the Second World War, new interest was emerging in France, mainly in
the 1950s and 1960s, for concentration and market power issues. The pioneer was Jacques
Houssiaux. Under US influence (he had been doing research in Harvard), he introduced
the study of concentration in France. In 1958, he published a first analysis of concentration
(Houssiaux and Amoy, 1958) and his acclaimed book on monopoly power (Houssiaux,
1958). His approach was mainly empirical and comparative. He became well known due
to a contribution, Economic concentration outside the USA in Hearings before the SubCommittee of Antitrust and Monopoly (90th Congress, Washington, 1968).
He introduced the study of industrial organization, in the strict sense of the term, in
France. He persuaded many economists to enter into this domain, which was at that
time quite new. Indeed, he convinced them of two complementary things: (i) although
concentration had been, not ignored, but neglected, in the past, with the booming economy
(France was catching up in the 1950s and even more so in the 1960s) it was fast becoming
a really hot issue; (ii) the then dominant structureconductperformance (SCP) paradigm
was not, or certainly not any more, satisfactory and that better and more comprehensive
analyses would be needed. Strong emphasis was thus put both on concentration at the
industry level and on big firms (organization, strategies, performances).
His premature death (in a car accident) put a stop to this very promising career. But
Houssiaux can be said to have initiated many other French economists into the field of
industrial economics. They subsequently created a very lively scientific community, which
has been quite influential both in theoretical terms and de facto, in policy matters, mainly
in the 1970s and 1980s, and amplified many of his basic ideas. The results of this were
quite impressive, as the 1970s experienced an explosive growth of industrial economics in
France. In addition to a series of publications,33 the community of industrial economists
was rapidly organized, even institutionally. An association was created in 1976 (ADEFI:
Association pour le Dveloppement des tudes sur la Firme et lIndustrie), a journal in
1977 (Revue dconomie Industrielle), and a cooperative research structure (GRECO:
Groupe de Recherches Coordonnes, en conomie Industrielle) within the National Center
for Scientific Research, in 1979.
Because of the intense activity of this community, it has sometimes been called the
French School of Industrial Economics (De Bandt, 1991). Many of its characteristics
can be said to have been, at least to a certain extent, inherited from Houssiaux and even,
through him, from some of the older French traditions. Some of those characteristics are
as follows. The importance of empirical approaches, aiming, on the basis of deep and
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90
continuous monographic analyses, at some kind of comprehensive knowledge of particular

domains of industrial activity. I have asserted above that French industrial economists
have always, since Say, had some kind of direct or intimate knowledge or know-how of
industrial realities. This tradition has continued through Houssiaux and beyond. A second
characteristic has been the attempt to escape from the strict SCP paradigm and to delve
more deeply into the complexities and dynamics of industrial realities. This has led in
particular to more systemic approaches, integrating a wider set of interactions between
agents. Typical of these are many contributions concerning the concept of production
filire (and/or production system). The importance also attached to firms in contrast
to a kind of dualism between the theory of the firm and industrial organization and
particularly both to SMEs and to big firms, with specific strategic designs and behaviours,
has led to much attention and research on groups of firms. Another characteristic was
the constant emphasis on market power and more generally following, as we have seen,
an older tradition on economic power and dominance or asymmetric relations. What is
said about firms and systems, also means that industrial activities are studied at different
levels and attempts are made to make those analyses consistent: at the micro level of the
firm, at the meso level of the sector or, better, of some subsystem, and at the global, macro
level of the industrial system itself.
On the basis of this presentation of this century-long period, it might appear that more
happened in the field of industrial economics in both the period before and the period after.
But this would not be a fair interpretation. Significant and very important contributions
were made in the preceding period, on the basis of which longlasting traditions have
emerged, and strong developments have taken place at the end of and following this
period. Nevertheless, the contributions to industrial organization during the period are far
from negligible, in particular: (i) the continuation, deepening and extension of empirical
industrial organization; (ii) the strong emphasis on concentration, big firms or groups
and market or economic power; and (iii) more dynamic and for that reason more systemic
approaches to the working and development of the industrial system.
NOTES
1. Anne Robert Jacques Turgot, Baron de lAulne (172781) was a public decision maker (administrator
and politician). His main work Rflexions sur la formation et la distribution des richesses was published in
1766.
2. Richard Cantillon (16801734) was of Irish origin, but a Paris banker. His Essai sur la nature du commerce
en gnral circulated from 1730 on and was quite influential but was published only after his death, in
1755. Cantillon was subsequently ignored and then rediscovered, only in 1881, by W.S. Jevons.
3. Says formulation of a threefold division of productive operations the production of knowledge, the
selection and use of knowledge for practical applications, and knowledge being put to work in the production
process itself is somehow anticipating what will become the so-called linear model of the innovation
process, going in successive steps from the production of knowledge (upstream) down to the innovation
proper (downstream).
4. As a matter of fact, the Bourbons (Restauration) had a strong objection to the term political economy
which was seen as being subversive. This facilitated its replacement by another term.
5. Pellegrino Rossi (17871848) published his Cours dconomie politique in 1840.
6. Michel Chevalier (180679), professor, but also involved in politics, published his Cours dconomie politique,
in 184244.
7. The pure or unconditional free-trade tradition, still celebrated to this day, was to be represented somewhat
later by Frdric Bastiat (180150), known for his optimism (with regard to the convergence or harmony
of class interests). His is often presented as a (brilliant) journalist or even a kind of lampoonist.
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91
8. Jean Charles Lonard Simonde de Sismondi (17731842) simultaneously a farmer, a politician, essentially
an intellectual, with a strong propensity for history published his Nouveaux principes dconomie politique
in 1819 (after his main work, as a historian, on the Italian republics in the Middle Ages).
9. Two articles written in response to the critiques of the Ricardians are published in the second edition of
his Nouveaux principes.
10. Claude-Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de Saint Simon (17601824) who was a genuine count, and who had
a very adventurous life (including participating in the American War of Independence) published many
books, including Du systme industriel in 1821.
11. Similar groups, clubs or even sects of Saint Simoniens were created in other countries, particularly in the
US.
12. Arsne Jules Etienne Juvnal Dupuit, an engineer, published De la mesure de lutilti des travaux publics
in 1844 and De linfluence des pages sur lutilit des voies de communication, in 1849.
13. Antoine Augustin Cournot (180177), a university administrator, published Recherches sur les principes
mathmatiques de la thorie des richesses, in 1838. For many years, not a single copy of his book was sold.
Later, in 1863, he published his Principes de la thorie des richesses, which can be seen as a much simplified
version of his earlier work with little more success. It must be added, however, that publications of Cournot
in other disciplinary fields mathematics, philosophy, history, epistemology, and so on were much more
successful.
14. The liberals concentrated their repeated critiques on Lon Walras.
15. Cheyssons very detailed microeconomic analyses (Oeuvres choisies, 1911) represent an amazing collection of
tools and ideas, in particular his La statistique gomtrique, ses applications industrielles et commerciales
(Le Gnie Civil, X, nos 13, 14, 1887). See Hbert (1970, 1972).
16. If I were willing to use the term School in any other sense than that adopted in this book, I should
certainly form a school from those brilliant French engineers in the public services who contributed, and
are contributing, so substantially, to scientific economics (Schumpeter, 1959, p. 842).
17. Best known for his famous la proprit cest le vol, but also for the fierce critique of his work by Karl
Marx, who treated him as a petit-bourgeois (meaning a narrow-minded person).
18. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu (18431916) published his Essai sur la rpartition des richesses in 1881. When his term
ended (in 1916), the famous chair in the Collge de France was discontinued.
19. Marie Esprit Lon Walras (18341910) published his Elments dconomie politique pure ou thorie de la
richesse sociale in 187477.
20. Except for a few followers, such as Albert Aupetit, Etienne Antonelli and Franois Ouls.
21. F. Simiand (18731935) published his two best-known books, in 1932: Le salaire, lvolution sociale et la
monnaie, and Les fluctuations conomiques longue periode et la crise mondiale.
22. In 1912, he published La mthode positive en science conomique.
23. L.H. Dupriez, Des mouvements conomiques gnraux, Louvain, 1951; Philosophie des conjonctures
conomiques, IRES-NAUWELAERTS Louvain, 1959.
24. (L.H. Dupriez, N. Bardos, G. Szapary and J.-P. Peemans, Diffusion du progrs et convergence des prix, Etudes
Internationales, IRES-Nauwelaerts, Louvain, 1966, J. De Bandt, Les redistributions professionnelles sous
lemprise des mouvements longs de prix, Bulletin de lIRES, 1959; C. Reuss, E. Koutny and L. Tychon, Le
progrs conomique en sidrurgie: Belgique, Luxembourg, Pays-Bas, 18301955, IRES-Nauwelaerts, Louvain;
L.H. Dupriez, Problmes conomiques contemporains, IRES, Louvain, 1972.
25. Some of these publications are worth mentioning: L. Phlips, De lintgration des marchs, Nauwelaerts,
Louvain, 1962; De Bandt (1962); F. Trappeniers, Les avantages comparatifs dans le march commun,
Nauwelaerts, 1967.
26. Charles Gide (18471932) published a Cours dconomie politique, and with Charles Rist, Histoire des
doctrines conomiques, in 1909.
27. Gide, La Coopration.
28. Gide, Lcole nouvelle, in Quatre cole deconomie sociale, Geneva, 1890.
29. Clment Colson (18531939), was a teacher at two major engineering schools: the cole des Ponts et
Chausses and the Polytechnique. His lectures were published under the title Cours dconomie politique,
from 1901 up to 1933.
30. His Transports et tarifs was published in 1890.
31. R. Gibrat, Les ingalits conomiques: dune nouvelle loi, la loi de leffet proportionnel, Sirey, Paris, 1931.
32. See for example, M. Kalecki, On the Gibrat distribution, Econometrica, 13, 1945, or J. Aitchison and
J.A.X. Brown, The Lognormal Distribution with Special References to Its Uses in Economics, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1957; H. Simon and Ch. Bonini, The size distribution of business firms,
American Economic Review, September 1958.
33. To mention only a few: A. Bienaym, Lentreprise et le pouvoir conomique, Bordas, Paris, 1966; J. De Bandt,
Mesures de la dimension des units de production, Cujas, Paris, 1970; A. Cotta, Les choix conomiques de
la grande entreprise, Dunod, Paris, 1970; J. De Bandt, Les fonctions de production, Cujas, Paris, 1970; J.
de Jong 01 intro 91
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92

Parent, La concentration industrielle, PUF, Paris, 1970; A. Bienaym, La croissance des entreprises, Bordas,
Paris, 1971 and 1973; Y. Morvan, La concentration de lindustrie franaise, Armand Colin, Paris, 1972; M.
Baudoux, Les conomies dchelle et leur degr dexploitation, Cujas, Paris, 1972; A. Jacquemin, conomie
industrielle europenne, Dunod, Paris, 1975; P. Weber and F. Jenny, Concentration et politique des structures
industrielles, La Documentation franaise, Paris, 1975; G. Triolaire, Lentreprise et son environnement
conomique, Hachette, Paris, 1975; Y. Morvan, conomie industrielle, PUF, Paris, 1976; F. Morin, La structure
financire du capitalisme franais, Calmann Levy, Paris, 1974; J.M. Chevalier, Lconomie industrielle en
question, Calmann Levy, Paris, 1977; O. Pastre, La stratgie internationale des groupes financiers amricains,
Economica, Paris, 1979.
LITERATURE
Alcouffe, A. (1991), Profits et entrepreneur: Cantillon, Say, Saint-Simon, in Arena et al. (eds).
Arena, R., L. Bensoni, J. De Bandt, and P.M. Romani (eds) (1991), Trait dconomie industrielle,
2nd edn, Economica, Paris, pp. 212.
Barrere, A. (1994), Histoire de la pense conomique et de lanalyse conomique, Cujas, Paris.
Blaug, M. (1964), Economic Theory in retrospect, Heinemann, London.
Blaug, M. (1999), La pense conomique, trans. A. and Chr. Alcouffe, Economica, Paris.
Breton, Y. and M. Lutfalla (eds) (1991), Lconomie politique en France au XIXsicle, Economica,
Paris.
De Bandt, J. (1962), Dimension du march et optimum de production, Nauwelaerts, Louvain.
De Bandt, J. (1970), Mesures de la dimension des units de production: problmes de mthode, Cujas,
Paris.
De Bandt, J. (1991), Lconomie industrielle dans le contexte franais: dveloppements et spcificits,
in Arena et al. (eds), pp. 15670.
Cohen, Stephen and John Zysman (1987), Manufacturing Matters: The Myth of the Post-industrial
Economy, Basic Books, New York.
Denis, H. (1999), Histoire de la Pense Economique, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris.
Dos Santos Ferreira, R. and L.A. Gerard Varet (eds) (2000), Qua-t-on appris sur la concurrence
imparfaite depuis Cournot? special issue, Cahiers dconomie Politique, no. 37, autumn,
LHarmattan, Paris.
Gide, Ch. and Ch. Rist (1947), Histoire des doctrines conomiques, 7th edn, Sirey, Paris.
Hbert, R.F. (1970), A critical evaluation of mile Cheyssons contribution to economic analysis,
PhD thesis, Louisiana State University.
Hbert, R.F. (1972), A note on the historical development of the economic law of market areas,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 86(4).
Hbert, R.F. and A. Link (1988), The Entrepreneur: Mainstream Views and Radical Critiques, 2nd
edn, Praeger, New York.
Houssiaux, J. (1958), Le pouvoir de monopole, Sirey, Paris.
Houssiaux, J. and C. Amoy (1958), Lvolution de la concentration dans les industries franaises:
lexemple de lindustrie textile, Revue dconomie Politique.
Magnan, J. de Bornier (2000), Cournot avant Nash: grandeur et limites dun modle unitaire de la
concurrence, in Dos Santos Ferreira and Varet (eds), 0125.
Schumpeter, J. (1959), History of Economic Analysis, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford and
New York.
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A.
93
JEAN-BAPTISTE SAY (17671832)
Jacques De Bandt
Says Protestant merchant family, from the region of Nimes, sought refuge in Geneva
because of the revocation of the dit de Nantes, in 1685. He was successively an insurer,
a journalist, a politician, an entrepreneur and, later, a professor.
He became a member of the Tribunat (a deliberative assembly, 17991804). However,
he was expelled because of his lack of support (in his Trait dconomie politique) for
Bonapartes fiscal policy. He became the founder and manager of a cotton factory in
the northern part of France (18071813). At first a flourishing company (with up to 500
workers), it was then badly hit by import duties fixed by Napoleon.
Having discovered political economy by reading Adam Smiths Wealth of Nations in
1788, in 1803 he published, his Trait dconomie politique: Simple expos de la manire
dont se forment, se distribuent et se consomment les richesses.
His Trait the first such treatise in France was a real success: besides several editions
during his lifetime, it became, for more than a century, the main reference book for the
teaching of political economy in France. A shorter version was published in 1815, under
the title: Catchisme dconomie politique.
Say became an academic teacher in economics (the first in France), at two well-known
institutions : Conservatoire National des Arts et Mtiers and the Collge de France and
published, in 182830, his Cours complet dconomie politique pratique, which, compared
with the purely theoretical Trait, includes a detailed analysis of the various industries
and technologies. He also published Lettre Malthus in 1820.
A continuously much debated question concerns the originality and importance of Say
in the history of economic thought. He has been much criticized for being too simple or
straightforward. Karl Marx used the term der fade Say, referring to his so-called superficiality, Joseph Schumpeter insists on the fundamental error that vitiates appraisal of
Says position in the history of economics, namely, with the usual interpretation of his
relation to A. Smith (1959, p. 492). For example, while the division of labour is typically
due to Smith, Say can rightly be credited for having deepened the Smithian notion of the
division of labour.
Certainly, Says role has been decisive both for diffusing Smiths basic ideas and for
establishing the tradition for the teaching of economics in France. In addition, Say has
made several basic contributions, to which many authors and discussions have systematically referred. Three major contributions are attributed to Say, one of which has a direct
bearing on industrial economics, namely the central role played by the entrepreneur. The
others are the utility theory of value and the loi des dbouchs, eliminating the possibility
of any overproduction.
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B.
FRANOIS PERROUX (19031987)
Jacques De Bandt
Franois Perroux was an original thinker, very prolific, who has had a deep influence on
many economists, in France of course, but also, mainly, in Latin American developing
countries. He was a man of many intellectual and scientific debates and conflicts.
As a student of Etienne Antonelli, he became a kind of follower of Lon Walras, whose
thinking he presented in his La Valeur (1943). A first book on profits (Le problme des
profits) was published in 1926, followed, in 1936 and 1940, by two publications on the
Hitlerian myth and system. He became Professor at the Law Faculty of the University of
Lyon, in 1935, and published, that same year, an Introduction to the economic thinking
of Joseph Schumpeter, in the French translation of the Theory of Economic Development
(Dalloz, 1935). He was the founder of ISMEA, the Institute of Mathematical Sciences and
Applied Economics, which was to become very influential for most of the second half of
the twentieth century, and became professor at the famous Collge de France.
Besides writings on national accounting problems, his major writings were on value,
on Europe (Le Plan Marshall ou lEurope ncessaire au monde, 1948, and LEurope sans
rivages, Paris, 1954), on economic progress (Thorie gnrale du progrs conomique,
1957), on development (Lconomie des jeunes nations, industrialisation et groupement des
nations, 1962), on basic economic principles (conomie et socit, contrainte, change, don,
1963, and Leconomie du XXme sicle, 1969, and Pouvoir et conomie, 1973). Of special
importance, from the standpoint of industrial economics, was his Industrie et cration
collective (196470).
We shall end with a quotation from the History of Economic Thought website:
Franois Perroux belongs to that small, strange group of unique Frenchmen who, in spite of the
Anglophone dominance of economics, still manage to occasionally infect the imagination of the
economics world with their novel ideas. ... Like Walras, he was a Cartesian in method, a socialist
in sentiment and an evolutionist in vision.
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6.
Industrial economics in Italy

Patrizio Bianchi
THE RECENT ORIGINS OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS IN ITALY

A brief history of industrial economics in Italy can start in the early 1970s, when the Free
University of Trento a new university sponsored by the local government established
the first chair in industrial economics and public policy in an Italian University.
The first Professor of Industrial Economics and Public Policy was the young Romano
Prodi. After studying at the Catholic University of Milan, the London School of Economics
and Political Sciences and Harvard University, Prodi focused his research on industrial
dynamics and innovation: he diffused the structureconductperformance paradigm in
Italy, and integrated the international discipline into a rich national context of industrial
studies, derived from various theoretical and empirical traditions (Prodi, 1966, 1968).
After a short period in Trento, Prodi went to the ancient and prestigious University of
Bologna. At the newly created Faculty of Political Science, he established the Centre of
Industrial Economics and Public Policy within that extraordinary Institute of Economic
Sciences founded and directed by Nino Andreatta which since the beginning of the
1970s has been one of the most dynamic engines of the Italian economic and political
culture. The faculty trained a new class of political leaders: Prodi became Minister of
Industry in 1979, President of the Instituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI: Institute
for Industrial Reconstruction) in 1983, Prime Minister in 1996 and in 2006 and President
of the European Commission in 2000; Andreatta was Minister of Treasury, Budgeting and
Defence, and several scholars became members of parliament, members of the Antitrust
Authority and leading personalities in both political alliances.
The Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Bologna was created in the early
1960s by an extraordinary group of young scholars, who founded in the early 1950s, in
the most difficult years of the Cold War, a truly bipartisan and free centre of political
discussion, called Il Mulino. This association promoted an academic publishing house,
which started to diffuse the new social sciences in Italy and to support a new generation
of social scientists, trained abroad and interested in developing their research activity in
the Italian universities.
The previous Italian academic history was defined either by courses of microeconomics
offered in the faculties of economics and commerce, in programmes aimed at training
firm accounting experts, or by courses in political economy and public finance, taught in
the law faculties.
Economics diffused in the second half of the nineteenth century, mainly thanks to
Francesco Ferrara (18101900), who brought the marginalist revolution to Italy. The
Italian school of economics experienced a boom in the first years of the new century, with
95
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Maffeo Pantaleoni (18571924) and Vilfredo Pareto (18481923), who both proposed in
various ways a strong convergence between partial equilibrium analysis and the theory
of general equilibrium.
The rich Italian school of public economics (Luigi Einaudi, Antonio DeViti De Marco)
and the school of monetary studies, among which Marco Fanno and the whole group
of young economists who managed the Bank of Italy and the economic recovery after
the Second World War, both inherited from the teaching of Pantaleoni. The numerous
contributions proposed, during fascism and within corporatist economics, an important
reflection on the role of the state in the economy and in particular on the role of public
firms.
The years of fascism have, however, constituted a long period of closure which interrupted
the flow of ideas and people between European universities. The swearing of loyalty to
fascism was imposed in Italian universities and Jewish scholars were expelled, with many
negative consequences in many disciplines.
Vigorous debate was resumed, immediately after the Second World War, when important
discussion on the future of the Italian economy after the years of protectionism and
international sanctions took place in the Constituting Assembly. The debate focused on
the perspectives of trade openness, the opportunity to reprivatize the firms that had been
nationalized during the years of fascism and the necessity to develop the South of Italy.
Thus the comprehensive discussions on industrial economics and policy were largely
inspired by real questions on the future of the country.
In such a context of recovered freedom of speech and strong social dedication, the socalled new social sciences arrived in Italy. As we said above, the association Il Mulino
and its publishing company in Bologna attracted young scholars who had been abroad,
in countries such as the United States or the United Kingdom; back in Italy, which had
been closed for years, they diffused the new international tendencies in terms of sociology,
political sciences and economics.
In the same period, the entrepreneur Adriano Olivetti had created a centre of entrepreneurial culture, the Associazione Comunit, which diffused new studies on the large firm
and the ethical values of the modern industrial society, between Turin and Milan, in the
heart of the countrys industrial area.
In Rome the IRIs research department, the publicly owned company which managed
the largest part of heavy industry and services in Italy, became a centre of economic and
management studies, the Bank of Italy expanded its analysis on industrial dynamics,
and a new Ministry of Economic Planning, which promoted several studies on Italian
industry, in particular related to the development of the southern regions, was created in
the early 1960s.
In the mid-1960s, a large movement to decentralize the state also started, by establishing
the region as an intermediate level of government; this movement was supported by a
variety of studies on local economies. Regions were established in 1976 and most of them
promoted public centres of applied economic research, and in several cases supported new
chairs in industrial economics.
Moreover, from the end of the economic boom (mid-1960s) to the end of the prolonged
economic crisis related to the oil shock, the largest companies set up economic research
departments, strongly oriented to industrial economic analysis.
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All these initiatives created a positive climate for industrial economic studies, a large
demand for applied economists, and the opportunity for the new discipline to take root in
the Italian academy. New faculties of economics and new research centres were founded
during this period of intense intellectual activity: Trento, Bologna, Modena, Ancona,
Turin, Milan, Pisa, Naples. The two important journals of the discipline were consolidated
in the 1970s: the Bollettino di economia e politica industriale (then Economia e Politica
Industriale) in Milan, directed by Sergio Vacc, and in Bologna the Rivista di Economia
e Politica Industriale, founded by Romano Prodi, and merged afterwards with the old
prestigious journal LIndustria.
The new discipline was incubated in an extraordinary cultural context, but it has
developed in the period of dramatic economic and social crisis following the postwar reconstruction and the economic boom at the beginning of the 1960s. A strong need for policy
measures to stimulate industrial development pushed the scholars of the new discipline
towards an effective applied approach and relevant emphasis on policy issues, fixing the
basic features of the Italian tradition of industrial economics and public policy.
This is the context in which the core of industrial economics in Italy has developed from
the beginning of the 1970s to the creation of the Italian Society of Industrial Economics
and Policy (SIEPI) in 2000.
Nevertheless, most of the topics that the modern discipline identified were taught
earlier within lectures of political economy and business economics. A number of courses
contributed to the knowledge of the countrys industrial structure and to the analysis of
the competitive dynamics between firms, before the new science made its official entry
into Italian universities.
The elements that contributed to define the new discipline were numerous but some of
the most important are:
the so-called industrial technique, related to the work of Pasquale Saraceno at IRI
on the management of industrial production and the development of backward
regions;
the studies of large firms, by Franco Momigliano, linked to the experience of Adriano
Olivetti;
parts of political economy, especially the analyses of Paolo Sylos Labini on oligopoly,
technical progress and strategic deterrence;
the vast area of study of economic policy and in particular the work of Federico Caff
linked to the Bank of Italy, and his studies on the role of the state in the economy
and on the development of the South of Italy; and
the extraordinary boom of studies on industrial districts to which scholars of various
backgrounds turned their attention; in particular Prodi with his pioneering studies
on industrial dynamics and innovation in rapidly growing sectors, such as ceramics
(1966), Giacomo Becattini, who made an in-depth and theoretical study of the work
of Alfred Marshall (1961), Sebastiano Brusco, who conducted the first studies on the
productive externalization of the large firms (1975), and Giorgio Fu, who studied
economic development (1976).
The new discipline consolidated through the convergence of recurrent themes in the
Italian debate and has been characterized by the description of a reality which underwent
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large transformations and where strong peculiarities and diversities started to emerge
relative to other countries, especially Anglo-Saxon ones from which the discipline of
industrial organization originated.
Italy experienced a much delayed industrial development, having a crucial role for the
state in promoting economic growth and industrial organization.
THE DELAYED ORIGINS OF ITALIAN INDUSTRY: THE ROLE

OF LINDUSTRIA
Italian industry developed much later than in other European countries. In the years
following the unification of the country (1861) there was even a recession. The new
Kingdom of Italy was quickly formed, unifying small states with limited productive and
commercial structures. The Piedmont had a small productive structure which represented
a satellite of the French empire while the Northeast (that is, Lombardy and Veneto) had
been a vast and rich region of the Habsburg empire, so that all its flows were oriented
towards Vienna. The South had been the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, politically a satellite
of the Austrian empire, but economically oriented towards the Mediterranean sea which
was dominated by the UK. The unification implied enormous problems of economic
integration between states which were diverse, small and marginal relative to the already
established powerful economies of northern Europe (Bianchi, 2002a).
In a first phase the Kingdom of Italy developed strong links with France; the French
commercial banks started to invest in Italy, while France imported increasing volumes of
agricultural products from the south of the country.
The government which had transformed the small kingdom of Piedmont into the
Kingdom of Italy was liberal, with a policy aiming at budget equilibrium and a certain
degree of trade liberalization. Economists such as Francesco Ferrara and Maffeo Pantaleoni
brought to Italy, through various academic journals such as Il Giornale degli Economisti,
the new marginalist economy in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.
A reflection on the role of industry in economic development did not come from academia
but from industry itself. Thus Alessandro Rossi, a wool industrialist from Vicenza who
later became a Senator of the Kingdom, was a leader in advocating the fundamental role
of industry in economic development (Avagliano, 1998).
At the end of the nineteenth century, when inflation slowed down, many new firms which
have characterized Italian industrial history since then were founded. In the same period the
new entrepreneurial class distanced itself from the liberal tradition which had been unable
to spur economic development in the country. German banks replaced the French banks,
a new political class replaced the old Right Party, and a new policy oriented the country
towards the newly created German Reich. From an economic point of view, policy turned
towards protection of infant industry on the one hand and strong public intervention by
investing in infrastructure, energy, heavy industry and defence, on the other. The young
nation also started an imperialist and colonial policy at the end of the 1880s.
The economic journal LIndustria, represented the voice of this economic policy stance.
The journal was created in Milan in industrialist circles which had also favoured the
establishment of the Politecnico (an engineering school still famous nowadays). The debate
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99
among journals was acute and led LIndustria to sustain protectionist and industrialist
ideas against marginalist academic journals (Barucci and Roggi, 1986).
Italian industry experienced a period of strong growth in the first years of the twentieth
century, with a government led by Giovanni Giolitti who skilfully managed industrial
development. He was supported by new industrial leaders whose culture became the
reference in the country: among these, Giovanni Agnelli who founded Fiat in 1898 and
strongly supported the governments industrial development policy (Castronovo, 1995).
The technical progress related to the adoption of electrical technologies also eased this
policy. The Italian regions and especially those located in the Alps area had always used the
power of the rivers, developing various technologies for the exploitation of water turbines.
The scarcity of coal had induced Italy not to rely on vapour technologies.
The traditional technologies linked to the water mills were used again, this time in the
service of electricity generation using the Alpine waterfalls, so that a dynamic school of
electromechanics developed in Italy in these years, under the leadership of Galileo Ferraris
in the Turin Politecnico.
Turin and Milan became the centres of the new industry and the areas where a new
leading class was trained, less oriented towards France and Austria and increasingly
towards Germany. This leading class, contrary to the old liberal class close to agricultural
traditions, was in favour of protectionism, of support to the newly born industry and to
industrialization as the engine of economic development. As already mentioned, LIndustria
strongly sustained this vision.
While the academic Giornale degli Economisti was publishing the elegant proposals
of Lon Walras and W.S. Jevons, LIndustria referred to John Stuart Mills work on the
strategic protectionism of infant industry or even to Friedrich Lists work on the right of
the new nations to consolidate their autonomy, even at the cost of closing trade to the
more developed countries. This view of LIndustria was already consolidated in 1887 with
the publication of the work of two parliamentary commissions, the Ellena Commission
on the state of Italian industry and the Luzzatti Commission on the social conditions in
the country. The vision emerging from these working groups reflected the fragility of the
productive structure of the country at that time. Custom tariffs were therefore increased
between 1878 and 1887 and remained unaltered until after the First World War. The
publications in LIndustria, in explicit conflict with the more academic journals, stressed
the necessity to accelerate the industrialization which was taking place mainly in the
northeastern triangle (Milan, Turin and Genoa) (Zamagni, 1986).
After the First World War a slight opening of trade occurred until the financial
crisis of the 1920s which affected Italian banks and urged the Mussolini government to
strongly intervene. Indeed, in these years the fascist government defined a type of public
intervention which has continued to characterize the country for many years after fascism.
The accelerated development of the Italian economy at the end of the nineteenth century
had been made possible by the setting up of German-type banks in Italy. These banks
collected family savings and invested in industrial activities. The state was the main buyer of
the products of these industrial activities and therefore played the role not only of regulator
but also of guarantor of the system. During the First World War most firms experienced
an exceptionally strong growth but they had difficulty in converting their activities after
the war. They chose to acquire the banks they were related to, thereby creating a complex
interlaced system that held until the financial crisis.
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100
The financial crisis destabilized the entire system and in order to avoid a collapse of the
whole economy, the government asked the Central Bank to acquire a part of the banks
debts. In addition, it founded both a public Credit Institute and the IRI which acquired
the stakes of the three main banks in difficulty. Through this acquisition, the IRI also
obtained control over most large Italian firms. In the meantime, a new bank act prohibited
banks (now mostly public) to invest in firms.
These exceptional measures remained in place until the beginning of the 1990s, at the
start of the privatization process which led to the closing of the IRI in 2000. This process
turned out to be the largest privatization experience in Europe, including industrial firms
and banks.
The man who designed this form of public intervention that characterized Italy from
the 1920s to the 1990s was Alberto Beneduce, who spurred a modern view of industrial
development especially in the IRI research centre.
ALBERTO BENEDUCE AND THE REORGANIZATION OF

ITALIAN INDUSTRY
Beneduce was a technician who led the reorganization of the state institutions regulating
the economy. He came to this position in 1919 after a career as a university professor of
statistics and demography. He had already collaborated with Prime Minister Francesco
Saviero Nitti in the foundation of the Istituto Nazionale delle Assicurazioni (INA: National
Institute of Insurance) in 1912. INA was created in response to the crisis of the Cassa
Mutua Pensioni (an insurance company) of Turin, and soon became the regulator of this
important sector of the economy. Beneduce was asked to design a national insurance
monopoly and then, when he directed INA, to design a system not totally replacing the
private sector but to be characterized by a leading public firm which could have played
a regulating role in the sector through the acquisition of the portfolios of failing firms
(Bianchi, 2002a). Subsequently, during the First World War, Beneduce was asked to
establish the Opera Nazionale Combattenti (ONC), an organization aimed at finding
jobs for veterans of the war.
Beneduce then founded a national bank for public works (CREDIOP Consorzio
di Credito per le Opere Pubbliche) in 1919 and the Credit Institute for works of public
interest (Istituto di Credito per le Opere di Pubblica Utilit ICIPU) in 1924, of which
Beneduce remained president until 1939. The aim of these institutions was to guarantee
financial resources for public works and for works of public interest, even if conducted
by private firms, as in the case of electrical power. These two institutions grew so quickly
that in 1936, that is, when the banking reform took place, they managed credits totalling
an amount double in comparison with credits managed by the three banks of national
interest (Baratta, 1985).
In 1931, Beneduce became a board member of the Istituto Mobiliare Italiano (IMI),
the foundation of which he had supported in order to face the crisis of the Commercial
Bank in 1933. In the same year he became the first president of the IRI and stayed in
office until 1939, managing first the shares in industrial firms obtained through the banks
rescue operations and then the large public industrial assets.
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The Banking Law of 1936, which separated ordinary credit operations from special ones
and which remained the main pillar of the Italian financial system until the 1990s, was
the last step of the reorganization of the Italian economic system, the first step being in
our view the establishment of the Bank of Italy in 1894 following the crisis of the French
industrial credit institutes.
Beneduce and his colleagues were non-fascist, and at some stage of their life even antifascist. They were technicians who conducted a reform of the state to address the problems
of fragility of the production system. The measures making up the reform were supposed
to be temporary but turned out to have a long-lasting structural effect on the industrial
system. Thus the IRI soon abandoned the activity of short-term credit provision and
temporarily turned to a privatization policy (abandoned in 1937). The IRI became a
permanent body, a public holding that has continued to play the role of regulator of a
still fragile and short-term private industrial system (IRI, 1985).
Alberto Beneduce trained most of the technicians, bankers and economists, who managed
the postwar reconstruction, recovery and booming of the Italian industry; among them,
a special role was played by Pasquale Saraceno.
PASQUALE SARACENO AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF

DELAYED INDUSTRY
Saraceno has been one of the most important scholars of Italian industry. He was born
in 1903 in the extreme north of the country. During his life he followed the IRI from the
early period until his death at the beginning of the 1990s. He promoted a school of study
in southern Italy; a school of industrial techniques and economics that is still strong in
the University of Venice; and SVIMEZ, the association that taught young people about
the problem of delayed development (Vigna, 1997).
Saracenos first academic activities were in the field of industrial and commercial
techniques. This field, together with that of banking techniques, was for long one of the
pillars of the preparation in economics and commerce. The analytical base was that of
accounting, which represented a general technique for the description of the firm, stylized in
stocks and flows. Saraceno accompanied this field of competence with a strong knowledge
of political economy and in particular of the Pantaleoni school.
His meeting with Gino Zappa, the founder of modern accounting in Italy, was important
but Saraceno in any case had developed an original way of thinking, not only on the theory
of the firm, but also and mainly on the links between the industrial firm, its organization,
its management and the entire industrial system. He identified the fundamental link
between these elements as the organization and management of production. Industrial
production is thus the heart of the analysis of the firm in Saracenos work because
industrial production is seen both as the subject and as the instrument of economic
development (Bianchi, 2002b).
This link between production, the industrial firm, industrial development and economic
growth is examined systematically and in depth in his important book entitled Leconomia
dei paesi industrializzati (The Economy of Industrialized Countries) (1970). The firm as a
place of production is considered as the place where technical competencies and material
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resources are accumulated for the creation of capital and value from productive transformation. This process constitutes the basis for a sustainable development.
The theme of the creation of capital is recurrent in Saracenos work and is the characterizing element of his vision of Italian development and of the role of the state as a
promoter of development. He had an enormous influence on Italian economic literature
after the Second World War.
The interest in this issue is understandable, given the characteristics of the Italian
economy: problems of capital accumulation, production efficiency, and adequacy between
production organization and market extent in an overpopulated country (and therefore
with a strong need for development); and product and capital markets not large enough
to autonomously create an industrial dynamics able to increase the number of large firms
(hence a weak supply of development). In such a context, the risk is the development of
an economy based either on firms that are too small (hence, in the case where economies
of scale are important, inefficient) or on a few large firms that dominate and monopolize
the system. In both cases inefficiency from a social point of view prevails.
Starting from the awareness that development paths are unique and not repeatable and
that development requires, whatever the historical trajectory followed, adequate production
dimensions, Saraceno proposed an increasingly mature vision of the role of the state in the
economy which in Italy takes the form of the IRI, of the state having a stake in industrial
firms, of the exceptional intervention in the backward South and of economic planning
(Saraceno, 1985; Zoppi, 2002).
The public firm becomes a fundamental pillar for the growth of the industrial system,
thanks to its dimension, organization and capacity to accumulate competencies and
resources. It is also an essential instrument of economic growth since it avoids the
degeneration of the market towards asphyxiated monopoly positions. Here Saraceno views
the country as a system that should function according to the same principles of decision
making and planning of flows that govern the firm as a system, that is, a cornerstone of
his reflection on industrial production (1978a).
Saraceno had already addressed the problem of the relation between production
dimension and firm behaviour in the publications of the beginning of the 1940s. The
core of the relationship between conduct and structure is proposed in Lezioni di tecnica
amministrativa delle aziende industriali (Lectures on Administrative Techniques of the
Industrial Firms, 1940), through the analysis of the accounting problems related to the
increase in technical assets strictly connected with production: plants and machinery which
incorporate technical progress and imply the risk of fixing today future technological
choices. Hence the choice to acquire from outside or producing in-house must also be
decided in relation to the existing assets (Saraceno, 1940).
Among the specific choices of the firm is that regarding vertical integration, of which
Saraceno analysed the possible advantages in relation to the optimal dimension of the
firm, the nature of the productive cycle and the typology of goods produced. The choice
depends on historical conditions, structural constraints, market demand and the prefigured
strategies.
In this sense Saraceno clearly shows how the tendency to increase a firms size is
essentially determined by the objectives of managers, whose compensations and status
are clearly related to dimension and not to performance. Saraceno thus agrees with Robin
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Marris and the vast literature on the managerial firm characterized by the separation of
management and control.
The large firm thus constitutes a deciding subject that takes decisions under constraints,
and that can choose to externalize specific activities which could create rigidities in the
productive cycle. As a consequence, if efficiency advantages of dimension exist, they are not
absolute but determined by technology and demand. They evolve through time, according
to the structural elements that historically define the context in which the firm operates
and makes bounded rational choices, implying the irripetibilit dei modelli di sviluppo
(unrepeatable nature of development models), as stressed by his book of 1978 (Saraceno,
1978b).
Saraceno took a similar approach to the debate of industrial economics that was taking
place in the 1940s. He closely followed the international debate and used it in his analysis of
the Italian economy, taking the countrys specific features into account (Varaldo, 1993).
This approach in any case leads him and other Italian scholars such as Franco
Momigliano, to consider the large firm or better, the organizational forms specific to the
large firm, as the real engine of development, with the idea that planning and development
interlace in the management of the firm where current decisions on fixed capital, skilled
labour and managers will constrain the future choices. Therefore, it is necessary to prefigure
future strategies today in order to avoid that todays decisions impede future growth.
In this context the constraint represented by the limited extent of the market has to be
taken into account (Saraceno 1978a, 1970; Varaldo, 1993). It is in fact obvious that the
market must be large enough to enable the growth of a sufficient number of competitive
firms, otherwise the local market risks being monopolized. The limited extent of the
market can therefore prevent the growth of firms with dimensions and organizations able
to sustain the modernization of the productive system and can therefore be a risk factor
that generates monopoly inefficiencies.
There is thus a potential conflict which can be avoided only if one accepts the risk of
opening markets and is able to sell a large part of production abroad. Hence Saraceno
shares the same pragmatic europeism as those who contributed to the opening of the
Italian market in the 1950s, a concrete europeism in which trade opening is considered
essential for the modernization of the large industry and, with it, of the whole productive
system of the country.
The role of the state in the economy is thus a non-ideological but a concrete and
pragmatic element of the ways to project the principles of organization defined at firm
or country level. Saracenos approach has nothing to do with Soviet planning or with
the French holistic approaches. It is a projection at the country level of the large firms
necessity to avoid improvisation.
Saraceno offers a synthesis or, better, a conceptual map, of his thought in the introduction
to the last edition of La produzione industriale (Industrial Production, 1978a). Starting from
the relationship between scientific research and industrial progress, Saraceno addresses
the theme of the link between technical progress and models of development recalling a
reflection that, among others, Paolo Sylos Labini brought to the Italian debate through
numerous publications. The more important is technical progress, the more the gap
expressed in terms of technical, entrepreneurial and financial resources increases and,
therefore, the role of a state action to promote development becomes essential. Saraceno
thus does not suggest that protecting or guaranteeing the economy is the general solution
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to the development of backward areas but he emphasizes the need to put the problem
of capital formation at the centre of attention in order to initiate and maintain the
development process, being aware that the instruments of such action vary according to
the historical context and are necessarily more articulated when the technical gap across
countries reaches a certain level.
Saraceno inspired a number of scholars who dealt with policy for southern Italy, public
enterprise in Rome and business management in Venice. In Rome, Saraceno founded
SVIMEZ (Association for the Development of the South) in 1946, as a centre for research
and debate on the development of southern regions. For a long time SVIMEZ has had
a school of development that is a reference point for all those who studied problems
of delayed development and industrial dynamics in Italy. Entire generations of young
industrial economists, scholars of development and a political class have been trained
there (Zoppi, 2002).
Saraceno has also educated a large number of scholars in the area of industrial technique,
first in Milan and then in Venice. One such is Sergio Vacc, who has worked at the Bocconi
University and has been director of both the journal Economia e Politica Industriale and
the Institute for the Economics of Energy Resurces (Istituto di Economia delle Fonti di
Energia, IEFE), two essential elements of industrial economics in Milan. In Venice, that
tradition of studies on the industrial firm was developed by a large number of scholars,
including Maurizio Rispoli, who also became the rector of Ca Foscari, the University
of Venice.
FRANCO MOMIGLIANO, GIORGIO FU AND ADRIANO

OLIVETTI
In the years following the Second World War the intellectual importance of Saraceno
persuaded many scholars to choose the study of industrial problems, namely of backward
regions and of the creation of an industrial structure based on large firms, for which the
role of the public firm is essential in a country where capital is scarce. In the same period,
new groups of scholars were formed, specializing in the study of alternative modes of
development in the country. In particular, two research centres both created by two
important large Italian firms played a key role in this respect. First, the public gas
company ENI directed by Enrico Mattei founded a research centre that became very
dynamic, focusing on problems of energy sources, the new industries and so on. Second,
the other cultural pole of research on new industry and on industrial research was the
Movimento Comunit of Adriano Olivetti. Olivetti sustained the development of the most
innovative Italian firm, generating a whole new culture that he transmitted to generations
of managers and scholars.
Olivetti was based in Turin, a city which has been the real industrial capital of the
country since the end of the nineteenth century. Besides the presence of large firms like Fiat
and Olivetti, Turin has been a centre of technical culture and simultaneously a privileged
crossroads of various cultures, due to the arrival of managers (often of Calvinist tradition)
from France and Switzerland. Thus, Turin became a centre of Protestant culture in Italy
that co-existed with a strong Valdese community and a strong and rich Jewish community.
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The political culture was also lively and, after stagnation during fascism, flourished again
after the war (Rugafiori, 1999).
This is the context in which Franco Momigliano was trained. He was born in Turin in
1916. He obtained a university degree in 1938 but could not start a university career due
to the fascist racial discrimination against Jews. After the war he vigorously launched
into the subject of reconstruction, working in Olivettis economic research and planning
office which he directed for many years. Meanwhile, he became increasingly involved at
the University of Turin. He published numerous studies on the role of trade unions in the
transformation of the industrial system, on economic planning and on the role of large
firms in the economy (Momigliano, 1962, 1966). In 1975 he published Economia industriale
e teoria dellimpresa (Industrial Economics and Theory of the Firm), which was the first
Italian textbook on industrial economics.
Turin also hosted the School of Management directed by Ferres Pacces from which the
CERIS, that is, the research centre on industrial economics of the CNR (National Council
of Research) originates. Some members of this research centre have played an important
role in the government of the country, after brilliant academic careers: for instance, Enrico
Filippi (then President of the Insurance Control Authority), Giovanni Zanetti (Undersecretary of Industry in the late 1990s) and GianMaria GrosPietro (President of the IRI
until the complete privatization of the publicly owned enterprise group, then President
of ENI).
Giorgio Fu has also been closely linked to Olivetti. In Ancona he created a School of
Management that has been a reference for decades: the ISTAO, dedicated to Olivetti. Fu
was born in Ancona in 1919 and has devoted his exceptional qualities of researcher to the
problems of development, first focusing on the relationship between productive capacity
and unemployment and then to the problem of delayed development in Europe (1976,
1985). A school of studies on the development of small enterprises has also originated
from his work.
Momigliano and Fu thus represent the two extremes of the reflection on industrial
economics in the 1950s: both had a strong link with the most intellectual Italian
entrepreneurs and both shared the view that industrial economics should primarily be
applied and thus able to train managers. For Momigliano, the focus was on large firms,
agreeing with Saraceno on this point, while for Fu the focus should be on local small
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), since he was convinced that development could
be initiated by the creation of new firms in the Italian periphery, thereby promoting a
different development model.
ECONOMIC PLANNING AND THE ROLE OF PAOLO SYLOS

LABINI AND FEDERICO CAFF
While the IRI research centre located in Rome was in the 1950s the reference point of the
vast school headed by Pasquale Saraceno, the ENI research centre gathered a group of
very young scholars, back in Italy after a period of study abroad. The ENI directed by
Enrico Mattei represented a new public firm that claimed to be opposed to traditional
private industry in a context of intensification of international competition in the new
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sectors of oil and energy. It was not only an economic rival of other private firms in the
market, but also a political rival, especially of American firms.
The debate on development left the research centres and entered the political arena in the
1960s. The main theme was economic planning, which would be necessary to guarantee a
balanced development of the Italian economy. All the important economists of the time,
Saraceno, Andreatta, Momigliano, Fu and so on took part in the debate. They were all
involved in the Scientific Committee of the Inter-Ministerial Commission for Economic
Planning (Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica, CIPE).
In such a fertile Roman context, Paolo Sylos Labini emerged as a key economist. He was
born in 1920, was a student of Alberto Breglia and he also studied in the United States
with Joseph Schumpeter. In 1957 he published Oligopolio e progresso tecnico (Oligopoly
and Technical Progress), in which he showed how the technological discontinuities
between small, medium and large firms determine various possible market configurations.
Commenting on the study of Sylos Labini and on the contemporary study of Joe Bain
on entry barriers, Franco Modigliani in 1958 published his famous study on oligopoly, in
which he related market dynamics to industrial configurations.
Sylos Labini contributed substantially to the development of economics in Italy,
proposing research on economic development problems and the social dynamics involved,
and acting as an intellectual stimulus in a country where strong political and social conflict
was taking place. Sylos Labini trained entire generations of economists on the problems
of oligopoly and innovation, maintaining a role of theorist and of a scholar of political
phenomena.
In the meantime, the economic policy school of Federico Caff was consolidating.
Caff was born in 1914 in Pescara, worked at the Bank of Italy and became Professor
of Economic Policy at the Faculty of Economics and Commerce of Rome in 1955. He
undertook a rigorous analysis of the presence of the state in the economy, concentrating
also on the specific problems of the development of backward regions (1966). This school
was not directly connected to the new discipline of industrial economics and policy but
played an important role in fixing the elements of the Italian debate by highlighting the
problems of a backward economy that experienced an extraordinary economic boom in
the 1960s together with a long period of social conflict.
THE STUDIES ON INDUSTRIAL DISTRICTS AND THE

DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS
Giacomo Becattini is another scholar who has had a strong influence on the development
of industrial economics in Italy, becoming famous for his theoretical studies of Alfred
Marshall. From these studies, Becattini elaborated a very innovative view on industrial
dynamics in advanced economies, proposing as a reference parameter not the industry but
the territory, and in particular the territory characterized by the concentration of small
firms that collaborate in the same productive cycle. Using Marshalls terminology, in 1961
Becattini had already proposed a revision of the concept of industry and later reached a
complete conceptualization of the industrial district (1990).
A parallel contribution to the new industrial reality came from Sebastiano Brusco who
published an article in the Cambridge Journal of Economics in 1982 in which he reported
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an analysis of the industrial structure in the Emilia-Romagna region that later became
paradigmatic for numerous studies on SMEs. The reality of SMEs had to be found using
instruments of both economic and sociological analysis, given that the process of deverticalization that characterized the Italian economy implied the development of a new
organizational model in which the highly coherent social context guaranteed the social
control that the large firm could not ensure.
From the studies of Prodi, Brusco, Becattini and Fu, the most original Italian line of
research in industrial economics arose during the 1980s and 1990s: namely the research on
industrial districts and small firms, which also influenced both the analysis of backward
countries and the industrial policies proposed by international institutions in developing
countries.
The interest for the new model of industrial organization based on territorial diffusion of
productive activities grew within a dynamic economic context. The period following the oil
crisis experienced a dramatic social and political conflict, exacerbated by an unprecedented
occurrence of terrorist attacks on the state. Following the example of Fiat, larger firms
adopted a downsizing strategy. Employment in the largest companies halved in the 1980s,
from 1,500,000 to 700,000 units. In the meantime, new forms of industrial organization
developed rapidly, far away from the traditional industrial triangle.
The focus on SMEs induced a more complex analysis of industrial organization, where
the compact vertically integrated model of large firms was destructured in a variety of
network of productive and commercial relations, which could adapt more easily to an
uncertain and changing demand (Lane, 2002; Quadrio Curzio and Fortis, 2002).
Early studies on industrial districts explored processes of subcontracting in the
mechanical factories of the Milan area (Brusco, 1975). Then a wide variety of research,
promoted by trade unions, municipalities, trade associations and national government
exposed the complexity of the patterns defining an industrial district: Prodi (1966) had
already analysed the rapid growth of small firms when they work in a territorial system,
favouring individual specialization and collective complementarities.
In any case the decline of the largest companies was balanced by a booming growth of
the small firms organized in industrial districts, producing traditional, high valued products,
sold in international markets. This model, called Made in Italy offered a successful path
to the country, especially after the devaluation of the lira of 1992, but also showed its
historic weakness in high-tech sectors and innovation processes based on university research
(Barca, 1997).
A new wave of studies deeply analysed this process of social and economic transformation. Recent developments of Italian industrial economics are realized by various
scholars and numerous students of the older masters, with particular emphasis on some
lines of research, such as technological innovation (Antonelli, Dosi, Orsenigo, Malerba),
the organization of the large firm (Pontarollo, Alzona, Gros Pietro, Zanetti, Frigero), the
analysis of industrial systems of SMEs (Balloni, Mariti, Santarelli), emerging industrial
organization in southern regions (A. Del Monte, Raffa), industrial policy in open economies
(Gobbo, Silva, Prosperetti, Ranci, P. Bianchi), the various paths of internationalization
of the Italian economy (Onida, Viesti), and the role of energy in industrial organization
(Cl, Vacc).
Several young scholars were involved in the new course of the Italian economy. In the
early 1990s a massive process of privatization of the public banks (which accounted at
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that time for almost 95 per cent of total savings deposits) started and, from the mid-1990s
(with Romano Prodi as Prime Minister, and Carlo Azeglio Ciampi as Minister of Treasury)
the complete privatization of the IRI (with GianMaria Gros Pietro, as chairman) was
completed.
These privatizations the largest in Europe during the 1990s give a new shape to
Italian industry: new leaders emerged from the districts, and through these privatizations
acquired an important position in the national economy. The most interesting case is
Luciano Benetton, who in the late 1960s started to organize the textile production in the
emerging industrial districts in the northeast; he achieved tremendous success, introducing
an innovative model of industrial and distribution organization for high-fashion garments,
but he invested massively in privatized companies before finally achieving control of Societ
Autostrade, the IRI company controlling the Italian motorway network.
Traditional leaders faced dramatic crises, several disappeared, and some repositioned
through this privatization and liberalization movement. Pirelli, the traditional tyre producer,
acquired the control of Telecom Italia, the past monopolist in the telecommunication
sector, and formerly owned by the IRI.
New leaders emerged in innovative sectors, thanks to liberalization of public services,
and in some cases, thanks to strict relations with part of the political system, became
directly involved in politics as a result of the emergence of new conflicts of interest; the
most interesting case is Silvio Berlusconi, who became prime minister in 1994 and again
in 2000.
A new set of studies supported this process of industrial reorganization, with an
increasing interest in regulation and antitrust issues and in innovation and technology
topics (Francesco Silva and Michele Grillo, Luigi Prosperetti, Fabio Gobbo).
In the meantime, a large number of young scholars returning from abroad have massively
diffused the new industrial organization paradigm and the theory of game techniques,
increasingly integrating the Italian academy in the international science community. Silva,
president of the Italian Society of Industrial Economics and Policy (SIEPI), founded in
2000, in the first meeting of the association offered a very broad overview of the discipline
in the 1990s (Silva, 2003). His review of recent contributions in industrial economics shows
quite clearly the process of convergence of the new scholars into the wider international
research trends, but also the vitality of the traditional national approach, stressing the
issues related to industrial development and public policy.
Occasions for debating this variety of approaches were not only the publications in
the two above-mentioned journals, but also the annual meeting promoted by the journal
LIndustria that have taken place in various Italian cities since 1976. The annual meeting
of LIndustria has encouraged the discussion of the themes emerging from industry and
also those of the evolution of the discipline, by promoting the new scholars of industrial
economics and policy. Alzona et al. (2003), on behalf of SIEPI, analysed the present
state of the discipline, as taught in the Italian universities. They identify 156 full and
associate professors, lecturers and assistant professors, who offer about 170 courses related
to industrial economics in almost all the Italian universities.
In 1976 the present history of industrial economics and policy in Italy began. La Rivista
di Economia e Politica Industriale (later to merge with LIndustria), the journal founded
by Romano Prodi, promoted the Annual Congress of Industrial Economics and Policy,
providing even today a permanent forum for the national debate on industrial organization
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and industrial policy. The editorial board of the journal, edited after Prodi by Patrizio
Bianchi and finally by Fabio Gobbo, collected scholars such as Giovanni Zanetti, Enrico
Filippi, Gianni Gros Pietro, GianLuigi Alzona, PierCarlo Frigero, Enzo Pontarollo, Paolo
Mariti, Luigi Prosperetti, Pippo Ranci and Alberto Cl. They all played a crucial role not
only in academic life but also serving as ministers, under-secretaries of state, members
of antitrust, regulation and privatization authorities, and chairmen of national agencies
for regional development. The strong character of the Italian school of industrial and
economics policy still remains in the close relations between academic research on structural
change and policy implementation, following a path of ancient debate on the delayed
development of the country until the recent privatization of IRI (2000) and liberalization
of services (2006), both of which occurred under the government of Romano Prodi, prime
minister in 1997 and 2006.
REFERENCES
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universit italiane, LIndustria Rivista di economia e politica industriale, n.s. 24(3), 56180.
Annibaldi, C. and Berta, G. (eds) (1999), Grande impresa e sviluppo italiano- studi per i cento anni
della Fiat, Bologna: Il Mulino.
Avagliano, L. (1998), Alessandro Rossi. Fondare lItalia industriale, Rome: Edizioni Studium.
Baratta, P. (1985), A. Beneduce e la Costituzione e Gestione del CREDIOP e dellICIPU, in Atti
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Barca, F. (1997), Storia del capitalismo italiano dal dopoguerra ad oggi, Rome: Donzelli.
Barucci, P. and Roggi, P. (1986), I cento anni de LIndustria. La politica economica per
laffermazione della cultura industriale in Italia, LIndustria Rivista di economia e politica
industriale, n.s. 7(3), 35580.
Becattini, G. (1961), Il concetto di industria e la teoria del valore, Turin: Boringhieri.
Becattini, G. (1990), The Marshallian industrial district as a socio-economic concept, in F. Pyke,
G. Becattini and W. Sengenberger (eds), Industrial Districts and Inter-form Cooperation in Italy,
Geneva: IILS.
Bianchi, P. (2002a), La rincorsa frenata. Lindustria italiana dalla unit nazionale alla unificazione
europea, Bologna: Il Mulino.
Bianchi, P. (2002b), Saraceno, economista industriale ed economista politico, Rivista economica
del Mezzogiorno, 16(3), 699714.
Brusco, S. (1975), Organizzazione del lavoro e decentramento produttivo nel settore metalmeccanico, in FLM- Bergamo, pp. 787.
Brusco, S. (1982) The Emilian model: productive disintegration and social integration, Cambridge
Journal of Economics, 6(2), 16784.
Caff, F. (1966), Politica economica. Sistematica e tecniche di analisi, Turin: Boringhieri.
Castronovo, V. (1995), Storia Economica dellItalia dallOttocento ai Giorni Nostri, Turin: Einaudi.
FLM- Bergamo (1975), Sindacato e piccola impresa, Bari: De Donato.
Fu, G. (1976), Occupazione e capacit produttive: la realt italiana, Bologna: Il Mulino.
Fu, G. (1985), Problemi dello sviluppo tardivo in Europa, Bologna: Il Mulino.
IRI (1985), Alberto Benedice e i problemi delleconomia italiana del suo tempo, Rome: Edindustria.
IRI (1993), Pasquale Saraceno e gli studi di economia dimpresa, Rome: Edindustria.
Lane, D.A. (2002), Complessit e interazioni locali. Verso una teoria dei distretti industriali, in
Quadrio Curzio and Fortis (eds), pp. 11140.
Modigliani F. (1958), New developments on the oligopoly front, Journal of Political Economy,
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Momigliano F. (1962), Lavoratori e sindacati di fronte alla trasformazione del processo produttivo,
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Prodi, R. (1966), Modello di sviluppo di un settore in rapida crescita, Milan: Angeli.
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Quadrio Curzio, A. and Fortis, M. (eds) (2002), Complessit e distretti industriali. Dinamiche, modelli,
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Saraceno, P. (1985), Lintervento dellIRI per lo smobilizzo delle grandi banche, in Atti della giornata
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21/5/07 12:19:52
7.
The contributions of three English

economists to the development of
Michael A. Utton
INTRODUCTION
For students of industrial economics in the late 1950s there were none of the comprehensive
treatises on the subject that are widespread today. There was, it is true, Alfred Marshalls
Industry and Trade, all 874 pages of it, first published in 1919. For the beginning student,
however, or even for those more senior it was a formidable undertaking to read without
detailed guidance. What students were frequently recommended were P.S. Florences The
Logic of British and American Industry (1953) and E.A.G. Robinsons The Structure of
Competitive Industry (1931) and Monopoly (1941). These works, as we hope to show, were
in many ways complementary and although both authors dwell on the overwhelming
significance of economies of scale and size, in other respects there is remarkably little
overlap. Florence, for example, dealt extensively with types of control and labour relations
in the largest private enterprises, while in his second volume, Robinson discussed many of
the issues concerning the market conduct of dominant enterprises (such as the manipulation
of entry conditions, vertical restraints and localized price cutting) that are still hotly debated
today. A conscientious student of their major works would have derived from them a keen
sense of the importance of good-quality statistics as well as the need to understand and
apply the economic analysis of markets. On the other hand, what a modern student would
probably find surprising is the comparative neglect of oligopoly. The neglect is complete in
the case of Florence whose focus in any case was on the industry rather than the market.
In Robinson there is some reference to the likelihood of near monopoly prices in some
cases of concentrated oligopoly but without giving it the same attention or importance
that Marshall did in Industry and Trade.
ALFRED MARSHALL
Indeed, considering how much of the groundwork for the systematic study of industry
had been laid by Marshall and how great their debt to him was, Robinson and Florence
actually cite him very infrequently. In Monopoly there is one reference to Industry and Trade
while in The Structure of Competitive Industry no direct reference is given, even though
it is clear from the subject matter how much of it was inspired by Marshalls work. In
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Florences major work, although a number of references to Marshall are made (usually
the adoption of a particular phrase or definition) these are nearly all to the Principles.
Only three brief references are made to Industry and Trade.Yet in that book we can find
discussions of practically all of the major themes and issues that have engaged industrial
economists ever since. Although our main concern here is with the work of Florence and
Robinson it is appropriate by way of introduction to give a brief account of the richness
of Marshalls treatment of the field.1
Marshall dealt at considerable length with the sources and extent of economies of scale.
The scope of his discussion was wide and included not only production economies but
economies in the innovation process, raising capital, marketing and product variety. All of
these topics, of course, find a place in modern discussions of the economies of size. The
notion of minimum efficient scale in production often plays a significant role in antitrust
enquiries. Many writers have investigated the importance of large size for innovation. (The
results are summarized in Scherer and Ross, 1990, ch. 17). Prais (1976) gives a wealth of
evidence on the capital-raising benefits enjoyed by large firms compared with smaller ones,
and even economies producing a variety of products (recently re-christened economies
of scope) are discussed by Marshall in Industry and Trade (Marshall, 1921, p. 143). In
view of its later prominence in the assessment of entry barriers, Marshalls discussion of
marketing economies is especially interesting. While noting the enormous savings that can
be made by marketing on a large scale, he regrets the presence of competitive advertisements, most of which waste much of their force in neutralizing the force of rivals (ibid.,
p. 295). Perhaps his most telling observation on this aspect of the firm is that the economies
of size in marketing (broadly interpreted) will frequently exceed by a considerable margin
those in production. The size of the representative firm will thus be driven by the needs of
marketing. This, of course, was one of the central points made by Comanor and Wilson
in their classic analysis of advertising and market structure (Comanor and Wilson, 1974).
Marshalls widespread and first-hand experience of many branches of industry convinced
him of the overwhelming importance of economies of scale and size and, as we show
below, this view also prevails in the writings of Florence and Robinson.
How, then, did this view affect his expectations regarding market structure? Initially
he envisaged a self-correcting mechanism illustrated with his famous analogy of the trees
in the forest:
One tree will last longer in full vigour and attain a greater size than another; but sooner or later
age tells on them all. Though the taller ones have better access to light and air than their rivals
they gradually lose vitality; and one after another they give place to others, which though of less
matured strength, have on their side the vigour of youth. (Marshall, 1920, p. 263)
In the later editions of his Principles, however, and certainly in Industry and Trade he was
more cautious. The development and growth of joint stock companies with their ability
to hire energetic and talented new managers modified the process:
a large joint stock company has special advantages, many of which do not materially dwindle with
age. And even if it be somewhat lacking in energy and initiative, it can utilise new ideas and
appliances that have been created by independent workers: and it has special opportunities for
the introduction of new blood into its management. (Marshall, 1921, p. 316)
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The contributions of three English economists to the development of industrial economics 113
He recognized that such advantages could in some cases lead to monopoly but tended
to underplay the consequences. The very enjoyment of economies of scale and the
decreasing costs that they imply would spur on the monopolist to greater output and this
would mean lower prices than if the same commodity were supplied by a multitude of
smaller enterprises. Costs would also be lower because duplication of effort (especially
in advertising) would be avoided. In addition, a monopolist would also have a stronger
incentive to improve methods and machines because of the greater certainty of reaping the
full reward of its efforts rather than seeing them dissipated among a host of competitors. In
any case Marshall continually emphasized the fragile and conditional nature of all (except
natural) monopolies. They are perpetually under threat from the vigorous new entrant,
the alternative source of supply and the substitute product or material. In recognition of
this contingency, Marshall argued that the monopolist would limit its price not out of
altruism but out of a sensible recognition of its own long-term interests.
Monopolies hold their sway only on condition that, or provided that they do not
put prices much above levels necessary to cover their outlays with normal profits. If they
did, then competition would probably make itself felt; unless stayed by authority, as in the
case with patents, copyrights and some rights of way (ibid., pp. 3978). As later analysis
has shown, of course, how much above the competitive level the limit price may be depends
on the size and extent of the impediments to entry.
Marshall reserved some of his most damning criticism for the types of market behaviour
that may break out in oligopolies, and there are continued references to issues that exercise
modern industrial economists. It is also evident that although Robinson in the second
of the volumes considered below discussed many of the same topics, his tone was much
more moderate. As Reisman points out, Marshalls analysis of competition among the few
centred on two forces which all firms recognized (Reisman, 1986, p. 140): the need to keep
interlopers out by whatever means came to hand; and the need to ensure that the insiders
remained sufficiently satisfied with their rewards that they did not upset the status quo.
On the first point Marshall was convinced that the most malignant features of
unscrupulous competition, which recent research has brought to light, have been in the
pursuit and maintenance of monopolistic control in industries which might otherwise
remain open (Marshall, 1921, p. 180). The main causes of this anti-competitive behaviour
are the large profits that result from the destruction of a competitor and perhaps even more
important the high prestige for business ability (ibid.) which modern analysis of predatory
behaviour interprets as reputation effects: the perceptions of a potential entrant about the
likely profits of a market are adversely affected by the knowledge that a predecessor has
been destroyed by an unscrupulous incumbent. The largest and most savage developments
of destructive competition on record have been incidents in campaigns for crushing
inconvenient competitors by a Juggernaut car of combination striving for monopoly (ibid.,
p. 653). In such a campaign a whole battery of weapons might be employed. Predatory
pricing would be used in a selective way in order to inflict the maximum damage on the
entrant while minimizing the loss of revenue to the incumbent. Prices would be cut locally
where the entrant had appeared but maintained elsewhere (ibid., p. 533). Fighting brands
from bogus independent companies would provide a semblance of genuine competition.
In other markets where non-price forms of competition were more appropriate, excessive
advertising might be employed to blunt the impact of any new competition. Marshall was
also convinced that the need to thwart new entry was regarded as so important that firms
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114
would resort to what would now be called dirty tricks. The examples he gives (ibid.) bear a
depressing resemblance to those admitted recently by a very distinguished British company
(see Carlton and Perloff, 2000, p. 354). Indeed, the whole of his discussion of the strategies
employed by incumbents to deter or inhibit entrants is very reminiscent of the strategic
behaviour literature which flourished in the 1980s. In contrast there was comparatively
little discussion of such concerns in either Florence or Robinson.
In his discussion of the second point, the need to keep insiders happy with their rewards,
Marshall was more circumspect. He was prepared to see a number of advantages in the
cooperation between firms, partly influenced no doubt by the experience of the First
World War which would have been fresh in his mind when he was preparing Industry and
Trade. Cooperation in the collection and dissemination of information about conditions
especially in foreign markets, for example, might well generate economies by enabling
firms to share the possibly large overhead costs involved. Such reasoning lay behind the
exemption of export cartels from the antitrust laws which the US still provides. He also
recognized the possible benefits that could flow from cooperation rather than secrecy in
scientific research (Marshall, 1921, p. 583) which modern antitrust provisions in both the
US and the EU also allow under certain circumstances.
While recognizing these and other benefits that can flow from cooperation he was
also well aware of the negative effects that can result from the too close association
between ostensible rivals. In addition to the well-documented effects of restriction on
entry which helps to sustain monopolistic prices and the inertia which can result from
a more or less guaranteed abnormal return from cartel membership, he also warned of
the dangers from tacit collusion: Such combinations have often been most mischievous
when they have been based on mere implicit understanding, without any explicit and
formal agreement (ibid., p. 280) a problem with which antitrust authorities still have to
grapple. Nevertheless his ultimate verdict on highly concentrated industries and collusive
behaviour was more reassuring. Like Joseph Schumpeter he placed great faith in the
powers of competition from substitutes and innovation. After all, as we have seen, even
monopolies are impermanent.
Marshalls canvas was very broad, and like all great masters he has influenced directly
and indirectly those who came after him and who often chose a narrower conception of
the field of industrial economics. As two of his disciples both Florence and Robinson, in
their different ways, conveyed to the reader the complexity and importance of the issues
that he had raised and thus helped to ensure their further development.
PHILIP SARGANT FLORENCE

