Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • 42 views

    Hammer v. United States, 271 U.S. 620 (1926)

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    The Supreme Court reversed the judgment against Hammer for subornation of perjury. The Court held that the uncorroborated testimony of the sole witness, Trinz, was not sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Trinz's prior testimony was false. The same rule requiring corroboration that applies to perjury cases also applies to subornation of perjury cases. As the testimony against Hammer was not sufficiently corroborated, the trial court should have directed a verdict of not guilty.

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as COURT, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Hammer v. United States, 271 U.S. 620 (1926)

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    42 views5 pages
    The Supreme Court reversed the judgment against Hammer for subornation of perjury. The Court held that the uncorroborated testimony of the sole witness, Trinz, was not sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Trinz's prior testimony was false. The same rule requiring corroboration that applies to perjury cases also applies to subornation of perjury cases. As the testimony against Hammer was not sufficiently corroborated, the trial court should have directed a verdict of not guilty.

    Original Description:

    Filed: 1926-06-07 Precedential Status: Precedential Citations: 271 U.S. 620 Docket: 317

    Copyright

    © Public Domain

    Available Formats

    COURT, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    The Supreme Court reversed the judgment against Hammer for subornation of perjury. The Court held that the uncorroborated testimony of the sole witness, Trinz, was not sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Trinz's prior testimony was false. The same rule requiring corroboration that applies to perjury cases also applies to subornation of perjury cases. As the testimony against Hammer was not sufficiently corroborated, the trial court should have directed a verdict of not guilty.

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as COURT, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as court, pdf, or txt
    42 views5 pages

    Hammer v. United States, 271 U.S. 620 (1926)

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    The Supreme Court reversed the judgment against Hammer for subornation of perjury. The Court held that the uncorroborated testimony of the sole witness, Trinz, was not sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Trinz's prior testimony was false. The same rule requiring corroboration that applies to perjury cases also applies to subornation of perjury cases. As the testimony against Hammer was not sufficiently corroborated, the trial court should have directed a verdict of not guilty.

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as COURT, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as court, pdf, or txt
    of 5

    271 U.S.

    620
    46 S.Ct. 603
    70 L.Ed. 1118

    HAMMER
    v.
    UNITED STATES.
    No. 317.
    Argued May 5, 1926.
    Decided June 7, 1926.

    Mr. Robert H. Elder, of New York City, for petitioner.


    [Argument of Counsel from pages 620-622 intentionally omitted]
    Mr. Gardner P. Lloyd, of New York City, for the United States.
    [Argument of Counsel from page 623 intentionally omitted]
    Mr. Justice BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.

    Petitioner was indicted on three counts in the Southern district of New York. A
    verdict of not guilty as to the first and third was directed by the court. The jury
    found him guilty on the second, and the court sentenced him to the penitentiary
    for a year and ten months. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. 6 F.(2d) 786.

    The second count sets forth that Annie Hammer was adjudged a bankrupt on
    April 28, 1923, and that the proceeding was referred to one of the referees in
    bankruptcy in that district. The substance of the charge is that October 25,
    1923, petitioner suborned and induced Louis H. Trinz to take an oath before the
    referee, and there falsely to testify that prior to April 18, 1923, he had loaned
    $500 to the bankrupt, and that she had given him a note therefor.

    The petitioner contends that the making of a false oath in bankruptcy is not
    perjury, and that without perjury there cannot be subornation of perjury.
    Section 125 of the Criminal Code (Comp. St. 10295) provides that whoever,
    having taken an oath before a competent officer, in any case in which a law of

    the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify


    truly, shall state any material matter which he does not believe to be true, is
    guilty of perjury, and shall be fined not more than $2,000 and imprisoned for
    not more than five years. Section 29b of the Bankruptcy Act (30 Stat. 544, 554,
    c. 541 (Comp. St. 9613)), provides that a person shall be punished by
    imprisonment not to exceed two years upon conviction of the offense of having
    knowingly made a false oath in any proceeding in bankruptcy. Section 126 of
    the Criminal Code (Comp. St. 10296) provides that whoever shall procure
    another to commit any perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury and
    punishable as provided in section 125.
    4

