Special Warfare: Reserve Component Special Operations Forces
Special Warfare: Reserve Component Special Operations Forces
Special Warfare: Reserve Component Special Operations Forces
The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School
Reserve
Component
Special Operations Forces
PB 80921
March 1992
Vol. 5, No. 1
Spring
PB 80921
1989
Contents
March 1992
Special Warfare
Features
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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
Gordon R. Sullivan
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
Milton H. Hamilton
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
00340
Vol. 5, No. 1
Departments
60
63
64
Foreign SOF
66
Update
72
Book Reviews
Cover: Helicopter photo courtesy 1/245th Avn. Bn.; USASOC mobilization photos by Bob Jordan
Special-operations forces
Briefly, U.S. Army special operations are composed of five components made entirely of volunteers.
First, the Special Forces are the
Armys experts at unconventional
warfare. Taught to speak foreign
languages and blend in foreign cultures, they can survive behind
enemy lines and conduct risky longterm reconnaisance missions. They
are paratroopers, but they also
know how to infiltrate by land and
sea without detection, anywhere in
the world.
Secondly, Psychological-Operations forces use the tools of communication loudspeakers, leaflets,
and broadcasts to fire creative
propaganda campaigns at target
audiences. Their purpose: to neutralize hostile enemy attitudes, and
Desert Storm
Each of these five components
was represented in the diverse
assortment of special-operations
units we sent to the Persian Gulf:
Both active-duty soldiers and
reservists, they came from locations
throughout the United States, but
largely from Fort Bragg, N.C.; Fort
Campbell, Ky.; Hunter Army Airfield, Ga.; and Fort Devens, Mass.
In Saudi Arabia, these forces
were united with Navy and Air
Force special-operations units
under Gen. Norman Schwarzkopfs
special-operations command, called
SOCCENT. SOCCENTs commander, Col. Jesse Johnson, was the architect of the special-operations ef-
Coalition warfare
One of the Special Forces great
successes in the Gulf was coalition
warfare, which Schwarzkopf said
was a vital contribution to the overall campaign. U.S. Special Forces
soldiers were attached to the coalition forces and were their trainers
and advisers.
Col. Jesse Johnson, SOCCENT commander (left center), shakes hands with
the Emir of Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm.
March 1992
In this photo,
taken through
night-vision
goggles, specialoperations
troops fast-rope
from an
MH-53J
Pavelow III helicopter
during Operation Desert
Storm.
Special reconnaissance
But coalition warfare was not the
Special Forces only mission. Their
special-reconnaissance role would
prove to be vital: In his now-famous
4
Civil Affairs
Playing no small role in that battle is our Civil Affairs force. Close
to half of the Armys total Civil
Affairs force was deployed. Before
the war started, Civil Affairs soldiers were working with the legitimate government of Kuwait and
the U.S. State Department, planning for the countrys reconstruction. Called the Kuwaiti Task
Force, they were ideal for advising
the Kuwaitis because they are the
militarys experts in civil adminisSpecial Warfare
Psychological operations
Psychological-operations forces
proved to be a unique force multiplier for the commanders in the
field. Leaflets prepared by Army
PSYOP specialists were remarkably successful. One leaflet with a
picture of a B-52 bomber told Iraqi
soldiers in Arabic what day and
time they would be bombed next.
When the prophecy came true, the
leaflets became a very credible
source of information.
Along with the Saudis, we produced and distributed leaflets outlining for Iraqi soldiers the correct
procedures of surrender. These leaflets led countless Iraqis to surrender safely, while posing a minimum
amount of danger to U.S. soldiers.
Special-ops aviation
Another group of soldiers that
deserves a tremendous amount of
recognition is the 160th Special
Operations Aviation Regiment.
As mentioned earlier, one of the
Special Forces firefights ended in a
dramatic escape. During that
escape, CWO 4 Jim Crisafulli of the
160th flew his Blackhawk helicopter more than 150 miles into
Iraq in broad daylight just several
feet off the ground to exfiltrate the
team. He was flying so low that he
had to pull the chopper up just to
get over donkeys backs. Mr. Crisafulli volunteered for that mission;
he has since been awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross.
In the Persian Gulf War, the
160th flew mission after mission
infiltration, exfiltration, resupply
and medical evacuation. Under
SOCCENT, the 160th and special
Sgt. Fern Davis of the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations
Command helps Kurdish children arriving at the Zakhu resettlment camp
during Operation Provide Comfort.
aviation units from the U.S. Air
Force were 100 percent in charge
of combat search and rescue,
according to Schwarzkopf.
When a pilot gets shot down out
there in the middle of nowhere, surrounded by the enemy, and youre
the folks that are required to go in
and go after him, that is a very
Special Warfare
Treating the
Animals
of Kuwait
by Capt. Bob Vogelsang
The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait
cost many people their lives. It was
also unfortunate for the animals of
Kuwait, many of whom barely
survived.
People always wonder what a
doggy doc is doing in an SF group.
There arent any combat-tracker or
scout dogs anymore, and any horses
left are for show. However, a vet can
win a lot of hearts and minds in
many of the agriculturally-based
Third World nations that SF groups
may encounter.
Every animal facility I visited in
Kuwait had been affected by the
war. Only 32 of the original zoo-
the monkeys had been shot by occupying Iraqi troops the elephant
in the right shoulder and the monkey in the right leg. An Air Force
explosive-ordnance-disposal team
swept the elephants wound with a
metal detector and located the bullet, which had not gone very deep.
The wound was managed by daily
flushing and antibiotic application;
it eventually healed and scarred
over.
The monkey was taken to a combat-support hospital on the outskirts of Kuwait City to be X-rayed.
The X-ray showed a mid-shaft
femur fracture that was healing
crookedly. It also showed metal
fragments, confirming our fears
that he had been shot. He would
need surgery, but that was quite
out of reach of the resources we had
at the zoo.
One of the zoos bears could not
use his right rear leg. We thought
he might have broken something or
might have been shot also. He
seemed in good health but would
usually just sit in a corner of the
cage, and when he did move, he just
dragged the leg. Walsh made contact with the Riyadh Zoo and was
trying to get treatment for the bear
and the monkey when we left.
The real need for medicine and
hard work was out in the city.
There, many families were keeping
their animals in the small courtyards of their houses. One family
had about 70 animals tucked
away a regular Old MacDonalds
farm. Throughout the city, animals
were suffering from lice and infections. Many were thin and weak
from lack of food.
We found a one-ton Holstein bull
in a swimming pool it had been
trying to get a drink and fell in.
Local residents said the bull had
been in the pool for seven weeks.
They were feeding and watering
him and had drained the pool two
weeks before, but five weeks in
water had made his feet soft and
sore, and they couldnt get him out.
SSgt. Steve Rhine, an SF medic
from Co. B, 1/3rd SF Group, and I
Capt. Bob Vogelsang is the veterinary officer for the 3rd Special
Forces Group.
Food Distribution
During Operation
Provide Comfort
by Capt. David S. Elmo
Civilian
laborers unload
sacks of flour
at the food
warehouse in
Sirsenk, Iraq,
during Operation Provide
Comfort.