The culmination of Florences work in industrial economics was The Logic of British and
American Industry first published in 1953, with a revised edition in 1961. The book was
a development of his earlier Logic of Industrial Organisation (1933). His interests ranged
over a much wider field than is suggested by these works and he was keen to draw on
political science, sociology and management science whenever he thought the insights of
these disciplines aided our understanding of the structure and development of industry.2
The central purpose of the book, as the title suggests, was to trace the logic that underlies
changes and differences in the size of plants and firms and other industry characteristics
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(Florence, 1961a, p. vi). A particular strength was the extensive use of comparative data
for the US and Britain. In this respect, as well as many others mentioned below, Florence
was a pioneer. Subsequent writers have made more ambitious attempts at international
comparisons but all have had to contend with the vagaries of the different authorities
responsible for tabulating census returns.
Florences methodology was to use theory as a working hypothesis with attempts
at inductive statistical generalisation based on the observed facts of the situation as a
whole (ibid., p. 349). The observed facts were taken largely from the (British) Census of
Production and the (US) Census of Manufactures. He expressed surprise that it should
have taken economists so long to analyse industry in a systematic fashion given its central
importance and, as he said, the firm foundation laid by Marshalls Industry and Trade,
J.A. Hobsons The Evolution of Modern Capitalism (1894), A.A. Berle and G.C. Meanss
The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932) and Robinsons The Structure of
Competitive Industry (1931). His explanation for this tardiness was that economists trained
in abstract deduction found it difficult to grapple with the real world problems and analysis
based on measurement of the facts and on the behaviour and motives of actual persons
(ibid., p. xii).
A major conclusion from the data on US and British plant and firm-size distributions,
discussed in the first two sections of his 1953 book and indeed in contributions made to
the Economic Journal and the Statistical Journal, was the enormous efficiency gains that
could be made in many branches of industry by operating on a large scale. At the plant
level the principles of bulk transactions, massed reserves and multiples were used to explain
this phenomenon and, of course, similar explanations can be found in modern treatises
on industrial economics.3 At the firm or organization level, Florence made much of the
recent advances in scientific management which allowed for the seemingly unlimited growth
of firms: Most of those who have made a special study of organisation come to the
conclusion that no limit is set to the size of organisation, if correct principles are adopted
to enable the single leader to delegate control (ibid., p. 142). He contrasts this conclusion
with that of the economists, citing E.A.G. Robinson and Nicholas Kaldor in particular,
who saw limits to the coordinating ability of the management as the factor setting an
upper limit to the growth of firms. If there was no definite limit to the size of firms there
could not be, of course, a competitive equilibrium. There are clearly echoes here of the
famous controversy that had surfaced in the inter-war period over the laws of returns.4
In contrast, Florence argued that their conclusion was not based on actual experience of
business. To reinforce his point he refers to top decision making by government ministers
or army generals, where the organization involved was frequently much larger than that
of even the largest business enterprise.
He was convinced that the powerful forces making for economies of scale were far from
being fully realized in many industries. A major factor preventing their attainment was the
vagaries of consumer preferences. It is probably his treatment of consumer demand that
the modern reader would find most idiosyncratic. Consumers desires for variety and new
versions of established products often forced manufacturers to produce on a scale that was
technically inefficient. If consumers could be persuaded to narrow their demands to a
smaller range of products with less frequent modifications, this would improve production
planning and allow producers to achieve greater economies, resulting in lower costs from
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116
which consumers would benefit. As a result, believed Florence, a more logical match
between production and consumption could be achieved.
Even as a student in the late 1950s the present author felt a little uneasy at the apparent
contradiction that lay at the heart of sections II and III of Florences treatise. Florence
not only felt that consumers inhibited producers from realizing the full extent of scale
economies by their thirst for increased product variety but he also believed, along with
J.K. Galbraith whose American Capitalism (1952) was published not long after, that much
consumer demand was artificially created by the wiles of advertising agents:
Consumers react to emotional appeals and sentimental clap-trap, and are influenced by telling
posters with bright colours and snappy wise-cracks, and are gulled by half truths flashily presented
The demand is artificial in the sense that it is built upon high pressure advertising copy that
has little relation to the real qualities of the product. (Florence, 1961a, p. 119)
Since producers (of final consumer products) were thus responsible for stimulating
consumer taste for greater product variety, presumably producers were also ultimately
to blame for the non-achievement of all technically possible scale economies. Florence
looked forward to the time when the modern spirit of scepticism, coupled with wider
education would ensure that consumers made more logical choices on the basis of quality
and cheapness. Ironically he believed that advertising could be used in this process to
stimulate the consumer to demand the article which by large scale methods is the most
efficiently produced, and gradually to get trade into fewer hands, thus enabling each to
produce on an ever larger scale (p. 120). Given the very large number of firms then in
existence, he did not expect this desirable process to end in monopoly.
Although he envisaged that the trend may result in a number of industries having only
a few firms, there is practically no mention of oligopoly and certainly no analysis of the
competitive process in oligopoly. In fact the term competition is used for the first time
on page 116 and then merely en passant. A modern reader is bound to be struck by the
continued reference to industries and an almost complete absence of any use of the
concept of a market. The focus on industries flows naturally from his use of census data to
describe and compare manufacturing in Britain and the US. Relating such information to
market structure was left to later authors such as Evely and Little who in their imaginative
use of similar data in Concentration in British Industry (1960) presented a comprehensive
analysis of markets in Britain which formed the basis for much later work in the market
structureconductperformance tradition. Kaysen and Turner had published a similar
analysis for the US in the previous year (1959).
With the benefit of hindsight we catch tantalizing glimpses of concepts and ideas which
were being or would be developed by later researchers. One example in Florences discussion
of efficiency measurement is his reference to survival. A distribution of the sizes of plants
existing at any one time in various industries is a review of the survivors and of growth;
and this process of growth in sizes (or decline) was directly traced for American industries
between 1909 and 1939 and for British industries between 1935 and 1948 (Florence,
1961a, p. 53). This idea was, of course, to be developed much more fully by Stigler (1958)
and other writers in the 1960s and 1970s when the survivor technique was widely used to
estimate economies of scale.
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Other examples occur in his discussion of integration both vertical and conglomerate
(or lateral to use his preferred term). Having earlier taken theoretical economists to
task for an over-reliance on the simplifying assumption of the single-product firm, he
argues that integration depends largely on three factors: common costs; technical factors
particularly in distribution; and risk and uncertainty (Florence, 1961a, p. 74). There is
much in the subsequent discussion that a modern reader of Baumol et als (1982) analysis
of economies of scope would find familiar. Similarly in his references to management
extending product lines and seeking out all means to ensure that productive factors are
all used to capacity rather than allowed to remain partially idle, one is reminded of the
subsequent development of this (and many other) ideas by Penrose in her The Theory of
the Growth of the Firm (1959).
In his central work (Florence, 1961a) although he spends a great deal of time discussing
the factors making for economies of large-scale operation as well as the importance of a
scientific approach to internal organization and control, in contrast with modern treatments
of industrial economics, he had little to say about price determination. A large part of the
explanation for this was his intention to set out a factual comparison of industrial structures
of the two countries. However, it was also a reflection of his focus on industries (essentially
firms having similar technologies and using similar methods) rather than markets. Thus,
whereas a modern treatment will spend much time analysing price determination in, say,
oligopolistic or dominant firm market structures, he made scarcely any mention of how
prices emerge from the competitive process. One of the few references is to the full-cost
principle and then only in passing:
Though decisions on prices involving real thought may be made in a crisis, prices may normally
be determined by a fixed rule as to the margin to be charged above average costs a ritual with
priestly and lay codes (strict and less strict) discussed by English economists as alternatives to
profit maximisation. (ibid., p. 148)
At this point he cites P.W.S. Andrews whose Manufacturing Business was published in 1949 at
the height of the controversy over costplus pricing and the principle of profit maximizing.5
Perhaps rather surprising in view of his lack of emphasis on price determination and
market structure, is his (albeit casual) reference to the theory of games, in the early 1950s
still in its relative infancy. Having noted that large firms had been extending their scope
through internal growth and acquisition, he conjectures that:
The colourful model of two (or a few) large scale strategists playing a game (like red versus white
chessmen) is now challenging the (greyly) imperfect competition model which a decade or so
ago, displaced the two alternative models of (black) monopoly or (white) perfect competition
between numerous suppliers. (Florence, 1961a, p. 126, footnote reference to von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944) omitted)
The scope of Florences work was both broader and narrower than modern students
would expect. Thus Chapter V of The Logic contains an extensive discussion of the role
of the shareholder in the large firm and what would now be termed issues of corporate
governance. These were questions more fully explored in his 1961b study of Ownership,
Control and Success of Large Corporations. Today texts on industrial organization may
make passing reference to these topics, especially when dealing with mergers, but detailed
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118
treatments tend to be left to more managerially oriented works such as Milgrom and
Robertss Economics, Organization and Management. On the other hand, although
Florence devotes a lengthy chapter to the government and control of nationalized and
cooperative enterprises, there is no treatment of antitrust policy, except to note that it
was more developed in the US than in Britain. Although this was true, the omission is
surprising because by the time of the revised edition of The Logic in 1961 there had been
a large number of detailed reports by the British Monopolies and Restrictive Practices
Commission, as well as the establishment of a special branch of the High Court to hear
cases against restrictive practices. Economists were quick to realize that these reports
and proceedings provided an additional rich source of material on market conduct and
performance. There is no reference to it, however, in Florences work.
Perhaps because the formative time of his career was in the inter-war period, dominated
by widespread unemployment in the 1930s and then by the planning required by the war
economy, he did not consider monopoly a problem. Indeed, he concluded that Monopoly
obtained by combination has attractions (p. 340) not least because it would allow the
full exploitation of technical economies. His emphasis on the potential efficiency of large
organizations and the consequent need for planning within them, leads him to a conclusion
which Galbraith was to develop in his New Industrial State (1967) and the concept of the
technostructure. Thus Florence concludes:
The trend towards greater mechanisation and larger plants and firms requires the attention to
be shifted from the higgling of the market to the policy (particularly the investment policy) of
large firms and their internal organisation. Investment implies, in logic and fact, more fixed costs,
and planning to meet trade fluctuations, with an increase in staff, office workers and middle
management. (1961a, p. 341)
EDWARD AUSTIN GOSSAGE ROBINSON

How does this atheoretical, highly fact-based approach, compare to that of his slightly
younger contemporary who apart from a brief absence during and immediately after the
Second World War, remained in Cambridge throughout his career?
Robinson and Florence had had a lively exchange in the pages of the Economic Journal
in the 1930s.6 Students of industrial organization, however, would have had their first
contact with Robinsons work in two monographs he wrote for the renowned Cambridge
Economic Handbooks series, The Structure of Competitive Industry (first published in 1931)
and Monopoly (1941). Both can still be read with profit today but the first has the greater
resonance. A large part of the Monopoly volume consists of a review of the competition
laws in the US, Britain and Germany, and is necessarily dated. The central focus of The
Structure of Competitive Industry (hereafter SCI) is a detailed analysis of the factors
determining the optimum size of firm. Robinsons method is in the Marshallian tradition,
with many illustrations from British and American firms and industries. Compared with
Florence he made little, if any, use of the kind of data collected in the Census of Production
or Manufactures.
His discussion of the five forces which determine the best size of the business firm
technical, managerial, financial, marketing, and risk and fluctuation remains a classic
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and is still frequently cited in modern treatments (for example, Tirole, 1988 and Scherer and
Ross, 1990). The factors underlying technical economies of scale, the fact that the different
forces will frequently have quite different impacts on the optimum size of the entire unit,
and in particular, the recognition that economies of scale in marketing may play a central
role in overall size, all had an important bearing on much subsequent empirical work.
He agreed with Florence (although in rather less colourful language) that while some
advertising was desirable in very many cases it is purely wasteful (SCI, p. 63). More
significantly, in his later volume he recognized that goodwill frequently built up by
effective sales talk and the pressure of advertisement yields in some cases a monopoly
power that is far from negligible, and the great expense of competitive advertising can be
used by a large concern as a very effective weapon in preventing the growth or expansion
of small companies (Monopoly, p. 44). This insight anticipates the classic study by Bain
on Barriers to New Competition (1956). From his detailed case studies, Bain concluded
that product differentiation (in which advertising plays an important part) was the most
significant source of high entry barriers, greater that is, than economies of scale or absolute
cost advantages (ibid., p. 216). Robinson underlines the importance of the selling part
of the organization by arguing that the economies of scale in this function will tend to
determine the lower limit to the size of the optimum firm. In contrast, without attempting
an empirical analysis he was nevertheless confident that technical economies, with a few
notable exceptions, were not determinative of overall size: the technical optimum, though
it establishes a minimum scale of efficient operation, contributes hardly at all to the fixing
of a maximum point beyond which growth will lead to progressively increasing output
(SCI, pp. 323). In this regard, too, he anticipates much later work in the 1960s and 1970s
which attempted to determine the extent of production economies, as opposed to other
economies of size (Goldschmid et al., 1974; Scherer and Ross, 1990). The context then,
as when Robinson was writing, was how far market concentration needed to proceed to
ensure the achievement of all productive economies of scale. While Europeans tended to
believe that the state needed to do all it could to encourage firm growth (through merger,
for example) to compete with their larger US competitors, the Americans were growing
increasingly concerned that market concentration had gone beyond what was necessary to
achieve all available economies and that some downward correction was necessary.
Both Robinson and Florence were convinced, however, that when all factors, not just
technical ones, were taken into account, the overall advantages of size were very great and
that further substantial savings in resources were to be made by concentrating production
(in the UK) into fewer, much larger units. Robinson acknowledges, by citing Florences work
and that of others, that British firms were on average no smaller when measured in terms
of manpower employed, than American firms. UK firms, however, were more diversified
than their US counterparts and hence sacrificed economies. Robinsons explanation for
this difference was in terms of the character of the US market: the willingness of the
American consumer to accept standardisation, and in the determination and power of the
American producer and retailer to coerce him [sic] by sales pressure than in the straight
and simple economies of mere size of the market (SCI, p. 117).
In his chapter entitled Intervention to improve efficiency, Robinson sets out the central
point very clearly: it is hoped, by a scheme of rationalisation, to concentrate production
in those works which are best equipped to undertake it, and to close down the less efficient
plants. By operating the surviving plants at full capacity, it is hoped to secure economies
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120
and reduce costs and prices (ibid., p. 148). Undoubtedly a large part of this optimistic
expectation arises, as in the case of Florence, from having seen the disastrous effects of
the Great Depression especially on the old staple industries of textiles, coal, steel and
shipbuilding. Painstaking empirical work carried out shortly after the Second World War
by Rostas (1948) showed the enormous gap in productivity between many US and British
industries. The same point about comparatively low British productivity has been made at
regular intervals ever since, right up to the present. The current UK government remains
as concerned as its predecessors about a productivity gap which resists correction by even
the most imaginative policy measures.
We mentioned above the importance Robinson attached to what he termed goodwill,
created in large part by advertising, in his discussion of entry barriers in Monopoly. In
fact throughout this volume there are many references to issues that have concerned later
writers. He has an extensive discussion of the four main factors making entry difficult (legal
prohibition, control of factors of production, goodwill and scale economies) including a
reference to what would now be called raising rivals costs: To raise wages to a level that
can only be paid by a large and efficient organisation may, moreover, make the invasions
of smaller men doubly difficult (Monopoly, p. 171). In a chapter devoted to devices for
establishing or prolonging monopolies he argued that on close analysis the majority of
these devices will be found to be methods of preventing or impeding the entry of new
firms into the industry concerned by making the minimum scale of possible or effective
competition larger than it would otherwise have been (p. 63). He placed particular emphasis
on the effects of vertical integration where his discussion anticipates many of the issues still
aired in the literature, especially his conclusion that the power to prevent the distribution
of a product through the ordinary channels of the trade is likely to be a most effective
limitation to new entry (p. 66). Empirical support for this proposition has recently been
found among studies highlighting the main variables incumbent firms may use to maintain
their position (Smiley, 1988; Singh et al. 1998).
His interpretation of monopoly was broad and encompassed not only the singlefirm case (including natural monopoly) but also collusive agreements and concentrated
oligopoly. In common with Chamberlin (1932) he expected that markets with few firms
may well be able to arrive at a non-collusive equilibrium close to the monopoly level.
Having discussed the problem of price competition in oligopolies (without actually using
the term) he concludes:
[M]onopoly price is fully as much a consequence of the attitude of a small number of firms to
each other, of the assumptions that they make regarding each other, as of formal or informal
agreements. We cannot assume that where there is no agreement, even of a tacit nature, competition
exists. It all depends upon what one manufacturer thinks another manufacturer is going to do.
(Monopoly, p. 29)
He follows this immediately with a passage that the officials of the European Commission
might wish they had read before embarking on the notorious Woodpulp case:7 It follows,
therefore, that what we call the detective story approach to the study of monopoly, the
search for mysterious hidden agreements, is really a waste of time. Their existence may
prove something, their non-existence proves nothing (ibid., p. 30).
He also had a lesson for those writers who in the recent extensive debate about predatory
pricing argued that it was irrational for a dominant firm to employ such a tactic because,
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given their extensive market share, they would suffer heavier losses than an entrant.
Consequently they would refrain from predatory pricing (Bork, 1978; McGee, 1980). He
makes the obvious (to most observers) point that:
[T]he smaller firm is unlikely to be competing with equal intensity throughout the whole area
of the market, or throughout the whole range of products of the larger [firm]. A drastic cut of
price by the larger firm in some small part of the territory will thus greatly injure the smaller
competitor, while leaving the larger able to earn monopoly profits elsewhere. (Monopoly, p. 74,
emphasis added)
He illustrates this point with various examples from Britain and the US where the dominant
firm used a fighting brand as the vehicle for its strategy. In the UK early reports by the
newly established Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission provided further
examples in the 1950s.8
At the time Robinson was working on Monopoly the famous article on the same subject
was published by Hicks with its widely quoted conclusion that: The best of all monopoly
profits is a quiet life (Hicks, 1935, p. 8). Robinson elaborates the same point and thus
anticipates by some 25 years or so the concept of X-inefficiency which has now become
part of the mainstream of industrial organization:
For the comparatively greater ease with which profits may be earned [by a monopolist] may lull
a management into the torpor of routine, or provide insufficient spur to the achievement of the
highest efficiency Not a few monopolies would appear to reap their monopoly gains not in
the form of exceptional profits, but in a laxity of organisation and a conservation in technique.
(Monopoly, p. 129)
However, he does not give any illustrations of this point or direct the reader to those
monopolies where such laxity may be found. Florence does not refer to this idea, perhaps
because he was aware that it would be very difficult to demonstrate empirically.
Both writers, as we have indicated, were convinced of the substantial economies of size
still to be realized by British industry. Largely for this reason, Robinson in particular was
generally in favour of consolidations or mergers. He quotes with approval US data which
showed that industrial consolidations have not impeded technical progress. On the other
hand they have been amongst the foremost leaders in experimenting with and introducing
time-saving methods of production (ibid., p. 105). Furthermore, contrary to earlier beliefs,
consolidations had been more successful, on average, than the general run of firms.
Confidence in the extent of untapped economies of size plus the experience of interwar depression influenced Robinsons conclusions about the significance of competition
or antitrust policy. While he was certainly in favour of the control of restrictive practices
either by a single firm or a colluding group (although he was sceptical of the suitability of
courts for such proceedings) he was doubtful about structural remedies: If we discover a
condition of monopoly it is highly unlikely that we can with any certainty re-establish a
condition of competition merely by breaking up that monopoly into a few constituent parts
(ibid., p. 30). Furthermore, because of the distinctive form of competition in concentrated
oligopoly and the likelihood that price may often approximate the monopoly level, breaking
up oligopolists will also fail to restore competition: where willing co-operators have been
turned by law into unwilling competitors, such harmony of policy as would produce this
result [that is, a monopoly price] would not be improbable. It is thus extremely uncertain
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whether the policy of disintegration can in any case achieve the intended result (ibid.,
p. 180). With a few spectacular exceptions (for example, AT&T in the early 1980s) antitrust
authorities, even in the US, have been reluctant to order the dismemberment of their largest
(and highly successful concerns). Although the lower court proposed such a remedy in the
Microsoft case, it was rejected by the Court of Appeal.
A student of the work of Florence and Robinson was bound to be struck by their
different approaches. Florence examines a multitude of propositions about industrial
structure strictly in the light of the facts available for the US and the UK. In his attempt
to understand and explain, he was prepared to draw freely on the related disciplines of
economics, sociology and management science. In contrast, Robinson closely following the
example of Marshall, derives his conclusions about the structure of competitive industry
and monopoly from the application of economic analysis but with numerous short case
studies drawn largely from British experience.
While both achieved their stated objectives and stimulated much later work, neither
provided an overarching framework within which subsequent students could place the many
strands of their work. The first tentative steps in this direction were already being taken by
Clark (1940) and Mason (1937 [1957]) leading to the development of the market structure
conductperformance framework and the empirical studies of the 1960s and 1970s.
NOTES
1. Much more detailed discussions can be found in Andreano (1965), Gonce (1982) and Reisman (1986).
2. An indication of the breadth of his interests is given by the titles of his major works: Economics of Fatigue
and Unrest (1924), Overpopulation, Theory and Statistics (1926), Economics and Human Behaviour (1927),
Sociology and Sin (1929), Statistical Methods in Economics and Political Science (1929), Investment, Location
and Size of Plant (1948), Labour (1949) and Ownership, Control and Success of Large Corporations (1961).
3. Most extensively in Scherer and Ross (1990).
4. The contrasting contributions from J.H. Clapham, A.C. Pigou and D.H. Robertson were brought together
in G.J. Stigler and K.E. Boulding (eds), Readings in Price Theory (1953).
5. A survey of the controversy is given in R.B. Heflebower (1955), Full costs, cost changes and prices, in
National Bureau of Economic Research, Business Concentration and Price Policy, Princeton University,
Princeton, NJ.
6. Robinsons paper in the Economic Journal for 1934 was entitled The problem of management and the size
of firms. Florences reply appeared later in the same year.
7. The Commission found that a large number of companies from several countries had operated a concerted
practice in woodpulp markets. However, the Court allowed the companies appeal on the ground that the
facts of the case could sustain a quite different interpretation. The case is discussed in Van Gerven and Varona
(1994).
8. A review of these cases is given in Utton (1979, ch. 5).
REFERENCES
Andreano, R.L (1965), Alfred Marshalls Industry and Trade: a neglected classic in economic history,
in Andreano, R.L. (ed.) New Views on American Economic Development, Shenkman, Cambridge,
MA.
Andrews, P.W.S. (1949), Manufacturing Business, Macmillan, London.
Bain, J.S. (1956), Barriers to New Competition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Baumol, W.J., Panzar, J.C. and Willig, R. (1982), Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry
Structure, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York.
Berle, A.A. and Means, G. (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Macmillan, New
York.
21/5/07 12:19:21
Bork, R.H. (1978), The Antitrust Paradox, Basic Books, New York.
Carlton, D.W. and Perloff, S.M. (2000), Modern Industrial Organization, 3rd edn, Addison-Wesley,
Reading MA.
Chamberlin, E.H. (1932), The Theory of Monopolistic Competition: A Re-orientation of the Theory
of Value, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
Clark, J.M. (1940), Toward a concept of workable competition, American Economic Review, 30,
pp. 24150.
Comanor, W.S. and Wilson, T.A. (1974), Advertising and Market Power, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Evely, R. and Little, I.M.D (1960), Concentration in British Industry, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Florence, P.S. (19521, 1961a2, 19713), The Logic of British and American Industry: A Realistic Analysis
of Economic Structure and Government, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London.
Florence, P.S. (1961b), Ownership, Control and Success of Large Companies, Sweet and Maxwell, London.
Goldschmid, H.J., Mann, M. and Weston, J.F. (eds) (1974), Industrial Concentration: The New
Learning, Little, Brown, Boston, MA.
Gonce, R.A. (1982), Alfred Marshall on Industrial Organisation: from Principles of Economics to
Industry and Trade, in Cunningham Wood, J. (ed.) Alfred Marshall: A Critical Assessment, Vol.
iv, Croom Helm, London, pp. 32772.
Hicks, J.R. (1935), Annual survey of economic theory: the theory of monopoly, Econometrica, 3,
pp. 120.
Hobson, J.A. (1894), The Evolution of Modern Capitalism, (1926 reprint), Walter Scott Publishing,
London.
Kaysen, K. and Turner, J.S. (1959), Antitrust Policy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Marshall, A. (1920), Principles of Economics, 8th edn, Macmillan, London.
Marshall, A. (1921), Industry and Trade, 3rd edn, Macmillan, London.
Mason, E.S. (1937 [1957]), Economic Concentration and the Monopoly Problem, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA.
McGee, J.S. (1980), Predatory pricing revisited, Journal of Law and Economics, 23, October,
pp. 289330.
Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J. (1992), Economics, Organization and Management, Prentice-Hall, New
Jersey.
Penrose, E.T. (1959), The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Blackwell, Oxford.
Prais, S.J. (1976), The Evolution of Giant Firms in Britain, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge.
Reisman, D. (1986), The Economics of Alfred Marshall, Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Robinson, E.A.G. (1931, revised 1935, 1958), The Structure of Competitive Industry, Cambridge
Economic Handbooks, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Robinson, E.A.G. (1941), Monopoly, James Nisbet & Co., London.
Rostas, L. (1948), Comparative Productivity in British and American Industry, Cambridge University
Press.
Scherer, F.M. and Ross, D. (1990), Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 3rd edn,
Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA.
Singh, S., Utton, M. and Waterson, M. (1998), Strategic behaviour of incumbent firms in the UK,
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 16, pp. 22951.
Smiley, R. (1988), Empirical evidence on strategic entry deterrence, International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 6, pp. 167180.
Stigler, G.J. (1958), The economies of scale, Journal of Law and Economics, 1, pp. 5471.
Stigler, G.J. and Boulding, K.E. (eds) (1953), Readings in Price Theory, Homewood, IL, R. Irwin.
Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Utton, M.A. (1979), Diversification and Competition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
van Gerven, S. and Varona, E.N. (1994), The Woodpulp case and the future of concerted practices,
Common Market Law Review, 31, pp. 575608.
von Neumann, J. and O. Morgenstern, (19441, 19532, 19533), Theory of Games and Economic Behavior,
Science editions 1964, Wiley & Sons, New York.
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A.
ALFRED MARSHALL (18421924)
Henry W. de Jong
In his Memoirs of 1924, written on the death of Marshall, John Maynard Keynes says that
Max Planck, the originator of the quantum theory, once remarked that he had thought of
studying economics but had found it too difficult. Something akin to that must have moved
Marshall. He came late to economics, having tried several other subjects, was moved more
by social considerations than by intellectually persuasive reasons, was a hesitant writer,
retarding his publications sometimes for decades and said towards the end of his life: If
I had to live over my life again I should have devoted it to psychology. Economics has
too little to do with ideals (Keynes, Essays in Biography, Rupert Hart-Davis, London,
1951, p. 176).
Yet, Marshall was a pioneer who invented several concepts or names for concepts which
were half-understood and which influenced the profession, and market theory in particular,
for at least half a century. He has been compared to Adam Smith in the breadth of his
approach. The new things which flowed from his pen were concepts such as consumer rent,
elasticity (of wants or demand and of supply), and substitution at the margin. Although
important, these innovations were sometimes only new in name (the idea of consumer
surplus went back to Jean Buridan in the fourteenth century), or of limited operational
validity or simple a half-truth. For example, Marshall wrote in the Principles (8th edn, 1920,
Macmillan, London, p. 515) that the principle of substitution adjusts the employment of
each agent so that its cost is proportional to the additional net product (at the margin).
The role of the alert businessman is to be the medium through which this principle works,
he states.
This principle is founded upon the presence of diminishing returns and diminishing
product utilities. For industries where these conditions do not apply or are even reversed
think of growth industries based on technological innovations substitution is of small
importance in comparison with the cost reductions achievable through new methods or
systems of production or new types of products. Marshall did argue that these are also
substitutions; that may be true but in a different context. The Japanese Kanban system
of motorcar production, the introduction of shipping containers or the supermarket
revolution were not adjustments at the margin but fundamental adaptations of the
production structures.
Of course Marshall was not blind to these things. Even more than with Adam Smith
they occurred under his nose in English industry and he tried to cope with them by means
of the introduction of time as an analytical element and concepts such as internal and
external economies. Both were first-rate improvements, in particular because they were
not tied to irrelevant chronological time but to economic time.
Generally, it is said that the distinction refers to the long and the short period, but it
seems more true to distinguish, as Marshall did, between the instant period, the short and
the long and the structurally determined periods, depending on the time necessary for
supply to adapt to shifts in demand. Although Marshall was quite right in stressing the
inadmissibility of devising sharp classifications where Nature has made none (Preface,
Principles, 1890): For the element of Time, which is the centre of the chief difficulty of
almost every economic problem, is itself absolutely continuous (p. vii).
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Whether that sentence remains true when supply forces itself on demand is doubtful. The
continuity of time seems broken when periods of intense competition alternate with gigantic
consolidations, when old-time industries are decimated if not disappearing altogether,
when new nations become the workshop of the world within one quarter-century, or when
managerial revolutions like the conglomerate movement or the information technology
new age, uproot all that is sacred only to crash immediately afterwards.
Towards the end of the Principles, Marshall discusses the wider aspects of the distribution
and growth of the national dividend (that was his way of naming what we call the national
income). In Chapter 7 of Part VI he comes to distinguish between the two classes of
employers and other undertakers, namely those who open out new and improved methods
of business, and those who follow beaten tracks. The services which the latter perform for
society seldom miss their full reward: but it is otherwise with the former class. He seems
to intimate here (pp. 597 ff.) that businessmen who pioneer new paths have mostly not
been rewarded in accordance with the benefits they conferred on society. Yet he states that
it is the struggle for survival that tends to make the new business methods prevail; being
cheaper they will supplant the older ones. That may well be true in fact, at least in some
industries and in certain times. What is less convincing is that Marshall makes the law of
substitution a special case of the law of survival of the fittest. The first law was exposed
earlier in the book within the context of the stationary state in order to demonstrate the
proportionality of the cost of each agent with the additional net product at the margin.
Here, the struggle for survival operates within a developing and dynamic economy and
says Marshall the proportionality has gone.
Is an industrial economist excused if he thinks that competition to substitute is not the
same as the competition to survive?
The first variety serves equilibrium or as Marshall calls it the famous fiction of the
Stationary State (p. 366). The second type of competition is supposed to serve organic
growth of real society (p. 461). Here the great economist would seem to overtax our
comprehension. As a Dutch economist wrote with subtle irony: The concepts organism
and mechanism are not a well-balanced pair (G. Kool, Statica en Dynamica, H.J. Paris,
Amsterdam, 1935, p. 53).
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8.
Industrial economics in Scandinavia,

18801980
Nicolai J. Foss and Peter Mllgaard
INTRODUCTION
In the span of time covered by this chapter, the Scandinavian countries produced numerous
famous economists, notably Knut Wicksell, Gustav Cassel, Erik Lindahl, Gunnar Myrdal,
Bertil Ohlin, Frederik Zeuthen, Ragnar Frisch, Tryggve Haavelmo and Leif Johansen.
However, none of these saw themselves as contributors to industrial economics (however
defined), although at least Cassel (1901), Zeuthen (1929, 1930) and Frisch (1941a/b) made
the occasional contribution that can be argued to lie within the interstices of industrial
economics. Indeed, some of these have often been cited in the industrial economics literature
(Zeuthens 1930 work on bargaining). Moreover, the majority of the famous Scandinavians
in economics did their main work prior to or immediately after the Second World War,
that is, largely prior to the emergence of industrial economics as a distinct and recognized
field in economics in the 1950s.
Still, as we show in the following, the Scandinavian countries did produce interesting
work in industrial economics, although there was comparatively little of it and much was
written in the national languages. Specifically, in the ensuing pages, we map industrial
economics in the Scandinavian countries Denmark, Norway and Sweden in the 1880 to
1980 period. For each country, we offer a broad survey of the state of industrial economics
in the period, highlighting the contributions of the three to four leading economists in
the field. We also discuss the relative performance of the Scandinavian countries, as well
as their distinctive peculiarities.
METHODS AND DATA SOURCES

In this section, we briefly discuss the definition of industrial economics, and present our
methods and data sources.
Defining Industrial Economics
We adopt a broad definition of industrial economics as the disciplined application of
economic principles to explain and predict real-world behaviour of firms, markets and
industries (vision statement of the editors of the Journal of Industrial Economics). This
includes the economics-based study of the nature of competition, the determinants and
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Industrial economics in Scandinavia, 18801980
127
welfare effects of market structure, the variety of products that will be produced, and
the price and sales policies of suppliers (Krouse, 1990: xi). As Tirole (1988: 3) observes,
the frontiers of industrial economics are fuzzy, and a precise definition is impossible to
forward because the field strongly overlaps with microeconomics and because it has strong
implications for macroeconomics.
Observe also that the fuzziness may extend to what is meant by the disciplined application
of economic principles. Thus, modern industrial economists may not think of the use
of economics by the first wave of industrial economists as particularly disciplined (see
Tirole, 1988; Krouse, 1990). Morever, if by the notion of economic principles, is meant
contemporary standard theory, this is definitely too narrow, first, because the pioneers
simply did not have access to contemporary tools, and, second, because, contributions
were made to what we would like to think of as industrial economics by contributors who
thought of themselves as being outside of the economic mainstream. In Scandinavia,
Swedes Erik Dahmn and Bo Carlsson are two prominent examples.
Methods and Data Sources
We have relied on a broad spectrum of methods to identify Scandinavian industrial economics
contributions in the relevant period. These are briefly discussed in the following.1
E-mail questionnaire
An e-mail was distributed to 10 economics departments in Scandinavia, requesting
responses to questions relating to key persons in industrial economics prior to 1980 and
relating to their main contributions. About 10 responses were returned.
Search in relevant journals
We searched all volumes of the following journals for articles on industrial economics by
Scandinavian authors: Nordisk Tidsskrift for Teknisk konomi (Nordic Journal for Technical
Economics; 193555), Nationalkonomisk Tidsskrift (Journal of the Danish Economics
Society; 1873), Ekonomisk Tidskrift (Scandinavian Journal of Economics; 1899), and
Journal of Industrial Economics (1952). These journals were selected because publishing
activity in the relevant period was still a fairly local affair, so that national journals would
for many be a first choice. The Journal of Industrial Economics was included because it is
the only specialist journal in the relevant period.
There are obvious limitations of this procedure. Most notably, the sample of journals is
small and it may well be too small. For example, we cannot entirely exclude the possibility
that we have overlooked Scandinavian industrial organization (IO) papers in journals such
as the Economic Journal, Economica, Zeitschrift fr Nationalkonomie, or more obscure
journals. However, we are confident that the procedures we have followed have resulted
in a high probability of identifying Scandinavian IO contributions to at least the major
journals. One reason for this is that an IO publication in a major journal is likely to make a
splash in the relevant local economics community that is remembered, even years after.
Library search
We performed an extensive search in the Royal Library in Copenhagen, and in the libraries
of the Copenhagen Business School and the economics departments at the University
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of Copenhagen. Inputs into the search were those names that we had identified through
searching the above-mentioned journals or names that our key informants had provided
us with.
Key informants
On the basis of responses to the questionnaire, a number of key informants were selected.
These were:
Norway: Professor Einar Hope, Department of Economics, Norwegian School of
Economics and Business Administration
Sweden: Professor Lennart Hjalmarsson, School of Economics and Commercial
Law, Gothenburg
Denmark: Professor Bjarke Fog, Copenhagen Business School
DENMARK
Microeconomics has always been an important topic for Danish economists, especially
in the area of general equilibrium theory. Krgrd (1983, 1996) argues that marginal
analysis had already penetrated Danish economic thinking in the 1870s, that is, simultaneously with the independent discoveries of Carl Menger, Stanley Jevons and Lon Walras,
sometimes even preceding them. These Danish economists (for example, Frederik Bing,
Julius Petersen and Harald Westergaard) were adamant about the use of mathematics in
economics and quick to adopt Jevonss thinking in particular. The dissemination of the
ideas of the marginalist revolution was rapid in Denmark, not least because it quickly
got connected with economic policy, for example, issues concerning the determination of
the rational wage.
By 1880, Denmark was thus equipped with mathematical economists with knowledge
of and interest in microeconomics and marginal analysis. It thus seemed well situated to
take on industrial economics. In fact, four persons can be identified as pioneering Danish
IO in the twentieth century: Frederik Zeuthen started off on oligopoly, bargaining and
general equilibrium. He inspired Winding Pedersen to work on price theory, Hans Brems
to work on monopolistic competition (among other subjects) and Bjarke Fog to study
pricing empirically.
Frederik Zeuthen
Frederik Zeuthen (18881959) was in many ways an excellent example of an early
Danish professor of economics. He was interested in many different areas and covered
both economic theory and social policy (Philip, 1976: 367). He was one of the very few
Danish full professors of economics at that time, and had broad interests. However, he
distinguished himself from his peers by contributing to three strands of the international
economic literature (Brems, 1976: 3478): Monopolistic competition and a reinterpretation
of A. Augustin Cournot including business stealing effects in a sort of Bertrand model
of differentiated goods; bilateral monopoly as a dynamic game of alternating offers;
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and Walrasian equilibria with non-negativity constraints. We focus here on the first two
contributions that fall within industrial economics.
Arguably, Zeuthens best-known contribution was to the literature on imperfect or
monopolistic competition. His first paper on this was in Danish and appeared in 1929,
just after (and referring to) Hotelling (1929) and preceding the contributions by Chamberlin
(1933), Robinson (1933) and von Stackelberg (1934). He made this contribution available
in English in his monograph, Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare, which was
first published in 1930 with a preface and a recommendation by Joseph Schumpeter.
Zeuthens view of monopolistic competition was surprisingly modern. He defined
monopolistic competition as:
the instance in which several entrepreneurs have at the same time so great a share in the production
that they may be, and are, interested in influencing the price even at the cost of some reduction
of their own sales The actions of one entrepreneur will be adjusted to those of the others, and
vice versa. Many economists, therefore, think that no stable equilibrium can be obtained in this
instance, but others are of the opposite opinion. The different points of view depend, however,
on the choice of hypotheses. (Zeuthen, 1930: 24)
Today we would describe this situation as oligopolistic rather than monopolistic competition
and Zeuthen was indeed thinking of competition la Cournot (as further explained
by Wicksell, p. 26), Joseph Bertrand and F.Y. Edgeworth. He explains the difference in
approaches as stemming from different assumptions as to the degree to which a unilateral
reduction of the price extends the firms business by taking customers from the other party
(diversion2) or by capturing some of the unsatisfied consumption (business growing)
(Zeuthen, 1930: 41). Zeuthen thinks of Cournots duopolists as price setters (!) and uses
the parameterized ratio of diversion to business growing as an explanation why different
oligopoly models reach different results. He thus arrives at a reinterpretation of Cournot
equilibria (differentiated Bertrand) that is novel (Brems, 1976: 355) and based on rigorous,
but graphical, analysis.
Zeuthens other contribution within the field of IO dealt with the determination of prices
in bilateral monopoly, that is, the case when two monopolistic concerns face one another
as buyer and seller (Zeuthen, 1930: 64). In todays terminology and following Bremss
(1976) exposition, Zeuthen defined the threat point utilities that up- and downstream firms3
would obtain in the case of a breakdown of negotiations. Denote these u and d. He defined
the probability q that a breakdown would occur and the price p of the intermediate good
in the case of successful negotiation. Let U(p) and D(p) be the payoff or utility to each
party in the case of agreement on a price p. At round t of the negotiations, the upstream
firm offers to sell at pu(t) and the downstream firm offers to buy at pd(t). The upstream
firm can accept pd(t), thus obtaining utility U[pd(t)] or reject the offer which means that
with probability q it gets payoff u and with probability 1 q it gets payoff U[pu(t)] since
the upstream firm accepts its offer. Thus the upstream firm will be indifferent between
accepting and rejecting if q takes the value qu(t) that satisfies the indifference condition:
U[pd(t)] = qu(t)u + [1 qu(t)] U[pu(t)].
Similarly, the downstream firm will be indifferent between accepting the offer of the
upstream firm or rejecting it, if q takes the value qd(t) that satisfies:
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U[pu(t)] = qd(t)d + [1 qd(t)] U[pd(t)].

Zeuthen assumed that firm j would accept if the actual q > qj(t) since the risk of conflict
was too large and would reject if q < qj(t) where j = u,d denotes whether the up- or the
downstream firm is in focus. Thus qj(t) is the maximum probability of conflict to which
they are willing to expose themselves by maintaining an ultimatum (Zeuthen, 1930: 110).
Zeuthen then assumed that the party to cave in at round t would be the one with the lowest
qj(t). Caving in, however, did not mean accepting the counterparts offer but making a new
offer at round t + 1. He further assumed that both parties would revise their offers in the
next round such that the new set of offers would be less favourable to the party with the
lowest qj(t) of the previous round and more favourable to the other party. This process
would ensure convergence on an agreement. The last couple of assumptions were clearly
ad hoc to ensure the convergence and not founded in fundamentals, the main problem
being that the two firms do not see continued rounds of bargaining as an option when
setting up the indifference conditions. Thus, Zeuthen did not treat the problem as fully
dynamic. However, the setup is ingenious and is an early version of a dynamic bargaining
problem that was finally solved by Ariel Rubinstein (1982) in terms of a fully dynamic
model of sequential alternating-offers bargaining. This was more than 50 years later and
the solution exploited all the progress in the field that arose from the rigorous incorporation
of game theory.
In 1939, Zeuthen organized the 9th European meeting of the Econometric Society in
Elsinore, Denmark. In P. de Wolffs (1940) account of the meetings in Econometrica, the
first day of the meeting was chosen to coincide with the last day of the annual meeting of
the Society of Nordic Economists. However:
on account of the political situation of the moment, most non-Scandinavian members were
prevented from attending This, however, had the advantage that nearly all participators in
the meeting of the Nordic Economists were present during all the lectures of the Econometric
meeting. (de Wolff, 1940: 284)
At the meeting, many topics of IO or of marginal interest were discussed: Brge Barfod
of Aarhus contributed a paper on the theory of advertising; Professor E. Schneider of
Aarhus discussed price policy of firms in periods of depression; Thorkil Kristensen of
Copenhagen discussed a multi-product monopolist for which demands were interdependent; and Professor Winding Pedersen of Copenhagen discussed problems of monopoly,
arguing that duopoly pricing is indeterminate because the solution depends entirely on the
assumption made about the entrepreneurs opinions about their mutual policy. [S]uch
a solution can be given only by a dynamical theory (ibid.).
At the Econometric Society meeting, Zeuthen discussed price theory, arguing that the
study by Hall and Hitch (1939) that showed that firms use full-cost pricing (rather than
the marginal principle, see below) was not theoretically satisfying since the profit margin is
determined by an arbitrary (unmodelled?) collective pricing policy. [Zeuthen] underlined
the importance of the publications of Winding Pedersen and Thorkil Kristensen, treating
different forms of price policy and their consequences and showing that, even in the case of
several competing enterprises, deviations from the liberalistic thesis may occur (de Wolff,
1940: 284). Brems (1951c) elaborated on Zeuthens critique of Hall and Hitch (1939) and
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provided a reinterpretation of full-cost pricing as consistent with the marginal principle

in the long run.
While being one of the first Danish economics professors with a formal training in
mathematics, Zeuthen was no great believer in too complicated maths as a tool in economics
(Brems, 1976: 359). He also developed an interest in managerial economics and was open
to collaboration on cost theory with engineers (Ivar Jantzen) and economists of other
countries, notably Erich Schneider of Germany. But he was generally well connected
internationally; witness the preface by Joseph Schumpeter, the fact that Bertil Ohlin was
one of the discussants of this doctoral dissertation, and his organization of the European
meeting of the Econometric Society. And he inspired younger Danish economists such as
Brems, Fog and Winding Pedersen.
H. Winding Pedersen
Hans Winding Pedersen (190799) could be said to be the grand old man of Danish
antitrust economics. He contributed many books and articles in Danish on price theory
and competition and participated in the Trust Commission that prepared the Monopolies
and Restrictive Practices Act of 1955; see Trust Commission (1953) and Winding Pedersen
(1953) for the political economy of the proposal. He also served for many years as a highly
respected member of the Monopolies Council that decided antitrust cases according to
this act.
Winding Pedersen (1936) compared and analysed the decline of competition, comparing
the American antitrust tradition represented by Burns (1936) with von Stackelbergs (1934)
work on oligopoly. He concluded that imperfect competition will lead to stable prices
rather than extra volatility. In his 1939 treatise on modern price theory, he formulated
a hypothesis of indeterminacy of oligopoly prices and argued that rivals conjectures
are important in resolving this problem. He further concluded that the importance of
conjectures necessitates a dynamic approach to finding the equilibrium since firms will
react to each others actions with a lag.
His later books were mainly textbooks: his 1965 work treats the structure, conduct
and performance of manufacturing and was intended for use in a course on industrial
and trade policy. Winding Pedersen (1976) deals with price theory and competition,
focusing on oligopoly, buyer power and full-cost pricing and was intended to supplement
Bain (1972).
Hans Brems
Hans Brems (19152000) was mainly known for his work on the history of economic
thought and quantitative modelling, but he also worked on issues of industrial economics.
After receiving his doctorate from the University of Copenhagen on Some problems
of monopolistic competition in 1950, Brems taught at the University of California at
Berkeley, before joining the University of Illinois in 1954. Early on he was interested in
the micro foundation for macroeconomics a passion he maintained through his career
(for example, Brems, 1944, 1947, 1952a).
In 1970, Brems was awarded an honorary doctorate from the Swedish School of Business
in Helsinki, Finland, for his contribution to the theory of monopolistic competition. He
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also received an honorary doctorate from Copenhagen Business School in 1992 for the same
contributions.4 Examples include Brems (1948, 1949, 1951a, 1953) but he also analysed
oligopolies (1951b), and cost and production functions with indivisibilities (1952b, 1964)
tracing his ideas back to engineer-turned-economist Ivar Jantzen (1928, 1948).
In terms of prestigious international publications, Hans Brems is certainly the most
successful of the Danish economists that dealt with IO. He maintained contact with
Scandinavia and often returned to give talks in Denmark and Sweden.5
Bjarke Fog
Bjarke Fog (1921) was doing traditional industrial economics research in more than four
decades after the Second World War, and doing it at an international level. He received
his masters degree in economics in 1946, was a non-matriculated student at Harvard
University in 1947, and took up academic positions in Aarhus (Denmark) the same year.
In 1949, he joined the Copenhagen Business School where he became full professor in
1958, the year in which he defended his doctorate. His opponents were Frederik Zeuthen
(1958) and H. Winding Pedersen (1958). In contrast to his more theoretical colleagues,
Fogs approach was based on hands-on experience as a member of several boards and as
a consultant to numerous firms.6
Even his very early work was written in English. Fog (1946) dealt with dynamic oligopoly
pricing using an adaptive-expectations reaction function duopoly with conjectural
variations. The article was based on a talk given at Harvard University and the author
thanks Wassilij Leontieff of Harvard and Hans Brems for comments. The articles point
of departure is a model of Winding Pedersen (1939).
Fog (1948) dealt with a recurrent problem of his research: to what extent is price theory
descriptive of what businessmen do? Do businessmen use the marginal principle when
setting prices? His doctoral dissertation (1958, 1960) has a long discussion of this and sets
out to investigate the problem empirically. Based on semi-structured interviews, he describes
the pricing policies of 139 Danish manufacturing companies. As in the study of the UK that
inspired him (Hall and Hitch, 1939), he found full-cost pricing (or average-cost pricing) to
be the most dominant pricing policy but also that the margin to be added to average costs
might vary, for example due to changes in demand. He concludes that while businessmen
do not think that they use the marginal principle in the short run, this does not preclude
that their pricing is consistent with the marginal principle in the long run. This study is
much cited, for example, by Scherer and Ross (1990) and Hay and Morris (1979).
Another much-cited work, (Fog, 1956) describes how cartel prices are negotiated between
members of a cartel. At the time, formal price-fixing agreements were not immediately
illegal and Fog interviewed members of six cartels and found that cartel agreements often
do not express cordial cooperation but are rooted in distrust, necessitating the signing of
formal contracts. One of the sources of internal conflicts in cartels was found to be that
some firms were more short-sighted than others. In todays wording we would say that the
discount factor of some firms was too low to allow cartels the full benefits of cooperation.
Fogs work on cartels has been cited as recently as by Connor (2001).
In sum, Fog built an international recognition of his work on topics that were central to IO
and his research methodology fell within the mainstream at the time. His monograph from
1994 represents the accumulated knowledge of a life-time of research of empirical IO.
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Summing Up
As the above shows, Danish research in industrial economics had a strong theoretical
orientation in the 1930s, and was pioneered by Zeuthen, followed by Winding Pedersen
and Hans Brems in the 1950s. Bjarke Fog epitomizes empirical IO in the 1950s. In the
196080 period very little happened, although a few researchers published working papers
on oligopoly pricing (Mossin, 1978) and articles on dynamic models of entry deterrence
(Waagstein, 1982, 1983), mergers and acquisitions in Danish industries (hlenschlger
Madsen, 1983), or competition in quality space for industrial goods (Hjort-Andersen,
1981, 1988).7
NORWAY
In Bergh and Hanisch (1984) a history of economics in Norway from about 1835 to 1980
no explicit mention is made of industrial economics or anything resembling it. Norwegian
economics research appears to have evolved around distributional and macroeconomic
issues, often with a very close link to bureaucrats and politicians.
However, some pockets of industrial economics research did exist, notably at the
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration (NSEB; Norges Handelshyskole) in Bergen and, from about 1950, also at Bergen University. Norwegian
research efforts in industrial economics were therefore commonly referred to as the
Bergen group (Bergen-miljet). Most of the Norwegian industrial economics research,
with a few exceptions constituted by Frisch (1941a/b) and Munthe (1959, 1960, 1961),
appears to have been strongly descriptive and much focused on individual industries. A
peculiar manifestation of this is the establishment of professorships that were (and to
some extent still are) designed to address the economic concerns of particular industries,
notably shipping and fisheries. In spite of the relatively atheoretical character of much of
this work, it still owes a peculiar debt to a particular theoretical emphasis in Norwegian
economics, namely the fundamental work of Ragnar Frisch on production and investment
theory; thus, much of it may be seen as an attempt to make empirically concrete Frischs
heavily theoretical work.
Ragnar Frisch
Ragnar Frisch (18951973) made seminal contributions to a number of fields, for which he
(jointly with Jan Tinbergen) was awarded the first Nobel Prize in economics in 1969. One
of the areas to which Frisch made very significant contributions was production theory.
In fact, a case can be made that much of what today is called neoclassical production
theory is, in fact, the brainchild of Frisch, although for a long time much of this work
circulated only in the form of memos. Although Frisch began his work on the fundamental
theory of production in the mid-1920s, and soon produced a Norwegian volume on the
subject, Frischs perfectionism did not allow him to publish an English language booklength statement of his theory of production until four decades later (Frisch, 1964). The
book impresses by its magisterial quality, but there was probably relatively little in it that
was new when it was published.
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It is open to some debate whether Frisch may be classified as an industrial economist

in the modern sense of that term. His concern with production seems ultimately to have
been motivated by his interest in macroeconomics and business-cycle theory rather than in
constructing a foundation for industrial economics.8 However, Frisch published one paper
that explicitly deals with a classical industrial economics topic, namely his 1941 paper on
horizontal price agreements. Moreover, he lectured on forms of competition (1941a), giving
for the time an advanced treatment of alternative competitive forms, and explicitly
dealing with, and introducing, the notion of conjectural variations as an important aspect
of what he called competition in polypolies. The direct Norwegian descent of this kind
of work is represented by the work of Preben Munthe about two decades later.
Moreover, it is arguable that Frischs emphasis on the theory of production influenced
subsequent work on issues relating to firm-level production, although most of this later
work can be categorized as either business economics (for example, Coward, 1937, 1944;
Hellern, 1940) or empirical analysis of the cost and production characteristics in specific
industries (Wedervang, 1965; Hope, 1967).9 Frisch himself had published an early exemplar
of this kind of research, namely the 1935 paper, The principle of substitution: an example
of its application in the chocolate industry!
Preben Munthe
The Norwegian economist who comes perhaps closest to the traditional concerns of the
industrial economics area is Preben Munthe (1922), who after studying at NSEB and
Oxford University received his doctorate from NSEB and later became a professor at
the University of Oslo where he is still active as an emeritus. Munthe was in regular
contact with Bjarke Fog in Denmark. Although his early research was strongly theoretically
informed, and thus in some ways closer to the concerns of Danes Winding Pedersen and
Brems than to Fogs strongly empirically driven approach, Munthe was also interested in
using industrial economics to throw light on empirical phenomena, such as sales cartels
in whaling, dental manufacturing and rubber footwear (Munthe, 1961). In fact, like Fog
he was interested in applying industrial economics to the understanding of firm strategies,
rather than in understanding the aggregate welfare implications that may follow, given
assumptions about firms behaviours.
Although Munthe later broadened his research interests very considerably (for example,
to doctrinal history), his early work, mainly published as monographs, dealt with such
favourite industrial economics topics as entry conditions (1959), vertical relations (1960)
and horizontal cartels (1961).
The last is Munthes doctoral thesis. Using diagrammatical analysis, Munthe analyses
the necessary conditions for the formation of cartels (that is, the expectation of gains
from forming the cartel), the conflicting incentives of cartel members, and the resulting
chiselling. A slightly earlier work (1960) is taken up with vertical relations, in particular
how a producers advertising decisions relative to end consumers is influenced by whether
he can fix retail prices or not. Thus, Munthe treats a topic that after the publication of,
in particular, Yamey (1954) conquers centre stage at the time. Surprisingly, however, he
refrains from drawing any welfare and antitrust conclusions. His main aim seems to be
to give an economics-based interpretation of how pricing may interact with marketing
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decisions, thus staying closer to the concerns of Arne Rasmussen (1955) in Denmark than
to the traditional antitrust concerns of most industrial economists.
Frystein Wedervang
Frystein Wedervang (1918?) was the the son of influential economist Ingwar Wedervang
(18911961) (see Bergh and Hanisch, 1984). Frystein Wedervang studied at NSEB, but
received his doctorate in statistics from the University of Oslo. He returned to NSEB
as a Professor in Business Administration. While at NSEB he wrote his major work,
Development of a Population of Industrial Firms (1965). The monograph is a major study
of the evolution of a large subset of the population of Norwegian firms in the period
from 1930 to 1948. The main interest lies in tracing major structural characteristics of
this population, such as the number of employees and the value of fixed capital in establishments (taken to be a proxy of firm size), and the capitallabour ratio and the ratios
between added value and each of the input factors (gross labour productivity and gross
capital productivity, respectively). Also, C4 concentration ratios, rates of entry and exit
by sectors, and much else are calculated. This is done in painstaking detail, and is by itself
quite impressive, given the computing power and the data sources of the time.
However, the overall purpose of this major statistical exercise is not entirely clear.
Although findings on the size distribution of Norwegian firms and how this changes over
time is compared to findings such as those of Simon and Bonini (1958), there is no overall
attempt to ground such population dynamics in an overarching perspective (as in Downie,
1958). The overall impression is somewhat negative; for example, Wederwang finds that
it is not possible to fit a Cobb-Douglass function to the data, and he also observes that
Gibrats law is contradicted by his findings. However, this does give rise to much theoretical
reflection on his part. Wederwang does not seem to have published any of his findings from
the study in an international journal (that is, there are no hits in the Journal of Economic
Literature database).
Einar Hope
Einar Hope (1937) spent two years as a graduate student at the University of Minnesota
in the mid-1960s, and his 1967 PhD thesis Kostnader og bedrifsttrrelse (Costs and the
size of firms) (Hope, 1967) bears a strong US imprint with respect to its references and its
econometrics approach. However, in analysing the cost structure of a single industry it may
be argued to be directly in the Norwegian tradition of concern with production and cost
characteristics of single industries. Hopes thesis is an attempt to clarify whether and to
what extent increasing returns to scale characterizes Norwegian banking. Because of data
limitations, Hope begins from cost functions rather than production functions, and finds,
using standard regression techniques, that increasing returns do indeed characterize the
banking industry. He explicitly chooses not to discuss any possible efficiency implications
of this finding.
Most of Hopes professional career has taken place at NSEB, where he has been
instrumental in developing the teaching of industrial economics and where he served for
some time as the director of the Institute for Industrial Economics. Hope has also been
the Director General of the Norwegian Competition Authority (199599), and has served
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on many government committees. He produced numerous contributions to industrial

