LINNINS Et Al v. HAECO AMERICAS, LLC Et Al: Complaint Filed On 5/17/2016
LINNINS Et Al v. HAECO AMERICAS, LLC Et Al: Complaint Filed On 5/17/2016
LINNINS Et Al v. HAECO AMERICAS, LLC Et Al: Complaint Filed On 5/17/2016
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) Civil Action No.: 16cv486
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) CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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Plaintiffs, David Linnins, Kim Wolfington and Carol Blackstock, individually and on
behalf of all others similarly situated, by and through counsel, bring this action against the
Defendants, (hereafter referred to collectively as Haeco or Defendants) and allege as follows
based upon personal knowledge, investigation of counsel, and information and belief:
NATURE OF THE ACTION
1.
On April 29, 2016, Haeco acknowledged that in or about March 2016 a Haeco
employee received a phishing or scam email requesting the 2015 W-2 data for all of Haecos
employees.
professionals have been warned to avoid, the Haeco employee complied with the request in the
email by sending to unknown cyber criminals an unencrypted data file which contained either
copies of W-2 statements or all of the sensitive personally identifying information (PII) needed
to fill out a W-2, including names, mailing addresses, Social Security numbers, and wage and
withholding information (the Data Disclosure). The compromised data contained PII for every
W-2 employee1, as categorized by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), who worked at and
received wages from Haeco during the time period of January 1, 2015 through December 31, 2015.
It is estimated that approximately 3,000 current and former Haeco employees had their PII
compromised as a result of the Data Disclosure.
2.
Almost immediately, the cyber criminals exploited Haecos wrongful actions and
filed fraudulent tax returns in the names of many of the employees. Using the Social Security
numbers obtained in the Data Disclosure, the cyber criminals also requested IRS account
transcripts for individual employees. These transcripts provide data from most line items on a tax
form, including adjusted gross income and tax withholdings, and indicate whether current year tax
returns have been filed. But most importantly to cyber criminals, these IRS transcripts will also
disclose Social Security numbers and wage information of both spouses for those filing joint tax
returns. Thus, using the unlawfully obtained Social Security number of one employee, cyber
criminals can request a tax transcript from the IRS to fraudulently obtain the Social Security of the
employees spouse.
3.
No one can know what else the cyber criminals will do with the employees PII.
However, what is known is that the Haeco employees are now, and for the rest of their lives will
be, at a heightened risk of further identity theft and fraud. Victims of the Data Disclosure have
In simplest terms, the IRS has two categories for workers: employees and independent contractors. For employees,
payroll taxes are automatically deducted from paychecks and paid to the government through the employer. The
employer reports the wages to the IRS at the end of the year on a W-2 form. Independent contractors are responsible
for calculating and submitting their own payroll taxes. Companies report the wages paid to independent contractors
on a Form 1099. See, IRS Publication 15-A, available at https://www.irs.gov/publications/p15a/ar02.html (last visited
May 5, 2016).
suffered harm repeatedly since their PII was compromised. As set forth in more detail below, false
tax returns have been filed using Class Members PII , the cyber criminals have posed as Class
Members in contacting the IRS in an attempt to gain even more PII, and Class Members have spent
hours completing police reports, monitoring credit reports, and placing freezes on their credit.
Many Class Members are now paying fees for identity theft and credit monitoring services or
insurance. For all Class Members, fear and anxiety of identity theft or fraud is the new norm.
4.
Plaintiffs bring this class action against Defendants for failing to adequately secure
and safeguard the PII of Plaintiffs and the Class, failing to comply with industry standards
regarding electronic transmission of PII, and for failing to provide timely and adequate notice to
Plaintiffs and other Class members that their information had been stolen and precisely what types
of information were stolen.
PARTIES
David Linnins
5.
Carolina.
6.
7.
On or about April 13, 2016, Plaintiff David Linnins was using Turbo Tax to
Haeco.
complete his 2015 tax return. When he electronically submitted his completed return to the IRS,
he received notice that the return had been rejected and was instructed to contact the IRS at the
number provided. When Mr. Linnins called the IRS, he was advised that a 2015 tax return using
his Social Security number had already been filed. As Mr. Linnins had not filed this prior tax
return, he realized that he had been the victim of identity theft. Mr. Linnins was instructed by the
3
Mr. Linnins also notified the local police that he was the victim of identity theft and
tax fraud. He spent several hours with a detective completing a police report and working with
the assistance of the detective to complete additional paperwork from the IRS, including an
authorization for the IRS to release information regarding the incident to the local police
department.
9.
Mr. Linnins also notified the North Carolina Department of Revenue that he had
Additionally, Mr. Linnins pulled and reviewed his credit reports from each of the
Within days of discovering that he had been the victim of identity theft and tax
fraud, Mr. Linnins purchased identity theft and credit protection services through Lifelock at an
annual cost of $109.00.
