Maritime Logistics PDF
Maritime Logistics PDF
Maritime Logistics PDF
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the relationship between maritime logistics and the world
trading system. Maritime transportation is a crucial underpinning of world economic
prosperity. In this system states recognize the strategic role of ports and manage them
through unilateral reform, coordination of port management and cooperation in bodies
such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum. The attention on trade security is rooted in the events of
September 11, the rise of piracy in Asian waters and the emerging energy issues in the
region. A sustainable approach to trade security needs to go beyond border security and
confidence in the supply chain to a broader confidence in the world trading system and
national pursuit of the global common interest. The current efforts at constructing an
East Asian Economic Community need to establish concrete cooperative arrangements in
maritime logistics but also need to appreciate the different ways of doing logistics in the
Asian region. Asian countries are at different levels of development and the politics of
prosperity influence the priorities of port and maritime reform. Through sharing
experiences, Asian countries can appreciate the economics of regional adjustment in
maritime logistics over time.
1. INTRODUCTION
The world has become more interconnected due to global communications and
transportation and more interdependent due to the growth of international trade,
investment and finance (UN, 2000). The transportation of cargo and containers by sea
underpins the world trading system and global economic prosperity (OECD, 2003: 5;
ASEAN, 2004a). Essential to maritime transportation has been efficiently run ports and
confidence in sea-bound transportation. In the Asia Pacific region trade by sea is vital
especially for island nations such as Japan, Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand. For
example, 99.7% of all Japanese foreign trade enters and leave via ports and harbors and
Hong Kong transports 80% of its cargo by sea (Ports and Harbor Bureau, 2006: 1; WTO,
2006b: 92).
551 225
20-3March 2008
In recent years, one way to understand transportation has been the evolving discipline
of logistics. Logistics originally meant the physical network for transportation and
distribution but it has now come to include the integrated management of supply and
distribution chains (WTO, 2004). Logistics is the procedure to optimize all activities to
ensure the delivery of products through a transport chain from one end to the other
(WTO, 2001a). Logistics deals with the supply chain process that plans, implements, and
controls the efficient and effective point-to-point flow and storage of goods, services and
related information, throughout the production, distribution and delivery stages, from the
initial suppliers of inputs to final customers of products (WTO, 2004). This paper
considers the part of logistics that relates maritime transportation and port management.
This includes shipping lines that transport containers and bulk shipping (such as oil,
liquid gas, chemicals, ores or grain) (OECD, 2002: 10) as well as port management policies.
The importance of maritime logistics is also informed by economy-wide political,
economic and technological developments. The introduction in 1966 of containers replacing
break-bulk transportation was a revolution in marine transportation (Vigarie, 1999: 3).
New and larger vessels, port technology and advances in navigation are other examples of
technological change. The pressures for privatization in ports and logistics services reform
grew in the 1980s informed by national self-interest as well as support for the formation of
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). In the last decade the rise of China
and growing competition between East Asian economies has greatly influenced maritime
logistics. Since September 11, 2001, there has been considerable interest in secure
maritime trade related to terrorism, piracy and energy resources.
This paper first examines economic issues in maritime logistics and their relationship
with the world trading system. An appreciation of the various dimensions of trade security
follows with a discussion of border security, supply chain security and confidence-based
security. The final part of the paper considers Asian logistics in the context of the East
Asian Economic Community proposals.
20-3March 2008
ocean transshipment related to this route accounts for around 7.7% of Hong Kongs ocean
transshipment: some of this transshipment is expected to switch to direct traffic when
trade between Chinese Taipei and Mainland China is fully liberalized (WTO, 2006b: 94-5).
Hong Kong authorities are of the opinion that strong expansion of the southern China
cargo base will provide long-term growth of port traffic in HKSAR, despite some diversion
of ocean-going transshipment cargo and the competition from new ports in southern
China (WTO, 2006b: 94).
ASEAN also recognizes the growing importance of efficient maritime logistics in
paving the foundations for an ASEAN Economic Community. In the ASEAN Transport
Action Plan 2005-2010, poor port-related road systems, port infrastructure and inadequate
shipping networks form an intractable problem: entry barriers and high operating costs
discourage logistics companies from serving the region as a whole. The absence of regional
logistics players in turn perpetuates fragmented transport services (ASEAN, 2004a).