economics through the 1970s, many of which were highly descriptive and some of which
were taken up with the methodology of industry analysis (Hope, 1977). Hopes interest
in electricity markets pushed his research interests in the direction of energy economics
(he is professor of energy economics at NSEB), although he continued to be a prolific
contributor to industrial economics.
Summing Up
To sum up, Norwegian research efforts in industrial economics were relatively scant, and
had a mainly empirical orientation. Apart from Munthes work, very little or no theoretical
work appears to have been undertaken. Internationalization also came late to Norwegian
research.
SWEDEN
Around the turn of the century (1900), Sweden was endowed with four great economists:
Knut Wicksell of Lund/Stockholm (18511926); Gustav Cassel of Stockholm (18661945);
David Davidson of Uppsala (18541942) and Eli F. Heckscher (first Uppsala then
Stockholm; 18791952). They were to some extent rivals, eagerly debating utility theory,
Walrasian general equilibrium models, marginal productivity and international trade. Like
in Denmark, the preconditions for applying microeconomics to problems of industrial
organization were good, but somehow the interest was never really sparked in Sweden
until the 1970s.
Hans Thorelli
Hans Thorelli (1921), wrote a doctoral thesis half a century later (Thorelli, 1954),
appraising the early development of the American federal antitrust policy and dealing
with a broad range of problems in the field of industrial economics and public policy in
relation thereto (p. viii). Thorelli offers a synthesized social science interpretation of the
origination and institutionalization period of [the federal antitrust policy] (p. vii). At the
University of Stockholm, Thorelli was a student of Gunnar Heckscher, the son of Eli F.
Heckscher. He moved on to Northwestern University and through numerous teaching and
research institutions, ending his career at Indiana Universitys Kelley School of Business,
where he is now a distinguished professor emeritus. During the 1960s, Thorellis research
interests changed to strategic management and marketing, and he developed simulation
systems to facilitate strategic decisions in a multinational world.
Erik Dahmn
Erik Dahmn (19162005) provided a detailed study of the development of Swedish
manufacturing between the two World Wars (Dahmn, 1950). In addition to being a
professor at the Stockholm School of Economics, he was director of the Industrial Research
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Institute in Stockholm, 194850.10 Dahmns main influence appears to lie in coining the
notion of development block in the context of his inquiry into the evolution of Swedish
industry (Dahmn, 1950). The notion is an important early anticipation of contemporary
ideas on the role of complementarities in economic development. The main inspiration
for it appears to be the ideas of Joseph Schumpeter.
Bo Carlsson and Lennart Hjalmarsson
More recently, Bo Carlsson and Lennart Hjalmarsson have been pioneering Swedish
industrial economists. They shared an interest in the measurement of efficiency, tracing
their roots back to Eli Heckschers (1918) work on Swedish problems of production in
which he presented a diagram that preceded the Salter (1960) diagram by 42 years.11 Their
academic ancestors also include Gustav kerman (1931) who investigated the distance
between best practice and average practice in Swedish saw mills and Ingvar Svennilson
(1944) who followed in the same track.
Bo Carlsson
Carlsson received his BA from Harvard University in 1968 and his MA and PhD from
Stanford University (1970 and 1972, respectively). Today he is E. Mandell de Windt
Professor of Industrial Economics at Case Western University and has published widely
on industrial dynamics and technological systems. His early work (Carlsson, 1972) on
the measurement of efficiency in production was awarded the David Davidson Prize in
Economics. Carlsson (1987) measured efficiency in 26 Swedish manufacturing industries
and found that tariffs adversely affect efficiency and that the four-firm concentration ratio
is positively and strongly associated with efficiency. He argues that the latter result shows
that the concentration ratio reflects economies of scale and specialization rather than the
market power of the largest firms. In a report for the Industrial Research Institute, Carlsson
(1980) analyses technical change and productivity in Swedish industry in the postwar
period. Later articles appeared among others in the Journal of Industrial Economics, the
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization and the International Journal of Industrial
Organization. In one of these, his Presidential Address to the European Association for
Research in Industrial Economics, Carlsson (1987) makes an interesting attempt to separate
what he calls industrial dynamics, a more evolutionary/Schumpeterian approach, from
supposedly more static mainstream industrial economics. His later research has clearly
concentrated on elaborating the industrial dynamics programme, leading to publications
in, for example, Research Policy and the Journal of Evolutionary Economics.
Lennart Hjalmarsson
Hjalmarsson (1944) received his PhD in economics 1976 from the University of
Gothenburg. His thesis was entitled Studies in a Dynamic Theory of Production and its
Applications and his supervisor was Professor Leif Johansen of the University of Oslo.
By that time he had already published in the Swedish Journal of Economics and in the
European Economic Review. In Frsund and Hjalmarsson (1974) he initiated a productive
collaboration with Norwegian economist Finn Frsund of the University of Oslo. In this
article, they use static efficiency measures for inhomogeneous production functions in a
dynamic setting of structural change. They argue that from a policy point of view the
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problem is not to force the current structure close to the best-practice frontier but rather
to optimize an ongoing process.
In another early study, Frsund and Hjalmarsson (1979) analyse technical progress in
Swedish dairy plants in terms of the production function. Shifts of the production function
are translated into a reduction in unit costs (a generalization of Salters (1960) measure)
and further split into constituent parts consisting of proportional technical advance, factor
substitution and increase of optimal scale. They are able to trace the changing efficiency
frontiers from 1964 to 1973 and show that it is a movement of the frontier along a ray
towards the origin that is responsible for a 913 per cent reduction of unit costs at the
optimal scale. Hjalmarsson is the author of numerous articles in very prestigious journals
since 1980 and has ventured into energy economics along with his Norwegian co-author,
Finn Frsund.
Summing Up
As the above shows, Swedish research in industrial economics was rather sparse and
scattered until around 1970. In the 1970s, Bo Carlsson, Lennart Hjalmarsson and their
Norwegian colleague Finn Frsund did an impressive amount of work of a high quality,
especially in the area of efficiency measurement. It is also noteworthy that with the
exception of Hjalmarsson, the major early contributors to industrial economics either
did not have industrial economics as a major research area, or took industrial economics
into distinctly non-orthodox and usually Schumpeterian directions (Dahmn, Carlsson,
Gunnar Eliasson). In fact, for a long period in the 1980s and 1990s, the Stockholm-based
Industriens Utredningsinstitut (see, for example, Dahmn and Eliasson, 1980) became
a hotbed for these kinds of ideas.
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
The Relative Performance of the Scandinavian Countries
There are some remarkable differences in the way that industrial economics developed in
the Scandinavian countries. Thus, while the Danish research had a strong leaning towards
a more formal approach arguably a Zeuthen legacy (and perhaps going back even earlier)
Norway was almost completely dominated by empirical, industry-specific inquiry, in
spite of the strong emphasis on formal methods that the Frisch revolution (Bergh and
Hanisch, 1984) marked in Norwegian economics. There were no Norwegian counterparts
to Zeuthen, Brems and Winding Pedersen of Denmark. In fact, much of the relevant
Norwegian research is so much characterized by meticulous industry studies that industrial
economics may be a bit of a misnomer, at least as that term is understood today. The Frisch
influence was often indirectly present in such work, namely in attempts to fit specification
of production function to the data. Still, some contributions exist that may be categorized
as industrial economics proper, the names of Preben Munthe, Frystein Wedervang and
Einar Hope being representative.
Sweden presents a picture rather similar in some respects to that of Norway. Swedish
research in economics has historically been almost completely dominated by monetary
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economics, trade theory and general equilibrium theory, and until the 1970s, very little
research in industrial economics appears to have been undertaken. A distinct Swedish
peculiarity is the importance of Schumpeterian ideas, notably in the work of Dahmn
and Carlsson.
In terms of internationalization, Denmark appears to have been the first mover. However,
in spite of having the two advantages of some emphasis on formal methods and some
internationalization of the relevant research already around the Second World War, Danish
research in industrial economics did not take off in the sense of building a research group.
Research was largely concentrated on two professors, namely Winding Pedersen and Bjarke
Fog, and the perhaps most internationally prolific Dane, namely Hans Brems, who had
already emigrated to the United States in 1951.
What Explains the Scandinavian Research Effort in Industrial Economics?
One may speculate that a reason for the relatively little interest in industrial economics in
the Scandinavian countries has to do with, first, the relatively lax antitrust regimes that
have historically characterized these countries: because of the nature of these regimes, there
were simply rather few antitrust cases into which an economist could sink his analytical
teeth. Another possible reason has to do with the strong dominance of research in macroeconomics and general equilibrium, the former tendency no doubt being partly prompted
by (and lending partial legitimacy to) the ongoing development of the Scandinavian
welfare states.
One may further speculate that in the absence of these historical peculiarities, industrial
economics could have gained more momentum. This is not least because of the existence
of one important institution that could have organized research efforts in industrial
economics, namely the Nordisk Tidsskrift for Teknisk konomi (Nordic Journal for Technical
Economics) (193555). As Tjalling Koopmans (1977: 261) noted in his Nobel Prize speech,
this journal provided an internationally recognized important medium for discussions of
production theory and of ways of conceptualizing and measuring the internal efficiency
of firms. However, the journal never seriously took industrial economics on board. In
fact, it closed its operation in 1955, at about the time when industrial economics became
recognized as a field in economics.
Later Developments
Since 1980 there has been an upsurge of research in industrial economics. In Norway, Lars
Srgard of the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration in Bergen
has been the prime driver of research in industrial economics. In Sweden, Norwegian
Tore Ellingsen has an impressive track record. Lennart Hjalmarsson and Finn Frsund
have continued their cross-border collaboration with good results. Danish economists
who have contributed to industrial economics in the last 25 years include Morten Hviid,
Svend Albk, Per Overgaard and Christian Schultz. What they have in common is that
they base their research on the international literature and that they are not burdened by
the legacy of the pioneers of the preceeding century. The link is missing.
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NOTES
1. In addition to those methods mentioned in the following, we also performed searches on Google and the
Journal of Economic Literature database. However, these searches were, on the whole, fruitless, except for
tracking a few publications by Swedish and Norwegian industrial economists in the 1970s.
2. Diversion as a concept is used to calculate the unilateral effects of mergers. The diversion ratio shows the
fraction of demand for a certain brand that is captured by a rival brand (the ratio of the cross-price to the
own-price elasticity), see, for example, Shapiro (1996).
3. Zeuthen was mostly interested in applying the theory to the labour market so he phrased his theory in terms
of a workers union and an employers confederation.
4. The official reason was the importance of Bremss contribution to the theory of monopolistic competition,
a body of theory that was central to the development of the distinct approach to marketing developed by
Barfod (1937) and Rasmussen (1955).
5. Indeed Brems (1954) provides an overview of the state of competition policy in all three Scandinavian
countries.
6. Brems (1950) and Fog (1950) is a debate of what free competition means, whether there is any competition
left in Denmark (given its lax competition rules and pervasive postwar regulation), and in what dimensions
competition may take place (price, advertisements, quality). It is very clear that Brems is a theoretician and
that Fog is based on the empirical side of the divide.
7. This research was by and large undertaken in the late 1970s.
8. However, it is noteworthy that the Department of Economics at Gothenburg University has singled out as
one of its main research areas, the Scandinavian approach to industrial economics, developed by Ragnar
Frisch and Leif Johansen in Oslo.
9. However, the work of Finn Frsund, briefly discussed in connection with Lennart Hjalmarsson, is very
clearly in the formal Frisch tradition.
10. The Industrial Research Institute was founded in 1939 by the Federation of Swedish Industries and the
Swedish Employers Confederation with the aim of conducting research on economic issues of importance
for long-term industrial development in Sweden (www.iui.se). One of the major research programmes deals
with industrial organization and many Swedish academics have spent time at the Institute in Stockholm,
which in this way assembles the largest concentration of industrial economists in Sweden.
11. The (Heckscher-)Salter diagram shows a ranking of the different unit costs of different plants starting with
the lowest and ending with the highest. The abscissa measures the capacity of the different plants and the
ordinate the unit cost.
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Jantzen, Ivar (1948), Laws of production costs, Econometrica, 16: 448.
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PART II
Pioneers of the field in the USA and Canada
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9.
Introduction to the pioneers in North

America
William G. Shepherd
INTRODUCTION
From the 1870s to the 1980s, scholars in the United States and Canada made a brilliant
array of innovations. Some new ideas were basic and broad, such as the very nature of
effective competition, and the harms or benefits of monopoly. Others ranged down to
small and technical points; for instance, certain pricing tactics, or indexes of concentration.
Some involved pure theory and arcane symbolism, whereas others focused on hotly debated
facts or complex econometric methods. Still other new ideas were about public policies
such as antitrust or regulation.
The pioneering was often irregular and faltering, rather than steady and smooth.
Many authors excitedly extolled new ideas which were, in fact, never accepted. Other
innovations were accepted for a while but then soon faded out. Even so, some fundamental
concepts have now been well settled for over 100 years, and they may last for centuries
more.
Here I sum up this North American history, showing how the various pioneers fitted
into the long waves and brief ripples of new ideas and scholars. There were a series of
distinct eras, each lasting one or several decades (for example, the 190030 period, then
the 1930s, then the 1940s). I sum up each period in a few paragraphs and then present the
individual pioneers whose new ideas came out then.
After this introductory chapter, I present the individual profiles of the 43 most prominent
pioneers, in a long section. Here in this Introduction, those 43 pioneers are mentioned
briefly, but only to show where they fit in the flow. The details of their innovations, training
and best writings are saved for the later write-ups about them.
Each of the full write-ups of the 43 pioneers, and the shorter mentions of the 52 others
in this Introduction, has a length and details that reflect the relative importance of the
ideas. The lengths are only approximate. My suggested page lengths to authors were my
best judgment, but there is room for debate about them. And some authors strayed from
my suggested lengths. Even so, the whole array of profiles is probably a reasonably good
guide.
Also, there is some room for debate about the sequence; where each innovator should
be located in the whole series. I have tried to place each one when their main ideas began
to take hold, though of course some pioneers kept making innovations over many years.
In any event, I hope that the whole sequence is at least approximately correct.
147
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THE MAIN IDEAS AT THE CORE OF THIS FIELD

Before I start the review decade by decade, remember that there is a dominant organizing
topic of the field: how competition and monopoly may affect the efficiency and innovation
that occur in markets. That whole subject divides into a large series of detailed points and
debates. Early pioneers quickly clarified many of these large and small points, even before
1900. Other innovations continued, right down to the mid-1980s when this survey ends.
They have been targets for spirited debates, and rightly so.
The following list itemizes the whole fields main categories of ideas and methods.1 It is
a matrix for the fields literature, into which the innovators have placed their ideas, trying
to answer all the deep questions as well as the many technical points:
1. The meaning of effective competition in correctly defined economic markets. This
involves the defining of genuine and relevant markets; the true nature of competitive
processes (dynamic, static, short run, long run or other); the specific equilibrium
conditions reached by competition; and the variety and severity of imperfections that
can infect markets.
2. How the specific market features and structures may take effect. This especially
includes companies own market shares. They may give market dominance by one
firm or concentration that is jointly held by the several largest firms. It can also be
important how the several biggest firms interact with each other. Tight oligopolists
may coordinate with each other rather than compete, while loose oligopolists usually
fight hard.
3. The economies of scale. They are often shown by how steeply the average cost curve
slopes down, to reach its lowest point at minimum optimum scale. There also may
be diseconomies of scale at larger sizes. Also, the various methods for measuring the
economies and diseconomies; no methods are robust, but some methods are much
more reliable than others.
4. The nature of enterprises of all sizes. This includes their managers alternative
motivations (short- and long-run profits, company size, risk avoidance and so on);
and transactions costs for settling the arrangements that are made externally, among
companies, and internally, among the parts inside companies.
5. Mergers of all types (horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate). Also, friendly mergers
as distinct from hostile takeovers; the motives and quality of merger planning; which
mergers raise market power, or instead reduce it; and the economic impacts of mergers
on efficiency and innovation, including the impacts of hostile takeovers.
6. Vertical conditions and actions of all types, including vertical integration, vertical
economies, vertical restrictions, and other vertical exertions of control. The main
problems of defining and measuring these vertical conditions.
7. Potential competition from outside of the market. This includes whether and how the
potential competition might be measured; new entry (what it really is, and how it might
be measured); and barriers against new entry (what are they, and how might they be
measured?). How to define and estimate the many sources of entry barriers (both the
many possible exogenous, fundamental sources, and various endogenous voluntary
sources, particularly strategic pricing and related entry-preventing actions).
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Introduction to the pioneers in North America
149
8. The benefits of competition and the effects of monopoly power. These impacts include:
(i) financial outcomes, for example, price levels, profitability and price discrimination;
and (ii) such real economic outcomes as allocational efficiency, X-efficiency, the rate
of innovation, fairness and other effects of monopoly. The meaning and testing of
the efficient structure hypothesis.
9. Concepts of innovation: the measurement of innovations speed, scale and effects; and
how competition and monopoly may affect innovation.
10. Important other values that competition promotes, including freedom of choice,
fairness, stability, democracy and so on.
11. Industry studies in all sectors of the economy, ranging from primary materials and
agriculture to manufacturing, services, military supplies and others.
12. Game theory, mathematical versions of theory, and modeling of all kinds. Experimental
studies of the choices made by firms, rivals, consumers and policy makers under
controlled situations.
13. Antitrust policies, of the three main types: toward market dominance, toward mergers,
and toward collusion on prices and other conditions. Criteria for finding which actions
are truly anti-competitive: for example, some price discrimination, predatory pricing
and actions, raising rivals costs, mergers and alliances, and other devices.
14. Public regulation policies since the 1880s. Regulation as a social contract; with
constraints on prices and profits; the protection of monopoly positions; various
effects on efficiency and investment; and other critical and favorable theories of
regulation.
15. The deregulation of various industries in the US and elsewhere; conditions favoring the
removal of constraints; the various successes and failures of deregulation. Natural gas,
banking and equity markets, airlines, railroads, telecommunications, postal, electricity,
water and so on.
16. Public enterprise and not-for-profit third sector firms of various types. Defining
publicness by degrees of public ownership, control and subsidies. Varieties of nonprofit and social enterprises.
All these 16 main areas and their subtopics add up to a very wide range of complicated
subjects. Moreover, each area has several levels: the theory and concepts of the ideas;
the facts and patterns in real situations; and the methods for studying those ideas and
facts.
The pioneers work has improved understanding in all of these areas during the 1870s
to 1980s, but of course the innovations have varied hugely in their timing, importance,
style and impact. Every new idea and method has been controversial in some degree,
amid debates about their relative importance, their validity and their value. These are
difficult questions, and we can only present our best judgments about the pioneers and
their writings.
In this review, the 43 leading pioneers names are set in capital italics; their details are
given in individual profiles, in the next section. The 52 less-prominent pioneers (in italics)
are noted along the way here, in capsule summaries.
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THE 1870s1900s: CLARIFYING THE BASIC CONCEPTS AND

METHODS
The modern pioneering in this field began in the 18701900 decades, as neo-classical
economic theory became dominant in Europe and the United States.
Americans had long favored competition and had resisted controls over markets, by
monopolists and price fixers. After the 1870s, the focus on competition became even clearer.
The new microeconomic theory stressed with precision that competition drove markets
toward efficient allocation.
But at the same time, fierce struggles in real, rugged industrial markets were reducing
actual competition in many parts of the booming and changing US economy. For example,
the new Standard Oil trust captured monopoly power, as also did the US Steel trust of
1901 in the steel industry. Western railroads gained great monopoly power by 1890, and
so did heavy metals producers, farm equipment makers, the new electricity and telephone
monopolies, and scores of other new near-monopoly trusts in US industries during the
first great merger wave of 18971901. These problems were intensified not only by the
rising flood of mergers, but also by a variety of abuses that many dominant firms were
inflicting on their small rivals.2
So the up-beat competitive concepts were being developed in this field just as industrial
turmoil was creating a counter-reality, with intense needs for new policy lessons and tools.
The clash between bright theory and destructive reality forced the leading scholars to reach
complicated judgments and policy choices. Americans had long resisted monopoly and
industrial abuses in small local markets. Now the 18701900 tumult brought much larger
needs, on a national scale.
The earliest modern innovators tackled and clarified many of competitions basic issues.
By 1900 they had made major progress throughout much of the 16 main areas listed
above.
These pioneers engaged in intense debates over the correct theories and methods of
research. They also focused on the real conditions of real markets, even though the basic
types of data were scarce back then (such as about costs and profits, production levels
in firms and industries, and the market share of companies). By 19001910, the main
foundations of the field were in place.
The earliest American pioneer was CHARLES ELLET, JR (181062). He was the first
American mathematical economist, who clarified demand and cost functions, and pricing,
as early as 1839 though with little recognition.
Then in the 1870s1880s, a handful of energetic new scholars and economics departments
emerged, including a few important pioneers. At the University of Michigan, HENRY
CARTER ADAMS (18511921) pioneered before 1890 the early theory of monopolys
effects and the nature of increasing and diminishing returns, of natural monopolies, and
of the basis for public policies.
JOHN BATES CLARK (18471938) soon became the leading US economist writing
on the new neo-classical theory. He drew optimistic lessons that the competitive system
was both efficient and fair, even if it had trusts, monopolies, upheavals, and extreme
richpoor contrasts.
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Richard T. Ely (18541943) at Wisconsin pushed further the analysis of natural monopoly
and of market abuses in the turbulent emerging electricity industry.3
JEREMIAH W. JENKS (18561929) of Cornell did the first detailed studies of industries
that were monopolized by trusts (dominant firms). He also clarified the economies of
scale, effective competition, efficiencies and wastes.
Many others including spectacular popularizers and muckrakers like Ida Tarbell also
wrote and debated the effects and facts, but these few were the most prominent scholars.
THE 19001930 PERIOD: FURTHER INDUSTRIAL

TURBULENCE STIRS NEW IDEAS AND ACTIONS TOWARD
NEAR-MONOPOLIES LIKE STANDARD OIL AND AMERICAN
TOBACCO
Summary
The main issues of the 18701900 debates now played out in antitrust battles and new
regulatory experiments.
During the 1890s, the issues had gathered force with the merger flood, creating nearmonopolies in a wide range of major industries. The supposed mandates of modern
technology favoring large size (that is, economies of scale) were widely claimed, but they
were disputed at length, along with the various harms of monopoly. There was much
debate about whether the new electric and telephone companies were actually natural
monopolies. All these struggles continued after 1900, with the added heat of public outrage
over plutocrats excesses and legions of hapless victims.
During 190615, major antitrust cases were launched against six of the ten largest US
industrial companies. These spectacular cases stirred extensive disputes about the true
extent of the markets, what the anti-competitive abuses were and how severe their impacts
were, and whether the monopoly profits were enormous. During 191113 there were major
antitrust decisions, remedies and compromises by the Supreme Court, involving Standard
Oil, American Tobacco, AT&T and others. Later there was research on the impact of those
cures, especially in the oil industry.
Telephones and electricity stirred extensive debate about regulation and other possible
cures, and the first state-level regulatory commissions were created.
The 1920s brought a number of deeper analyses of costs, pricing and profits in
complicated large firms. The 1920s also engendered the roaring and unstable merger boom,
which included the corrupt pyramiding of controls over electricity systems.
In 1903, Charles J. Bullock (18691941) gave a thorough critique of the claims that mergers
created huge new efficiencies, showing that instead most of them were exaggerated.4 Bullock
anticipated much of the concepts and facts that John Moody presented in 1904, in his
extensive popular book, The Truth About the Trusts. Moodys book surveyed, profiled and
extolled the new dominant firms formed by mergers in many scores of large industries.
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Further critiques of the great 18971901 merger wave were done by William Z. Ripley
(18671941) and others.5
JOHN MAURICE CLARK (18841963), the son of John Bates Clark, made large
innovations with his 1923 book on overhead costs. In 1940 he offered the idea of workable
competition: a set of ten indicators or conditions which might show the strength of
competition.
Eliot Jones (?1971) provided early industry studies, with concepts and evidence about
leading problem industries such as railroads, petroleum, steel and copper. He mainly
criticized the idea of ruinous pricing.6
GEORGE W. STOCKING (18921975) made contributions from 1925 to the 1950s on
the inefficiencies caused by market power, and antitrust in many industries, especially oil
and steel.
MARTIN G. GLAESER (18881967) published in 1927 a landmark book on the
mainstream methods for regulating utilities, advancing the concepts of costs and
pricing.
INNOVATIONS IN THE IMPORTANT 1930s: LARGE FIRMS,

OLIGOPOLY THEORY AND EVIDENCE, THE STRUCTURE
CONDUCTPERFORMANCE LOGIC, WORKABLE
COMPETITION AND UTILITY REGULATION
Summary
The 1930s brought a dramatic enlargement of new ideas and research, as well as upheavals
to antitrust and regulatory policies.
Berle and Means dramatically restated the nature of large corporations, and Chamberlin
and Robinson then offered new theories of oligopoly. Many of the fields leaders shifted
toward using theoretical models and greater abstraction.
But government sources and some scholars also presented new research into large firms,
new statistical data, the detailed study of industry conditions, and the ways that each
markets structure may influence the performance of firms in that market. New data on
four-firm concentration in the US began to be produced and analyzed.
The mainstream structureconduct (behavior)performance logic of causation emerged,
saying that a markets structure tends to influence its behavior and performance. This logic
continued to lead the fields thinking on into the 1970s. It was tested and supported by
logic, statistical studies, and detailed industry research.
Vertical integration and price discrimination also drew attention. AT&Ts large and
deep vertical monopoly (tying its equipment-supplying Western Electric company to its
monopoly of local telephone operating companies) was critiqued at length. Other vertical
problems were hotly debated, especially the rapid growth of grocery chains like A&P and
other discounters as they wiped out thousands of small local stores. The discounters used
their monopsony power to force down the wholesale prices of the goods that they bought
and then resold to the final consumers.
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Antitrust and regulatory policies also went through spectacular changes, first fading
and then rebounding.
GARDINER C. MEANS (18961988) explored in 1932 (with A.A. Berle) the changing
nature of large corporations. Means also studied the effects of concentration on price
cooperation, and he advanced the idea of administered prices.
EDWARD H. CHAMBERLIN (18991967) published in 1933 The Theory of Monopolistic
Competition, often praised as the leading innovation in the field during the important 1930s
decade.
It was paralleled by Joan Robinsons (190383) book of 1933 on imperfect competition,
though there were significant differences.7 Always writing with sophistication, she originated
the marginal-revenue curve, which is crucial to analyzing monopolys effect on price. She
also enlarged the analysis of price discrimination and its competitive effects.
The oligopoly problem was intriguing, but it drew attention away from the much more
acute problem of single-firm dominance for at least the 1930s1950s period.
JAMES C. BONBRIGHT (18911985) developed further the concepts of consumer
benefits and natural monopoly as the basis for rate-base regulation of utilities.
In the 1930s, Frank H. Knight (18851972) and Henry C. Simons (18991946) led the
original Chicago school of the 1930s and 1940s, with a sophisticated view of competition
and many harms of monopoly.8 In the 1920s, Knight had pioneered the analysis of profit
and risk. In the 1930s, Knight and Simons stressed the wider values of competition, beyond
pure static-allocation efficiency. They also urged the importance of protecting competition
because it promoted innovation, healthy democracy, and broader social values, going well
beyond narrow efficiency. This Chicago school approach was radically reversed in the
1950s, toward a rosy optimism that all markets are essentially perfect, that market power is
insignificant, and that monopoly firms always deserve their control over their markets.
Ronald H. Coase (born 1910) began in England but spent most of his career at the
University of Chicago.9 In 1937, he advanced his theory of the nature of the firm. It explored
the conditions that would encourage the firm to enlarge its scope so as to coordinate its
actions internally, versus relying on market transactions to achieve coordination with
outsiders. His 1960 article, The problem of social cost, argued that private actions could
eliminate many harmful externalities, abuses and social problems. This favored minimal
government and encouraged the emergence of the law and economics field.
Abba P. Lerner (190382) also began in England but spent most of his career in the US.
He proposed a simple index of monopoly in 1937: the ratio of price minus marginal cost to
price.10 It soon became a fixture in the literature. The difficulties of defining and measuring
marginal costs (and for that matter, measuring prices) has limited its practical uses.
HAROLD HOTELLING (18951973) originated the theory of spatial location, and he
provided the logic of duopolists tending to choose adjacent locations in product space.
The young Paul M. Sweezy (19102004) presented in 1938 the idea of a kinked demand
curve, to explain how oligopolists might set uniform and unchanging prices.11 He assumed
that oligopolists were timid, because they fear the worst from either cutting or raising
their prices. So they would neither cut nor raise prices. Their resulting two-part demand
curve would have a kink, and the unchanged prices would be sticky. Though Sweezy
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was the leading Marxist economist in the US, he did not make research innovations in
this fields areas.
EDWARD S. MASON (18991992) joined J.M. Clark in advocating complex criteria
for competition. He also formed the Harvard group that did various industry studies,
and he promoted the structureconduct (behavior)performance logic.
In 1940 Clair Wilcox (18981970) published the first comprehensive survey of competition
and monopoly in the US economy.12 He noted that most of the US economic activity
took place in effectively competitive markets, but large market power existed in markets
with about 20 percent of the economy. His appraisals considered both concentration and
companies behavior and profitability. The study became a landmark for commentary
and later research.
Horace M. Gray (18981986) in 1940 declared that the regulation of utilities had already
shown fatal economic weaknesses.13 This early critique made him the first major advocate
of deregulation, a change which gained force only in the 1970s.
IN THE 1940s: SCHUMPETER AND GAME THEORY

Summary
The 1940s brought a new emphasis on the good role of dominant firms, and it also saw
the creation of game theory.
Schumpeter defended large firms with the idea of creative destruction, where competition
was a rough, dynamic process rather than a set of precise equilibrium results. Dominant
firms, he said, would generate innovations, rather than merely raise prices and retard
creative progress.
The 1940s also brought more oligopoly theorizing. Von Neumann and Morgensterns
creation of game theory in 1944 enlarged oligopoly theory and enhanced the role of
mathematics. Yet Fellner showed that words could still clarify oligopoly. Adelman praised
price discrimination for its pro-competitive role. And Edwards criticized extreme diversification by large firms.
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER (18831950) advanced in 1942 his view of competition as

a dynamic process, which would promote innovation even if it sacrificed static efficiency.
In 1944, John von Neumann (190357) and Oskar Morgenstern (190277) published
The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, with its extensive technical analysis that
immediately created game theory as a new field.14 It had relevance for numerous areas like
war gaming, and also for the two-firm version of oligopoly. It also enlarged the role of
mathematics in all market theorizing, including oligopoly.
In contrast, William J. Fellner (190583) enriched and extended in 1949 the analysis of
oligopoly situations, using analytical words and judgments rather than mathematics.15 In
1951, Fellner also wrote a classic paper arguing that competition would tend to increase
the rate of innovation. Both his oligopoly book and the innovation paper became fixtures
in the literature, but he then moved on to other economic areas.
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Corwin D. Edwards (190179) helped to create the RobinsonPatman Act of 1936,

which attacked price discrimination by large firms.16 He also studied and censured the
spread of highly diversified firms, both in the US and in the vast Japanese conglomerate
combines. They combined market power from many financial and industrial sectors,
resulting cumulatively in greater total political power. With that power, as Edwards and
others noted, the combines had strengthened Japans militarism and its ultimate role in
the Second World War. He later wrote extensively about price discrimination, which he
regarded as mostly anti-competitive.
Eleanor M. Hadley (born 1916) was a key young staff official in the Allied Occupation
Forces in postwar Japan.17 She worked aggressively and effectively in helping to break
up the leading financial and industrial conglomerates; Japanese officials often referred
to her as the Dragon Lady. In 1969 she published a definitive account of the industrial
break-ups.
MORRIS A. ADELMAN (born 1917) was the true originator of many free-market
ideas, involving price discrimination, concentration and vertical integration. After 1960,
he became a leading expert on the world oil industry.
THE 1950s: NEW RESEARCH IDEAS ON TIGHT OLIGOPOLY,

BARRIERS TO ENTRY, COUNTERVAILING POWER AND
MEASUREMENTS
Summary
The 1950s greatly enriched the fields variety of concepts and methods.
Adelman led the effort to disprove any rise of US industrial concentration. Galbraith
advanced the idea of countervailing power, and Harberger produced empirical suggestions
that monopolys harms might be tiny rather than important. Marginal-cost pricing was
advanced by J.R. Nelson in the US, as well as by French and British specialists.
Big business assigned itself credit for much of the US 1950s economic boom, when the
structureconduct (behavior)performance logic of this field was dominant. But the large
oligopolies in steel, automobiles and so on, usually raised prices once each year, after laborunion bargaining was set, and then held them steady. This stair-step pattern looked like the
1930s administered prices, rather than determined by flexible, competitive pressures.
Also, there was testing of the BerleMeans thesis from 1932, that large-firm managers
often pursue other motives sheer size, growth, risk avoidance, personal amenities and
so on which deviate from maximizing the firms profits.
In 1956, Bains major book shifted attention out to the edges of the market, where
potential competition and entry barriers may be important. Such barriers would
supplement or perhaps displace the dominance and concentration that could create
market power at the center of the market.
In contrast, Kaysen and Turner said in 1959 that tight oligopoly, with four-firm
concentration above 70 percent, was really shared monopoly, which needed correction by
antitrust policy actions. Oligopoly was now analyzed with several distinct models (including
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theoretical models and game theory, kinked demand curves, price leadership of various
sorts, and tight oligopoly shared monopolies).
A major 1959 book also explored competition in the transport industries, especially
railroads. And by 1960 Shubik and others had tried but failed to apply game theory to
real industries.
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH (born 1908) advanced a theory of war-time price

controls in 1948. The governments controls could be tighter over few-firm oligopolies
than over the many scrappy firms in unruly competitive markets. In 1952 he originated
the idea of countervailing power, and later in the 1960s he analyzed and deplored the
militaryindustrial complex.
In 1951 John Nash (born 1928) wrote his main ideas about the theory of games, which
later gained prominence in the game theory literature.18
Fritz Machlup (190283) published in 1952 two thorough books, on monopoly pricing
and on patents.19 His discussion of price discrimination was detailed and sophisticated,
noting that discrimination could be pro- or anti-competitive, depending on the setting.
ALFRED E. KAHN (born 1917) and Joel Dirlam (born 1915) proposed in 1954 that
fair competition be made the goal and criterion for antitrust policy. This would consider
a firms behavior and intentions, not just its market position and profit rates. In 1959
Kahn co-authored (with Melvin de Chazeau) a major study on vertical integration in the
US oil industry.
Dirlam later joined in the important 1958 study of diverse managerial motivations in
large firms.20 It showed that disparate motives like large size, risk avoidance and personal
amenities were widespread. He was also the co-author in 1966 with WALTER ADAMS
of two strong critiques of the US steel industry, for its pricing rigidity (which was caused
by excess vertical integration) and its poor innovation. In the 1960s, Dirlam pioneered by
studying Yugoslavias shift toward less-controlled markets and its unique worker-managed
enterprises.
In 1954 the theorist Arnold Harberger (born 1924) analyzed some data for 1926,
concluding that market power in the US economy back then had only a tiny effect in
reducing efficient allocation.21 Various downward biases in his methods were soon shown
by several writers, and a variety of later estimates were substantially higher. But Harberger
did initiate this line of research.
WALTER ADAMS (192298) and Horace M. Gray in 1955 attacked needless regulation
for blocking the beneficial effects of competition, especially in transportation industries.
Adams also presented a textbook of industry studies, and (with Joel Dirlam) in 1966 he
criticized the tight oligopoly in the steel industry. In the 1980s he criticized the merger
mania.
Jesse W. Markham (born 1916) published industry studies on rayon in 1952 and the
fertilizer industry in 1958.22 Perhaps his best-known innovation was about price leadership.
He noted that price leaders might raise prices as benign barometers, which merely reflected
the underlying cost trends and other causes, rather than exerting any separate effects to
raise prices.
Gideon Rosenbluth (born 1921) has been a Canadian innovator who published extensive
analyses of Canadas industrial concentration.23 Rosenbluth put this in book-length form
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in 1957, and in 1970 he mounted a pathbreaking study of foreign control in relatively small
countries like Canada, small in economic totals, compared at least with the US.
JOE S. BAIN (191293) urged the importance of potential competition, entry barriers
and limit pricing. He also elaborated more on the mainstream SCP (or SBP) approach,
and in the 1960s he published an international comparison of industrial structures in
several Western nations.
A thorough study of managers actual motivations was published in 1958 by Kaplan,
Dirlam and Robert F. Lanzillotti (born 1920).24 Applying extensive research to the Berle
and Means hypothesis of managerial control, it showed that many managers strayed
significantly from strict profit maximizing. This anticipated much of the large-firm literature
of the 1960s.
Edith Tilton Penrose (191596) presented in 1959 a pathbreaking analysis of The Theory
of the Growth of the Firm.25 It stressed that new pockets of various managerial skills and
excess resources might naturally emerge within firms, leading to further growth and change.
It tied into Marshalls earlier study of firms evolution, and it anticipated much of the later
discussion of firms internal conditions. After some time, it came to be seen as a classic,
with seminal status. Because Penrose had to be peripatetic with her husbands career, she
lacked a firm academic platform for building and enlarging on her innovations.
WILLARD F. MUELLER (born 1925) co-wrote with George W. Stocking in 1955
an influential critique of antitrust standards in the Cellophane case decision. He greatly
enhanced the quality and influence of economics in the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
in the 1960s, developing many lines of research.
William Vickrey (191496) also concentrated on marginal-cost pricing, developing
concepts for using it in road pricing and other local transportation.26 In 1971 he offered
proposals for responsive pricing of utility services.
James R. Nelson (191785) critiqued in 1958 the regulation of transportation, particularly
railroads, for blocking competition and flexible pricing.27 In 1963 he published Marginal-Cost
Pricing in Practice; his applied focus was an advance on the pure theories of marginal-cost
pricing. Nelson dealt especially with French electricity pricing, including translations and
commentary by Nelson on the major French writings.
CARL KAYSEN (born 1920) applied oligopoly theory creatively in 195152; published
in 1956 a major case study of the United Shoe Machinery case; and urged in 1957 a wider
standard for evaluating the impacts of large corporations.
In 1959 he joined with DONALD F. TURNER, JR (192294) in rethinking tight
oligopoly and antitrust policy. They surveyed industry structures in the US economy,
arguing that tight oligopoly held harmful market power and needed an antitrust cure.
Later, both as a scholar and as the Antitrust Division chief in 196568, Turner dealt with
a wide range of antitrust issues. His AreedaTurner rule (1975) changed antitrust policies
toward predatory pricing.
GEORGE J. STIGLER (191191) had advocated strict criteria for competition and
antitrust during 194752; but by 1958 he reversed this viewpoint, finding virtually all
markets to be competitive. He promoted the survivor method for estimating scale economies,
and in the 1960s he developed theories of oligopoly and of regulation.
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL (born 1922) urged in 1959 that sales or growth maximizing was
important in many large firms. He later suggested a stay-low rule for curing predatory
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pricing. With colleagues, he discussed in 1979 the sustainability of Ramsey prices, and
he offered in 1982 (with colleagues) the idea of contestability.
Merton J. Peck (born 1925) contributed to assembling the detailed concentration data
on tight oligopolies in the 1959 KaysenTurner book.28 He also participated as a co-author
in the landmark 1959 book (by JOHN R. MEYER (born 1927), Peck, John Stenason,
and Charles J. Zwick), which analyzed how competition might improve efficiency in
the regulated railroad industry. In 1962 Peck analyzed (with F.M. SCHERER) why the
militarys weapons purchasing process created large wastes. He also published in 1962 a
case study of the aluminum industry. In 1969 he co-authored (with ROGER G. NOLL
and John J. McGowan) an innovative analysis of regulation and future of the television
industry.
Martin Shubik (born 1926) was deeply involved with game theory in the 1950s, developing
new technical features of it.29 He also tried to apply it to real markets. But in his 1959
book Strategy and Market Structure, Shubik admitted that game theory could not be
applied to real markets. Real cases were simply too complicated to fit to games models
of duopoly. Game theory faded in interest and attention, but in the 1970s many young
theorists turned to it again. Game theory still lacked practical uses, but theorists spoke
of its insights and suggestions and rigor. Shubik led and joined that rebirth, and his
Market Structure and Behavior (1980) (with R.E. Levitan) was a significant contribution
to the new game theory literature.
THE 1960s: EVEN RICHER VARIETY, WITH NEW

ATTENTION TO INNOVATION, DATA ON CONCENTRATION,
X-INEFFICIENCY IN LARGE FIRMS, AND DOUBTS ABOUT
REGULATION
Summary
The 1960s expanded the diversity of research methods, to use pure theory, various kinds
of cross-section empirical studies, and analyses of antitrust and regulation.
The analysis of antitrust and regulation became increasingly critical. New econometric
studies of structure and performance drew on the fast-growing power of computers, which
could crunch far more detailed numbers on industrial concentration, pricecost patterns,
and mergers. The causes, types and benefits of innovation became a major research topic.
Critiques of regulations economic impacts began to expand, especially about the regulation
of transportation industries like airlines and railroads.
Chicago school and other free-market advocates began to defend monopoly more
aggressively, and their resistance to antitrust policies hardened. As for large firms, they
blossomed as a research field. The idea that large firms might often have great X-inefficiency
became influential.
As part of the rising attention to technological change, Richard R. Nelson (born 1930)
supervised two major NBER (National Bureau of Economic Research) studies (in 1961
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and 1962), dealing in depth with the measurement and analysis of innovation.30 He and
Sidney G. Winter also researched how an evolutionary process might cause changes in
firms and markets.31
Norman Collins and Lee E. Preston (born 1930) showed in 1961 how unstable the ranks
of the largest US corporations might be.32 Then in 1968 they used census pricecost margins
to test market powers effects in raising prices.
Edwin Mansfield (193098) was a leader in the 1960s in the practical measurement of
innovations dimensions and monopolys influence on it.33 He tested monopoly powers
effect in retarding innovation, as William J. Fellner had predicted theoretically in 1949.
In contrast, Galbraith had suggested that tight oligopolies facing vertical pressure would
innovate rapidly. Mansfield found mixed patterns; market power showed some slowing of
innovation, but certain conditions could reverse the effect.
RICHARD E. CAVES (born 1931) published in 1962 a pathbreaking critique of US
airline regulation. Later he applied econometric methods to many hypotheses, especially
about international aspects of competition. His research also extended into numerous
fields beyond industrial organization.
Michael Gort (born 1923) provided in 1962 an extensive factual analysis of diversification and integration in US industries.34 He stressed the role of the firms endowment of
human capital; it determines the choices whether to diversify and/or to integrate vertically.
In 1963 he analyzed the stability and change of market shares over time, with a focus on
concentration patterns. He explored how innovations have changing roles over the lifestage of an industry; at first, innovation promotes entry, while it retards entry in the later
stages.
Richard M. Cyert (born 1921) and James G. March (born 1929) extended the analysis
of large firms internal tendencies toward bureaucracy and inefficiency.35 The concepts
expanded the ideas begun by Berle and Means in 1932, Ronald Coase in 1937 and Edith
Penrose in 1956.
LELAND L. JOHNSON (born 1930) published in 1963 (with Harvey Averch) a
pathbreaking analysis explaining why regulated monopolies tend to indulge in bloated
costs and too much investment.36 They also explained why the constrained monopolist
will try to capture and monopolize adjacent markets, using subsidies from the regulated
market, as AT&T had done and continued to do in the 1970s.
Almarin Phillips (19252006) published studies in 1962 covering a range of collusive and
cartel pricing behavior.37 Phillips also led a 1975 collective study of regulations possible
economic harms in a variety of sectors (this extended the work of Adams and Gray in
1955).
LEONARD W. WEISS (192594) began with case studies, then measured concentration
and its effects on wages, prices, discrimination and advertising.
John M. Blair (191676), a prominent congressional economist and later academic
scholar, argued that industrial concentration caused large costs and dangers.38 As Chief
Economist of Senator Estes Kefauvers Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
during 195670?, he produced research evidence about market and total concentration in
the 1950s1960s, and also about administered prices. In the 1960s he led the subcommittees
investigations of monopoly in drug markets. He also worked with census officials to expand
US industrial concentration data, and he clarified the adjustments for fitting arbitrary
census industries to true market boundaries.
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Franklin M. Fisher (born 1934) was a co-author in an early group study (1962) into
oligopolys effect in raising the frequency and costs of US automobile model changes.39
Later he and colleagues criticized the use of accounting profits. They said that profits data
had no value in antitrust cases involving IBM (he led IBMs economics team in the 1970s,
helping IBM to defeat some 20 antitrust challenges).
Donald J. Dewey (19222002) was an early innovator in using price theory to assess the
research on concentration and its effects.40 Though trained at Chicago, he held independent
views, urging realism rather than romance in antitrust policy, avoiding the perfectmarkets attitude. Among his creative discussions: challenging the possible correlation
of concentration with profitability, the importance of free entry, the harms of collusion,
and the claims of Robert H. Bork. He relied on neo-classical price theory, in deflating
traditional claims for antitrust and other public policies.
JACOB SCHMOOKLER (191867) deepened in 1966 the analysis of technologys
progress, exploring its historical sources and stressing the role of competition.
FREDERIC M. SCHERER (born 1932) studied military waste, dominant-firm
innovation, mergers and economies of scale; he also wrote a 1970 landmark textbook
on the field.
WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD (born 1936) analyzed the actual levels and effects of market
concentration, the efficiency of public enterprises, the survivor test, marginal-cost pricing,
racial and gender discrimination, dominant-firms profits, the trend of US competition,
the central role of market share, and contestability theory.
HARVEY J. LEIBENSTEIN (192292) created in 1966 the important concept of Xefficiency.
WILLIAM S. COMANOR (born 1935) created studies (with Thomas A. Wilson) that
explored how intensive advertising might tend to raise market power. Comanor also
clarified drug-industry innovation, vertical restrictions, and (with Robert H. Smiley) he
estimated monopolys impact on the distribution of wealth.
Paul M. Sweezy joined with Paul A. Baran in 1966 in publishing a Marxist book about
Monopoly Capital. They asserted that financial controls over industrial concentration were
pervasive, but they did not present evidence.
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON (born 1932) did early-1960s research on large firms,
eventually developing the idea of transactions costs. In 1968 he explored the possible
trade-off between mergers monopoly effects in raising prices and the possible economies
of scale that might reduce prices.
HAROLD DEMSETZ (born 1930) extended the new Chicago schools free-market
approach in two ways. He argued in 1968 that franchise regulation could replace price
regulation. He also favored reversing the mainstream SCP (or SBP) logic of causation.
Seymour Melman (19172004) first showed by 1954 how management costs related to
firm sizes. Later he focused on the permanent war economy, with its industrial market
power.41 Extending Galbraiths work on the military-industrial complex, Melman stressed
in the 1960s and later that Pentagon capitalism was distinct from normal competitive
markets; it was driven by monopoly, vertical collusion, and other special conditions.
Radical political economists are a puzzling case of Marxian innovations that did not
occur. Karl Marx had provided in Das Kapital (1883) a deep left-wing challenge to the
mainstream ideas in this field, which treated markets as mostly competitive. Marx predicted
that ownership and power would become ever more concentrated, eventually in a few
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161
hands. Monopoly would prevail. Until the 1960s, Marxist economists were few, and only
two of them, Paul M. Sweezy and Paul Baran, continued to urge Marxs predictions.42
Their restatement of them in 1966 amounted to a type of pioneering step at that time.
In the 1960s sharp dissent cropped up in the US, and a new echelon of radical economists
formed sizeable groups at several campuses (especially the University of Massachusetts,
the New School for Social Research, and the University of California at Riverside).43 They
focused on labor problems, social issues and Third World development. But they ignored
the applied questions of actual industrial concentration and market power. Therefore they
missed the chance to do innovative research in this field.
THE 1970s: MORE RICH VARIETY, BUT WITH A SHIFT

TOWARD FREE-MARKET THEORY, GAME THEORY
AND A CAMPAIGN FOR DEREGULATION
Summary
The 1970s brought further enrichment of the field, but also a rapid spread of game
theorizing. And free-market advocates grew more influential.
Econometric studies tested the effects of individual firms market shares, mergers
and innovations. Large-firm conditions were explored further by Williamson, especially
transactions costs. Experimental studies of duopoly were developed further by Friedman
and others. The free-market challenge to the mainstream SBP approach gathered force,
relying mainly on theory rather than on thorough factual research. Game theory spread,
and research about regulations possible harms proliferated further, favoring the growing
campaign to remove regulation from a variety of utility sectors.
PAUL W. MACAVOY (born 1934) partitioned and criticized the effects of natural gas
regulation, helping make the case for the deregulation of that industry. He critiqued (with
Stephen Breyer, born 1938) the regulation of electricity. And he suggested that OPEC
(Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries) raised oil prices in the 1970s only
moderately above the effect of rising long-term scarcity.
HARRY M. TREBING (born 1927) restated regulatory economics and applied it to
telecommunications.
John J. Siegfried (born 1945) defended concentration ratios; and did numerous empirical
studies, including one which tested firm size and market structure as determinants of
antitrust actions to raise competition.44 He also tested how market power could influence
political activities and actual policies.
Stanley E. Boyle (192784) was a leading economist at the FTC in the 1960s, working
with Willard F. Mueller to enlarge FTC research.45 In the 1970s he and Mueller founded
the Industrial Organization Society to foster applied research, and in 1974 he began
publishing the Industrial Organization Review, which was renamed the Review of Industrial
Organization in 1984.
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162
DENNIS C. MUELLER (born 1940) explored with econometrics the determinants

of corporate mergers, the persistence of dominant-firm profits in the long run, and the
welfare costs of market power.
Morton I. Kamien (born 1938) and Nancy L. Schwartz (193781) studied the possibilities
that competition would lead firms to invest in innovation by either too much or too
little; too little, because they cannot capture all the benefits of innovations, or too much
because of pressures in the race to prevail by innovating first.46 Kamien and Schwartz also
modified the analysis of limit pricing to assume that entry was related to the incumbents
price level.
ROGER G. NOLL (born 1940) joined early analysis of deregulation (1971), co-authored
an early exploration of television regulation and deregulation (1973), and pioneered
economic research into the sports industry (1974).
SAM PELTZMAN (born 1940) analyzed controls and entry in commercial banking in
1965, finding them ineffective. Later he evaluated the regulation of the drug industry in
the 1960s, and in 1976 he offered a general theory of regulation.47
Kenneth G. Elzinga (born 1942) extended Walter Adamss earlier point that many
successful antitrust cases turn out to be Pyrrhic victories; winning the formal case but
losing when no good remedy is applied.48 He also co-authored a criterion (with Thomas F.
Hogarty) for defining geographic markets, such as for coal or beer. This test used data on
the ratio of shipments into and out of a local area to find if that area was a true market.
James W. Friedman (born 1936) developed early experimental studies of duopoly,
working with groups of students.49 His work analyzed the numerous dimensions and
behavior of leading firms in oligopoly markets.
RICHARD SCHMALENSEE (born 1944) did research on advertisings effects, market
power in the cereals industry and advertising, the nature of market power, and the various
causes of high profitability.
Robert T. Masson (born 1944) analyzed the motives of large-firm executives, relating them
to stock-price performance. He also showed distortions caused by the public regulation
of milk markets.50
A. MICHAEL SPENCE (born 1943) studied monopolistic competition and possible
excess product variety, and also the power of signalling.
Kenneth D. Boyer (born 1949) disaggregated the informational and persuasive components
of advertising, while estimating how advertising influences profits.51 He showed that
differing sizes of firms could make it difficult to define markets clearly. He also became a
leader in applying rigorous concepts to the economics of transportation.
The theorist ROBERT D. WILLIG (born 1947) joined W.J. Baumol in much of the work
on sustainability and contestability. He also explored definitions of predation (1981).
19801985: FURTHER EMERGENCE OF PURE THEORY AND

FREE-MARKET IDEAS
Summary
Free-market ideas gained political advantage in the Reagan administration, both in antitrust
and deregulation efforts. Game theorizing also spread further.
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163
Christopher Green (born 1937) of Canadas McGill University, wrote the first comprehensive
study of the Canadian field of industrial organization.52 This early 1980s book also covered
the actual competitive conditions, as well as Canadas antitrust and regulatory policies.
Stephen Martin (born 1948) showed in the early 1980s that market structure can be
partly endogenous in empirical structureconduct (behaviour)performance studies using
industry data.53 His 1983 monograph suggested that the positive market-share-profitability
association reflects more than efficiency. This finding was affirmed by his 1988 study.
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ (born 1943) studied asymmetric information, risk, insurance
and the theory of market structure.
John E. Kwoka (born 1946) applied statistical analysis in 1979 to relate individual firms
market shares especially the third-largest firm to the pricecost margins of the entire
market.54 Kwoka also joined in FTC research on the professions, showing that market
power reduced quality and raised prices in those important sectors.
Steven C. Salop (born 1946) defined raising rivals costs (with David T. Scheffman), a
device which firms may impose to put their rivals at a disadvantage.55 He also analyzed
theories of price variations, strategic entry deterrence, consumer information and oligopoly
coordination.
Paul M. Joskow (born 1947) wrote in 1983 (with Richard Schmalensee) an extensive
analysis of the prospects for competition in the regulated electricity industry.56
JOHN R. MEYER and others explored the effects from deregulating US airlines in
1978.
NOTES
1. The shape of the fields literature can be seen in Joe S. Bain, Industrial Organization, rev. edn, Wiley, New
York, 1968; F.M. Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 3rd edn,
Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA, 1990; William G. Shepherd, The Economics of Industrial Organization, 5th
edn, Waveland Press, Prospect Heights, IL, 2005; and for recent technical directions, Richard Schmalensee
and Robert D. Willig (eds), Handbook of Industrial Organization, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1989.
2. See Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry, 18951956, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ, 1959; and Naomi Lamoreaux, The Great Merger Movement in American Business, 18951904,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.
3. BA Columbia College, 1876. Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin, 18921922. Also Founder
and President, American Economic Association, 190002.
4. BA Boston University, 1889; PhD University of Wisconsin, 1895. Professor of Economics, Harvard
University, 190335. See his Trust literature: a survey and criticism, Quarterly Journal of Economics,
February 1901, pp. 167217.
5. BA MIT, 1890; MA, PhD Columbia University, 1892, 1893. Professor of Economics, Harvard University,
190133. See his Railroads Rates and Regulation, Ginn, Boston, MA, 1912; and Ripley, W.Z. (ed.), Trusts,
Pools and Corporations, Ginn, Boston, MA, 1916.
6. See Eliot Jones, Is competition in industry ruinous?, Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1920,
pp. 4845.
7. MA Cambridge University, 1927. Lecturer to Professor of Economics, Cambridge University, 193271.
See her Economics of Imperfect Competition, Macmillan, London, 1933.
8. Frank H. Knight, 18851972. BA Milligan College, 1911 and University of Tennessee, 1913; PhD Cornell
University, 1916. Professor of Economics, University of Chicago, 192855; also at Cornell University and the
University of Iowa. See his Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, Macmillan, London, 1921, and, at the University
of Chicago Press, Chicago, Chicago, The Economic Organization, 1933, The Ethics of Competition, 1935
and Freedom and Reform, 1947.
Henry C. Simons, 18991946. BA University of Michigan, 1920. Professor of Economics, University of
Chicago, 192746; also at the University of Iowa, 192027. See especially his Economic Policy for a Free
Society, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1948.
21/5/07 12:19:27
164
9. BCom, DSc University of London, 1932, 1951. Professor, University of Chicago, 196479. Reader at
the London School of Economics, 193551; Professor, University of Buffalo, 195158 and University of
Virginia, 195864. Recipient of the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1991. See his The nature of the firm,
Economica, November 1937, pp. 386405; and The problems of social cost, Journal of Law and Economics,
October 1960, pp. 144.
10. BSc, PhD University of London, 1932, 1943. Professor of Economics, New School for Social Research,
194247; Roosevelt University, 194759; Michigan State University, 195965; University of California,
Berkeley, 196571; and Queens College, New York, 197178. See his The concept of monopoly and the
measurement of monopoly power, Review of Economic Studies, June 1934, pp. 15775.
11. BA, PhD Harvard University, 1931, 1937. Instructor and Assistant Professor, Harvard University, 193446;
Co-editor, Monthly Review, 19492004. See his Demand under conditions of oligopoly, Journal of Political
Economy, August 1939, pp. 56873.
12. BS University of Pennsylvania, 1919; MA Ohio State University, 1922; PhD University of Pennsylvania,
1927. Assistant Professor to Professor of Economics, Swarthmore College, 192768. See his Competition
and Monopoly in the American Economy, Monograph 21, Temporary National Economic Committee, US
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1940; and Public Policies Toward Business, 4th edn, Richard
D. Irwin, Homewood, IL,1970.
13. BS 1922, MS 1923, PhD 1926 all at the University of Illinois. Assistant Professor to Professor, University
of Illinois, 192766. See his Passing of the public utility concept, Journal of Land and Public Utility
Economics, 8, February 1940, pp. 1635.
14. John Von Neumann, PhD University of Budapest, 1926. Professor at Princeton University Institute for
Advanced Study, 193357. See Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ, 1944.
Oskar Morgenstern, Dr. University of Vienna, 1925. Professor of Economics, Princeton University,
193870.
15. Diplome (Chemical Engineering) Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich, 1927; PhD University of Berlin,
1929. Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 193952; and Yale University, 195273.
President of the American Economic Association, 1969. See his Competition Among the Few, Norton, New
York, 1949.
16. BA, BJ, University of Missouri, 1920, 1921; Diploma in Economics, BLitt, Oxford University, 1922, 1924;
PhD, Cornell University, 1928; Rhodes Scholar, 192124. Edwards spent most of his career in staff positions
at the Federal Trade Commission and various congressional committees, but he was also Professor of Law,
University of Oregon, 196371. He wrote a massive study of the Japanese combines in 1945, based on
research he did in Japan immediately after the Second World War. See also his Maintaining Competition,
McGraw-Hill, New York, 1949; The Price Discrimination Law, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC,
1959; and Cartelization in Western Europe, Department of State, Washington, DC, 1964.
17. BA Mills College, 1934; MA Radcliffe College, 1943; PhD Harvard College, 1949. Associate Professor
of Economics, Smith College, 195665; Adjutant Professor, George Washington University, 197284;
Group Director, International Division, US General Accounting Office, 197481; Lecturer, University of
Washington, 1984. See her Antitrust in Japan, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1971.
18. BS, MS Carnegie-Mellon University, 1948; PhD Princeton University, 1950. Instructor, MIT, 195159.
Awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics, 1994. See his Noncooperative games, Annals of Mathematics,
September 1951, pp. 28695. Featured in the major movie A Beautiful Mind, 2003.
19. Dr. Rer. Pol. University of Vienna, 1923. Professor of Economics, University of Buffalo, 193547; Johns
Hopkins University, 194760; Princeton University, 196071; and New York University, 197183. President
of the American Economic Association, 1966. See his The Economics of Sellers Competition, Johns Hopkins
University Press, Baltimore, MD, 1952; and The Political Economy of Monopoly, Johns Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore, MD, 1952.
20. BA, PhD Yale University, 1936, 1947. Professor of Economics, University of Connecticut, 1952, 195663;
University of Rhode Island, 196481; and Visiting Professor, University of Paris, 196970. Consultant,
US International Trade Commission, since 1981; research on Yugoslav enterprises, 195973.
See A.D.H. Kaplan, Joel B. Dirlam and Robert F. Lanzillotti, Pricing in Big Business: A Case Approach,
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1958; Adams and Dirlam, Steel imports and vertical oligopoly
power, American Economic Review, March 1966, pp. 16068; and Adams and Dirlam, Big steel, invention
and innovation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 1966, pp. 16789.
21. MA (International Relations), PhD University of Chicago, 1947, 1950. Associate Professor to Professor of
Economics at the University of Chicago, 195391. See his Monopoly and resource allocation, American
Economic Review, May 1954, pp. 7787.
22. BA University of Richmond, 1941; MA, PhD Harvard University, 1947, 1949. Professor of Economics,
Princeton University, 195368; Harvard University, since 1982. See his The nature and significance of price
leadership, American Economic Review, December 1951, pp. 891905; Competition in the Rayon Industry,
21/5/07 12:19:28
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
165
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1952; and The Fertilizer Industry: Study of an Imperfect Market,
Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, TN, 1958.
BA University of Toronto, 1943; PhD Columbia University, 1953. Professor at University of British
Columbia, since 1962. President, Canadian Economic Association. See his Measures of concentration,
in George J. Stigler (ed.), Business Concentration and Price Policy, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
NJ, 1955; Concentration in Canadian Manufacturing Industries, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ,
1957; and The relation between foreign control and concentration in Canadian industry, Canadian Journal
of Economics, February 1970, pp. 5795.
Robert F. Lanzillotti, BA, MA, American University, 1947, 1948; PhD, University of California at Berkeley,
1953. Professor and Chair of Economics, Michigan State University, 196169; Professor of Management
and Dean, School of Business, University of Florida, since 1969. Commissioner, US Price Commission,
197172. See A.D.H. Kaplan, Joel B. Dirlam and Robert F. Lanzillotti, Pricing in Big Business, Brookings
Institution, Washington, DC, 1958.
BA University of California, 1936; MA, PhD Johns Hopkins University, 1951. Lecturer, Johns Hopkins,
195159; Professor of Economics, SOAS, 196478; and Professor of Political Economy, INSTEAD,
Fontainebleau, France, 197784. She served on numerous British Commissions of Enquiry and councils
on overseas development matters. See her The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Basil Blackwell, Oxford,
1959, rev. edn, 1995.
BS Yale University, 1935; MA, PhD Columbia University, 1937, 1947. Professor of Political Economy,
Columbia University, 195079. President of the American Economic Association, 1992; awarded the Nobel
Prize in Economics, 1996. See his The Revision of the Rapid Transit Fare Structure of the City of New York,
Financial Project, Mayors Commission Management Survey, 1952; and Responsive pricing of utility
services, Bell Journal of Economics, 1971.
BA 1938, Oberlin; PhD 1941, Harvard. Professor of Economics, Amherst College, 194884. See his MarginalCost Pricing in Practice, Wiley, New York, 1963.
BA Oberlin College, 1949; MA, PhD Harvard University, 1951, 1954. Professor of Economics, Yale
University, 196281. See Competition in the Transportation Industries (with John R. Meyer, John Stenason
and Charles J. Zwick), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1959, Competition in the Aluminum
Industry, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1962, and Weapons Acquisition: An Economic Analysis
(with F.M. Scherer), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1963, Economic Aspects of Television
Regulation (with Roger G. Noll and John McGowan), Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1973.
BA (Maths), MA University of Toronto, 1947, 1949; MA, PhD Princeton University, 1951, 1953. Professor
of Economics and Organization, 196075, of Mathematics and Institutional Economics, Yale University,
since 1975. See his Strategy and Market Structure, Wiley, New York, 1959, and Market Structure and
Behavior (with R.E. Levitan), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1980.
BA Oberlin College, 1952; MA, PhD Yale University, 1954, 1956. Professor of Economics, Yale University,
196886; Professor of International Public Affairs, Business and Law, Columbia University, since 1986. See
Nelson (ed.), Government and Technical Progress: A Cross-Industry Analysis, Pergamon, Oxford, 1982.
See their An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1981.
Lee E. Preston, BA Vanderbilt, 1951; MA, PhD Harvard University, 1953, 1958. Professor, School of
Business Administration, University of California at Berkeley, 195869; Professor, School of Management,
State University of New York at Buffalo, 196979; Professor, College of Business and Management,
University of Maryland at College Park, 1980. See Collins and Preston, The size structure of the largest
industrial firms, American Economic Review, December 1961, pp. 9861011; and their Pricecost margins
and industry structure, Review of Economics and Statistics, August 1969, pp. 27186.
BA Dartmouth College, 1951; MA, PhD, Duke University, 1953, 1955. Assistant and Associate Professor,
Carnegie-Mellon University, 195563; Professor of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 196398. See
his Industrial Research and Technological Innovation, W.W. Norton, London, 1968, and The Economics of
Technological Change, W.W. Norton, London, 1968.
BA Brooklyn College, 1943; MA, PhD Columbia University, 1951, 1954. Professor of Economics, State
University of New York, Buffalo, NY, since 1963. See his Diversification and Integration in American Industry,
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1962; Analysis of stability and change in market share, Journal
of Political Economy, 71, February 1963 pp. 5161; and Time paths in the diffusion of product innovations,
Economic Journal, 92, September 1982 (with S. Klepper), pp. 64042.
Richard M. Cyert, BS University of Minnesota, 1943; PhD Columbia University, 1951. Professor of
Economics and Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University, 194872, President, CarnegieMellon University, after 1972. See his Oligopoly price behavior and the business cycle, Journal of Political
Economy, February 1955, pp. 4151, and (with James G. March), A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, PrenticeHall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1963.
James G. March, BA University of Wisconsin, 1949; MA, PhD Yale University, 1950, 1953. Professor
of Economics, Carnegie-Mellon University, 195364; University of California at Irvine; and Dean of
21/5/07 12:19:28
166
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