Special Warfare
A Turkish relief worker for CARE pauses in the midst of Isikveren, a camp
in Turkey where 160,000 Kurds camped after their flight from Iraq.
with 65 grams of protein and 47
grams of fat. Supplemental menu
items included high-protein biscuits, canned meats, canned peas,
canned vegetables, tea, salt, baby
food and milk.
Initially, food was delivered by
truck convoy from Silopi, Turkey,
where the coalition forces had
established a humanitarian-service
support base (a logistics hub and
warehouse). But problems encountered at the Turkish/Iraqi border
slowed deliveries of food. Convoy
operations became more streamlined once food warehouses and
supply stores were positioned in
Iraq at the newly secured city of
Zahko and at the Sirsenk Airfield
(50 km east of Zakho).
In the early days of resupply,
coalition military trucks were used
to rush food deliveries and other
March 1992
Focusing
on the
Future:
The role of SOF
in emerging
defense strategy
10
Special Warfare
Changing world
Without question, the world political picture is becoming more complex. Despite the already visible
benefits of diminished East-West
tensions, the world that we confront
today is even more complicated
than it was only a few years ago.
Increased U.S.-Soviet cooperation
has significantly reduced the risk of
nuclear war. But the end of the
Cold War has not resulted in the
end of all conflict. There will still be
numerous conflicts that either
directly or indirectly threaten U.S.
interests. As Iraqs bold invasion of
Kuwait confirmed, the threats emanating from the Third World
where special-operations forces
most often operate have not disappeared. And I would even argue
that they are likely to increase.
The demise of the Soviet Union
has changed our strategic focus
March 1992
Peacetime engagement
It was August 1990, in a major
foreign-policy address in Aspen,
Colo., when President Bush first
articulated this new four-pronged
12
be a democratic superpower. It
doesnt mean instant solutions to
all of our problems. It doesnt mean
playing the role of the worlds
policeman. It does mean being in a
position to act on our principles and
our interests without being
hostage to the arsenals of a hostile
power. Special-operations forces
are one key instrument of national
policy that provide us with that
capability.
If recent trends are any indication of the future, the number and
kinds of missions assigned to special-operations forces will continue
In a volatile and
turbulent world,
where rapid change
is the only reliable
norm, well-trained
and equipped special-operations forces
will undoubtedly be
called upon to face
the tough, delicate
and unexpected challenges that other
components of the
Department of
Defense are not
equipped to meet.
to expand. In a volatile and turbulent world, where rapid change is
the only reliable norm, well-trained
and equipped special-operations
forces will undoubtedly be called
upon to face the tough, delicate and
unexpected challenges that other
components of the Department of
Defense are not equipped to meet.
Their flexibility, size, ease of
deployment and peacetime experience around the globe make them
ideally suited for limited contingencies, nation-assistance missions, or
service as valuable adjuncts in larger conventional actions. Given the
fiscal cutbacks and drawdowns
13
USACAPOC:
WO
PD
P
Y S
WO
N
DE E D A
One Step
Closer to the
Total Army
History
USACAPOC is an indirect result
of the Defense Authorization Act of
14
wartime missions upon mobilization. Unlike ARCOM units, however, USACAPOCs chain of command
does not include any continental
army command or FORSCOM. The
unique chain of command reflects
the unique mission of USACAPOC:
special operations which emphasize
peacetime missions in low-intensityconflict environments and support
to the conventional commander.
The peacetime missions of RC
SOF present special challenges for
USACAPOC, since RC forces have
traditionally been oriented to wartime contingency missions which
require mobilization before RC
units become operational. In both
Grenada and Panama, CA reservists volunteered individually, but
USAR units were not activated
since there was no mobilization.
Operation Desert Shield/ Storm
presented a different challenge.
Elements
USACAPOC active forces are the
4th Psychological Operations Group
and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion. Its Army Reserve units are the
351st Civil Affairs Command,
Mountain View, Calif.; 352nd Civil
Affairs Command, Riverdale, Md.;
353rd Civil Affairs Command,
Bronx, N.Y.; 360th CA Brigade,
Columbia, S.C.; 361st CA Brigade,
Pensacola, Fla.; 308th CA Group,
Homewood, Ill.; 321st CA Group,
San Antonio, Texas; 2nd PSYOP
Group, Cleveland, Ohio; 5th PSYOP
Group, Washington, D.C.; and the
7th PSYOP Group, Presidio of San
Francisco, Calif.
Because USACAPOC is primarily
a reserve-component command, it is
similar to other ARCOMs which are
also authorized a major general
commander. As with ARCOM units,
USACAPOC units have contingency
Just Cause
Although planning for Operation
Just Cause had called for participation of reserve-component Civil Affairs units, those plans had assumed that reserve forces would be
mobilized. The decision by the National Command Authority not to
mobilize reserve forces left only the
one active-duty CA unit, the 96th
2nd Psychological
Operations Group
5th POG
353rd CA Cmd
Command
March 1992
352nd CA Cmd
7th POG
4th Psychological
Operations Group
Desert Shield/Storm
The Persian Gulf crisis tested the
militarys ability to move more than
15
CAPOC, shouldered the responsibility to validate each unit and determine its readiness to deploy.
Validation included standard
medical, dental and administrative
checks common to a preparation of
replacements for overseas movement, but soldiers also had to meet
SOF standards on the PT test, the
rucksack march, orienteering and
weapons qualification. Soldiers
were also interviewed to ensure
their MOS technical proficiency.
Only after they met both FORSCOM and SOF requirements were
soldiers deployed. Those who did
not meet the requirements or who
had medical profiles stayed in a
holding company until they were fit
to deploy.
As units arrived at Fort Bragg,
the 351st-USACAPOC team identified their requirements and scheduled them for training, medical
Future operations
USACAPOC missions have a
unique feature which is well-suited
to its citizen-soldiers. It is the
requirement that they work closely
with indigenous civilians in the
area of operations, as well as with
civilian representatives of U.S.
Civil Affairs
soldiers from
USACAPOC
load onto a
C-141 at Pope
AFB, N.C. prior
to their long trip
to the Middle
East for Operation Desert
Storm.
Special Warfare
agencies, usually under the direction of the U.S. ambassadors country team. Military activities in LIC
focus on public support for politicomilitary objectives, and CA and
PSYOP personnel have vital roles
in mobilizing public support.
Civil-military relationships and
public support for politico-military
objectives are essential in at least
five of the 10 special-operations
activities of USSOCOM: CA,
PSYOP, humanitarian assistance,
foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare.
In the hostile and politically ambiguous environment of LIC, the
soldiers of USACAPOC should be
able to interrelate with U.S. and
indigenous civilians with the finesse
of diplomats. As civilians with
unique military skills needed in
LIC, USAR personnel can bridge
the gap between diplomacy and military operations, an essential task
in peacetime military operations.
In addition to civil-military relations, mission success in LIC
depends upon an integrated effort
of active and reserve forces of all
services. While USSOCOM is a unified command and is responsible for
the readiness of all SOF, its forces
will become operational in peacetime or wartime under the command and control of geographical
theater commands. The United
States Southern Command is one
such unified command that has
relied heavily on SOF in its theater
of operations.
