RepublicofthePhilippines

SupremeCourt
Manila

THIRDDIVISION

NENALAZALITATATING,G.R.No.155208
Petitioner,
Present:

YNARESSANTIAGO,J.,
Chairperson,
versusAUSTRIAMARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,SR.,
CHICONAZARIO,and
NACHURA,JJ.

FELICIDADTATINGMARCELLA,
representedbySALVADORMARCELLA,
CARLOSTATING,andtheCOURTOF
APPEALS,Promulgated:
Respondents.March27,2007
xx

DECISION

AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,J.:

[1]
Assailed in the Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the Court are the Decision
dated February 22, 2002 and the Resolution dated August 22, 2002 of the Court of
[2]
Appeals(CA)inCAG.R.CVNo.64122,whichaffirmedtheDecision oftheRegional

TrialCourt(RTC)ofCadizCity,NegrosOccidental,Branch60.
ThepresentcasearosefromacontroversyinvolvingaparceloflanddenominatedasLot
56ofSubdivisionplanPsd31182,locatedatAbelardeSt.,CadizCity,NegrosOccidental.
Thesubjectlot,containinganareaof200squaremeters,wasownedbyDanielaSolano
Vda.deTating(Daniela)asevidencedbyTransferCertificateofTitle(TCT)No.T4393
[3]
issuedbytheRegistryofDeedsoftheCityofCadiz.

On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein
petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract of sale was embodied in a duly
[4]
notarizedDeedofAbsoluteSaleexecutedbyDanielainfavorofNena. Subsequently,
[5]
title over the subject property was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the
property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the
[6]
years1972,1973,1975to1986and1988. However,thelandremainedinpossessionof
Daniela.

On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had
actuallynointentionofsellingthepropertythetrueagreementbetweenherandNenawas
simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to
obtainaloanbymortgagingthesubjectpropertyforthepurposeofhelpingherdefrayher
businessexpensesshelaterdiscoveredthatNenadidnotsecureanyloannormortgage
thepropertyshewantsthetitleinthenameofNenacancelledandthesubjectproperty
[7]
reconveyedtoher.

[8]
DanieladiedonJuly29,1988 leavingherchildrenasherheirs,namely:Ricardo,
Felicidad, Julio, Carlos and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented by
hereinpetitioner.

In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they
discovered the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a
consequence, they are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the

[9]
subject property as heirs of Daniela. Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the case
amicablyprovedfutile.

Hence,onSeptember6,1989,CarlosandFelicidad,representedbyhersonSalvador,filed
acomplaintwiththeRTCofCadizCity,NegrosOccidentalagainstNenaprayingforthe
nullificationoftheDeedofAbsoluteSaleexecutedbyDanielainherfavor,cancellation
oftheTCTissuedinthenameofNena,andissuanceofanewtitleandtaxdeclarationin
[10]
favoroftheheirsofDaniela.
Thecomplaintalsoprayedfortheawardofmoraland
exemplarydamagesaswellasattorneysfeesandlitigationexpenses.OnMarch19,1993,
theplaintiffsfiledanamendedcomplaintwithleaveofcourtforthepurposeofexcluding
[11]
Ricardoasapartyplaintiff,hehavingdiedintestateandwithoutissueinMarch1991.
HeleftCarlos,Felicidad,Julio,andNenaashissoleheirs.

InherAnswer,Nenadeniedthatanyfraudormisrepresentationattendedtheexecutionof
thesubjectDeedofAbsoluteSale.Shealsodeniedhavingreceivedtheletterofheruncle,
Carlos.Sheprayedforthedismissalofthecomplaint,andinhercounterclaim,sheasked
thetrialcourtfortheawardofactual,exemplaryandmoraldamagesaswellasattorneys
[12]
feesandlitigationexpenses.
Trial ensued. On November 4, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment with the
followingdispositiveportion:

WHEREFORE,inviewofalltheforegoing,judgmentisherebyrenderedinfavor
of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, and hereby declaring the document of sale
datedOctober14,1969 (Exh. Q) executed between Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating and
NenaLazalitaTatingasNULLandVOIDandfurtherordering:

1. The Register of Deeds of Cadiz City to cancel TCT No. 5975 and in lieu
thereoftoissueanewtitleinthenamesofCarlosTating,Proindivisoowner
of onefourth () portion of the property Felicidad Tating Marcella, Pro
indiviso owner of onefourth () portion Julio Tating, Proindiviso owner of
onefourth () portion and Nena Lazalita Tating, Proindiviso owner of one
fourth()portion,alloflot56afterpaymentoftheprescribedfees

2. The City Assessor of the City of Cadiz to cancel Tax Declaration No. 143
00672andinlieuthereofissueanewTaxDeclarationinthenamesofCarlos
Tating,Proindiviso portion Felicidad Tating Marcella, Proindiviso portion

Julio Tating, Proindiviso portion and Nena Lazalita Tating, Proindiviso

3. ThedefendantisfurthermoreorderedtopayplaintiffsthesumofP20,000.00
by way of moral damages, P10,000.00 by way of exemplary damages,
P5,000.00 by way of attorneys fees and P3,000.00 by way of litigation
expensesandto

4.Paythecostsofsuit.