the School of Social Sciences, 196470, Professor of Higher Education, Management and International
Management, Stanford University, 197095.
BA, University of Oregon, 1952; MA, PhD Yale University, 1953, 1956. Senior Economist, RAND
Corporation, 1963. See Behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint, American Economic Review,
December 1963, pp. 105269.
BS, MA, University of Pennsylvania, 1948, 1949; PhD Harvard University, 1953. Associate and Full
Professor, University of Virginia, 195663; University of Pennsylvania, 195356, 196391?. See his Market
Structure, Organization and Performance, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1962; and Phillips
(ed.), Promoting Competition in Regulated Markets, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1975.
BA, ? PhD,? Starting 1938, he did research reports on industrial concentration, especially in the oil industry.
He was Assistant Chief Economist at the Federal Trade Commission during 194756, doing many reports
on concentration. See John M. Blair, Economic Concentration, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, New York,
1972; and The Control of Oil, Pantheon Books, New York, 1976.
BA, MA, PhD Harvard University, 1956, 1957, 1960. Professor of Economics, MIT, since 1962; Visiting
Professor, Tel Aviv University, 197380. Clark Medal, American Economic Association, 1973; Vice-President
and President, Econometric Society, 197779. See his The costs of automobile model changes since 1949
(with Zvi Griliches and Carl Kaysen), Journal of Political Economy, 70, October 1962, pp. 43351, and
Folded, Spindled and Mutilated: Economic Analysis and U.S. v. IBM (with John J. McGowan and Joen
Greenwood), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1983.
BA University of Chicago, 1943; MA University of Iowa, 1947. Professor of Economics, Columbia
University, New York, 196092?; Associate Professor, Duke University, 195060. See his Monopoly in
Economics and Law, Rand-McNally, Chicago, 1959, 1964. The Theory of Imperfect Competition: A Radical
Reconstruction, Columbia University Press, New York, 1969. The Antitrust Experiment in America, Columbia
University Press, 1990, which contains his main articles.
BSS City College, NY, 1939; PhD Columbia University, 1949. Professor of Economics, 194863; Professor
of Industrial Engineering, 196395, Columbia University. See his Administration and production cost in
relation to size of firms, Application Statistics, March 1954, The Peace Race, Ballantine, New York, 1961,
and The Permanent War Economy, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1974.
See Paul M. Sweezy and Paul Baran, Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social
Order, Monthly Review Press, Washington, DC, 1966.
I was closely involved with them as a fellow faculty member at the University of Massachusetts in
19862002.
BS Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1967; MA Pennsylvania State University, 1968; PhD University of
Wisconsin, 1972. Professor of Economics, Vanderbilt University, since 1972. See his Economic power and
political influence: the impact of industry structure on public policy, American Political Science Review,
September 1977 pp. 102642).
BA, MA Washington State College, 1954, 1955; PhD University of Wisconsin, 1959. Economist, Bureau
of Economics, FTC, 1959; Division Chief, FTC, 196369; Professor of Economics, Virginia Technical
University, 196984.
Morton I. Kamien, BA City College of NY, 1960; PhD Purdue University, 1964. Professor of Economics,
Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, 1970; also Carnegie-Mellon University,
196367. See Market Structure and Innovation (with Nancy L. Schwartz), Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1982.
Nancy L. Schwartz, BA 1960, Oberlin College, 1960; MS, PhD Purdue University, 1963, 1964. Professor
of Economics, 197081; and Chair, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School of
Management, Northwestern University.
BBA City College, NY, 1960; PhD University of Chicago, 1965. Professor of Economics, Graduate School
of Business, University of Chicago, since 1978; and University of California, Los Angeles, 196773. Member,
Council of Economic Advisers, 199092. See his Entry in commercial banking, Journal of Law and
Economics, October 1965; An Evaluation of consumer protectiion regulation: the 1962 drug amendments,
Journal of Political Economy, SeptemberOctober 1973; and Toward a more general theory of regulation,
Journal of Law and Economics, August 1976.
BA Kalamazoo College, 1963; MA, PhD Michigan State University, 1966, 1967. Professor of Economics,
University of Virginia, since 1967. See his The antimerger laws: Pyrrhic victories, Journal of Law and
Economics, April 1969, pp. 4378; The Problem of geographic market delineation in antimerger suits (with
Thomas F. Hogarty), Antitrust Bulletin, Spring 1973, pp. 4581.
BA University of Michigan, 1958; MA, PhD Yale University, 1960, 1963. Professor of Economics, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, since 1985; and at the University of Rochester, 196883. See his Oligopoly
and the Theory of Games, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1977, and Research in Experimental Economics: An
Experiment in Noncooperative Oligopoly (with A. Hoggatt), JAI Press, Greenwich, CT, 1979.
21/5/07 12:19:28
167
50. BA University of California, Santa Barbara, 1966; MA, PhD University of California, Berkeley, 1967,
1969. Professor of Economics, Cornell University, since 1976; and Northwestern University, 196974. See
his Executive motivations, earnings, and consequent equity performance, Journal of Political Economy,
NovemberDecember 1971, pp. 127892, and The social cost of the government regulation of milk (with
R.A. Ippolito), Journal of Law and Economics, April 1978, pp. 3365.
51. BA Amherst College, 1970; MA, PhD University of Michigan, 1973, 1975. Professor of Economics,
Michigan State University, since 1975. See his Information and goodwill advertising, Review of Economics
and Statistics, November 1974, pp. 5418; Minimum rate regulation, modal split sensitivities and the railroad
problem, Journal of Political Economy, July 1977, pp. 493512; Degrees of differentiation and industry
boundaries, in Terry Calvani and John Siegfried (eds), Economic Analysis and Antitrust Law, Little, Brown,
Boston, MA, 1979; and Are there scale economies in advertising? (with Kent M. Lancaster), Journal of
Business, July 1986, pp. 50926.
52. BA University of Connecticut, 1959; MA, PhD University of Wisconsin, 1962, 1966. Professor of Economics,
McGill University, 1969. See his Canadian Industrial Organization and Policy, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, New
York, editions of 1980, 1985 and 1990.
53. BA (Math) Michigan State University, 1970; PhD MIT, 1977. Professor of Economics, Michigan State
University 197788; European University Institute (Florence, Italy), 198895; University of Copenhagen,
199599; and Purdue University School of Business, since 1999. See his Advertising, concentration, and
profitability: the simultaneity problem, Bell Journal of Economics, Autumn 1979, pp. 63947; and Market
structure and trade flows (with Anthony Y.C. Koo), International Journal of Industrial Organization,
September 1984, pp. 17397.
54. BA Brown University, 1967; PhD University of Pennsylvania, 1972. Professor of Economics, George
Washington University, 19812001; Northeastern University since 2001. See his Effects of market share
distribution on industry performance, Review of Economics and Statistics, LXI, February 1979 pp. 101109;
and Advertising and the price and quality of optometric services, American Economic Review, 79, March
1984, pp. 21116.
55. Steven C. Salop, BA University of Pennsylvania, 1968; MPhil, PhD Yale University, 1971, 1972. Professor,
Law Center, Georgetown University, 1981; Assistant Director, Bureau of Economics, FTC, 197881.
56. BA Cornell University, 1968; MPhil, PhD Yale University, 1971, 1972. Professor of Economics and
Management, MIT, since 1972. See Paul L. Joskow and Richard Schmalensee, Markets for Power: An
Analysis of Electric Utility Deregulation, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1983; also Joskow, M. Baughman
and D. Kamat, Electric Power in the United States: Models and Policy Analysis, MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA, 1979.
21/5/07 12:19:28
21/5/07 12:19:28
SECTION 1
Individual pioneers in the USA and Canada
21/5/07 12:19:28
21/5/07 12:19:28
10.
A.
To the 1930s
CHARLES ELLET JR
F.M. Scherer
Innovations
Calculus-based theory of the firms profit-maximization problem with explicit demand
and cost functions; concepts of reservation price and charging what the traffic will bear;
advantages of price discrimination in railroad and canal price-setting; showed tendency for
vertically stacked monopolies to charge more than an integrated monopolist; foundations
of spatial economics.
Personal history
Born 1810, Penns Manor (Indiana County), PA, USA; died of combat wounds in 1862
as a colonel in the Union army.
Education
183032.
Self-taught plus formal studies at the cole des Ponts et Chausses, Paris,
Principal positions Bridge, canal and railroad engineer.
A graduate student at the University of Chicago is said to have rushed into the office of
Professor Jacob Viner reporting excitedly that he had discovered an unknown nineteenthcentury mathematical economist. Oh, said Viner, You must mean Charles Ellet Jr. Yes,
said the student, but how did you know?. Because he is the only unknown nineteenthcentury mathematical economist, was Viners reply.
Since then Ellet has been rediscovered, but his stunningly original contributions are still
undervalued relative to those of his contemporaries and economists who wrote during the
second half of the nineteenth century.
Ellet ventured into economics because he perceived errors in the policies adopted by
his employer, the James River and Kanawha Improvement Association, in the pricing of
canal and eventually rail connections between Richmond, Virginia, and the Ohio River
through the Allegheny Mountains. These errors, he concluded, prevented his employer from
maximizing its profits and influenced the spatial pattern of US economic development.
His insights were reported in an 1839 book, in a series of short articles published during
the ensuing five years, and in diverse later papers.
171
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172
While better-known contemporary economists (other than Augustin Cournot) were

treating the demand for goods and services in muddled ways, Ellet saw clearly the quantity
demanded as an explicit declining function of the price charged for transportation services.
He recognized that too high a price could choke off demand altogether, and for bulky
commodities of relatively low value, he argued, transport rates should fall discriminatorily
with distance shipped rather than being invariant per ton mile as long as the marginal costs
of transportation were covered. In this and in recognizing that higher-valued items could
pay higher freight charges, he anticipated the concept of charging what the traffic will
bear. He saw that there was a difference between the maximum price that would be paid
for a service the reservation price and costs, and he showed that with linear demand
functions, profits were maximized by equating what we now call marginal revenue with
marginal cost at a quantity where costs were half the reservation price. For passenger
fares, he recommended two rate classes, one for travellers desiring economy and a higher
one for those with a preference for luxury.
Many transportation lines, he observed, fed into one another, each with monopoly
power over its individual segment. Ellet demonstrated that the price charged by a unified
service monopoly would yield higher total profits and permit a higher quantity of service
than the prices the individual segments would charge if they myopically maximized their
profits. In this he anticipated the double marginalization proof by Joseph Spengler 110
years later. Ellet recognized that many rate setters, with imperfect understanding of the
laws of trade, set prices above the profit-maximizing level and that in order to correct this
error, which was also disadvantageous to the general public, legislative intervention might
be required. In a series of articles published in the Journal of the Franklin Institute, Ellet
worked out a mathematical theory of railroad costs, among other things distinguishing
among costs varying with distance, with tonnage carried, and those independent of both
variables. He recognized that fixed costs vary in the longer run and worked out a trade-off
between the costs of climbing steep gradients and increasing line length. Among other
things, he viewed as one cost of shipment the interest cost of capital invested in goods in
transit. He compared the predictions generated by his theoretical estimates with actual
cost data for 17 rail lines and found in most cases a close correspondence.
Many of Ellets insights and methodological innovations paralleled those published
in 1839 by Cournot. Ellets were specialized to transportation services, while Cournots
claimed wider generality, which probably explains why Cournots fame is greater. There is
no indication in Ellets publications that he was aware of Cournots work, and so, without
new evidence, it would appear that the two economists contributions were, as is often the
case, simultaneous but independent.
Most relevant publications
(1839), An Essay on the Laws of Trade in Reference to the Works of Internal Improvement in the United States,
Richmond, VA: Bernard; Reprinted by Augustus Kelley, 1966.
(1840), The laws of trade applied to the determination of the most advantageous fare for passengers on railroads,
Journal of the Franklin Institute, 30 (new numbering system), 36979.
(184244), Cost of transportation on railroads, Journal of the Franklin Institute, 34 (1842), 1457, 22833 and
30411; 36 (1843), 31624 and 36170; 37 (1844), 18 and 7382.
(1842), On the value of time, Journal of the Franklin Institute, 34, 3617.
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Individual pioneers: to the 1930s
B.
173
HENRY CARTER ADAMS
Harry M. Trebing
Innovations
Landmark analysis of the role of the state in the public control of economic activity.
Adams established the conceptual framework within which many of the Progressive and
New Deal reforms dealing with the regulation of public utilities and transportation took
place in the first half of the twentieth century.
Personal history
Born
1851, Davenport, IA, USA; died 1921.
Degrees
Bachelors Degree Iowa College, 1874; PhD Johns Hopkins University, 1878.
Principal positions Professor of Political Economy and Finance, University of Michigan,

18871921. Lecturer in Political Economy at Johns Hopkins University, 188081. Lecturer
at Cornell University and the University of Michigan, 188087. (Adams was forced out of
Cornell because of his radical economic teaching.) President of the American Economic
Association, 189597. From 1887 to 1897, Dr. Adams also held various administrative
positions with the newly created Interstate Commerce Commission.
Henry Carter Adams stands as a major figure in the development of economic thought
in the US from the late nineteenth century into the early twentieth century. As one of the
founders of the American Economic Association, he sought to bring economic theory
and its policy uses to bear on the real-world problems of industrial power.
Adams sought to develop a completely different system of thought for defining the
nature and concept of economic regulation and competitive action. His landmark paper,
Relation of the state to industrial action (1887), placed this major set of innovative ideas
squarely in the fledgling literature of the new American Economic Association (AEA).
He rejected both English laissez-faire and the German concept of the state. He argued
that the fundamental error of English political philosophy lies in regarding the state as a
necessary evil; the fundamental error of German political philosophy lies in its conception
of the state as an organism complete in itself (Adams, 1887, p. 494) In Adamss view, the
role of the state would be to determine the playing field for competitive action, permit
social realization of the efficiency gains from monopoly, and establish a social harmony
between economic sectors by extending the duties of government.
As a part of this process of defining the role of the state, Adams introduced a pioneering
analysis of the concepts of constant returns, diminishing returns, and increasing returns,
with direct state control focusing primarily on the latter. Where increasing returns
prevailed, he argued, the benefits of competitive markets could never be realized through
the uncontrolled play of private interests. Rather, state intervention would be necessary
to achieve effective economic results. At the same time, the public would be denied the
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174
benefits of increasing returns without public control in those industries where these
natural-monopoly cost characteristics prevailed. Unless there were strong and thorough
public regulation, the public would be denied benefits inherent in cases where monopoly
organization yielded the greatest efficiency. Adams was intensely skeptical and practical,
as well as being a gifted theorist.
Further, he believed that a well-organized society would include no extra-legal monopolies
of any sort. Rather, society must be secured against the oppression of exclusive privileges
administered for personal profit. Adams held a variety of high-level assignments at the new
Interstate Commerce Commission. In those, and throughout his long and distinguished
career, he was able to engage in the pioneering applications of statistics and accounting
as regulatory tools. Adams deserves great credit for developing the Uniform System of
Accounts that would permit the classification and valuation of assets, the determination
of operating revenues, the calculation of operating expenses, and the estimation of net
operating income. This conceptual framework would also lend itself to the disallowance
of expenses and charges not properly assigned to the ultimate consumer. Over time, this
system of accounts created a valuable database for rate base/rate-of-return regulation.
Private accounting was totally inadequate to this task and clearly vulnerable to fraudulent
manipulation.
A century later, the accounting scandals that culminated in the bankruptcy of Enron
and WorldCom (Americas two largest bankruptcies) demonstrated the wisdom of Adamss
argument in favor of public accounting oversight. Regrettably, these accounting controls
were summarily dismissed in the 1990s by the proponents of deregulation.
Adams also had a great interest in the interrelationship of economics and law. In his AEA
presidential address, Economics and Jurisprudence (1896), he reaffirmed this interest and
incorporated a role for labor through arbitration and collective bargaining in the structure
of modern industry. Professor Joseph Dorfman believes that John R. Commonss Legal
Foundations of Capitalism (1924) was an expansion of Adamss doctrines (Dorfman,
1954, p. 172).
(1887), Relation of the state to industrial action, Publications of the American Economic Association, 1(6),
January, 465549.
(1905), Commercial valuation of railway operating property in the United States, 1904, United States Bureau
of the Census Bulletin No. 21, Washington.
(1908), The administrative supervision of railways under the twentieth section of the Act to Regulate Commerce,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 22 (May), 3756.
(1910), Valuation of public service utilities, in Publications of the American Economic Association, 3rd series
(Cambridge MA), April, 11, 193.
(1954), Relation of the State to Industrial Action and Economies and Jurisprudence Two Essays by Henry Carter
Adams, edited with an Introductory Essay by Joseph Dorfman, New York: Columbia University Press.
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C.
175
JOHN BATES CLARK
John Howard Brown

Innovations
Developed marginal productivity theory of wages, potential entry as substitute for
competition in an industry.
Personal history
Born
1847, Providence, RI, USA; died 1938.
Principal position
Professor of Economics Columbia University.
Other Cofounder American Economic Association (1885), serving as its president

(189395).
John Bates Clark whom Henry (1995) characterizes as, the first United States economist
to reach a position of prominence within this profession (p. 1) produced an immense body
of professional work. (Henrys bibliography lists over 100 publications dating from 1877 to
1935.) That work extends well beyond industrial organization, including pioneering work
in marginal productivity theory and the economics of war and peace.
In industrial organization, Clark was concerned with the problem of trusts. He praised
large-scale business organizations for their economies: The machine and particularly the
locomotive has been what we may call a great promoter; it has been a great consolidater
[sic] of business establishments and has caused large shops to be so economical as to
drive out a multitude of small ones (1904, p. 15). However, he notes that not all of the
advantages of large firms are socially beneficial: such ... as getting special rates for freight
on the railroads which the small shop cannot get (p. 17) or erecting barriers to entry: Can
they ... club or frighten off, or in their own rough way, send off, the competitors who enter
the field ... but if competitors do not dare to come, if the few that do come have severe
lessons taught them, and others, in prudence, stay out, the trust has a clear possession of
the field (p. 31). Among the clubs Clark mentions are cutting prices locally (p. 35) or on
varieties of goods (p. 36), or exclusive dealing arrangements inhibiting the distribution
(p. 36) of smaller competitors.
However, Clark was optimistic about the control of trusts. He placed great emphasis
on potential competition: In the selling of goods and services the best competition has
always been in the potential form (p. 112). The example he cites is of a village blacksmith
who has the structural characteristics of a monopolist as a sole supplier but can never
exert monopoly power because of entry. He concludes: That is an instance of potential
competition, and this is the variety which ought forever to survive. That implies that it
ought to be made to survive, even after the formation of great trusts (p. 112). Henry
(1995, p. 67) notes that this is essentially the notion of contestability proposed by William
J. Baumol and others in the 1980s.
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176
John Bates Clark occupied the middle ground in the gilded era debate regarding
appropriate response to the developing dominant firms in manufacturing. He did not feel
that dissolution of such monopolistic powerhouses was desirable because of the substantial
economies they achieved. However, his faith in the discipline of potential competition was
tempered by the fear that bullying tactics by incumbents could indefinitely prevent the
emergence of competitors to limit monopoly power.
Clark held that legal restrictions on firm tactics limiting potential competition were more
effective than attempting to restore competition to industries not capable of an atomistic
structure: The trust can get a monopolistic price because, by virtue of these different clubs
which it holds in its hands ... What sort of legislation do we want if we are going to keep
the trust, make it a useful thing and take away its power for evil? (1904, pp. 367). He felt
that the common law doctrine of restraint of trade which was the primary contemporary
tool was irrelevant to the requirements of modern industry.
Later, in the revised edition of The Control of Trusts (1912) written with his son,
the equally distinguished John Maurice Clark, Clark seniors notions of the beneficial
contributions of large-scale enterprise and potential competition were tempered by Clark
juniors acceptance of a larger governmental role in supervising competition. Joseph
Dorfman (1971) in his introduction to the reprint, judges that: The Control of Trusts
played a formative historical role in policy making, for it provided the most systematic
exposition of the view on trusts that was embodied in 1914 at President Wilsons urging
in the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act (p. 17).
The Clarks begin with an open acknowledgment of their advocacy: The purpose of
the work is entirely constructive, since it advocates a positive policy for controlling trusts
(p. v). Their proposal is: regulating competition. It would cut off entirely an abnormal
type of [competition] by forbidding and repressing the cut-throat operations by which the
trusts often crush their rivals (p. vi). This represents a more interventionist stance than
John B. Clark had advocated earlier.
An important difference between Clark seniors previous positions and the 1912 book
is a focus on the dynamic contribution of large firms instead of their economies. The
Clarks agree: We do not here retract anything that has been said as to the economy of
large production . ... The trusts have saved wastes and added to the productive power of
labor and capital (p. 14). They go on to assert that: It is not a large present social income
that is the chief desideratum but a constantly enlarging income. Progress is in itself the
summum bonum in economics, and that society is essentially the best which improves the
fastest (p. 134, emphasis in original).
This revised edition of The Control of Trusts also emphasizes the historical importance
of new entry, in the eighties of the last century ... trusts went through a hard experience
(p. 25). That experience was: When prices are raised beyond a certain point, owing to the
too grasping policy of some trusts, the thing still happens which happened more frequently
in the early history of combinations (pp. 256).
Extrapolating from this historical experience leads to the assertion: A merely possible
mill which as yet does not exist may forestall and prevent monopolistic acts. If the way is
quite open for it to appear, the trust may refrain from keeping prices at a high level (p. 121).
However, the influence of this latent competition cannot be trusted as it could in earlier
days (p. 27). As John B. Clark emphasized in his The Problem of Monopoly, because the
possible competitor does not become an actual one as promptly as he should. The trouble
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177
is that he has not a fair chance for his life when he appears on the scene. He is in danger
of being crushed by the trust (p. 27). The situation was made worse because: his [the
entrants] plant is a specialized one (p. 172), or as put more colorfully earlier in the same
discussion: He enters ... burning his bridges behind him (p. 171). Thus Clark recognized
sunk costs as a barrier to potential entry well before the debate on contestability.
The elder Clarks earlier position changed in two significant, if subtle, ways. First, The
only sure evidence that rival mills can be built and run with safety is the fact that some
of them have been built and are running (p. 121). Thus actual entry into a market is now
more emphasized than potential entry in assessing the state of competition.
Also, reflecting the professional work of John M. Clark on overhead costs, is an added
appreciation of the role of such costs in price discrimination. Entry in some industries
involves a substantial addition to capacity, the would-be competitor ... must build a
big plant or none at all (p. 172). For these: industries are more likely to find themselves
equipped with power to produce more goods than the market will take at a living price
(pp. 1723). Where entry has occurred and there is excess capacity, the firms find themselves
in a fierce struggle for business (p. 173), since incremental orders permit firms to further
spread their overhead costs.
Thus, even though the Clarks condemn discrimination as unfair competition, they
recognize that conditions of modern industry make some discrimination inevitable. What
policy do they propose against these trust abuses? They first establish their yardstick:
the supreme test of measures for regulating trusts is that which tells us whether they will
accelerate technical progress or retard it whether they will make the world as a whole
grow richer or poorer (p. 3).
They contrast two widely held views, either that: in large-scale business competition
has failed completely and monopoly has come to stay. The large plant is more efficient
than the small one, the combination is more efficient than the independent, competition
is wasteful and unnatural and monopoly the inevitable outcome (p. 141), or that which
consists of those which would merely destroy monopoly and make competition free (p. v).
The first view tends to legalize monopoly, and in place of free competition as a regulator
of prices ... will place the decrees of a public commission (p. 143). The second view holds
that the monopolistic powers of the trusts are accidental and not inevitable, that they are
built upon privileges that can be removed, powers that can be withdrawn and predatory
acts that can be forbidden (p. 143).
Neither opinion is without difficulties. Regarding the trust-busters, they note that the
task is Sisyphean: we may attack the various forms of combined control, as we have done
in the past; but like the sorcerer in the story they take new shapes and elude us (p. 144).
Although they concede: We know today that we can dissolve the trusts that we can
break up the big corporations into smaller ones and this is distinctly more than we once
knew (p. 3).
Price regulation by commission is likewise no panacea: We cannot afford to remove
or seriously reduce the incentive to improvements. Any change involves risk, and capital
takes no chances unless lured by hope of rewards above the safe interest (p. 161). They
then argue presciently against the limitations of rate of return regulation.
The way forward is to combine elements of both, competition is to be maintained, not
by breaking up efficient businesses, but by outlawing practices that support exploitative
monopoly. The regulatory commission ought to regulate not prices but unfair practices.
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The Clarks advocate the imposition of FOB (free on board) pricing for all manufacturers.
This would eliminate both predatory price discrimination and railroad favoritism that
allegedly represented the major advantages realized by the trusts. They also suggest a
test for monopoly: Has every consumer a choice of efficient and independent producers
to buy from? If so, there is no monopoly, even if one combination should control three
quarters of the output (pp. 1845). Their other prescription is more conventional: more
publicity regarding the trusts affairs (both to protect investors and stimulate entry). This
is a common theme in gilded age/progressive era responses to monopoly.
References
Clark, John B. (1904), The Problem of Monopoly, Columbia University Press, New York, Macmillan.
Clark, John M. and John B Clark (1912), The Control of Trusts: rewritten and enlarged edition, Reprinted 1971,
Augustus M. Kelley, New York.
Henry, John F. (1995), John Bates Clark: The Making of a Neoclassical Economist, St. Martins Press, New
York.
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179
JEREMIAH WHIPPLE JENKS
John Howard Brown

Innovations
Empirical analysis of pricecost margins in industries dominated by trusts.
Personal history
Born
1856, St Clair, MI, USA; died 1929.
Degrees
BA, MA University of Michigan, 1878, 1879; PhD University of Halle, 1885.
Principal position
Professor of Economics, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 18911912.
Other Positions at Mt. Morris College, Knox College, Indiana State University, New
York University (191229).
Jenks deserves recognition as an important precursor of the contemporary economic field

of industrial organization. Jenks pioneered a style of statistical empiricism that would not
be out of place in modern industrial organization. He also proposed an analytical scheme
that anticipates the structureconductperformance paradigm proposed in the late 1930s
by Edward S. Mason.
Jenkss own assessment of his accomplishments, in the final edition of his classic, The
Trust Problem (1900) shortly before his death in 1929, begins with his conclusion that the
question of the Trusts was likely to be one of the two most prominent subjects of legislation
in the near future (p. 3). He approached the problem with, personal investigation of large
corporations through contact with their officers and workmen ... and also from such
statistical data as seemed to be trustworthy (p. 3).
The investigation he refers to in the quotation above was one of the first attempts to
study an industry (other than railroads) by an American economist, reported in his article,
The Michigan Salt Association (1888). In this article he considers the attempts of salt
manufacturers in Michigan to establish a stable collusive arrangement. He followed this
article with The development of the Whiskey Trust (1889), also on the theme of developing
a sustainable collusive arrangement.
The two industries were similar in their production processes since both involved joint
production that made individual firms reluctant to reduce production. There were also
potential competing sources of supply. Jenks provides a detailed history of each industry
and the painful steps toward developing a trust. In each case, the trust was formed after
an extended period in which prices had been too low. The first step was a marketing pool
where the respective producers used a joint market agency to distribute their output.
This was of limited effectiveness so long as the individual firms in the industry retained
control of productive capacity. Thus the ultimate step was forming a single entity in trust
or holding company form to control the assets of the producers and restrict output to
keep prices high.
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In the Whiskey Trust article, Jenks provided a chart comparing the behavior of whiskey
prices with corn prices and the margin between them. The time periods during which
collusion was practiced were identified and the effects of these collusive episodes on the
margins analyzed. As Jenks notes (Jenks et al., 1929, p. 6), This has proved to be the
most effective method of showing clearly the course of price and of exposing many of
the fallacious conclusions drawn from merely grouping over a series of years prices of
the finished products or by using groupings of selected years of the marginal differences.
Jenks claimed to have been the first to use this empirical technique and the first to employ
index numbers for comparing the effects of combination in the steel industry on prices
(ibid., p. 6).
Jenks applied this tool again in Trusts in the United States (1892) where he analyzed the
pricecost margins in sugar and petroleum refining. In his investigation for the Industrial
Commission, he extended the analysis of pricecost margins in two dimensions. He added
international comparisons of the margins between raw and refined sugar and analyzed the
pricing in several segments of the steel industry relative to a price index. Jenks s statistical,
empirical approach to the trust problem was unprecedented and unparalleled by his contemporaries. It foreshadows the development of empirical industrial organization almost
half a century later.
Jenks also held views that are surprisingly close to the modern analysis of the effects
of market structure. He recognized that the conditions of production such as economies
of scale limited the number of firms in a market and altered the nature of competition.
Thus:
If the amount of capital which must of necessity be invested in a fixed plant for the successful
production of any class of goods is large, the nature of the competition differs materially from
that of an industry in which a small amount of fixed capital is sufficient to enable one to work
to good advantage. In the first instance the number of competitors is likely to be much smaller
than in the latter. (1900, p. 16)
This led him (1894) to speak of a capitalistic monopoly which was, a qualified monopoly
maintained within rather narrow limits by the sheer force of large capital (Jenks et al.,
1929, pp. 56). Jenks claimed this term as yet another of his doctrinal innovations. In
modern terms this is an absolute capital barrier to entry. The concept was controversial
when Jenks proposed it, since the economists had held that only government franchise
created monopoly.
Other barriers he recognized were:
those industries ... in which the product is uniform in its nature and the productive work of a
routine character; those in which the product is bulky and there is a wide distribution of freight;
or ... somewhat similar characteristics ... such as very expensive advertising, patents, etc., serve
to encourage the combination of capital. (Ibid., p. 208)
Jenks here highlights structural aspects of the markets which produce concentration of
output in limited numbers of firms. Advertising expenditures for product differentiation
and patents have been recognized as barriers to entry which limit the degree of competition
since at least the 1950s (Bain, 1956).
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Jenks contrasts these oligopolistic industries with, [a]n industry which requires but
small capital to carry it on, will encourage hundreds, or more likely thousands or tens of
thousands, of individuals to engage in it (Jenks et al., p. 18). He further observes: [i[t is
the consideration mainly of industries of this type (i.e. competitive ones) that has given rise
to theories of normal price, a marginal price, etc., as a safe basis for economic reasoning,
and many writers in speaking of competition think of this kind only (ibid., p.18). Jenks
likewise disparaged what he characterized as the common assumption that competition
is free. He noted:
The friction of competition is most readily noticed in the retail trade. Careless customers, ignorant
of prices, call for goods which please them, and often purchase without striving to get the lowest
price. ... The convenient location of his store, or his pertinacity in soliciting custom, often enables
a dealer to sell for more than the lowest market price, so that competition, from the point of view
of price, is far from being free, or at least from being efficient. (1900, p. 11)
Thus Jenks recognized something quite like the modern notion of monopolistic
competition. He also claimed that implicit collusion among members of a trade within a
city was a near constant in commercial life, echoing Adam Smiths famous opinion about
such conspiracies against the public.
In concentrated industries, Jenks recognized that:
[A dominant firm] certainly is exercising and can exercise for a considerable length of time a
really monopolistic power. It is also, however, true that in fixing prices so as to secure under the
circumstances the greatest net returns, he has to take into consideration this third factor that
of potential competition ... (ibid., p. 61)
[Under these circumstances] it may perhaps keep prices somewhat above former competitive rates,
it must keep them low enough so that the temptation for competitors to enter the field will not
be great, and it must be able to put them without absolute loss lower than it would be possible
for an ordinary rival to manufacture and sell. (Ibid, pp. 623)
This passage anticipates the famous limit price analysis of Joe Bain in the 1950s (see
Bain, 1956).
Although Jenks agreed that potential competition was useful, he was somewhat more
pessimistic about its effects than many other figures of the era:
Those, however, who take the position that potential competition will prevent prices from going
at all above former competitive rates, overlook the fact that new capital is not at all likely to be
invested under such circumstances, unless the profits of the combination are put very high indeed.
(1900, pp. 656)
He also noted the significant efficiencies that could be attained by large-scale production,
although he carefully noted that a firm need not be a trust to achieve many of these:
One ought not to lose sight of the distinctions between production on a great scale and
production under monopoly (ibid., p. 21). In terms of policy responses to monopoly power,
as early as 1892, Jeremiah Jenks was critical of antitrust legislation for failing to recognize:
that without combination financial ruin was imminent, and that organization was merely
a means of safety. Free competition had proved disastrous (ibid., p. 72).
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He urged the abolition of unfair competitive methods, particularly the various forms
of discrimination:
When unfair and illegal methods of competition are employed ... Such unfair and illegal methods
put the question rather into the field of criminal law or social ethics. Such practices are under no
circumstances to be justified or defended. (Ibid., p. 200)
In a later article (1908) Jenks argued that the dissolution decrees against Standard Oil
and American Tobacco were ill-considered since: although there might be a reorganization in form, they would still remain combinations in fact (p. 355). Jenks concluded that
even if competition were restored in these industries, we should still question whether the
remedy were in the public interest [since] the application of this remedy must result in a
loss of industrial efficiency (p. 355).
For Jenks the appropriate role for government in the economy was entirely a matter
of pragmatic adaptation to the ever-changing conditions of the market economy and
society at large. In his 1907 Presidential Address to the American Economic Association,
he argued that the nature of some industries was such that they ought to be managed by
the government.
In other cases, Jenks asserts: A legislature or an executive may lay down fixed rules
for certain lines of industry, and a commission or an inspector may apply these rules in
special cases (ibid., p. 15). In either of these capacities, government can set an example
for private establishments (ibid., p. 16). It can also fix the limits of competition, either by
operating enterprises that compete with private monopolies or through inspection and
supervision (ibid., p. 17). However, this is conditioned upon the fact that competition
affords on the whole the best stimulus to effort, to originality of thought, and to the
development of personality in enterprise (1908, p. 17). As a consequence, The government
should simply see to it that the competition in all directions is kept within fair and just
limits (ibid., p. 17).
As the final word on Jenkss scholarly activity in industrial organization, we can take
his own words from the Introduction to The Trust Problem (1900, pp. 89):
An effort has been made to explain these Trusts, and not to rest content with calling them the
product of evolution, and assuming that, therefore, they are both inevitable and in the long run
helpful rather than harmful . ... with that view of economic evolution, as something requiring
further explanation before being either approved or condemned, the book has been written.
References
Bain, Joe S. (1956), Barriers to New Competition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Jenks, Jeremiah (1888), The Michigan Salt Association, Political Science Quarterly, 3(1), March, 7898.
Jenks, Jeremiah (1889), The development of the Whiskey Trust, Political Science Quarterly, 4(2), June,
296319.
Jenks, Jeremiah (1892), Trusts in the United States, Economic Journal, 2(5), June, 7099.
Jenks, Jeremiah (1894), Capitalistic monopolies and their relation to the state, Political Science Quarterly, 9(3),
September 486509.
Jenks, Jeremiah (1900), The Trust Problem, McClure, Phillips & Co, New York.
Jenks, Jeremiah (1908), The principles of government control of business, American Economic Association
Quarterly, 3rd Series, 9(1), Papers and Discussions of the Twentieth Annual Meeting, Madison, WI, December
2830, 1907, April, pp. 120.
Jenks, Jeremiah and Walter E. Clark with John J. Quigley (1929), The Trust Problem, 5th edn, Doubleday, Doran
& Company, Inc, Garden City, New York.
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183
JOHN MAURICE CLARK
William L. Baldwin
Innovations
Intensive analysis (with J.B. Clark) of antitrust policies in light of scale economies. Pathbreaking complex analysis of costs, including overhead costs in the presence of high capital
density. Workable competition. Competition as a dynamic process.
Personal history
Born
1884, Northampton, MA, USA; died 1963.
Degrees
AB Amherst College, 1906, PhD Columbia University 1910.
Principal positions Served on the faculties of Colorado College (190810), Amherst

College (191015), the University of Chicago (191526), and Columbia University
(192657), where in 1951 he was appointed to a chair named in honor of his father, the
John Bates Clark Professorship of Political Economy.
Other Over the course of his long and distinguished career, other honors include his
election as President of the American Economic Association (AEA) in 1935 and award
of the Francis A. Walker Medal for distinguished service, the highest recognition given by
the AEA. He received honorary degrees from Amherst College, Columbia University, the
University of Paris, the New School for Social Research and Yale University.
Noting that John Maurice Clark (JMC) was a prolific writer, Jesse W. Markham wrote
in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 2, pp. 50811 (New York:
Macmillan, 1968):
Clarks writings include treatises on virtually every economic problem that loomed large in his
lifetime. Although he is chiefly recognized for his contributions designed to close the gap between
the abstractions of statics and the realities of dynamics, he published works concerned with the
business cycle, the economic costs of war, wartime controls and demobilization, public works,
the labor market, education and a host of other problems.
While the sheer volume and significance of his published scholarship would have won
JMC a prominent place among the leading economists of the twentieth century, the web
of interconnections tying his varied works into an integrated whole over an active career
of nearly 60 years is a unique feature of his work that adds to his luster.
A strong professional relationship with his father, John Bates Clark (18471938), marked
JMCs early career. The elder Clark, a founding member and third president of the AEA,
was one of a handful of economists of the previous generation whose development of
marginal productivity and distribution theorems had led to the marginalist revolution
which transformed economics in the post-Civil War era.
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The close association between father and son became sealed when John Bates Clark served
as an advisor to JMC on the latters doctoral dissertation, Standards of Reasonableness
in Local Freight Discriminations, published in 1910 by Columbia University Press. It was
reinforced in 1912 when the two Clarks co-authored a revised and enlarged edition of an
original work by J.B. Clark alone, The Control of Trusts (New York: Macmillan). In the
preface to the revised edition, JMC is given credit for most of the new material, although
both authors share in the revisions. Harsh criticisms of the antitrust laws in the first
edition were removed from the second. In light of the aftermath of the Supreme Courts
1911 dissolution decrees against the Standard Oil Company and the American Tobacco
Company, the Clarks wrote: We know to-day than we can dissolve the trusts that we
can break up the big corporations into smaller ones and this is distinctly more than we
once knew (p. 3, italics in original). However, simply because dissolution was possible
did not mean that it was advisable. Rather, the Clarks continued to oppose a widespread
dissolution policy. The trusts had been of benefit to the nation in several ways, notably
checking cut-throat competition and promoting technical progress. If the large trusts
stagnated, the Clarks contended, they would be far worse than if they raised prices and
restricted output. The large trusts that were true monopolies in the most fundamental
sense of the word, that is, because they feared no competition, either existing or latent,
should be dissolved. The Sherman Antitrust Act should be strengthened to constrain
anti-competitive practices. The Clarks wrote:
America is the natural home of the trusts; but if we can draw the fangs of the monster and train
it to good uses, we can get therefrom an advantage over other nations and realize all the benefits
it is possible to get out of material civilization namely abundant wealth, honestly gained,
widely dispersed among the people and ensuring a high level of life, intellectual and moral as
well as physical. (p. 22)
Drawing the fangs, for JMC, meant identifying their sources and then formulating
public policies to extract or blunt them. The primary sources such as he saw them were the
accelerator effect, overhead costs, and price discrimination. Appropriate public policies
included enforcing antitrust laws aimed at promoting effective or workable competition,
both static and dynamic.
In 1917 JMC published an article, Business acceleration and the law of demand: a
technical factor in economic cycles in the Journal of Political Economy, in which he
developed a principle that subsequently became central to macroeconomic models of the
business cycle. The core of this accelerator is a relationship between demand for consumer
goods and the demand for capital goods derived therefrom in which a change in the
level of increase in the demand for consumer goods leads to a proportionately greater
change in the demand for capital goods. JMC recognized that business firms of all sizes,
as well as farms, might well be capital intensive and thus be vulnerable to magnification
of fluctuations in consumer demand, but he noted that the large firms with monopoly
power, that is, the trusts that had sprung up in the post-Civil War era, were particularly
capital intensive and therefore had the most plausible reason for stabilization of demand
even if it involved agreements or understandings with rivals.
JMCs long-standing interest in the effects of capital intensity and overhead cost led
to his major contribution to that area in 1923, when his book Studies in the Economics
of Overhead Costs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) appeared along with a four-
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part journal article, Overhead costs in industry in the Journal of Political Economy. But
JMCs continued intellectual ties to his father were made clear in his dedication to the
book where he noted that [my] greatest debt of all is to my father, who started me in this
field of inquiry as a graduate student (pp. xixii).
JMC defined overhead costs as those which did not vary with output or could not be
traced to units of output, and he observed that these costs were crucial in modern processes
of production. (For this reason he thought that improvements in cost accounting were of
great importance in an industrialized economy as they would give business managers a
better idea of what effects they would have on their market in setting prices intended to
cover full costs.) He maintained that a meaningful economic theory must be built around
the consequences of high overhead costs. He emphasized the fact that the problems raised
for the firm were not limited to the trusts but were endemic to business in an industrialized
nation. JMCs basic concern was that high overhead costs could lead to ruinous competition
as overhead costs remained constant, in the short run, even as variable costs fluctuated. In
terms of the marginal analysis to which John Bates Clark had contributed immensely, in
a short-run profit-maximizing equilibrium every factor of production would be employed
up to the point where the value of its marginal output was equal to its marginal cost to
the firm. But in the short run, marginal overhead cost is zero, and the firm will continue to
produce as long as the marginal revenue of its product is greater than or equal to marginal
short-run, or variable, costs. In the long run, of course, the firm must cover overhead
costs or go out of business, but JMC thought that short-run pricing was widespread, and
where it existed it could drive rivals to match prices below full cost, resulting in cut-throat
and possibly ruinous pricing. Further, static equilibrium theory was of little or no help in
explaining or analyzing the observed phenomena.
The problem was compounded by the possibility of price discrimination. If lower prices
could be charged to some but not all customers, spreading the overhead became more
feasible but made retaliatory pricing by other firms more likely. In Studies in the Economics
of Overhead Costs, JMC wrote:
Since unchecked competition is suicidal and cannot continue, can anything continue which deserves
the name of competition, or are we living in a regime of combination and monopoly, and is
monopoly essential to the life of private industry? The answer appears to be that business
rivalry still exists, subject to checks in the way of understandings and standards of fair tactics
group ethics of the business community [and] a lively sense of the need of common selfpreservation. (p. 435)
In a 1926 book, Social Control of Business (Chicago: University of Chicago Press),

JMC discussed both the economics of concentration and monopoly and the ethical,
legal and political issues involved in government regulation of industry. Arguing that
the law, although constrained by precedent, is a means to a social end, JMC noted with
approval that the courts were condemning only clear-cut antisocial behavior by the large
combinations while paying no attention to indiscriminately broad prohibitions included
in the antitrust laws. On this basis he welcomed these laws.
JMCs introduction of the concept of workable or effective competition in a 1940
American Economic Review article, Toward a concept of workable competition (vol.
30) is generally regarded as on a par with, as well as complementing, the significance of
his analysis of overhead costs. The basic thrust is the authors realization that perfect
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competition does not and cannot and presumably never existed. What we have left is
an unreal or ideal standard which may serve as a starting point of analysis and a norm
(p. 241). There were two features of the model of perfect competition that might lead to
the most egregious errors. First, it was static, whereas the real economy was dynamic,
that is, subject to irreversible change, and the causes and results of such change are much
more important to our understanding of what the real world is like than are equilibrating
forces. Second, many of those features which render the model of perfect competition
irrelevant or incorrect, such as immobility of resources, lack of full knowledge, economies
of scale relative to market size and differentiation of product, may make generalization
impossible: that is, analysis must be inductive rather than deductive. For this reason
JMC never attempted to formulate a complete and uniformly applicable definition of
workable competition. Anticipating the theory of second best, he posited an industry
with all of the attributes of perfect competition and argued that these attributes could be
so interdependent that if any one was taken away the others would be unable to sustain
workable competition.
In the preface to his last major work (Competition as a Dynamic Process, Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution), JMC wrote:
The present volume is an elaboration of a line of inquiry dating from the authors [1940] article
Toward a Concept of Workable Competition. I have become increasingly impressed that
the kind of competition we have, with all its defects is better than the pure and perfect norm,
because it makes for progress. Thus the inquiry goes back to my fathers basic conception that
the analysis of static equilibrium, for which he is chiefly known, is properly not an end but an
introduction to the study of dynamics, in which it should find its fulfillment.
Bibliographic notes
Extensive lists of the published works of John Maurice Clark are to be found in Jesse W. Markham, John Maurice
Clark, International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 2, pp. 50811 (New York: Macmillan, 1968) and in
C. Addison Hickman, J.M. Clark (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).
I have also drawn on my unpublished PhD dissertation, Changing concepts of the large firm and antitrust
enforcement (Princeton University, 1958).
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F.
187
GEORGE WARD STOCKING
Willard F. Mueller
Innovations
Critiques of antitrust legaleconomic rules using industrial organization theories and
empirical analyses. Conducted numerous empirical studies of international cartels, domestic
monopoly and anti-competitive practices. Served as an advisor and active participant in the
enforcement of the antitrust laws and as an advisor to many other government agencies.
He was an imaginative academic administrator and inspiring teacher.
Personal history
Born
1892, Clarendon, TX, USA; died 1975.
Degrees BA Clarendon College, TX, 1918; BA, MA University of Texas, 1918, 1921;
PhD Columbia University, 1925.
Principal position Research Professor and Chair, Department of Economics and Director
of Research in the Social Sciences at Vanderbilt University, 194763.
Other Dartmouth College, 1925; University of Texas, 192647. Technical Advisor,
US Labor Board, 193335; Chairman, Petroleum Labor Policy Board, NRA, 193334;
Member, Consumers Advisory Board, NRA 193335; frequently served as consultant to
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and served as co-chair of the Consent Decree
Section of that department, 194243; Member, War Labor Board, 194346; Director,
Federal Reserve Bank, San Antonio, TX, 194346. President of the Southern Economic
Association (1951) and the American Economic Association (1958).
The hallmark of George Stockings professional career was to improve understanding of

American capitalism and to develop antitrust policies improving competitive markets.
His thinking about these matters was influenced by his mentors at Columbia University,
Thorstein Veblen and Wesley Clair Mitchell. Although he admired Veblens insights into
the institutional characteristics of American capitalism, Stocking rejected Veblens view
that the system of private business enterprise would pass away in the course of time. He
embraced Mitchells belief that the institutional matrix in which economists find themselves
determines the problems economists think about and the way they think about them.
Although public policy fashions often changed during his lifetime, Stocking consistently
advocated reliance on antitrust policies to promote competitively structured markets. To
this end he applied the disciplines of economics and law in evaluating the origins and
implications of economic power. His life work involved (i) empirical studies of specific
industries and business practices and (ii) analysis and formulation of legal rules governing
competitive behavior.
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His early research reflected his previous life in Texas, where he had worked as a roughneck
in the western Texas oilfields. His first published research was The Oil Industry and the
Competitive System (1925); his last major work was Middleast Oil: A Study in Political
and Economic Controversy (1970).
Stockings most ambitious research accomplishment was a six-year study of the
interrelated problems of domestic monopoly and international cartels. The studies were
sponsored by the Twentieth Century Fund and were directed by Stocking and his longtime friend, Professor Myron W. Watkins. Their first volume, Cartels in Action (1946),
provided a detailed factual account of cartel arrangements in eight fields. The second
volume, Cartels or Competition? (1948), provided an appraisal of international cartels and
their influence on industrial stability, employment, technological progress and the growth
of investment. These seminal works often became the genesis of subsequent studies of
international cartels.
The third volume, Monopoly and Free Enterprise (1951), addressed the monopoly
problem in the American economy. It examined the relation between the concentration
of economic power and the theory and practice of free enterprise. It also examined the
laws designed to ensure that the system served the public interest. The book became a
popular textbook for courses in public policy toward business.
Stockings second area of accomplishment involved his active participation in the
regulatory process. Following enactment of the National Recovery Act of 1933, Stocking
was appointed to the Consumers Advisory Board of the National Recovery Administration
(NRA). But he and his fellow board members were no match for the industrialists that
enforced the NRA codes that fixed prices of numerous industrial products. Stocking often
regaled his students with his frustrations during this period as his years of spitting in the
wind. But the experience proved rewarding by demonstrating the dangers inherent in
abandoning antitrust enforcement.
During the subsequent antitrust revival in 1938 with President F.D. Roosevelts
appointment of Thurman Arnold as head of the Antitrust Division, Stocking served
as an economic advisor to Arnold. In the 1950s, Stocking became a leading critic of the
concept of workable competition conceived by Edward Mason and John M. Clark as
an appropriate test of socially acceptable market arrangements. In essence, the approach
proposed that the legality of competitive practices be judged by an industrys performance
rather than its structure and business practices. Stocking believed that competitively
structured markets best fostered satisfactory business performance.
These conflicting approaches clashed in 1953 when the Attorney General appointed a
National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws. Stocking was invited to serve on the
committee, but demurred. The committee was chaired by S. Chesterfield Oppenheim,
who had urged injection of the concept of workable competition and the rule of reason
into the antitrust laws. Stockings worst fears were realized when the committees final
report contained a chapter on the Economic indicia of competition and monopoly that
embraced the concept of workable competition and included numerous economic criteria
for identifying the nature of competition in a market. In consultation with Arnold, Stocking
prepared a lengthy law review article attacking the committees report.
What especially rankled Stocking was that the committee embraced an essentially
Sherman Act rule of reason standard for the enforcement of the recently enacted
CellerKefauver Act. Moreover, the committee endorsed a Federal Trade Commission
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(FTC) decision in the first merger challenged under the CellerKefauver Act, Pillsbury
Mills. F.T.C. Dkt. 6000 (1953).
Stocking believed that the FTCs legal standard requiring a case-by-case examination
of all relevant factors was ambiguous and contrary to the language and legislation history
of the CellerKefauver Act. He predicted that the standard would, at best, greatly prolong
litigating merger cases. Subsequent events confirmed Stockings prophecy. The Pillsbury
case remained in litigation until 1963, when an appellate court once again remanded the
case to the FTC to decide what steps should now be taken in view of both the lapse of
time and the present state of the law applying Section 7. The Commission vacated the
case for lack of public interest.
Stocking continued to conduct research of business practices and antitrust policy for
the rest of his life. Many of his works are included in a book, Workable Competition
and Antitrust Policy (1961). In addition to educating his students and other scholars,
Stocking was adept in influencing policy makers. Two articles he co-authored were cited
with approval in important Supreme Court decisions in the 1950s and 1960s. One critiqued
the initial decision in the DuPont Cellophane case of 1954 and the other examined the
potential competitive problems of reciprocal trading among large corporations.
Finally, Stocking established prominent economics departments at the University of
Texas and Vanderbilt University. At Vanderbilt he attracted substantial research grants,
graduate students, and a prestigious group of industrial organization economists: William
H. Nicholls, Jesse W. Markham, and James W. McKie.
(1946), Cartels In Action (with M.W. Watkins) (Twentieth Century Fund, New York).
(1948), Cartels or Competition? (with M.W. Watkins) (Twentieth Century Fund, New York)
(1951), Monopoly and Free Enterprise (with M.W. Watkins) (Twentieth Century Fund, New York).
(1955), The Cellophane case and the new competition (with W.F. Mueller), American Economic Review, 65,
March, 2963.
(1955), The Attorney Generals Committee report: A businessmans guide through antitrust, Georgetown Law
Review, 44(1), November, 157.
(1957), Business reciprocity and the size of firms (with W.F. Mueller), University of Chicago Journal of Business,
30, April, 7393.
(1961), Workable Competition and Antitrust Policy, Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, Tenn.
(1970), Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Controversy (Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville,
Tenn).
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G.
MARTIN G. GLAESER
Harry M. Trebing
Innovations
Glaeser formulated comprehensively much of the economic content of utility regulation.
He analyzed the interrelationships among differential pricing, cost and operational characteristics of public utilities, technological advance, and the move toward greater industry
concentration. He concluded that these factors required an evolving pattern of government
intervention and control for public utility industries. He critically examined the components
of the regulatory process, ranging from the determination of revenue requirements to the
design of rates and proposed ratemaking guidelines to promote efficiency and control the
exercise of market power. Glaeser analyzed changing technology in these industries, and
advanced the analysis of common and joint costs.
Personal history
Born
1888, Tepliwodau, Germany; died 1967.
Degrees
AB University of Wisconsin, 1911; PhD Harvard University, 1925.
Principal positions Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin, 191967. He

initially joined the Wisconsin faculty in 1917 working with Richard T. Ely and John R.
Commons. Glaeser held a variety of positions at the Wisconsin Public Service Commission
(191118), and he was executive secretary for the Public Utility Acquisition Committee
studying regulation or municipal ownership of the Milwaukee electric utility (192025).
He served as special adviser to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) from 1933 to 1936,
and Chief Power Planning Engineer for TVA from 1937 to 1938. Glaeser served as a
commissioner with the Wisconsin Commission for the last four years of his life.
Martin G. Glaeser devoted much of his professional career to the study of public utility
industries both at the academic and governmental levels. He received an introduction to
the problems of the railroads and the regulation of corporate power as a student of William
Z. Ripley and Roscoe Pound while completing a PhD at Harvard. At the University of
Wisconsin he was a youthful colleague of Richard T. Ely and John R. Commons, who
were heavily involved in implementing the LaFollette Idea which sought to integrate
academia with state government to introduce public policy reform. He served as a special
adviser to the Tennessee Valley Authority (193336) and as Chief Power Planning Engineer
(193738), where he played a pivotal role in shaping the policies of TVA, which had become
one of the jewels of the New Deal reform program. He also served as a member of the
Wisconsin Commission. All of this was combined into almost 40 years of teaching as an
institutional economist at Wisconsin.
Glaesers perception of public utility industries as a separate sector in need of state
control or regulation was set forth in Outlines of Public Utility Economics (1927) and Public
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Utilities in American Capitalism (1957). He analyzed the origin of the concept of public
utility status and the evolution of different patterns of social control as these industries
moved from competition to monopoly status, and then to regional or national infrastructure networks. He incorporated this pattern of evolution into the four economic dimensions
of efficiency that characterize these industries. These are economies of the load factor,
diversity factor economies, economies of scale and economies of joint production.
Glaeser described the public utility sector as quite distinct from traditional government
functions where collective interests are supported by taxes (for example, national defense and
the administration of justice), and the unregulated market sector. Public utilities perform
quasi-public functions where collective interests and common benefits are dominant, but
special benefits accrue to individuals in a fashion that can be rationed by price. The public
interest is promoted through collective action (that is, state intervention and regulation)
that liberates individual action and enhances consumer choice. Glaeser noted that the
zone between public utility functions and competitive markets can be characterized by
oligopolistic behavior and administered pricing. Here, he says, we meet some of the most
perplexing problems of modern capitalism (Glaeser, 1957, p. 11).
In his approach to the study of public utilities, Glaeser adopts a broad evolutionary
approach that is much more comprehensive than that developed by Henry Carter Adams
or James Bonbright. He traces the origin of the concept of public utility status back
to the doctrine of just price. He then proceeds to describe both the evolution of public
utility industries and the institutional arrangements for social control through four distinct
epochs. The first was the promotional epoch that was characterized by government
promotion and subsidization of public utilities and transportation. The second was the
competitive epoch where primary reliance was placed on promoting inter-firm rivalry to
constrain the behavior of suppliers. During this period, considerable reliance was placed
on the issue of multiple franchises to encourage entry. The third epoch emerged when
monopoly replaced competition. In part, the monopoly epoch was the result of mergers
and consolidations when capital-intensive suppliers faced conditions of excess capacity
and demand instability. It also reflected growing acceptance of the natural monopoly
concept by government as the most efficient method for providing service. In this period,
the independent regulatory commission replaced franchise and legislative regulation. The
fourth epoch was characterized by Glaeser as a period of planning and coordination.
Government would assume greater planning responsibility and there would be greater
acceptance of more diverse options for providing utility-type services. Interconnection of
networks and integration of systems would also grow in importance. When the provision
of public utility service became monopolized, the producer would have control over a
common necessity, and that market power would have to be curbed by the political power
of the state.
For Glaeser, this required commissions to apply rate base/rate-of-return regulation
utilizing the Uniform System of Accounts as a database together with supplemental
monitoring for quality of service. He discusses each of these components of the regulatory
process at length and he devotes special attention to the incentive to achieve full utilization
of fixed plant through pricing strategies. His 1927 book contains a pioneering discussion of
price discrimination. He noted that the classification of customers on the basis of different
demand elasticities and charging them differential class prices permits the monopolist
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to invade what might otherwise be either a consumers surplus or competitive profit

(1927, p. 627).
Glaeser believed that public utilities should be permitted to compete for different classes
of customers, but not at the expense of placing additional burdens on current customers.
If there were surplus revenues through differential pricing, Glaeser argued that: (i) prices
on all units should be reduced, (ii) output should be increased, or (iii) prices should be
lowered for existing customers and output expanded to new customers at a lower price:
The objective is that public purpose and not private goals should control the disposal of
surplus profits (ibid., p. 635). He also added that regulatory approval of additional capacity
does not imply that the state should underwrite the associated risks.
Throughout both the 1927 and 1957 books, Glaeser discusses at length four economic
dimensions of efficiency that are of unique importance in the public utility industries.
These are economies of the load factor, economies of the diversity factor, economies of
scale and economies of joint production. He gave particular attention to economies of
joint production where it would be cheaper to turn out two or more services from one
central process or structure than to produce them separately (1957, p. 177). He points out
that joint costs associated with such production are difficult to segregate among different
products or components of the enterprise. In 1927, he noted that those services where
demand is highly elastic will bear the smallest portion of the total joint costs.
Glaesers experience with the TVA and the need to reconcile the joint costs of multiple
purpose of river basin projects led him to formulate a fascinating theory for handling this
problem. Glaesers alternative justifiable expenditures theory would proceed as follows.
First, the direct (avoidable) cost of each service would be subtracted from the total system
cost. This would yield the joint/common costs. These joint/common costs would be assigned
to each service on the basis of the relative benefit which that service derived from being
included as a part of the integrated utility supply system. The relative benefit is measured
by the difference between each services direct and stand-alone cost. Each service could
then be assigned its direct plus its allocated joint/common cost. If this consolidated cost is
less than its stand-alone cost, then pervasive system-wide economies exist and that service
or activity benefits by being an integral part of the network. Where no such economies
exist because the stand-alone cost is equal to or less than the combined cost of providing
the service over the system network, then there would be no cost-based rationale for
including it as an integral part of the utility-based supply system. Glaesers theory could
be applied to prescribe the revenue contribution of each service of activity. It would be
far preferable to relying on demand-based price discrimination to determine each services
proportional contribution.
Since Glaeser stressed the evolutionary nature of public utility services and regulation, it
is reasonable to assume that he would agree that the form and scope of regulation should
change over time. Proponents of deregulation could argue that the Energy Policy Act of
1992 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 became the embodiment of his government
planning function. Only this was planning to replace regulation with markets wherever
possible. Clearly, this is not what Glaeser had in mind. His emphasis on the dominance
of collective over individual interests, the need for regulation to liberate individual action,
and the potential abuses inherent in monopoly costing and pricing leave no doubt that
deregulation was not his objective. He would admit that the zone between public utilities
and the unregulated market will change, but it is difficult to envisage that he would
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concede that the latter would supplant the former. Quite the contrary, his approach to
the treatment of joint costs provides an intriguing solution for the problem of preventing
cross-subsidization between regulated and deregulated markets when repeal of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act leads to the proliferation of new holding companies.
Glaesers argument on the need for collective action by the state stands in sharp contrast
to the deregulation movement of the past two decades. He provides a conceptual and
historical framework for a critical examination of deregulation that strongly suggests
deregulation will not yield pervasive competition but rather greater concentration and
greater market power.
(1927), Outlines of Public Utility Economics, London: Macmillan.
(1939), Those joint TVA costs, Public Utilities Fortnightly, 24, August, 259ff.
(1957), Public Utilities in American Capitalism, London: Macmillan.
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11.
A.
The 1930s
GARDINER C. MEANS
John Howard Brown

Innovations
Separation of ownership from control in modern corporations, concept of administered
prices, concentration ratios as a measure of market structure.
Personal history
Born
1896, Windham, CN, USA; died 1988.
Degrees BA (Chemistry) Harvard University, 1918; MA and PhD Harvard (Economics)