Because many SOF missions are
peacetime-oriented and
mobilization during peacetime is
not necessary for mission accomplishment, individual-volunteer
theater augmentation will continue
to be executed unless some change
in the law requires effective integration of USACAPOC units into
theater-Army peacetime operations.
Operations Just Cause and
Desert Shield/Storm have demonstrated that USACAPOC is an
operational command that complements USASFC and the Navy and
Air Force special-operations comMarch 1992
The 200K
Call-up:
Just Cause vs. Desert Shield
by Col. Frederick C. Oelrich, USAR
GMR
Desert Shield served as a crucial
test of GMR, a concept that originated late in the Carter administration. Most operations plans then
in being were aimed at a large conventional war in Europe and were
inappropriate for smaller contingencies. Certain individual and
bite-sized mobilization actions
could be used as responses and
become a deterrent, whereas the
large mobilization actions/events
(e.g., declaration of a national
emergency) envisioned for Europe
would be too much and too escalatoSpecial Warfare
Just Cause
During the Just Cause operation in Panama, Air Reserve components were used routinely from the
onset, by the Defense Intelligence
Agency and the North American
Air Defense Command as well as
the Air Force, while the Army
Reserve and Marine Corps Reserve
components were not. (The Army
also quietly provided Southern
Command with about half of the
Reserve individual mobilization
augmentees that would augment
SOUTHCOM in wartime.)
Only some Army National Guard
military police units which happened to be in Panama for annual
training and Army Reserve Civil
Affairs volunteers who came later
were allowed to participate. Army
reserve-component full-time-manning personnel were not permitted
to volunteer.
In planning for the operation, the
staff of the U.S. Army Southern
Command recognized early the
need for Army Reserve CA units to
assist with the re-establishment of
the civilian government and nation
rebuilding. But when the Just
Cause troop list was received at
SOUTHCOM just before the operation, it showed no CA units. On
Dec. 19, the day before military
operations began, SOUTHCOM
sent an immediate message to the
JCS with an urgent request for a
small call-up of five USAR CA
units. Initial staffing action was
begun and the Army went so far as
Desert Shield
Sgt. Maj. Ramon Gonzalez of the 353rd CA Command talks with a resident
of a displaced civilian camp during Operation Just Cause.
20
An EC-130 from the 193rd Air National Guard, Harrisburg, Pa., practices
electronic-warfare operations during Operation Desert Storm.
units would be needed; and what
units, by type, would be needed in
the event the crisis broadened.
Flags (unit identification) were
determined by using first the units
that had been identified in CENTCOMs plans and were of sufficient
readiness. Then other units were
selected on the basis of previously
planned missions, active/reserve
command structure, linkages and
unit readiness.
Although the following remarks
are biased toward the reserves, that
is not to infer the deployments did
not go well, or that deployed units
did not do well. Quite the opposite
is true; the mobilization process
went well and GMR worked.
The services adopted the Total
Force policy (e.g., integration of
the reserve components as an integral part of the services war plans)
at the end of the Vietnam era, but
the Air Force seems to be the only
component to have really integrated regular use of reservists. Use of
Air Force Reserve airlift aircraft
and crews has become so routine as
to be transparent to the user
whether the mission is active or
reserve.
During Desert Shield, beginning
Civil Affairs soldiers from the Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command load onto a C-141 for deployment during Desert Storm.
We should come away from this
contingency much better equipped
to implement a deterrent strategy,
to use deterrent-force packages and
deployment modules and to conduct
contingency operations if the deterrence fails.
Use of Reserves
There are many arguments pro
and con regarding use of the
reserves. Many of the political leadership have an outmoded stereotype of the reserve components. The
reserves of today are all volunteers.
None are serving to evade the draft.
Those opposing the use of reserves
cite as their reasons: poor readiness, lack of political courage to
enact a call-up, possible strategic
security breaches, and escalatory
signals from mobilization.
Some also strongly believe war
should be left only to professionals.
Others on the same side of this coin
believe that because career military
folks are paid fighters, their lives
Service differences
During Just Cause the use of
the Air Force reserve components
went well because to them it was
routine. The use of the Army
reserve components did not go as
well.
The reason is twofold: first there
is confusion concerning the use of
reserves, and second, the makeup
of the units in the Air Force and
Navy reserve components is basically different from that of the
Army and Marine Corps reserve
components. Because of this difference, the services plan and react
differently.
Air Force Reserve and Naval
Reserve personnel are significantly
older, and the units have more officers and a higher enlisted rank
structure. They are more equipment-intensive, are manned by
prior-service persons and can field
teams or crews to operate their
equipment. They typically are
employed from their home base or
port.
For example, an aviation unit can
generate a crew or crews to operate
a portion of their equipment on a
regular basis. Many, including the
technicians, have military leave
from their employment as well as
vacations that permit double pay
for up to six weeks a year while on
active duty. This permits many of
these units and individuals to be
employed.
In contrast, Army Reserve and
Marine Corps Reserve units are
labor-intensive, requiring numerous low-ranking individuals who
must accomplish interdependent or
interrelated tasks in a coordinated
way to do the mission. These units
typically deploy to the place of
March 1992
Use of volunteers
In todays environment some
reservists can volunteer twice, first
to be in a unit, then to accomplish
routine military missions. The
reserve aircrews that fly operational missions in peacetime are
volunteers, and this works very
well, because only the part of the
unit that is used gets paid.
The support structure for the personnel comes from the local community, supported by the local economy, rather than an active base
funded from the defense budget.
This also works well because they
do it routinely.
When there are enough reserve
volunteers with the right skills
available for a long-enough time,
24
Special Warfare
Ensuring
Readiness for
Active and ReserveComponent
SF Units
Qualification
In the past, training courses were
different for active and reservecomponent SF: The RC SF Qualification Course was a six-phase program (at that time, the active program was three-phases) which combined resident training during
annual training periods with training by correspondence course. Qualification of RC soldiers took an
average of six years.
The RC Special Forces Qualification Course has been phased out.
All new Special Forces soldiers go
through the same Special Forces
Qualification Course (now two
phases). An individual recruited off
the street for an RC SF group goes
to basic training, advanced individual training, airborne school and
the Primary Leadership Development Course before he comes to
Fort Bragg for pretraining and Special Forces Assessment and Selection. (See SF Pretraining, pp. 3031. Ed.) If he is selected in SFAS,
he then attends the SFQC. Since
the Q-Course now contains the SF
Basic NCO Course as well, when
(C)
1st Special
Forces Group
11th Special
Forces Group
3rd SFG
12th SFG
19th Special
Forces Group
112th Signal
Battalion
528th Support
Battalion
20th SFG
5th SFG
7th SFG
10th SFG
(C)
Command
Coordination
25
26
Desert Storm
On Jan. 23, 1991, the 20th SFGA
was activated in support of Operation Desert Storm the first time
that an RC SF group had been
called to active duty. A number of
other RC Special Forces soldiers
eagerly volunteered to serve during
the operation. Twenty-six SF
medics from the USAR were called
to active duty and served with distinction in the Kuwaiti theater of
operations as members of the 5th
SF Group. Following Desert Storm,
about 40 members of the 20th
Group, mostly engineers, linguists
and medics, went to Turkey for
Operation Provide Comfort, the
Kurdish relief effort. Fourteen of
the USAR SF medics also served in
Operation Provide Comfort with
the 10th SF Group, following their
March 1992
27
Federalization:
20th SF Group
becomes first RC SF
unit to be activated
by Sgt. Scott D. Hallford
ma, Mississippi, Florida and Maryland, began packing for mobilization and movement to Fort Bragg
on Feb. 23.