12.
As a result of the Data Disclosure, Plaintiff David Linnins has spent numerous
hours making telephone calls and completing paperwork necessary to address this fraud, and his
efforts are ongoing. Further, Mr. Linnins has had to take time off from work for these efforts to
remediate the tax fraud he experienced, as these telephone calls and meetings had to take place
during the normal business day hours.
13.
Prior to the Data Disclosure, Plaintiff David Linnins had no knowledge of ever
being the victim of identity theft or being involved in a data breach incident.
Kim Wolfington
14.
Carolina.
4
15.
North Carolina.
16.
electronically file his tax returns, it was rejected. Mr. Wolfington contacted the IRS and learned
that a 2015 tax return using his Social Security Number had been filed previously. Advising the
IRS that he had not filed this prior return, Mr. Wolfington was given instructions by the IRS on
filing an alternate tax return and steps he needed to take in order to prove his identity, including
providing his birth certificate to the IRS.
17.
In the weeks preceding April 15, 2016, Mr. Wolfington received notification from
the IRS that his Social Security number had been used in an attempt to view his tax information
through the IRSs Get Transcript application on www.IRS.gov. Mr. Wolfington assumed that his
accountant has made this inquiry in conjunction with preparing Mr. Wolfingtons tax return and,
thus, had not been alarmed. After learning that he had been the victim of identity theft, Mr.
Wolfington inquired of his accountant and discovered that an unauthorized third party had made
this attempt using his PII.
18.
To his knowledge, prior to the Data Disclosure, Mr. Wolfington had never been the
As a result of the Data Disclosure, Plaintiff Kim Wolfington has spent several hours
remediating the identity theft and tax fraud that he experienced, and it is likely that he will be
required to spend additional time protecting himself from future incidents of identity theft and
fraud. Additionally, the 2015 federal tax refund that he was expecting is being delayed while the
IRS investigates the matter further, verifies Mr. Wolfingtons identity, and processes the correct
return.
5
Carol Blackstock
20.
Carolina.
21.
facility.
22.
On or about March 28, 2016, Plaintiff Carol Blackstock received a letter from the
IRS addressed to her and her husband. The letter was a response to a March 19, 2016 request
made to the IRS for an account transcript. Concerned that neither she nor her husband had made
the request for this transcript, which included their Social Security Numbers, 2015 Adjusted Gross
Income, 2015 Taxable Income, and tax withholding amounts, Mrs. Blackstock contacted the IRS.
She was instructed on the steps to take to report the identity theft and fraud.
23.
Because she had not experienced any other issues, Mrs. Blackstock did not feel a
sense of urgency to complete the paperwork requested by the IRS. However, weeks later, after
learning that her PII had been disclosed by Haeco to unknown third parties, she began taking
immediate steps to prevent future identity theft and harm. As a result of the Data Disclosure, Mrs.
Blackstock has spent, and will continue to spend, numerous hours filing police reports, monitoring
her credit reports and completing the IRS paperwork necessary to protect herself from future
incidents of identity theft or fraud.
24.
Prior to the Data Disclosure, Plaintiff Carol Blackstock had never been the victim
Services, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Greensboro, North
Carolina.
6
26.
liability company with its principal place of business in Greensboro, North Carolina.
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act, 28
U.S.C. 1332(d), because there are more than 100 Class Members, the class contains members of
diverse citizenship from Defendant, and the amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000 exclusive
of costs and interests.
28.
This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants because Haecos U.S.
headquarters is in this District and each Defendant is authorized to and does conduct substantial
business in North Carolina, and in this District.
29.
U.S. headquarters is in this District, the Defendants regularly conduct business in this District, and
a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to this action occurred in this District.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
30.
On or about April 16, 2016, Haeco advised current employees that a Data
Disclosure was suspected as several employees had reported experiencing problems when filing
their 2015 tax returns.
31.
held meetings with current employees to advise that W-2s for some of Haecos employees had
been disclosed to a third party and, as a result, some employees reported having fraudulent tax
returns filed using their PII. At no point during this meeting were employees advised that the
third party to whom the PII had been disclosed were unknown cyber criminals.
32.
On or about April 19, 2016, Haeco Americas CEO, Kevin Carter, sent a letter via
company email advising that all W-2 forms of Haeco Americas employees had been disclosed to
an outside party. Once again, Haeco did not disclose the identity of the third party, or more
appropriately, that the identity was unknown. Acknowledging the importance of the privacy and
security of its employees PII, Mr. Carter further advised that Haeco would be offering two years
of free identity theft protection through third-party provider ProtectMyId.com to those employees
who enrolled on-line.
33.