1927, 1933.
Principal position
Non-academic, government.
Gardiner Means deserves to be considered as at least the most important forerunner, if not
the founder, of modern industrial organization. His influential and creative scholarship
during the crucial decade of the 1930s helped to set the research agenda which dominated
the early field of industrial organization.
Meanss contribution was predominantly empirical. With Adolph Berle, Means (1932)
documented the gradual erosion of the rights of shareholders. This led to the notion that
there had emerged a separation of ownership and control.
As they note in the 1967 edition of The Modern Corporation one of the consequences
of their book was the Securities Exchange Act of 1933. Within the economics profession,
the vast literature of agency, the market for corporate control, and executive compensation
proceeds from Berle and Means. At the same time the early twenty-first-century corporate
scandals point to the continued relevance of the concept of the separation of ownership
and control.
Berle and Means assert that the changes are significant, because [t]he separation of
ownership from control produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate
manager may, and often do, diverge, and where many of the checks which formerly operated
to limit the use of power disappear (1932 [1967], p. 7). At the same time, the giant size and
all encompassing nature of modern firms changes the very nature of capital, so that:
194
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Individual pioneers: the 1930s
195
To an increasing extent it is composed not of tangible goods, but of organizations built in the
past and available to function in the future. Even the value of tangible goods tends to become
increasingly dependent upon their organized relationship to other tangible goods ... of these
great units. (pp. 456)
These organizations exert what they characterize as a centripetal attraction causing

ever larger organizations. It also has consequences for the social control of business.
They observe: a society in which production is governed by blind economic forces is being
replaced by one in which production is carried on under the ultimate control of a handful
of individuals. The economic power in the hands of the few persons who control a giant
corporation is a tremendous force (p. 46).
The major conceptual revolution of Berle and Meanss work is the notion of control
as something distinct from either ownership or management (p. 66). They define control
as for practical purposes (that) control lies in the hands of the individual or group who
have the actual power to select the board of directors (or its majority) (p. 66). They go
on to identify and quantify the various methods of control ranging from control by a
single dominant shareholder to control by the incumbent management with little or
no shareholding. Of this last category they observe: Where ownership is sufficiently
subdivided, the management can thus become a self-perpetuating body even though its
share in the ownership is negligible (p. 82).
They examined the ownership structure of the 200 largest corporations and conclude:
[that] 65 percent of the companies and 80 per cent of their combined wealth should be
controlled either by the management or by a legal device involving a small proportion
of ownership indicates the important extent to which ownership and control have been
separated (p. 110).
They acknowledged a very definite limitation on the control of the corporation, the
power of public markets. According to them, the growing corporation is, dependent on
new capital (p. 247) so that: The bulk of their growth came almost entirely from new
issues of stock or other securities. The corporations dependence upon capital markets,
sets a very definite limit on the extent to which those in control can abuse the suppliers
of capital.
Another of Meanss contributions to industrial organization was the notion of
administered price. Working as an Economic Advisor to Henry Wallace the Secretary of
Agriculture, Means examined the behavior of prices as a part of the implementation of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act. Thus he followed his bombshell, The Modern Corporation
with yet another incendiary, his theory of administered prices (1935a). Hamilton (Hamilton
et al., 1938, p. vii) cites the creation in the summer of 1934 of a Cabinet Committee on
Price Policy which was to investigate the pricing policies of various industries. It is not
clear whether this committee predates Meanss memo to Secretary Wallace.
Means defined an administered price as, one which is set by administrative action and
held constant for a period of time (1935a, p. 1). This differs from market prices that
are made in the market as the result of the interaction of buyers and sellers and also to
the traditional distinction between competitive and monopoly prices. The distinguishing characteristic of administered prices which gives them their considerable economic
significance is that they are rigid and sales fluctuate with the demand at the rigid price
(1935b, p. 401).
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As Means puts it, The main point ... is that inflexible, administered prices have acted
as an impediment to that automatic readjustment which is supposed to occur through
price change and which is supposed to keep our economy in approximate balance with full
use of economic resource (1936, p. 33). According to Means, technology and economic
concentration have brought about a change in the demand curve faced by the individual
producer. In a great body of cases he faces a demand curve which slopes up to the left
(pp. 334). Thus the producer in an oligopolistic industry has the discretion to control
prices, and does.
Meanss thesis is well known. In competitively structured industries, prices fell
dramatically at the onset of the Great Depression. In more concentrated industries the
tendency for prices to change was substantially more muted. In a flurry of theoretical and
statistical analyses in 193536, Means showed that sectors of the economy had responded
differently to the onset of the Great Depression. He further identified administered prices
as a source of the American economys unsatisfactory performance in the period.
For statistical evidence he used the Bureau of Labor Statistics monthly survey of
wholesale prices over the 192633 period (1935a,b). He first counted the number of changes
reported in the price of one of the commodities sampled. The number of price changes
experienced by a commodity proved to be widely variable (1935b, Chart 1).
Means divided the commodities into ten groups based on their frequency of reported
price change. The behavior of prices for each of these groups was described, first from
1926 to 1933 (1935a), subsequently from 1929 through 1936. The results were dramatic.
Commodities with the most flexible prices dropped the most during the recession of
192933 and then rose the most in the subsequent recovery (l936, p. 24). Means linked
the differences in price flexibility to the extent of output adjustment in the respective
industries. Inflexible prices were closely associated with large reductions of output during
the recession. In contrast, flexible price industries maintained output at almost unchanged
levels during the recession and the subsequent recovery.
In the first of the three papers (Senate Document 13, 1935a) the links to Meanss earlier
work with Berle are most evident. He asserts that administered prices were caused by the
rise of large-scale firms so that where once: [b]alance between the actions of individuals was
maintained ... by the impersonal forces of the market and the law of supply and demand.
Through the market, the apparently unrelated activities of individuals were made to mesh
into a single coordinated whole (1935a, p. 9), now there arose an economy where: more
and more of economic coordination has been accomplished administratively.
As Means notes: More than half of all manufacturing activity is carried on by 200
big corporations while big corporations dominate the railroad and public-utility fields
(p. 10). There were benefits to this since: This development of administrative coordination
has made possible tremendous increases in the efficiency of industrial production within
single enterprises. However, it also eliminates flexibility in adjusting to changing demand.
Because decision-making power in the economy has been concentrated in the hands of a
few managers, individuals have a direct control over industrial policy which they exercise
in making business policy for their own enterprise (p. 10). This is a distinct change from
laissez-faire principles. Instead, since in many industries the number of competing units has,
been reduced to a relatively small handful, industrial policy is no longer made wholly by
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the market but in part by individuals. Industrial policy become subject to administrative
control even though there is no monopoly or collusion.
Unfortunately, the incentives for the individual businessman are such that in making
industrial policy, he almost necessarily makes wrong industrial decisions. This is the
case since the businessman must make business policy in a way to maximize the profits
of his own enterprise. This frequently requires him in the presence of falling demand to
hold price and curtail his production even though this means idle men and idle machines
in consequence, The net effect of business control over industrial policy is, therefore, to
aggravate any fluctuations in economic activity and prevent any necessary readjustments.
This is no necessary reflection on either his character or his intelligence.
Meanss work on pricing inspired and contributed to the wave of investigations of pricing
during the 1930s. Edward Masons Price and output policies (1939), usually considered
the founding document of industrial organization, represents a logical extension of this
literature. Meanss role in sparking the literature on pricing is the reason that this author
ranks him, and not Mason, as the founding father of industrial organization. However,
Meanss contribution to the development of industrial organization was not complete.
A third contribution is found in, The Structure of American Industry (Natural Resources
Committee, 1939). This massive volume was nothing less than a case study of the entire
American economy. Means was the head of the research division of the Natural Resources
Committee. This was a bureau within the Interior Department charged, as the name
suggests, with examination of patterns of resource use in the United States.
Each chapter outlines one aspect of the national economy. Chapter Seven contains the
material related to the current field of industrial organization. It is the first study to use
the four-firm concentration ratio of an industry to establish the degree of oligopolistic
dominance in the industry (Lee, 2001). This measure is a stalwart of empirical industrial
organization.
Nor was Means done with the concept of administered prices in the 1930s:
In 1959, my pamphlet, Administrative Inflation and Public Policy, reported the discovery of a
wholly new kind of inflation in which prices increase perversely in response to a fall in demand,
thus producing simultaneous inflation and recession, an impossibility under traditional theories.
Study of this finding showed that the new inflation does not arise from too much money chasing
too few goods but from normal administrative decisions which carry an inflationary bias and that
it cannot be controlled by monetary and fiscal measures. (Meanss autobiographical summary
in Blaug, 1999, p. 762)
According to Means, this administered price inflation, unlike conventional inflation,

was not subject to the ordinary levers of fiscal and monetary policy.
Bibliography
Berle, Adolf and Gardiner Means (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Macmillan, New York,
reprinted 1967, Harcourt, Brace & World, New York.
Blaug, Mark (ed.) (1999), Whos Who in Economics, 3rd edn, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton,
MA, USA.
Hamilton, Walton, Mark Adams, Irene Till, Albert Abrahamson, George Marshall and Helen Everett Meiklejohn
(1938), Price and Price Policies, McGraw-Hill, New York.
Lee, Frederic S. (2001), personal communication, April 4.
Mason, Edward S. (1939), Price and output policies of large scale enterprise, American Economic Review,
Supplement, 29(1), pp. 6174.
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Means, Gardiner C. (1935a), Industrial Prices and Their Relative Inflexibility, Senate Document 13, 74th Congress,
1st session, Washington, DC.
Means, Gardiner C. (1935b), Price inflexibility and the requirements of a stabilizing monetary policy, Journal
of the American Statistical Association, 30(190), June, 40113.
Means, Gardiner C. (1936), Notes on inflexible prices, American Economic Review, 26(1), 2335.
Means, Gardiner C. (1959), Administrative Inflation and Public Policy, A. Kramer Associates, Washington,
DC.
Natural Resources Committee (1939), The Structure of the American Economy, Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC, reprinted 1966, Augustus M. Kelley, New York.
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B.
199
EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN
William L. Baldwin
Innovations
The theory of monopolistic competition in oligopoly markets where the leading firms
understand their mutual dependence.
Personal history
Born 1899, La Conner, WA, USA; died 1967. On the death of his father, his mother
moved the family to Iowa City, Iowa, where he completed his high school education and
graduated from the University of Iowa.
Degrees BA University of Iowa; MA University of Michigan, 1922; PhD Harvard
University, 1927; his doctoral dissertation was awarded the David H. Wells prize for the
academic year 192728.
Principal position He remained a member of the Harvard faculty until his death, by which
time he had been appointed the David H. Wells Professor of Political Economy.
For six years Chamberlin devoted his attention virtually exclusively to his 1933 book The
Theory of Monopolistic Competition: A Re-orientation of the Theory of Value (TMC)
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), drawn from his dissertation. In the following
years Chamberlin wrote over 30 published scholarly works in the general field of microeconomics, but his focus remained largely on the theory of monopolistic competition.
Jesse W. Markham noted in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (vol. 18,
pp. 11721 at p. 119, New York: Macmillan, 1979), [T]here are eminent scholars whose fame
rests on a major contribution and whose professional lives are devoted to elaborating and
perfecting it. Chamberlin, he concluded, was par excellence such a scholar. Indeed, Markham
observed, It is a ... high tribute to the results of his tenacity that Monopolistic Competition
and [Keyness] General Theory are often identified as the two most influential economic
treatises of the twentieth century (p. 120). Or, as William J. Baumol commented in the 1964
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings (vol. 54, May, p. 52), Chamberlins book
was the most influential single work ever produced by an American economist.
But not all American economists subscribed to quite such a glowing opinion of this
book. In one text, A History of Economic Theory and Method by Robert B. Eckelund, Jr
and Robert F. Hbert, the authors wrote Practically every text in principles of economics
and in intermediate microeconomic analysis devotes space to Chamberlin and his ideas.
However, [A] large and ever-growing coterie has come to defend an expanded model of
perfect competition as a more consistent and useful approach to microeconomic problems
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 3rd edn, 1990, pp. 494, 495). This division of opinion may be
described and assessed in three major areas: basic concepts such as demand curves and
mutual dependence recognized; analysis; and policy implications.
Prior to the publication of TMC and simultaneously of Joan Robinsons The Economics
of Imperfect Competition (London: Macmillan, 1933) economists tended to simplify
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their analyses of market structures and pricing by assuming that firms were either price
makers (monopolies) or price takers (in competition). In the case of a monopoly a firm
was assumed to have no competitors, with perhaps its ability to raise price to a very high
level constrained by the potential entry of others, but with much of the downward-sloping
Marshallian demand curve facing the monopolist being identical with the market demand.
The firm in competition, by contrast, was assumed to be so small, and the number of these
firms in a given market so large, that no firm could alter the supply-and-demand determined
price by raising or lowering its rate of output. Such a firm would face a horizontal or
perfectly elastic demand curve showing price as independent of any one firms output.
The standard approach by economic theorists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries was to develop models of pure monopoly and pure competition and compare the
two. Economists of the marginalist revolution were well aware of and dissatisfied with the
simplistic dichotomy between the two, but had been unable to go any further than to note
factors which might temper both monopoly and competition. As Chamberlin observed in
introducing the concept of mutual dependence recognized:
When a move by one seller evidently forces the other to make a counter move, he is very stupidly
refusing to look further than his nose if he proceeds on the assumption that he will not. ... He
must consider not merely what his competitor is doing now, but also what he will be forced to do
in the light of change which he himself is contemplating. (TMC, 8th edn, pp. 46, 47)
This concept is the core of Chamberlins theory and what distinguishes his contribution
most distinctly from Joan Robinsons. Essentially, the demand curve becomes a subjective
construct, or what the firm thinks is most likely to be the relation between its price and
output. In one limiting case, the monopolistic seller assumes correctly that it faces the
market demand curve. At the other limit, each of the many competitive firms accounts for
so many rivals and so small a share of the market that it is impossible for any one to think
through the likely ramifications of a price or production rate change, or correctly it assumes
that its impact on the market would be so minor that others would ignore it. As a result, the
competitive firm takes the existing price structure as given. The concept could be applied
as a continuum to intermediate markets; that is, mutual dependence fully recognized,
partially recognized and ignored. But, as Chamberlin warned repeatedly throughout his
book, such flexibility made it necessary to neglect, hold constant or assume away so many
elements of real-world industries and markets that each case had to be treated sui generis.
Among these are number and size distribution of firms, product differentiation, risk, entry
conditions, frictions, imperfections of knowledge and brand loyalties. In his discussion
of the theory Chamberlin wrote: [T]hese variations will give no real difficulty in the end.
Exposition of the group theory is facilitated, however, by ignoring them for the present.
We therefore proceed under the heroic assumption that both demand and cost curves for
all the products are uniform throughout the group (ibid., p. 82).
While the mutual dependence model was without doubt a great improvement over
the monopoly/competition dichotomy, it has its problems, notably in the case of mutual
dependence fully recognized in oligopolistic markets. Under Chamberlins heroic
assumption mutual dependence recognition fully recognized in such markets will lead to
the same price, output and profit as pure monopoly. This may come about through either
overt or tacit collusion. However, early work in game theory made it clear that the mutual
adoption and maintenance of joint maximizing strategies involved extremely difficult
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problems, even in the duopoly case, notably in the absence of direct communication (that
is, the prisoners dilemma) or in a repeated game with a finite time horizon (the final round
problem). It appeared that Chamberlin had attributed abilities to at least some business
decision makers in tight oligopoly situations that were well beyond the skills of economic
theorists to model.
In Chamberlins basic analytical model the firm in oligopoly faces two subjective demand
curves. The first, labeled DD' for graphical purposes, is the curve for mutual dependence
fully recognized; and the second, labeled dd', is that for mutual dependence ignored,
or assuming that competitors prices and outputs are held constant. Both have negative
slopes, but clearly, dd' is more elastic than DD' and intersects it from below and to the
left. Assuming that the firms price and output are shown at the point of intersection of
these two curves, the firm faces a constant temptation to cut price on the assumption that
it can get away with the cut without triggering any response from its rivals that is, dd is
the relevant demand curve. But it is often not so, for this reason having been labeled an
imaginary demand curve. The result is that the firms rate of output is determined by
the less elastic DD', or dd' has slid down DD' to a new short-run equilibrium at which all
firms in the industry are worse off. From time to time such slides occur and are reversed by
restoration of mutual recognition, but over time the number of firms and the differentiation of products increase and mutual dependence is ignored. A long-run equilibrium in
this case is determined by tangency of dd' and long-run average cost.
At this equilibrium, however, even though the rate of profit has been reduced to zero, the
rate of output is below the optimum and price is above optimum. This equilibrium, in which
oligopoly has been replaced by monopolistic competition, is illustrated by the tangency of
a downward-sloping demand curve with a U-shaped cost curve. Such a tangency must by
construction lie to the left of the minimum point of the cost curve, indicating that there
are too many firms of suboptimal scale. At the same time Joan Robinson came to the
same conclusion, illustrating with virtually identical graphs. In her view, this misallocaton
of resources reflected an inefficiency of free-market capitalism, although later she was
quoted, curiously enough in a volume edited by Chamberlin, as saying: I make no apology
for having written my book twenty years ago, but I find it shocking that people still
read it (Monopoly and Competition and Their Regulation, Papers and Proceedings of a
Conference Held by the International Economic Association, London: Macmillan, 1954,
p. 507). Chamberlin, on the other hand, held that variety in products offset much if not
all of the social costs of monopolistic competition:
[E]ven where possible, it would not be desirable to standardize products beyond a certain point.
Differences in tastes, desires, incomes, and the locations of buyers, and differences in the uses
which they wish to make of commodities all indicate the need for variety and the necessity
of substituting for the concept of a competitive ideal an ideal involving both monopoly and
competition. How much and what kinds of monopoly, and with what measure of social control,
become the questions. (8th edn, pp. 21415)
Chamberlins formulation of mutual dependence recognized quickly replaced the concept

of monopoly as limited to a single or overwhelmingly dominant seller and in 1956 was
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court, which defined monopoly as the power to control
prices or exclude competition (United States v. E. I. du Pont & Company, 351 US 377, 391).
Monopoly power is now understood by economists and lawyers alike to be a matter of
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degree. Mutual dependence fully recognized among a small group of oligopolistic firms with
similar costs and products may lead to collusion, whether overt or tacit, yielding virtually
the same results as single-firm, or pure, monopoly. As the number of firms increases or
differences in cost or product grow, the degree to which mutual dependence is recognized,
and hence monopoly power, is likely to fall. But the courts have had difficulty with the
concept which the judiciary has labeled conscious parallelism, but which in truth is hard
to distinguish from recognition of mutual dependence.
In 1946, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of three major cigarette manufacturers
on charges of conspiracy both to restrain trade and to monopolize. These three had in total
at one time accounted for approximately 90 percent of cigarette production in the US. The
evidence presented was almost entirely of parallel behavior in setting prices, particularly
during the Depression. In its opinion the Supreme Court stated:
No formal agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy. Often crimes are a matter
of inference deduced from the acts of the person accused and done in pursuance of a criminal
purpose. ... The essential combination or conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act may be
found in a course of dealings or other circumstances as well as in an exchange of words. (American
Tobacco Company v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 80910)
In a series of subsequent cases the courts adopted the term conscious parallelism, and
the antitrust enforcement agencies sought to convince the courts that the American Tobacco
decision outlawed tacit as well as overt collusion. But in a 1954 case, the Court stated its
reluctance to rely solely on consciously parallel business practices, asserting:
This Court has never held that proof of parallel business behavior conclusively establishes
agreement or, phrased differently, that such behavior itself constitutes a Sherman Act offense.
Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy inroads into
the traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but conscious parallelism has not yet
read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely. (Theater Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film
Distributing Corporation, 346 U.S. 537, 541)
As Galbraith had viewed the issue on the eve of the Theater Enterprises decision:
To suppose that there are grounds for antitrust prosecution wherever three, four or a half dozen
firms dominate a market is to suppose that the very fabric of American capitalism is illegal. This is
a notion which can seem sensible only to the briefless lawyer. (American Capitalism: The Concept
of Countervailing Power, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1952, p. 55)
Isaiah Berlin has quoted a line from the Ancient Greek poet Archilochus, The fox
knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing (The Hedgehog & the Fox: An
Essay on Tolstoys View of History, New York: Touchstone, 1986, p. 1). E.H. Chamberlin
exemplifies the best in Berlins hedgehog, with one big thing which made fundamental
contributions to both microeconomic analysis and public policy toward business.
Bibliographic notes
An extensive list of the published works of Edward H. Chamberlin is to be found in Jesse W. Markham,
Chamberlin, Edward H., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 18, pp. 11721 (New York:
Free Press, 1979).
I have also drawn on my unpublished PhD dissertation, Changing concepts of the large firm and antitrust
enforcement (Princeton University, 1958).
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C.
203
JAMES C. BONBRIGHT
Harry M. Trebing
Innovations
Bonbright presented a comprehensive analysis of the case for public utility regulation,
setting forth the conditions for public control of enterprise, the components of economic
regulation, and an analysis of the broader market structure within which such control must
function. With respect to the latter, he demonstrated the need for structural reforms that
would be forthcoming in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.
Personal history
Born
1891, Evanston, IL, USA; died 1985.
Principal positions Professor of Finance, Graduate School of Business and Department

of Economics, Columbia University (192760). He initially joined the Columbia faculty in
1920. He was a trustee of the Power Authority of New York from 1931 to 1946, and was
a member of the Governors Commission on New York State Power Resources in 1959.
Degrees BS Northwestern University, 1913; PhD (Economics) Columbia, 1921. He was
awarded an Honorary LLD from Northwestern University in 1956.
Bonbright wrote extensively on public utility problems over a long professional career. He
taught at Columbia University from 1920 to 1960, wrote four major treatises on public
utility regulation, and served as chair of the New York Power Authority from 19201960.
His continuing goal was the refinement and improvement of the institution of economic
regulation.
He accepted and articulated the concept of public interest regulation. In defining a
public utility, Bonbright believed that an enterprise should not be regarded as a public
utility unless it was subject to direct controls over the rates charged for service. However, he
believed that price control alone was not sufficient to confer public utility status. Bonbright
emphasized that the primary purpose of regulation must be the protection of the public in
the role of consumer rather than in the role of producer or taxpayer. Accordingly, a public
utility is any enterprise subject to price regulation of a type designed primarily to protect
consumers. As he noted, What must justify public utility regulation is the necessity of
regulation and not merely the necessity of the product (Bonbright 1961, p. 9).
On the topic of market structure, Bonbright recognized that although public utilities
may face severe competition in selected markets they are still essentially monopolistic.
What favors regulation, he believed, was not that the enterprise operates under increasing
returns, but rather that it involves a close connection between the plant-supplying service
and the ultimate consumer. Interestingly, Bonbright, in collaboration with Gardiner C.
Means, wrote a critical assessment of the holding company movement in 1932. Both authors
believed that the holding company system was conducive to waste and inefficiency, financial
manipulation and exploitative service fees that could be shifted forward to the consumer.
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Bonbright and Means argued against the diversification of utilities into non-utility
activities since this would be damaging to the ratepayer because it would menace the
credit of the public utilities. For them, the appropriate industry structure was composed
of autonomous operating entities, unencumbered by holding company affiliates and diversification programs. Clearly Bonbright would have vigorously opposed efforts in 2005 to
repeal the Public Utility Holding Company Act and to eliminate regulation of the holding
companies by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Much of Bonbrights writing was devoted to the application of base rate/rate-of-return
regulation to public utility enterprises. This included both the calculation of revenue
requirements and the appropriate design of price or rate structures. He wrote a two-volume
study on the valuation of assets which is an integral part of determining revenue requirements
(Bonbright, 1937). In 1961, he wrote an authoritative analysis of rates, which remains a
classic for regulators applying base rate/rate-of-return regulation (Bonbright, 1961).
Bonbright distinguished between total revenue requirements reflecting historic and
current costs and the design of rates reflecting anticipated or escapable costs. To determine
revenue requirements he would rely upon base rate/rate-of-return regulation. To design
prices he would rely upon marginal cost analyses. Bonbright noted that between revenue
requirements and rate design there would be an intermediate standard reflecting the cost of
serving a particular class or group of customers. He called this a class rate standard. Class
rate standards would determine whether charges for a specific service were compensatory
or non-compensatory, and accordingly would serve as a standard for judging internal
cross-subsidization.
For Bonbright, class rate standards should be based on differential or incremental costs
and not on absolute accounting costs. However, if a total cost apportionment were required,
Bonbright suggested that: fully apportioned costs should reflect cost relationships, not
absolute costs a relationship of direct proportionality suggests itself, and is perhaps
the most generally useful one for rate-making purposes (Bonbright, 1961, pp. 34041). In
effect, Bonbright was proposing an apportionment of total costs or revenue requirements
reflecting relative or proportional relationships rather than an estimate of absolute cost
by service.
Bonbright continued his discussion of pricing behavior by responding to the critics of
regulation who argued that rates in the long run will be higher with than without regulation,
and that profit-maximizing firms would experiment with rate reductions which would be
impeded under commission regulation. Bonbright believed that when freed from controls,
utilities would not follow a practice of lower prices to maximize profits. Instead, these
utilities would be more apt to follow a policy of price discrimination with high prices for
inelastic markets and low prices for elastic markets. He believed that there would be no
incentive for this type of rate structure to conform to cost-of-service standards.
Bonbright advocated public utility regulation so as to promote efficiency. Like Henry
Carter Adams and Martin Glaeser, Bonbright sought to capture the efficiency inherent in
the cost characteristics of public utilities and pass them forward to the ultimate consumer.
While he felt that public utility status involved more than increasing returns, he clearly
believed that a single public utility supplying a given market would do so more cheaply
than two or more companies operating in direct competition. He noted that even when
the utility supplies output under conditions of increasing unit costs, the single company
can secure the maximum advantages of economies of scale and density, while it is no
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more subject to the diseconomies of enhanced output than two or more companies
called upon to supply the region with the same total output (ibid., pp. 1516). In a sense,
he anticipated the subadditivity argument that came more than a decade later.
Critics of regulation will argue that the Bonbright model is limited to static situations
where classic conditions of natural monopoly prevail. They will argue that the cost of
this approach is the resultant stability that produces little or no innovation. They might
point to possible examples in telecommunications. However, this does not mean that
rapidly innovative market structures will not satisfy the need for consumer protection
which was Bonbrights principal criterion for regulation. How to adapt the regulatory
model to dynamic conditions remains a challenge for the future.
(1932), The Holding Company (with Gardiner C. Means), New York: McGraw Hill.
(1937), The Valuation of Property, 2 vols, New York: McGraw-Hill.
(1948), Utility rate control reconsidered in the light of the Hope Natural Gas case, American Economic Review,
38, May, 46582.
(1961), Principles of Public Utility Rates, New York: Columbia University Press.
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D.
HAROLD HOTELLING
John Howard Brown

Innovations
Spatial product differentiation; theory of marginal cost pricing.
Personal history
Born
1895, Fulda, MN, USA; died 1973. He spent much of his youth in Seattle.
Degrees BA (Journalism) University of Washington, 1919; masters (Mathematics)

University of Washington, 1921; PhD (Mathematics) Princeton University, 1924.
Principal position 193146 Columbia University, where he was a central figure in the
creation of the statistics department.
Other Stanford University; University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he was
a professor of mathematical statistics, associate director of the Institute of Statistics and
a professor of economics.
Harold Hotelling is best known in economics today for his 1929 article, Stability in
competition. This article, in fact, represents an important milestone in the development
of modern theories of industrial organization. However, Hotellings contributions extend
substantially beyond this much-cited work. He was also an important and pioneering
statistician, responsible for the development of statistics education at both Columbia
University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. In addition he published
a work often considered as a foundation of resource economics (1931) and substantial
work on the theory of marginal cost pricing.
In his A general mathematical theory of depreciation (1925), Hotelling first develops
the modern economic view of depreciation. That is, the owner wishes to maximize the
present value of output minus the operating costs of the machine or other property. This
quantity is, in fact, the value of the property (1925, p. 341). This allows depreciation to
be, defined simply as rate of decrease of value (ibid.).
Hotellings 1929 paper, Stability in competition, represents a first systematic attempt
to model product differentiation. Hotelling begins by noting the gap in economic analysis
arising from cases lying between the monopoly case where market and firm demand are
identical and the competitive case where demand is perfectly elastic. The famous Hotelling
model is offered as an example of one form of product differentiation. The article develops
the notion of product differentiation much further than is generally appreciated.
The starting point of Hotellings analysis is that: If the purveyor of an article gradually
increases his price while his rivals keep theirs fixed, the diminution of volume of his
sales will in general take place continuously rather than in the abrupt way which has
been tacitly assumed (1929, p. 41). This characteristic, associated in modern thought with
product differentiation, was Hotellings key to the puzzle of whether competition among
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duopolistic firms could ever achieve stable equilibrium. He considers the literature of
duopoly stemming from Augustin Cournot (considered in Chapter 2) and including Joseph
Bertrand and Francis Edgeworths criticisms of the instability of the model. Hotelling then
asserts that economic theory has failed to take notice of this characteristic of demand for
individual firms (that is, their demand curves are not perfectly elastic) (p. 44). He concedes
that these cases violate the law of one price but notes that: the doctrine is only valid where
the commodity is standardized and its market is a single point in space (pp. 445). As a
consequence, [b]etween the perfect competition and monopoly of theory lie the actual
cases (p. 44).
It is at this point that he introduces the justly famous Hotellings model which uses
physical location as an analogue of the various types of actual product differentiation. The
mathematical details of the model, being well known, need not delay us. More important
are the results derivable from the model. The first is that the model converges to a stable
equilibrium in a manner similar to Cournots. Hotelling also notes both the possibility of
implicit collusion among the duopolists to emulate the monopoly outcome and the inherent
instability of such understandings. One important point of difference that Hotelling asserts
is that prices will never stay below the equilibrium, contradicting Bertrands assertion that
prices tend to the competitive level in duopoly.
The other result in Hotellings paper runs contrary to the conventional result that differentiation driven by the pursuit of profit results in too much product variety. Instead,
where relocation is costless, Hotelling notes the tendency of suppliers to cluster, offering
insufficient differentiation of products. In this result, he explicitly extends the analysis
to product varieties as well as physical location (p. 54). Hotellings model represents a
substantial innovation in industrial organization by developing a method of incorporating
product differentiation in modeling of competition.
Hotellings subsequent work was largely concerned with the proper mathematical
specification of demand systems. It is in this context that his work in marginal cost pricing
arose. In his 1938 article, The general welfare in relation to problems of taxation and of
railway and utility rates, Hotelling first demonstrates that any departure from marginal cost
pricing results in a decrease in general welfare or what he refers to as dead loss (p. 254).
This is coupled with the formula that was subsequently applied by Arnold Harberger in
calculating the welfare costs of monopoly. Following a discussion of the case of pure
monopoly (a bridge), he discusses railroad rates and their relationship (or actually their
lack of a relationship) with marginal costs and vigorously argues the merits of adopting
marginal cost based tariffs (p. 264).
In the following section, he recognizes that marginal cost depends on the extent of
capacity utilization of a facility. He further suggests that tariffs based on marginal costs
ought to include a surcharge when capacity is approached. In modern terms these capacity
surcharges are recognized as a component of the marginal costs of the services. Given the
high level of mathematical sophistication Hotellings work usually displays, it is surprising
that he did not determine the appropriate welfare-maximizing surcharge.
A final section of this remarkable paper notes that the criterion for socially worthwhile
investment in facilities with large fixed costs is different from the conventional breakeven
constraints. Instead, he specifies that: if some distribution of the burden is possible such
that everyone concerned is better off than without the new investment, then there is a prima
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facie case for making the investment (p. 267, emphasis in original). His final passionate
argument for marginal cost pricing is:
it will be better to operate the railroads for the benefit of living human beings, while letting dead
men and dead investments rest quietly in their graves, and to establish a system of rates and
services calculated to assure the most efficient operation. When the question arises of building
new railroads, or new major industries of any kind, or of scrapping the old, we shall face, not
a historical, but a mathematical and economic problem. The question then will be whether the
aggregate of the generalized surpluses is likely to be great enough to cover the anticipated cost
of the new investment. (p. 269)

(1925), A general mathematical theory of depreciation, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 20(151),
September, 34053.
(1929), Stability in competition, Economic Journal, 39(153), March, 4157.
(1931), The economics of exhaustible resources, Journal of Political Economy, 39(2), April, 13775.
(1938), The general welfare in relation to problems of taxation and of railway and utility rates, Econometrica,
6(3), July, 24269.
(1939), The relation of prices to marginal costs in an optimum system, Econometrica, 7(2), April, 1515.
21/5/07 12:19:04
E.
209
EDWARD S. MASON
William G. Shepherd
Innovations
Mason led in establishing the underlying structurebehaviorperformance logic of the
field, and in defining effective competition; also he led the creation of detailed industry
studies.
Personal history
Born
1899, Clinton, IA, USA; died 2002.
Degrees
BA University of Kansas, 1919; MA, PhD Harvard University, 1920, 1925.
Principal position Professor of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA,

193669.
Other
President, American Economic Association, 1962.
From the 1930s to the mid-1950s, Mason presided at Harvard as a leader shaping the field.
He interpreted the new oligopoly theory of E.H. Chamberlin and Joan Robinson, as well as
the ongoing public debates about market power. Mason explained and helped to establish
the structurebehaviorperformance logic of causation, in defining market power and its
effects. He also developed the criteria for effective competition and monopolys impacts,
in responding to J.M. Clarks idea of workable competition.
His 1939 paper, on Price and production policies of large-scale enterprises, is regarded
as a landmark, if not the foundation itself, in the creation of the field of industrial
organization.
Always an applied thinker and clear writer, Mason developed the industry study
approach to the field, creating and leading a group of young scholars who produced detailed
studies of specific industries. In the 1940s and 1950s at Harvard, the group eventually
included Joe S. Bain (petroleum), William Nicholls (tobacco), Jesse W. Markham (rayon
and fertilizer), Merton J. Peck (aluminum), Richard E. Caves (airlines), Samuel Loescher
(cement), Richard Tennant (cigarettes) and James W. McKie (metal cans).
Mason stressed the importance of antitrust policies in shaping industries; also that
the policies were open to industrial pressures. The leading companies, after all, were
determined to prevent government limits and to defeat the government agencies every
case against them. He discussed the repeated waves of self-interested advocacy for bigness
in business (in the 1890s, 1920s and 1950s), which claimed that very large businesses were
inherently superior to small-scale firms and unruly competition. These advantages of
bigness supposedly justified reducing or even eliminating antitrust enforcement. Those
waves have, of course, continued since then and will probably recur into the indefinite
future.
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210

(1939), Price and production policies of large-scale enterprises, American Economic Review, March, 6474.
(1949), The current state of the monopoly problem, Harvard Law Review, June, 126585.
(1959), Economic Concentration and the Monopoly Problem, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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12.
A.
The 1940s and 1950s

JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER
F.M. Scherer
Innovations
The impact of technological innovation on economic growth, the key role of entrepreneurship in innovation, the relationship between innovation and business cycles, market
structural conditions favorable to innovation, and creative destruction.
Personal history
Born
Degree
1883, Triesch (now Tet), Moravia; died 1950.

Doctor of jurisprudence, University of Vienna, 1906.
Principal position Professor of Economics, Harvard University, 193250.

Other Attorney, Cairo, Egypt, 190708; dozent, University of Czernowitz, Moldavia,
190911; professor, University of Graz, Austria, 191118; State Secretary of Finance, Austria,
191819; bank president, 192024; professor, University of Bonn, Germany, 192532.
By the time Joseph Schumpeter was a university student during the first decade of the
twentieth century, enormous strides had been achieved in articulating the theory of general
competitive market equilibrium. But the theory, summarized and evaluated meticulously
in papers written during Schumpeters doctoral studies and his Habilitation Monograph,
was essentially static. It provided no satisfactory explanation of how real income per capita
had advanced so dramatically in industrialized nations during the nineteenth century.
Filling this void was the goal he set after taking his first teaching posiiton at Czernowitz.
The result, his Theory of Economic Development (1912, 1934) was critically acclaimed
throughout the economically literate world.
Schumpeter begins his analysis, carried through without the use of formal mathematics,
by focusing upon equilibria changing only gradually a condition he called the circular
flow. What jolts economies out of essentially static equilibria is innovation significant
and discontinuous change in the quality of goods or production processes, or the
opening of new markets, or the tapping of new supply sources, or new forms of business
organization. Important innovations simultaneously create surplus value or rents for the
firms implementing them while undermining the profitability of competitors mired in the
211
21/5/07 12:19:04
212
circular flow. As the innovator succeeds, other firms imitate it in an increasing swarm,
propelling a burst of new capital investment and the erosion of temporarily elevated prices,
with consumers as the ultimate beneficiaries. In Schumpeters original view, success in one
important innovation created preconditions favorable to other innovations. The clustering
of innovations and the investment they precipitated led in the aggregate to businesscycle upswings. In a later (1939) book, Schumpeter elaborated on this macroeconomic
theme, recognizing among other things how differences in market structure could lead to
aberrations in business-cycle phenomena.
In his Theory of Economic Development, Schumpeter sharply distinguished the role
of entrepreneurship undertaking new combinations from invention, narrowly
defined, and the provision of risk capital to finance innovations. The entrepreneur was
the central actor in his scheme of economic development a captain of industry type who
departed radically from accepted technological or organization norms. Entrepreneurs
were distinctive in recognizing the opportunity for new combinations and making the key
strategic decisions to act upon them. Their motivation was profit: they innovated to tap
latent profit opportunities. In this sense the central feature of Schumpeters scheme of
economic development was profit-seeking behavior. And since it was driven by the desire
for profit, the economic changes to which it led were endogenous, quite different from
inventions that appeared like manna from heaven through scientific advances or a stroke
of genius. As Schumpeter emphasized (1934 translation, p. 88):
Economic leadership in particular must hence be distinguished from invention. As long as they
are not carried into practice, inventions are economically irrelevant. And to carry any improvement
into effect is a task entirely different from the inventing of it, and a task, moreover, requiring
entirely different kinds of aptitudes. ... It is, therefore, not advisable, and it may be downright
misleading, to stress the element of invention as much as many writers do.
In Schumpeters 1912 schema, innovations tended to come from firms outside the
circular flow that is, from new and initially small firms, not from established enterprises.
Schumpeter recognized the existence of monopolies and trusts but considered them too
hidebound to innovate. That successful innovations often gave rise to monopoly positions,
and that the lure of monopoly profits motivated entrepreneurs, was clearly recognized in
his original 1912 book. But in a 1942 book written for a more popular audience, which
among other things quantified the substantial gains in real per capita income resulting
from technological progress, he changed his view radically. Innovation, and especially hightechnology innovation, had become so complex and expensive that large-scale oligopolistic
enterprises enjoyed powerful advantages in undertaking it by virtue of their financial
resources, their command over superior talent, the scale economies they realized, and the
stable platform their positions provided for planning and investing in long-range schemes.
As he concluded (1942, p. 106):
What we have got to accept is that [the large-scale establishment or unit of control] has come
to be the most powerful engine of that progress and in particular of the long-run expansion of
total output not only in spite of, but to a considerable extent through, this strategy which looks
so restrictive when viewed in the individual case and from the individual point in time. In this
respect perfect competition is not only impossible but inferior, and has no title to being set up
as a model of ideal efficiency. It is hence a mistake to base the theory of government regulation
of industry on the principle that big business should be made to work as the respective industry
would work in perfect competition.
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Individual pioneers: the 1940s and 1950s
213
Nor was Schumpeter fearful of adverse consequences that might come from tolerating
or encouraging monopolies to achieve more rapid economic progress. Monopoly positions
themselves were subject to an ever-present threat of displacement in what he called the
process of creative destruction. He argued (ibid., p. 84):
But in capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not [price competition]
which counts but the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source
of supply, the new type of organization (the large-scale unit of control for instance) competition
which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of
the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives. This
kind of competition is as much more effective than the other as a bombardment is in comparison
with forcing a door ...
Schumpeters conceptual innovation stimulated a swarm of studies by economists

attempting through mathematical theory, statistical analysis, and case studies to determine
what kind of market structure was in fact most conducive to economic progress. The weight
of the evidence appears to support a conclusion that Schumpeter overstated the advantages
of large-scale enterprises and monopolistic positions. But not all have been persuaded,
and some nations especially many leading European nations remained in the decades
following the Second World War committed to industrial policies stressing the cultivation
of national champion enterprises able to hold their own technologically against what were
perceived to be more powerful corporations based in the large US market.
Although Schumpeter viewed modern capitalism as a spectacular success in generating
economic growth, he was skeptical that it could survive. On one hand, the increasingly
formal organization of corporate research and development laboratories would so routinize
innovation that the Schumpeterian entrepreneurs essential function would be undermined.
On the other hand, business cycles, including depressions, unemployment and considerable
inequality of income were seen as natural concomitants to the processes of capitalistic
growth. Intellectuals whose position owed much to capitalist prosperity would react to these
evils by successfully advocating steeply progressive taxation, the support of labor unions,
price controls, bank regulation, antitrust and a host of other government interventions that
demoralized the remaining cadre of entrepreneurs and made them less willing to take risks.
Writing in his 1942 book following the traumatic experience of the Great Depression of
the 1930s and when the wartime US economy was tightly controlled from Washington, and
again in his presidential address to the American Economic Association (1950), he feared
(he expressly disclaimed predicting) that the consequence of these developments would be
a march into some form of socialism. On this he has, at least thus far, been more wrong
than right. But others of more conservative persuasion than the author might disagree.
(1912), Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot; English version translated by
Redvers Opie, The Theory of Economic Development, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934.
(1939), Business Cycles, New York: McGraw-Hill.
(1942), Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, New York: Harper.
(1950), The march into socialism, American Economic Association Presidential Address, American Economic
Review, 40, May, 44656.
(1954), History of Economic Analysis (edited by Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter), Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
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214
B.
MORRIS A. ADELMAN
William G. Shepherd
Innovations
He explained that price discrimination will often intensify competition, both by horizontal
and by vertical effects; he showed that industrial concentration scarcely rose during the
1930s1950s; he clarified the dimensions and effects of vertical integration; and he analyzed
the world oil industry after 1960.
Personal history
Born
Degree
1917, New York, NY, USA.

PhD Harvard University, 1948.
Principal position Professor of Economics, MIT, Cambridge, MA, 1960.
Especially in the 1950s, Morris Adelman led the analysis of vertical practices and structures,
as well as the more complex pricing processes. Always a thorough but lively writer, he
noted forcefully in 1949 that price discrimination could be a crucial device driving real
competition forward, as competitors make selective price cuts in order to attract sales.
This pricing device attacks monopoly-affected prices, driving them down. He stressed
the dynamic nature of the process, in contrast to the static inverse-elasticity structure of
discriminatory prices set by monopolists.
In 1954, Adelman showed that US industrial concentration had scarcely been rising
since the 1930s; if at all, then only at a glacial pace. The finding countered Karl Marxs
prediction in Das Kapital that capitalism would become increasingly concentrated, reaching
extreme levels.
In 1955 Adelman published a major restatement of the economics of vertical integration,
including the problems of measuring it reliably.
In 1959, he published a comprehensive defense of the A&P against antitrust claims of
unfair competition. A&P had led the rise of the new supermarket grocery chains, from
the 1930s on. It used lower prices (mostly based on requiring lower input prices from
its suppliers) in addition to convenience and the wider array of choice to defeat the
traditional small, local grocery stores. Using thorough and detailed evidence, Adelman
argued that A&Ps lower retail prices largely reflected true cost advantages, not anticompetitive pricing and unfair cost advantages. Therefore, he said, A&P was functioning
in pro-competitive and pro-efficiency ways. A&Ps victory in the case led not only to a
massive spread of supermarket chains but also to the rapid growth of discount chains in
many other retail sectors.
Adelman then turned in the 1960s to the world petroleum and gas industry, doing his
most extensive and sustained research during the next several decades. Among many
specific topics, he analyzed the opposed fundamental tendencies that determined oil prices:
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215
increasing physical depletion raised the costs of crude oil. But that could be offset by the
increasing knowledge of geology and engineering, plus improved technology.
(1949), Effective competition and the antitrust laws, Harvard Law Review, 62 1289350.
(1955), Vertical integration, in George J. Stigler (ed.), Business Concentration and Price Policy, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, pp. 281322.
(1959), A&P: CostPrice Behavior and Public Policy, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(1972), The World Petroleum Market, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
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C.
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH
William G. Shepherd
Innovations
He advanced in 1952 the phenomenon of countervailing power; he noted oligopolys
benefits in promoting rapid innovation, and also its compliance to wartime price controls;
and he stressed in the 1960s the links of big business and military overproduction.
Personal history
Born
1908, Iona Station, Ontario, Canada.
Degrees BA Ontario Agricultural College, Guelph, 1931; PhD (Agricultural Economics)

University of California, Berkeley, 1934.
Principal positions Professor of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA
194675; Paul M. Warburg Professor 1975.
Other Deputy Administrator, US Office of Price Administration, 194143; Director,
US Strategic Bombing Survey, 194546; US Ambassador to India, 196163. Chairman,
Americans for Democratic Action, 196769; President, American Economic Association,
1972; President, American Academy of Arts and Letters, 198487.
One of Americas most provocative and interesting economists, Galbraith began as an

agricultural economist from Canada and then, improbably, became leader of the US effort
to control prices during the Second World War. Drawing on that experience as the head of
the Office of Price Administration, Galbraith noted in a 1952 book that high concentration
would help price controllers to put an effective lid on prices in oligopoly industries, which
were dominated by only a few firms. His officials were able to control the price of tight
ologopolies much more easily than the prices of highly competitive industries, which are
fragmented among many small, unruly firms.
In 1952 Galbraith published American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing
Power, which found that both efficiency and innovation would occur when high horizontal
concentration faced strong vertical monopsony power. This amounted to praise for tight
oligopoly, which was then under attack for its collusive tendencies. Tight oligopolists would
be able to innovate rapidly because they were large enough to reach large-scale economies
of innovation. But they were also under competitive pressure from each other, and they
were under vertical pressure from their few large customers, such as large supermarket
chains or other discounters.
That countervailing power would also nullify any attempts by tight oligopolies to raise
their prices. Powerful discount retailers (a leading recent example is Wal-Mart) would
neutralize and prevent the sellers attempts to raise prices.
Under criticism, Galbraith conceded in 1954 that countervailing power would not
always automatically arise to nullify the market power of large sellers. But Galbraiths
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idea had strengths, it gave more weight to the older concept of monopsony, and it remains
a significant part of the literature.
Galbraith took a broad view of industrial power, urging that market power could arise
outside the specific technical market conditions of high market shares and concentration
ratios. Also, he was disturbed by the post-Second World War rise of large US military and
industrial interests. There, he said, was very large power indeed. He extended in detail the
analysis of a large interlocking system of the government and the Pentagon, the array of
weapons-producing companies, and leading university research interests.
(1952), A Theory of Price Control, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(1952), American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
(1967), The New Industrial State, Boston: MA, Houghton Mifflin.
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D.
ALFRED E. KAHN
William G. Shepherd
Innovations
He proposed fair competition as a behavioral standard for antitrust. His landmark textbook
(1971) restated and expanded the economic content of regulation and deregulation. He
chaired the New York Regulatory Commission (197477), applying thorough economics; he
quickly abolished US airline regulation in 1978 (as Chair of the Civil Aeronautics Board),
and he later joined at length in debates about the deregulation of many sectors.
Personal history
Born
1917, Paterson, NJ, USA.
Degrees
BA, MA New York University, 1936, 1937; PhD Yale University, 1942.
Principal positions Professor of Economics, and Dean, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY,
USA, 194789.
Other Chairman, NY State Public Service Commission; Chairman, Council on Wage
and Price Stability; Adviser to President Carter on Inflation, 197880.
Kahn has been a restless and creative encyclopedist, in applying new thinking and evidence
to many of the most important industrial, antitrust and regulatory topics. Both the
intellectual breadth of his interests and the time-length of his pioneering interval have
been extraordinary.
His earliest work clarified the economics of patents. He also made early industry studies
on cartels in the chemical industries.
Then in 1954 he proposed (with Joel B. Dirlam) a complicated and nuanced behavioral
standard of fair competition for antitrust, to replace the traditional structural evidence of
market power and anti-competitive actions. The factual tests for fair competition proved
to be difficult to define and apply (like those of J.M. Clarks workable competition).
Instead, structural standards prevailed until the 1980s.
In 1959 (writing with Melvin G. de Chazeau), Kahn showed that vertical integration in
the oil industry could reduce competition, but he did not recommend major policy actions.
He spent much of the 1960s absorbing the field of utility regulation, while working with
AT&T and other firms as an expert.
This led to his comprehensive two-volume magnum opus on regulation (1970, 1971),
which used economic analysis extensively to cut through the surface patterns and details.
It was extremely well-timed for two large purposes, which helped to make it a landmark
for its impact as well as its brilliance and comprehensiveness. First, it summed up the
lessons of utility regulation after the 1920s1960s golden era of regulatory activity. Second,
it crystallized and explored the intensifying economic critiques of regulation in a wide
range of industries. But Kahn avoided the trap of saying that deregulation was easy. He
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showed in exhaustive detail that to deregulate to replace regulation with fully effective
competition had its own array of difficulties. His prescient analysis helped frame the
stubborn competitive troubles that deregulation has faced in a swath of sectors (such as
airlines, railroads, telecommunications, electricity and water).
Kahn was both bold and clear about main points, and also subtle and very detailed
about the more nuanced issues. He used core microeconomic theory, but with a deft touch
for real conditions and for policies genuine effects. On the important topic of marginalcost pricing, he stressed that the powerful efficiency gains could be large, in theory. But he
also discussed thoroughly its practical difficulties, both in this treatise and in many later
writings and testimony about deregulation.
Kahn also pioneered in performing actual regulation and deregulation in important realworld sectors. Previously, few economists had been appointed to regulatory commissions;
usually only lawyers and politicians were appointed. But Kahn was made chair of the New
York regulatory commission during 197677, and he pushed it to make extensive use of
sound economics and to remove unnecessary controls.
Then he was made chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Commission in 1977, with support
for decisive actions to deregulate. By 1978 he had taken a complicated series of formal and
behind-the-scenes actions that succeeded in achieving the commissions outright abolition.
That brought an immediate explosion of competitive influx and price-cutting. Later, he
inveighed against backsliding (by permitting rigid pricing and competition-suppressing
mergers) that reduced the competition.
On the key related topics of price discrimination and predatory actions, Kahn further
enriched the debate. He clarified discriminations efficiency role for static conditions, but
he was also alert to its anti-competitive impact, when dominant airlines used it to eliminate
small rivals by deep price cuts. He showed repeatedly in testimony and writings that pinpoint price cuts were eliminating small firms and newcomers.
After 1978, Kahn was influential in pressing for the deregulation of trucking and the
railroads in 1980. After 1980, he wrote and testified about telecommunications and other
sectors.
His 1971 treatise raised the standards for economic coherence and clarity in subsequent
debates about regulation and deregulation. He stressed valid economic analysis and detailed
practical judgments of policies. Many of his judgments in specific industries and policies
were eventually controversial, in the nature of these complex issues. But Kahns major
work enhanced and enriched the debates.
(1953), Standards for antitrust policy, Harvard Law Review, 67, November, pp. 2654.
(1954), Fair Competition: The Law and Economics of Antitrust Policy (with Joel B. Dirlam), Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
(1959), with Melvin de Chazeau, Integration and Competition in the Petroleum Industry, New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
(1970, 1971), The Economics of Regulation, 2 vols, New York: Wiley; republishd Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1988.
(1984), Kahn and the economists hour, in Thomas McGraw (ed.), Prophets of Regulation, Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, ch. 7, pp. 22299.
(1987), Current issues in telecommunications regulation: pricing (with W.B. Shew), Yale Journal on Regulation,
4, pp. 191256.
(1998), Letting Go: Deregulating the Process of Deregulation, E. Lansing, MI: Michigan State University.
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E.
WALTER ADAMS
James A. Brock
Innovations
Empirical study of the structural foundations of economic and market power, their adverse
consequences in a free society, and the public policies required to combat them.
Personal history
Born
1922, Vienna, Austria; died 1998.
Degrees
BA Brooklyn College, 1942; PhD, Yale University, 1947.
Principal positions Professor, Distinguished Professor, and President, Michigan State

University, 19471992.
Other Consultant and counsel, US House and Senate Small Business Committees,
195056; member, US Attorney Generals National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws,
195355; Consultant, US Senate Judiciary Committee, 195962; presidential appointee,
US Advisory Commission on International Education and Cultural Affairs, 196169;
Visiting Professor, Falkenstein Seminar, Frankfurt, Germany, University of Paris, and
University of Ancona; R.J. Reynolds Professor of Economics, Wake Forest University;
Vernon Taylor Professor of Economics, Trinity University (TX); Expert testimony before
congressional committees, 194990; President, American Association of University
Professors, 197274.
The unifying innovation and contribution of Walter Adamss work is his extensively
documented contention that the competitively structured market plays a vital role in a free
society, not only by promoting good economic performance narrowly construed (efficiency,
innovativeness) but, more importantly, as a system of checks and balances for regulating
economic decision-making and guarding against the abuse of economic decision making
power in a democratic society.
To perform these vital tasks, Adams showed that the private market must be competitively
structured, comprising no undue concentration, no excessive corporate size, and no artificial
barriers to new competitors. He contended that these structural prerequisites were neither
automatic nor immutable but, instead, require deliberate antitrust enforcement to achieve
and sustain. The paramount challenge, as he saw it, was to make competition work.
This emphasis also shaped his analysis of American antitrust policy and his criticisms
of its failure to be structurally focused on the goal of rooting out existing concentrations of private power (through monopoly and oligopoly policy), as well as preventing
such concentrations from arising in the first place (through a preventive policy against
mergers and acquisitions). Adams also showed how private concentrations of economic
power are both the cause, and the effect, of government policies, rather than determined
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by any dictates of modern technology and, further, that the economic problems they
engender require structural remedies aimed at fostering competitive market structures. As
a corollary, his publications and addresses forcefully reminded the economics profession
of the importance of taking seriously the manifold problems caused by concentrations
of private market power.
This emphasis emerged early in Adamss career, when he served as staff member and
economic consultant to Senate and House committees investigating concentration in major
American industries. In this capacity he produced congressional reports exposing the
monopolistic and cartelistic relationships between private firms and government regulatory
agencies in the airline and trucking fields, and called for paring back such counterproductive, anti-competitive regulation long before this position became a mainstream view in
the economics profession. These and other studies culminated in a 1955 book, Monopoly
in America: The Government as Promoter, published with Horace Gray.
Another notable report he produced during this period was a painstakingly detailed
expos of the evolution and operation of the international oil cartel over the first half of
the twentieth century (a Senate Small Business Committee report considered so explosive
that its public availability was generally suppressed for two decades). He returned to the
oil industry during the energy crises of the 1970s, advocating that the vertical market
power of the major oil companies was the linchpin for their industry-wide control; that
the integration of the oil giants into alternative energies institionalized a profound conflict
of economic interest regarding the optimal development of each energy source; and
recommending that both types of integration should be structurally dissolved.
On the legislative policy front, in 1951 he drafted a new antitrust statute for the House
Judiciary Committee which called for the study and dissolution of dominant firms unable to
defend their market dominance on the basis of proven superior economic performance a
proposal later taken up by the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy (Neal Report)
in 1968; Senator Phillip Harts proposed Industrial Reorganization Act of 1972; and nofault monopoly policies propounded during the late 1970s. He also long advocated a cap
and spin policy toward large mergers: Fortune 500 firms making large acquisitions should
be required to spin off viable commercial operations equal in financial size to those they
desired to acquire, in order to prevent mergers from continuing to serve as the primary
means for concentrating control of American industry.
Another Adams innovation was editing a collection of case studies of major industries,
The Structure of American Industry, which was first published in 1950, subsequently went
through nine editions (plus two recent editions by a co-author), and became a mainstay
for industrial organization economists and university courses in industrial economics.
Adamss objective was to provide a diverse, continually updated collection of industry
studies, contributed by leading economists in each field, as a way of offering a real-world
laboratory in which to assess the consequences of varying market structures for market
conduct and, ultimately, for economic performance and public policy. An ancillary purpose,
he wrote in the preface to numerous editions of the book, was to provide an antidote to
the economists proclivity for abstract, mathematical model building.
During the 1960s Adams contested the claim, most notably asserted by John Kenneth
Galbraith, that the giant firm inhabiting a highly-concentrated industry was foreordained
by the economics of modern technology. Through a number of publications and in a
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remarkable Senate hearing organized around a debate between these two intellectual
combatants, Adams provided factual evidence refuting this faith in the virtues of economic
bigness. Perhaps most famously, he and Joel Dirlam demonstrated in a landmark study
that organizational giantism and oligopoly concentration in the American steel industry
had failed to promote either invention or innovation and, instead, had rendered the largest
US steel produers inefficient, technologically backward, and vulnerable to competition
from abroad. Adams also published a major paper in the Quarterly Journal of Economics
(1953) disputing Galbraiths thesis that countervailing power between buyer and seller
(and between employer and employee) would automatically emerge to protect society
from abuses of market power; in later publications, he demonstrated how vertically
opposing power blocs coalesce with, rather than countervail, each other, including the
case of management and organized labor in the regulated industries, as well as via
managementlabor coalitions joining together to successfully lobby for government
restraints on foreign competition in automobiles and steel. In a related vein, Adams
disputed the Schumpeterian claim that monopoly and oligopoly were economically
desirable and inevitable, showing through a number of industry studies how monopolists
and oligopolists were able to construct storm shelters to shield themselves from Joseph
Schumpeters gales of creative destruction.
Throughout the remainder of his career, during the 1980s and 1990s, Adams continued
to refine, expand and further document these positions, particularly in refuting the growing
laissez-faire orientation of the economics profession and the rise of the Chicago school
(ironically, the university where Adams first enrolled in graduate school before his studies
were interrupted by combat service in the Second World War). He continued to document
how the existence of market power contradicted abstract claims concerning the beneficent
operation of markets how poorly performing oligopolies could lobby government for
protection from the consequences of their deficient performance, including the capacity of
collapsing corporate giants like Chrysler to obtain government bailouts rather than submit
to the discipline of the private marketplace as laissez-faire advocates assume they do. He
was equally critical of industrial policy proposals emanating from liberal quarters: these
too, he maintained, were fatally flawed by virtue of their failure to explicitly recognize the
deleterious consequences of the concentrations of economic power they would sanction
and encourage. Adams continued to analyze these and related issues and challenges in his
uniquely far-reaching historic and philosophical way, ranging from medieval statecraft and
the gilded age in America, to the European Theater of the Absurd.
His lifetime of work, analysis and contemplation of these issues culminated in a
book, The Bigness Complex: Industry, Labor, and Government in the American Economy,
published in 1987 with James Brock (a second edition of which was issued in 2004). Two
of Adamss dissertation students also co-edited a collection of his seminal publications
in 1991, Antitrust, the Market, and the State: The Contributions of Walter Adams. One
of these, Kenneth Elzinga, perhaps best captured the innovations of Walter Adams in
observing that he uniquely combined the economics of Henry Simon, the politics of
Paul Douglas, the philosophy of John Dewey and the jurisprudence of Louis Brandeis.
Throughout his professional life, Adams prodded industrial organization economists to
expand their horizons, and to deepen their empirical analyses, in order to appreciate that
the field of industrial economics encompasses the transcending challenges of maintaining
an economically efficient and free society.
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(195095), The Structure of American Industry, 9 edns, London: Macmillan and Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall.
(1953), Competition, monopoly, and countervailing power, Quarterly Journal of Economics, November,
pp. 46492.
(1955), Monopoly in America: The Government as Promoter, London: Macmillan.
(1958), The role of competition in the regulated industries, American Economic Review, May, pp. 42743.
(1966), Big steel, invention, and innovation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, May, pp. 16789.
(1971), The Test, London: Macmillan.
(1977), Vertical divestiture of the petroleum majors: an affirmative case, Vanderbilt Law Review, November,
pp. 111547.
(1986), The new learning and the euthanasia of antitrust, California Law Review, October, pp. 151566.
(1987), The Bigness Complex: Industry, Labor and Government in the American Economy, New York: Pantheon
(2nd edn, 2004, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).
(1989), Dangerous Pursuits: Mergers and Acquisitions in the Age of Wall Street, New York: Pantheon.
(1990), The Sherman Act and the economic power problem, Antitrust Bulletin, Spring, pp. 134.
(1991), Antitrust Economics on Trial: A Dialogue on the New Laissez-Faire, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
(1991), Pareto optimality and antitrust policy: the old Chicago and the new learning, Southern Economic
Journal, July, pp. 114.
(1991), Antitrust, the Market, and the State: The Contributions of Walter Adams, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.
(1993), Adam Smith Goes to Moscow: A Dialogue on Radical Reform, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
(1996), Predation, rationality, and judicial somnambulance, University of Cincinnati Law Review, Spring,
pp. 81178.
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F.
JOE S. BAIN
Richard E. Caves
Innovations
Concept and measurement of entry barriers; structureconduct (behavior)performance
paradigm; testing hypotheses in cross-section.
Personal history
Born
1912, Spokane, WA, USA; died 1993.
Degrees
BA, UCLA, 1935; MA, PhD Harvard University, 1939, 1940.
Principal positions Assistant Professor, Associate Professor, and Professor of Economics,

