Dizon Rivera Vs Dizon Digest
Dizon Rivera Vs Dizon Digest
Dizon Rivera Vs Dizon Digest
FACTS:
On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato Rosales and their
two children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosario, predeceased her, leaving
behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. Magna Rosales Acebes
instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. The trial court ordered that Fortunato,
Magna, Macikequerox and Antonio be entitled each to share in the estate of decedent. Irenea, on the other hand,
insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the
deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Irenea is entitled to inherit from her mother-in-law.
RULING:
No. Under the law, intestate or legal heirs are classified into two groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right,
and those who inherit by the right of representation. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow
(surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The law has already meticulously enumerated the intestate
heirs of a decedent. The Court held that Irenea misinterpreted the provision of Article 887 because the provision refers
to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the
estate of a parent-in-law. Therefore, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the
parent-in-law.
The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of testaments, and to paraphrase an
early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will, amount to the only law
whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and
legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Thus,
the oppositors proposition for partition cannot be given effect.
ON PARTITION: The testamentary disposition of the decedent was in the nature of a partition. In her will, the
decedent noted that after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the expenses of her last illness
and funeral and the expenses for the probate of her last will and for the administration of her property in accordance with
law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish and I command that my property be divided" in
accordance with the dispositions immediately thereafter following, whereby she specified each real property
in her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven compulsory heirs and seven other
grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. This was a valid partition of her estate, as contemplated
and authorized in the first paragraph of Art 1080 NCC, providing that "Should a person make a partition of
his estate by an act inter vivos or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice
the legitime of the compulsory heirs."
CAB: This was properly complied with in the executors project of partition as the oppositors were adjudicated the
properties respectively distributed and assigned to them by the decedent in her will and the differential to complete their
legitimes were taken from the cash and/or properties of Marina and Tomas, who were obviously favored by the decedent in
her will.
Aside from the provisions of Art 906 and 907, other codal provisions support the executrix-appellee's project of partition as
approved by the lower court rather than the counter-project of partition proposed by oppositors-appellants whereby they
would reduce the testamentary disposition or partition made by the testatrix to one-half and limit the same, which they
would consider as mere devises and legacies, to one-half of the estate as the disposable free portion, and apply the other
half of the estate to payment of the legitimes of the seven compulsory heirs. Oppositors' proposal would amount
substantially to a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the testatrix's will, contrary to Art 791 NCC.
EFFECT OF PARTITION: 'A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property
adjudicated to him", from the death of her ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter, and, she cannot be
deprived of her rights thereto except by the methods provided for by law
DEVISES: The adjudication and assignments in the testatrix's will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot be
considered all devises, for it clearly appears from the whole context of the will and the dispositions by the testatrix of her
whole estate (save for some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion) that her clear
intention was to partition her whole estate through her will. Furthermore, the testatrix's intent that her testamentary
dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions
were therefore on account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in the fourth
paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I
likewise command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die before I do, his
forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased."
COLLATION: Collation is not applicable in this case because here, distribution and partition of the entire estate was made
by the testatrix, without her having made any previous donations during her lifetime which would require collation to
determine the legitime of each heir nor having left merely some properties by will which would call for the application of
Art 1061 to 1063 of the Civil Code on collation.
CAN THE OPPOSITORS DEMAND MORE THAN THEIR LEGITIME? No. Their right was merely to demand completion of their
legitime under Article 906 of the Civil Code and this has been complied with in the approved project of partition, and they
can no longer demand a further share from the remaining portion of the estate, as bequeathed and partitioned by the
testatrix principally to the executrix-appellee.
OTHERS:
The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one
which will render any of the expressions inoperative. Of the two projects of partition submitted by the contending
parties, that project which will give the greatest effect to the testamentary disposition should be adopted. Thus, where
the testatrix enumerated the specific properties to be given to each compulsory heir and the testatrix repeatedly used
the words "I bequeath" was interpreted to mean a partition of the estate by an act mortis causa, rather than as an
attempt on her part to give such properties as devises to the designated beneficiaries. Accordingly, the specific
properties assigned to each compulsory heir were deemed to be in full or partial payment of legitime, rather than a
distribution in the nature of devises.
The tenor of the decision notwithstanding, it is important to note the provision of Article 886 which reads: "Legitime is
that part of the testator's property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for certain heirs who
are, therefore, called compulsory heirs." Article 886 is couched upon a negative prohibition "cannot dispose of". In the
will under consideration, the testatrix disposed of practically her entire estate by designating a beneficiary for each
property. Necessarily, the testamentary dispositions included that portion of the estate called "legitime." It is thus
imperative to reconcile the tenor of Article 1080 (which is the basis of the following decision) with Article 886.
