DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983)
DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983)
DelCostello v. Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983)
151
103 S.Ct. 2281
76 L.Ed.2d 476
Syllabus
The issue in each of these cases is what statute of limitations applies in an
employee suit against an employer and a union, alleging the employer's
breach of a collective-bargaining agreement and the union's breach of its
duty of fair representation by mishandling the ensuing grievance or
arbitration proceedings. United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S.
56, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 67 L.Ed.2d 732, held in a similar it that an
employee's claim against the employer was governed by a state statute of
limitations for vacation of an arbitration award rather than by a state
statute for an action for breach of contract, but left open the issues as to
what state statute should govern the employee's claim against the union or
whether, instead of applying a state statute of limitations, the provisions of
10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act establishing a 6-month
limitations period for making charges of unfair labor practices to the
National Labor Relations Board should be borrowed. In No. 81-2386,
respondent local union brought a formal grievance under the collectivebargaining agreement based on petitioner employee's alleged improper
discharge. After a hearing, a joint union-management committee informed
petitioner of its conclusion that the grievance was without merit, and the
committee's determination became final on September 20, 1977. On
March 16, 1978, petitioner filed suit in Federal District Court, alleging
that the employer had discharged him in violation of the collectivebargaining agreement, and that the union had represented him in the
employee's claim against the union. While a state limitations period for
legal malpractice is the closest state-law analogy for the c aim against the
union, application of such a limitations period would not solve the
problem caused by the too-short time in which the employee could sue the
employer, and would preclude the relatively rapid resolution of labor
disputes favored by federal law. In contrast, 10(b)'s 6-month period for
filing unfair labor practice charges is designed to accommodate a balance
of interests very similar to that at stake here. Both the union's breach of its
duty and the employer's breach of the bargaining agreement are often also
unfair labor practices. Moreover, in 10(b) "Congress established a
limitations period attuned to what it viewed as the proper balance between
the national interests in stable bargaining relationships and finality of
private settlements, and an employee's interest in setting aside what he
views as an unjust settlement under the collective-bargaining system."
Mitchell, supra, 451 U.S., at 70-71, 101 S.Ct., at 1567-1568 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in judgment). Pp. 163-172.
2. The judgment in No. 81-2408 is reversed because it is conceded that the suit
was filed some 11 months after respondents' causes of action accrued.
However, in No. 81-2386 the judgment is reversed but the case is remanded
since petitioner contends that certain events tolled the running of the limitations
period until about three months before he filed suit, but the District Court,
applying a 30-day limitations period, declined to consider any tolling issue. P.
172.
679 F.2d 879 (CA4 1982), reversed and remanded; 671 F.2d 87 (CA2 1982),
reversed.
employer and a union, alleging that the employer had breached a provision of a
collective bargaining agreement, and that the union had breached its duty of fair
representation by mishandling the ensuing grievance-and-arbitration
proceedings. See infra, at 162; Bowen v. United States Postal Service, --- U.S. --, --- - ---, 103 S.Ct. 588, 593, 74 L.Ed.2d 402 (1983); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424
U.S. 554, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976). The issue presented is what
statute of limitations should apply to such suits. In United Parcel Service, Inc.
v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981), we held that a
similar suit was governed by a state statute of limitations for vacation of an
arbitration award, rather than by a state statute for an action on a contract. We
left two points open, however. First, our holding was limited to the employee's
claim against the employer; we did not address what state statute should govern
the claim against the union.1 Second, we expressly limited our consideration to
a choice between two state statutes of limitations; we did not address the
contention that we should instead borrow a federal statute of limitations,
namely, 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 160(b).2
These cases present these two issues. We conclude that 10(b) should be the
applicable statute of limitations governing the suit, both against the employer
and against the union.
9* A.