University of California, Berkeley, 193975.
Joe S. Bain made major contributions to the substance of industrial organization (IO)
and to its empirical research methods. His work shaped the research frontier of empirical
IO for several decades, and its mark remains readily evident in undergraduate textbooks.
His single most prominent substantive contribution was the concept of barriers to entry
(Bain, 1956). A review of its theoretical and empirical content conveniently leads to Bains
other contributions.1
Barriers to entry: concept and market equilibrium
The competitiveness of a market, Bain proposed, depends not just on the number of sellers
(and buyers) actually present but also the stock of potential entrants (the general condition
of entry). This stock was regarded as a queue fronted by the potential competitor needing
the smallest departure of market price and quantity from pure competition to induce it to
enter. The potential entrants might be homogeneous, or they might control heterogeneous
assets that would favor them in varying ways and degrees as potentially profitable entrants
and thereby place them in the queue. The structural bases for entry barriers clearly suggest
the types of assets that could push their owners toward the head of the queue of entrants,
but the factors that determine the queues ordering empirically were pursued only much
later. Bain presumed that the condition of entry into an industry is structural and stable
over time, implying that its state today would rest on the same factors that governed entry
in the past. The current condition would then be correlated with the markets number of
incumbents. An industry with numerous actual competitors would likely face easy entry
(many candidates subject to little or no disadvantage). More important, highly concentrated
incumbents would likely face an entry queue limited in numbers and with successive members
subject to increasing net disadvantages. The door was opened for strategic interdependence
between incumbents and entrants (discussed subsequently).
How might incumbents actions be affected by the supply of potential entrants? If
incumbents are numerous, they make independent price or output decisions, and something
approaching pure competition should prevail in the short run. Entry may or may not be
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induced, but that expected consequence does not affect individual incumbents actions.
If incumbents are few and recognize their interdependence, the short-run policies they
select should take account of whether or not entry is induced. (Cooperating oligopolists
need consensus on the condition of entry as well as the usual requisites for coordinating
their own actions.)
Looking back after the game-theory revolution, one is pulled up short by the assumption
that entry is fully determined by the incumbents current price (plus structural variables).
Bain (1956, p. 97) recognized that entrants conjectures need not depend in any simple way
on incumbents actions currently observed by potential entrants. In a quest for plausible
patterns of interdependence between incumbents and entrants, however, he proposed that
an entrant might focus on two: that incumbents keep their prices constant following entry
(and reduce their outputs); and that incumbents sustain their outputs (and reduce prices)
when entry occurs. In the absence of other salient conditions, Bain proposed, these cases
should bracket entrants conjectures and thus define the opportunities for incumbents to
affect the likelihood of entry.2 Whatever the potential entrants conjecture, its decision
to enter embraces adjusting the variables in its control (such as plant scale and level of
sales-promotion outlays) so as to maximize its expected post-entry profits (Bain, 1956,
pp. 55, 133).
That brings us to the alternative short-run market outcomes that determine whether entry
will be induced. It is effectively impeded when incumbents can profitably forgo some shortrun profits in order to maintain a price/output choice that will deter entry, obtaining their
reward in higher profits in subsequent periods. This is the limit price policy choice. The
limiting case of effectively impeded entry occurs when the short-run monopoly price/output
fails to attract entrants (blockaded entry). Entry is ineffectively impeded when short-run
monopoly profits more than offset the incumbents loss of expected future profits due to
entry. Effectively impeded entry is more likely, the higher is the structural disadvantage of
the least disfavored potential entrant, since short-run monopoly profits then cannot much
exceed the profits that flow from impeding entry. Impeding entry also is encouraged by an
inelastic supply of potential entrants those a few places back in the queue are substantially
more disfavored. Conversely, entry tends to be ineffectively impeded when entry barriers
are low and the supply of entrants elastic, so that short-run monopoly profits (grab the
bundle and run) much exceed short-run entry-deterring profits.3 There remains, though,
the possibility that entry is effectively impeded despite low barriers because competition
among incumbents keeps price close to incumbents marginal costs. Bain recognized but
did not stress that ineffectively impeded entry is a transient state of the market (ibid.,
p. 24). Entry will occur, likely to raise industry output and lower price, deterring further
entry and leading to a long-run equilibrium.4
The model carries the implication that price can exceed marginal cost, a distortion that
Bain evaluated using the marginal-cost level attained by the most efficient incumbent. This
seems puzzling, since the standard equilibrium in a competitive industry calls for market
price to be equal to the marginal cost of each active producers. The explanation is that
Bain assumed away diseconomies of scale, so that any producer capable of attaining a low
variable cost in a competitive market would expand output, displacing rivals with higher
variable costs. This assumption is worth noting for its relevance to subsequent controversies
with the Chicago school, which argued that monopoly profits (due to impeded entry) were
being confused with rents to efficient producers who (because of diseconomies of scale)
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could not profitably take over the whole market. Clear identification of this source of
difference could have spared a good deal of debate.
Barriers to entry: empirical measurement
The second major contribution of Bains work on entry barriers lies in his painstaking
empirical measurement of their height in a sample of 20 US manufacturing industries.
While data from the US Census of Manufactures were used, the project relied heavily on
information supplied by company executives via interviews and questionnaire responses.
Pinning down each source of entry barriers required conceptual development as well
as empirical digging. Of the three types of barriers that Bain identified, only scale
economies had been widely recognized previously, and Bain (ibid., p. 61) noted tartly that
previous positions on the extent of scale economies rested mainly on opinion rather than
information. He did identify and accept a previous consensus on the typical form of the
manufacturing firms long-run average cost curve: increasing returns at small scales up to
a minimum optimal scale, then constant costs over a substantial range of output levels.
He took no firm position on the existence of diseconomies of large scale, but reported no
evidence that actual manufacturing firms encounter them. In order to facilitate empirical
measurement he characterized scale economies in an industrys long-run average costs
by two parameters minimum optimal scale expressed as a fraction of the size of the
relevant market, and the proportional elevation of unit costs at operating scales smaller
than minimum optimal scale. His direct estimates of scale economies from industry sources
indicated varying heights of scale-economy entry barriers, but they did suggest that most
US industries can achieve minimum optimal scales in production with a moderately large
number of competitors present in the market.5
Bain (ibid., p. 142) called the sources of entry barriers associated with product differentiation varied and complex, and his work indeed left behind a number of active
controversies. That is understandable, since there was little preceding research on which
to build, other than the model of monopolistic competition associated with the concept
of product differentiation. Potential buyers of differentiated products have diverse tastes,
and they incur costs of informing themselves about the match between their tastes and the
product varieties available to serve them. These information costs can be high, because some
differentiated goods are complex and/or purchased infrequently. For goods consumed in a
social setting (conspicuous consumption), sources of hard information might hold little
relevance for the buyer. Either way, Bain (ibid., pp. 66, 116, 143) argued, the incumbent
firm enjoys the advantage that at least some potential consumers already know that its
brand works, putting the entrant in an asymmetrical position of prompting consumers
to try its untested brand. Schmalensee (1982) later formalized this effect. The entrants
best response to such a barrier is either to quote consumers a lower price than incumbents
offering comparable quality or to undertake more extensive sales promotion. The productdifferentiation barrier, Bain held, also had supply-side aspects. Scale economies might exist
in advertising and other sales-promotion outlays; Bain (1956, pp. 656, 133) lamented his
lack of empirical evidence on this point. Besides, the control of distribution via vertical
integration or long-term contracts could augment entrants costs or limit their options.
Overall, Bain judged product differentiation to be the most important source of entry
barriers in his sample of industries, and the source of the highest barriers.
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Absolute-cost disadvantages comprise a group of factors that can elevate the average
costs of an entrant above those of incumbents. Bain associated these with failures in input
markets that forced entrants to pay more than incumbents. The clearest case involves an
incumbents monopolization of the input, such as control of limited sources of natural
resources, or ownership of process patents. Bain mentioned other distortions, such as
long-term contracts and trade secrets, but the foundations needed for evaluating long-term
contracts were laid only two decades later (see von Weizscker, 1980). Bain also flagged
access to capital as a source of absolute-cost barriers, and he identified it empirically with
the size of the investment needed to install a plant of minimum optimal scale. Present-day
models of capital-market imperfection might pin the disadvantage on other factors, such
as the greater risk associated with the success of an entrant (relative to the continuation
of an incumbent). In general the normative significance of absolute-cost barriers received
only a light treatment from Bain and indeed is difficult to resolve today. For example, some
absolute-cost disadvantages of entrants represent shake-down costs that the incumbents
themselves previously incurred. The transient disadvantage then is presumptively not a
distortion, but one might emerge in the tactical advantages that the incumbent can exploit
while the entrants shake-down is under way.
Indeed, this problem with absolute-cost barriers leads into the question of entry barriers
overall welfare significance. Neither Bain nor his principal critics took a comprehensive
view of the welfare issues, causing the subsequent discussion to generate more heat than
light (for an overview, see Geroski et al., 1990). Bain focused on entry barriers effect on
the industrys pricecost margin and the associated deadweight loss. This was generally
predicted to grow with the height of the barriers, with exceptions for ineffectively impeded
entry (which implied larger immediate and smaller subsequent losses) and for competition
among incumbents too severe to lift the market price to entry-attracting levels. He
recognized the welfare trade-off between allocative and productive efficiency invoked by
large minimum optimal scales, but did not develop it formally. Stigler (1968) focused instead
on the efficiency of the input transaction allegedly underlying the absolute-cost barrier. He
defined an entry barrier as imposing some cost on an entrant that was not borne by the
incumbent when it entered. This is clearly part of the net welfare outcome, but the effect
of the absolute-cost barrier on the market equilibrium at the time of entry still matters.
Entrant and incumbent could face identical entry costs, but the incumbents current lower
costs could still place the entrant at a competitive disadvantage. Or the entrants elevated
cost could stem from some (costly) investment by the incumbent in devising and installing
an entry barrier.6 The overall normative evaluation of entry barriers in an industry requires
that differential or distorted entry costs, short- and long-run deadweight losses, and longrun effects on productive efficiency all be weighed in the balance.
The structureconduct (behavior)performance paradigm
Barriers to New Competition added entry barriers to the generally recognized marketstructure elements the number of sellers and the presence or absence of product
differentiation. Bain went further, however, by developing the generalization that numerous
exogenous or structural features of the market could influence the behavior of parties
competing in it and thereby the normative properties of the resource allocation that
resulted. The aspects of behavior importantly affected by structure are those believed to
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affect the normative outcome. The paradigm is implicitly defined backward: the relevant
aspects of resource allocation in a market are those believed to affect economic welfare; the
relevant aspects of conduct are those that affect the equilibrium values of these dimensions
of resource allocation; and the salient aspects of structure are those that influence these
patterns of conduct. Bain (1942) began assembling this structure under the influence of
E.H. Chamberlins Theory of Monopolistic Competition (1933), which focused on the
key structural elements of the number of sellers and differentiation of the product. He
continued with a short paper (Bain, 1950) that recognized the presence of several salient
and independent dimensions of market performance and suggested hypotheses linking
these dimensions of performance to elements of market structure that could theoretically
influence them. Furthermore, his massive study of the Pacific Coast petroleum industry
(Bain, 194447) was clearly organized around the framework.7
Thus, the idea was in place that theoretical models of imperfect competition could yield
empirical predictions open to serious statistical testing.8 This idea challenged the positions
of nay-sayers who had previously blocked this rapprochement of theory and systematic
empiricism. Price theorists observing the diversity of theoretical models of oligopoly had
pronounced its market outcome to be indeterminate for lack of a one-size-fits-all model
such as pure competition or pure monopoly. Empirical students of IO had nursed their
own negativism in the view that performance outcomes in oligopoly could or did depend
on managerial whim and random event rather than systematic and observable aspects of
market behavior. Bains paradigm invited us to line up market models with their competing
assumptions clearly identified and stated as operational properties of market structure
or performance. It also invited an emphasis on structural determinants of performance.
J.M. Clarks (1940) approach to workable competition in oligopoly had pressed for an
independent role of conduct patterns, which Bain considered to be both endogenous (to
market structure) and difficult to classify and distinguish empirically. In a later contribution
Bain (1960) argued against the proposition that empirical patterns of price leadership
(conduct) could be sorted into those based on the leaders information advantages
(improving performance) and those implementing collusion (impairing performance).
The paradigm has been criticized for lacking the formal structure of a coherent theoretical
model. That was never its purpose; rather, it supplied a framework in which models could
be arrayed for comparison and their empirical predictions extracted for testing.
Statistical testing of hypotheses
Bain (1951) also pioneered the statistical testing in cross-section of hypotheses about
the determinants of market performance. His approach (in hindsight) was the simplest
and most obvious to relate the (excess) profit rates of firms classified to a sample of
manufacturing industries to a measure of the industries oligopolistic structure: the share
of industry shipments held by the eight largest firms (concentration ratio). His main
empirical finding was that industries with eight-firm concentration less than 70 percent
registered profit rates only 57 percent as high as their more concentrated brethren. The paper
remains worth reading for the care taken with the data and formulation of the hypothesis.
The maximum set of industries for which concentration (1935) and leading-firm profit
(19361940) data were available numbered 149. These were screened to eliminate several
classes of industries: those for which profit data were available from too few firms; those
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with regional submarkets (for which national concentration ratios would be inappropriate);
and those with heterogeneous product lines and the leading firms diverse in the spread of
their activities across those product lines. The surviving sample contained 42 industries.
In the event, the key relationship confirmed for the 42 industries would have been rejected
for the whole 149, if the screening had been omitted.
Exactly how should the hypothesis be formulated, and what controls should be employed?
In evaluating Bains decisions, we must recognize that in the 1940s multivariate ordinary
least squares regression was a venture into the unknown. He chose to employ a simple
test for significant mean differences between highly concentrated and less concentrated
industries. He based this specification on a pattern evident in his data. However, in other
writings Bain clearly accepted the idea that the likelihood of successful cooperation among
oligopolists, declining with the number of rivals in the market, at some point drops to
zero. The existence of a threshold hence no doubt struck him as theoretically plausible,
although he did not push the point. He also checked the correlations between his profit
and concentration measures (on the one hand) and other structural or quasi-structural
variables: the industrys average firm size, capital intensity, durability of goods, type of
buyers. The effects of averaging profit rates over time and across firms were considered.
In Barriers to New Competition (1956, ch. 7) he faced the problem of testing the joint
effects on performance of entry barriers and seller concentration in a dataset with only
20 observations (industries). With characteristic caution he eschewed statistical tests and
confined himself to cross-tabulations (pp. 1978). Consistent with Bain (1951), these
showed sharp breaks between 12 industries with high and eight with low to moderate
concentration, and between five industries with very high and 15 with moderate or
substantial barriers. Mann (1966) subsequently performed the statistical test on an
expanded version of Bains dataset and rejected the null hypothesis. While one senses that
cross-industry tests descended from Bain (1951) have now yielded up much of their value,
they have provided a large and invaluable residue of findings about the associations among
market structure, conduct and performance. They have taken us some distance toward
dealing with another problem that Bain uncovered the dependence of some aspects of
structure (notably concentration) on other, more fundamental ones.
International differences
Bain (1966) made another contribution to empirical research strategies in IO by analyzing
international differences in a given industrys national branches. Being able to observe
(say) the cement industry as it is organized and performs in each of a number of countries
opens the possibility of testing the effect of fundamental structural factors (for example,
market size) and policies while holding constant fundamental features of technology and
buyers behavior. Bain chose to focus on the effect of market size on seller concentration
and its components the concentration of plants and the extent of multi-plant operation
by the largest firms. He sampled 34 manufacturing industries in eight countries, the United
States and seven others varying in national market size down to Sweden and in level of
development to India. Missing observations and data problems abound, but the data
roughly suggest an intriguing pattern. Mean plant size in the typical industry is a good
deal smaller in other countries than in the United States. Plant concentration is not proportionally much higher in these other (smaller) countries than in the United States because
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of the large differences in plant sizes. And seller concentration is only modestly higher
in other countries than in the United States, because multi-plant development of leading
firms is greater in America.
In hindsight, some of Bains procedures suffer from the lack of a theoretical framework
that would indicate appropriate strategies of measurement and testing. However, the
implements for which one would nowadays reach to undertake this study (the Cournot
model, for example) were then not in everybodys tool kit. The international comparative
approach later launched other major research efforts. The investigation of multi-plant
economies of scale by Scherer et al. (1975) followed directly on Bains work, and Sutton
(1991) showed how such an approach can draw upon an elegant theoretical framework.
Notes
1. For an earlier survey emphasizing the context of IOs development, see Shepherd (1976).
2. This analysis appears in Bain (1956, ch. 3), at which point only scale economies have been introduced as a
source of entry barriers. Bain did not attempt to address the conjectural interdependence between incumbents
and potential entrants for the other empirical sources of disadvantage to entrants.
3. As with several other theoretical issues concerning entry barriers, Bain set out the essence of the argument,
but (in quest of safe empirical generalizations) did not try to pin down the theoretical fine points. In this
instance, Masson and Shaanan (1982) provided clarification.
4. Bain only mentioned that entrants might occasionally turn up endowed with attributes enabling them to
displace incumbents; entry as an aspect of turnover gained attention much later.
5. Bain (1956, p. 61) discussed and criticized another technique for inferring scale economies that later became
popular the survivor technique.
6. The whole subsequent discussion of contrived entry barriers unfortunately leads to few clear normative
conclusions, because the barrier-raising outlays also serve non-strategic and normatively innocent
functions.
7. An unresolved question is the degree to which the formulation of the framework is due to Edward S. Mason,
who taught IO at Harvard to Bain and other IO notables in that generation. Mason published little, but his
pedagogy was apparently built around some version of the paradigm.
8. The approach was implemented at the undergraduate textbook level in Bain (1968).
References
Bain, Joe S. (1942), Market classifications in modern price theory, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 56 (August):
56074.
Bain, Joe S. (194447), The Economics of the Pacific Coast Petroleum Industry, 3 vols, Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press.
Bain, Joe S. (1950), Workable competition in oligopoly: theoretical considerations and some empirical evidence,
American Economic Review, 40 (May): 3547.
Bain, Joe S. (1951), Relation of profit rate to industry concentration: American manufacturing, 19361940,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 65 (August): 293324.
Bain, Joe S. (1956), Barriers to New Competition: Their Character and Consequences in Manufacturing Industries,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bain, Joe S. (1960), Price leaders, barometers, and kinks, Journal of Business, 33 (July): 193203.
Bain, Joe S. (1966), International Differences in Industrial Structure: Eight Nations in the 1950s, New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press.
Bain, Joe S. (1968), Industrial Organization, 2nd edn, New York: John Wiley.
Clark, J.M. (1940), Toward a concept of workable competition, American Economic Review, 40 (June):
24156.
Geroski, Paul, Richard J. Gilbert and Alexis Jacquemin (1990), Barriers to Entry and Strategic Competition,
Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic.
Mann, H. Michael (1966), Seller concentration, barriers to entry, and rates of return in thirty industries,
19501960, Review of Economics and Statistics, 48 (August): 296307.
Masson, Robert T. and J. Shaanan (1982), Stochastic dynamic limit pricing: an empirical test, Review of
Economics and Statistics, 64 (November): 41322.
Scherer, F.M., Alan Beckenstein, Erich Kaufer and R. Dennis Murphy (1975), The Economics of Multi-Plant
Operation: An International Comparisons Study, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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231
Schmalensee, Richard (1982), Product differentiation advantages of pioneering brands, American Economic
Review, 72 (June): 34965.
Shepherd, William G. (1976), Bains influence on research into industrial organization, Essays on Industrial
Organization in Honor of Joe S. Bain, ed. Robert T. Masson and P. David Qualls, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger,
pp. 117.
Stigler, George J. (1968), The Organization of Industry, Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin.
Sutton, John (1991), Sunk Costs and Market Structure: Price Competition, Advertising, and the Evolution of
Concentration, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
von Weizscker, C.C. (1980), Barriers to Entry: A Theoretical Treatment, Berlin: Springer Verlag.
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G.
WILLARD FRITZ MUELLER
Bruce Marion
Innovations
Served dual role of Chief Economist and Director of Bureau of Economics of the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) which allowed him to advise commissioners on policy issues
and provided access to other policy makers in Washington during 196169; rebuilt the
Bureau of Economics into one of the leading economics groups in Washington, enabling
him to become one of the most influential economists in Washington during the 1960s; the
prime mover behind the FTC Line-of-Business (LOB) Reporting Program and Pre-merger
Notification Programs; served as executive director of the Presidents Cabinet Committee
on Price Stability in 1968; was advisor and active participant in antitrust policy over nearly
four decades; organized and nurtured large-scale multi-university studies of competition
in the US food system from 1972 to 1996.
Personal history
Born
1925, Ortonville, MN, USA.
Degrees BS and MS University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1950, 1951; PhD Vanderbilt

University, 1955.
Principal position William F. Vilas Research Professor, Department of Agricultural and
Applied Economics, Department of Economics and Law School, University of WisconsinMadison, 196998.
Other Executive Director, Presidents Cabinet Committee on Price Stability, 196869;
Chief Economist and Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, 196169;
Assistant Professor to Professor, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 195761; Lecturer
to Assistant Professor, University of California-Davis, 195457; United States Navy,
194246.
Like his mentor, George W. Stocking, Willard Fritz Muellers career blended the fields
of applied economics and antitrust law to analyze and design policy prescriptions for
limiting market power. Convinced of the central role that market structure plays in
affecting competition, Mueller devoted much of his career to studying empirically the
forces influencing market structure and the competitive impact of market structure on
market behavior.
Perhaps Muellers greatest innovation was to demonstrate that an extremely capable and
energetic economist, backed by a capable staff and access to key policy makers, could play
a central role in formulating economic-based legal rules for antitrust enforcement. Mueller
rebuilt the Bureau of Economics from obscurity in 1961 to one of the most influential
groups of economists in Washington by 1969. The output of the Bureau was prodigious,
with 48 economic studies published during 196670. Muellers dual role as chief economist
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to the Commission and Director of Bureau of Economics of the FTC gave him access to
the commissioners and congressional policy makers. This enhanced greatly his effectiveness
inside and outside the Commission. He was a powerful economist in Washington, often
an ally of Walter Heller, the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors. He had entre
to White House staff as well as many members of Congress and their staffs. The 1960s is
known as one of the most aggressive decades of antitrust enforcement in no small measure
due to Muellers initiatives.
Several innovative programs and actions came out of this period. The LOB Reporting
Program had its genesis with Muellers efforts throughout the 1960s to obtain better data
from large corporations. He continued to pursue these efforts while serving ten months in
the Executive Office of the President in 1968 and later while working with congressional
committees. These efforts were consummated with the approval of the LOB program
in 1974.
Muellers long interest in mergers led to innovative policy approaches: merger guidelines
for specific industries in 1967 and the FTC pre-merger notification program, approved
in 1969. The latter program required corporations with assets of $250 million or more to
notify the Commission at least 30 days prior to acquiring any company with assets of $10
million or more. These programs allowed antitrust agencies to challenge mergers before
they were consummated and assets co-mingled. Mueller subsequently consulted with and
testified before the House and Senate committees that enacted the HartScottRodino
Act of 1976. Peter W. Rodino, Jr, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, praised
Mueller for the studies he prepared for the committee and for his helpful counsel to
the Committee during the deliberations on the pre-merger notification program under
the HartScottRodino Act of 1976, probably the most significant advance in antitrust
enforcement over the past three decades. Senator Philip S. Hart, Chairman of the Senate
Antitrust Committee, before whom Mueller testified frequently, characterized Mueller
as one of the most articulate voices in developing a vigorous and imaginative national
antitrust enforcement policy.
After returning to the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1969, Mueller continued his
active involvement in the nations antitrust policy and enforcement. Over four decades he
was an economic advisor to congressional committees, individual members of Congress,
and the executive branch. From 1960 to 1996, he testified 28 times before congressional
committees.
Drawing on his experience working with the FTC Bureau of Economics and the
National Commission of Food Marketing, which he assisted during 196768, Mueller
recognized that teams of economists often were better able to conduct research and
influence antitrust policy than isolated scholars. During the 1970s and 1980s, he led an
18-university research consortium that produced several landmark studies of competition
in the food manufacturing and food retailing industries. Once again he demonstrated
the impact that economists may have if they have access to good data (often obtained
through congressional committees), conduct careful analyses and have access to key policy
makers. The research group received awards from the American Agricultural Economics
Association for scholarly excellence in Public Policy, Quality of Communications and
Quality of Research Discovery. Appropriately for a Wisconsin economist, Muellers last
major study was an innovative analysis of price manipulation of the National Cheese
Exchange, a classic thin market. The four-year study led to congressional hearings, a
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Governors Task Force, replacement of the National Cheese Exchange with a spot cheese
market on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and a change in the US Department of
Agricultures milk-pricing regulations.
Mueller most prized his role as a teacher and researcher, and enjoyed working with his
undergraduate and graduate students, as well as his academic colleagues. These efforts
resulted in numerous published works, his first in 1952 and his last in 2004.
(1955), The Cellophane Case and the new competition (with G.W. Stocking), American Economic Review, 29,
pp. 2763.
(1957), Business reciprocity and the size of firms (with G.W. Stocking), University of Chicago Journal of Business,
April, pp. 7395.
(1969), Economic Report on Corporate Mergers, Staff Report of the Federal Trade Commission, Washington,
DC, pp. 754.
(1975), Antitrust in a planned economy: an anachronism or an essential complement?, Journal of Economic
Issues, June, pp. 15977.
(1978), The CellerKefauver Act: The First 27 Years of Enforcement, Report to Subcommittee on Monopolies
and Commerce of Judiciary Committee, House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
(1979), The Food Retailing Industry: Market Structure, Profits and Prices (co-author), New York: Praeger
Press.
(1984), The Food Manufacturing Industries: Structure, Strategies, Performance and Policies (co-author), Lexington,
MA: Lexington Press.
(1987), The Sunkist Case: A Study in LegalEconomic Analysis (co-author), Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books.
(1991), An empirical test of the free rider hypothesis (with F. Geithman), Review of Economics and Statistics,
May, pp. 301308.
(1996), Cheese Pricing: A Study of the National Cheese Exchange (co-author), Madison, WI: University of
Wisconsin-Madison Press, p. 210.
(2004), The revival of economics at the FTC in the 1960s, Review of Industrial Organization, 25, pp. 91105.
21/5/07 12:19:08
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235
CARL KAYSEN
William G. Shepherd
Innovations
He applied oligopoly theory creatively in 195152, published in 1956 a major case study
of the United Shoe Machinery antitrust case, broadened in 1957 the analysis of large
corporations, and co-wrote the landmark 1959 study of the harms of tight oligopoly.
Personal history
Born
1920, Philadelphia, PA, USA.
Degrees
1953.
BA University of Pennsylvania, 1940; MA, PhD, Harvard University, 1947,
Principal positions Professor of Economics, 195066, Harvard University; Professor of

Political Economy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 197690.
Other
Director, Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, 196576.
Beginning in 1945 as something of a boy wonder in economics broadly, Kaysen reached

star quality in the field in the 1950s, ranging from issues in theory to applied work to
legaleconomic issues. During 194652 he published a variety of creative papers on the
dynamic theory both of monopoly and of oligopoly situations.
Then he pioneered in a unique experimental position as an economic adviser to Judge
Charles Wyzanski for the major antitrust case involving the United Shoe Machinery
Corporation. Such a neutral judges economic adviser had never been arranged before.
Kaysen can be credited with much of the economic soundness of the final opinion in the
case. But the experiment has not been repeated. As expert-witness work mushroomed in
the 1970s, with the mammoth AT&T and IBM cases and hundreds of others, adversaries
would have attacked and rejected any neutral judges economist for supposed bias.
The debate on large firms opened in 1932 by A.A. Berle and G.C. Means had developed
much theory and also practical research about the managers array of motivations. Kaysen
broke with that trend in 1957, arguing forcefully that large firms should be held to high
standards of social contributions as well as narrow commercial ones.
Perhaps his deepest impact came with the KaysenTurner book of 1959, Antitrust Policy,
which addressed the long-pending policy question of oligopoly. The book defined the
distinct case of tight oligopoly, where concentration was high and the leading firms often
behaved like a shared monopoly. They thoroughly assessed the extent of tight oligopoly
in the US economy, finding that it was a major section of the economy. They urged making
it presumptively illegal because of its economic harms, though they did not clearly set a
firm policy step to cure the problem.
Kaysen then left this field after 1960, when he was just 40, joining the Kennedy administration as its chief activist for arms control and the avoidance of nuclear danger.
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During 196576 he headed the renowned Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton
University.
(1946), A dynamic aspect of the monopoly problem, Review of Economic Studies, pp. 115.
(1952), Dynamic aspects of oligopoly price theory, American Economic Review, 42, May, pp. 198210.
(1956), United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation: An Economic Analysis of an Anti-trust Case,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(1957), The social significance of the modern corporation, American Economic Review, 47, May pp. 31119.
(1959), Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis (with Donald F. Turner, Jr), Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
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237
DONALD F. TURNER
William G. Shepherd
Innovations
He articulated the tight-oligopoly concept; shifted US antitrust to a fuller reliance
on economic content; created a major antitrust case to remove AT&Ts large vertical
monopoly; conceived and issued the first antitrust guidelines for mergers; co-authored the
now-standard pricecost definition of predatory pricing; and urged that conglomerate
mergers had no anti-competitive role.
Personal history
Born
1921, USA; died 1994.
Degrees BA Northwestern University, 1941; PhD (Economics), Harvard University,

1947; LLB Yale, 1950.
Principal position Professor of Law, Harvard University, 195479.
Other
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, US Department of Justice, 196568.
Turner was a unique figure. He was both a prolific and renowned legal scholar at Harvard
Law School and also an economics PhD who created some of the first highly sophisticated
laweconomics thought, even before that field took form in the 1970s. He wedded deep
and sophisticated research with the direct personal experience of making and changing
Americas antitrust policies.
In 1959 he wrote (with Carl Kaysen) a pathbreaking proposal for strict antitrust
policy toward tight oligopoly (1959). Their book combined thorough legal analysis with
comprehensive economic data about the scope and effects of actual oligopoly concentration
in US industry.
Then in 1965, after publishing other research on antitrust issues, he was appointed
by Lyndon Johnson as head of the Antitrust Division in the Department of Justice, the
senior US antitrust agency. He held this post for three tumultuous years. From the start,
he raised the rigor and depth of economics in making antitrust choices.
As part of that, he created an economic adviser position (Special Economic Assistant to
the Assistant Attorney General), which became a fixture. (Among the 43 pioneers profiled
here, those who were special economic assistants include William S. Comanor, Oliver E.
Williamson, William G. Shepherd and Leonard W. Weiss.)
Turner prepared a major legal case in 1966 to remove AT&Ts long-standing vertical
monopoly. Though the case was stymied by higher officials, the same result was reached
when a similar 1974 case led to AT&Ts break-up in 1984.
He rejected claims that the spectacular 196669 wave of conglomerate mergers posed
any threat to true economic competition. Those mergers did not change the structures
inside any markets, and so Turner denied that they would affect market power.
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He originated the idea of creating and publishing official merger guidelines to show and
explain Americas current merger policies; in 1968 he prepared and issued the first actual
guidelines, based on economic criteria. In their more recent revised forms, the guidelines
remain the anchor of merger policies.
In perhaps his most striking innovation, in 1975 he published (with Philip Areeda) a
new, lucid economic definition of predatory pricing. Based on comparing price with
marginal cost if price is not lower than marginal cost, there is no anti-competitive effect
(or predation) the AreedaTurner rule quickly became standard antitrust policy, and
it remains so.
Then in 1978, Turner published (also with Areeda) an immense, encyclopedic, economicsbased and virtually definitive seven-volume coverage of antitrust policies. It completed
the conversion of antitrust law to a thorough economic basis. It was an instant landmark
and, in successive editions, it has remained so.
(1959), Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal Analysis (with Carl Kaysen), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
(1975), Predatory pricing and related practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act (with Philip Areeda),
Harvard Law Review, February 697733.
(1978), Antitrust Law (with Philip Areeda), 7 vols, Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
21/5/07 12:19:08
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239
GEORGE JOSEPH STIGLER
Sam Peltzman
Innovations
Economic analysis of regulation, politics and law; economics of information and
oligopoly.
Personal history
Born
1911, Renton, WA, USA; died 1991.
Degrees
BBA University of Washington, 1931, PhD University of Chicago, 1938.
Principal position Charles R. Walgreen Professor of American Institutions, University

of Chicago, Chicago, USA 195891.
Other Professor Columbia University, New York, 194758. Nobel Laureate in Economics,
1982.
Industrial organization emerged as a recognizable field within US economics some time

in the 1930s. Edward Chamberlins Theory of Monopolistic Competition (1933) probably
deserves much of the credit for this development, perhaps along with A.A. Berle and
G.C. Meanss The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932). At its inception the
field was centrally concerned with the operation of markets and firms, especially those
aspects which seemed to deviate from the textbook model of perfect competition. The
main policy concern of early industrial organization was antitrust enforcement.
The field has broadened considerably since those early days. An important example
occurred in the 1960s when industrial organization subsumed the economic analysis of
much public regulation beyond antitrust. Indeed, the field is commonly called IO/regulation
today. George Stigler had much to do with that development, and I have chronicled that
elsewhere (Peltzman, 1993).
In this profile I shall concentrate on Stiglers contribution to industrial organization in
its original conception. Stigler did not have many kind words for either Chamberlin or
Berle and Means, but he shared their interest in the operation of firms and markets and in
the related antitrust policy issues. In a career that began just after industrial organization
was born, he made landmark contributions to the field.
His contributions to the traditional industrial organization of competition, monopoly and
antitrust (hereafter IO) were many and varied. His own distillation of the published work
(Stigler, 1968) contains 22 articles and notes. They cover issues such as how concentration
and economies of scale ought to be measured, what constitutes a barrier to entry, the
methodological flaws in Chamberlins magnum opus and the statistical flaws in the analysis
of price rigidity. Some of these issues will seem quaint or obscure to the current generation
of IO economists. But two items in the collection probably will define his legacy to the
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field, and here I shall focus exclusively on these. They are his articles on the economics of
information and the theory of oligopoly.
The articles are related intellectually and appeared within three years of each other in
the early 1960s, when Stigler was at the peak of his intellectual power and influence. The
first was The economics of information (Stigler, 1961). It grappled with the mundane,
but theretofore largely neglected truth that information about the market was costly to
produce. Much of the analysis is couched in terms of information about prices, perhaps
because price theory is, after all, centrally concerned with prices. However, the theory
Stigler developed was applicable to almost any variable aspect of a transaction, such as
the quality of the good, delivery times and so forth.
To understand Stiglers contribution in The economics of information it is well to
look back to where price theory was at the time he wrote. A central result of the theory
was the law of one price, whereby the same good had to sell at the same price in the
same location (or could differ across locations only within bounds set by transport costs).
Simple arbitrage reasoning seemed to compel the result. But, of course, a stroll through
the neighborhood would reveal that the law was being routinely violated.
The reaction of economists of the time to the massive empirical failure of one of
their central tenets was varied. There was the Talmudic reaction: what is a location?
What is a transport cost? There was the retreat to methodology: the law holds in longrun equilibrium, a condition we are not privileged to observe in the world. Among IO
economists, there was the search for the monopolist under every bed: the law holds under
perfect competition, so price dispersion signals some market imperfection; ubiquitous price
dispersion was just one more example of the infirmities of perfect competition models in
the post-Chamberlin era.1 The overall view that competition was nice to teach to undergraduates but not otherwise to be taken seriously by adults was then perhaps even more
common than it is today.
Stigler viewed all this huffing and puffing as beside the point. All of the explanations
and evasions emanated from a fictitious world in which information about prices was
costless.2 Only if all the market participants knew the full distribution of bid and ask
prices could competitive arbitrage surely eliminate price dispersion. But this surfeit of
information would not automatically materialize if the information were costly to produce
and disseminate. With costly information, the law of one price has to be wrong. It posits
an equilibrium where the marginal value of information is zero (you cannot gain by getting
another price quote because every price is the same) in a world where the marginal cost of
the information is positive. But the larger logic of competition implies equality between
marginal values and costs.
Stiglers article is nothing more or less than an adumbration of what that standard
equalization of marginal benefits and costs means in the context of price information.
For one thing, the marginal value of search has to be positive in the full long-run perfectly
competitive equilibrium. That is, there is price dispersion. The buyer (seller) could in
principle find a lower (higher) price somewhere, but it does not pay to look for it. Our task
then is to analyze this dispersion.
Stigler does some of this in the article. He shows, for example, why large buyers will
pay lower prices than small buyers (under perfect competition), why price dispersions are
greater where there is much buyer/seller turnover and so on. However, as with much of
his work, the main impact of the article was in the way it framed a question. Here the
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question was what are the implications of costly information? There would follow a
new subfield that pursued those implications in a variety of contexts. The most obvious
were explorations of the supply and demand for information. These led to results like the
reservation-price search rule3 on the demand side and signaling models of advertising on
the supply side.4 The more subtle applications extended well beyond IO. For example,
the notion that unemployment is an equilibrium phenomenon arising out of employer/
employee search for information became integral to labor economics and macroeconomics. Both fields were thus relieved of the same kind of discomfort with persistent non-zero
unemployment as had been occasioned elsewhere by persistent price dispersions.
Stiglers (1964) article A theory of oligopoly is also an application of his economics
of information. Here the central problem was how oligopolists acquired information
about rival behavior. The general problem had been lurking since Augustin Cournot and
became more explicit after Joseph Bertrand. Cournots famous equilibrium significant
departures from competition with few rivals implicitly assumed free information about
rival outputs. Bertrands equilibrium marginal cost pricing under duopoly made the
information problem explicit. If a rival could conceal a price reduction long enough,
Cournots equilibrium would degenerate to marginal-cost pricing with only two rivals.
The corollary to Bertrand is that significant departures from competition require sufficient
timely information among rivals about each others actions. Stiglers theory pursues that
corollary in a world where, in addition to the usual costs of acquiring, communicating
and verifying information, there are legal costs as well. That is, direct communication of
prices between competitors and various mechanisms for internalizing information such as
joint sales agencies, mergers and so on are all subject to antitrust penalties.
Accordingly, the question Stigler grapples with is whether a non-competitive equilibrium
is stable when each seller must independently discover what rivals are doing. The specific
information mechanism that Stigler emphasizes is the sellers own sales. That is, if a rival
undercuts your price, you will find that your sales dry up. Your private information (sales
declined) allows inferences about rival actions (some rival-reduced price). However, sales
can decline or rise for a variety of (unobservable) reasons unrelated to rivals pricing.
Buyers enter and leave the market from time to time, their demands move around randomly
and so on.
The heart of the oligopolists information problem, according to Stigler, is to filter
this random noise from the signal of rival behavior. This filtering takes time, and the
stability of a non-competitive equilibrium hinges on how long it takes for the signal to
emerge. If it takes long enough, Bertrand-style competition will prevail, because the rival
who initiates a price reduction will reap the fruits (higher sales) for a long enough time to
make that strategy irresistible. Stiglers great insight was then to connect this time required
for learning to the structure of the market within which the rivalry occurred.
A simple example will illustrate the connection: imagine that ten sellers collude on the
price of widgets to 100 buyers who buy one widget each week. Buyers are indifferent to
whom they buy from, given price. So, since the price is initially the same across the sellers,
each buyer picks a seller by throwing darts at a ten-section board every week. This random
selection process is the only source of noise in the example. But it is sufficient to create
a temptation to cheat. Without cheating, each seller will average ten units sold per week,
but the standard deviation of each sellers sales will be three per week. Thus good or bad
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luck could produce considerable deviation from the average in any one week without any
deviation from the collusive agreement.
Now suppose a cheater can gain an extra five sales per week by discounting the collusive
price by, say, 10 percent. The mean of the honest rivals sales generating process has shifted
down by 5/9 per week (five customers lost to nine rivals), but with a standard deviation of
3 the loss cannot be detected right away. Eventually the nine rivals will awake: the standard
deviation of the mean will decline with the square root of the number of weekly draws
from the new process. For example, after 100 weeks the standard error of the mean sales
per firm will be only 0.3. They will at that point look back on sales that have averaged
something like 0.6 less than the 10 they expected, compare that loss to the 0.3 standard
error and conclude that bad luck cannot account for the shortfall. With no other source
of variation in the story, rivals will be able to infer that someone has cheated.
The difficulty, of course, is that even if prices fell to marginal cost in week 101 two years
worth of cheating profits may be much more profitable than adhering to the collusive
price. In that case, the collusion will unravel at the beginning, because it will pay no one
to remain honest.
Now imagine that there are two rivals instead of ten. All else the same, expected weekly
sales per firm are now 50, with a standard deviation of 5. A cheating strategy with the
same short-run payoff as in the previous case (five extra sales for a 10 percent discount)
will now be detectable after a month or so,5 compared with two years in the previous case.
If a months worth of cheating profits are not great enough to offset the long-run costs the
collusive equilibrium can be sustained indefinitely. The intuition behind this connection
between market structure (two firms versus ten) and the likelihood of a stable collusive
equilibrium is simple: with only two firms, much of the previous noise becomes internalized.
Imagine that the old firms 15 and 610 had merged to form the two-firm industry. Now
darts that land on section 1 instead of 2 or 3 or 4 or 5, and so on do not create noise when
once they did. This reduction in noise6 speeds detection of the signal.
Stiglers article goes on to use the logic underlying the above example to connect the
likelihood of a stable non-competitive equilibrium to aspects of market structure beyond
the number of sellers, such as the number of buyers, their loyalty and, importantly, the
concentration of output. Indeed the connection between expected price and concentration
in Stiglers theory probably remains the major theoretical underpinning of the literature on
the empirical relation between profits and concentration that was blossoming at the time.
That literature began well before Stiglers article, but the connection between concentration
and profitability (viewed then as a proxy for super-competitive prices) did not rigorously
follow from any oligopoly model until Stiglers.7
Stiglers oligopoly theory also had a considerable influence on antitrust policy. It provided
a rigorous basis for regulation of mergers, something that was hard to find in the preceding
literature.8 Stiglers theory suggested that the relevant measure of concentration was the
HerfindahlHirschmann index (the sum of squared market shares), and this measure
later became the standard for judging mergers in the Department of Justices merger
guidelines. It also contributed a new way of understanding a host of practices that
had previously seemed either benign or hard to understand. For example, sharing of
information among rivals, such as had occurred in open price trade associations could
no longer be excused on grounds that the sharing stopped short of an agreement. If the
practice speeded dissemination of private price information, this could help stabilize an
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agreement. On the other side of the market, a preference among substantial buyers for
negotiating prices with sellers rather than accepting the lowest published price could be
understood as a defensive strategy that helped keep rival sellers in the dark about each
others price offers9 and thereby encouraged rivals to deviate from an agreement. Stigler,
father of the economics of information, understood that more information did not always
mean more competition.
No account of Stiglers influence on IO would be complete without some mention of
his intellectual influence at Chicago. He was on the faculty of the Graduate School of
Business and Economics Department from 1958 until his death in 1991. In that time he was,
literally, a towering figure among Chicago economists. He was the recognized leader among
a large group of IO economists who resided in economics, business and law. This tripartite
collaboration was unusual in its time and contributed greatly to a distinct approach to IO
that was to have long-lasting consequences for academic and policy discourse.
Stigler was, for example, a great friend of Aaron Director, the second economist hired
by the Law School.10 Director was skeptical about much of the then prevailing wisdom
in antitrust, especially in areas like vertical restraints (such as exclusive dealing and resale
price maintenance) and predatory pricing. However, Director published little, so Stigler
took on himself a facilitating role: He convinced Director to establish a new Journal of
Law and Economics and Stigler urged colleagues to write articles inspired by Directors
teachings. Two prominent examples of this mid-wifery were Lester Telsers (1960) article
on resale price maintenance and John McGees (1958) article on predatory pricing. Works
like this ultimately became the basis for what is sometimes called the Chicago view in
antitrust policy. This includes more tolerance for vertical restraints and more skepticism
about allegations of predation than had theretofore been common. Ultimately the courts
adopted much of this view.
George Stigler rarely wrote an article which was the last word in its subject. Unlike his
other great friend at Chicago, Milton Friedman, Stigler had few students to carry on a
more or less well-defined research program. He stayed largely aloof from public policy.
His influence rests largely in the kind of questions he asked and the kind of colleagues he
brought together at Chicago. While he was skeptical that there was a recognizable Chicago
school in economics generally or IO in particular, he was probably wrong about that. And
his work is probably the main reason for that.
Notes
1. But so too does the opposite. Evidence in the cement antitrust case of 1948 revealed 11 identical bids of
$3.286854 per barrel of cement for a highway contract. The court rejected the defendants exculpatory
invocation of the law of one price under competition.
2. Or, more precisely, arbitrarily cheap.
3. Whereby the buyer sets a lower-bound price and then searches until he or she finds that price or a lower
one.
4. Stigler briefly discussed advertising as a supply response to the demand for information in his article. In the
ensuing decade or so much was made of distinctions between informative advertising the type Stigler
seemed to be talking about when he discussed price search and the persuasive advertising that Chamberlin
seemed to have in mind. The signaling model, due to Nelson (1974), shows how apparently persuasive ads
with little hard information content can nevertheless be informative by signaling a products quality.
5. Here one rival would lose five sales per week. Suppose the mean loss has to be 2.0 times the standard error
to be considered significant. With a weekly standard deviation of 5, this condition will occur after 4 weeks
on average, when the standard error of the mean will be around 2.5.
6. It can be measured by the coefficient of variation of a firms sales that is, the standard deviation divided
by the mean. This is 30 percent in the first case (3/10) and only 10 percent in the second (5/50).
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7. Of course, Cournot and his descendants have such a relation implicit. They focus on the number of firms
rather than concentration. But the negative correlation between numbers and concentration suggests a
positive correlation between prices and concentration. Stiglers theory is able to separate the information
advantages of high concentration from those stemming from fewness of rivals.
8. For example, consider a triopoly operating under Cournot rivalry that becomes a duopoly via merger. In
the simplest case, industry profits rise but the merged firms profits fall (because it only has half the total
versus 2/3 for the merging firms). Thus, a naive reading of Cournot suggests no incentive to anti-competitive
mergers.
9. If the large buyers policy is to buy at some published price, then the rival sellers can learn each others
prices to that buyer simply by obtaining each others catalogues.
10. Henry Simons was the first.
References
McGee, John S. (1958), Predatory price cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) case, Journal of Law and Economics,
1, October, pp. 13769.
Nelson, Phillip (1974), Advertising as information, Journal of Political Economy, 82, July/August, pp. 72954.
Peltzman, Sam (1993), George Stiglers contribution to the economic analysis of regulation, Journal of Political
Economy, 101, October, pp. 81832.
Stigler, George J. (1961), The economics of information, Journal of Political Economy, 69, pp. 21325.
Stigler, George J. (1964), A theory of oligopoly, Journal of Political Economy, 72, February, pp. 4461.
Stigler, George J. (1968), The Organization of Industry, Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin.
Telser, Lester G. (1960), Why should manufacturers want fair trade?, Journal of Law and Economics, 3, October,
pp. 86105.
21/5/07 12:19:09
K.
245
WILLIAM JACK BAUMOL
Stephen Martin
Innovations
Analysis of alternative firm objective functions in imperfectly competitive markets; theory
of contestable markets; application of economics to antitrust and regulatory policy;
economic analysis of the arts.
Personal history
Born
1922, New York City, USA.
Degrees BSS City College, New York, 1942; PhD University of London, 1949; various
honorary degrees.
Principle positions Professor of Economics, Princeton University, 194992, since then,
Emeritus Professor; Professor of Economics, New York University, since 1971; Director,
C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, NYU, 19832000.
Other Assistant Lecturer, London School of Economics, 194749; Junior Economist,
US Department of Agriculture, 194243, 1946.
William J. Baumol is a polymath whose contributions to the field of industrial economics
are a portion of his professional opus.
While acknowledging that there is an unavoidable arbitrary element to any classification
scheme, I discuss Baumols contributions to industrial economics under four headings:
theory generally, the theory of contestable markets, the economics of antitrust and
regulation, and studies of particular industries.
Baumol (1958, 1959 [1967]) explores the implications of sales maximization as an objective
function, alternative to that which is usually assumed (profit or value maximization,
depending on whether one works with a static or a dynamic model) for firms in imperfectly
competitive markets. Analysis of the strategic implications of such alternative objective
functions, sales maximization in particular, has become a standard element in the analysis
of imperfect competition.
Over and above the substantive contribution, two methodological points come out of
this work. Baumol traces his study of revenue maximization to his experience consulting
with US corporations (1958, p. 187; 1967, pp. 459). That is, and this is explicit in the title
of Baumol (1959 [1967]), the study of revenue maximization is based on observation of
firms behavior. The assumptions of the model are justified on the ground of realism.
Baumols discussion (1967, pp. 29) of the relation between his methodological approach
and that of Friedman (1953) should be noted.
Baumol also takes the view (1958, p. 188, footnote 1) that economics, as such, is agnostic
as far as indicating what a firms objective function ought to be. Rather, economic analysis
serves to analyze the implications of alternative objective functions for firm and/or market
performance.1
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246
Baumol and Bradford (1970, p. 265) defend what they describe as a mislaid maxim, a
result that has been lost sight of although it has appeared many times in the literature,
having been reported by most eminent economists in very prominent journals. This
result is that (ibid., p. 265): generally, prices which deviate in a systematic manner from
marginal costs will be required for an optimal allocation of resources, even in the absence
of externalities. In related work, Baumol (1979a) makes a point about the best market
performance that can be obtained using a price system, and by implication about feasible
goals for antitrust or regulatory policy. The point is that (ibid., p. 579): Generally, the best
that any fixed set of prices can achieve is the Ramsey (1927) solution, whose welfare yield
is constrained by Walras law and that the implied welfare level will in general fall short
of the first-best level. Hence (ibid., p. 580): the welfare loss required by the acceptance of
the Ramsey solution is generally unavoidable under any standard price system in which
the individual decision maker treats prices as fixed parameters whose values are beyond
his control, and where prices are not discriminatory.
The importance of potential competition for market performance has been another
mislaid maxim of economics.2 After Baumol et al.s (1982) Contestable Markets and
the Theory of Industry Structure and the follow-on literature, it seems unlikely that this
particular maxim will ever be mislaid again. The book emphasizes the implications of
free and easy entry and exit for market performance and market structure, including the
case of multi-product firms. Empirical tests of the applicability of the theory to specific
industries (in particular but not limited to the passenger airline industry) contributed
much insight into the subtle ways in which strategic behavior on the part of incumbent
firms may raise entry costs.
Baumol (1979b, 1996) has applied rigorous economic analysis to the question of antitrust
policy toward predatory behavior.
On his own and with co-authors,3 Baumol early on produced industry studies characterized
by an attention to institutional detail that is characteristic of current practice.
Scholars who maintain their research productivity typically expand their contributions
to a field moving forward in time, by a continuing stream of publications. Baumol has
done this. Exceptionally, the list of his contributions to industrial economics has expanded
going backward in time as well. As theoretical industrial economics has reintegrated itself
with mainstream economic theory and as the distinction between antitrust economics
and the economics of regulation has faded, publications of his which at their appearance
would have been thought to enrich other branches of economics are now seen as part
of the literature of industrial economics. In a real sense, his contributions to industrial
economics have anticipated the broad lines of development of the field.
Notes
1. Baumol (1982) takes a similar position as regards the social welfare function.
2. The importance of potential competition for equilibrium market performance was emphasized by Chadwick
(1859), Gunton (1888), Liefmann (1915) and Machlup (1942). Entry conditions were, as Baumol et al. (1983)
note, central to the structureconductperformance paradigm.
3. For example, Baumol (1971), Baumol and Bowen (1966).
References
Baumol, William J. (1958), On the theory of oligopoly, Economica, 25, August, 18798.
Baumol, William J. (1959 [1967]), Business Behavior, Value and Growth, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World;
rev. edn, 1967.
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247
Baumol, William J. (1971), Economics of Athenian drama: its relevance for the Arts in a small city today,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85(3), August, 36576.
Baumol, William J. (1979a), Quasi-optimality: the price we must pay for a price system, Journal of Political
Economy, 87(3), June, 57899.
Baumol, William J. (1979b), Quasi-permanence of price reductions: a policy for prevention of predatory pricing,
Yale Law Journal, 89(1), November, 126.
Baumol, William J. (1982), Book review (of Steven Kelman, What Price Incentives, Boston, MA: Auburn House,
1981), Journal of Economic Literature, 20(3), September, 11056.
Baumol, William J. (1996), Predation and the logic of the average variable cost test, Journal of Law and
Economics, 39(1), April, 4972.
Baumol, William J. and William G. Bowen (1996), Performing Arts, the Economic Dilemma: A Study of Problems
Common to Theater, Opera, Music, and Dance, New York: Twentieth Century Fund.
Baumol, William J. and David F. Bradford (1970), Optimal departures from marginal cost pricing, American
Economic Review, 60(3), June, 26583.
Baumol, William J., John C. Panzar and Robert D. Willig (1982), Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry
Structure, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Baumol, William J., John C. Panzar and Robert D. Willig (1983), Contestable markets: an uprising in the theory
of industry structure: reply, American Economic Review, 73(3), June, 4916.
Chadwick, Edwin (1859), Results of different principles of legislation and administration in Europe of
competition for the field, as compared with competition within the field, of service, Journal of the Royal
Statistical Society, 22, September, 381420.
Friedman, Milton (1953), The methodology of positive economics, in Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive
Economics, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 343.
Gunton, George (1888), The economic and social aspect of trusts, Political Science Quarterly, 3(3), September,
385408.
Liefmann, R.L. (1915), Monopoly or competition as the basis of a government trust policy, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 29, February, 30825.
Machlup, Fritz (1942), Competition, pliopoly, and profits, Economica, 9, February, 123; May, 15373.
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L.
JOHN ROBERT MEYER
John C. Spychalski
Innovations
Pioneering applications of statistical methods and neoclassical price theory in critiques
of industry performance and other economic phenomena.
Personal history
Born
1927, Pasco, WA, USA.
Degrees BA University of Washington, 1950; PhD Harvard University, 1955; Hon. Dr

(Sc), Lowell Technological Institute, 1973.
Principal position James W. Harpel Professor of Capital Formation and Economic
Growth, Emeritus, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, USA, 1997 .
Other Harpel Professor, Professor of Transportation, Logistics and Distribution, and
Professor of Economics, Harvard University, 198396; 197383; 195968. President,
National Bureau of Economic Research, 196777; Professor of Economics, Yale University,
196873; Vice-Chairman of the Board, Union Pacific Corporation, 198183.
As an innovative and seminal work, Meyers co-authored (with M.J. Peck, J. Stenason and
C. Zwick) book, The Economics of Competition in the Transportation Industries (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1959), stands pre-eminent among his industry performancefocused works. It provided a pathbreaking blend of statistical, economic and institutional
analysis supportive of the proposition that many of the then-extant critical problems in
intercity freight and passenger transport stemmed from excessive government regulation.
Its findings inspired an upsurge in research on the effects of transport regulation. The
result was a widely accepted intellectual rationale supportive of the post1975 dismantling
of most of the comprehensive system for economic regulation of transport that had been
enacted incrementally between 1887 and 1940.
In the wake of deregulation, Meyer led co-authored investigations of its impacts on
airline fares, service and profitability (Airline Deregulation: The Early Experience, 1981;
Deregulation and the New Airline Entrepreneurs, 1984; and Deregulation and the Future of
Intercity Passenger Travel, 1987). The findings in each were largely favorable, and hence
supportive of prescriptions for deregulation proffered earlier by Meyer and others.
In the early 1960s, rising road congestion coupled with central city decline, prolific
suburban development, and impoverishment in the urban transit industry sparked calls for
government-funded rehabilitation and expansion of public transit service. Meyer responded
with co-authored book-length studies of the comparative costs of automobile, bus, and rail
transit and demographic and land-use data (The Urban Transportation Problem, 1965, and
Autos, Transit and Cities, 1981). A central conclusion was that elimination of all subsidy
for both automobile and public transit use would be preferable to transit subsidization.
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Unlike his prescription for deregulation, however, this option has not yet, four decades
after its initial publication, gained acceptance among policy makers.
Meyers work on transport industry policy has extended beyond the USA. Following
service as an advisor on shifts from government to market-provided transport services
in developing countries and former communist nations, Meyer co-authored publication
of Going Private: The International Experience with Transport Privatization (1993), and
Moving to Market: Restructuring Transport in the Former Soviet Union (1996).
The financial crisis that enveloped operators of most of the rail mileage in the northeastern
US and portions of the Midwest and West in the early 1970s moved the Council of
Economic Advisers to appoint Meyer as chair of a task force charged with assessment of
the railroad industrys condition and prospects. The ensuing report (Improving Railroad
Productivity: Final Report of the Task Force on Railroad Productivity, 1973) influenced
rail deregulation legislation enacted in 1974 and 1980. It also opened the way to Meyers
service on the boards of several major railroads.
Meyers scholarship has spanned diverse phenomena beyond the ambit of industrial
organization, as revealed by titles of his other co-authored and co-edited books, including
The Investment Decision: An Empirical Study (with Edwin Kuh, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1957); The Economics of Slavery and Other Essays on the Quantitative
Study of Economic History (with Alfred H. Conrad, Chicago, IL: Aldine Press, 1964);
and by articles such as Economic theory, statistical inference, and economic history
(with Alfred H. Conrad, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 17, December, 1957);
The New England states and their economic future: some implications of a changing
industrial environment (with Robert A. Leone, The American Economic Review, Vol. 68,
May, 1978); and Measurement and analysis of productivity in transportation industries
(with Jose Gmez-Ibez in New Developments in Productivity Measurement and Analysis,
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980). The titles of the last two articles reflect
interests aligned with his service as President of the National Bureau of Economic Research
(196777).
Meyers personal bibliography is replete with co-authored entries. It thus is impossible
for an outside observer to measure Meyers contributions vis--vis those of others. In the
words of one who was there:
He [Meyer] would gather around him a team of faculty and doctoral students to work on each
book, but he inevitably did more than his share, generating the intellectual framework and key
insights and drafting and redrafting the manuscript. By example and direction, he taught dozens
of young scholars how to do research and set a standard of generosity in giving credit and
coauthorship to his collaborators. (Gmez-Ibez et al., 1999, p. 2)
In summing up, it can be said with certainty that the results of Meyers collaborative
research contributions have exerted significant impact on the work of other scholars, and
on the formation and execution of policy in the public and private sectors.
Reference
Gmez-Ibez, Jos A., William B. Tye and Clifford Winston (eds) (1999), Essays in Transportation Economics
and Policy: A Handbook in Honor of John R. Meyer, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
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13.
A.
The 1960s to the mid-1980s

RICHARD E. CAVES
William S. Comanor
Innovations
The intersection between international trade and industrial organization. Most work in
industrial organization (IO) rests on the foundation of a closed economy, or one that is
influenced minimally by external factors. Much of Cavess work rejects that simplifying
assumption and explores the consequences for industrial behavior and performance of
international considerations. Caves was also a major figure in the approach to industrial
organization that emphasized the structureconduct (behavior)performance paradigm,
although he moved away from that in his later years. He spent the great bulk of his career
as a distinguished member and sometimes chair of the Department of Economics at
Harvard University.
Born
1931, Akron, OH, USA.
Degrees BA Oberlin College, 1953; MA Harvard University, 1956, PhD Harvard

University, 1958.
Principal position
19622003.
Professor of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA,
Caves was a giant in the field of industrial organization. Although his graduate studies
were completed at Harvard, he spent five formative years at the University of California
at Berkeley, where Joe Bain was a important colleague. When he returned to Harvard
in the summer of 1962, he had not yet reached his 31st birthday but still had completed
three important books while in California. These volumes, all published by the Harvard
University Press and part of the Harvard Economic Studies, set the stage for much of
his future work. These books are: The Canadian Economy: Prospect and Retrospect (with
Richard H. Holton, 1959); Trade and Economic Structure: Models and Methods, 1960; and
Air Transport and Its Regulators: An Industry Study, 1962.
IO had developed in the context of a large and generally closed economy such as the
United States in the early postwar years. Caves saw the need to extend that analysis to
other settings, and in particular to small and more open economies. In that environment,
competition and market results depend as much on international as on domestic factors
so one could not accurately appraise the behavior of firms and industries without dealing
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Individual pioneers: the 1960s to the mid-1980s
251
with both sets of forces. He led the way towards a broader analysis that encompassed both
sets of considerations.
While at Berkeley, Caves encountered Joe Bain, who was one of the originators of the
structureconductperformance paradigm that had become a leading tool for IO research.
Caves pursued this approach in one of his first efforts following his return to Harvard: a
small but influential text on industrial organization. The volume was entitled: American
Industry: Structure, Conduct, Performance. It was published in 1964 and went through
seven editions, with the last one published in 1992.
Although written originally as a module for an introductory economics text, it had
a larger life than that. The earlier approach was to emphasize industry studies with the
hope of finding commonalities from the considerable factual detail amassed in each
study. The structureconductperformance paradigm, described lucidly in Cavess brief
volume, followed directly from that effort for it emphasized these commonalities, and in
particular, how the structure of a market along with expected patterns of firm conduct
could influence performance in the industry. Although largely rejected by the 1980s and
1990s, this approach served to motivate an impressive body of IO research in earlier years,
and for which Caves was an important pioneer. Its more recent rejection on the grounds
that it could not incorporate the major feedback effects on various dimensions of market
structure does not lessen the important contributions that Caves made.
Cavess 1962 study of the airline industry represented his early contribution to this body
of research. He employed that paradigm extensively in this volume. In that era, the airline
industry was tightly regulated by the Civil Aeronautics Board. Cavess purpose was not
simply to examine this industry but also to evaluate the effects of direct regulation. As he
expressed it then, his effort was after bigger game than [merely] a scholarly evaluation of
the air-transport industry (p. 3). He sought to determine the effects of public regulation
and concluded that this industry was more workably competitive than some unregulated
industries in the economy (pp. 4489).
A later important study in this vein is his paper with Michael Porter entitled From
entry barriers to mobility barriers: conjectural decisions and contrived deterrents to new
competition, which was published in the Quarterly Journal of Economics in 1977. As
with the airline study, this paper rested on the structureconductperformance paradigm.
Its goal was to establish the impact of an incumbents actions on the height of entry
barriers.
In addition, this paper extended the concept of entry barriers to a broader and more
empirically relevant setting where there are limits on the growth of existing firms as well
as on new firms seeking to enter a market. The writers emphasized that such restrictions
may also retard competitive pressures and be as important as entry barriers for market
results. In adopting this approach, Caves and Porter set the stage for the more recent
analysis that emphasizes the role of firms rather than industries. In this sense, this paper
represents an important component of the structureconductperformance literature as
well as an early step beyond it.
His later work on individual industries shifted away from that paradigm but remained
directed at the ways firms behaved and performed. His concerns were the same but his
approaches and methods had shifted to the new methodologies in use. Both his constancy
and shift are evident in two important papers written on different facets of the pharmaceutical industry: one published with Mark Hurwitz in 1988, and the other with Michael
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Whinston and Mark Hurwitz in 1991. These papers remain important contributions to
the economic literature on the pharmaceutical industry.
Cavess concerns with international factors and the competitive effects of international
trade led him to study and write about economies where international considerations
were more important. This work included important volumes on the British, Canadian
and Japanese economies.
His 1968 volume, Britains Economic Prospects, was a significant contribution. In that
era, there was much concern about the performance of the British economy. The Brookings
Institution commissioned a broad overview of British economic policies in the hope that
a collection of external observers might provide a useful report and offer helpful recommendations. Caves was selected to direct this study. He in turn selected his collaborators
but reserved the review of British industrial policies for himself.
Caves saw the need for increased competitive vigor throughout the British economy but
cautioned that the problems of excessive product differentiation, inappropriate degrees of
integration, sub-optimal use of research and development, [and] an inefficient marketing
and investment planning are deficiencies which might melt slowly and incompletely before
the heat of increased market rivalry (p. 322). More specific types of interventions might
be called for, but he cautioned that their effectiveness was still untested: policy toward
industry can serve as a useful stick, but not as a magic wand (p. 323).
Cavess work on the Canadian economy is more extensive and represents one of his
most longstanding interests. His very first paper, published nearly 50 years ago, in 1957,
was entitled The inter-industry structure of the Canadian Economy, and his first book
on that subject appeared two years later. What followed was a virtual torrent of books
and articles about the Canadian economy: from Policies for economic growth in Canada
in 1965 and Canadian economic policy and impact of international capital flows (with
Grant Reuber) in 1969 to Trade liberalization and structural adjustment in Canada:
the genesis of intra-industry trade in 1991. Through these works and others, Caves had
become one of the leading commentators on the Canadian economy. He pioneered the
study of competitive conditions in small open economies and applied that analysis to the
Canadian experience.
During the 1970s, Caves directed his attention towards Japan. In that era, the Japanese
economy was the most prominent engine for growth in the world, and Caves became
interested in how industry was organized in a non-Western context. Along with Masu
Uekusa, he contributed a chapter entitled Industrial organization to Asias New Giant:
How the Japanese Economy Works, and then extended that article into a book: Industrial
Organization in Japan. Both were published in 1976. Again, Cavess work explored the
interactions between domestic and international factors that were so important for the
Japanese experience. He was directing his talents at a new subject area but with equal
clarity and insightfulness.
In addition to his work on individual economies, Caves focused on firms that were not
linked to any economy. He studied the substantial roles played by multinational firms
and their impact on economic performance. He produced a major volume on this subject,
Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, which was originally published in 1982.
His purpose was to offer a synthesis of the considerable business and economic literature
that dealt with these entities.
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Caves suggested that a principal reason for these firms is their possession of the critical
intangible asset resulting from their knowledge of how to produce a cheaper or better
product at current input prices. Such assets yield additional returns to these firms, which
are not often available to smaller, single-nation enterprises. He examined these issues and
reported that the presence of these enterprises resulted largely from a complicated form
of transactional economies.
Public policy issues towards these enterprises are equally complex. In addition to the
obvious questions of how national taxes should be levied on multinational enterprises,
there are issues of natural-resource rents, competition policy for industrial markets, and
the creation and transfer of industrial knowledge (Caves, 1982, p. 298). In all of these
areas, Caves continued his exploration into the consequences of business regulation.
The striking feature about Cavess contribution to industrial organization is the breadth
and scope of his work. Rather than set a narrow agenda, he established a broad path to
follow, and has done so consistently for nearly 50 years. The organization and performance
of firms and industries in an open economy has served as his underlying theme, and he
contributed much to our understanding of how these factors interact.
It is sometimes suggested that modern scholars are in effect working on the shoulders
of all those who went before. They can only reach their current positions and see the
landscape before them because of those who had worked earlier. Otherwise, their vista
would be much lower than it is. There is little doubt but that scholars in the future will
rest heavily on the pioneering work of Richard Caves. He is clearly a major pioneer in the
construction of the edifice of industrial organization.
(1957), The inter-industry structure of the Canadian economy, Canadian Journal of Economics and Political
Science, 23, August, pp. 31330.
(1959), The Canadian Economy: Prospect and Retrospect (with Richard E. Holton), Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
(1960), Trade and Economic Structure: Models and Methods, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(1962), Air Transport and Its Regulators: An Industry Study, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(196492), American Industry: Structure, Conduct, Performance, 7 edns, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
(1968), et al, Britains Economic Prospects, Washington, Brookings Institution.
(1976), Industrial Organization in Japan (with Masu Uekusa), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(1977), From entry barriers to mobility barriers: conjectural decisions and contrived deterrents to new competition
(with Michael E. Porter), Quarterly Journal of Economics, May, 24161.
(1979), Monopolistic export industries, trade taxes, and optimal competition policy (with A.A. Auquier),
Economic Journal, September, pp. 55981.
(1980), Competition in the Open Economy (with Michael E. Porter and A. Michael Spence), Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
(1982), Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
(1988), Persuasion or information? Promotion and the sales of brand-name and genetic pharmaceuticals (with
Mark A. Hurwitz), Journal of Law and Economics, 31, October, pp. 299320.
(1990), Efficiency in U.S. Manufacturing Industries (with D. Barton), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
(1991), Patent expiration, entry and competition in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry (with Michael D. Whinston
and Mark A. Hurwitz), Brookings Paper on Economics Activity: Microeconomics, Washington, pp. 165.
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B.
LELAND L. JOHNSON
William G. Shepherd
Innovations
He explained how regulation could have three harmful effects: it would encourage
excess costs and too much investment, while also inducing the monopoly firm to capture
dominance in adjacent markets in anti-competitive ways.
Personal history
Born
1930, USA.
Degrees
BA Univesity of Oregon, 1952; MA 1953, PhD 1956, Yale University.
Principal position Senior economist, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 1963?
The Averch-Johnson paper burst on the regulatory scene in 1962, giving a major push to
economic doubts and debates about regulation that had already begun growing. Johnson
provided the articles economic content and explanation in clear prose, while Averch
provided a mathematical proof.
Their critique of regulation had three points. The most original point was that regulation
applied incentives for the firm to increase its levels of investment beyond what efficiency
alone would prescribe. That gold-plating effect became known as the AverchJohnson (or
AJ) effect, and it rattled the proponents of regulation. True, it had been hinted at in many
earlier regulatory cases, which required that the utility invest only in equipment that would
be used and useful. Yet AverchJohnson provided the first solid economic rationale.
The second effect was the tendency of the firm to prefer a bloating of all its costs under
regulation. It could enhance its profits, but it could also cushion the management against
risks by providing abundant quality and depth of resources. This danger had long been
more familiar in the literature.
AverchJohnsons third harmful effect was that the firm would be induced to capture
monopoly positions in adjacent markets. For this, the firm would be using funds that
would otherwise be taken away by regulation. So the firms true cost of subsidizing its
own actions to capture monopoly power was zero.
The paper inflamed a series of severe claims against the public regulation of all sectors,
from railroads and airlines to electricity, telecommunications, postal and other industries.
Averch and Johnson had only indicated that inducements and tendencies existed, with no
specific predictions or measures of the degree of impacts. Their economic originality was
striking, since the literature on regulation had given only scattered hints of these possible
cost-raising, gold-plating and market-capturing effects.
The issues were extensively debated in the 1960s and 1970s, and they quickly became
a fixture in complaints about regulations economic faults. But there was little applied
research into the actual effects, and even then it focused only on the electricity industry. It
found only moderately reliable indications of mild tendencies, not strong proof of large
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distortions. By comparison, the capturing of adjacent markets has been a leading count
against regulated monopolies like AT&T, other more recent telecommunications firms,
electric firms and others. AT&T had done it repeatedly before the 1980s, when it was the
massively powerful monopoly telephone system of virtually the entire United States. Since
then the problem persists in the unregulated affiliate problem for electric and other partly
regulated firms.
Johnson also pursued and developed the analysis of policies on telecommunications
over several decades, but those did not involve such distinctive contributions.
Most relevant publication
Averch, Harvey, and Leland L. Johnson (1962), Behavior of the firm under regulatory constraint American
Economic Review, December, pp. 105269.
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C.
LEONARD W. WEISS
F.M. Scherer
Innovations
First collection of industry case studies that blended theory, historical evidence and
policy; improvements in the measurement of industry concentration; extension of the
structureconduct (behavior)performance paradigm to the analysis of such variables as
wages, discriminatory hiring, and selling costs; and shifting the emphasis of SCP studies
from profits to prices.
Personal history
Born
1925, Eugene, OR, USA; died 1994.
Degrees
BS Northwestern University, 1945; PhD Columbia University, 1954.
Principal position Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin, 196290.