[13]
SOORDERED.

Nena filed an appeal with the CA. On February 22, 2002, the CA rendered its
[14]
DecisionaffirmingthejudgmentoftheRTC.

NenasMotionforReconsiderationwasdeniedbytheCAinitsResolutiondatedAugust
[15]
22,2002.
Hence, herein petition for certiorari anchored on the ground that the CA has
decidedtheinstantcasewithoutdueregardtoandinviolationoftheapplicablelawsand
Decisions of this Honorable Court and also because the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, which it has affirmed, is not supported by and is even against the evidence on
[16]
record.

At the outset, it must be stated that the filing of the instant petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is inappropriate. Considering that the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the CA finally disposed of the case, the proper remedy is a
petitionforreviewunderRule45oftheRulesofCourt.

The Court notes that while the instant petition is denominated as a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, there is no allegation that the CA
committedgraveabuseofdiscretion.Ontheotherhand,thepetitionactuallyaverserrors
of judgment, rather than of jurisdiction, which are the proper subjects of a petition for
reviewoncertiorari.Hence,inaccordancewiththeliberalspiritpervadingtheRulesof

Court and in the interest of justice, the Court decided to treat the present petition for
certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, especially considering that it was filed
[17]
withinthereglementaryperiodforfilingthesame.

As to the merits of the case, petitioner contends that the case for the private
respondents rests on the proposition that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 14,
1969issimulatedbecauseDanielasactualintentionwasnottodisposeofherpropertybut
simplytohelppetitionerbyprovidingherwithacollateral.Petitionerassertsthatthesole
evidencewhichpersuadedboththeRTCandtheCAinholdingthatthesubjectdeedwas
simulated was the Sworn Statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. However,
petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the
lowercourtsconsideringthatDanielahaslongbeendeadwhenthedocumentwasoffered
inevidence,therebydenyingpetitionertherighttocrossexamineher.

PetitioneralsocontendsthatwhilethesubjectdeedwasexecutedonOctober14,1969,the
Sworn Statement was purportedly executed only on December 28, 1977 and was
[18]
discoveredonlyafterthedeathofDanielain1994.
Petitionerarguesthatifthedeedof
saleisindeedsimulated,Danielawouldhavetakenactionagainstthepetitionerduringher
lifetime. However, the fact remains that up to the time of her death or almost 20 years
after the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, she never uttered a word of complaint
againstpetitioner.

Petitioner further asserts that the RTC and the CA erred in departing from the doctrine
held time and again by the Supreme Court that clear, strong and convincing evidence
beyond mere preponderance is required to show the falsity or nullity of a notarial
document.PetitioneralsoarguesthattheRTCandtheCAerredinitspronouncementthat
thetransactionbetweenDanielaandpetitionercreatedatrustrelationshipbetweenthem
becauseofthesettledrulethatwherethetermsofacontractareclear,itshouldbegiven
fulleffect.

IntheirCommentandMemorandum,privaterespondentscontendthatpetitionerfailedto

show that the CA or the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving at their
assailedjudgmentsthatDanielasSwornStatementissufficientevidencetoprovethatthe
contract of sale by and between her and petitioner was merely simulated and that, in
effect,theagreementbetweenpetitionerandDanielacreatedatrustrelationshipbetween
them.

TheCourtfindsforthepetitioner.

The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between petitioner and
Danielaissimulated.Acontractissimulatedifthepartiesdonotintendtobeboundatall
(absolutelysimulated)orifthepartiesconcealtheirtrueagreement(relativelysimulated).
[19]
Theprimaryconsiderationindeterminingthetruenatureofacontractistheintention
[20]
oftheparties.
Suchintentionisdeterminedfromtheexpresstermsoftheiragreement
[21]
aswellasfromtheircontemporaneousandsubsequentacts.

Inthepresentcase,themainevidencepresentedbyprivaterespondentsinproving
theirallegationthatthesubjectdeedofsaledidnotreflectthetrueintentionoftheparties
thereto is the sworn statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. The trial court
admitted the said sworn statement as part of private respondents evidence and gave
credencetoit.TheCAalsoaccordedgreatprobativeweighttothisdocument.