Despite the massive nature of the
move, We moved all of our people
and 250 pallets of equipment without incident and got here on time,
Michelini said. The move left nothing in the 20ths armories. They
were stripped of everything because
we expected to be on active duty for
a year. One of the things that
helped us was that weve done a
whole lot of overseas deployments,
so packing everything up and moving is not a strange thing to us.
After being here (Fort Bragg) for
only three days we were set up and
operational, said Michelini. But it
looked like wed been here for
months. One of the reasons the mobilization was so successful is because of the help we received from
Special Forces Command. When we
came on line we were treated like
any other SF Group.
Another thing for the 20th to be
proud of is its performance during
mobilization process, Michelini
said. Generally, an activated
reserve-component unit loses 8-10
percent of its personnel during in-
of these citizen-soldiers.
There was tremendous crossfertilization of ideas, according to
Maj. Steve Causey, 2/7th operations
officer. Being the Armys newest
branch (SF) and not having specific
doctrine, there are challenges.
Theres no manual that says do it
this way. A lot of these guys in 20th
have a lot of good experience. Suddenly, you see lots of good ways to
do things. Training with 20th
Group has been a very enlightening
experience.
Most of 20th Group left Fort
Bragg May 17 and demobilized
from federal duty May 23. But before leaving Fort Bragg, the group
held a demobilization ceremony at
Pike Field, including a pass-inreview by an entire Special Forces
group, a rarity because of the very
nature of their mission: they may
be broken up in deployments all
over the world at any given time.
But while most members of the
unit looked forward to demobilization, some of the Guardsmen decided to become full-time soldiers.
Guthrie said he fully expected to
lose some people to the active side
of the house. We have some very
sharp men in our unit and Im sure
29
SPECIAL
FORCES
PRETRAINING
by Lt. Col. George Rollins
In 1989, the Special Warfare Center and School and the Army
National Guard began a new training program that has doubled the
success rate of reserve-component
soldiers in Special Forces Assessment and Selection.
The two-week Special Forces pretraining program allows students to
review basic land-navigation skills,
learn rucksack marching and swimming techniques, teach classes,
practice rope climbing and develop
a proper attitude for Special Forces
through extensive contact with Special Forces cadre role models.
Pretraining also briefly defines
the role of Special Forces and
reviews basic soldier skills such as
operations orders and first aid.
Since physical conditioning is key
to successful Special Forces training, pretraining attempts to
improve the soldiers fitness level
by demonstrating proper techniques. It is not designed to get a
soldier into physical condition: this
has to be done by the soldier several weeks prior to pretraining.
From a cursory observation, the
concept of pretraining is very simple. In actuality, the establishment
of a viable program required
30
March 1992
these 53 were selected 75 percent. This high success rate continued through fiscal year 1990. For
the first year, pretraining soldiers
had a 72-percent selection rate in
SFAS.
For its first two years, most of SF
Pretrainings students came from
the reserve components. Desert
Shield/Storm changed that. During
that period, most active-duty candidates for Special Forces training
were deployed to the Middle East.
To fill the resulting void in Special
Forces training, the Army began
recruiting personnel who had
recently left the military through
the 18X prior-service program.
Since most of them needed refresher training, all 18X personnel began
attending SF Pretraining.
Near the end of Desert Storm,
the 20th SF Group activated, and
about 250 of its soldiers went to
pretraining as well. In all, during
Desert Shield/Storm, pretraining
prepared more than 600 active and
National Guard personnel to attend
Special Forces Assessment and
Selection.
Pretraining, in combination with
the Primary Leadership Development Course, has greatly improved
reserve-component success in Special Forces training. To allow successive attendance, the schedules of
31
The
LORDS
of DARKNESS
Oklahomas 1/245th Aviation Battalion
by SSgt. Gregg Bond
Year-round training
By 1981, year-round annualtraining periods for the 1-245th had
become commonplace. Teams of aircraft, crews and support personnel
flew to various locations across the
U.S. to support SOF training and
operations. Often several teams
deployed to different locations at
the same time, testing the
battalions ability to maintain control and effective logistical and
administrative support of its assets.
Night-vision-goggle training was
top priority. Long-range deployments during darkness were made
on a continuing basis to remote
airstrips and confined landing
zones. For more distant operations,
battalion aircraft were ferried,
along with other Army and Air
Force special-operations units, in
Air Force C-130 transports. Train-
Night-vision flights
The battalions pilots frequently
fly after dark, wearing night-vision
goggles, in order to deliver or
retrieve special-operations cargo.
Their missions and training require
flying in all conditions, enduring
temperature extremes, high winds
and reduced visibility. Their specialty is flying nap-of-the-earth missions in virtually all types of ter-
The Army
Aviation
Support
Facility near
Tulsa features
a two-story
armory, an
aircraft hangar
and a flightoperations
center.
Two facilities
Two crews from the 1/245th sharpen their night-flying skills under the
light of a full moon.
March 1992
An MH-60
Blackhawk
from the
1/245th
slingloads
a steel tower
during training
at Fort Chaffee,
Ark., in 1988.
Drug interdiction
In tune with the times, the
1-245th is trained, equipped and
experienced to meet the growing
demands of the nations war on
drugs.
Several pilots and crews have
already flown special missions in
support of drug-interdiction operations in Oklahoma and the desert
Southwest. In these missions, the
battalions ability to work closely
with civilian law-enforcement, federal agencies and joint military
forces has been successfully tried
and tested.
Photo courtesy 1/245th Aviation
Personnel profile
The average Lord of Darkness
is 28 years old. A large percentage
of the veteran NCOs and officers
Exercise support
The long list of SOF units with
which the 1-245th has trained is an
indication of its stature and experience level. The battalion has
deployed, trained or served with
active- and reserve-component
Army special-operations forces on
such exercises and operations as
Casino Gambit 86 in Puerto Rico;
Cabanas 86 in Honduras; Label
Vista II and III at Fort Huachuca,
Ariz.; Erawan 87 in Thailand; Lempira 87-4 and 88 in Honduras;
Operation Balikatan in the Philippines; maintenance training
throughout the U.S. and at
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii; Operation Jaguar Bite at Fort Campbell,
Ky., and Operation Larkspur Bounty 89 at Camp Williams, Utah.
Nearly 100 members of the
1/245th supported the 19th SF
Group in June 1990 during Golden
Star, a 17-day exercise in Alaska
involving close to 1,100 National
Guard members from several
states. Flying Alaskas UH-1 Hueys
during the exercise, the Oklahoma
aviators inserted Special Forces
teams into various areas when
those teams couldnt parachute in.