Other Wayne State University, San Jose State College, and University of Minnesota;
Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, US Department of Justice, 196970.
Served in US Navy, 194347.
After a career intially emphasizing international trade and urban economics, Leonard
Weiss moved into the field of industrial organization with a blockbuster burst. His 1961
book, Economics and American Industry, provided a systematic introduction to industrial
organization through a series of case studies blending exposition, mostly geometric, of
the relevant theory, with a detailed analysis of seven industries historical experience and
the policy measures that either contributed to or attempted to remedy deficiencies in their
performance. There had been excellent industry case-study collections before, but no one
before Weiss provided a systematic theoretical framework. And most such studies had been
written by an assemblage of industry specialists, not by a single author mastering the details
of numerous industries. The industries were selected by Weiss to illustrate a broad range of
structural and performance conditions, including purely competitive agriculture (with more
intense focus on dairying), textile manufacturing (pure competition with less government
intervention), monopolized aluminum, electric power (regulated monopoly), oligopolistic
steel, automobiles (a differentiated oligopoly), and monopolistically competitive retailing
(with detailed studies of gasoline stations, pharmacies and liquor stores). An additional
chapter explored the bilaterally monopolistic bargaining between steel companies and the
steelworkers union. Updated but truncated versions of the book (deleting the textiles,
aluminum and automobile chapters) were published under a different paperback title in
1967 and 1980.
The last chapter of Weisss 1961 book set out upon a quite different methodological path.
Following the structureconductperformance (SCP) paradigm pioneered by Joe S. Bain
and George Stigler, Weiss examined cross-sectional relationships between indices of seller
concentration in 23 manufacturing industry groups and several performance measures:
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profit returns, changes in profit returns, changes in wholesale price indices, advertising
outlays, long-term output growth, long-term productivity growth and wage changes. The
analyses consisted mainly of two-variable cross-sectional scatter diagrams, but with them,
Weiss staked out an agenda that would occupy much of his remaining research career.
One of his first published articles (1963a) tracked what was becoming the standard
regression analysis of how seller concentration affected industry profitability, but taking
into account other variables such as industry growth and the stage of the business cycle.
Weiss recognized early on, however, that industry structure itself depended endogenously
upon the pricing policies that firms pursued. His 1976a article with Allyn Strickland was
one of the first, following Comanor and Wilson in 1967, to use a simultaneous equations
approach to estimate the relationships among profits, market structure and advertising.
In 1983 (with two others) he was the first to analyze the magnitude and determinants of
manufacturers selling costs other than advertising.
That structural effects might be endogenous and that elevated pricecost margins might
reflect efficiencies as well as monopoly (or oligopoly) power was recognized by Weiss to be
a fundamental issue. In a classic debate with Harold Demsetz, Weiss (1974) surveyed the
existing empirical literature and articulated an approach to resolving the question utilizing
individual firms market share data. As others followed through on his suggestion, he chose
to push his research in another direction. The standard theories of oligopoly, he insisted,
emphasized price setting per se and not so much the profitability variables upon which most
SCP analyses focused. Teaming up with his own students (during his tenure at Wisconsin
he directed 47 PhD dissertations) and other economists, he organized a compendium of
studies (1989) in which price, not profits, was the variable to be explained using a variety of
controls, including market structural variables. His conclusion from analyzing 12 industry
clusters with 121 datasets was that in the preponderance of cases, prices rose with seller
concentration, although seldom by large increments.
As an economist interested in the effect of market structure on performance, Weiss
directed a substantial portion of his research to understanding the determinants of
structure and ensuring that it was correctly measured. In his first formal SCP analysis
(1963a), he subjectively adjusted concentration ratios so that they appropriately reflected
competitive conditions in the relevant markets. Seeking more objective measures, he tapped
Census of Transportation data to develop a systematic method (1972a) for distinguishing
between regional and national markets. Coupling this method with his vast knowledge
of real-world industries, he compiled a compendium of adjusted manufacturing industry
concentration ratios circulated in unpublished form and used by many economists in their
quantitative analyses.
Unwilling to take existing structural measures for granted, Weiss sought to identify
the determinants of market structure more precisely. An early (1964) paper evaluated the
reliability of the survivor method in identifying efficient plant-operating scales. Another
paper (1965) worked out a methodology for disentangling the structural influences of
mergers, new entry, exit, and existing firms internal growth and decline. In still another
effort (1976b), he surveyed company officials and leveraged his insights to estimate for
33 industries the extent to which economies of scale required relatively large plant sizes.
He found that a considerable fraction of industries capacity was embodied in plants of
inefficiently small scale and that the higher seller concentration was, the smaller the fringe
of inefficient capacity was likely to be. Recognizing that market structures might become
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more concentrated as a consequence of random growth variations under some version

of Gibrats law, Weiss found support for the hypothesis that growth was more erratic in
industries with highly differentiated products (1963b).
In this and in other facets of research, Weiss was sensitive to the dynamics of price,
cost and market structure relationships. In a series of papers exploring the administered
price hypotheses originated by Gardiner Means, Weiss showed that changes in cost were
the most important drivers of price changes. But he went beyond that not unsurprising
insight to reveal (1966b) that there were differences over the business cycle in the pricesetting behavior of concentrated as compared to atomistic industries. The former were
slower to advance their prices in periods of open inflation, but then caught up (or set a
pattern for further changes) when capacity was less fully utilized.
The focus on cost changes led naturally to the question of whether labor wages were
related to market structure. Pioneering the use of Census of Population statistics covering
individuals to test market structural hypotheses, Weiss ascertained (1966a) that wages
indeed rose with seller concentration, but by paying higher wages, the more concentrated
industries attracted workers with better education and other identifiable quality characteristics. Among other things, the analysis suggested discrimination against black workers
by concentrated industries. From this it was a logical step to study with his University
of Wisconsin colleague Jeffrey Williamson (1972b, 1975) how improved education could
advance the progress of minorities out of poverty.
To summarize, Leonard Weisss research program covered most of the issues raised by
the BainStigler SCP paradigm, and in many of those areas, he made pioneering methodological as well as substantive contributions. It would be fair to say that his work set
the stage for the next wave of empirical research in industrial organization, in which, but
for a debilitating illness, he most likely would have played an active role.
(1961), Economics and American Industry, New York: Wiley; paperback abridgements issued as Case Studies in
American Industry, Wiley: 1967 and 1980.
(1963a), Average concentration ratios and industrial performance, Journal of Industrial Economics, August,
23754.
(1963b), Factors in changing concentration, Review of Economics and Statistics, February, 7077.
(1964), The survival technique and the extent of sub-optimal capacity, Journal of Political Economy, June,
24661.
(1965), An evaluation of mergers in six industries, Review of Economics and Statistics, May, 17281.
(1966a), Concentration and labor earnings, American Economic Review, March, 96117.
(1966b), Business pricing policy and inflation reconsidered, Journal of Political Economy, April, 17797.
(1972a), The geographical size of markets in manufacturing, Review of Economics and Statistics, August,
24557.
(1972b), Black education, earnings, and interregional migration: some new evidence (with Jeffrey Williamson),
American Economic Review, June, 37283.
(1974), The concentrationprofits relationship and antitrust, in Harvey J. Goldschmid, H. Michael Mann and
J. Fred Weston (eds), Industrial Concentration: The New Learning, New York: Little-Brown, pp. 184232.
(1975), Black education and earnings: even newer evidence (with Jeffrey Williamson), American Economic
Review, March, 2414.
(1976a), Advertising, concentration, and price cost margins (with Allyn Strickland), Journal of Political Economy,
October, 110922.
(1976b), The economies of scale and the extent of suboptimal capacity, in Robert T. Masson and P. David Qualls
(eds), Essays in Industrial Organization in Honor of Joe S. Bain, Cambridge: Ballinger, pp. 12342.
(1983), The size of selling costs (with George Pascoe and Stephen Martin), Review of Economics and Statistics,
November, 66872.
(1989), Concentration and Price, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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259
JACOB SCHMOOKLER
F.M. Scherer
Innovations
Demand-induced technological innovation, the logic of inter-industry technology flows.
Personal history
Born
1917, Woodstown, NJ, USA; died 1967.
Degrees
AB Temple University, 1940; PhD University of Pennsylvania, 1951.
Principal position Professor of Economics, University of Minnesota, 195767.

Other Instructor, University of Pennsylvania, 194651; Assistant Professor, Michigan
State University, 195157.
Jacob (Jack) Schmookler was the first economist successfully to explore statistically the
economics of technological innovation at a detailed industry level. He crystallized the
notion of endogenous technological change and its influence on economic growth two
decades before the concept was reinvented by macro economists. Most of his key findings
are brought together in his 1966 book. The underlying data and an extension of work in
progress at the time of his death are in a 1972 book.
Before Schmookler made his contributions, the conventional wisdom in economics
was that technological innovations were supply-side driven, for example, as advances in
knowledge opened up new opportunities for profitable invention and innovation. Through
the extensive analysis of time-series and cross-sectional patent data and historical case
studies, Schmookler demonstrated that demandpull influences were also important: the
more intense the demand, the more creative groups and individuals were drawn to work
on an unsolved problem and the more patentable inventions they generated.
Struggling during the early 1960s to reconcile the conflicting knowledgepush and
demandpull hypotheses, Schmookler argued that both could be important, just as (following
Alfred Marshall) it takes the two blades of a scissors to cut paper. He hypothesized that
superior command over relevant areas of knowledge, for example, specialization in chemistry,
electronics, or machine construction determined the industry locus of work to satisfy unmet
demands; the demand itself might be found in a quite different industry. To operationalize
this view, he conceived the notion of a technology flows matrix of the form:
Industry expected to use the technology
1 ................i .................n
Industry
1
t11 ..............t1i ...............t1n
developing
...
i
ti1 .............. tii ............... tin
the
technology ...
m
tm1 ..............tmi ...............tmn
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where the row industries originate technological innovations and the column industries use
them, and industry n encompasses final consumption. Technology flows on the diagonal
of the matrix, for example, t11 and tii, represent process technology that is, inventions,
usually of a cost-saving nature, that improve production activities within ones own sphere
of activity. Much of Schmooklers empirical work focused on capital goods inventions. He
died prematurely before he was able to implement his technology flow concept. A largescale effort by the author of this biography to construct a technology flows matrix and
test his demandpull hypotheses (Journal of Industrial Economics, March 1982) yielded
strong support for capital goods inventions and weaker support for intermediate materials
inventions. The influence of demand proved to be at least as strong for inventions that
crossed industry boundaries as for intra-industry (process) inventions.
Among Schmooklers other contributions was a 1952 article that anticipated the
productivity growth decomposition for which Robert Solow won the Nobel Prize in 1987. In
a 1959 article he weighed into the growing controversy over the technological innovativeness
of large as compared to small firms by showing that for every eight patented inventions
resulting from full-time research and development employees, five came from employees
engaged only part-time in inventive activity, often in smaller companies. Schmookler
also collaborated with Richard R. Nelson in organizing a 1960 conference that brought
economists together for the first time to struggle with the economics of innovation and
their relationship to productivity growth. The results were published in 1962 under the title,
The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
(1952), The changing efficiency of the American economy, 18691938, Review of Economics and Statistics, 34
(August), 21431.
(1959), Bigness, fewness, and research, Journal of Political Economy, 67 (December), 630.
(1966), Innovation and Economic Growth, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(1972), Patents, Invention, and Economic Change (Leonid Hurwicz and Zvi Griliches, eds), Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
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E.
261
FREDERIC M. SCHERER
John E. Kwoka
Innovations
Empirical testing of Schumpeterian hypotheses about the determinants of patenting and
technological innovation. Key analyses of inter-industry technology flows, research and
development (R&D) and productivity growth, innovation and international trade. His
industrial organization textbook was a landmark integration of all aspects of the field,
including theory, empirical evidence, and antitrust policy. Scherers studies of the defense
industry, of scale economies in manufacturing, and of mergers are modern classics.
Personal history
Born
1932, Ottawa, IL, USA.
Degrees
BA University of Michigan, 1954; MBA, PhD Harvard, 1963, 1968.
Principal positions Faculties of Princeton University, University of Michigan,

Northwestern University, Swarthmore College and Kennedy School of Government
(Harvard). Research position at the International Institute of Management, Berlin. Also
Director of Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission.
Scherer has been a towering figure in industrial organization. It is not excessive to say that
he has helped to define the modern field, to set its agenda, and to bring it to the attention
of many economists and non-economists who were previously unaware of its importance
and relevance to their own work. His primary research interests have involved empirical
testing of Schumpeterian and neo-Schumpeterian hypotheses, but his contributions have
been numerous and range widely over the field.
Scherer got into economics in a somewhat roundabout manner. Early on, he was intrigued
by the career of Thomas Edison, but the sciences did not spark his interest in college.
While at Michigan, however, his exposure to Kenneth Boulding, Z. Clark Dickenson and
Shorey Peterson prompted him to consider economics. Then, after stints in the army and
at the family-owned trucking company, Scherer entered Harvard Business School. There
coursework and research into manufacturing processes, patents and innovation, and the
defense industry identified issues of enduring interest to him. The research into the defense
industry under Joe Peck and David Novick in particular convinced him that his real interest
lay in economics. This resulted in two books, one of which The Weapons Acquisition
Process: Economic Incentives (1964) ultimately served as his doctoral dissertation. Scherer
switched to Harvards economics department, where he studied with Jesse Markham,
Richard Hefleblower and Thomas Schelling, and from which he got his PhD in 1963.
Over the next 40 years, Scherer would author or co-author 21 books and more than
150 articles. One persistent theme has been Scherers conviction that technological change
has had, and will continue to have, much more of an impact on material well-being than
the niceties of static resource allocation to which microeconomists devote most of their
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attention (Innovation and Growth: Schumpeterian Perspectives, 1984, p. vii). This conviction
originated with his reading of Joseph Schumpeters Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy
while at the University of Michigan, and resulted in a lifetime of research that has at various
times proven and disproven Schumpeters central hypotheses. Collectively, this undertaking
has rewritten much of what we know about technological change and technology policy.
Scherers initial foray into this area was prompted by the then-common prediction that the
1956 antitrust decrees opening up AT&Ts and IBMs patents would hinder technological
progressiveness. The following year, together with some of his fellow students at Harvard
Business School, Scherer surveyed 69 companies concerning the role of patents in their
R&D decisions. In contrast to the prediction, they found that patents in fact played little
role in actual R&D decision making, implying that the compulsory licensing provisions
of the decrees would not have adverse effects. Later research by a number of economists
confirmed this result.
This exercise illustrated several enduring characteristics of Scherers research and methodological bent. It foreshadowed a career of questioning commonplace assertions and
of subjecting hypotheses to empirical test, rather than simply accepting those assertions
or relying on theoretical demonstrations in support of them. It also illustrated Scherers
willingness to go out into the real world and develop new data whenever existing data
were inadequate for the issue at hand. In this latter respect, Scherer distinguished himself
from many of his fellow industrial organization economists, who increasingly attempted to
correct for poor data with higher-powered econometric techniques if they did empirical
analysis at all.
Scherers 1965 article on market structure and patenting in the American Economic
Review (Firm size, market structure, opportunity, and the output of patented inventions)
demonstrated the power of this approach. Having compiled new data on more than 350
firms, Scherer probed key Schumpeterian hypotheses about the structural determinants of
inventive output, measured by a count of patents and checked against R&D employment.
He examined firm size, market concentration and diversification as possible causal factors.
He tested for nonlinear scale effects in the relationship and for differences among industry
groups. And despite his appreciation for Schumpeters work, Scherers tests rejected most
of his hypotheses. In particular, neither large firm size nor high market concentration was
found to be uniquely supportive of more patenting.
The importance of this paper was considerable. It represented the first large-scale test
of widely held views about technological change. It illustrated the power of empirical
research as well as the importance of compiling necessary data. Its approach would be
widely followed by later research into technological change. And it demonstrated another
enduring characteristic of Scherers work a deep respect for facts. Whatever might have
been his prior beliefs or expectations, Scherer accepted the results of good empirical
research his own and that of others.
Scherers contributions to the literature on technological change continued apace.
Perhaps most notable among many articles is his 1967 paper on R&D under rivalry,
which analyzed the role of market structure on the timing and certainty of R&D
projects (Research and development resource allocation under rivalry). He introduced
the notion of a development possibility function, which related development costs and
timing. Mathematical and graphical analysis then established that for reasonably highprofit innovations, an atomistic industry would innovate and do so quickly. For low-value
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innovations, however, an atomistic industry might not produce sufficient returns to any
single firm to induce it to undertake the innovative effort, so that at least some degree
of concentration would ensure the innovation, even if a bit more slowly. These insights
were enormously helpful in disentangling the relationship between innovation and market
concentration, a topic about which there was much confusion.
Another notable advance in this area occurred some 15 years later with Scherers study
of inter-industry technology flows (Interindustry technology flows in the United States,
1982). This exercise sought to identify the actual industry of origin of new technologies
that benefit a particular industry. These industries might not be the same insofar as process
and even product advances might arise from firms in an upstream industry supplying
the industry in question. In such cases the count of the using industrys patents would
understate its technological advance (since its advances originate elsewhere), and for the
industry of origin, R&D expenditures and patent count bear no relationship to its own
technological progressiveness.
To examine these questions, the Scherer team examined more than 15,000 patents
obtained by 443 large US corporations for which R&D and other data were reported in
the Federal Trade Commissions (FTCs) 1974 Line of Business survey. Using sectors for
each patent were exhaustively recorded. The result was a vast matrix of technology flows
among US industries, which documented the considerable inter-relatedness of industries
technology experience. In addition, industry labor productivity was shown statistically
to depend upon both own and using industries R&D expenditures. This demonstrated
the importance of looking beyond the industrys own efforts in assessing the reasons for
productivity growth.
But earlier, and barely three years into his professional career, Scherer found himself
where so many instructors do dissatisfied with available textbooks. That, together with an
interest in speaking to a wider audience of industrial economists than his work on R&D
captured, led him in 1966 to begin work on what would be the first modern comprehensive
textbook in industrial organization. Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance
would be three years in the making. Its appearance was a watershed event in the field.
It evaluated huge amounts of literature, both theoretical and empirical. It synthesized
findings into a coherent framework for understanding what the literature did and did not
say. Its critiques of the literature constituted a research agenda for the next generation, or
two, of students and faculty alike.
The book contained the first comprehensive statement of the economics of antitrust
policy from mergers to vertical restraints, from monopolies to cartels. Because of that
and because of its scholarship and readability, Industrial Market Structure and Economic
Performance had influence far beyond the narrow field of industrial organization economics.
Lawyers, both academic and practicing, policy makers inside and outside government,
business leaders, faculty and students in business schools and schools of public policy,
as well as economists in all fields, picked it up and found that it spoke to issues they were
dealing with. It became the standard source of understanding about a wide range of policy
questions. It is said that at least one clerk in every Supreme Court Justices office at the
time had a copy of Scherers book on his or her shelf.
There were, of course, predecessors to this book, Joe Bains Industrial Organization
perhaps the most important. Scherers perspective differed, however, in that it did not
lie in Bains famous structureconduct (behavior)predominance tradition. Rather,
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Scherer emphasized feedback effects, the complex role of firm strategies, and of course
the importance of technological change, none of which occupied as important a place in
the discipline prior to this treatise. As a result of its sheer scholarship, its encyclopedic
nature, and its readability, the three editions of Industrial Market Structure and Economic
Performance (1970, 1980, 1990) would dominate the field for 25 years.
This account of the books impact would be incomplete without reference to its role in
the debates initiated by the Chicago school of economics. That schools often vehement
attacks questioned the modeling, the empirical work, the interpretation and the credibility
of the received body of knowledge about industrial markets. Scherer and others challenged
the Chicago school for its simplistic theorizing, for its dismissal of (indeed, sometimes
contempt for) empirical testing, and for its ideological policy prescriptions. During this
time, Scherers book provided careful guidance to those who believed, as did his mentor
Schumpeter, that history, statistics, and theory all mattered in the study of industrial
economics and policy.
Some 26 of Scherers contributions to economic policy are collected in Competition
Policy, Domestic and International (2001). Written over a period of 30 years, these address a
wide range of policy issues, including the goals of antitrust policy; the policy implications of
such business practices as vertical restraints, focal point pricing, and petroleum exchanges;
efficiencies and remedies in merger and monopoly cases; the use and misuse of patents;
and the role of competition policy in an increasingly global economy. Taken as a whole,
these essays blend theory, statistics and history into compelling analyses that speak to key
issues of competition policy.
While most of Scherers contributions to policy have taken the form of such essays,
on one occasion he took a non-academic, policy position in government. For two years
beginning in 1974, he was Director of the Bureau of Economics essentially the chief
economist at the Federal Trade Commission. Scherer has termed this a memorable and
gratifying experience (An accidental Schumpeterian, 1996, p. 12) with much of his time
devoted to fostering the FTCs Line of Business programs pioneering data collection
exercise, as well as to overseeing such antitrust cases as cereals and the petroleum industry
investigation. He later expressed frustration with the Reagan administrations subsequent
reversal of many of his efforts at the FTC.
Three other areas at the frontiers of industrial organization have also been scrutinized
by Scherer. Previously mentioned was his early analysis of the defense industry. Until
that time, the defense industry was seen essentially as a government program with its own
rationale and budget determined by politics, both domestic and foreign. As he did with
many other topics, Scherer applied industrial organization economics to this industry. His
focus was on incentives in the system optimal incentives, reputation effects, the effects
of small numbers, alternative cost-sharing mechanisms, multi-dimensional objectives,
administrative controls and post-contract performance. This approach was pathbreaking
not only because it was a novel way of viewing the defense industry, but also because
it anticipated a movement in the profession a generation later that viewed transactions
generally as matters of incentives and contracts.
The Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic Incentives (1964) was notable also because it
contained a passage that reflected Scherers concerns about the uses of economics in policy.
His Preface began with the following passage: The publication of this volume terminates
a long struggle with my conscience. It is difficult to write a book of this sort without
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suppressing doubts about the morality of modem weapons development and production
efforts (p. ix). He went on to set out his reservations about the uses of weapons systems,
their opportunity cost, and the merits of improving the efficiency of the acquisition process.
One rarely encounters such open reflection on the purposes served by economic analysis.
Another landmark study probed economies of scale. Scherers research with Alan
Beckenstein, Erich Kaufer and Dennis Murphy was prompted in part by two observations:
(i) most large firms were large because of multiplant operation rather than by virtue of
their scaling up a single plant, and (ii) in other countries individual plants were generally
much smaller than in the US but firms had similar numbers of plants. All this suggested
the importance of multiplant operation, importance that might exceed the gains from the
traditional scaling up view of economies. In this research, Scherer et al. first identified
a number of economies that arose from multiplant structures, as well as some limits to
firm growth from that strategy. They then applied these insights into 12 major industries
in the US and five other developed industrial economies, developing information through
interviews with company officials and painstaking data compilation.
The resulting treatise, The Economics of Multi-Plant Operation: An International
Comparisons Study (1975), significantly generalized previous empirical inquiries into scale
economies. It highlighted the importance of multiplant economies, including such forces
as advertising, investment planning, R&D and transport costs. Its conclusions became the
foundation for the elucidation of economies of scale that appeared in Industrial Market
Structure and Economic Performance which represented the state of our understanding
about actual economies for a very long time some might say, from a practical perspective,
even to this day.
The third notable area of inquiry by Scherer concerned mergers. Again, the research
was prompted by important questions for which the evidence was anecdotal or based
at most on modest data: what effects do mergers have on economic performance? Are
mergers generally successful? Why are so many mergers deliberately undone by subsequent
divestiture? And once again Scherers effort to amass evidence was on a huge scale. He and
co-worker David Ravenscraft linked nearly 6000 mergers to the companies and time period
of the FTCs Line of Business data source. This permitted the performance of individual
lines of business to be tracked statistically through merger, sell-off, or divestiture. Together
with case-study evidence and survey work, this represented one of the most comprehensive
efforts at assessing mergers in the US.
The results, published in Mergers Sell-Offs, and Economic Efficiency (1987), refuted many
commonly held views about mergers. Scherer and Ravenscraft reported, for example, that
target firms were considerably more profitable than nontarget firms, belying the view that
mergers were intended to improve weak firms performance. Further, they found that nearly
half of all acquired units were subsequently divested, and the rate was particularly high for
conglomerate acquisitions. Units that were acquired and retained on average experienced
severe postmerger profit declines. Mergers among units of similar size fared somewhat better,
those taken over via tender offers significantly worse. All in all, the picture of mergers that
emerged was one described as widespread failure, considerable mediocrity, and occasional
success (Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 1990, p. 173).
Scherers research into mergers illustrates the characteristics that have made his work
so important. Time and again, he has asked the big questions. Then he has painstakingly
compiled vast amounts of the data required to address the questions. Finally, he has
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uncovered novel, often startling and provocative, answers to those questions. His studies
of particular issues, his monumental textbook, his lifelong attention to technological
change all justifiably ensure his pre-eminent place in the history of industrial organization
and policy.
(1964), The Weapons Acquisition Process: Economic Incentives, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School
Division of Research.
(1965), Firm size, market structure, opportunity, and the output of patented inventions, American Economic
Review, December, 1097125.
(1967), Research and development resource allocation under rivalry, Quarterly Journal of Economics, August,
35994.
(1970), Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 2nd edn, 1980, 3rd ed with David Ross (ed.),
1990, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
(1975), The Economics of Multi-Plant Operation: An International Comparisons Study (with Alan Beckenstein,
Erich Kaufer and R.D. Murphy), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(1982), Industrial technology flows in the United States, Cambridge, MA: Research Policy, 11, 22745.
(1984), Innovation and Growth: Schumpeterian Perspectives, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
(1987), Mergers, Sell-offs, and Economic Efficiency (with David J. Ravenscraft), Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution.
(1996), An accidental Schumpeterian, The American Economist, Spring, 513.
(2001), Competition Policy, Domestic and International, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward
Elgar.
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WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD
John Howard Brown

Innovations
Highlighting the role of individual firm market share in the exercise of monopoly power;
critiques of the empirical weaknesses of received techniques.
Personal history
Born
Ames, IA, USA, 1936.
Principal position Professor, University of Massachusetts.

Other University of Michigan; Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General for
Antitrust.
Degrees BA (Economics, with honors), Amherst College, 1957; MA, PhD (Economics),
Yale University, 1958, 1963.
William G. (Geoff) Shepherds contributions to industrial organization have been

manifold, particularly including his role as long-serving editor of the Review of Industrial
Organization, where he nurtured many younger scholars. A major scholarly contribution
has been recognizing and documenting the role of individual firms market shares in the
exercise of market power. .
In his 1972 paper, The elements of market structure (1972a) he demonstrated that in
a sample of 231 large firms from 196069, individual firm market share was the most
important, and almost invariably, statistically significant determinant of firm rate of return.
The effect held over a large variety of specifications and overshadowed the effect of market
share jointly held by the largest firms in an industry. This result explains the puzzling (to
the neo-classical economic theorist) fixation that corporate executives have on their firms
market shares. These equations also highlighted the important role of advertising and firm
growth in explaining rate of return. Coupling firm market share in estimating equations
with high barriers to entry likewise demonstrated the powerful effects of firm market share,
high barriers and firm revenue growth.
Like this paper, the rest of Shepherds work has been noteworthy for its careful empiricism
and willingness to tack against the currents of received professional opinion. Exemplars of
this care and tough-mindedness can be found throughout his oeuvre, notably in his 1970
book, Market Power and Economic Welfare. This book, as the title suggests, lays out the
relationships between market power and economic performance.
In the first part, Shepherd lays the theoretical groundwork for economic understanding
of market power. In the second part, he describes the identifiable extent of market power
in the American economy circa 1970. This represents, to a degree underemphasized in the
book, a substantial amount of original research. For instance, in evaluating claims about
the level of industrial concentration in this book, Shepherd recognizes that many SIC
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industries do not correspond to economically meaningful markets (pp. 1067). He adjusts

the census published figures to reflect actual markets and finds that concentration was
substantially higher than reported. The third part appraises the performance of industries
where market power is present across a wide array of measures.
Reflecting the same tough-mindedness, he notes that the structureconduct (behavior)
performance model while used by most systematic research has become something of
a cookbook formula for dissertations on specific industries (p. 18). One result of this, as
he notes a few pages later is that: The rush to test concepts empirically has degenerated
frequently into a sort of scientism, in which lack of findings in a faulty test using slender
evidence was asserted to disprove the existence of otherwise likely phenomena (p. 23).
Yet another example of Shepherds myth-busting style is his 1982 article, Causes of
increased competition in the U.S. economy, 19391980. Since at least the 1930s economists
in the nascent field of industrial organization had been concerned with declining competition
across a broad spectrum of American industries, particularly manufacturing. (See Burns,
Arthur R., The Decline of Competition: A Study of the Evolution of American Industry,
McGraw-Hill, New York, 1936 for example.) In this article, Shepherd leads this sacred
cow to the slaughterhouse, demonstrating that the extent of competition in the American
economy had actually increased over the period in question.
As he notes, the degree of competitiveness appears in more than one dimension (p. 615,
emphasis in original). Which makes the very measurement of competition a process
fraught with difficulty. As always, Shepherd is cautious about reductionism in measuring
competition, observing that: Concentration ratios measure only one element of market
structure (p. 615). At the time, concentration ratios were the standard yardstick in empirical
industrial organization, held to almost solely define market structure. Beyond this, he
remarks that: market structure itself does not fully determine the degree of competitiveness. For each specific structure (apart from perfect competition) a range of behavioral
competitiveness is possible (p. 615).
With this foundation, Shepherd divides the markets in the economy into four categories:
monopoly, dominant firm, tight oligopoly and effectively competitive. The last category
represents all those markets where the exercise of market power is unlikely to rise to the
level of a public policy issue. Compiling and evaluating data from a broad range of sources,
Shepherd concludes that approximately 75 percent of national income in 1980 originated
in sector markets that were effectively competitive. This represented a dramatic change
from 1939 where scarcely one half of all output stemmed from markets which might
be classified as competitive. Both pure monopoly and dominant firm market structures
which are most likely to see the troublesome exercise of monopoly power fell to one half
of their 1939 values.
Examining the causes of these dramatic developments, Shepherd concludes that four
forces were responsible for this transformation. The first was increasing competition from
imports where 13 industries generating 3.8 percent of national income were subjected to
effective competition from imports. More controversially, Shepherd attributes a substantial
role to antitrust enforcement. In fact, he finds that 20 industries representing over 8 percent
of national income became more competitive due to antitrust actions. A third factor
that Shepherd examines is the trend towards deregulation of substantial portions of the
economy. A final source, which Shepherd was unable to quantify adequately was the role
of declining economies of scale (relative to market size) in many industries.
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Further application of Shepherds careful empiricism led him to conclude that the survivor
test proposed by Stigler is an empty vessel, providing little practical guidance about the
degree and evolution of economies of scale in manufacturing industries (1967). As he notes,
The primary limitation is that the technique gives descriptive, not normative, estimates of
optimality: it tells what is, not necessarily what is optimum or efficient in terms of net
social costs (p. 115, emphasis in original). This limitation has several implications for the
use of survivorship as an analytical technique. First, that survival may be influenced by
market power more than technical efficiency. Second, that no analysis of why efficient sizes
have changed is possible. Finally, survivorship does not indicate the degree of efficiency
of surviving plant sizes or the relative inefficiency of shrinking sizes.
Beyond these conceptual objections, Shepherd is also critical of the practical empirical
difficulties of correctly implementing the technique. His most important objection is that
the results of applying survivor analysis to industries is, even when an appropriate standard
of measurement can be developed, and adequate and, most importantly, comparable data
are available, the results are most often ambiguous regarding the nature of the changes
an industry has experienced. His conclusion is that: these results fall short of the early
promise of the survivor technique: the failures are many, the proven successes are few
(p. 122). The effectiveness of his critique can be judged by the absence of virtually any
applications of the technique subsequent to his article.
A final thread in Shepherds work is his continuing struggle against Panglossian
appraisals of the benefits of competition. There is literally no reason to doubt the benefits
conferred through the operation of competition in a market economy. However, Shepherd
has been at pains to make clear that extent of competition, as opposed to the exercise of
monopoly power, is an empirical question. His criticisms of the Chicago schools optimistic
views of market power are one instance of this. His work on the extent of and trends
in competition in the US economy as an example of this empiricism counterpoised to
theoretical argumentation has already been discussed.
Another consequence of this is that he was one of the most effective opponents of the
notion of contestability as proposed by W.J. Baumol et al. in the later 1970s and early
1980s (1984). Shepherds critique of contestability begins by identifying the core idea of
contestability as the notion of ultrafree entry. This implies that entry occurs without costs
or lags, is met passively by incumbent firms, and is costlessly reversible. Like his critique
of the survivor technique, Shepherd begins on the conceptual level, discussing the internal
inconsistencies and empirical irrelevancy of contestability. Turning to empirical issues, he
notes that a substantial body of empirical research points to competition among existing
firms, and the barriers to entry in markets as explanations for firm pricing behavior. Further,
Shepherd points out a paucity of cases that might be plausibly identified with contestable
markets. Even the cases that Baumol et al. specifically suggested such as airlines, appear
on further examination to provide little support for the concept.
(1966), Residence expansion in the British telephone system, Journal of Industrial Economics, 14(3), June,
26374.
(1967), What does the survivor technique show about economies of scale?, Southern Economic Journal, 34,
July, 11322.
(1970), Market Power and Economic Welfare: An Introduction, New York: Random House.
(1972a), The elements of market structure, Review of Economics and Statistics, 54(1), February, 2537.
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(1972b), Structure and behavior in British industries, with U.S. comparisons, Journal of Industrial Economics,
21(1), November, 3554.
(1973a), Entry as a substitute for regulation, American Economic Review, 63(2), Papers and Proceedings of the
Eighty-fifth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, May, 98105.
(1973b), Managerial discrimination in large firms (with Sharon G. Levin), Review of Economics and Statistics,
55(4), November, 41222.
(1982), Causes of increased competition in the U.S. economy, 19391980, Review of Economics and Statistics,
64(4), November, 61326.
(1984), Contestability vs. competition, American Economic Review, 74(4), September, 57287.
(1986), Tobins q and the structureperformance relationship: comment, American Economic Review, 76(5),
December, 120510.
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271
HARVEY J. LEIBENSTEIN
William G. Shepherd
Innovations
He created the concept of X-efficiency in 1966, and he analyzed and applied it in extensive
detail.
Personal history
Born
1922, USA; died 1992.
Degrees
1951.
BS, MA Northwestern University, 1945, 1946; PhD Princeton University,
Principal position
196692.
Others
Professor of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA,
Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 195167.
The X-efficiency term (and its reverse version, X-inefficiency) was created by Leibenstein
in 1966, to denote all forms of inefficiency other than allocative efficiency as it is defined
in neo-classical microeconomic theory. That theory assumed that rational choices would
prevent any X-inefficiency from ever existing, because all firms would maximize profits by
squeezing costs to the minimum. Leibensteins X-inefficiency idea deviated from theoretical
traditions, but it agreed both with business knowledge and with the growing study of largefirm behavior and its departures from theoretically strict business efficiency.
Leibenstein pressed the idea creatively and forcefully, noting that X-inefficiency could
grow to large dimensions, much larger than the slivers of misallocative losses that theorists
had focused on. Against A.C. Harbergers 1954 estimate that allocative inefficiency was
tiny, at 0.1 percent or less, Leibenstein noted that X-inefficiency can often be large on
the order of 10 to 20 percent of total costs and he argued that it is often widespread
and deeply rooted. He noted such important examples as weapons firms selling to the
Pentagon, monopolies, and other firms not facing market pressures.
Liebenstein urged that X-inefficiency had two main elements: the firms absorption of
excessive amounts of inputs, and the low levels of workers efforts that may occur during
their time at work. Low effort levels was a particularly novel concept in scholarly circles,
and it helped lead to extensive new research in the field of labor economics. Low effort
could be the larger part of X-inefficiency in many actual instances.
Leibenstein elaborated his full statement of X-inefficiencys importance in a 1976 book,
Beyond Economic Man.
(1966), Allocative efficiency vs. X-efficiency, American Economic Review, June, pp. 392415.
(1976), Beyond Economic Man, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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H.
WILLIAM S. COMANOR
William G. Shepherd
Innovations
He studied the determinants of innovation in the drug industry; he showed (with Thomas
Wilson, 1967 and 1974) how advertising might create and raise monopoly power; he noted
the importance of X-inefficiency in judging mergers; he estimated the effect of monopoly
profits in making the distribution of wealth in the US more unequal; and he explored
important aspects of vertical restrictions that could reduce competition.
Personal history
Born
1937, Philadelphia, PA, USA.
Degrees
BA Haverford College, 1959; PhD Harvard University, 1963.
Principal positions Professor of Economics, University of California at Santa Barbara,

1975; also Professor of Health Services, UCLA, 1993.
Other Harvard University, 196168; Special Economic Assistant to the Assistant Attorney
General for Antitrust, 196566; Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 196873;
Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, 197880.
Comanor used theory and detailed evidence in the early 1960s to find whether drug-industry
patents and advertising might tend to reduce research and development (R&D) activity
and the resulting flow of new pharmaceutical drugs. He generally noted that innovation
would be reduced.
He then (with Thomas Wilson) pioneered in 1967 and 1974 in studying how intensive
advertising could raise entry barriers and increase market power. They developed the
concept of advertising intensity (total spending on advertising, as a percentage of total
sales revenue). They prepared a range of firm- and industry-based data on profitability,
market structure, scale economies and advertising. They used the data to estimate
advertisings effects in a wide range of US industries. Comanor and Wilson concluded
that the significant correlation of advertising intensity with profit rates reflect causation;
hence, they said, advertising causes market power.
Comanor also pointed out (1969, with Harvey J. Leibenstein) that X-inefficiency can be
a large harm caused by rises in monopoly power large enough to exceed any beneficial
economies of scale that a merger might yield. The point countered Oliver E. Williamsons
stress on mergers economic benefits, even if they hurt competition.
Next Comanor prepared (1975, with Robert H. Smiley) a strikingly original test of
monopolys effect in increasing the inequality of the distribution of wealth in the US after the
1870s. The model assumed a range of values for monopolys strength, the rate of retention
of family fortunes, and other parameters. The model and data indicated a substantial effect
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on the wealth distribution in the century before the 1970s, ranging roughly from 10 to 25
percent of the total distribution. The paper stands as an unchallenged classic.
In the early 1980s, Comanor developed the theory of vertical restrictions, exploring
whether vertical restrictions would reduce competition; he found that they could, in certain
situations.
Throughout, Comanor has applied high standards of rigor and technique, and his
writing is invariably lucid and concise.
Comanor also pioneered as the first Special Economic Assistant in 196566, appointed by
Donald F. Turner, who was then the head of the senior US antitrust agency (the Antitrust
Division in the US Department of Justice). This position gave innermost economic access
to and involvement with all important Antitrust Division decisions. It also embodied
Turners resolve to raise the economic quality of US antitrust. This important situation
continued with a series of later Special Assistants, including Oliver E. Williamson, William
G. Shepherd, H. Michael Mann, Leonard W. Weiss, Kenneth G. Elzinga and George
Hay.
In 197880 Comanor doubled this achievement when he also became the Chief Economist
of the Federal Trade Commission (Director of the Bureau of Competition). No other
economist has served this leadership role in both of the US antitrust agencies.
(1965), Research and technical change in the pharmaceutical industry, Review of Economics and Statistics,
May.
(1967), Advertising, market structure and performance, Review of Economics and Statistics (with Thomas
Wilson), November, 42340.
(1969), Allocative efficiency, X-efficiency, and the measurement of welfare losses, Economics (with Harvey J.
Leibenstein), August, 3049.
(1974), Advertising and Market Power (with T.A. Wilson), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(1975), Monopoly and the distribution of wealth (with R.H. Smiley), Quarterly Journal of Economics, May,
89, pp. 17794.
(1985), Vertical price fixing, vertical market restraints, and the new antitrust policy, Harvard Law Review,
March.
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I.
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON
William G. Shepherd
Innovations
In the early 1960s, Williamson did research on large firms, eventually developing in the
1970s the idea of transactions costs as part of new institutional economics. In 1968
he explored the possible trade-off between the price-raising harms that a merger might
cause, vs. the possible benefits from greater economies of scale.
Personal history
Born
1932, Superior, WI, USA.
Degrees BS MIT, 1955; MBA Stanford University, 1960; PhD Carnegie-Mellon University,
1963.
Principle positions Professor of Business Administration, Economics and Law, University
of California, Berkeley, CA; at Berkeley, 196368, 1988; Professor of Economics,
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 196883.
Other Fellow, Econometric Society, 1977; President, American Law & Economic
Association, 1998. Special Economic Adviser to the head of the Antitrust Division,
196667. Professor of Economics, Law and Organization, Yale University, 198388.
In the early 1960s, Williamson was (with Richard Cyert and James G. March) among those
involved in the growing study of real motivations and effects in large corporations. Work
by Williamson and others continued the research line that had been opened by A.A. Berle
and G.C. Means in 1932 and was enlarged by A.D.H. Kaplan, Joel B. Dirlam and Robert
F. Lanzillotti in 1958. Williamson drew on various ideas of Ronald H. Coase, Herbert
Simon, Kenneth Arrow and Alfred Chandler to explore several of the possible effects when
corporate executives strayed from strict profit-maximizing behavior.
Williamson often coined unusual terms such as expense preferences and bounded
rationality and credible threats for ideas that had arisen in the literature. He also
discussed possible research methods for measuring these effects.
He later developed this into the transactions costs approach, which further explored the
inner patterns within large firms. He showed how bounded rationality (reflecting managers
limited data and abilities) might lead to predictable deviations from the conventional
predictions of profit-maximizing actions within firms. By 1980 he presented this as a
fundamental new system of thought, a new institutional economics.
His research approach primarily used theory and judgments about business experience,
rather than large-scale econometric testing. Transactions costs have attracted discussion
as a subfield that studies the inner workings of enterprises. It has not led to substantial
changes in antitrust policies.
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In 1968, Williamson argued that merger policies should be changed to allow for possible
economies of scale. He showed with a diagram that such economies (a horizontal rectangle)
might be larger than the monopoly effects of a merger (shown by the long-recognized
welfare triangle). This trade-off should, he said, lead officials to permit such mergers,
when the mergers would give net gains in efficiency.
Since he was then the economic adviser to Donald F. Turner, who was in charge of the
Antitrust Division during 196568, Williamsons point gained added attention. Previously,
the policy had been skeptical of self-interested and unverifiable claims of economies;
decisions would focus on the harm to competition and consumers.
Others soon showed that Williamsons analysis tended to understate the monopoly harms
of mergers and to accept the claims of economies. Moreover, he omitted X-inefficiency
as a possible cost of rising monopoly power, as well as the precedential effects of each
merger-policy decision on later mergers. The decision on todays merger may influence
hundreds of other future merger plans. But he did give merger economies more role in
antitrust debates for some years.

(1964), The Economics of Discretionary Behavior, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
(1968), Economies as an antitrust defense, American Economic Review, March, pp. 1836.
(1975), Markets and Hierarchies, New York: Free Press.
(1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: Free Press.
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J.
HAROLD DEMSETZ
William G. Shepherd
Innovations
He articulated the hard-line Chicago school position; he proposed replacing the regulation
of utilities by the threat of losing the franchise; and he stressed the efficient structure
hypothesis.
Personal history
Born
1930, Chicago, IL, USA.
Degrees BS University of Illinois, 1953; MBA, MA, PhD Northwestern University,

1954, 1959, 1959.
Principal position Professor of Economics, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA, 1971.
Other
University of Michigan, 195860; University of Chicago, 196371.
Harold Demsetz joined with George J. Stigler in advocating the hard-line Chicago school
free-market position. Demsetz also extended that approach in two ways, which urged the
removal of constraints on business freedom.
First, he argued in 1968 that traditional regulation was unnecessary and should be
abolished. Instead, the monopolist would face only a periodic need to renew its monopoly
franchise. Under threat of losing its franchise, the firm would, Demsetz said, behave as
if it were under absolutely complete competitive pressure. Critics pointed to problems of
adequate information and predictions that could plague the franchise auctions, and they
doubted that this pressure would be thorough and reliable. It would, for example, intensify
the firms incentives to exploit some or many consumers. But Demsetzs basic logic did
have some merit; periodic reviews of regulated firms performance can apply beneficial
pressure toward efficiency and innovation.
Demsetz was equally severe against antitrust policies. He argued in 1973 that the standard
causation of the structurebehavior (conduct)performance triad should be reversed,
under the logic of an efficient-structure hypothesis. Assuming that markets contained no
imperfections at all, he argued that when any firm holds dominance over the market and
reaps high profits, that could occur only if the firm had won them by its superior efficiency
and innovations. Market power would not exist; only exceptional performance which
yields illusory monopolies which must behave like efficient and innovative competitors.
Demsetz also said that perfect-market conditions would guarantee that no anti-competitive
actions could occur.
The view requires that all markets, including capital markets, fit perfect assumptions.
For empirical support, Demsetz offered a table of summary data about company size
classes and profit rates.
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277

(1968), Why regulate utilities?, Journal of Law & Economics, April, 10, pp. 5565.
(1973), Industry, structure, market rivalry, and public policy, Journal of Law and Economics, April, pp. 190.
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278
K.
PAUL W. MACAVOY
William G. Shepherd
Innovations
He showed that much of the historical basis of US railroad regulation involved the creation
of monopoly power; analyzed the case for deregulating natural gas; criticized eletricity
regulation in 1974 and helped to lay the basis for its later deregulation; and clarified the
role of OPECs (Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries) market power in
the rise of oil prices after 1973.
Personal history
Born
1934, Haverhill, MA, USA.
Degrees
BA Bates College, 1955; MA, PhD Yale University, 1956, 1960.
Principal positions Professor of Management Studies, Yale University School of

Management, Yale University, 197783, 1990 and Dean, 199294.
Other Professor, Sloan School of Management, MIT, 196375; Presidents Council of
Economic Advisers, 197576; Dean and Professor, Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Rochester, NY, 198391.
Starting in the 1960s, MacAvoy marked out innovative positions and did creative applied
research on a range of issues especially related to regulated sectors (energy, transportation
and telecommunications).
First, he re-examined early US railroad regulation, at the time when the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) was formed in 1888. He found that there was intense
competition not natural monopoly on many routes in most of the US. Therefore, the
creation of ICC regulation involved blocking out that competition artifically, replacing
effective competition with weak and ineffective regulation.
He then turned to natural gas and urged that the conditions for effective competition
were widespread in that industry.
In 1974 he joined with Stephen Breyer (later a Justice on the US Supreme Court) in a
detailed analysis of the regulation of electricity by the US Federal Power Commission (FPC;
soon renamed as FERC, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission). Though the FPC
had been unusually effective in the 1960s, MacAvoy and Breyer urged that it be replaced
with a reliance on competition in nearly all of the industry. This contributed importantly to
the growth of the effort to deregulate the industry. MacAvoy pushed further for marginalcost pricing and other market-based changes in electricity while he was on the Council of
Economic Advisers in the mid-1970s. He also pressed for abolishing the regulation of US
airlines. In fact airline deregulation occurred in just a year, while the electricity deregulation
campaign finally flowered in the 1990s, though with mixed results.
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279
MacAvoy turned to the oil industry, where OPEC actions had helped to force up oil prices
sharply in 197374 and 1979. He showed that the oil industry was affected by a powerful
long-run trend toward increased scarcity. The resulting rise in long-run scarcity prices could
explain much (though not all) of the rise in oil prices. Much of OPECs seeming monopoly
impact instead merely reflected short-term variations around the longer upward trend.
MacAvoy also made innovative studies of AT&T, its break-up, and the subsequent
struggles among its parts.
(1974), Energy Regulation by the Federal Power Commission, with Stephen Breyer, Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution.
(1982), Crude Oil Prices: As Determined by OPEC and Market Fundamentals, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
(1983), Winning by losing: the AT&T settlement and its impact on telecommunications (with Kenneth Robinson),
Yale Journal on Regulation, November, 1(1), 1ff.
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280
L.
HARRY M. TREBING
William G. Shepherd
Innovations
He developed sophisticated analyses of utility regulation, and later urged the dangers of
simple deregulation; he also improved telecommunications and postal regulation; and
during 196692 he arranged a vast series of conferences that improved the understanding
of regulation economics among virtually all its participants.
Personal history
Born
1927, Baltimore, MD, USA.
Degrees
1958.
BS, MA University of Maryland, 1950, 1952; PhD University of Wisconsin,
Principle positions Professor of Economics and Director of the Institute of Public

Utilities, Michigan State University, 196692, then Emeritus; Associate Professor, Indiana
University, 196266, and Assistant Professor, University of Nebraska, 195762.
Other Chief, Economic Studies Division and Chief Economist, 196566, and Industry
Economist, 196365, at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Chief Economist,
US Postal Rate Commission, 197172. Numerous task forces, advisory panels, and expert
commissions, of states and the US government agencies.
Trebing drew on and improved the regulatory ideas of his mentor, Martin G. Glaeser, and
he clarified the modern lessons of the whole regulatory literature. He presented a wide
range of analyses that noted the strengths of regulation, toward such classic sectors as
telecommunications, electricity, gas and the postal system, and transportation industries
such as railroads and airlines. His work also involved a massive series of conferences that
he designed and mounted during 196692.
In his research papers, policy debates and the conferences, Trebing advanced several
main themes. One is that the classic allocational efficiency goals need to be supplemented
by innovation, and also broadened to include other public interests and impacts. A second
theme is that regulation is a complex and evolving process, which has needed to change as
the industries have changed. Trebing stressed that static price and cost criteria were only
a small part of regulations goals; innovation, product quality and variety, fairness and
social effects should also be promoted.
In his third theme, Trebing analyzed the major troubles when deregulation yields
weak competition. Frequently, the deregulation process stops when the former regulated
monopoly firms capture a dominant or tight-oligopoly position. Trebing was an early
critic, stressing this neglected problem from the 1960s on.
He was closely involved in the economics and regulation of the telephone industry in the
1960s, rising to be the FCCs Chief Economist in 196566. The industry was then changing
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into the more complicated telecommunications sector. From the 1960s on as the older
copper-wire and local-exchange telephone systems were altered successively by computers,
data transmission, optical fiber, wireless technology, and most recently the internet and
VOIP Trebing gave skeptical and incisive analysis of how regulation should change.
He built the Institute of Public Utilities, as its first director during 196692; he mounted
scores of large conferences (two-week, one-week and shorter) on all facets of utilities,
regulation and deregulation, both at the Institute and at the National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners. Altogether, over 10,000 people attended these
conferences, once or repeatedly, including virtually all important participants in all
regulated industries.
He was highly skeptical of deregulation, repeatedly stressing the limits of pure theory as
a guide for complex policies. He showed that many theoretical attacks on regulation were
overstated and misleading. His educational efforts substantially enhanced the understanding
of regulatory commissioners, their staff, officials of utility firms, experts on all sides, and
also the public. Moreover, he continued all these efforts at full speed after 1985 and was
still publishing papers in 2006.
(1976), Market structure and regulatory reform in the electric and gas utility industries, in Werner Sichel (ed.),
Salvaging Public Utility Regulation, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books pp. 79116.
(1977), Broadening the objectives of public utility regulation, Land Economics, February, 53, pp. 10622.
(1984a), Public utility regulation: a case study in the debates over effectiveness of economic regulation, Journal
of Economic Issues, March, 18, pp. 22350.
(1984b), Public control of enterprises: neoclassical assault and neoinstitutional reform, Journal of Economic
Issues, June, 18, pp. 35368.
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M.
DENNIS CARY MUELLER
Stephen Martin
Innovations
Life cycle of the firm, industry; analysis of mergers; persistence of profits; welfare costs
of market power.
Personal history
Born
1940, Milwaukee, WI, USA.
Degrees
BS (Maths) Colorado College, 1962; PhD Princeton University, 1966.
Principle positions Professor, University of Vienna; 1994; Professor, University of

Maryland, College Park, 197794; Assistant and Associate Professor, Cornell University,
196876; Assistant Professor, Simon Fraser University, 196566; Director, International
Institute of Management/Industrial Policy, Berlin, 198283; Federal Trade Commission,
Research Contract, 197881; Postdoctoral Fellow, Center for Study of Public Choice,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 197273.
Mueller (1992, p. 163) writes: Alas the real world does refuse to conform to our models.
Faced with a choice between studying the real world and elaborating models of markets
that may or may not have their counterpart in the real world, Mueller has consistently
opted for the former.
Firm and industry life cycle
Mueller (1967) estimates a model of firm decisions about capital investment, spending
on research and development (R&D), spending on advertising, and dividend payments.
It is marked by careful attention to issues of simultaneity, and includes a discussion of
the merits of structural versus reduced-form estimation. This work appeared at least five
years before these same issues were tackled in the empirical literature that worked with
industry- rather than firm-level data.
Grabowski and Mueller (1972) continue this line of research, studying capital investment,
R&D spending, and dividends at the firm level in a comparison of the predictive power
of the managerial and neoclassical (value-maximization) models of the firm. The results
favor the managerial model.
Mueller and Tilton (1969) rely heavily on case-study evidence to assess the impact
of R&D costs over an industry technology cycle that is defined as having four stages:
innovation, imitation, technological competition and standardization. With respect to
the first stage, they find that: Neither large absolute size nor market power appears to be
a necessary condition for successful development of most major innovations (p. 573). It
is at the third stage, technological competition, that the nature of the R&D process tends
to favor the large firm and raise the cost of entry.
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These various strands of research are brought together in Mueller (1972), A life cycle
theory of the firm. This paper contrasts the implications of the models of the valuemaximizing firm and the managerial, growth-maximizing firm for a firms life cycle.
Successful early innovation and sufficient subsequent growth may place management in
a position to pursue its own interests at the expense of those of stockholders. A review of
the evidence suggests support for managerial growth maximization.
Marris and Mueller (1980) compare and contrast neo-classical, internal organization,
managerial (static and dynamic), and life-cycle models of the corporate firm. They discuss
rent seeking, under the heading competition for monopoly, and incentives to invest in
innovation in imperfectly competitive markets. Their conclusion advocates the study of
the corporation as it is, not as it is modeled (a similar approach to empirical research in
industrial organization is put forward by Coase, 2006).
Mergers
Mueller (1985) examines the impact of mergers on market share for a sample of firms
ranked by the US Federal Trade Commission as being among the 1000 largest US firms
in 1950 and in 1972. Conglomerate and horizontal mergers are studied separately. In
both cases, merger appeared to reduce the acquired firms market share, compared with
otherwise identical firms not involved in a merger. This is evidence against the argument
that the threat of takeover disciplines managers who do not maximize stockholder value:
to a significant extent, firms in this sample did less well for their shareholders after takeover
than they did before.
Working with an international sample, Mueller and three co-authors (Gugler et al., 2003)
find that mergers increase profit and reduce market share, on average. Mergers that increase
profitability by increasing market power are more likely to involve large firms; mergers that
increase profitability by increasing efficiency are more likely to involve smaller firms.
Mueller (1969) analyzes conglomerate mergers in a growth-maximization framework.
Mueller (1977b) surveys the literature on the effects of conglomerate mergers; Mueller
(1980) discusses US mergers in the decade before the first oil shock; Mueller (1989) surveys
mergers generally.
Distilling the evidence on mergers, managerial discretion is seen as permitting managers
to engage in mergers that reduce efficiency and stockholder value. One policy response
would be to increase the amount of information available to stockholders. Competition
authorities might also block mergers that seem likely to reduce efficiency.
Persistence of profit
Mueller (1977a) founded a literature that explores the extent to which market forces do
(or more precisely, in terms of the results obtained, do not) result in the convergence of
extremely high or extremely low profits to normal levels.
The results obtained reject convergence. Confirming results for a number of countries are
reported in Mueller (1990). Megna and Mueller (1991) present evidence that the persistence
of profitability at the firm level is not due to a systematic failure to capitalize the intangible
assets of firms operating in high R&D or high-advertising industries.
Mueller (1997) elaborates on Mueller (1972) and on Mueller (1977a). Here the focus is
on the kinds of factors (learning by doing and other supply-side forces, demand inertia
that may be reinforced by advertising) that allow, in many industries, one of the early
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leading firms to maintain a dominant position, and that allow the high profitability of
early leaders to persist.
Welfare cost of market power
Cowling and Mueller (1978) critique and extend the literature flowing from Harbergers
(1954) estimates of the deadweight welfare loss due to the exercise of market power.
Working with firm rather than industry data and taking account of welfare losses arising
from efforts to obtain or maintain positions of market power, they obtain a range of
deadweight welfare loss estimates which, even at the low end, are substantially larger than
those of Harberger.
Resum
There is a remarkable coherency to the research agenda that has resulted in the works
discussed above. A recurring theme is that economic theory teaches that price competition
leads to a Pareto optimum in general equilibrium if all markets are perfectly competitive,
but it offers no such presumption if competition is in dimensions other than price or
if some markets are imperfectly competitive. It offers no presumption that the fact of
persistence demonstrates that organizational forms that persist are efficient. To understand
the performance of firms as they are in the kinds of markets in which they are found, and
to understand the performance of those markets, economists should analyze what firms
actually do, and how markets actually work.
References
Coase, Ronald (2006), The conduct of economics: the example of Fisher Body and General Motors, Journal
of Economics & Management Strategy, 15(2), 25578.
Cowling, Keith and Dennis C. Mueller (1978), The social costs of monopoly power, Economic Journal, 88,
December, 72748.
Grabowski, Henry G. and Dennis C. Mueller (1972), Managerial and stockholder welfare models of firm
expenditures, Review of Economics and Statistics, 54(1), February, 924.
Gugler, Klaus, Dennis C. Mueller, B. Burcin Yurtoglu and Christine Zulehner (2003), The effects of mergers:
an international comparison, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21(5), May, 62553.
Harberger, Arnold C. (1954), Monopoly and resource allocation, American Economic Review, 44(2), May,
7787.
Marris, Robin and Dennis C. Mueller (1980), The corporation, competition, and the invisible hand, Journal of
Economic Literature, 18(1), March, 3263.
Megna, Pamela and Dennis C. Mueller (1991), Profit rates and intangible capital, Review of Economics and
Statistics, 73(4), November, 63242.
Mueller, Dennis C. (1967), The firm decision process: an econometric investigation, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 81(1), February, 5887.
Mueller, Dennis C. (1969), A theory of conglomerate mergers, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 83(4), November,
64359.
Mueller, Dennis C. (1972), A life cycle theory of the firm, Journal of Industrial Economics, 20(3), July,
199219.
Mueller, Dennis C. (1977a), The persistence of profits above the norm, Economica, 44(176), November,
36980.
Mueller, Dennis C. (1977b), The effects of conglomerate mergers: a survey of the empirical evidence, Journal
of Banking and Finance, 1, December, 31547.
Mueller, Dennis C. (1980), The United States, 19621972, ch. 9 in Dennis C. Mueller (ed.), The Determinants
and Effects of Mergers: An International Comparison, Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, and
Knigstein/Ts: Verlag Anton Hain, 1980.
Mueller, Dennis C. (1985), Mergers and market share, Review of Economics and Statistics, 67(2), May,
25967.
Mueller, Dennis C. (1986), Profits in the Long Run, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Mueller, Dennis C. (1989), Mergers: causes, effects and policies, International Journal of Industrial Organization,
7(1), March, 110.
Mueller, Dennis C. (ed.) (1990), The Dynamics of Company Profits: An International Comparison, Cambridge
and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mueller, Dennis C. (1992), The corporation and the economist, International Journal of Industrial Organization,
10(2), June, 14770.
Mueller, Dennis C. (1997), First-mover advantages and path dependence, International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 15(6), October, 82750.
Mueller, Dennis C. (2003), The Corporation: Investment, Mergers, and Growth, London and New York:
Routledge.
Mueller, Dennis C. and John E. Tilton (1969), Research and development costs as a barrier to entry, Canadian
Journal of Economics, 2(4), November, 57079.
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N.
ROGER G. NOLL
William G. Shepherd
Innovations
He was involved by 1971 in the early efforts toward the deregulation of utilities; he also
analyzed the emerging forms of television and cable TV patterns; and in 1975 he pioneered
with thorough research into the economics of the sports industry.
Personal history
Born
1940, Monterrey Park, CA, USA.
Degrees BS California Institute of Technology, 1962; MA, PhD Harvard University,