10
11
On March 16, 1978, DelCostello filed this suit in the District of Maryland
against the employer and the union. He alleged that the employer had
discharged him in violation of the collective bargaining agreement, and that the
union had represented him in the grievance procedure "in a discriminatory,
13
Respondents filed this suit in the Western District of New York on January 9,
1979, naming both the employer and the union as defendants. The complaint
alleged that the company's work assignments violated the collective bargaining
agreement, and that the union's "preparation, investigation and handling" of
respondents' grievances were "so inept and careless as to be arbitrary and
capricious," in violation of the union's duty of fair representation. App. 10. The
District Court dismissed the complaint against both defendants, holding that the
entire suit was governed by New York's 90-day statute of limitations for actions
to vacate arbitration awards.8 The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of its
prior holding in Mitchell v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 624 F.2d 394 (CA2
1980), that such actions are governed by New York's six-year statute for
actions on contracts.9 Flowers v. Local 2602, United Steelworkers of America,
622 F.2d 573 (CA2 1980) (mem.). We granted certiorari and vacated and
remanded for reconsideration in light of our reversal in Mitchell. Steelworkers
v. Flowers, 451 U.S. 965, 101 S.Ct. 2039, 68 L.Ed.2d 344 (1981). On remand,
the Court of Appeals rejected the argument that the six-month period of 10(b)
applies. Accordingly, following our decision in Mitchell, it applied the 90-day
arbitration statute and affirmed the dismissal as to the employer. As to the
union, however, the Court reversed, concluding that the correct statute to apply
was New York's three-year statute for malpractice actions.10 671 F.2d 87 (CA2
1982).
C
14
In this Court, petitioners in both cases contend that suits under Vaca and Hines
should be governed by the six-month limitations period of 10(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 160(b). Alternatively, the
Steelworkers, petitioners in No. 81-2408, argue that the state statute for
vacation of arbitration awards should apply to a claim against a union as well as
to one against an employer.11 We granted certiorari in both cases and
consolidated them for argument. --- U.S. ---, 103 S.Ct. 442, 74 L.Ed.2d 599
(1982).
II
A.
15
As is often the case in federal civil law, there is no federal statute of limitations
expressly applicable to this suit. In such situations we do not ordinarily assume
that Congress intended that there be no time limit on actions at all; rather, our
task is to "borrow" the most suitable statute or other rule of timeliness from
some other source. We have generally concluded that Congress intended that
the courts apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state
law.12 "The implied absorption of State statutes of limitation within the
interstices of the federal enactments is a phase of fashioning remedial details
where Congress has not spoken but left matters for judicial determination
within the general framework of familiar legal principles." Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395, 66 S.Ct. 582, 584, 90 L.Ed. 743 (1946).13 See,
e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180-182, 96 S.Ct. 2586, 2599-2600, 49
L.Ed.2d 415 (1976); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 101-105, 92 S.Ct.
349, 352-354, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971); Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S.
696, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966); Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta,
203 U.S. 390, 27 S.Ct. 65, 51 L.Ed. 241 (1906); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155
U.S. 610, 15 S.Ct. 217, 39 L.Ed. 280 (1895).
16
"[T]he Court has not mechanically applied a state statute of limitations simply
because a limitations period is absent from the federal statute. State legislatures
do not devise their limitations periods with national interests in mind, and it is
the duty of the federal courts to assure that the importation of state law will not
frustrate or interfere with the implementation of national policies. 'Although
state law is our primary guide in this area, it is not, to be sure, our exclusive
guide.' " Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367, 97 S.Ct.
2447, 2454, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977), quoting Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1722, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975).
18
Hence, in some cases we have declined to borrow state statutes but have instead
used timeliness rules drawn from federal laweither express limitations
periods from related federal statutes, or such alternatives as laches. In
Occidental, for example, we declined to apply state limitations periods to
enforcement suits brought by the EEOC under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, reasoning that such application might unduly hinder the policy of
the Act by placing too great an administrative burden on the agency. In
McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 78 S.Ct. 1201, 2 L.Ed.2d
1272 (1958), we applied the federal limitations provision of the Jones Act to a
seaworthiness action under general admiralty law. We pointed out that the two
forms of claim are almost invariably brought together. Hence, "with an eye to
the practicalities of admiralty personal injury litigation," id., at 224, 78 S.Ct., at
1203, we held inapplicable a shorter state statute governing personal injury
suits. Again, in Holmberg, we held that state statutes of limitations would not
apply to a federal cause of action lying only in equity, because the principles of
federal equity are hostile to the "mechanical rules" of statutes of limitations.