Helicopters were equipped with
special landing skids to keep them
from sinking into marshy areas
when they landed troops.
The true measure of the 1/245th
still rests with the future. If Oklahomas proud past and its heritage
are typical of what to expect down
the road, then the men of the 1st
Battalion, 245th Aviation, The
Lords of Darkness, will continue to
be rated highly among those units
and special-operations forces whose
purpose in life is stated on the
1-245ths regimental crest: Not for
ourselves alone.
35
The
Reserve
Component
Special Forces
Soldier
An Asset with
Special Capabilities
by Capt. Michael A. OBrien
With the future of warfare directed more and more toward lowintensity conflict, the need for Special Forces personnel will continue
to grow, and with half the SF force
in the reserve components, it is not
inconceivable that future SF operations might contain a mixture of AC
and RC soldiers.
The active-component Special
Forces commander who finds himself in charge of RC SF soldiers
may be uncertain what their capabilities are and how best to employ
them. He may have had little or no
exposure to Army Reserve and
National Guard SF personnel. He
may wonder whether he has been
saddled with a mob of overweight,
overage and under-trained weekend warriors or instead been
blessed with an operational detachment possessing abilities and skills
not found in his own unit.
The RC SF soldier must meet the
same standards and complete the
same training as an active-component SF soldier; however, the RC
soldier is somewhat different in
nature.1 An SF leader, when commanding RC personnel, must learn
36
Positive aspects
Many RC SF soldiers, as a result
of their civilian occupations, possess skills not found in active-component SF detachments. All detachment operations sergeants have
completed the Operations and
Intelligence Course, but how many
are also master electricians? How
many detachment commanders
hold multi-engine and instrument
ratings as pilots? How often will the
detachment medic be a registered
nurse who works at the hospital
emergency room and is also a professional artist?
By surveying the RC SF soldiers
under his control, the SF commander may find that he has doctors,
lawyers, firemen, police officers,
computer engineers, railroad workers, telephone-company technicians
and their combined knowledge
available for his use.
The skills of the soldiers cited
above are all applicable to the different SF missions. During a recent
Army Training and Evaluation Program exercise, the engineer sergeant for a National Guard operational detachment cited in his portion of the briefback highly technical target data and displayed a familiarity with civilian communications equipment to which SF engineers are not normally exposed.
The senior AC evaluator questioned the sergeants description of
the interior of a building in which
the sergeant had never been and
his ability to identify pieces of
equipment that would have to be
damaged or destroyed in order to
disable a communications relay
site.
The evaluator learned that two
detachment members were employed by a telephone company as
technicians and that a third soldier,
normally employed as a computersystems engineer, knew how to
disrupt the relay sites control
equipment.
An NCO who works with complex
equipment on a daily basis doesnt
require additional training in order
to render it inoperable. A soldier
who is a general contractor in his
civilian occupation can plan and
build a complex structure, while an
active-component engineer would
likely require some form of assistance. These extra skills enable
the SF commander to accept, plan
and complete missions without
requests for additional training or
extra personnel.
A particular strength of RC SF
lies in the extended periods of time
that individual soldiers serve together on a detachment or at least
within the same company. It is not
unusual to find detachments in
which soldiers have been together
for 4-5 years. Although all military
units experience some turnover
each year, the number of soldiers
lost to extended schools, post commitments, promotions and discharges is much lower in RC SF
units. This durability results in RC
detachments with long-term working relationships and greater mission proficiency.
Special Warfare
Negative aspects
Although the characteristics of
RC units as described above present many advantages to the commander, that commander must also
be aware of the negative aspects
inherent in RC SF units. These
must be recognized and planned
for; however, they do not present
long-term problems.
The SF commander will find that
RC SF soldiers are in good physical
condition. Most personnel in a typical RC SF company engage in a
physical-fitness program on their
own, as they recognize that conditioning cannot be maintained by
training only during drill periods.
Instead, physical training during a
unit assembly (drill weekend)
serves as a tool for monitoring the
fitness of company personnel. A soldier who cannot handle weekend
activities is counseled and retested
the following month.
Although the RC SF soldier is
serious about his physical condition, any off-duty physical-conditioning program must be juggled
with civilian employment. While
38
Capt. Michael A. OBrien is currently an SF detachment commander in B Co., 3rd Battalion, 20th
SF Group. He has also served as a
detachment executive officer and as
a weapons NCO in the 3/20th
Group and spent six years on active
duty with the U.S. Marine Corps.
In his civilian occupation, Captain
OBrien is chief of the economic
crimes unit in the Office of the
Florida State Attorney in Orlando,
Fla. He is a graduate of the
Infantry Officer Advanced Course
and holds BA and JD degrees from
Florida State University.
Notes:
1 Although an understanding of the RC
SF soldier would appear to be important in
these days of the Total Force policy, the
author is aware of only one commentary on
this area. See Hans Halberstadt, Green
Berets: Unconventional Warriors (Novato,
Cal.: Presidio Press, 1988), pp. 27-30.
Special Warfare
FID
in the
90 s
by Terry Doherty
Changing role
The U.S. role in FID will range
from the less-likely unilateral support for a friendly government to a
much more likely multinational
coalition to assist a nation in taking
its place in an emerging world
order considerably more diverse
and actually more challenging than
the bipolar world we have known.
While superpower confrontation
appears unlikely, subversion, insurrection, rebellion, insurgency and
revolution are sure to occur in
many areas of the world. For a wide
variety of reasons, established governments will continue to be threatened by forces striving to overthrow
and replace them.
Some reasons for rebellion are
just; others are not. Human-rights
abuses, lack of social mobility,
unjust economic conditions, ethnic
or religious discrimination, and
governmental unresponsiveness or
Requirements
The FID mission requires a highly skilled military force one with
significantly more skills than those
39
SOF responsibility
Because of the unique characteristics of special-operations forces
which make them especially appropriate for FID, USSOCOM must
play a prominent role in FID planning and operations. Not only do
SOF have a specifically assigned
FID responsibility, but their language skills, area orientation and
capability for independent action
make them ideally suited for the
FID mission. USSOCOM therefore
can be expected to provide the
regional commanders-in-chief with
the expertise they need to accomplish their varied FID missions.
Moreover, as there will be considerably fewer U.S. personnel deployed
overseas than before, the CINCs
will be required to look to USSOCOM for the specialized skills and
talent essential for successful FID
operations.
The FID mission will not call for
a large number of people, but only
those people with the appropriate
skills are likely to be successful.
Although FID will involve forces
other than SOF, the unique
characteristics of USSOCOM make
it most capable of assuming the
overall responsibility for preparing
and providing the force to accomplish the FID mission. USSOCOM
therefore must ensure that military
personnel assigned FID responsibilities are prepared to operate on
both a unilateral and a multinational basis. Moreover, USSOCOM,
in coordination with the theater
CINCs, must develop an effective
analytical capability both to identify potential FID environments and
to assess existing FID operations.
March 1992
41
The
Crusade of
A Green Beret
institutions more colorful characters, affectionately known throughout the Corps of Cadets as Ranger
Major Parmly. Although sworn to
secrecy concerning a years mission
with the CIA in Laos, he was a visible and outspoken proponent of the
Special Forces.