2.3 The World Trade Organization (WTO) and maritime transportation
In recent years there has been growing interest in some trading economies (such as
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand) for the consolidation of port reform and
incorporation of maritime logistics in WTO negotiations. It is argued that differences in
logistics costs could even be higher than tariffs and could easily undermine comparative
advantage in production costs (WTO, 2004: 2). Liberalization of trade has also highlighted
the costs associated with the transportation of goods and the share of transport costs in
the final price of the product is steadily increasing (WTO, 2001b). Despite the
privatization trends, maritime transport has had a difficult relationship with the WTO
since the 1980s. At the root of the problem is that disagreement exists on the nature of
best practice, and the boundaries and limits of WTO trade law in maritime policy. The
failure of maritime services in the WTO is in contrast to the relatively successful
Information Technology Agreement (ITA) negotiated in 1996.
The interest in further reform is evident in the competitive pressures between trading
economies. Shippers and exporters often find fault with various costly regulations or
administrative rules that affect business operations. One approach is to take up such
issues at the bilateral level and reach an agreement. The opportunities for further WTOrelated reform of maritime logistics also has a basis in the trade law of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Government Procurement Code, the
Subsidies Agreement and WTO discussions on competition policy and investment reform.
Some complaints may be justified but they may also misunderstand the different ways of
doing logistics or even different priorities due to the economic development policies of
developing countries. Port services, the construction of ports, the procurement policies of
states, the customs arrangements, the costs of licenses and administrative requirements,
subsidies available to shipping companies are all trade-related and therefore subject to
scrutiny by trading partners. The clarity of multilateral rules and the consensus rule of the
WTO offers an alternative to resolution of maritime logistics in the bilateral context.
555 229
20-3March 2008
An example of the politics of maritime trade is found in the US relations with Japan
and China. China and the US seem to have resolved many of their differences on maritime
policy with the 2003 treaty that helped open markets for American shipping by allowing
US carriers to open full branches in China and operate without restrictions (USTR, 2006:
18). Recent Chinese reforms have included compliance with WTO commitments, removal of
regulations on domestic shipping operations and promotion of foreign investment in
international shipping (WTO, 2006c: 240). For the United States, Japan is a different
matter. The 2006 National Trade Estimates report argued US carriers serving Japanese
ports have long encountered a restrictive, inefficient and discriminatory system of port
transportation services (National Trade Estimates, 2006: 378). In October 1997, Japan
agreed to reform its port system and to reduce the influence of the Japan Harbor Transport
Association. A decade later, according to the United States, several of the grievances
remain in licensing, joint venture requirements and discriminatory policies (National
Trade Estimates, 2006: 378).
Maritime Services was taken up in the Uruguay Round (1986-1994) but became
detached from the overall reciprocal-based negotiations with a deadline of June 1996
covering shipping, auxiliary services and port facilities. Only 42 members plus 16
observers participated in the discussions from 1994-1996. In June 1995, 24 offers were
made, but the US was not one of them, holding the view that the offers were lacking
substance. In June 1996, negotiations were suspended, to be taken up again in the services
negotiations that were to begin in 2000. This suspension according to Hong Kong SAR was
a disappointing chapter in the history of multilateral liberalization of services trade
(WTO, 2001a).
One emerging model for future negotiations is for a comprehensive approach to the
liberalization of logistics services in general, of which maritime transportation is but one
component (WTO, 2001a; WTO, 2004). Another approach is to link maritime liberalization
with competition policy (WTO, 2001c; OECD, 2002). In Australia for example, port services
are subject to national competition policy legislation (WTO, 2001c). Key in this discussion
is a possible distinction between core and non-core logistics. A distinction was proposed in
WTO discussions on logistics services (WTO, 2004). Core logistics (cargo and container
handling, storage and warehousing, transport agencies and auxiliary services) are
essential logistics requiring substantive liberalization in market access and national
treatment (WTO, 2004). Maritime, air, road and rail services however require only
broadly liberal arrangementscrucial to the efficient supply of integrated logistics
services as well as providing an enabling environment for third-party logistics services to
flourish (WTO, 2004). Given the slow progress of the Doha Round, the incorporation of
logistics reform remains to be seen. This suggests a continued prominence to be given to
bilateral solutions or reforms based in maritime bodies such as the IMO, WCO or even
APEC and the East Asian Summit process.