196567.
Principal position Professor of Economics, Stanford University, 1984.
Other California Institute of Technology, 196584; Chair, Division of Humanities and
Social Sciences, Cal Tech, 197882.
Noll made a series of important innovations about regulation and such sectors as telecommunications, transportation and sports. His analysis has always been independent-minded
and unusually sophisticated about complex causes and situations.
He explored many features of regulation and deregulation. By 1971 he published an
innovative treatise on reforming regulation that looked toward applying competitive market
processes to a variety of sectors. Much later, in 1983 he wrote (with Bruce Owen) an incisive
and sophisticated analysis of the political forces that tend to distort both regulation and
any simple efforts at reforming regulation.
On the sports industry, Noll published early, extensive research (1974) on the economic
determinants and policy choices for league sports, particularly baseball. He estimated
demand equations that explained the determinants of team profits, and he analyzed the
effects of salary caps and revenue sharing. Later he analyzed promotion and relegation
systems, the contraction of baseball, and lessons of organization theory about sports
leagues. He soon became a leading authority on the economics and policy choices of
sports leagues.
As a major co-author of Economic Aspects of Television Regulation (with Merton J.
Peck and John J. McGowan, 1973), he analyzed televisions future trends and regulations
likely effects. He predicted a variety of developments, including the tendency of cable
TV to enlarge mass entertainment choices, rather than high culture, social services and
education.
Later, Nolls interests evolved toward a broader study of the processes of politics
and the formation of policies, and of other topics like public goods and air pollution
permits. Noll also became prominent in academic administration at Cal Tech and Stanford
University.
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(1971), Reforming Regulation, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
(1973), Economic Aspects of Television Regulation (with Merton J. Peck and John J. McGowan), Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution.
(1974), Government and the Sports Business, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
(1983), The Political Economy of Deregulation (with Bruce Owen), Washington, DC: American Enterprise
Institute.
(1985), Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
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O.
SAM PELTZMAN
William G. Shepherd
Innovations
He extended the theory of regulation (1976); and he offered evidence for the efficientstructure hypothesis.
Personal history
Born
1940, New York City, NY, USA.
Degrees
BBA City College NY, 1960; PhD University of Chicago, 1965.
Principal position Professor of Economics and Financial Services, Graduate School of

Business, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, 1978.
Other Assistant and Associate Professor, UCLA, 196773; Sr Member, US Presidents
Council of Economic Advisers, 199091; Editor, Journal of Political Economy, 197489;
Editor, Journal of Law and Economics.
Peltzman was a protg of George J. Stigler, who from 1957 led the optimistic free-market
new Chicago school. Peltzman wrote on regulations effects on banking, drugs, automobile
safety and advertising. But much of his main research has been on broader policy topics
(for example, voting, the formation of policies, education), which are outside the industrial
organization field. Peltzman participated in forming the efficient-structure hypothesis,
and in 1977 he presented the most extensive evidence for that hypothesis that members of
the new Chicago school have provided.
He also extended the theory of public regulation to study the interests that regulators
really follow; this was along rational-choice lines earlier discussed by Stigler.
(1976), Toward a more general theory of regulation, Journal of Law and Economics, August, 21140.
(1977), The gains and losses from industrial concentration, Journal of Law and Economics, October, 22963.
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RICHARD SCHMALENSEE
William G. Shepherd
Innovations
He enlarged the use of pure theory in the 1970s, especially on advertising; he restated
regulations economic effects; he clarified demand inelasticity as an estimator of market
power (1982); he showed prospects for competition in the electricity industry; and he
extended the study of firm and industry effects in causing higher profitability.
Personal history
Born
1944, Belleville, IL, USA.
Degrees
BS, PhD MIT, 1965, 1970.
Principal positions Professor of Economics and Management, 1970, and Dean, 1988,
Sloan School, MIT, Cambridge, MA.
Other Economics faculty, University of California, San Diego, 197077; Member, US
Presidents Council of Economic Advisers, 198991.
Schmalensee made several significant advances, mainly in raising the level of technical
rigor in analyzing competition. He also developed factual methods for testing theoretical
lessons in this field.
Joining the new wave of research on advertising, he extended the ComanorWilson
approach by using more explicit theoretical analysis, relying especially on Hotelling-type
models of spatial analogies for differentiated products. He then studied the ready-to-eat
cereals industry in depth, as part of a major Federal Trade Commission case against
the leading cereals producers. His 1978 paper became a standard in the advertising
literature.
He also expanded the analysis of pricing by firms with market power, using moderate
technical advances to draw conclusions about the effects on competition.
In 1979, he enlarged the growing skeptical literature on regulation with a comprehensive
book that recast the economic issues with more technical rigor. He kept a neutral position
on the need for deregulation.
In a 1982 paper directed to legal scholars, Schmalensee actually clarified the economic
criteria for monopoly by focusing on the simple role of demand elasticity. Schmalensee
argued that clear tests of demand elasticity could bypass the need to define markets
clearly.
He (and Paul M. Joskow) showed in detail in 1983 the emerging possibilities for shifting
the US electricity industry from regulation to competition. The book anticipated much
of the difficult efforts in the 1990s to deregulate the industry, though it did not envisage
the scandals and market abuses that erupted after 2000, especially in California and
adjacent states.
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Finally, Schmalensee tried to sort out the firm- and industry-based causes of high
profitability, in an empirical 1985 paper. Although his ideas and findings met sharp
criticism, he did substantially open and energize the topic.
Schmalensee later co-edited with Robert D. Willig in 1988 a broad review of new IO
theory in the field.
(1972), The Economics of Advertising, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
(1978), Entry deterrence in the ready-to-eat cereal industry, Bell Journal of Economics, Autumn, 30527.
(1979), The Control of Natural Monopolies, Lexington, MA: DC Heath.
(1982), Another look at market power, Harvard Law Review, June, 1789816.
(1983), Markets for Power: An Analysis of Electric Utility Deregulation (with Paul L. Joskow), Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
(1988), Handbook of Industrial Organization (with Robert D. Willig, eds), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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A. MICHAEL SPENCE
F.M. Scherer
Innovations
Theory of market signaling; contributions to theory of optimal product variety, market entry
through investment and the theory of entry deterrence, and learning curve economics.
Personal history
Born
1943, Montclair, NJ, USA.
Degrees AB Princeton University, 1966; AB, MA Oxford University (Rhodes Scholar),

1968; PhD, Harvard University, 1972.
Principal positions Professor, Harvard University, 197590; Dean, Faculty of Arts and
Sciences, Harvard University, 198490; Dean, Stanford University Graduate School of
Business, 199099; Venture Capitalist, 2000; Associate Professor, Stanford University,
197375.
Few economists, and very few indeed toiling in the vineyards of industrial organization,
have managed to win a Nobel Memorial Prize in economics for the work presented in their
PhD dissertation. The only known case is A.M. (Mike) Spence, who shared the Nobel
Prize in 2001 with Joseph Stiglitz and George Akerlof. The award to Spence, however,
was not for work in industrial organization, but for his pioneering exploration into the
rationale of market signaling, with emphasis on such labor market implications as acquiring
educational credentials to seek employment, academic admissions and job promotions
within organizations. Possible applications to advertising and image differentiation are
mentioned briefly in the final chapter of Spences 1974 book, where Spence refers to
parallel research on advertising by Philip Nelson and cites a paper that Nelson presented
at a University of Chicago conference in 1972 and published in 1974.
Following a brief assistant professorship at Harvard, Spence was an associate professor
between 1973 and 1975 at Stanford, where he wrote what may be his most important
contribution to the industrial organization literature. The context demands scrutiny. At
Stanford during that time, the principal theme for research in industrial organization
was the host of problems left unsolved by Edward Chamberlins Theory of Monopolistic
Competition (1933). An oral tradition for graduate students and others working in industrial
organization at Stanford at the time was set by James N. Rosse, with one of the highest ratios
of research stimulated to own publications in the history of economic thought. Curiously,
Spence does not mention Rosse in his paper (June 1976a) nor does he cite the parallel
work of Kelvin Lancaster. Spences approach, quite unlike Lancasters, was to analyze the
optimal product variety problem in terms of monopoly demand and cost functions in a
multi-product context. Spences approach is much more amenable to empirical verification
than alternative models, although Spence attempted no test. He observed that the incentive
for multiplication of product varieties, each of which entails a front-end fixed launch cost,
is the incremental producers surplus that can be gained from adding a new product. From
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a welfare perspective, however, the key, especially in the absence of first-degree price discrimination, is how much unappropriated surplus the producer leaves for consumers. This
in turn depends upon the shape of demand curves. Concave downward demand curves leave
relatively less surplus for consumers than convex functions, with corresponding tendencies
toward product over- and underproliferation, respectively. Spences contribution helped
fill the most important theoretical void left by Chamberlin.
From Stanford, Spence returned to Harvard, where the prevailing research tradition
emphasized entry, entry deterrence by dominant firms, and their consequences for market
performance that is, following the paradigm established much earlier by Joe S. Bain. In
his Autumn 1977 paper, Spence showed how, by building excess capacity, a dominant firm
could reduce its marginal costs for high levels of output, and thus it could expand and react
more aggressively to entry, leaving less residual demand for entrants than was implied under
the output maintenance assumptions of Bain and Paolo Sylos-Labini. Given the added
entry deterrence capability permitted with excess capacity, pre-entry prices could be higher
than those implied by standard limit-pricing models. Spence had apparently prepared a
preliminary version of his paper at the time controversy escalated over the AreedaTurner
price less than average variable cost approach to proving predation in antitrust cases
alleging monopolization. As a result, he and Richard Caves were strategically positioned
to provide an appendix to the AreedaTurner rejoinder (1976b) showing that an average
cost floor below which predation was inferred allowed stronger deterrence than a marginal
cost floor, permitting less-efficient small-scale would-be entrants to be deterred. These
discussions in turn elicited the important Q rule alternative from Oliver Williamson in a
1977 Yale Law Journal article which, however, failed to capture the hearts and minds of
judges setting US antitrust precedents.
Subsequent work by Spence carried the analysis of entry along new and more dynamic
lines. His Spring 1979 article analyzed investment trajectories through which early entrants
into new markets could preempt rival entry opportunities and create structural asymmetries
permitting the exercise of Stackelberg leadership strategies. His Spring 1981 article analyzed
the evolution of market structures when firms costs fall with accumulated production
experience, that is, with learning by doing. Among the contributions in that article to a
burgeoning literature was a demonstration that, with zero discount rates, true marginal
cost equals marginal cost at the foot of the learning curve (but is higher with positive
discount rates). Spence also went beyond naive Cournot approaches to the problem of
rivalry with learning by doing, exploring how closed-loop approaches altered the results,
as they would be expected to do when there are initial asymmetries and firms attempt
la Stackelberg to influence rival responses.
In 1984, Spence turned from an emphasis on scholarship to administration, becoming
Dean of Harvards Faculty of Arts and Sciences, second only to the president at Harvard
in influence, and then in 1990 assuming the decanal position at Stanfords Graduate School
of Business. He retired from Stanford in 2000 and pursued what is said to have been a
successful career in venture capital.
(1974), Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Processes, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
(1976a), Product selection, fixed costs, and monopolistic competition, Review of Economic Studies, 43 (June),
21735.
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(1976b), Appendix to Philip Areeda and Donald F. Turner, Scherer on predatory pricing: a reply, Harvard Law
Review, 89 (March), 897900.
(1977), Entry, capacity, investment and oligopolistic pricing, Bell Journal of Economics, 8 (Autumn), 53444.
(1979), Investment, strategy and growth in a new market, Bell Journal of Economics, 10 (Spring), 119.
(1981), The learning curve and competition, Bell Journal of Economics, 12 (Spring), 4970.
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R.
ROBERT D. WILLIG
William G. Shepherd
Innovations
He was a co-author of analytical concepts about regulatory economics and competition,
especially including sustainability and contestability.
Personal history
Born
1947, New York, NY, USA.
Degrees BA (mathematics) Harvard University, 1967; MS (operations research), PhD

Stanford University, 1968, 1973.
Principal position Professor, Princeton University, 1978.
A gifted theorist, Willig wrote with William J. Baumol and others in the 1970s and 1980s
on issues related to the AT&T company, which had been since 1900 the near-complete
telephone monopoly of the US. First they analyzed the regulation of public utilities,
clarifying reasons for letting AT&T retain its monopoly. Then when deregulation of AT&T
became likely, Baumol and Willig focused on reasons for freeing AT&T from restraints in
competing with new entrants.
Two main ideas from this effort were sustainability and contestability. Sustainability
refers to a set of discriminatory prices which would allow a natural monopoly to stay in
business by gaining enough revenues. The Baumol group labeled these inverse-elasticity
prices as Ramsey prices, which would fit static efficient conditions. They did not focus on
the transition to competition, when Ramsey prices would lose their allocative relevance
and would be anti-competitive.
Willig, Baumol and John Panzar in 1982 offered contestable markets theory, saying it
was a complete replacement for the entire theory of competition itself. The contestability
theory rested on two pure assumptions: that both entry and exit were perfectly free (for
example, sunk costs must be zero), and that entry and exit would both be instantaneous and
unlimited. The resulting threat of instant, total entry would nullify any market power, even
if the incumbent were a total monopolist. Contestability would discourage the monopolists
efforts to raise price, even by just a penny.
Baumol and Willig often acknowledged that the theory was an exercise, useful for its
seminar insight, and they conceded that no real market closely fits the theory. Yet the tone
changed in their frequent testimony on real cases of mergers, pricing and regulation. There
they said that the contestability idea gave definitive proof that any actual anti-competitive
effects would not occur.
As a leader of the new IO theory wing of the field, Willig later co-edited the two-volume
analytical review Handbook of Industrial Organization (1989).
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(1982), Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure (with William J. Baumol and John C. Panzer),
New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
(1989), Editor (with Richard Schmalensee), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Amsterdam: NorthHolland.
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S.
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ
F.M. Scherer
Innovations
Impact of information asymmetries on market equilibrium; monopoly exploitation of a
depletable resource; commodity pricing cartels; economics of research and development
(R&D) rivalry; product differentiation.
Personal history
Born
1943, Gary, IN, USA.
Degrees
1966.
AB Amherst College, 1964; PhD, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Principal positions Professor, Yale University, 197074; Professor, Stanford University,

197476 and 19882001; Professor, Oxford University, 197679; Professor, Princeton
University, 197988; Member and then Chairman, US Council of Economic Advisers,
199397; Vice President and Chief Economist, World Bank, 19972000; Professor,
Columbia University, 2000.
The extraordinary productivity of Joe Stiglitz led in 2001 to a Nobel Memorial Prize in
Economics, shared with A. Michael Spence (see Profile Q, above) and George Akerlof.
His contributions span a broad array of topics in mathematical economics, including
(mostly later in his career) industrial organization. His MIT dissertation, supervised
by Robert Solow and a fellow Gary, Indiana, native, Paul Samuelson, modeled several
aspects of economic growth and income distribution. Even before he began the work on
the consequences of informational asymmetries that won a Nobel Prize, he published
extensively on such diverse topics as factor proportions, investment behavior, portfolio
risk, public finance, labor economics, economic development and much else.
The research that led to his shared Nobel Prize stemmed from a resurgence of interest
in the economics of information, manifested inter alia in well-attended conferences on
the topic at Princeton in 1973 and Stanford in 1975. The work given special emphasis
by the Nobel Prize committee (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976a) explored why insurance
companies offer a variety of contracts, specifying both price and quantity (that is, amount
of insurance provided) and inducing consumers to self-select into risk classes. The sorting
behavior with nonlinear outlay schedules emphasized by their analysis is applicable in
many other situations, with an older and wider tradition in tax policy and public utility
pricing. Possible extensions to educational screening and sorting in labor and financial
markets were mentioned in passing.
The OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries) oil price shock
of 197374 apparently triggered Stiglitzs first work in the mainstream of industrial
organization economics. His 1976b article extended insights by Harold Hotelling and
Robert Solow, among others, on how monopolized resource providers differed from
21/5/07 12:19:16
297
their competitive counterparts in the rate at which they depleted their resource. Stiglitz
showed that, depending upon demand elasticities and costs, monopolists were sometimes
indeed, but not always, our grandchildrens best friend, conserving resources for the long
run by setting initially high demand-limiting prices. A later paper with Dasgupta (1982)
investigated how the eventual switch to a backstop technology, available initially only at
higher cost, depended upon market structure.
Another plunge into the mainstream of industrial organization topics appears to have
begun in the intellectual ferment existing at Stanford University during the 1970s (see
Profile Q, above of A. Michael Spence). Dixit and Stiglitz (1977a) worked out with unusual
virtuosity the mathematics underlying Edward Chamberlins qualitative conjectures on
monopolistic competition and optimal product diversity. The insights in that paper are
less novel than those in a predecessor (1976a) article by Spence, acknowledged by Dixit
and Stiglitz.
From monopolistic competition, Stiglitz moved on to the endogenous relationships
between market structure and the speed and intensity of R&D investments. Two papers
with Dasgupta (1980a, b) extended a particularly rich mathematical treatment to insights
advanced earlier by Arrow (1962), (less elegantly) Scherer (1967), and several others. They
concluded, as others had, that the question ... of whether restricted competition leads to
more research than free competition is truly complex, requiring the stance of Harry S.
Trumans apocryphal two-armed economist.
OPECs success in raising crude oil prices led other less-developed nations to consider
cartelization as a remedy for the volatile and frequently low prices they received for the
primary commodities in which they specialized. The World Bank and the US Agency for
International Development commissioned Stiglitz and David Newbery to undertake a
major book (1981) on commodity cartels, with particular focus on buffer stock cartels.
Their approach was mostly theoretical, but there were also empirical analyses the
only ones among the works cited here. They found inter alia that the emphasis on linear
supply and demand functions in the substantial earlier literature yielded biased results.
Exploring diverse causes of commodity price variability, introducing risk aversion into
buffer stock schemes, and stressing the impact on primary commodity producers income,
they concluded that the benefits from price stabilization schemes were likely to be smaller
than previous studies had suggested.
A more broad-based contribution by Stiglitz to the field of industrial organization was
his leadership in organizing, with Frank Mathewson, a star-studded May 1982 conference
on New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structures, out of which a conference
volume (1986) emerged. In his introduction to the published volume, Stiglitz highlighted
five significant areas of advance in the theory of non-socialist market structures during
the 1970s:
While much of the earlier literature took market structure as given, the new theory
of market structure begins by asking what determines the number of firms? What
are the barriers to entry? By what mechanisms can existing firms deter entry?
In the new view ... it is not only the number of firms in the market which matters,
but also their relationship with one another.
Recent work has questioned whether all participants work to maximize the value of the
firm and whether there is unanimity of goals between managers and shareholders.
21/5/07 12:19:16
298
Recent advances in the economics of uncertainty and information have reexamined the
economics of vertical integration and where the boundaries of the firm emerge.
The standard welfare analysis has little to say about modern industrial economies,
where technological change and information problems are of central importance.
None of these insights was really new, as perusal of the profiles in this volume for Jeremiah
Jenks, Edward Chamberlin, Joe S. Bain, Herbert Simon, E.A.G. Robinson, Ronald Coase,
Edwin Mansfield and many others will reveal. A more balanced interpretation might be
that advances in theory during the 1970s, to which Joe Stiglitz made notable contributions,
carried earlier insights to unprecedented heights of rococo mathematical splendor.
In 1993 Stiglitz migrated to Washington, first as a Member and then Chairman of
President Bill Clintons Council of Economic Advisers and then as Chief Economist and
Vice President of the World Bank. In the latter function he publicly challenged many
traditional but discredited shibboleths of the economic development community and
spurred the consideration of important new initiatives. Returning to academia in 2000,
he has continued to publish, but with a new emphasis on books and articles addressing
more popular audiences.
(1976a), Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: an essay on the economics of imperfect information
(with Michael Rothschild), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90 (November), 62949.
(1976b), Monopoly and the rate of extraction of exhaustible resources, American Economic Review, 66
(September), 65561.
(1977a), Monopolistic competition and optimum product diversity (with Avinash Dixit), American Economic
Review, 67 (June), 297308.
(1976b), Monopoly, non-linear pricing and imperfect information: the insurance market, Review of Economic
Studies, 44 (October), 40730.
(1980a), Industrial structure and the nature of innovative activity (with Partha Dasgupta), Economic Journal,
90 (June), 26693.
(1980b), Uncertainty, industrial structure, and the speed of R&D (with Partha Dasgupta), Bell Journal of
Economics, 11 (Spring), 128.
(1981), The Theory of Commodity Price Stabilization (with David Newbery), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
(1982), Market structure and resource depletion (with Partha Dasgupta), Journal of Economic Theory, 28
(October), 12857.
(1986), New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure (edited with G. Frank Mathewson), Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
21/5/07 12:19:16
Index
A&P grocery chain 152, 214
abstraction 27
accounting 101, 102, 174, 185
Ackersdijck, J. 56
Adams, Henry Carter 150, 1734, 191, 204
Adams, Walter 156, 159, 162, 22023
Addyston Pipe case xxix
Adelman, Morris A. 154, 155, 21415
advertising 257, 265, 282, 283, 288, 289, 291
and consumers 116, 119, 134, 162
and entry barriers 119, 120, 272
intensity 272
and market structure 112
minimum efficient scale in production 114
and rate of return 267
signaling models 241
agriculture 2731
airline industry 159, 209, 218, 219, 221, 251,
254, 280
see also transportation industries
American Tobacco 151, 182, 184, 202
Andreatta, Nino 95, 106
antitrust policy 52, 108, 131, 139, 149, 158,
162, 163, 2323, 246, 273, 274, 292
and competition 156, 187, 189, 214, 218, 268
early development 10, 136, 151, 152, 153,
181
economies of information 241, 243
and economies of scale 183, 184, 185
export cartels exemption 114
industry development 209
market structure 161, 22023, 276
and oligopoly 155, 157, 235, 2378
profits data (IBM) 160
Q rule 292
and technological innovation 2614
see also competition; industrial organization
theory; monopoly
Areeda, Philip 157, 238, 292
Aristotle 8, 9, 34
AT&T 122, 151, 152, 159, 218, 235, 237, 255,
262, 279, 294
auctions 11, 1415, 64
Austrian school 4, 34, 359, 60, 65
automobile industry 160, 222, 256
Averch, Harvey 159, 254
Bain, Joe S. 106, 119, 131, 155, 157, 181, 209,

22431, 250, 251, 256, 258, 263, 292, 298
Baldwin, William L. 1836, 199202
banking industry 83, 98, 100101, 1078, 135,
162, 288
bankruptcy 174
Baran, Paul A. 160, 161
Baudeau, Nicolas 2021, 30
Baumol, William J. 117, 1578, 162, 175, 199,
2457, 269, 294
Becattini, Giacomo 97, 106, 107
Belgium
competition policies 69
financial holdings 723
Beneduce, Alberto 100101
Berle, A.A. 72, 115, 152, 153, 155, 157, 159,
194, 195, 196, 239, 274
Bertrand, Joseph 52, 67, 83, 128, 129, 207, 241
Bianchi, Patrizio 95110
Blair, John M. 159
Bonbright, James C. 153, 191, 2035
Boyer, Kenneth D. 162
Boyle, Stanley E. 161
Brems, Hans 128, 129, 13032, 134, 138, 139
Brock, James A. 22023
Brown, John Howard 17582, 1948, 2068,
26770
Brusco, Sebastiano 97, 1067
Bullock, Charles J. 151
Buridan, Jean 6, 8, 1617, 19, 33, 58, 124
Caff, Federico 97, 106
calvinist tradition 1045
Cantillon, Richard 11, 1821, 25, 30, 33, 82
capital
creation 102, 104, 227
intensity and overhead costs 1845
productivity of 2930
capitalism 6, 64, 160, 187, 191, 201, 213, 214
Carlsson, Bo 137, 139
cartels 66, 67, 72, 78, 86, 134, 187, 188, 221,
263, 297
commodity 297
and competition 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 44,
50, 51, 54, 624, 69
and consumer demand 38
299
21/5/07 12:19:16
300
Index
export exemption 114

growth-cycle theory 41, 42, 71
price-fixing 63
pricing 132, 159
and profitability 64
state intervention 42, 51, 634, 69
see also mergers; monopoly; protectionism
Caves, Richard E. 159, 209, 22431, 25053,
292
Chamberlin, Edward H. 67, 88, 120, 129, 152,
153, 199202, 209, 228, 239, 240, 2912,
297, 298
Cheysson, mile 84, 86
Chicago school 153, 158, 160, 222, 2256, 243,
264, 269, 276, 288
see also free-market tradition
child exploitation 65
Clark, John Bates 29, 150, 152, 1758, 1834,
185
Clark, John Maurice 43, 122, 152, 154, 176,
178, 1836, 188, 209, 228
Coase, Ronald H. 153, 159, 274, 283, 297
Collins, Norman 159
Colson, Clment 86
Comanor, William S. 112, 160, 237, 25053,
257, 2723, 289
Commons, John R. 174, 190
competition
alternative forms 134
anti-competitive behaviour 69, 11314, 149,
151, 155, 156, 177, 182, 187, 219, 221,
238, 276
and antitrust policy 156, 187, 189, 214, 218,
268
barriers to 45, 229
benefits of 149, 269
and cartels 35, 36, 37, 38, 41, 42, 44, 50, 51,
54, 624, 69
and concentration 35, 36, 37, 856, 89
contestable market theory 269, 294
and cooperation 88
destructive 113
and duopoly 43, 44, 50, 52, 207
dynamic 38, 154
and efficiency 1489, 151, 158, 177
and equilibrium theory 37, 43, 50, 65, 66, 71,
85, 115, 148
and guilds 17
hindrance, monopoly as 612
imperfect 129, 131, 153, 228, 245
import protection 37, 63
and innovation 68, 72, 1489, 150, 153, 154,
162, 283
and interdependency 54, 67
just price 7, 89, 1014
latent 38, 66
measurement 268
monopolist see monopolist competition
in oligopoly markets see oligopoly
optimal 435
perfect 45, 67, 83, 86, 88, 1856, 240
potential 148, 155, 157, 1756, 181, 246
and price see price; pricing
and product differentiation 44, 119, 226
and profits see profits
public opinion 667
in quality space for industrial goods 133
regulation 66, 156, 157, 176, 182, 203
restraints 44
rivalry 1920, 43, 67, 68, 112, 114, 120, 163,
177, 184, 185, 191, 225, 241, 2423, 252,
292
ruinous 42, 43, 445, 50
stability 206
survival of the fittest 125
and uncertainty 1820, 60
and vertical restrictions 272, 273
wealth-producing effect 59
and welfare goals 43, 45
without dominance 88
workable 55, 67, 71, 148, 151, 152, 154, 183,
1856, 1889, 209, 220, 228
see also antitrust; industrial organization
theory; market theory; monopoly
consumers
and advertising 116, 119, 134, 162
choice 34, 38, 62, 64, 11516, 149, 181, 191,
226, 292
conflict of interests 1718
and innovation 31
primacy of 325
and production efficiency 5960
rate-base regulation of utilities 153
surplus 8, 16, 17, 124, 192
cooperatist school 86
corruption 7, 8, 65
cost theory 131, 192
costs, raising rivals 149, 163
countervailing power theory 155, 156, 21617,
222
Cournot, Antoine Augustin 50, 67, 83, 84, 87,
128, 129, 171, 207, 241, 292
Cyert, Richard M. 159, 274
Daems, Herman 72, 73
Dahmn, Erik 1367, 139
De Bandt, Jacques 8094
de Bruyn Kops, Jacob Leonard 4, 30, 31,
5862, 64
de Jong, Henry W. 35, 649, 5677, 124
21/5/07 12:19:16
Index
de la Court, Pieter 9, 1718, 19
de Vries, Franois 39, 656, 67, 78
defense industry 21617, 261, 2645
demand
demand-pull hypotheses 25960
effective 8, 1617, 18, 19
and pricing 21, 29, 62
and supply 78, 21, 378, 60, 62, 68, 200
see also growth
democracy 51, 149, 153, 220
Demsetz, Harold 160, 257, 2767
Denmark, industrial economics 12833, 138,
139
deregulation 149, 162, 163, 174, 1923, 21819,
248, 268, 278, 28081, 286, 289, 294
Dewey, Donald J. 160
Dirlam, Joel 156, 157, 218, 222, 274
diseconomies of scale 148, 225, 226
disequilibrium economics 4, 16, 43, 83, 85
distribution, and national income growth 125
diversification 72, 159, 262
drug industry see pharmaceuticals
duopoly 20, 132, 153, 158, 161, 162, 201
and competition 43, 44, 50, 52, 207
pricing 130, 241
see also monopoly; oligopoly
DuPont Cellophane case 157, 189
econometric studies 70, 135, 159, 161, 162
economic
agents as entrepreneurs 19, 21, 36, 378,
4042, 212
crises 96, 99100, 101, 249
development 889, 94, 97, 99, 106, 137
growth 41, 73, 102, 157
policy 389, 889, 98100, 155, 158, 222, 255
power 65, 88, 89, 152, 155, 158, 172, 176,
192, 195, 200, 220, 222, 255
restructuring 734
science, dualistic 589
use value 345
economics
of information 24043
and law 174, 235, 237
economies of scale 151, 157, 160, 191, 192,
239, 261, 265, 272
and antitrust policies 183, 184, 185
and competition 45
and consumer choice 115, 116
diseconomies 148, 225, 226
firm size 102, 137, 257, 2689
monopoly 86, 113, 176, 275
and production 70, 112, 11516, 11920, 180
economies of scope 112, 117
economies of size 112, 119, 121
301
education 21, 32, 258, 291

Edwards, Corwin D. 155
efficiency
and competition 1489, 151, 158, 177
monopoly 1489, 174, 177
production 5960, 112, 137, 138, 181
electricity industry 150, 151, 157, 161, 163, 192,
219, 2545, 256, 278, 280, 289
Ellet, Jr, Charles 150, 1712
Ellingsen, Tore 139
Ely, Richard T. 151, 190
Elzinga, Kenneth G. 162, 273
employment levels 734, 82, 107
England see UK
entrepreneurs 4, 8, 16, 96
action parameters 42
business combinations 65
business cycle 72
business risk 30
central role played by 93
conservative 40, 41
and consumer choice 34
coordinative behaviour 42
as economic agents 19, 21, 36, 378, 4042,
212
and guilds 11, 12, 1718, 56, 578, 61, 62
imitative 40, 41
incentives 21
innovation 2021, 3031, 367, 4043, 53,
60, 67, 68, 71
integrative theory 27
and interdependent markets 19
and market growth 71
motivation 36, 40
quality improvements 3031
rivalry 42
roles 3031, 36, 4041
theory foundations 1617
and uncertainty 1, 21, 30, 34, 434, 72
see also firms; managers
entry barriers 106, 133, 155, 157, 163, 220, 239,
267, 297
absolute-cost 227
and advertising 119, 120, 180, 272
market equilibrium 2247
monopolistic prices 114, 180, 200, 269, 292
and performance 229, 251
product differentiation 119
welfare issues 227
equilibrium theory 7, 15, 25, 83, 96, 120,
1289, 131, 136, 139, 211, 225, 228, 241
and competition 37, 43, 50, 65, 66, 71, 85,
115, 148
disequilibrium economics 4, 16, 43, 83, 85
21/5/07 12:19:17
302
Eucken, Walter 39, 51, 52
Europe
cloth industry 1718
competition policies 39, 43, 69, 70
industrial economics 70, 72
market theory 626, 7071
Woodpulp case 120
see also France; German language area
economists; Italy; Low Countries;
Scandinavia; UK
exit barriers 45, 67
fascism 96, 99, 105
Fellner, William J. 67, 154, 159
Ferrara, Francesco 95, 98
Fibonacci of Pisa, Leonardo 67
firms
and accounting 101, 102, 174
bounded rationality choices 103, 274
business organization 65, 668, 70, 72, 86
business stealing effects 128
business-cycle principle 72, 134, 184, 212,
213, 258
concentration 38, 3940, 856, 87, 89, 154,
155, 159, 185
cooperative relations 88, 114, 148
coordinative behaviour 42, 153
corporate governance 10, 11, 723, 11718
diversification 40, 42, 154, 155
dominance 88, 102, 121, 148, 153, 154, 160,
162, 181, 221, 292
and economic growth 41, 73, 102, 157
and economic power 88
efficient 5960, 102, 103, 115, 116, 137, 159
evolution of 159
industrial growth 1012, 102, 115, 116
innovation 45, 60, 61, 73, 86, 88, 107, 154,
159, 160
large 90, 967, 112, 154, 161, 162, 175, 176,
184, 196, 2212, 235, 262, 271, 2745
life-cycle 2823
and marketing 112
multi-market 72, 246, 265
not-for-profit third sector 149
optimal scale 37, 42, 102, 118
organizational forms 103, 105, 107
profits see profits
reputation 37
risk avoidance 156
shareholders 11718, 194, 195
size distribution 87, 102, 11415, 11820,
135, 162
tacit collusion 114, 159, 180, 203
takeovers 42, 72
trusts see trusts
Index
vertical integration 37, 42, 102, 107, 117,
120, 148, 152, 155, 156, 159, 171, 214,
226, 237
X-inefficiency 121, 149, 158, 160, 271, 272,
275
see also competition; entrepreneurs;
managers; market theory; monopoly;
oligopoly; production
Fisher, Franklin M. 160
Florence, Philip Sargent 4, 11112, 11418,
119, 120, 121, 122
Fog, Bjarke 131, 132, 134, 139
Frsund, Finn 1378, 139
Foss, Nicolai 12643
France
Champagne fairs 6
cooperatist school 86
free-market tradition 82, 84, 87
industrial economics school, emergence of
8990
inherited traditions 827
mathematicians 837
Parisian school 12, 84, 87
political economy about industrial matters
8094
franchise regulation 160, 191, 276
free-market tradition 10, 12, 82, 84, 87, 155,
160, 161, 162, 276
see also Chicago school
Freiburg school 51
Friedman, James W. 161, 162
Frisch, Ragnar 1334, 138
Fu, Giorgio 97, 105, 106, 107
Galbraith, J.K. 116, 118, 155, 156, 159, 160,
202, 21617, 2212
game theory 83, 108, 117, 130, 149, 154, 156,
158, 161, 162, 200201
gas industry 104, 161, 214, 278, 280
see also oil industry
German language area economists (19th and
20th century)
Austrian school 4, 34, 359, 65
dynamic market theory since 1960 3943
entrepreneurial roles 3031
labour and wages 312
optimal competition 435
pioneers 326, 5054
production circles 289
productivity of capital and labour 2930
Germany
competition law 69
profit sharing 32
Gibrat, Robert 87, 135, 258
Gide, Charles 856
21/5/07 12:19:17
Index
Giles of Lessines 6, 8
Glaeser, Martin G. 152, 19093, 204, 280
Gort, Michael 159
government intervention see state intervention
Graswinckel, Dirck 213
Gray, Horace M. 154, 156, 159, 221
Green, Christopher 163
Grotius, Hugo 9, 10, 12
growth
and education 32
growth-cycle theory 42, 43, 45, 712, 73, 74
and income distribution 296
and industrial development 1012
and product differentiation 258
of social product 43
and technological innovation 21113
see also demand
guilds 11, 12, 1718, 56, 578, 61, 62
Hadley, Eleanor M. 155
Harberger, Arnold 155, 156, 271, 284
Harvard group 154
Heckscher, Eli 136, 137
Hefleblower, Richard 122, 261
Hennipman, P. 68
Henry of Ghent 6, 78, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16
Herfindahl, Orris 87, 242
Heusz, Ernst 40, 41, 523
Historical school 52
Hjalmarsson, Lennart 1378, 139
Hobson, J.A. 115
Hope, Einar 13, 134, 1356
Hoppmann, Erich 45, 54
Hotelling, Harold 129, 153, 2068, 289, 296
Houssiaux, Jacques 5, 8990
human actions 256, 334, 52
human capital 159
IBM 160, 235, 262
imitators 31, 53
income inequality 213
industrial
concentration 155, 1567, 159, 160, 239
development 1014, 102, 103, 1034, 105,
107, 209
dynamics and innovation 97
growth 1012, 102, 115, 116
life-cycle 2823
policy 72, 74, 107, 222
defining 1267
English economists contribution 11125
and French political economy 8094
French school, emergence of 8990
303
international comparisons 11415, 116, 118,

119, 120, 121, 122
Italian industrial districts 1069
in Italy 95110
North America see North America
in Scandinavia 12643
X-inefficiency 121, 149, 158, 160, 271, 272,
275
industrial organization theory 83, 194, 1967,
209, 224, 22830, 23943, 2619, 288, 290,
294, 2967
and international trade 25053
see also antitrust; competition; monopoly
industrialization 5, 73, 99
inflation 45
information
asymmetries 296
economies of 241, 243
innovation 112, 158, 159, 160, 259, 272, 280,
2823
and competition 68, 72, 1489, 150, 153,
154, 162, 283
see also patents; R&D
international market and time 213
Italy
banking industry 98, 100101, 1078
industrial districts studies 1069
industrial economics in 95110
role of LIndustria 98100, 108
Jacquemin, Alex 5
Jenks, Jeremiah Whipple 151, 17982, 298
Jevons, William Stanley 32, 99, 128
Johnson, Leland L. 159, 2545
joint stock companies 18, 11213
joint ventures 72, 179, 192, 193
Jones, Eliot 152
Joskow, Paul M. 163, 289
Kahn, Alfred E. 156, 21819
Kaldor, Nicholas 115
Kamien, Morton I. 162
Kantzenbach, Erhard 43, 55
Kaplan, A.D.H. 157, 274
Kaysen, Carl 116, 155, 157, 158, 2356, 237
Kleinwchter, Friedrich 623
Knight, Frank H. 153
knowledge dissemination 21, 253, 25960
Kondratieff, N.D. 80, 85
Kwoka, John E. 163, 2616
Labini, Paolo Sylos 97, 103, 106, 292
labour
collective bargaining 174
division of 25, 59, 82, 87, 93
21/5/07 12:19:17
304
productivity of 2930, 312
real labour cost theory 73, 74
and wages 312
see also wage levels
laissez-faire 173, 196, 222
Lambers, Henk Wilm 58, 67, 68, 72, 789
Lanzillotti, Robert F. 157, 274
laws of returns 115, 1734
Le Play, Frdrich 84
Leibenstein, Harvey J. 160, 271, 272
Lerner, Abba P. 153
Levy, H. 35, 367, 38, 39, 42, 43
Liefmann, Robert 38, 78, 246
List, Friedrich 4, 99
Low Countries
1800s 5664
1900s 6474
agriculture 279
see also Netherlands
MacAvoy, Paul W. 161, 2789
McGee, John 121, 243
Machlup, Fritz 156, 246
macroeconomics 6, 27, 578, 73, 81, 83, 85,
131, 134, 212, 259
mainstream economics 82, 87, 137, 152, 157,
160
management costs, and firm sizes 160
managers
and competition 434
corporation 723, 196
diverse motivations 148, 155, 156, 157
and entrepreneurs, distinction between 30,
82
firm size and growth 72, 1023, 115, 117,
155, 2823
industrial, production 97, 101
joint stock companies 11213
managementlabor coalitions 222
see also entrepreneurs; firms
Mansfield, Edwin 159, 297
manufacturing industry 20, 116, 132
March, James G. 159, 274
Marchal, Jean 39
marginal utility school of value 323
marginalism 32, 33, 86, 95, 98, 99, 128, 200
Marion, Bruce 2324
market
dominance 148, 149, 150, 151, 221
growthdecline paradigm 39
signaling 291
structureconductperformance (SCP)
paradigm see structureconduct
performance (SCP) paradigm
Index
market power
advertising and 162, 180
and economic performance 2678
and free society 22021
inefficiency and 152, 156
political activities and 161
and pricing 289
and quality 163
structural foundations 220
welfare costs 162, 284
market structure
and advertising 112
concentration ratios 194, 217, 22022, 257,
2623
holding company system 2034
and market behavior 232
and market share 267
non-socialist during 1970s 2978
market theory
contestable 294
dynamic analysis (since 1960) 3945
economics of information 24043
and equilibrium 5051
in Europe 626
French political economy about industrial
matters 8094
German language area economists (19th and
20th century) 2755
history of 35
and institutional structure 34
and interdependency 54
in Low Countries 5679
medieval background 67
private and social interests, divergence
between 39
scholastic economics see scholastic
economics
welfare considerations 423
see also competition; firms; monopoly;
oligopoly
Markham, Jesse W. 156, 183, 199, 209, 261
Marshall, Alfred 4, 11, 35, 65, 67, 78, 84,
11114, 115, 118, 122, 1245, 157, 200,
259
studies of 97, 106
Martin, Stephen 163, 2457, 2825
Marxism 35, 93, 154, 16061, 214
Mason, Edward S. 122, 154, 179, 188, 197,
20910, 230
Masson, Robert T. 162, 230
mathematical economics 837, 128, 150, 154,
172, 207, 221, 254, 257, 296, 297
Means, Gardiner C. 72, 115, 152, 153, 155,
157, 159, 1948, 2034, 239, 258, 274
21/5/07 12:19:17
Index
mediation 13, 1415, 19
Melman, Seymour 160
Menger, Carl 8, 325, 36, 37, 43, 128
mercantilism 6, 21
mergers 67, 72, 11718, 133, 148, 149, 150, 156,
160, 162, 221, 242, 257, 263
and antitrust 220
and competition 41, 42, 44, 54, 2378, 294
and economies of scale 275
and efficiency 1512, 2656
growth-cycle theory 41, 423, 71
litigation 189
and market share 283
notification program 233
state intervention 42, 119, 191
and technical progress 121
X-inefficiency 272
see also cartels; monopoly
Meyer, John R. 158, 163, 2489
microeconomics 85, 95, 128, 150, 219, 271
Microsoft case 122
Mirabeau, Comte de 20
Mllgard, Peter 12643
Molina, Luis 9, 11, 13
Momigliano, Franco 97, 103, 105, 106
monetary studies 96
monopolist competition 359, 59, 121, 1289,
1312, 14950, 1534, 162, 199203, 239,
278, 297
hindrance to 612
and innovation 68, 72, 283
latent 38, 66
optimal competition 434
monopoly
and advertising 119, 272
bilateral 83, 128, 129
capital 160, 180
and competition see monopolist competition
conflicts of interest 17
costs and investment 159
and demand elasticity 289, 2967
duopoly see duopoly
early references 910, 22
economic dominance 102, 121
and economic power 88, 89, 152, 155, 158,
172, 176, 192, 200, 222, 255
and economies of scale 86, 113, 116, 176,
275
effects of 149, 150
and efficiency 1489, 174, 177
franchise 160, 191, 276
and free enterprise 188
index of 153
305
inefficiencies 103
and innovation 1489, 159, 21213, 283
joint stock companies 18, 11213
natural 86, 113, 120, 151, 294
in oligopoly markets see oligopoly
profits 21, 2256
restrictive practices 118, 121
vertical 171, 237
and wealth distribution 160, 2723
see also antitrust; cartels; competition; firms;
industrial organization theory; market
theory
monopoly pricing 1112, 43, 129, 130, 131,
132, 156, 160, 171, 257
economic power 152, 172, 176, 192, 200
and economies of scale 113, 1212
and entry barriers 114, 120
industry structure 257
marginal-revenue curve 153
see also price discrimination
Montesquieu 9
Moody, John 151
Morgenstern, Oskar 83, 117, 154
Mueller, Dennis C. 162, 2825
Mueller, Willard F. 157, 161, 1879, 2324
multinationals 2523
Munthe, Preben 1345, 138
Nash, John 83, 156
National Socialism 5051
nationalization 66
Navarro (Martin de Azpilcueta) 12
Nelson, James R. 155, 157
Nelson, Richard R. 1589, 260
neoclassical theory 4, 38, 40, 83, 84, 1334,
150, 160, 248, 267, 271, 282, 283
opposition to 85, 87
substitution of production factors 73
Netherlands
Competition Laws 45, 689
dynamic market theory 4043
East India Company 12, 18, 56
grain trade 223
see also Low Countries
New Deal reforms 173, 190
new entrants 71, 11314, 148, 176, 257, 292
new institutional economics 78, 274
new social sciences 96
Nobel Dynamite Trust-Company 63
Noll, Roger G. 158, 162, 2867
Norfolk agricultural system 279
North America
1880s1900s 15051
19001930 1512, 1712
21/5/07 12:19:17
306
Index
1930s 1524, 194210

1940s and 1950s 1548, 21149
1960s1985 15863, 25098
see also United States
Norway, industrial economics in 1336, 138
Oberender, Peter 41, 5055
oil
industry 65, 150, 152, 161, 180, 209, 21415,
218, 221, 228, 264, 278, 279, 297
shocks 96, 107, 221, 296
oligopoly 83, 97, 132, 160, 163, 220
actionreaction interdependency 523
and cooperation 202, 225
economic power 152, 200, 222
and economics of information 2412
and economies of scale 113, 121
entry barriers 120
and industry structure 162, 257
and innovation 106, 212, 216
and pricing 1534, 155
pricing 39, 131, 196, 228
problems and business organization 668
tight 45, 148, 157, 159, 201, 235, 237, 280
see also duopoly; market theory; monopoly
Olivetti, Adriano 96, 97, 1045
Oresmius, Nicolas 12
overhead costs 1845
ownership and control, separation of 1945
Pantaleoni, Maffeo 96, 98, 101
Pareto, Vilfredo 50, 84, 87, 96
Parisian school 12, 84, 87
patents 61, 113, 156, 180, 218, 227, 259, 261,
262, 263
see also innovation; R&D
Peck, Merton J. 158, 209, 248
Peltzman, Sam 162, 23944, 288
Penrose, Edith Tilton 117, 157, 159
Perroux, Franois 879, 94
petroleum see oil industry
pharmaceuticals industry 159, 162, 272, 288
Phillips, Almarin 159
physiocrats 2021, 27
Pierson, Nicolas Gerard 62
Pillsbury Mills case 189
political economy 97
Portugal, Salamanca school 9, 12, 13, 15, 16
poverty 61, 258
Preston, Lee E. 159
price
administered 153, 155, 194, 1956, 258
bargaining 12930
collusion 149, 2412
competition 45
competitive (just) 7, 89, 1014, 15, 20, 25,
656, 191
and concentration 160
cooperation 153
determination 117
economics of information 24043
and economies of scale 113
equilibrium 4, 21, 25, 79
evolutions 85
fixing 78, 11, 1216, 17, 19, 65, 66, 132,
2334, 246
formation and effects 33, 789
horizontal agreements 134
and industrial concentration 70
inflation 197
law of one 240
leadership 156
long-term movements and growth 85
market and production cost 62
movable 1416, 19, 66
natural see price, competitive (just)
pricecost margins 17982, 227
published 68
Ramsey 158, 246, 294
regulation 66, 160, 177, 203
resale price maintenance 243
restraint 73
rigidity 239
and scarcity 223
sustainability 158
transaction 68
and trusts see trusts
wars 50
and wealth 22
see also profits
price discrimination 152, 155, 171, 178, 292
and monopoly power 149, 1912, 294
overhead costs 177, 185, 21415, 246
see also monopoly pricing
pricing
authoritative 11, 1213, 17, 22
business pricing problems 70
and cartels see cartels
collective 130
control 656, 156
and costs 11, 38, 70, 117, 13031, 132, 163
and demand and supply 78, 21, 378, 60,
62, 68, 200
differential 192
flexible 157, 196
free-market 11, 12, 1416, 178
full-cost 13031, 132
21/5/07 12:19:18
Index
and industry structure 257
limit 157, 162, 181, 225
marginal-cost 157, 206, 2078, 219, 225, 238,
240, 2412, 246, 257, 278, 292
marginal principle 130, 131, 132
and market power 289
model, discreditation of 656
monopoly see monopoly pricing
predatory 11314, 12021, 149, 1578, 162,
178, 237, 238, 243, 246, 292
profit obstacles, removal of 21
ruinous 152, 185
short-run 185
strategic 148
see also profits
prisoners dilemma 201
private property ownership 25, 83, 85
privatization 100, 101, 1078, 249
Prodi, Romano 95, 97, 107, 1089
product differentiation 44, 119, 180, 2067,
226, 228, 252, 258, 289
production
circles 289, 102
and consumer demand 11516
cooperatives 65
cost and market price 62
deviation 656
and economic power 88, 90
economies of scale 70, 112, 11516, 11920,
180
efficiency 5960, 112, 137, 138, 181
evolutions 85
functions with indivisibilities 132
global system analysis 85
and human needs 33, 34
management of industrial 97, 101
modernization 103
multi-product variety 2912
neoclassical theory 1334
organization of 856
overproduction 93, 216
and unemployment 105
vertically disintegrated 34, 122
welfare issues 65
productivity
of capital and labour 2930
gap 120
profits
and advertising 162
and concentration 242
high, causes of 290
and market growth 19, 35
307
maximizing 117, 157, 185, 197, 204, 245,

271, 274
maximization, calculus-based theory 171,
172
net yield 21, 30
persistence 2834
and predatory behaviour 113
and production efficiency 5960
sales maximization 245
sharing 32
and uncertainty 30, 153
see also price; pricing
Progressive reforms 173
proportional effect, law of 87
protectionism 4, 12, 37, 42, 61, 63, 96, 98, 99,
222
see also cartels
Proudhon, Pierre Joseph 84
public regulation policies 17, 149, 151, 152,
158, 162, 1734, 190, 251, 253, 2545
Quesnay, Franois 20, 21, 39
R&D 107, 252, 2623, 265, 282, 283, 297
see also innovation; patents
radical political economists 16061
rail industry 150, 152, 158, 172, 196, 219, 249,
254, 278, 280
see also transportation industries
rationalization 16, 17, 38, 42, 65, 66, 11920
regulation
airlines 159
and competition 163, 220
and consumer choice 188, 191
deregulation 149, 162, 163, 174, 1923,
21819, 248, 268, 278, 28081, 286, 289,
294
harmful effects of 188, 2545
and investment levels 254
oil industry see oil industry
pharmaceuticals 162
public policies 17, 149, 151, 152, 158, 162,
1734, 190, 251, 253, 2545
television industry 158, 162
utility see utility regulation
restrictive practices 118, 121
Ricardo, David 27, 83
Ripley, William Z. 152, 190
Rist, Charles 86
Robinson, E.A.G. 4, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115,
11822, 297
Robinson, Joan 35, 78, 129, 152, 153, 199, 200,
201
21/5/07 12:19:18
308
Index
Rosenbluth, Gideon 1567

Rubinstein, Ariel 130
Rudolf, Thomas 5055
Saint Simon, Comte de 81, 83
Salamanca school 9, 12, 13, 15, 16
Salop, Steven C. 163
Saraceno, Pasquale 97, 1014, 105
Say, Jean-Baptiste 4, 30, 82, 84, 85, 90, 93
Scandinavia, industrial economics in 12643
see also individual countries
Scherer, Frederic M. 112, 119, 132, 158, 160,
1712, 21113, 229, 25660, 2616, 2913,
297
Schmalensee, Richard 162, 163, 28990
Schmookler, Jacob 160, 25960
scholastic economics 6, 721, 25
just price see price, competitive
see also individual countries, pioneers and
schools
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 8, 9, 10, 33, 356, 39,
41, 60, 68, 72, 84, 85, 93, 94, 137, 139, 154,
21113, 261
Schwartz, Nancy L. 162
service industries 19, 74
Shepherd, William G. 14767, 20910, 21419,
230, 2356, 2545, 26770, 27181,
28690, 2945
Shubik, Martin 158
Siegfried, John J. 161
Simiand, Franois 85
Simon, Herbert 135, 274, 298
Simons, Henry C. 153
Sismondi, Simonde de 83
SMEs 66, 86, 87, 90, 105, 106, 107, 119, 121
Smith, Adam 4, 10, 11, 12, 18, 256, 28, 33, 35,
39, 71, 78, 83, 93, 124
Srgard, Lars 139
social product, growth and optimal
distribution of 43
socio-economic tradition 83, 84, 85, 87
solidarity principles 86
Spain, Salamanca school 9, 12, 13, 15, 16
spatial location 153
specialization 107, 137
Spence, Michael 162, 2913, 296, 297
Spiegel, Henry W. 13
sports industry 162, 286
Spychalski, John C. 2489
Standard Oil 150, 151, 182, 184
state intervention 51, 61, 67, 83, 84, 97, 98,
99100, 102, 190, 191
and cartels 42, 51, 634
competition policy 69, 176, 182
economic development 71, 1034, 106

price regulation 66, 177
and returns 1734
statistics 56, 58, 70, 258
steel industry 73, 150, 152, 156, 180, 222, 256
Stenason, John 158, 248
Stigler, George J. 116, 157, 227, 23944, 256,
258, 269, 276, 288
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 163, 291, 2968
Stocking, George Ward 152, 157, 1879, 232
structureconductperformance (SCP)
paradigm 89, 116, 122, 152, 154, 155, 157,
163, 179, 20910, 2279, 250, 268
challenge to 90, 95, 160, 161, 251, 276
and seller concentration 2568
subcontracting 107
subsidies 42, 50, 72, 159, 191, 193, 2489
substitution principle 124, 134
supply and demand see demand
survivor analysis 269
sustainability 162, 294
Sweden, industrial economics in 1369
Sweezy, Paul M. 1534, 160, 161
syndicates 623
tariffs 10, 63, 70, 99, 137, 207
taxation 58, 213, 253
technology
flows, inter-industry 25960, 263
innovation 107, 21113, 2212, 25960,
2614
progress 99, 102, 1034, 138, 160, 190, 196
telecommunications 64, 150, 151, 161, 192,
205, 219, 254, 255, 280, 281
television industry 158, 162, 286
Telser, Lester 243
Theater Enterprises case 202
Thomas Aquinas 6, 8, 9
Thorelli, Hans 136
time as analytical element 1245
trade unions 65, 66, 105, 107, 155, 213
transaction costs 148, 160, 161, 274
transportation industries 156, 162, 172, 173,
191, 2489, 251, 257, 278, 280, 288
see also airline industry; automobile
industry; rail industry
Trebing, Harry M. 161, 1734, 19093, 2035,
28081
trusts 35, 36, 37, 38, 44, 623, 645, 78, 150,
151, 17582, 184
see also cartels
Turgot, Anne Robert Jacques 20, 82
Turner, Donald F. 155, 157, 158, 235, 2378,
275, 292
Tydeman, H.W. 568, 62
21/5/07 12:19:18
Index
UK
Corn Laws 23
deindustrialization 73
East India Company 12
English economists contribution to
industrial economics 11125
Norfolk system of agriculture 279
profit sharing 32
uncertainty 1617
in economic transactions 33
and entrepreneurs 1, 21, 30, 34, 434, 72
and profits 30, 153
unemployment 61, 105, 118, 213, 241
United States
CellerKefauver Act 1889
Chicago school 153, 158, 160, 222, 2256,
243, 264, 269, 276, 288
DuPont Cellophane case 157, 189, 201
Pillsbury Mills case 189
RobinsonPatman Act 155
Sherman Antitrust Act 184, 188, 202
Theater Enterprises case 202
United Shoe Machinery case 157, 235
see also North America
utility regulation 153, 154, 19093, 2035, 218,
276, 294
airlines 219
and efficiency 192, 204
electricity 150, 151, 157, 161, 163, 192, 219,
2545, 256, 278, 280, 289
gas 104, 161, 214, 278, 280
holding companies 2034
mainstream methods 152
rail 219
telecommunications 219, 28081, 294
transportation 157
water 219
see also deregulation
utility theory of value 93, 136
Utton, Michael 4, 11123
van der Schalk, Willem 634
vertical integration 37, 42, 102, 107, 117, 120,
148, 152, 155, 156, 159, 171, 214, 226,
237
vertical restraint 264, 272
Vickrey, William 157
Vissering, Simon 62
309
von Hayek, Friedrich 33, 45, 54, 67

von Neumann, John 83, 117, 154
von Stackelberg, Heinrich 5051, 52, 129, 131
von Thnen, Johann 4, 278, 2930, 312, 33
von Wieser, Friedrich 33, 35, 36, 67, 78
wage levels
and labour 312
long-term movements and growth 85
marginal productivity theory 175
and productivity 312, 120, 175
and profit-sharing 32
rational 128
subsistence 31, 32
wage restraint 73, 74
see also labour
Walras, Lon 50, 83, 845, 87, 94, 99, 1289,
136
wealth
chrematistics 83
distribution 589, 61
distribution and monopoly 160, 2723
and division of labour 25
and innovation 61
and population size 28
and price 22
production and competition 59
Wedervang, Frystein 134, 135, 138
Weiss, Leonard W. 159, 237, 2568, 273
welfare
market power 423, 162, 284
and production 65
Wibaut, F.M. 645
Wilcox, Clair 154
Williamson, Oliver E. 160, 161, 237, 272, 273,
2745, 289, 292
Willig, Robert D. 162, 2945
Wilson, Thomas A. 112, 160, 257, 272
Winding Pedersen, H. 130, 131, 132, 134, 138,
139
Woodpulp case 120
X-efficiency 149
X-inefficiency 121, 158, 160, 271, 272, 275
Zeuthen, Frederik 12831, 132, 138
Zijlstra, Jelle 689
21/5/07 12:19:18

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Pioneers of Industrial Organization

de Jong 00 pre iii

Henry W. de Jong and William G. Shepherd 2007

A catalogue record for this book

ISBN 978 1 84376 434 2

Introduction to the pioneers and the issues

MARKET THEORY AND ITS PIONEERS IN EUROPE

1. Introduction to market theory and its European pioneers

7. The contributions of three English economists to the development of

PIONEERS OF THE FIELD IN THE USA AND CANADA

9. Introduction to the pioneers in North America

Individual pioneers in the USA and Canada

10. To the 1930s

John Kenneth Galbraith

de Jong 00 pre vii

M. Dennis Cary Mueller

de Jong 00 pre viii

Sam Peltzman Professor of Economics, Graduate School of Business, University of

de Jong 00 pre xii

About the editors

MOST RELEVANT PUBLICATIONS

de Jong 00 pre xiii

About the editors

(19762004), Editor of the series: Studies in Industrial Organization (with A. Jacquemin

MOST RELEVANT PUBLICATIONS

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About the editors

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de Jong 00 pre xvii

de Jong 00 pre xviii

Introduction to the pioneers and the issues

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Introduction to the pioneers and the issues

Introduction to the pioneers and the issues

WHO IS INCLUDED, AND WHY

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Introduction to the pioneers and the issues

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Introduction to the pioneers and the issues

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Introduction to the pioneers and the issues

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Introduction to the pioneers and the issues

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Introduction to the pioneers and the issues

HOW THE FIELDS MAIN TOPICS HAVE EVOLVED

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Introduction to the pioneers and the issues

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Introduction to the pioneers and the issues

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Introduction to the pioneers and the issues

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Introduction to the pioneers and the issues

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Introduction to the pioneers and the issues

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Introduction to the pioneers and the issues

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Market theory and its pioneers in Europe