At that time, the status of Special
Forces had been enhanced by President John F. Kennedy, who came to
West Point to address the graduating class of 1962. In that speech
Kennedy described a new kind of
war differing from the nuclear
strategy so prominent in the late
1950s. He talked of war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression. He
made a plea for the Special Forces,
and sitting in the field house,
Parmly was elated. He was in his
element, where young leaders for
war would be schooled. He was, as
he thought, in the right place at the
right time. Little did he suspect
that of that 600-man graduating
Special Warfare
Twin loyalties
The account of Lee Parmlys own
service in Southeast Asia is both a
character study and a lesson in history and tactics. Lee Parmly was a
Special Forces soldier whose background and combat experience had
developed warrior tendencies; he
was also a deeply religious man
with respect for human dignity and
misgivings about the American
presence in Southeast Asia. These
twin loyalties haunted him during
his time in Southeast Asia and
afterward.
It is rare for a soldier in combat
to find time, or to possess the talent
and energy, to record what goes on
around him. It is fortunate that Lee
Parmlys exploits have come to
light, supported by three accounts
that he prepared without the slightest thought that people might come
upon them after his death. One is a
tape prepared in 1977 at the
request of a sixth-grade class in
American history in Morehead, Ky.,
of which his niece, Carolyn West,
was a member. The students sent
their request for the tape along
with eight questions for the colonel
to answer.
A second source is a letter to his
wife dated Nov. 12, 1966, written
just after his return from the Plei
Trap Valley operation during the
Vietnam War. Finally, we can resort
to notations from his diaries to
show the sources of Lees faith and
the reasons for his being an officer.
In Lee Parmlys case, his diaries
said what he meant he wrote the
entries in ink, with scarcely a
strike-over. In them one can see the
agony and the judgment of a man
who loved life and adored the
Church and knew the meaning of
death.
In the tape he prepared for the
history class, Parmly summarized
his service in Southeast Asia:1
I served three tours in the Army
in Southeast Asia and Im able to
comment as a witness on three of
March 1992
the stages of our nations involvement in the efforts of the intervention by communists to spread control over Southeast Asia. My first
tour was from 1955 to 1958. I was
in Thailand with the Joint United
States Advisory Group. There I
observed and participated in the
combined efforts ... to confront the
communist-directed nationalistic
takeovers of the three protocol
nations of the former French colony
of Indochina Laos, Cambodia
and Vietnam. I traveled to Cambodia and Vietnam and also to Hong
Kong, to the Philippines and
Burma, and to India, those three
years that I was in Thailand. ...
My second tour in Southeast
Asia began two years later in 1960
and went for a little over a year, to
1961. I was on a secret mission to
Laos. I was used as an adviser on
anti-guerrilla warfare on the United States Military Advisory Team
in Laos.
Eventually I became the main
adviser for the commander of the
Laotian Army units which formed
a counter-revolutionary force ...
against the Neutralists of Kong Le
who overthrew the government in
August of 1960. The Pathet-Lao
Communists assisted Captain
Kong Le and his coup dtat in
fighting against the Royalists of
General Phoumi Nosavan, and
then eventually the Communist
Pathet-Lao absorbed Captain Kong
Les Neutralist party into the Communist party. ...
Laos
Lee Parmlys combat experience
in Laos deserves further explanation. When he arrived in Laos in
the summer of 1960 (for what he
calls a secret mission to Laos), all
Laotian operations were done with
advice and support of U.S. Special
Forces advisers who were incognito.
They were all civilians placed
on the retired list, paid by CIA and
not the U.S. Army, because the Geneva Agreement prohibited American military personnel in Laos. The
quasi-military organization set up
Vietnam
About this time President Kennedy approved use of Special Forces
as trainers and advisers to South
Vietnam. With three years in Thailand and service in Laos, Parmly
was prepared for important work
training and organizing the South
Vietnamese special forces which
eventually brought him back to
Southeast Asia. The tape describes
his next experience:
My third tour in Southeast Asia
was from August 1966 to August
1967, when I was in Vietnam as
commander of several United
States-forces units fighting against
the Vietnamese guerrillas as well
Special Warfare
West Point classmates Lt. Col. Bill Simpson, Lt. Col. Eugene Deatrick and
Lt. Col. Lee Parmly pose together following the Plei Trap battle.
as the regulars of the North Vietnamese Army. My tour in Vietnam
was limited to the northern twothirds, but I was all over that
major portion of the country.
My U.S. soldiers there were
about 400 of them advised
and led over 40 battalions of irregular soldiers, who were more capable than guerrillas but certainly
less capable than professional soldiers. ... We organized and
equipped them ourselves and we
used them to wage war on the
enemy from three dozen separate
and very, very isolated and fortified
camps. They were strategically
located in the country of South
Vietnam, either in the mountains
or the jungles that were controlled
by the enemy... We also placed the
camps along the border, provocatively located astride the main
routes of infiltration for the North
Vietnamese coming across the borders from Cambodia, from Laos
and from the DMZ in the north. We
also located some of our camps in
valleys and in places that were
main avenues of attack by the communists if they were to try to hit
any of the major cities in the northMarch 1992
Lee Parmly
talks with Brig.
Gen. Glenn
Walker on the
morning of Nov.
10, 1966, the
day of the Plei
Trap operation.
Parmlys black
pajama shirt
came from the
pack of a dead
NVA soldier.
46
Plei Trap
Lee Parmly may have had second
thoughts about volunteering for
that tour in Vietnam when he and
his small task force of Montagnard
strikers became heavily engaged
with superior North Vietnamese
regular forces during the Plei Trap
Valley operation in November 1966.
Parmly arrived in the highlands
in August, 1966 as commander of
Co. B, 5th Special Forces Group at
Pleiku, about the time that lead
elements of the 4th Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen.
Arthur S. Collins, were arriving
from Fort Lewis, Wash.
The 4th Division was still
unblooded when Operation Paul
Revere IV was being planned as the
first operation controlled by the
division in Vietnam.5 Radio intercepts indicated that several North
Vietnamese regiments had crossed
the border from Cambodia and
were in the mountains north of Plei
Djerang, north of Duc Co, but nearer Pleiku and farther from the border.6 Parmlys Montagnards would
support the Divisions 2nd Brigade.
As Shelby Stanton describes it,
Parmly was horrified at their (the
4th Divisions) first battle plan to
insert Task Force Prong (named for
Colonel Prong, the Vietnamese
commander of Kontum Special Military District) between two divisional battalions on an axis of
advance by phase lines. He immediately requested that the CIDG be
simply employed moving along the
Cambodian border, so he could conSpecial Warfare
48
Special Warfare
March 1992
51
Dumb war
Parmlys frankness caused S.L.A.
Marshall to describe him as one of
the Armys most outspoken officers.18 Consider the way in which
he handled rebellious students of
Johns Hopkins University while on
ROTC duty in the early 1970s.
With the war in Vietnam, draft-age
college students were rioting. In
uniform, Parmly would confront the
Students for a Democratic Society
as if they were West Point cadets at
the opposite end of the political
spectrum. He disarmed these angry
students by his enthusiasm and
sincerity. He describes one
encounter for the history class:
I once told a rioting bunch of college students that my personal and
private thoughts of the Vietnam
War were that it was a dumb war.