230 556
20-3March 2008
The issue of price-fixing and capacity regulation among liner conferences however, is a
very controversial issue (OECD, 2002: 2) because maritime shipping lines and their
conferences are exempt from normal anti-competitive laws (OECD, 2002: 9). Due to
destructive competition between ships in the 1870s-1880s agreements were made to limit
capacity and fix rates; the conference system (OECD, 2002: 18). Conference advocates
argue this exemption is essential to ensure stable international shipping services because
their absence would return shipping to the destructive competition that characterized the
industry in the 1880s (OECD, 2002: 18-19). Official government policy in many countries
affirms that the shipping industry is a special case (OECD, 2002: 10). Critics argue that
the 1870s justifications are not longer valid, that the shipping industry (in light of
competitive transportation elsewhere) is not unique, and the contention that destructive
competition would emerge if the conferences were abolished is not convincing (OECD,
2002: 75). Despite the criticisms, the view that liner shipping is a special case resonates in
the policy of governments to maintain the status quo. Indeed, not all aspects of the world
trading system are part of the formal trade law apparatus of the WTO. There remains
continued contention in Europe and North America over the special status of agriculture,
multilateral investment laws as well as how to appropriately manage natural resources.
232 558
3.3 Terrorism
Perhaps one of the most far reaching decisions in maritime security recently was H.R.
4954, the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, the SAFE Port Act,
signed by President George W. Bush on October 13th 2006. H.R. 4954 builds on previous
post-9/11 law such as the Maritime Transportation Security Act. H.R. 4954 mandates the
use of high-technology screening and radiation detection of cargo at the worlds top 22
ports by the end of 2008. It also strengthens the Container Security Initiative (CSI), the
Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism (CTPAT) and the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (Bush, 2006).
The CSI mandated the presence of US inspectors at foreign ports to check cargo before
it leaves for the US. The CSI scheme seems to have relatively successful. According to US
Customs and Border Protection, CSI is also reciprocal (US Customs and Border Protection,
2003). The CTPAT mandated self-regulation of shipping companies to increase security
which is rewarded. In this scheme, US importers are required to ensure security
throughout the supply chain and at every stage (Singapore, 2004: 5) The World Customs
Council (WCO) in June 2004 adopted the Integrated Supply Management Guidelines
which requires 24 hour prior provision of manifests to customs officials in an attempt to
secure the supply chain (Singapore, 2004: 5). The International Maritime Organization
proposed the International Maritime Organization (IMO) s International Ship and Port
Facility ISPS Code which has become a vital point of reference for maritime discussions in
Asia. The secure border model is also popular in Australia with Australian ports equipped
with high-tech X-ray technology to selectively screen cargo while most cargo entering
Australia passes customs prior to entry (Carmody, 2006a). Recent US port policy has also
influenced Australias decisions to rethink the relationship between facilitation and
security, but the problem of illegal fishing in Australias northern waters is also a
significant factor (Carmody, 2006a). The Australian view is that the customs authorities
primary responsibility to the community is encapsulated in the term border security
(Carmody, 2006a). The ASEAN Regional Forum in 2003 also emphasized the border
security perspective (ASEAN Regional Forum, 2003b).
The US CSI program caused some disquiet about the effect of security on efficiency but
it is limited to investigating selected, suspicious containers (Singapore, 2004: 3). CSI
however focuses only on ships and ports which are only one part of the overall supply
chain. An alternative view is that supply chain security is required from point of origin to
point of destination (Singapore, 2004: 4). This approach would address cargo security and
confidence in the supply chain instead of merely scrutinizing containers at one node in the
supply chain (Singapore, 2004: 4).
The confidence model was adopted in the World Customs Organization (WCO). The
WCO noted that It is an unacceptable and an unnecessary burden to inspect every
shipment. In fact, doing so, would bring global trade to a halt (WCO, 2005: 6; Singapore,
2004: 3). In 2005, the WCO adopted the Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate
559 233
20-3March 2008
Global Trade. This harmonizes advance electronic cargo information requirement and risk
management processes; based on comparable technology, the exporting nation will perform
inspection of high-risk containers and cargo using detection equipment such as X-ray
machines (WCO, 2005: 7). However, it also advocates the Authorized Economic Operator
(AEO) who is an approved entity involved in the transportation of goods (WCO, 2005: 10;
Carmody, 2006a). Australia for example is implementing a Customs Cargo Compliance
Program, a voluntary system for private companies who can demonstrate required levels
of security along the supply chain (Australian Customs Service, 2006: 6).
