THOMASSON - Geographic Objects and The Science of Geography
THOMASSON - Geographic Objects and The Science of Geography
THOMASSON - Geographic Objects and The Science of Geography
Amie L. Thomasson
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AMIE L. THOMASSON
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2.4. Summary
Thus as we have seen, the issue of whether or not epistemology precedes metaphysics in the case of the
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social facts studied by human geography is too complicated to be accommodated by either Lakoffs or
Smiths general answer. In some cases, namely those
of direct creation by token, knowledge (or acceptance)
of the fact does make it the case. In other cases (those
involving direct creation by type), token facts of the
relevant sort may remain unknown or may be falsely
believed to exist. But here we still have a closer epistemic relation to the kind of fact than we do in the
case of natural kinds, since no facts of that kind can
exist without certain conditions relevant to the nature
of the kind being accepted, and principles collectively
accepted regarding sufficient conditions for kind membership must hold, leaving the creating and sustaining
group with a privileged knowledge regarding the nature
of these social kinds that everyone lacks in the case of
natural kinds. These results limit to a certain extent the
range of possible discovery open to human geography,
and necessitate the use of humanistic methods of discovery for many of these facts and for the nature of
these kinds.
Yet these limitations, I think, do not unduly constrain
the possibilities of geographic inquiry, much less entail
that genuine discoveries in human geography are impossible. As I argued in section 1.3, there are many minddependent geographic facts the existence of which may
be completely opaque to everyone, and so it can be a
genuine matter of discovery, e.g., that (or how) cities
are typically de facto zoned into economic, religious, or
functional sectors. (Of course formal zoning involves
institutional facts that must be transparent at least to
those who create and maintain them.) In these cases,
Smiths position that our thinking does not make it so
is apt.
Even regarding directly created social facts there is
much that awaits discovery by social scientists. First,
such facts as are token created and maintained by others
will remain opaque and require discovery by geographers. Similarly, geographers themselves will have no
privileged knowledge regarding the nature of geographic kinds, where facts of that kind are type-created
by others. Secondly, even certain facts involving social
status or fiat boundaries within ones own culture may
remain opaque and in need of discovery. Indeed the
most central issues pursued by geographers involve not
discovering the boundaries of fiat objects such as
Wyoming, nor the conditions relevant to belonging to
a social kind like being a national park, but rather causal
relations involving geographic entities, to answer ques-
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Notes
References
deBlij, H.: 1977, Human Geography: Culture, Society, and Space,
New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Devitt, M.: 1991, Realism and Truth (Second Edition), Princeton
(NJ): Princeton University Press.
Elder, C.: 1989, Realism, Naturalism and Culturally Generated
Kinds, Philosophical Quarterly 39, 425444.
Gilbert, M.: 1996, Living Together: Rationality, Sociality and
Obligation, Lanham (MD): Rowman and Littlefield.
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Philosophy Department
University of Miami
USA