Those were the words I used: dumb
war. That remark was printed in
the Baltimore and Washington
newspapers and I got a call from
the Pentagon asking me to explain
why I made that derogatory
remark on the way I thought of the
war. I answered the Pentagon
spokesman, that if he picked any
war in history and picked either
side of that war, that I could prove
that as a means of solving the
problems of that country that it
was a dumb war to that side. He
said nothing, and I never heard
any more about the incident. War is
hell. War is also stupid and unnecessary. If we would only love ourselves and each other as God loves
us, there would be no more wars.
There wouldnt even be rumors of
war.
Record of service
His service to the church did not
go unrecognized. On Nov. 7,1966, in
a ceremony at II Corps Headquarters in Pleiku, Father Sampson
(later chief of chaplains), representing the Vatican, presented Parmly
with the highly respected Benemerenti Award that, for the Roman
Catholic faith, is comparable to the
Distinguished Service Cross.
Parmly was driven by Christian
compassion, yet he was every inch a
soldier, as his record of service
bears out. Love for his fellow man
was Lees guiding principle. He
never joined an organization or
supported a cause just to be numbered as a member. He anxiously
assumed leadership and took
responsibility.
Active in scouting as a youth,
Parmly contributed more than 30
years of leadership in the Boy
Scouts of America, serving as a
leader in 15 Scout, Explorer and
Order of the Arrow units. He held
the Vigil Honor of the Order of the
Special Warfare
5 History of the 4th Infantry Division, prepared by the 29th Military History Detachment, p. 3.
6 Charles M. Simpson III, Inside the
Green Berets The First Thirty Years: A History of the U.S. Army Special Forces (Novato,
Calif.: Presidio Press, 1983), p. 219.
7 Stanton, p. 126.
8 S.L.A. Marshall, West to Cambodia
(Nashville, Tenn.: The Battery Press, Inc.,
1984), p. 115.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Eleazar Parmly IV to wife Marie, 12
November 1966, from the Parmly family collection.
12 Col. Eugene P. Deatrick to Richard L.
Gruenther, 14 January 1990. A West Point
classmate of Parmlys, Deatrick took over
command of the 1st Air Commando Squadron (A-1Es) in February of 1966. The squadrons mission was to provide close air support primarily in II Corps, but it frequently
flew north of the DMZ and south into III
Corps. Deatrick and Parmly had initiated a
program whereby squadron officers were assigned for a week to each of Parmlys Special
Forces camps to prepare target folders and
to synchronize working relationships. This
obviously paid dividends in the Plei Trap.
13 The C Co. mentioned here is C Company, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry. A Co. is
A Company, 1st Battalion, 14th Infantry.
14 Brig. Gen. David A. Bramlett, interview
with Col. Richard L. Gruenther, 21 August
1990.
15 Simpson, p. 219.
16 Ibid., pp. 228-229.
17 Plebe Spring Mini-Conference at Round
Pond, USMA, 24 March 1973.
18 Marshall, p. 102.
Notes:
1 Eleazar Parmly IV to Carolyn West and
6th grade history class 1977, tape from
the Parmly family collection.
2 Time, 17 March 1961.
3 Shelby Stanton, Green Berets at War
(Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985),
pp. 19-21.
4 Ibid., p. 22.
55
REVIEW ESSAY
Understanding Terrorism Since
the 60s An Evaluation of Academic
and Operational Perspectives:
What have we learned and
where are we going?
by Stephen Sloan
The Terrorist
Maxwell Taylor in The Terrorist
takes a psychological perspective
in the study of terrorism. More
specifically, the author employs an
Final Warning
March 1992
Brokaw and Bernard Shaw illuminate the constant problems associated with attempting to reconcile
the need for ethical behavior with
the pressures involved in getting
the story.
In the final section, after providing readers with parts of the transcript of a command-post exercise
for dealing with a terrorist incident,
the authors make a solid case for
the use of simulations to train crisis
managers and policy makers in
dealing with present and future
threats.
Final Warning can help to sensitize both the public and policy makers to a danger to the civil order
that will not only continue but be
59
Spring
1989
Special Warfare
SF officers to participate
in Army Acquisition Corps
60
Special Warfare
Listed below are statistics which show how Special Forces warrant officers
fared on the FY 91 CWO 3 promotion board compared to the Army as a
whole:
Above zone
Primary zone
Below zone
cons sel
%
cons sel
%
cons sel %
SF
12
5
41.6
55
38
69.0
9
1 11.1
Army
21.3
66.1
5.3
Promotion opportunities to CWO 3 remain excellent, and to CWO 4 even
better, according to CWO 3 Bobby Shireman of the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. Shireman reminds warrant officers who will be
eligible in FY 92 of the importance of updating their officer record briefs.
The SF Branch reminds officers that the two principal factors influencing
officer assignments are Army requirements and the Officer Distribution
Plan. ODP is the way that the Army matches assignments of the officer
population against TOE and TDA authorizations. It determines how many
officers by grade and specialty can be assigned to a given major command
or installation. When an assignments officer says he cant assign a soldier
to a particular post because it is over ODP, it means the post is projected
to be balanced or over in that officers grade and specialty. Other general
assignment considerations include:
Grade, career field, education and experience
Professional-development needs of the officer
Availability
Policy considerations PCS costs, stabilization and tour equity
Officers potential for advancement
Officers personal preferences or family considerations
Date of projected command designated position list; location of command
These factors result in the following officer-assignment priorities:
Captains New SF captains go immediately to detachment command for
basic branch qualification; following ODA command, captains can expect 18away-from-troops or functional-area assignments; some officers may attend
advanced civil schooling to support functional-area development.
Majors (and promotable captains) Resident command-and-staff college
selectees go to those schools as soon as possible; maximum resident CSC
graduates go to troops for branch qualification; many go to joint- duty
assignments for early designation as joint-specialty officers or to functional-area assignments; some senior majors are positioned with troops before
consideration for lieutenant-colonel battalion command.
Lieutenant colonels Some command SF battalions; many will serve in
joint-duty assignments or functional-area assignments.
March 1992
61
The fiscal-year 1991 Special Forces Accession Board for year-group 1988
officers met Sept. 23-25 to select officer volunteers to begin Special Forces
training. Acceptance of further applicants will be limited to those needed
to round out the year-groups goal. No further applications for rebranching
from YG 84 have been accepted since March 1991, and YG 85 closed Sept.
1, 1991, according to Maj. Jean-Luc Nash of the SWCS Special Operations
Proponency Office. Nash encourages applicants for rebranching to submit
their applications in their third or fourth year of service. The accession
board occurs in their fourth year of service. Officers will be considered for
major in their ninth year, and there is a limited time for Special Forces
Assessment and Selection, the Special Forces Qualification Course, language training, officer advanced course, 12-18 months service as an SF
detachment commander, CAS3, and functional-area training, Nash said.