327 U.S., at 396, 66 S.Ct., at 584.
19
Auto Workers v. Hoosier was a straightforward suit under 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 185, for breach of a collective
bargaining agreement by an employer. Unlike the present cases, Hoosier did
not involve any agreement to submit disputes to arbitration, and the suit was
brought by the union itself rather than by an individual employee. We held that
the suit was governed by Indiana's six-year limitations period for actions on
unwritten contracts; we resisted the suggestion that we establish some uniform
federal period. Although we recognized that "the subject matter of 301 is
'peculiarly one that calls for uniform law,' " 383 U.S., at 701, 86 S.Ct., at 1110,
quoting Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103, 82 S.Ct. 571,
576, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962), we reasoned that national uniformity is of less
importance when the case does not involve "those consensual processes that
federal labor law is chiefly designed to promotethe formation o the collective
agreement and the private settlement of disputes under it," 383 U.S., at 702, 86
S.Ct., at 1111. We also relied heavily on the obvious and close analogy
between this variety of 301 suit and an ordinary breach of contract case. We
expressly reserved the question whether we would apply state law to 301
actions where the analogy was less direct or the relevant policy factors
different:
20
21
Justice Stewart, who wrote the Court's opinion in Hoosier, took this caution to
heart in Mitchell. He concurred separately in the judgment, arguing that the
factors that compelled adoption of state law in Hoosier did not apply to suits
under Vaca and Hines, and that in the latter situation we should apply the
federal limitations period of 10(b). 451 U.S., at 65-71, 101 S.Ct., at 15651568. As we shall explain, we agree.
B
22
It has long been established that an individual employee may bring suit against
his employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement. Smith v. Evening
News Assn., 371 U.S. 195, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962). Ordinarily,
however, an employee is required to attempt to exhaust any grievance or
arbitration remedies provided in the collective bargaining agreement. Republic
Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 85 S.Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965); cf.
Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679, 101 S.Ct. 2088, 68 L.Ed.2d 538
(1981) (exhaustion of intra-union remedies not always required). Subject to
very limited judicial review, he will be bound by the result according to the
finality provisions of the agreement. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, --U.S. ----, at ----, 103 S.Ct. ----, at ----, 75 L.Ed.2d ----; Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). In Vaca
and Hines, however, we recognized that this rule works an unacceptable
injustice when the union representing the employee in the grievance/arbitration
procedure acts in such a discriminatory, dishonest, arbitrary, or perfunctory
25
"The arbitration proceeding did not, and indeed, could not, resolve the
employee's claim against the union. Although the union was a party to the
arbitration, it acted only as the employee's representative; the [arbitration panel]
did not address or resolve any dispute between the employee and the union. . . .
Because no arbitrator has decided the primary issue presented by this claim, no
arbitration award need be undone, even if the employee ultimately prevails."
451 U.S., at 73, 101 S.Ct., at 1569 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (footnotes omitted).
26
Justice STEVENS suggested an alternative solution for the claim against the
union: borrowing the state limitations period for legal malpractice. Id., at 7275, 101 S.Ct., at 1569-1570; see post, at 174 (STEVENS, J., dissenting); post,
at 175 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting). The analogy here is to a lawyer who
mishandles a commercial arbitration. Although the short limitations period for
vacating the arbitral award would protect the interest in finality of the opposing
party to the arbitration, the misrepresented party would retain his right to sue
his lawyer for malpractice under a longer limitations period. This solution is
admittedly the closest state-law analogy for the claim against the union.
Nevertheless, we think that it too suffers from objections peculiar to the
realities of labor relations and litigation.
