Commrev - Insurance Iii. Classes of Insurance - CTPL 3 Cases
Commrev - Insurance Iii. Classes of Insurance - CTPL 3 Cases
Commrev - Insurance Iii. Classes of Insurance - CTPL 3 Cases
3 CASES
G.R. No. L-17312
1958 not having been renewed on or before the last working day of
February 1959, as required by section 31 of the Motor Vehicle Law,
Act No. 3992. That section states that any license not so renewed
"shall become delinquent and invalid," and section 21 states that
"except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act no person
shall operate any motor vehicle on the public highways without
having procured a license for the current year, nor while such
license is delinquent, invalid, suspended or revoked."
In rendering judgment for plaintiff the trial court adverted to the
absence of evidence that Manuel Tanco had been "disqualified by
order of a court of law or by reason of any enactment or regulation
in that behalf from driving such motor vehicle," and ruled that if
there is any ambiguity in the definition of the term "authorized
driver" in the policy the ambiguity should be construed in favor of
plaintiff, since the policy had been prepared in its entirety by
defendant. The trial court's advertence is true as a matter of fact;
and its ruling is correct as a matter of law. But neither one nor the
other is relevant in this case. Appellant does not rely on the portion
of the proviso in the policy quoted by the court but on that which
states that "the person driving is permitted in accordance with the
licensing or other laws." And as to this there is no ambiguity
whatsoever, because the Motor Vehicle Law expressly prohibits any
person from operating a motor vehicle on the highways without a
license for the current year or while such license is delinquent or
invalid. That Manuel Tanco renewed his license on September
8,1959, one week after the accident did not cure the delinquency or
revalidate the license which had already expired.
We are not aware that the question presented here has been
decided by this Court in any previous case. Indeed all the
authorities cited by the parties consist of decisions Courts United
States. We note, however, that those relied upon by appellee are
not in point by reason of material differences in the facts or issues
presented. In Messersmith vs. American Fidelity Co., 187 App. Div.
35, 175 N.Y. Supp. 169; and Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. vs.
Haley, 129 Miss. 525, 90 So. 635, the question was whether the
insured could recover on an automobile policy for damage
sustained in a collision which occurred while the vehicle was being
driven in violation of law in the first case by an infant at the
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COMMREV - INSURANCE
3 CASES
instance of the insured, and in the second by the insured himself
beyond the statutory speed limit. In neither case was there a
provision in the policy expressly excluding liability by reason of the
particular violation involved. We have no reason to disagree with
the pronouncement of the court in the second case, after citing the
first, that "if such a defense (that the vehicle was being driven in
violation of law) were permissible automobile insurance would be
practically valueless."
In MacMahon vs. Pearlman, 13 N.E. 154-156, a Massachusetts case,
the defense of the insurer was also the violation of law by the
insured, namely, that she was driving without a license; but as
stated in the decision, "the casualty company does not urge that
the unlawful conduct is forbidden in express terms, (but) that
because of public policy it ought not to be compelled to pay
damages." The court, citing Messersmith v. American Fidelity Co.,
supra, similarly allowed recovery, saying that to restrict such
insurance to cases where there has been no violation of criminal
law or ordinance would reduce indemnity to a shadow.
In the case before Us now appellant's defense does not rest on the
general proposition that if a law is violated at the time of the
accident which causes the damage or injury there can be no
recovery, but rather on a specific provision in the policy that
appellant shall not be liable if the accident occurs while the vehicle
is being driven by any person other than an authorized driver and
that an authorized driver, if not the insured himself, is one who is
acting on his order or with his permission, provided he is permitted
to drive under the licensing laws.
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FEDERICO
C.
NARVASA, J.:
Presented in the proceeding at bar is the sorry situation of the loss
by a party of the right to argue the merits of a cause on appeal due
to an obsessive pre-occupation with a question of admissibility of
evidence, like a man who, it is said, "fails to see the forest for the
trees."
COMMREV - INSURANCE
3 CASES
It appearing, according to Empire, that at the time of the mishap,
the driver Perfecto Amar only had a temporary operator's permit
(TVR) already expired his drivers license having earlier been
confiscated by an agent of the Land Transportation Commission for
an alleged violation of Land Transportation and Traffic Rules, he was
not permitted by law and was in truth disqualified to operate any
motor vehicle; and this operated to relieve it (Empire) from liability
under its policy.
