Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950)

339 U.S.
629
70 S.Ct. 848
94 L.Ed. 1114
SWEATT
v.
PAINTER et al.
No. 44.
Argued April 4, 1950.
Decided June 5, 1950.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 9, 1950.
See 71 S.Ct. 13.

Messrs. W. J. Durham, Dallas, Tex., Thurgood Marshall, New York City,
for petitioner.
Messrs. Price Daniel, Liberty, Tex., Joe R. Greenhill, Houston, Tex., for
respondents.
[Argument of Counsel from page 630 intentionally omitted]
Mr. Chief Justice VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 70 S.Ct.
851, present different aspects of this general question: To what extent does the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limit the power of a
state to distinguish between students of different races in professional and
graduate education in a state university? Broader issues have been urged for our
consideration, but we adhere to the principle of deciding constitutional
questions only in the context of the particular case before the Court. We have
frequently reiterated that this Court will decide constitutional questions only
when necessary to the disposition of the case at hand, and that such decisions
will be drawn as narrowly as possible. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 1947,
331 U.S. 549, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 91 L.Ed. 1666, and cases cited therein. Because of
this traditional reluctance to extend constitutional interpretations to situations or
facts which are not before the Court, much of the excellent research and
detailed argument presented in these cases is unnecessary to their disposition.