27
The most serious objection is that it does not solve the problem caused by the
too-short time in which an employee could sue his employer under borrowed
state law. In a commercial setting, a party who sued his lawyer for bungling an
arbitration could ordinarily recover his entire damages, even if the statute of
29
30
31
These objections to the resort to state law might have to be tolerated if state law
were the only source reasonably available for borrowing, as it often is. In this
case, however, we have available a federal statute of limitations actually
designed to accommodate a balance of interests very similar to that at stake
herea statute that is, in fact, an analogy to the present lawsuit more apt than
any of the suggested state-law parallels.20 We refer to 10(b) of the National
Labor Relations Act, which establishes a six-month period for making charges
of unfair labor practices to the NLRB.21
32
The NLRB has consistently held that all breaches of a union's duty of fair
representation are in fact unfair labor practices. E.g., Miranda Fuel Co., 140
N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (CA2 1963). We have
twice declined to decide the correctness of the Board's position,22 and we need
not address that question today. Even if not all breaches of the duty are unfair
labor practices, however, the family resemblance is undeniable, and indeed
there is a substantial overlap. Many fair representation claims (the one in No.
81-2386, for example) include allegations of discrimination based on
membership status or dissident views, which would be unfair labor practices
under 8(a)(1) or (2). Aside from these clear cases, duty-of-fair-representation
claims are allegations of unfair, arbitrary, or discriminatory treatment of
workers by unionsas are virtually all unfair labor practice charges made by
workers against unions. See generally R. Gorman, Labor Law 698-701 (1976).
Similarly, it may be the case that alleged violations by an employer of a
collective bargaining agreement will also amount to unfair labor practices. See
id., at 729-734.
33
At least as important as the similarity of the rights asserted in the two contexts,
however, is the close similarity of the considerations relevant to the choice of a
limitations period. As Justice Stewart observed in Mitchell:
34
10(b) of the NLRA as the appropriate limitations period for lawsuits such as
this." 451 U.S., at 70-71, 101 S.Ct., at 1567-1568 (opinion concurring in the
judgment) (footnote omitted).
35
We stress that our holding today should not be taken as a departure from prior
practice in borrowing limitations periods for federal causes of action, in labor
law or elsewhere. We do not mean to suggest that federal courts should eschew
use of state limitations periods anytime state law fails to provide a perfect
analogy. See, e.g., Mitchell, 451 U.S., at 61, n. 3, 101 S.Ct., at 1563, n. 3. On
the contrary, as the courts have often discovered, there is not always an obvious
state-law choice for application to a given federal cause of action; yet resort to
state law remains the norm for borrowing of limitations periods. Nevertheless,
when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy
than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake and the
practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate
vehicle for interstitial lawmaking, we have not hesitated to turn away from state
law. See supra, Part II-A. As Justice Goldberg cautioned, "in this Court's
fashioning of a federal law of collective bargaining, it is of the utmost
importance that the law reflect the realities of industrial life and the nature of
the collective bargaining process. We should not assume that doctrines evolved
in other contexts will be equally well adapted to the collective bargaining
process." Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 358, 84 S.Ct. 363, 376, 11
L.Ed.2d 370 (1964) (opinion concurring in the result).
III
36
In No. 81-2408, it is conceded that the suit was filed more than ten months after
respondents' causes of action accrued. The Court of Appeals held the suit
timely under a state three-year statute for malpractice actions. Since we hold
that the suit is governed by the six-month provision of 10(b), we reverse the
judgment.
37
The situation is less clear in No. 81-2386. Depending on when the joint
committee's decision is thought to have been rendered, the suit was filed some
seven or eight months afterwards. Petitioner DelCostello contends, however,
that certain events operated to toll the running of the statute of limitations until
about three months before he filed suit. Since the District Court applied a 30day limitations period, it expressly declined to consider any tolling issue. 524
F.Supp., at 725. Hence, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
38
It is so ordered.