    It is plain that the offense charged includes perjury as defined by section 125.
    That section is in general terms and is broad enough to apply to persons sworn
    in bankruptcy proceedings. The facts alleged include all the elements of that
    offense, as well as the making of a false oath in bankruptcy, and they show a
    violation of both sections. The indictment does not specify the section under
    which it is drawn, but the omission is immaterial. The offense charged is to be
    determined by the allegations. Williams v. United States, 168 U. S. 382, 389,
    18 S. Ct. 92, 42 L. Ed. 509. And it follows that petitioner was accused of
    subornation of perjury. Cf. Wechsler v. United States, 158 F. 579, 86 C. C. A.
    37; Epstein v. United States, 196 F. 354, 116 C. C. A 174; Kahn v. United
    States, 214 F. 54, 130 C. C. A. 494; Ulmer v. United States, 219 F. 641, 134 C.
    C. A. 127; Schonfeld v. United States (C. C. A.) 277 F. 934. We need not
    consider whether perjury committed in bankruptcy proceedings may be
    punished by more than the maximum fixed by section 29b, as the sentence
    imposed on the petitioner is less than that. Nor need we consider whether every
    false oath in bankruptcy is perjury under section 125.

    Petitioner also contends that the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the
    judgment.

    At the trial of petitioner, it was satisfactorily shown that Trinz was sworn in the
    bankruptcy proceeding and there gave the testimony alleged to have been false
    and suborned. Trinz was the only witness called to prove the falsity and
    subornation. He testified that he gave the testimony alleged in the indictment,
    that it was not true, and that petitioner suborned him. At the close of all the
    evidence the petitioner moved the court to direct a verdict in his favor, on the
    ground that the uncorroborated testimony of Trinz was not sufficient to warrant
    a finding of guilt. The motion was denied; and, on the request of the
    prosecution, the court charged the jury that the law did not require any
    corroboration of that testimony, and that, if believed, it was sufficient.

    The question of law presented is whether the unsupported oath of Trinz at the
    trial of petitioner is sufficient to justify a finding that the testimony given by
    him before the referee was false. The general rule in prosecutions for perjury is
    that the uncorroborated oath of one witness is not enough to establish the falsity
    of the testimony of the accused set forth in the indictment as perjury. The
    application of that rule in federal and state courts is well nigh universal.1 The
    rule has long prevailed, and no enactment in derogation of it has come to our
    attention. The absence of such legislation indicates that it is sound and has been
    found satisfactory in practice. On the issue of falsity the case presented is this:
    On the first occasion Trinz testified that he had loaned money to the bankrupt
    and that she had given him a note. At the trial he swore that his statement
    before the referee was not true. The contest is between the two oaths, with
    nothing to support either of them. The question is not the same as that arising in
    a prosecution for perjury, where the defendant's own acts, business
    transactions, documents, or correspondence are brought forward to establish the
    falsity of his oath alleged as perjury. That, in some cases, the falsity charged
    may be shown by evidence other than the testimony of living witnesses, is
    forcibly shown by the opinion of this court in United States v. Wood, 14 Pet.
    430, 443, 10 L. Ed. 527. That case shows that the rule, which forbids
    conviction on the unsupported testimony of one witness as to falsity of the
    matter alleged as perjury, does not relate to the kind or amount of other
    evidence required to establish that fact. Undoubtedly in some cases documents
    emanating from the accused and the attending circumstances may constitute
    better evidence of such falsity than any amount of oral testimony.

    As petitioner cannot be guilty of subornation unless Trinz committed perjury


    before the referee, the evidence must be sufficient to establish beyond
    reasonable doubt the falsity of his oath alleged as perjury. The question is not
    whether the uncorroborated testimony of Trinz is enough to sustain a finding
    that he was suborned by the petitioner. It is whether, as against the petitioner,
    his testimony at the trial is enough to sustain a finding that his oath before the
    referee was false. Clearly the case is not as strong for the prosecution as where
    a witness, presumed to be honest and by the government vouched for as worthy
    of belief, is called to testify to the falsity of the oath of defendant set forth as
    perjury in the indictment. Here the sole reliance of the government is the
    unsupported testimony of one for whose character it cannot vouch-a dishonest
    man guilty of perjury on one occasion or the other. There is no reason why the
    testimony of such a one should be permitted to have greater weight than that of
    a witness not so discredited. People v. Evans, 40 N. Y. 1, 3.