Trade security needs to go beyond confidence and border based notions to
strengthening the broader cooperative frameworks that oversee the regional and world
economy. Cooperation over time ranging from technical assistance and capacity building to
trade facilitation, mutual recognition and promotion of trust complements any specific
border security measure.
3. 4 APEC and Trade Security
APEC has examined cooperation in maritime transportation in the context of the
Transportation Working Group, focusing on best practice, sharing experiences and
technical cooperation. The overall focus has been the transportation sector as a whole, but
the unilateral reform measures in maritime policy are registered in the Individual Action
Plans and the discussion of trade security has been taken up in the context of counterterrorism cooperation in APEC.
The issue of counter-terrorism was also discussed in APEC in 2002 and the Secure
Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) was introduced. Thus far, the focus has been on
promotion of best practice, sharing experiences and ideas, a Counter Terrorism Action
Plan (CTAP) concept, capacity building and technical assistance and more recently, the
concept of total supply chain security (APEC, 2007). The initial concrete focus of STAR
was promotion of compliance with ISPS, but since then, efforts have become more broadly
connected with discussions related to trade and security (APEC, 2007).
3. 5. WTO and Trade Security
The issue of maritime trade security is also being discussed at the WTO including
natural disasters as well as terrorist attacks and their economic impacts (WTO, 2006d).
Specific measures are being left to the functional bodies such as IMO and WCO. To avoid
conflicts over unilateral measures some relationship between WTO trade law and trade
security may provide clear boundaries for legitimate action. It seems unusual that a sector
with such vital importance to world prosperity have thus far managed to avoid direct
entanglement with the GATT/WTO system.
3.6. Energy and Trade Security
The growth in energy security issues in East Asia might force matters in this
direction. The 2007 East Asian Summit (EAS) focused on energy security resulting in the
234 560
Cebu Declaration on East Asian Energy Security, an Energy Cooperation Task Force and
an Energy Ministerial Meeting in the context of EAS (East Asian Summit, 2007). The Cebu
Declaration emphasized energy efficiency, environmental issues, alternative energy and
affordable energy but neglected any mention directly of energy security or terrorism in
any sense. This was in contrast to the inaugural East Asian Summit that discussed
maritime security and terrorism (East Asian Summit, 2005). The issue of energy security
is gaining increasing attention in Japan in business and official circles (Keidanren, 2006).
In 2006, Japans Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry focused much attention on
energy policy. The Energy Security Study Group Interim Report and the New National
Energy Strategy place great emphasis upon cooperative action alongside the pursuit of
national interest in the securing of future energy supply for Japan (Energy Security Study
Group, 2006: 12-15; New National Energy Strategy, 2006). The recognition of mutual
interest and stable markets need to be addressed in ASEAN+3 and EAS (Energy Security
Study Group, 2005: 12-13). The New National Energy Strategy (2006) notes that every
country has been promoting the restructuring of national energy strategies to protect
national interest and secure energy resources overseas (National Energy Strategy, 2006:
9). At the same time, availability of oil is constrained by environmental considerations,
growing state control and absence of adequate distribution facilities around the world. In
this situation, Japan argues that countries should be careful not to stir up national
competitions for natural resources as a result of implementing our national energy security
measures (National Energy Strategy, 2006: 4, 11). The Study Group implies that in the
advent of an oil crisis, China or India or other Asian developing nations might intervene to
control energy resources or sea-lanes and these actions could in turn develop into
international problems that transcend energy concerns (Energy Security Study Group,
2006: 21; National Energy Strategy, 2006: 8).
More concretely the report notes that natural disasters, accidents or terrorism in the
Straits of Malacca the bottleneck of the supply chain, could also seriously hinder the
supply of energy (Energy Security Study Group, 2006: 21). Regional cooperation including
the US, China, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore is essential to ensure the
Straits of Malacca remain open but in the long-term, according to Japan, a different route
is required (Singapore, 2004: 2; Energy Security Study Group, 2006: 7, 22). This is bound
to be a controversial issue for the future.
4.
20-3March 2008
Vision Group Report discussed the establishment of an East Asian Free Trade Agreement,
investment and financial cooperation. Cooperation to reduce piracy was the only maritime
issue addressed (East Asian Vision Group, 2001: 18). The report stressed the need for a
united voice to advance the regions common interests (2001: 7). The translation of Asias
common interests in maritime logistics into a practical work program was not considered.