The fact of Amar's having only an expired TVR at the time of the
accident was duly established during the trial. It does not seem to
have been seriously disputed by the plaintiffs. What plaintiff's
counsel attempted to do, to neutralize that fact, was to offer
rebuttal testimony (1) to explain the circumstances attending the
issuance of the TVR by the LTC officer to Amar in proof of the
proposition that there was no reason for confiscation of Amar's
license and the issuance to him of a TVR, and the LTC agent was
wrong in doing so, and also, to (2) prove that, "contrary to the
implication' of one of Empire's exhibits, Amar's license had not
expired, but had been renewed. The respondent Judge however
sustained the objection of Empire's councel to the evidence on the
ground that it was irrelevant to the issue. 2 The Judge also denied
plaintiffs' request for time to present additional rebuttal evidence in
proof of the same propositions. 3
The plaintiffs having moved for reconsideration, and the Court
having refused, said plaintiffs have come to this Court seeking
communication on certiorari of the above describe orders, assailing
them as being tainted by grave abuse of discretion.
It would seem fairly obvious that whether the LTC agent was correct
or not in his opinion that driver Amar had violated some traffic
regulation warranting confiscation of his license and issuance of a
TVR in lieu thereof, this would not alter the undisputed fact that
Amar's licence had indeed been confiscated and a TVR issued to
him, and the TVR had already expired at the time that the vehicle
being operated by him killed two children by accident. Neither
would proof of the renewal of Amar's license change the fact that it
had really been earlier confiscated by the LTC agent. The plaintiffs'
proferred proof therefore had no logical connection with the facts
thereby sought to be refuted, the proof had no rational tendency to
COMMREV - INSURANCE
3 CASES
COMMREV - INSURANCE
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The second incident is the prayer for an order of this court
for the Insurance Company, Perla Compania de Seguros,
Inc., to pay immediately the P5,000.00 under the "no fault
clause" as provided for under Section 378 of the Insurance
Code, and finding that the requisite documents to be
attached in the record, the said Insurance Company is
therefore directed to pay the plaintiffs (private respondents
herein) within five (5) days from receipt of this order.
Petitioner denied in its Answer its alleged liability under the "no
fault indemnity" provision [Rollo, p. 44] and likewise moved for the
reconsideration of the order. Petitioner held the position that under
Sec. 378 of the Insurance Code, the insurer liable to pay the
P5,000.00 is the insurer of the vehicle in which private respondents
were riding, not petitioner, as the provision states that "[i]n the
case of an occupant of a vehicle, claim shall lie against the insurer
of the vehicle in which the occupant is riding, mounting or
dismounting
from."
Respondent
judge,
however,
denied
reconsideration. A second motion for reconsideration was filed by
petitioner. However, in an order dated January 3, 1979, respondent
judge denied the second motion for reconsideration and ordered
the issuance of a writ of execution [Rollo, p. 69.] Hence, the instant
petition praying principally for the annulment and setting aside of
respondent judge's orders dated March 1, 1978 and January 3,
1979.
The Court issued a temporary restraining order on January 24,1979
[Rollo pp. 73-74.]
The sole issue raised in this petition is whether or not petitioner is
the insurer liable to indemnify private respondents under Sec. 378
of the Insurance Code.
The key to the resolution of the issue is of courts e Sec. 378, which
provides:
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3 CASES
4. In all cases, the right of the party paying the claim to
recover against the owner of the vehicle responsible for the
accident shall be maintained.
The law is very clear the claim shall lie against the insurer of the
vehicle in which the "occupant" ** is riding, and no other. The
claimant is not free to choose from which insurer he will claim the
"no fault indemnity," as the law, by using the word "shall, makes it
mandatory that the claim be made against the insurer of the
vehicle in which the occupant is riding, mounting or dismounting
from.
That said vehicle might not be the one that caused the accident is
of no moment since the law itself provides that the party paying the
claim under Sec. 378 may recover against the owner of the vehicle
responsible for the accident. This is precisely the essence of "no
fault indemnity" insurance which was introduced to and made part
of our laws in order to provide victims of vehicular accidents or
their heirs immediate compensation, although in a limited amount,
pending final determination of who is responsible for the accident
and liable for the victims'injuries or death. In turn, the "no fault
indemnity" provision is part and parcel of the Insurance Code
provisions on compulsory motor vehicle ability insurance [Sec. 373389] and should be read together with the requirement for
compulsory passenger and/or third party liability insurance [Sec.
377] which was mandated in order to ensure ready compensation
for victims of vehicular accidents.