Catalina Ramirez-Pablo, A202 067 149 (BIA April 11, 2016)
Catalina Ramirez-Pablo, A202 067 149 (BIA April 11, 2016)
Catalina Ramirez-Pablo, A202 067 149 (BIA April 11, 2016)
Department of Justice
..
A 202-067-149
Date of this notice: 4/11/2016
Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.
DOWtL c(lftA)
Sincerely,
Donna Carr
Chief Clerk
Enclosure
Panel Members:
Mann, Ana
O'Leary, Brian M.
Grant, Edward R.
Userteam: Docket
Date:
AFr< i
APPEAL
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Thomas L. Niklitschek, Esquire
APPLICATION: Reopening
The respondent, a native and citizen of Guatemala, was ordered removed in absentia on
October 20, 2015. On November 9, 2015, the respondent filed a motion to reopen proceedings,
which an Immigration Judge denied on December 7, 2015. The respondent filed a timely appeal
of that decision. The appeal will be sustained, proceedings will be reopened and the record will
be remanded.
The Board reviews an Immigration Judge's findings of fact, including findings as to the
credibility of testimony, under the clearly erroneous standard. 8 C.F.R 1003.l(d)(3)(I). The
Board reviews questions of law, discretion, and judgment and all other issues in appeals from
decisions of Immigration Judges de novo.
Upon de novo review of the record and in light of the totality of circumstances presented in
this case, we conclude that the respondent demonstrated that reopening is warranted. 1 See
sections 240(b)(5)(C)(i), (e)(l) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A.
1229a(b)(5)(C)(i), (e)(l). We will therefore sustain the respondent's appeal and remand the
record for further proceedings.
ORDER: The respondent's appeal is sustained, the in absentia order is vacated, proceedings
are reopened and the record is remanded to the Immigration Judge for further proceedings and
for the entry of a new decision.
Among other factors, we have considered that notice for the October 20, 2015, hearing was
sent by regular mail with the Immigration Judge's September 28, 2015, order to the respondent's
counsel who has stated that he only received a copy of the Immigration Judge's
September 28, 2015, order.
Cite as: Catalina Ramirez-Pablo, A202 067 149 (BIA April 11, 2016)
IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
IN THE MA7TER OF
RAMIREZ-PABLO, CATALINA
ABLE
TO
FILE A 202-067-149
Cite as: Catalina Ramirez-Pablo, A202 067 149 (BIA April 11, 2016)
FF
In the Matter of
Catalina RAMIREZ-PABLO,
Respondent
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IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
Cite as: Catalina Ramirez-Pablo, A202 067 149 (BIA April 11, 2016)
The issue is then whether the evidence supports the conclusion that the respondent's
attorney should be charged with receipt of the notice. See Matter ofM-D-, 23 I&N Dec. 540, 544
(BIA 2002); Maner ofG-Y-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 181, 189-90 (BIA 2001). According to INA
239(c), service by regular mail raises a rebuttable presumption of effective service if there is proof
of attempted delivery to the last address provided. See Ghounem v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 740 (8th
Cir. 2004); Salta v. INS, 314 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 2002); see also M-D-, 23 I&N Dec.540
(BIA 2002). Although the presumption of effective service of notice by regular mail may not be
as strong as the presumption created by delivery via certified mail, 1 there must still be some
evidence that she (or in this case her attorney) did not receive, or cannot be charged with receiving,
proper notice to rebut the presumption.
In Matter of C-R-C-, 24 I & N Dec. 677 (BIA 2008), the Board held that the respondent
had overcome the presumption of delivery of a Notice to Appear that was sent by regular mail by
submitting an affidavit stating that he did not receive the notice and that he had continued to reside
at the address to which it was sent, as well as other circumstantial evidence indicating that he had
an incentive to appear, and by exercising due diligence in promptly seeking to redress the situation
by obtaining counsel and requesting reopening of the proceedings. Dominguez v. United States
Attorney General, 284 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2002), distinguished.
The Board has also held that a respondent's motion to reopen to rescind an in absentia
order of removal based on a claim that a notice sent by regular mail to the most recent address
provided was not received requires consideration of all relevant evidence, including, but not
limited to, factors such as affidavits from the respondent and others who are knowledgeable about
whether notice was received, whether due diligence was exercised in seeking to redress the
situation, any prior applications for relief that would indicate an incentive to appear, and the
1
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Division C of Pub.
L. No. 104-208, I IO Stat. 3009-546, changed the requirements with regard to notification of removal proceedings.
Prior to the enactment of IIRIRA, notice was required to be sent by certified mai1 when personal service was not
practicable. See INA 2428( I)( 1995). The Act now allows notice to be sent via regular mail no longer requiring
service by certified mail. See JNA 239(a)( I).
Herc, the record reflects that the respondent was ordered removed in absentia on August
18, 2015 when she and her attorney were not present when the case was called. Her first motion to
reopen maintained that she had been in fact present outside the hearing room since 9:00 a.m.
waiting for her attorney arrive. Accordingly, she was given the benefit of the doubt and her
motion was granted on September 28, 2015. The Record of Proceeding indicates that a copy of
the Order was mailed to the respondent's attorney on the same day along with the notice of the
re-opened hearing on October 20, 2015. The address to which these documents were mailed is the
same address to which the August 18, 2015 hearing notice was sent. It is well-settled that notice
to an attorney is imputed to his or her client. See Matter of Barocio, 19 I & N Dec. 255 (BIA
I 985); see also 8 C. F.R. 1292.5(a).
o/
JAMES i0UJTMOTO
IMMIGRATION JUDGE
Here, there is no evidence (for example, an affidavit of counsel) other than the conclusory
statement in the motion (which is repeated verbatim in the respondent's Affidavit) that her attorney
did not receive notice of the October 20, 2015 hearing. These uncorroborated assertions are given
litlle weight, however, in light of the fact that both notices of' hearing as well as both in absentia
removal orders were mailed to the same address (above).