2
In the instant case, petitioner filed an application for admission to the

University of Texas Law School for the February, 1946 term. His application
was rejected solely because he is a Negro.1 Petitioner thereupon brought this
suit for mandamus against the appropriate school officials, respondents here, to
compel his admission. At that time, there was no law school in Texas which
admitted Negroes.
The State trial court recognized that the action of the State in denying petitioner
the opportunity to gain a legal education while granting it to others deprived
him of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court did not grant the relief requested, however, but
continued the case for six months to allow the State to supply substantially
equal facilities. At the expiration of the six months, in December, 1946, the
court denied the writ on the showing that the authorized university officials had
adopted an order calling for the opening of a law school for Negroes the
following February. While petitioner's appeal was pending, such a school was
made available, but petitioner refused to register therein. The Texas Court of
Civil Appeals set aside the trial court's judgment and ordered the cause
'remanded generally to the trial court for further proceedings without prejudice
to the rights of any party to this suit.'
On remand, a hearing was held on the issue of the equality of the educational
facilities at the newly established school as compared with the University of
Texas Law School. Finding that the new school offered petitioner 'privileges,
advantages, and opportunities for the study of law substantially equivalent to
those offered by the State to white students at the University of Texas,' the trial
court denied mandamus. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. 1948, 210
S.W.2d 442. Petitioner's application for a writ of error was denied by the Texas
Supreme Court. We granted certiorari, 1949, 338 U.S. 865, 70 S.Ct. 139,
because of the manifest importance of the constitutional issues involved.
The University of Texas Law School, from which petitioner was excluded, was
staffed by a faculty of sixteen full-time and three part-time professors, some of
whom are nationally recognized authorities in their field. Its student body
numbered 850. The library contained over 65,000 volumes. Among the other
facilities available to the students were a law review, moot court facilities,
scholarship funds, and Order of the Coif affiliation. The school's alumni occupy
the most distinguished positions in the private practice of the law and in the
public life of the State. It may properly be considered one of the nation's
ranking law schools.
The law school for Negroes which was to have opened in February, 1947,
would have had no independent faculty or library. The teaching was to be
carried on by four members of the University of Texas Law School faculty,
who were to maintain their offices at the University of Texas while teaching at
both institutions. Few of the 10,000 volumes ordered for the library had
arrived;2 nor was there any full-time librarian. The school lacked accreditation.
Since the trial of this case, respondents report the opening of a law school at
the Texas State University for Negroes. It is apparently on the road to full
accreditation. It has a faculty of five full-time professors; a student body of 23;
a library of some 16,500 volumes serviced by a full-time staff; a practice court
and legal aid association; and one alumnus who has become a member of the
Texas Bar.
Whether the University of Texas Law School is compared with the original or
the new law school for Negroes, we cannot find substantial equality in the
educational opportunities offered white and Negro law students by the State. In
terms of number of the faculty, variety of courses and opportunity for
specialization, size of the student body, scope of the library, availability of law
review and similar activities, the University of Texas Law School is superior.
What is more important, the University of Texas Law School possesses to a far
greater degree those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but
which make for greatness in a law school. Such qualities, to name but a few,
include reputation of the faculty, experience of the administration, position and
influence of the alumni, standing in the communicty, traditions and prestige. It
is difficult to believe that one who had a free choice between these law schools
would consider the question close.
Moreover, although the law is a highly learned profession, we are well aware
that it is an intensely practical one. The law school, the proving ground for
legal learning and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals
and institutions with which the law interacts. Few students and no one who has
practiced law would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the
interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is concerned.
The law school to which Texas is willing to admit petitioner excludes from its
student body members of the racial groups which number 85% of the
population of the State and include most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors,
judges and other officials with whom petitioner will inevitably be dealing when
he becomes a member of the Texas Bar. With such a substantial and significant
segment of society excluded, we cannot conclude that the education offered
petitioner is substantially equal to that which he would receive if admitted to
the University of Texas Law School.
10
It may be argued that excluding petitioner from that school is no different from
excluding white students from the new law school. This contention overlooks
realities. It is unlikely that a member of a group so decisively in the majority,
attending a school with rich traditions and prestige which only a history of
consistently maintained excellence could command, would claim that the
opportunities afforded him for legal education were unequal to those held open
to petitioner. That such a claim, if made, would be dishonored by the State, is
no answer. 'Equal protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate
imposition of inequalities.' Shelley v. Kraemer, 1948, 334 U.S. 1, 22, 68 S.Ct.
836, 846, 92 L.Ed. 1161, 3 A.L.R.2d 441.
11
It is fundamental that these cases concern rights which are personal and
present. This Court has stated unanimously that 'The State must provide (legal
education) for (petitioner) in conformity with the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and provide it as soon as it does for applicants of any
other group.' Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 1948, 332 U.S. 631, 633, 68 S.Ct.
299, 92 L.Ed. 247. That case 'did not present the issue whether a state might not
satisfy the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by
establishing a separate law school for Negroes.' Fisher v. Hurst, 1948, 333 U.S.
147, 150, 68 S.Ct. 389, 390, 92 L.Ed. 604. In State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 1938, 305 U.S. 337, 351, 59 S.Ct. 232, 237, 83 L.Ed. 208, the Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, declared that 'petitioner's right was a
personal one. It was as an individual that he was entitled to the equal protection
of the laws, and the State was bound to furnish him within its borders facilities
for legal education substantially equal to those which the State there afforded
for persons of the white race, whether or not other Negroes sought the same
opportunity.' These are the only cases in this Court which present the issue of
the constitutional validity of race distinctions in state-supported graduate and
professional education.
12
In accordance with these cases, petitioner may claim his full constitutional
right: legal education equivalent to that offered by the State to students of other
races. Such education is not available to him in a separate law school as offered
by the State. We cannot, therefore, agree with respondents that the doctrine of
Plessy v. Ferguson, 1896, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256, requires
affirmance of the judgment below. Nor need we reach petitioner's contention
that Plessy v. Ferguson should be reexamined in the light of contemporary
knowledge respecting the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
effects of racial segregation. See supra, 339 U.S. 631, 70 S.Ct. 849.
13
We hold that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

requires that petitioner be admitted to the University of Texas Law School. The
judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for proceedings not

inconsistent with this opinion.
14
Reversed.
It appears that the University has been restricted to white students, in

accordance with the State law. See Tex.Const. Art. VII, 7, 14;
Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Arts. 2643b, 2719, 2900 (Vernon, 1925 and Supp.)
'Students of the interim School of Law of the Texas State University for
Negroes (located in Austin, whereas the permanent School was to be located at
Houston) shall have use of the State Law Library in the Capitol Building * * *.'
Tex.Laws 1947, c. 29, 11, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. (Vernon, Supp.), note to Art.
2643b. It is not clear that this privilege was anything more than was extended
to all citizens of the State.

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339 U.S.

See 71 S.Ct. 13.

detailed argument presented in these cases is unnecessary to their disposition.

In the instant case, petitioner filed an application for admission to the

We hold that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for proceedings not

It appears that the University has been restricted to white students, in

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