The Dexter, 90 U.S. 69 (1875)
The Dexter, 90 U.S. 69 (1875)
The Dexter, 90 U.S. 69 (1875)
69
23 L.Ed. 84
23 Wall. 69
THE DEXTER.
October Term, 1874
APPEAL from the Circuit Court for the District of Maryland, affirming a
decree of the District Court dismissing a libel filed by the owners of the
schooner Julia against another schooner, the Dexter, in a cause of collision
in Chesapeake Bay, by which the Julia was totally lost; the only difficulty
in the controversy beingthat usual one in causes of collision at seato
ascertain what were the facts of the case; in other words, to settle the case;
a matter rendered difficult in this cause, as in so many others of collision,
by the circumstance that witnesses of one side swore in direct opposition
to witnesses of the other. The adjudication, therefore, ministers nothing to
jurisdical science.
The case, as it was assumed in both the courts below, and in this, upon the
contradictory testimony adverted to, was thus:
On the night of November 17th, 1870the night being clear and the
moon shining brightlythe schooner Julia was sailing up Chesapeake
Bay. The schooner Dexter was sailing down it. The wind, which was
fresh, was between northwest and west-by-north, and the vessels were
each sailing at the rate of eight miles an hour; approaching, therefore,
rapidly. The Julia was close to the wind, though not as close as she would
lie without impeding her course.
The helmsmen of the two vessels saw them respectively when three miles
from each other. What their exact course then was, and whether likely to
come together did not so plainly appear. Some evidence tended to show
that, at that time, the vessels were not approaching end on, but that the
Dexter was sailing with the wind free. But by the time that they got to
within a half-mile of each other the Julia was heading north-northeast, and
the Dexter south-southwest; that is to say, the vessels were approaching
from exactly opposite directions; and the vessels were approaching also
end on, or nearly so. As they thus approached the Dexter ported her helm.
The Julia kept on her course, till the vessels got very near, when a
collision was plainly threatened. The Julia then starboarded her helm. A
collision ensued, and the Julia, which was heavily laden with oysters, went
to the bottom.
The only lookout on the Dexter when the Julia came in sight was the
captain, who, at the time of the collision, was standing aft of the foremast.
The act of Congress 'fixing certain rules and regulations for preventing
collisions on the water,' among its 'Steering and Sailing Rules' thus
provides: 1
TWO SAILING-SHIPS MEETING.
'ARTICLE 11. If two sailing-ships are meeting end on, or nearly end on,
so as to involve risk of collision, the helms of both shall be put to port, so
that each may pass to the port side of the other.'
TWO SAILING-SHIPS CROSSING.
'ARTICLE 12. When two sailing-ships are crossing, so as to involve risk
of collision, then if they have the wind on different sides, the ship with the
wind on the port side shall keep out of the way of the ship with the wind
on the starboard side, except in the case in which the ship with the wind
on the port side is closehauled, and the other ship free; in which case the
latter ship shall keep out of the way. But if they have the wind on the
same side, or if one of them has the wind aft, the ship which is to
windward shall keep out of the way of the ship which is to leeward.'
NO SHIP, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, TO NEGLECT PROPER
PRECAUTIONS.
'ARTICLE 20. Nothing in these rules shall exonerate any ship, or the
owner, or master, or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to
carry lights or signals, or of any neglect to keep a proper lookout,' &c.
The District Court, as already said, decreed a dismissal of the libel; the
Circuit Court affirmed the decree, and the owner of the Julia took this
appeal.
Mr. R. F. Brent, for the appellant, owner of the Julia , contended
1. That the captain was not a competent lookout, and that if he had been so
in general, he was standing on this occasion aft of the foremast, and
plainly could not see; that Article 20 of the act of Congress is obligatory
on vessels to keep a proper lookout, and that none of the other rules which
ought to have ported; if the twelfth, she ought to have kept her course. She
violated her duty under either rule.
5. It is unimportant, in view of the facts of this case, under either of these
rules, whether the Julia was closehauled or not. There was nothing to
prevent her from porting, going farther to leeward, if that was her duty, or
from keeping her course, if subject to the twelfth rule. If she had done
either there would have been no collision.
6. The case as proved shows that the Julia was not closehauled.
7. The error on the part of the Julia was not excusable on the ground of
well-founded alarm arising from too dangerous proximity, the result of
previous fault on the part of the Dexter.