39
40
41
Today the Court holds that the Rules of Decision Act does not determine the
result in this case, because it believes that a separate federal law, growing out of
"the policies and requirements of the underlying cause of action," ante, at 159,
n. 13, "otherwise require[s] or provide[s]." The Court's opinion sets forth a
number of reasons why it may make good sense to adopt a six months statute
of limitations, but nothing in that opinion persuades me that the Constitution,
treaties, or statutes of the United States "require or provide" that this particular
limitations period must be applied to this case. 2
42
Congress has given us no reason to depart from our settled practice, grounded
in the Rules of Decision Act, of borrowing analogous state statutes of limitation
in cases such as this. For the reasons set forth in my separate opinion in United
Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 71, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 1568, 67
L.Ed.2d 732 (1981), I believe that in a suit for a breach of the duty of fair
representation, the appropriate "laws of the several states" are the statutes of
limitations governing malpractice suits against attorneys. I would apply those
laws to resolve the worker-union disputes in these two cases. And I would
continue to abide by our holding in Mitchell in resolving the employeeemployer dispute presented in No. 81-2386.
43
44
45
As the Court recognizes, "resort to state law [is] the norm for borrowing of
limitations periods." Ante, at 171. When federal law is silent on the question of
limitations, we borrow state law in the belief that, given our longstanding
practice and congressional awareness of it, we can safely assume, in the
absence of strong indications to the contrary, that Congress intends by its
silence that we follow the usual rule.1 In Auto Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal
Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966), we applied the
"norm" to a suit under 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. 185. I see no reason in this case to depart from our usual practice of
borrowing state law, for we have no contrary indications strong enou h to
outweigh our ordinary presumption that Congress' silence indicates a desire that
we follow the ordinary rule. As a result, I would look to state law for a
limitations period. For the reasons given by Justice STEVENS in his separate
opinion in United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 72-74, 101 S.Ct.
1559, 1569-1570, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981), I think that a malpractice action
against an attorney provides the closest analogy to an employee's suit against
his union for breach of the duty of fair representation, and I would apply the
state's statute of limitations for such an action here. In DelCostello's action
against his employer, I, like Justice STEVENS, would follow Mitchell.2
Only the employer sought certiorari in Mitchell. Hence, the case did not present
the question of what limitations period should be applied to the employee's
claim against the union. See 451 U.S., at 60, 101 S.Ct., at 1562; id., at 71-75
and n. 1, 101 S.Ct., at 1562 and n. 1 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
Id., 5-101.
Respondents argue that DelCostello did not raise the argument below that the
applicable limitations period is the six-month period of 10(b). He did raise
the 10(b) point perfunctorily in opposition to respondents' motion for
reconsideration, however, App. 264, and he brie ed it more thoroughly in the
Court of Appeals, App. 282-290. Respondents likewise addressed the 10(b)
issue fully on the merits in the Court of Appeals; they did not raise any
contention that DelCostello had waived the assertion. Court of Appeals Brief
for Appellees 41-45.
The other petitioner is the United Steelworkers of America, with which the
Local is affiliated. The two labor organizations will be treated as one party for
purposes of this case. Bethlehem Steel Corporation was a defendant below but
is not before this Court in the present proceeding.
Id., 213(2).
(BRENNAN, J., concurring). The suits at issue here, of course, are amalgams,
based on both an express statutory cause of action and an implied one. See
infra, at 164-165 and n. 14. We need not address whether, as a general matter,
such cases should be treated differently; even if this action were considered as
arising solely under 301, the objections to use of state law and the availability
of a well-suited limitations period in 10(b) would call for application of the
latter rule.
10
Id., 214(6).
11
12
borrowing state provisions. See also Auto Workers v. Hoosier Corp., 383 U.S.
696, 703-704, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 1111-1112, 16 L.Ed.2d 192 (1966).
Justice Stewart pointed out in Mitchell that this line of reasoning makes more
sense as applied to a cause of action expressly created by Congress than as
applied to one found by the courts to be implied in a general statutory scheme
especially when that general statutory scheme itself contains a federal statute of
limitations for a related but separate form of relief. 451 U.S., at 68, n. 4, 101
S.Ct., at 1564, n. 4 (opinion concurring in the judgment); see also McAllister v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 228-229, 78 S.Ct. 1201, 1206, 2
L.Ed.2d 1272 (1958)
13
Respondents argue that the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. 1652, mandates
application of state statutes of limitations whenever Congress has provided
none. The argument begs the question, since the Act authorizes application of
state law only when federal law does not "otherwise require or provide." As we
recognized in Hoosier, 383 U.S., at 701, 86 S.Ct., at 1110, the choice of a
limitations period for a federal cause of action is itself a question of federal law.