Even in the Final Report of the East Asia Study Group, nothing original was proposed for
East Asian cooperation in maritime transportation. The report recalled the decision of the
4th Informal ASEAN Summit in 2000 to adopt the Initiative for ASEAN Integration.
4.2 ASEAN and Maritime Transportation
The 4th ASEAN Informal Summit agreed to the Initiative for ASEAN Integration to
narrow the divide within ASEAN and enhance ASEANs competitiveness as a region
(ASEAN, 2000). Singapore, China, Korea and Japan would provide training and education
to the less developed countries in the group. Transportation was one of the critical areas
nominated (ASEAN, 2000). In 2001, infrastructure, human resource development,
information technology and regional integration were chosen. Infrastructure in the
proposal means the reinforcement of transportation linkages through developing and
implementing more extensive land, sea and air infrastructural projects in order to
facilitate the flow of goods and people and to generate higher income for people in the
region (ASEAN, 2001). The ASEAN Transport Action Plan (2005-2010) proposed a more
efficient and competitive regional maritime transport sector. Aspects of the Action Plan
include identification of vital sea-lanes in ASEAN waters, liberalization of intra-ASEAN
maritime transport services, promotion of the ASEAN shipping fleet and the promotion of
competition in the vital sea-lanes through rationalization of the shipping fleet and
coordination among the 47 regional and secondary ports (ASEAN, 2004b). In 2007, Japan
and ASEAN agreed to a Declaration on Transport Security. The Declaration emphasized
compliance with and support for existing international efforts in maritime security, the
provision of assistance to less developed ASEAN members. In addition security and trade
facilitation priorities need to be balanced (ASEAN-Japan, 2007).
4.3. Japans Position
Japans approach to the East Asian Group offers one possible way to address maritime
logistics in the context of East Asian regionalism. Japans position is that functional
cooperation (in practical issues such as piracy) is a unique characteristic of community
building in East Asia and accommodates the diversity of the region in which application of
unified rules and establishment of region-wide mechanisms are less feasible in comparison
to other regions (Japan, 2004: 11/16-11/17). The Japanese position is that the spread of
regional cooperation networks in wide-ranging issues will facilitate closer interdependence
among countries in the region (13/17). Maritime transportation was not included as a
priority issue for Japan (2004). The experience of APEC has shown over the last twenty
years that functional cooperation need not be the basis for more sophisticated
arrangements, provided that the functional cooperation continues to deliver practical and
useful results, contributing to confidence building.
236 562
20-3March 2008
In Japan, the 1950 Port and Harbor Law reflected a period that oversaw the
construction of foreign cargo wharves to manage the growth in trade. This fed into the next
period until the end of high growth in the early 1970s and the purpose was the
development of large-scale industrial lands and wharves for large specialized bulk carriers
designed to establish heavy chemical industrial belts (Ports and Harbor Bureau, 2006:
15). Public corporations were responsible for foreign cargo container terminal construction.
The next period until the middle of the 1980s oversaw a number of developments such as
construction of container terminals, bulk carrier wharves, wharves for coal and gas in line
with Japans increased resource diversification and consumption (Ports and Harbor
Bureau, 2006: 15). This period also led into growing attention to the environment and the
renovation of ports for community recreation.
238 564
6. CONCLUSION
This paper examined the role of logistics in the world trading system by examining
economic, security and regional issues. These issues confronted the politics of
cooperation and the consequences of competition as well as the pragmatic realities of
adjustment to change. Despite a lack of consensus in WTO-based reforms, unilaterally
driven privatization of services including ports is a major feature in the world economy.
Ports and shipping, by virtue of their role in the world economy, remain strategic and
port management requires effective coordination by governments as well as various
forms of state assistance. Disputes over port and customs related procedures continue to
be taken up in existing bilateral frameworks but different approaches to doing logistics
can reflect not only protectionism but also national characteristics and levels of
development. Management of competition in liner shipping through conferences and
alliances continues and while the WTO has taken up the issue of trade security recently,
maritime logistics in trade law is not as prominent as its actual role in the world
economy.
Trade security involves not only the security of ships and ports but also the
sustainable supply of resources and cargo as well as the adequacy of national
administrative infrastructure. This requires on one hand cooperative arrangements to
understand transnational threats to security such as energy resources, piracy, terrorism,
and on the other unilateral policies to reinforce confidence in the supply chain at home and
abroad through technical assistance. The post-September 11 focus on the confidence of
border security is only one part of a broader trade security at the heart of which is
confidence not only in the supply chain but on the pragmatism of trading partners to
pursue a regional and global common interest.
