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    Lang v. New Jersey, 209 U.S. 467 (1908)

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    The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Frederick Lang for murder by the New Jersey state courts. Lang argued his constitutional rights were violated because two grand jurors were over the age of 65, which was prohibited by a New Jersey statute. However, the statute also stated objections to grand jurors must be made before they are sworn in. The Court found no unconstitutional discrimination in the statute or its application. The qualifications were intended to create an efficient grand jury, not benefit a particular class. Lang failed to show any prejudice from the grand jurors' ages.

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    Lang v. New Jersey, 209 U.S. 467 (1908)

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    The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Frederick Lang for murder by the New Jersey state courts. Lang argued his constitutional rights were violated because two grand jurors were over the age of 65, which was prohibited by a New Jersey statute. However, the statute also stated objections to grand jurors must be made before they are sworn in. The Court found no unconstitutional discrimination in the statute or its application. The qualifications were intended to create an efficient grand jury, not benefit a particular class. Lang failed to show any prejudice from the grand jurors' ages.

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    Filed: 1908-04-27 Precedential Status: Precedential Citations: 209 U.S. 467 Docket: 649

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    The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Frederick Lang for murder by the New Jersey state courts. Lang argued his constitutional rights were violated because two grand jurors were over the age of 65, which was prohibited by a New Jersey statute. However, the statute also stated objections to grand jurors must be made before they are sworn in. The Court found no unconstitutional discrimination in the statute or its application. The qualifications were intended to create an efficient grand jury, not benefit a particular class. Lang failed to show any prejudice from the grand jurors' ages.

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as COURT, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as court, pdf, or txt
    17 views4 pages

    Lang v. New Jersey, 209 U.S. 467 (1908)

    Uploaded by

    Scribd Government Docs
    The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Frederick Lang for murder by the New Jersey state courts. Lang argued his constitutional rights were violated because two grand jurors were over the age of 65, which was prohibited by a New Jersey statute. However, the statute also stated objections to grand jurors must be made before they are sworn in. The Court found no unconstitutional discrimination in the statute or its application. The qualifications were intended to create an efficient grand jury, not benefit a particular class. Lang failed to show any prejudice from the grand jurors' ages.

    Copyright:

    Public Domain
    Download as COURT, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
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    of 4

    209 U.S.

    467
    28 S.Ct. 594
    52 L.Ed. 894

    FREDERICK LANG, Plff. in Err.,


    v.
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY.
    No. 649.
    Argued April 6, 1908.
    Decided April 27, 1908.

    Mr. Alan H. Strong for plaintiff in error.


    [Argument of Counsel from page 467 intentionally omitted]
    Mr. George Berdine for defendant in error.
    [Argument of Counsel from page 468 intentionally omitted]
    Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:

    Plaintiff in error was convicted in the court of oyer and terminer of Middlesex
    county, New Jersey, of the crime of murder. His conviction was successively
    affirmed by the supreme court of the state and the court of errors and appeals.
    68 Atl. 210. He attacks the judgment on the ground that he has been deprived of
    the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the 14th Amendment of the
    Constitution of the United States, in that his motion to quash the indictment was
    denied, a plea in abatement overruled, and that he was required to answer the
    indictment.

    The crime for which plaintiff in error was indicted was committed after the
    grand jury was impaneled, and two of its members were over the age of sixtyfive years. The object of his motion and plea was to avail himself of the
    limitation of age of grand jurors prescribed by the statutes of the state, and
    avoid that part of the section which provides that the exception on that ground
    must be taken before the jury is sworn.1

    This provision, plaintiff in error contends, as applied by the courts of the state,
    separates criminal defendants into classes; to wit, those who are accused before
    the finding of the indictment, and those who are accused afterwards; giving to
    the first a privilege of challenge which is denied to the second. And it is
    contended that there is no substantial reason for the classification, and,
    therefore, the provision of the 14th Amendment which secures to all persons
    the equal protection of the laws is violated.

    The court of errors and appeals met this contention by denying that the statute
    made the classification asserted. The court observed that the contention rested
    'fundamentally upon the proposition that the right to have a grand juror
    discharged upon the statutory grounds stated in 6 of the jury act is for the
    benefit or protection of a particular class of persons,' whom, the court said, 'to
    avoid constant paraphrase,' it would 'call putative criminals.' And 'putative
    criminals,' the court defined to be all who actually committed crime before the
    grand jury had been sworn, or who were charged or suspected, or, being wholly
    innocent, were ignorant of the fact that they were suspected, as well as those
    who were charged with the crime during the sitting of the grand jury. But to
    none of these, the court said, was the protection of the statute addressed; that its
    purpose was the 'furtherance of the due and efficient administration of justice
    for the protection of those against whom crimes might be committed, as well as
    those who might be charged with the commission of such crimes.' The object
    sought to be attained, it was further said, by the disabilities expressed in the
    statute, 'was to secure an efficient and representative body of citizens to take
    part in the due administration of the law for the benefit of all who were entitled
    to its protection, and not specially or even primarily for the benefit of those
    who were charged with its violation.'