If the answer to that question (based on the policies and requirements of the
underlying cause of action) is that a timeliness rule drawn from elsewhere in
federal law should be applied, then the Rules of Decision Act is inapplicable by
its own terms. As we said in United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412
U.S. 580, 93 S.Ct. 2389, 37 L.Ed.2d 187 (1973):
"There will often be no specific federal legislation go erning a particular
transaction . . .; here, for example, no provision of the . . . Act guides us to
choose state or federal law in interpreting . . . agreements under the Act. . . . But
silence on that score in federal legislation is no reason for limiting the reach of
federal law. . . . To the contrary, the inevitable incompleteness presented by all
legislation means that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of
the federal courts. 'At the very least, effective Constitutionalism requires
recognition of power in the federal courts to declare, as a matter of common law
or "judicial legislation," rules which may be necessary to fill in interstitially or
otherwise effectuate the statutory patterns enacted in the large by Congress. In
other words, it must mean recognition of federal judicial competence to declare
the governing law in an area comprising issues related to an established
program of government operation.' " Id., at 593, 93 S.Ct., at 2397, quoting
Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U.Pa.L.Rev. 797, 800
(1957).
See also Western & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of
Diversity?, 78 Mich.L.Rev. 311, 352-359 and nn. 122 and 142, 368-370, 377-
Indeed, the contrary view urged by respondents cannot be reconciled with the
numerous cases that have declined to borrow state law, see infra, at 162-163,
nor with our suggestion in Hoosier that we might not apply state limitations
periods in a different case, 383 U.S., at 705, n. 7, 707, n. 9, 86 S.Ct., at 1113, n.
7, 1114, n. 9.
14
The duty of fair representation exists because it is the policy of the National
Labor Relations Act to allow a single labor organization to represent
collectively the interests of all employees within a unit, thereby depriving
individuals in the unit of the ability to bargain individually or to select a
minority union as their representative. In such a system, if individual employees
are not to be deprived of all effective means of protecting their own interests, it
must be the duty of the representative organization "to serve the interests of all
members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its
discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary
conduct." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 87 S.Ct. 903, 909, 17 L.Ed.2d 842
(1967). See generally Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct.
226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337, 73
S.Ct. 681, 685, 97 L.Ed. 1048 (1953); Syres v. Oil Workers International
Union, 350 U.S. 892, 76 S.Ct. 152, 100 L.Ed. 785 (1955); Humphrey v. Moore,
375 U.S. 335, 342, 84 S.Ct. 363, 367, 11 L.Ed.2d 370 (1964); R. Gorman,
Labor Law 695-728 (1976). The duty stands "as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary
union conduct against individuals stripped of traditional forms of redress by the
provisions of federal labor law." Vaca, 383 U.S., at 182, 87 S.Ct., at 912.
15
The majority of States require filing within 90 days (22 States and the District
of Columbia) or three months (seven States). See also 9 U.S.C. 12. Only two
States have longer periodsone for one year, the other for 100 days. Other
statutes allow 30 days (six States), 20 days (three States), or 10 days (two
States). The remainder of the States either impose time limits based on terms of
court or have no statutory provision on point.
16
with regard to the principles of Vaca, Hines, and Mitchell. Moreover, the
difficulty of detecting and mustering evidence to show the union's breach of
duty may be even greater in these situations, and it may not be an easy task to
ascertain when the cause of action accruesobviously a matter of great
importance when the statute of limitations may be as short as 30 days.
17
Inability to sue the employer would also foreclose use of such equitable
remedies as an order to arbitrate. See Vaca, 386 U.S., at 196, 87 S.Ct., at 919.