There are several problems with aspirations for an East Asian Community in light of
maritime transportation. To date, the discussions have not highlighted the vital role of
maritime transportation and port competition, nor practically resolved the regional
character of ports and maritime shipping in this East Asian Group. The rise of East
Asian regionalism comes at a time to defuse the possible national tensions arising over the
competitive search and exploitation of finite natural and economic resources. The other
weakness is that Asia is not Europe and there are vastly different levels of economic
development and societal expectations.
While trade security is the keyword for a post-9/11 world, the concept of confidence
seems to better locate the current controversies. Confidence in the supply chain,
confidence in the adequacy of natural resources, and confidence in the long-term
aspirations of regional powers in the Asia region dominate. It is strange given the role of
maritime transport that it is not very visible in the WTO, despite the pursuit of port
privatization and liberalization of border barriers. The advice of the Japanese Energy
Strategy is pertinent: in the pursuit of national interest, the impact of that interest on the
565 239
20-3March 2008
REFERENCES
APEC, (2007) Counter Terrorism and Secure Trade in the APEC Region, APEC Secretariat
Web-Site
ASEAN, (2004a) ASEAN Transport Action Agenda 2005-2010 http://www.aseansec.org/16597.htm
ASEAN, (2004b) Annex A: Transport Sectoral Action Plan 2005-2010, 13th November
ASEAN, (2001) Hanoi Declaration on Narrowing Development Gap for Closer ASEAN
Integration, Hanoi, 23rd July http://www.aseansec.org/935.htm
ASEAN, (2000) The 4 th ASEAN Informal Summit, 22-25 November, Singapore
http://www.aseansec.org/5459.htm
ASEAN-Japan, (2007) ASEAN-Japan Ministerial Declaration on Transport Security,
Bangkok, 9th February http://www.aseansec.org/19729.htm
ASEAN Regional Forum (2003a) ARF Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and Other
Threats to Security, http://www.aseansec.org/14838.htm
ASEAN Regional Forum, (2003b) ASEAN Regional Forum Statement on Cooperative
Counter-Terrorism Action on Border Security, http://www.aseansec.org/14836
Australian Customs Service, (2006) Customs Cargo Compliance Program, 2006-7
Bush, George W., (2006) President Bush Signs SAFE Port Act, White House Press Release,
October 13, Retrieved November 11th, 2006
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/10/print/20061013-2.html
Carmody, Michael, (2006a) Address by Michael Carmody, 1 st September 2006, CBFCA
National Conference and Exhibition 2006, Australian Customs Service, Retrieved 24 th
January 2007, http://www.customs.gov.au/site/page.cfm?u=5658
Carmody, Michael, (2006b) Australian National Security Summit, CEO of the Australian
Customs Service, 14th November, Retrieved 24th January 2007, http://www.customs.gov.au
East Asian Summit, (2005) Chairmans Statement of the First East Asian Summit, Kuala
Lumpur 14th December
East Asian Summit, (2007) Chairmans Statement of the Second East Asian Summit, Cebu,
Philippines 15th January
East Asian Vision Group Report, (2001) Towards an East Asian Community: Region of
Peace, Prosperity and Progress
ESCAP, (2005) Development of Shipping and Ports in North-East Asia, United Nations
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
Energy Security Study Group, (2006) Interim Report, Agency of Natural Resources and Energy,
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, June
Final Report of the East Asia Study Group, (2002) ASEAN+3 Summit, 4th November
Freight Logistics Industry, (2002) Freight Logistics in Australia: An Agenda for Action
Keidanren, (2006) Energy Policy in a New Era, Masaharu Shibata, Economic Trend, December
Japanese Government, (2004) Issue Papers Prepared by the Government of Japan, East
240 566
20-3March 2008
United States Trade Representative (2006a) US-China Trade Relations: Entering a New
Phase of Greater Accountability and Enforcement, Top-to-Bottom Review
United States Trade Representative (2006b) National Trade Estimates
Vigarie, Andre, (1999) From break-bulk to containers: the transformation of general cargo
handling, GeoJournal 48: 3-7
Michael SUTTON, Assistant Professor, College of International Relations, Ritsumeikan
University
IMO
APEC
/11
242 568