    This we accept as the proper construction of the statute, and see no


    unconstitutional discrimination in it. It is to the effect that certain qualifications
    have been deemed advisable in order to make the grand jury a more efficient
    instrument of justice, qualifications which have no relation to any particular
    defendant or class of defendants. And the practical is regarded. Objection may
    be taken before a jury is sworn, but not afterwards; and the statute uses for its
    purpose the prosecutor of pleas, those who stand accused of crime, and even,
    the court says, an amicus curioe. A grand jury thus secured will have all the
    statutory qualifications in most cases for all defendants; and, besides, the
    discrimination is very unsubstantial, as was pointed out in Gibbs v. State, 45 N.
    J. L. 382, 46 Am. Rep. 782.

    Counsel has not been able to point out what prejudice results to defendants from

    the enforcement of the statute. He urges a verbal discrimination, and invokes


    the 14th Amendment against it. The statute, he in effect says, fixes the limit of
    service at twenty-one and sixty-five years, and confesses the latter is 'somewhat
    early,' but seeks to sustain his contention as follows: 'And though it may not be
    possible in any case to show that the fact of the juror being above the lawful
    age has worked injustice to the defendant, he is not required to show it. It is
    enough that a statute has been transgressed which was enacted, in some
    measure, at least, for his benefit. The due observance of that statute is part of
    the protection of the laws, to which, equally with all others in like
    circumstances, he is entitled under the guaranty of the 14th Amendment.'
    7

    But this proceeds upon a misconception of the purpose of the statute, as was
    pointed out by the court of errors and appeals, and of the power of the state.

    Let it be granted, in deference to the argument of counsel, that the statute makes
    two classes,those who are accused of crime and those that may be accused,
    there is certainly no discrimination within the classes, and the only question
    can be whether, in view of the purpose of the statute, is the classification
    justified? In other words, whether the persons constituting the classes are in
    different relations to the purpose of the law. That they are, we think, is obvious;
    and, as we have said, the law neither offers nor withholds substantial rights. It
    constitutes one of its instrumentalities of persons having certain qualifications
    which cannot affect essentially the charge against, or the defense of, any
    defendant. It is the conception of the state that a grand jury so constituted
    would be more efficient in the administration of justice than one not so
    constituted, but that there would be counteracting disadvantages if the right of
    challenge should be extended beyond the date of the empanelment of the jury.
    We think it is competent for the state to have so provided.

    It will be observed that the provision of the statute is that no exception to a


    juror 'on account of his citizenship or age or any other legal disability [italics
    ours] shall be allowed after he has been sworn.' It is hence contended that 'the
    principle of the decision' under review is not limited to the 'statutory
    disqualifications.' The court said, however: 'Whether the words of the statute,
    'any other disability,' include the common-law grounds of prejudice, malice,
    and the like, and, if so, what would be the rights and remedies of an indicted
    person who had had no opportunity to challenge a given juror upon these
    personal grounds, is not involved in the facts of the present case, or in the line
    of reasoning upon which, in our judgment, its decision should be placed.' In
    connection with this comment see Lee v. New Jersey, 207 U. S. 67, ante, 22, 28
    Sup. Ct. Rep. 22.

    10

    Judgment affirmed.

    That every person summoned as a grand juror in any court of this state, and
    every petit juror returned for the trial of any action or suit of a civil or criminal
    nature, shall be a citizen of this state, and resident within the county from
    which he shall be taken, and above the age of twenty-one and under the age of
    sixty-five years; and if any person who is not so qualified shall be summoned as
    a grand juror, or as a juror on the trial of any such action in any of the courts of
    this state, or if any person shall be summoned as a petit juror ar any stated term
    of any court of this state, who has served as such at any of the three stated terms
    next preceding that to which he may be summoned, it shall be good cause of
    challenge to any such juror, who shall be discharged upon such challenge being
    verified according to law, or on his own oath of affirmation in support thereof;
    provided, that no exception to any such juror on account of his citizenship or
    age, or any other legal disability, shall be allowed after he has been sworn or
    affirmed. [Laws 1876, p. 360.]

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