    To hold to the rule in perjury and to deny its application in subornation cases
    would lead to unreasonable results. Section 332 of the Criminal Code abolishes

    the distinction between principals and accessories and makes them all
    principals. One who induces another to commit perjury is guilty of subornation
    under section 126, and by force of section 332 (Comp. St. 10506) is also
    guilty of perjury. In substance, subornation is the same as perjury; and one
    accused of perjury and another accused of subornation may be indicted and
    tried together. Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U. S. 480, 38 S. Ct. 168, 62 L.
    Ed. 414; Commonwealth v. Devine, 155 Mass. 224, 29 N. E. 515. Obviously
    the same rule of evidence in respect of establishing the falsity of the matter
    alleged as perjury must apply to both. Evidence that is not sufficient to warrant
    a finding of that fact as against the one accused of perjury cannot reasonably be
    held to be enough as against the other who is accused of suborning the perjury.
    No such distinction can be maintained. The rule that the uncorroborated
    testimony of one witness is not enough to establish falsity applies in
    subornation as well as in perjury cases. People v. Evans, supra. Falsity is as
    essential in one as in the other. It is the corpus delicti in both.
    10

    The trial court should have directed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty on
    the ground that the uncorroborated testimony of Trinz at the trial was not
    sufficient as against petitioner to establish the falsity of the oath alleged as
    perjury. We need not consider whether his testimony was sufficient to establish
    the fact of subornation.

    11

    Judgment reversed.

    United States v. Wood, 14 Pet. 430, 437, et seq., 10 L. Ed. 527; United States v.
    Hall (C. C.) 44 F. 864, 868, 10 L. R. A. 324; Allen v. United States, 194 F.
    664, 667-668, 114 C. C. A. 357, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 385; Peterson v. State, 74
    Ala. 34; Clower v. State, 151 Ark. 359, 363, 236 S. W. 265; People v. Follette
    (Cal. App.) 240 P. 502, 511; Thompson v. People, 26 Colo. 496, 503, 59 P. 51;
    State v. Campbell, 93 Conn. 3, 12, 104 A. 653; Marvel v. State (Del.) 131 A.
    317; Cook v. United States, 26 App. D. C. 427, 430, 6 Ann. Cas. 810;
    Yarbrough v. State, 79 Fla. 256, 264, 83 So. 873; People v. Niles, 295 Ill. 525,
    532, 129 N. E. 97; Hann v. State, 185 Ind. 56, 60, 61, 113 N. E. 304; State v.
    Raymond, 20 Iowa, 582, 587; State v. Wilhelm, 114 Kan. 349, 353, 210 P. 510;
    Day v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 790, 793, 243 S. W. 1051; State v. Jean, 42
    La. Ann. 946, 949, 8 So. 480; Newbit v. Statuck, 35 Me. 315, 318, 58 Am. Dec.
    706; Commonwealth v. Butland, 119 Mass. 317, 324; People v. Kennedy, 221
    Mich. 1, 4, 190 N. W. 749; State v. Storey, 148 Minn. 398, 182 N. W. 613, 15
    A. L. R. 629; Johnson v. State, 122 Miss. 16, 84 So. 140; State v. Hardiman,
    277 Mo. 229, 233, 209 P. 879; State v. Gibbs, 10 Mont. 213, 219, 25 P. 289, 10

    L. R. A. 749; Gandy v. State, 27 Neb. 707, 734, 43 N. W. 147, 44 N. W. 108;


    State v. Cerfoglio, 46 Nev. 332, 340, 205 P. 791, 213 P. 102, 27 A. L. R. 848;
    People v. Evans, 40 N. Y. 1, 5; Territory v. Remuzon, 3 N. M. (Johns.) 368, 9
    P. 598; State v. Hawkins, 115 N. C. 712, 20 S. E. 623; State v. Courtright, 66
    Ohio St. 35, 63 N. E. 590; Wright v. State (Okl. Cr. App.) 236 P. 633, 636;
    Williams v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. 493, 501; State v. Pratt, 21 S. D. 305, 311,
    112 N. W. 152; Godby v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. R. 360, 363 227 S. W. 192; State v.
    Sargood, 80 Vt. 415, 421, 68 A. 49, 130 Am. St. Rep. 995, 13 Ann. Cas. 367;
    Schwartz v. Commonwealth, 27 Grat. (Va.) 1025, 21 Am. Rep. 365; State v.
    Rutledge, 37 Wash. 523, 527, 79 P. 1123. And see An act to consolidate and
    simplify the law relating to perjury and kindred offenses (1911) 1 & 2 Geo. V,
    c. 6, 13.

    You might also like