Thereisnoissueintheadmissibilityofthesubjectswornstatement.However,the
[22]
admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.
The
admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight of
evidencepertainstoevidencealreadyadmittedanditstendencytoconvinceandpersuade.
[23]
Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight
depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.
[24]
It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not

generallypreparedbytheaffiantbutbyanotherwhouseshisownlanguageinwritingthe
affiantsstatements,whichmaythusbeeitheromittedormisunderstoodbytheonewriting
[25]
them.
Moreover,theadversepartyisdeprivedoftheopportunitytocrossexaminethe
[26]
affiant.
Forthisreason,affidavitsaregenerallyrejectedforbeinghearsay,unlessthe
[27]
affiantsthemselvesareplacedonthewitnessstandtotestifythereon.
TheCourtfinds
that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement
probativeweight.SinceDanielaisnolongeravailabletotakethewitnessstandassheis
already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Danielas
sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and
petitioner was simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was created
betweenthem.

Privaterespondentsshouldhavepresentedotherevidencetosufficientlyprovetheir
allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she
executedthesubjectdeedofsaleinfavorofpetitioner.Asinallcivilcases,theburdenis
ontheplaintifftoprovethematerialallegationsofhiscomplaintandhemustrelyonthe
[28]
strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defendant.
Aside from Danielas sworn statement, private respondents failed to present any other
documentaryevidencetoprovetheirclaim.Eventhetestimoniesoftheirwitnessesfailed
toestablishthatDanielahadadifferentintentionwhensheenteredintoacontractofsale
withpetitioner.

[29]
InSuntayv.CourtofAppeals,
theCourtruledthatthemostprotuberantindex
of simulation is the complete absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any
[30]
manner to assert his rights of ownership over the disputed property.
In the present
case, however, the evidence clearly shows that petitioner declared the property for
taxationandpaidrealtytaxesonitinhername.Petitionerhasshownthatfrom1972to
1988shereligiouslypaidtherealestatetaxesdueonthesaidlotandthatitwasonlyin
1974and1987thatshefailedtopaythetaxesthereon.Whiletaxreceiptsanddeclarations

and receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not, in themselves,
incontrovertibleevidenceofownership,theyconstituteatleastproofthattheholderhasa
[31]
claimoftitleovertheproperty.
Thevoluntarydeclarationofapieceofpropertyfor
taxationpurposesmanifestsnotonlyonessincereandhonestdesiretoobtaintitletothe
propertyandannounceshisadverseclaimagainsttheStateandallotherinterestedparties,
[32]
butalsotheintentiontocontributeneededrevenuestotheGovernment.
Suchanact
[33]
strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
On the other hand,
privaterespondentsfailedtopresentevenasingletaxreceiptordeclarationshowingthat
Danielapaidtaxesdueonthedisputedlotasproofthatsheclaimsownershipthereof.The
only Tax Declaration in the name of Daniela, which private respondents presented in
[34]
evidence, refers only to the house standing on the lot in controversy.
Even the said
Tax Declaration contains a notation that herein petitioner owns the lot (Lot 56) upon
whichsaidhousewasbuilt.

Moreover,theCourtagreeswithpetitionerthatifthesubjectDeedofAbsoluteSale
didnotreallyreflecttherealintentionofDaniela,whyisitthatsheremainedsilentuntil
herdeathshenevertoldanyofherrelativesregardingheractualpurposeinexecutingthe
subject deed she simply chose to make known her true intentions through the sworn
statement she executed on December 28, 1977, the existence of which she kept secret
from her relatives and despite her declaration therein that she is appealing for help in
ordertogetbackthesubjectlot,shenevertookanyconcretesteptorecoverthesubject
propertyfrompetitioneruntilherdeathmorethantenyearslater.
It is true that Daniela retained physical possession of the property even after she
executed the subject Absolute Deed of Sale and even after title to the property was
transferred in petitioners favor. In fact, Daniela continued to occupy the property in
dispute until her death in 1988 while, in the meantime, petitioner continued to reside in
Manila. However, it is wellestablished that ownership and possession are two entirely
[35]
different legal concepts.
Just as possession is not a definite proof of ownership,
neitherisnonpossessioninconsistentwithownership.ThefirstparagraphofArticle1498
of the Civil Code states that when the sale is made through a public instrument, the

executionthereofshallbeequivalenttothedeliveryofthethingwhichistheobjectofthe
contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.
Possession,alongwithownership,istransferredtothevendeebyvirtueofthenotarized
[36]
deedofconveyance.
Thus,inlightofthecircumstancesofthepresentcase,itisofno
legal consequence that petitioner did not take actual possession or occupation of the
disputed property after the execution of the deed of sale in her favor because she was
alreadyabletoperfectandcompleteherownershipofandtitleoverthesubjectproperty.

