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Count One of The Indictment Is Clearly Sufficient in This Case

The United States filed a response opposing the defendant's motion to dismiss Count One of the indictment. The response argues that (1) Count One sufficiently alleges the requisite intent for a Sherman Act conspiracy charge, (2) the indictment sufficiently informs the defendant of the charges against him by specifying the time, place, manner, means and effect of the alleged bid-rigging conspiracy, and (3) willfulness is not an element of a Sherman Act offense that needs to be proven. The government requests that the court deny the defendant's motion to dismiss Count One.

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63 views

Count One of The Indictment Is Clearly Sufficient in This Case

The United States filed a response opposing the defendant's motion to dismiss Count One of the indictment. The response argues that (1) Count One sufficiently alleges the requisite intent for a Sherman Act conspiracy charge, (2) the indictment sufficiently informs the defendant of the charges against him by specifying the time, place, manner, means and effect of the alleged bid-rigging conspiracy, and (3) willfulness is not an element of a Sherman Act offense that needs to be proven. The government requests that the court deny the defendant's motion to dismiss Count One.

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legalmatters
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS


HOUSTON DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )


)
v. ) Criminal No.: H-92-152
)
JOHN J. JOHNSON, )
) (filed 3/9/94)
Defendant. )
)

GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION


TO DISMISS COUNT ONE OF THE INDICTMENT
The United States, through its undersigned

attorneys hereby responds to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count


One of the Indictment.
I
Count One of the Indictment is
Clearly Sufficient in this Case

"To determine the sufficiency of an indictment, the


court must examine the entire document to ascertain whether it

contains the elements of the offense charged and apprises the


accused of the nature of the charge so as to enable him to
prepare a defense." Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 764,

83 S.Ct. 1038, 1047 (1962). The test for validity is not whether
the indictment could have been framed in a more satisfactory
manner, but whether it conforms to minimal Constitutional
standards. United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir.
1989). Furthermore, courts have routinely held that indictments
which are tardily challenged on such grounds are liberally

construed in favor of validity. United States v. Edmonson, 962


F.2d 1535, 1542 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Pheaster, 544
F.2d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 1976).

A. Count One of the Indictment Alleges the Requisite


Intent

Defendant contends that Count One of the Indictment


fails to sufficiently state an offense under Section One of the
Sherman Act, because it fails to allege that the defendant acted
with the requisite intent.
"While requisite intent must be pled and proved in any

criminal prosecution arising out of the Sherman Act", United


States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436-48 & n. 20,
98 S.Ct. 2864, 2873-2876 & n.20, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978), the

"charge of conspiracy to violate the criminal law has implicit in


it the elements of knowledge and intent." Schnautz v. United
States, 268 F.2d 525, 529 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 910

(1959); United States v. Metropolitan Enterprises, Inc., 728 F.2d


444 (10th Cir. 1984).
The Supreme Court in Frohwerk v. United States held that

"intent to accomplish an object cannot be alleged more clearly


than by stating that parties conspired to accomplish it." 249
U.S. 204 (1919). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held in Schnautz

v. United States, that the omission of the word "knowingly" does


not make an indictment defective, the charge of conspiracy to
violate a criminal law has implicit in it the elements of
knowledge and intent. 263 F.2d at 529; see also Williams v.
United States, 208 F.2d 447, 449 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied
347 U.S. 928 (1954).
More recently, the Fifth Circuit in United States v.
Wilson, 884 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1989), and the cases cited
therein have routinely rejected challenges to indictments that
omit the mens rea requirement. See United States v. De La Rosa,
911 F.2d 985, 989 (5th Cir. 1990). These cases require that the
indictment "fairly import" the mental state. Id. Specifically,

Wilson holds that the law does not compel a ritual of words, and
a recitation of the exact scienter ("knowing") is not required
when the pleading fairly imports intent. 884 F.2d at 176. In

this case, the indictment fairly imports this knowledge by not


only explicitly designating Count I a conspiracy count in the
heading and citing to 15 U.S.C. § 1, Id., but also by the

allegations of overt acts related to the bid-rigging conspiracy.


See United States v. Hodges, 556 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1977).

B. The Indictment Sufficiently Informs the Defendant of


the Charges Against Him

In United States v. Mobil Materials, Inc., the Tenth


Circuit analyzed a case directly on point, holding a bid-rigging

indictment sufficiently informed the defendant of the charges


against him. 871 F.2d 902, 906 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1043 (1989). For purposes of testing the sufficiency of

the indictment, the essential elements of a conspiracy under


section 1 of the Sherman Act are time, place, manner, means, and
effect. Id. Following the analysis of Mobil Materials, the
requirement of time is satisfied in this case where the
indictment against the defendant alleges a bid-rigging conspiracy
occurred between 1985 and May 1990. The place element is
satisfied by the indictment's allegation that the conspiracy took
place within the Southern District of Texas. The indictment sets
out the manner and means of the conspiracy in paragraphs 8 and 9

by alleging that the defendant and his co-conspirators, among


other things, discussed bids; designated which corporate
co-conspirator would be the lowest responsive bidder on
contracts; discussed and agreed upon prices to be submitted on
bids; refrained from bidding or submitted intentionally high,
complementary bids; and supplied wholesale grocery products at

noncompetitive prices.
Finally, the effect requirement is met through the
allegation that the conspiracy was within the flow of and

substantially affected interstate commerce, as well as through


alleging that the bids rigged by defendant and his
co-conspirators were not competitive. Thus, the indictment in

this case, not to mention the numerous bills of particulars,


sufficiently apprise the defendant of the charges against him.
II
Willfulness is not an Element of Count One of the Indictment

The government's only burden is to prove that the per se


agreement alleged was in fact made, and that the defendant
knowingly and intentionally joined that agreement. United States
v. All Star Industries, 962 F.2d 465, 474 and n. 18 (5th Cir.
1992). Willfulness is not an element of a Sherman Act offense.
See, Government's Pre-trial Memorandum of Law pp. 18-20.
CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the government requests that


the defendant's motion be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

"/s/"
JANE E. PHILLIPS
JOAN E. MARSHALL
MARK R. ROSMAN
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Antitrust Division
1100 Commerce Street, Room 8C6
Dallas, Texas 75242-0898
(214) 767-8051
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the

Government's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count One


of the Indictment and proposed Order has been served this 9th
day of March, 1994, upon:

Lynne Liberato, Esq.


Haynes And Boone, L.L.P.
1600 Smith Street
Suite 3700
Houston, Texas 77002-3445
Courtesy copy:
Sandra Morehead, Esq.
Joel M. Androphy, Esq.
Berg & Androphy
3704 Travis Street
Houston, Texas 77002

"/s/"
JANE E. PHILLIPS
Attorney
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )


)
v. ) Criminal No.: H-92-152
)
JOHN J. JOHNSON, )
)
Defendant. )
)
O R D E R

HAVING DULY CONSIDERED Defendant's Motion to


Dismiss Count One and the government's response,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED.


DONE AND ENTERED THIS day of , 1994.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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