In a letter dated April 29, 2016, and received by most employees on or about May
4, 2016, Haeco advised that it had experienced a data security issue. The letter, signed by CEO
Kevin Carter, stated that on April 15, 2016, Haeco became aware that W-2 information had been
disclosed to an unknown third party in response to a phishing email. The letter further stated
that the information disclosed was W-2 information, including names, Social Security numbers
and wage information. Mr. Carter declared in the letter that no other information had been
disclosed. The letter advised again that employees could receive two years of identity theft
protection if they went on-line to enroll in the service. This letter was the first notice by Haeco
that the employees PII had been given to unknown cyber criminals.
34.
This Data Disclosure was caused by Haecos voluntary disclosure of the PII of its
current and former employees, ironically at a time in the calendar year when W-2 information is
most vital and valuable.
35.
Haeco was not without warning of this phishing email scam, yet it failed to
36.
On August 27, 2015, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued a report
warning of the increasingly common scam, known as Business Email Compromise, in which
companies fall victim to phishing emails.2 Most importantly, this report called attention to the
significant spike in scams, also referred to as CEO email schemes, in which cyber criminals send
emails that appear to have initiated from the CEO or other top level executive at the target
company.
37.
On February 24, 2016, noted cybersecurity journalist Brian Krebs warned of this
precise scam, which snared Haeco, in a blog that said all it needed to say in its title: Phishers Spoof
CEO, Request W2 Forms.3 Krebs warned that cyber criminals were attempting to scam companies
by sending false emails, purportedly from the companys chief executive officer, to individuals in
the human resources or accounting department asking for copies of W-2 data for all employees.
Krebs even provided an example of such an email that had been sent to another company:
See, Public Service Announcement, Business Email Compromise, Alert No. I-082715a-PSA (August 27, 2015),
available at https://www.ic3.gov/media/2015/150827-1.aspx (last visited May 5, 2016.).
3
Brian Krebs, Phishers Spoof CEO, Request W2 Forms, available at http://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/02/phishersspoof-ceo-request-w2-forms/ (last visited May 5, 2016).
38.
On March 1, 2016, the IRS issued an alert to payroll and human resources
professionals warning of the same scheme, which Haeco ignored. In precise detail, the alert stated:
The Internal Revenue Service today issued an alert to payroll and human
resources professionals to beware of an emerging phishing email scheme
that purports to be from company executives and requests personal
information on employees.
The IRS has learned this scheme part of the surge in phishing emails
seen this year already has claimed several victims as payroll and human
resources offices mistakenly email payroll data including Forms W-2 that
contain Social Security numbers and other personally identifiable
information to cybercriminals posing as company executives.
This is a new twist on an old scheme using the cover of the tax season and
W-2 filings to try tricking people into sharing personal data. Now the
criminals are focusing their schemes on company payroll departments, said
IRS Commissioner John Koskinen. If your CEO appears to be emailing
you for a list of company employees, check it out before you respond.
Everyone has a responsibility to remain diligent about confirming the
identity of people requesting personal information about employees. 4
39.
repeated warnings and alerts, not only of the increasing risk of general phishing scams, but of the
actual W-2 phishing email scam it chose to ignore and thus fell prey to.
40.
Haecos failures handed to criminals the PII of Plaintiffs and other Class Members
and put Plaintiffs and the Class at serious, immediate and ongoing risk for identity theft and fraud.
The practice with such breaches is that the cyber criminals will use the PII, as they have done here,
to file false tax returns immediately but also will continue to use the PII to exploit and injure Class
Members by selling the PII to third parties or otherwise using the PII for illicit purposes.
IRS, IRS Alerts Payroll and HR Professionals to Phishing Scheme Involving W-2s, IR-2016-34 (March 1, 2016),
available at https://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Alerts-Payroll-and-HR-Professionals-to-Phishing-SchemeInvolving-W2s (last visited May 5, 2016)
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41.
The Data Disclosure was caused and enabled by Haecos violation of its obligation
to abide by best practices and industry standards concerning the security of its computer and
payroll processing systems. Haeco failed to comply with security standards and allowed its
employees PII to be compromised by failing to implement security measures that could have
prevented or mitigated the Data Disclosure. Haeco failed to implement even the most basic of
security measures to require encryption of any data file containing PII sent electronically, even
within the company.
42.
Haeco failed to ensure that all personnel in its human resources and accounting
departments were made aware of this well-known and well-publicized phishing email scam.
43.
Haeco failed to timely disclose the extent of the Data Disclosure, failed to
individually notify each of the affected individuals in a timely manner, and failed to take other
reasonable steps to clearly and conspicuously inform Plaintiffs and the other Class Members of
the nature and extent of the Data Disclosure. By failing to provide adequate and timely notice,
Haeco prevented Plaintiffs and Class Members from protecting themselves from the
consequences of the Data Disclosure.