The following list may help officers who need to contact PERSCOM about
promotions, assignments or professional development:
SF Officer Branch
Col. Kavin L. Coughenour
Branch Chief
DSN 221-3173
comm. (703) 325-3173
DSN 221-3169
comm. (703) 325-3169
DSN 221-3175
comm. (703) 325-3175
DSN 221-3178
comm. (703) 325-3178
DSN 221-3115
comm. (703) 325-3115
Warrant Officers
CWO 4 John McGuire
WO Assignments Manager
DSN 221-7841
comm. (703) 325-7841
62
Special Warfare
Spring
1989
Soldiers in Career Management Field 18 will now receive up to 60 promotion points for completion of the Special Forces Qualification Course/SF
Basic NCO Course. (SF BNCOC is taught as part of the SFQC.) The additional points can be used to compete for promotion beginning April 1,
1992; there will be no retroactive promotions based on the new policy,
according to Sgt. Maj. Bill Frisbie of the SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office. Local personnel service centers will add points according to a
formula in PERSCOM message 121500Z Dec 91 and notify soldiers of
their new scores. For further information contact Sgt. Maj. Bill Frisbie at
DSN 239-9002/2415, commercial (919) 432-9002/2415.
PERSCOM, ARPERCEN
offices can answer
soldiers questions
The Special Forces Advanced NCO Course is scheduled to run three classes in 1992: Class 01-92 Jan. 6-April 2; Class 02-92 May 4-July 28;
and Class 03-92 Sept. 8-Dec. 4. Soldiers should plan to report one day
prior to the class start date. The 12-week course is divided into three
phases: common leadership training, SF MOS-specific skills and SF common skills. Soldiers may attend either TDY or TDY in conjunction with a
PCS move. To be eligible, soldiers must have a secret security clearance
and have graduated from the Basic NCO Course. For more information,
contact the SF Enlisted Management Directorate at PERSCOM, DSN
221-5497, commercial (202) 325-5497, or the Enlisted Training Branch,
Directorate of Training and Doctrine, USAJFKSWCS, DSN 239-5000,
commercial (919) 432-5000.
The SWCS NCO Academy is scheduled to run the Psychological Operations Basic Noncommissioned Officers Course March 23-April 29, 1992.
Students should report one day prior to the starting date for inprocessing.
PSYOP BNCOC is five weeks, three days long and is conducted once per
year. It emphasizes PSYOP-related subjects, intelligence functions and
common-core leadership tasks. The Army Personnel Command nominates
the best-qualified soldiers to attend training, and unit commanders have
the option to approve, substitute for, or defer a candidate. For further
information contact MSgt. Phil Snyder, SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-6406, commercial (919) 432-6406.
March 1992
63
Spring
1989
Foreign SOF
Special Warfare
64
For three decades, spokesmen for the now-former Soviet Union reserved
some of their harshest condemnations of Western military establishments
for U.S. Army special-operations forces. Recently, however, some Soviet commentary on U.S. SOF has been clearly complimentary. One author
expressed admiration for the professional efficiency of U.S. SOF in Just
Cause, and suggested that the Soviets might borrow from the U.S. experience of fielding and employing a spectrum of light and special-operations
forces but for use in internal-security and stability actions. In discussing
Soviet military spetsnaz training and activities in late 1990, the article said
that spetsnaz groups studied the U.S. effort to rescue American hostages in
Tehran, concluding: the operation of the U.S. reconnaissance service ... was
prepared for in a quite well-thought-out and thorough manner it was broken off purely because of events. The author said that Soviet spetsnaz treat
U.S. SOF with neither arrogance nor uncritical approval, noting, Professionals respect professionals. These assessments, stripped of ideological
condemnations that characterized much of earlier reporting, highlight an
intention to assess, and possibly draw on, U.S. special-operations experience
as members of the commonwealth restructure their own military and security forces.
The acquisition of illegal arms by terrorist groups within the former USSR
has become a major problem for military and security forces charged with
controlling interethnic and national conflicts and responding to violence of
all types. For several years, weapons have been stolen from military and
security-force warehouses, illegally purchased from soldiers and police, and
seized by nationalist or criminal groups in armed attacks on isolated garrisons. As a result, thousands of assault rifles and machine guns, as well as
mortars, grenade launchers and other weapons, have found their way into
illegal groups of various types. In March 1991, a military spokesman from
the Soviet Main Missile and Artillery Directorate pointed to an alarming
new development the production of assault rifles and pistols in clandestine shops. According to the Soviet officer, recovered weapons produced in
these shops are of high quality and clearly turned out by skilled specialists.
Some models even included inscribed serial numbers, underscoring the
increasingly organized nature of weapons production.
Special Warfare
With a drug-cultivation problem in the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union that evokes comparisons with Colombia, 1991 reports indicate that Ministry of Internal Affairs Militia Detachments of Special Designation, or OMON, are being employed in drug-eradication efforts. OMON
units gained notoriety for their repressive and lethal activities in the Baltic
republics and are based in many other republic areas. Created to deal with
terrorist incidents, serious criminal activities and the maintenance of public order, they are organized like SWAT teams or light infantry, depending
on their roles. With rapidly increasing poppy and marijuana cultivation,
the continuing problem of wild and cultivated hemp, and the growing phenomenon of armed traffickers, at least some Central Asian republics are
now using OMON forces. In Tajikistan, for example, OMON elements are
delivered by helicopter to plantations. OMON forces destroy the crops
manually, break down fences around the plots and destroy homemade
watering systems. The loosening control of central authorities, the desperate need for hard currency and the move to a market economy are expected
to result in an explosion of narcotics problems. As a consequence, Soviet
or republic counternarcotics efforts may acquire an increasingly militarized
character.
Military establishments of former Warsaw Pact member-states have begun to examine war-fighting approaches that depart from the Soviet-Warsaw Pact coalition model. A 1990 article in a Polish military journal noted
that future battlefields would see units operating in isolation, and it discussed the prospect that such units could become encircled. Under those
circumstances, the author noted, if there is no communication from the
superior, the subunit has not received another mission, and there is not a
chance of breaking through to its own troops, then the subunit should
transition to battle in the form of partisan or special actions. This statement suggests that at least some Polish military theorists may be considering unconventional war-fighting approaches under some circumstances.
Polish armed forces are being reduced sharply in size, with some units
redeployed eastward. The emergence of some kind of peoples war concept to deter a larger and more powerful neighbor would be an intriguing
dimension to evolving military posture.
Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Maj. Arnaldo Claudio of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.
March 1992
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are still being developed, but current plans call for all nine to be
completed prior to the conversion to
the new Civil Affairs TOE, scheduled for Sept. 16, 1992. For further
information contact Capt. Mark S.
Stevenson, phone (919) 4325333/3416, DSN 239-5333/3416.
operations. Its records include correspondence, reports, maps, photographs, film footage and captured
propaganda.
The most recent addition to the
records consists of more than 3,000
cubic feet of declassified material
acquired from the CIA since 1980.
For more than a decade, the National Archives has worked to declassify, arrange, describe and index
the materials, said Lawrence McDonald, a projects archivist at the
National Archives. Earlier Archives
OSS holdings consisted of approximately 1,000 cubic feet of records
received from the State Department
File photo
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1989
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PIN: 069206000