8. The absence of a special lookout other than the captain on the Dexter
could not have contributed to the collision. Her captain saw the Julia two
miles off; saw all that could be seen, and did everything that could have
been done under any circumstances.7
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Objection is made by the libellant that the lookout of the Dexter was
insufficient, but it is unnecessary to decide the question, as it was a clear night,
and as each vessel was seen by the other long before there was any necessity
for precaution and in ample time before the collision to have done whatever the
circumstances required to have prevented the disaster. Sufficient lookouts are
required by the rules of navigation, but where it appears that the officer in
charge of the deck saw the approaching vessel while she was yet so distant that
no precautions to avoid a collision had become necessary, and that the want of
a lookout did not and could not have contributed to the collision, the vessel
omitting such a proper precaution will not be held responsible for the
consequences of the disaster if in all other respects she is without fault.8
It is insisted by the libellant that the wind was from the northwest and that his
schooner was closehauled. On the other hand, it is contended by the claimant
that the wind was west-by-north, and he denies that the course of the schooner
was such as is alleged by the libellant.
Strong doubts arise whether the wind was as far north as the point assumed by
the libellant, and the proofs fail to convince the court that it was as far to the
west as is supposed by the claimant. Difficulties attend the inquiry, but the
better opinion is that the course of the schooner of the libellant was not as close
to the wind as she would lay, without impeding her headway. Nor is it very
material whether she was or not when the vessels were first seen by each other,
as they were then two miles apart and were moving through the water, by
estimation, at the rate of fourteen or fifteen miles an hour. Satisfactory proof is
exhibited that the schooner of the claimant was heading south-southwest, and
whatever may have been the course of the other schooner when they were two
miles apart, the proof is equally satisfactory that her course when they were a
half a mile apart was exactly opposite to that of the schooner of the claimant.
Evidence is certainly exhibited in the record tending to show that the course of
the schooner of the libellants was east-northeast when the vessels were first
seen by each other, but it is convincing that when they were only a half-mile
apart they were approaching from exactly opposite directions and that the case
falls within the true intent and meaning of the eleventh sailing rule prescribed
by Congress.
4
Sailing ships are meeting end on, within the meaning of that provision, when
they are approaching each other from the opposite directions or on such parallel
lines as involve risk of collision on account of their proximity, and when the
vessels have advanced so near to each other that the necessity for precaution to
prevent such a disaster begins, which cannot be definitely defined, as it must
always depend, to a certain extent, upon the speed of the respective vessels and
the circumstances of the occasion.9
Rules of navigation, such as the one mentioned, are obligatory upon vessels
approaching each other from the time the necessity for precaution begins and
continue to be applicable as the vessels advance so long as the means and
opportunity to avoid the danger remain. They do not apply to a vessel required
to keep her course after the approach is so near that the collision is inevitable,
and are equally inapplicable to vessels of every description while they are yet
so distant from each other that measures of precaution have not become
necessary to avoid a collision.
Apply the eleventh sailing-rule to the case and it is clear that the decree of the
Circuit Court should be affirmed, as the evidence shows that the two vessels
when they were half a mile apart were approaching each other in opposite
directions and that the schooner of the claimant ported her helm as required by
that rule; and it is equally clear that the collision would have been prevented if
the schooner of the libellant had performed her duty in that regard. Instead of
that she held her course until the danger became imminent, and then, by the
mistake of the man at the wheel, put her helm in the wrong direction, which
rendered the collision inevitable.
Attempt is made in argument to exculpate the error of the helmsman upon the
ground that the danger was imminent, but such an excuse cannot be admitted as
a valid one where it appears that the imminence of the peril was occasioned by
the negligence, carelessness, or unskilfulness of those in charge of the vessel
setting up such an apology for a violation of a plain rule of navigation.
Serious conflict exists in the testimony as to what was done by the respective
vessels when they were more distant from each other, but it is not deemed
necessary to give that part of the evidence much examination, as it is clear that
they had ample time and opportunity to adopt every needful precaution to avoid
a collision after it must have been apparent to both that they were fast
approaching each other from opposite directions.
Resort is had by the libellant to that part of the evidence to show that the case
falls under the twelfth sailing-rule and not under the eleventh, as contended by
the claimant. Even suppose that proposition could be maintained, which is
denied, it is quite clear that it would not benefit the libellant, as it is conceded
that his schooner changed her course by putting her helm to starboard and that
it was that error which produced the collision.
10
Viewed in any light it is clear that the libellant is not entitled to recover.
11
DECREE AFFIRMED.
Ib. 337.