As to Danielas affidavit dated June 9, 1983, submitted by petitioner, which

However,evenifDanielasaffidavitofJune9,1983isdisregarded,thefactremains
thatprivaterespondentsfailedtoprovebyclear,strongandconvincingevidencebeyond
[37]
mere preponderance of evidence
that the contract of sale between Daniela and
petitionerwassimulated.Thelegalpresumptionisinfavorofthevalidityofcontractsand
[38]
thepartywhoimpugnsitsregularityhastheburdenofprovingitssimulation.
Since
private respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving their allegation that the
contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela was simulated, the presumption of
regularityandvalidityoftheOctober14,1969DeedofAbsoluteSalestands.

ConsideringthattheCourtfindsthesubjectcontractofsalebetweenpetitionerand
Danielatobevalidandnotfictitiousorsimulated,thereisnomorenecessitytodiscuss
theissueastowhetherornotatrustrelationshipwascreatedbetweenthem.

WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTED.TheassailedDecisionandResolution
of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 64122, affirming the Decision of the
RegionalTrialCourtofCadizCity,NegrosOccidental,Branch60,inCivilCaseNo.278
C, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The complaint of the private respondents is

DISMISSED.

Nocosts.

SOORDERED.

MA.ALICIAAUSTRIAMARTINEZ
AssociateJustice

WECONCUR:

CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO
AssociateJustice
Chairperson

ROMEOJ.CALLEJO,SR.MINITAV.CHICONAZARIO
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice

ANTONIOEDUARDOB.NACHURA
AssociateJustice

ATTESTATION

IattestthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionhadbeenreachedinconsultationbefore
thecasewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGO

AssociateJustice
Chairperson,ThirdDivision

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons
attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
CourtsDivision.

REYNATOS.PUNO
ChiefJustice

AlsospelledasLasalitainotherpartsoftherollo.
[1]
PennedbyJusticeMartinS.Villarama,Jr.andconcurredinbyJusticesConchitaCarpioMorales(nowamemberofthis
Court)andSergioL.Pestaorollo,p.53.
[2]
OriginalRecords,pp.318342.
[3]
ExhibitA,id.at138.
[4]
ExhibitQ/1,id.at177.
[5]
Exhibit3,id.at179.
[6]
Exhibits8Ato8AA,id.at183212.
[7]
ExhibitD,id.at142.
[8]
ExhibitI,id.at149.
[9]
ExhibitE,id.at143.
[10]
Id.at1.
[11]
Id.at55.
[12]
Id.at2325.
[13]
Id.at342.
[14]
CArollo,p.86.
[15]
Id.at103.

[16]
Rollo,p.5.
[17]
DelsanTransportLines,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,335Phil.1066,1075(1997).
[18]
BasedonthecertificationissuedbytheCivilRegistryofCadizCity,DanielaS.TatingdiedonJuly29,1988.
[19]
PeoplesAircargoandWarehousingCo.,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,357Phil.850,869870(1998).
[20]
Ramosv.HeirsofHonorioRamos,Sr.,431Phil.337,345(2002).
[21]
Id.at345.
[22]
AyalaLand,Inc.v.Tagle,G.R.No.153667,August11,2005,466SCRA521,532.
[23]
Id.at532.
[24]
HeirsofLourdesSabanpanv.Comorposa,456Phil.161,172(2003).
[25]
Limv.CourtofAppeals,380Phil.60,78(2000)citingPeoplesBankandTrustCompanyv.Leonidas,G.R.No.47815,
March11,1992,207SCRA164D.M.Consunji,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.137873,April20,2001,357
SCRA249,260261.
[26]
D.M.Consunji,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,id.at260261.
[27]
Id.at260261.
[28]
Dungaranv.Koshnicke,G.R.No.161048,August31,2005,468SCRA676,685.
[29]
321Phil.809,831832(1995).
[30]
Ramosv.HeirsofHonorioRamos,Sr.,supranote20,at348349.
[31]
HeirsofMiguelFrancov.CourtofAppeals,463Phil.417,433(2003).
[32]
Calicdanv.Cendaa,G.R.No.155080,February5,2004,422SCRA272,280.
[33]
Id.at280.
[34]
ExhibitBOR,139.
[35]
SpousesSabiov.TheInternationalCorporateBank,Inc.,416Phil.785,820(2001).
[36]
Id.at820OngChingPov.CourtofAppeals,G.R.Nos.11347273,December20,1994,239SCRA341,347.
[37]
Mendezonav.Ozamiz,426Phil.888,904(2002).
[38]
PeoplesAircargoandWarehousingCo.,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,supranote19,at870Ramosv.HeirsofHonorio
Ramos,Sr.,supranote20,at346.