4. The intention to exempt from collation should be expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the
general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a clear indication of that intention, we apply not the exception but
the rule, which is categorical enough.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Locsin v CA
Facts:
Don Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina Jaucian Locsin, as the sole
and universal heir of all his properties. The spouses being childless, had agreed that their properties, after both of
them shall have died should revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his
"Locsin relatives" (i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives."
Don Mariano died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In due time, his will was probated
in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any opposition from both sides of the family. Don Mariano relied
on Doa Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years after his death, as if in obedience to his
voice from the grave, and fully cognizant that she was also advancing in years, Doa Catalina began transferring, by
sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties to their respective nephews and nieces.
She made the following sales and donation of properties which she had received from her husband's estate, to his
Locsin nephews and nieces:
Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 she had made a will affirming and
ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives. After the
reading of her will, all the relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for probate because the
properties devised to them under the will had already been conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still
alive, except some legacies which the executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to
distribute.
In 1989, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had already received their legacies and hereditary
shares from her estate, filed action in the RTC-Legaspi to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins
during her lifetime, alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and intended solely to
circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest to Doa Catalina did not join the action.
After the trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Jaucian, and against the Locsin. The CA affirmed the said
decion,hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, are entitled to inherit the properties
which she had already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death.
Held: NO
They are not entitled since those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued
thereto since the opening of the succession."
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs
until such time.
Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer
formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the
property that remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs.
Even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to
impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents
since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs.
Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any such, hence there
were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property during her lifetime . All that the
respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject
only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke:
Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor or part thereof, provided he reserves, in
full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the
acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation
shall be reduced on petition of any person affected.
Petition for review is granted.
Allegedly, AgatonaGuevarra (Guevarra) inherited a property from Justina Navarro, which is now under possession of
the heirs of Guevarra. Guevarra had six children, one of them is Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez
Manongsong (Manongsong). The respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez claimed that the property was
actually sold to them by Justina Navarro prior to her death. The respondents presented deed of sale dated October 11,
1957. Milagros and CarlitoManongsong (petitioners) filed a Complaint on June 19, 1992 praying for the partition and
award to them of an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5), by right of representation. The RTC ruled that the conveyance
made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the property conveyed had a conjugal character and that
AgatonaGuevarra as her compulsory heir should have the legal right to participate with the distribution of the estate
under question to the exclusion of others. The Deed of Sale did not at all provide for the reserved legitime or the heirs,
and, therefore it has no force and effect against AgatonaGuevarra and should be declared a nullity ab initio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the rights of the compulsory heirs were impaired by the alleged sale of the property by Justina.
RULING:
No. The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public document and prima facie
evidence of its authenticity and due execution. There is no basis for the trial courts declaration that the sale embodied
in the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a disposition inter vivos
by lucrative or gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller. When
the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of values,
that is, the property sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration. The Property was sold in 1957 for
P250.00.
The trial courts conclusion that the Property was conjugal, hence the sale is void ab initio was not based on evidence,
but rather on a misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife. The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the property was
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired
the Property during her marriage.
Spouses Joaquin v. CA
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari
Doctrine: The legitime of a compulsory heir is merely inchoate and vests only upon the death of the parents. While
still alive, the parents are free to dispose of their properties, provided such dispositions are not made in fraud of
creditors.
Facts:
Spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and
Natividad, as well as of defendants Fidel, Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe and Gavino.
Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale of real property executed by defendant
parents in favour of their co-defendant children.
The plaintiff children are claiming that no actual valid consideration for the deeds of sale were made and that
the purported sale was the result of a deliberate conspiracy designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the
compulsory heirs of their legitime.
Issue: Were the deeds of sale by the parents to their co-defendant children valid? Yes.
Ruling:
The right of children to the properties of their parents, as compulsory heirs, is merely inchoate and vests only
upon the parents death. While still alive, parents are free to dispose of their properties, provided such
dispositions are not made in fraud of creditors.
Compulsory heirs have the right to a legitime but such right is contingent since said right commences only
from the moment of death of the decedent.
There can be no legitime to speak of prior to the death of their parents. In determining the legitime, the value
of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered.
The legitime of a compulsory heir is computed as of the time of the death of the decedent. Plaintiffs cannot
claim an impairment of their legitime while their parents live.
The testimony of the defendants particularly that of the father will show that the Deeds of Sale were all
executed for valuable consideration.
Petitioners failed to show that the prices in the Deeds of Sale were absolutely simulated.