18
One State's limitations period for legal malpractice is 10 years. Other statutes
allow six years (10 States); five years (four States); four years (five States);
three years (10 States and the District of Columbia); two years (16 States); and
one year (four States).
19
The solution proposed by Justice STEVENS also has the unfortunate effect of
establishing different limitations periods for the two halves of a 301/fair
representation suit. A very similar consideration led us to reject borrowing of a
state statute in McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 78 S.Ct.
1201, 2 L.Ed.2d 1272 (1958). See also Vaca, 386 U.S., at 186-188 and n. 12,
87 S.Ct., at 914-915 and n. 12; Clayton v. Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679,
694-695, 101 S.Ct. 2088, 2098-2099, 68 L.Ed.2d 538 (1981).
20
This is not to say that the sole options available are a federal statute of
limitations or a state one. As Holmberg and Occidental show, see supra, at 161,
162 we have sometimes concluded that Congress's intention can best be carried
out by imposing no predefined limitations period at all.
21
22
Vaca, 386 U.S., at 186, 87 S.Ct., at 914; Humphrey, 375 U.S., at 344, 84 S.Ct.,
at 369; see Mitchell, 451 U.S., at 67-68, n. 3, 101 S.Ct., at 1566, n. 3 (Stewart,
J., concurring in the judgment).
In 1789 the First Congress enacted the Rules of Decision Act (the Act),
Rev.Stat. 721, 1 Stat. 92, plainly stating:
"That the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties or
statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United
States in cases where they apply."
In 1895, construing that Act, we held that state statutes of limitations provided
the relevant rules of decision in patent infringement actions, explaining:
"That this section [Rev.Stat. 721] embraces the statutes of limitations of the
several States has been decided by this court in a large number of cases, which
are collated in its opinion in Bauserman v. Blunt, 147 U.S. 647 [13 S.Ct. 466,
37 L.Ed. 316] . . . . Indeed, to no class of state legislation has the above
provision been more steadfastly and consistently applied than to statutes
prescribing the time within which actions shall be brought within its
jurisdiction." Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 614, 15 S.Ct. 217, 218, 39
L.Ed. 280 (1895). Accord, McClaine v. Rankin, 197 U.S. 154, 25 S.Ct. 410, 49
L.Ed. 702 (1905).
In response to the suggestion that the Act was not intended to govern
nondiversity cases raising federal questionssuch as patent suits or suits under
the National Labor Relations Actwe bluntly observed that "[t]he section itself
neither contains nor suggests such a distinction." 155 U.S., at 615, 15 S.Ct., at
219.
When the Court recognized the cause of action in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,
87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967), the majority explained, "We cannot
believe that Congress, in conferring upon employers and unions the power to
establish exclusive grievance procedures, intended to confer upon unions . . .
unlimited discretion to deprive injured employees of all remedies for breach of
contract." Id., at 186, 87 S.Ct., at 914. But nothing in the language, structure, or
legislative history of the National Labor Relations Act compels the further
conclusion that Congress intended the federal judiciary to abandon the
traditional practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations when no federal
statute directly applies. Saying that a statute impliedly creates a cause of action
is not the same thing as saying that it impliedly commands the courts to
abandon the standard procedure for choosing limitations periods and instead to
borrow a period that Congress established for a different purpose.
I believe, basically for the reasons given by the Court, ante, at 159-161, n. 13,
that our practice of borrowing state periods of limitations depends largely on
this general guide for divining congressional intent. See, e.g., Auto Workers v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 1112, 16 L.Ed.2d
192 (1966); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395, 66 S.Ct. 582, 584, 90
L.Ed. 743 (1946). I agree with the Court that the Rules of Decision Act, 28
U.S.C. 1652, only puts the question, for it simply requires application of state
law unless federal law applies. See ante, at 159-161, n. 13. Therefore, I am
unable to join Justice STEVENS's dissent. My disagreement with the Court
arises because I do not think that federal law implicitly rejects the practice of
borrowing state periods of limitations in this situation.