44.
The ramifications of Haecos failure to keep its employees PII secure are severe.
Once PII is stolen, fraudulent use of that information and damage to victims may continue for
years.
45.
committed or attempted using the identifying information of another person without authority.5
The FTC describes identifying information as any name or number that may be used, alone or
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in conjunction with any other information, to identify a specific person, including, among other
things, [n]ame, Social Security number, date of birth, official State or government issued drivers
license or identification number, alien registration number, government passport number,
employer or taxpayer identification number.6
46.
Social Security numbers, for example, are among the worst kind of personal
information to have stolen because they may be put to a variety of fraudulent uses and are difficult
for an individual to change.
47.
The Social Security Administration has warned that identity thieves can use an
individuals Social Security number to apply for additional credit lines. Such fraud may go
undetected until debt collection calls commence months, or even years, later.7
48.
Stolen Social Security numbers also make it possible for thieves to file fraudulent
tax returns, as they have done here, file for unemployment benefits, or apply for a job using a
false identity. Each of these fraudulent activities is difficult to detect. An individual may not know
that his or her Social Security number was used to file for unemployment benefits until law
enforcement notifies the individuals employer of the suspected fraud. Fraudulent tax returns are
typically discovered only when an individuals authentic tax return is rejected.
49.
What is more, it is no easy task to change or cancel a stolen Social Security number.
An individual cannot obtain a new Social Security number without significant paperwork and
evidence of actual misuse. In other words, preventive action to defend against the possibility of
Id.
Social Security Administration, Identity Theft and Your Social
http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10064.pdf (last visited May 5, 2016).
7
Security
Number,
available
12
at
misuse of a Social Security Number is not permitted; an individual must show evidence of actual,
ongoing fraud activity to obtain a new number.
50.
Even then, a new Social Security number may not be effective. According to Julie
Ferguson of the Identity Theft Resource Center, The credit bureaus and banks are able to link
the new number very quickly to the old number, so all of that old bad information is quickly
inherited into the new Social Security number.8
51.
significantly more valuable than the loss of, say, credit card information in a large retailer data
breach such as those that occurred at Target and Home Depot. Victims affected by those retailer
breaches could avoid much of the potential future harm by cancelling credit or debit cards and
obtaining replacements. The information compromised in the Haeco Data Disclosure is difficult,
if not impossible, to changeSocial Security number, name, date of birth, employment
information, income data, etc.
52.
This data, as one would expect, demands a much higher price on the black market.
Martin Walter, senior director at cybersecurity firm RedSeal, explained, Compared to credit card
information, personally identifiable information and Social Security numbers are worth more than
10x on the black market.9
53.
PII, and alerts regarding the actual W-2 phishing email scam perpetrated, Haecos approach to
Victims of Social Security Number Theft Find Its Hard to Bounce Back, NPR, Brian Naylor, Feb. 9, 2015, available
at
http://www.npr.org/2015/02/09/384875839/data-stolen-by-anthem-s-hackers-has-millions-worrying-aboutidentity-theft (last visited May 5, 2016).
9
Anthem Hack: Personal Data Stolen Sells for 10x Price of Stolen Credit Card Numbers, IT World, Tim Greene,
Feb. 6, 2015, available at http://www.itworld.com/article/2880960/anthem-hack-personal-data-stolen-sells-for-10xprice-of-stolen-credit-card-numbers.html (last visited May 5, 2016).
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maintaining the privacy of its employees PII was lackadaisical, cavalier, reckless, or in the very
least, negligent.
54.
in this Data Disclosure. Haeco has not offered to provide any compensation for the costs and
burdens associated with the fraudulent tax returns filed as a result of the Data Disclosure. Haeco
has not offered employees any assistance in dealing with the IRS or state tax agencies. Haeco
has not offered to reimburse employees for the costs current and future incurred as a result of
falsely filed tax returns.
55.
Haeco simply responded that each employee would have to file his or her own report on his or
her own time. Haeco has not offered to compensate employees for any time off from work taken
to deal with the ramifications of the Data Disclosure.
56.
To date, Haeco has offered its employees only two years of identity theft protection
through the Experian ProtectMyId service. Employees and victim of the Data Disclosure have to
take their own time to enroll in the service. Haeco has not offered to reimburse the cost of identity
theft protection services purchased by employees before Haeco gave notice that it would pay for
such services.
57.
In any event, the offered ProtectMyID service is inadequate to protect the Plaintiffs
and Class Members from the threats they face, particularly in light of the PII stolen. The
ProtectMyID service does nothing to protect against actual identity theft, as its services revolve
around credit report monitoring. Instead, it only provides a measure of assistance after the identity
theft has been discovered. For example, ProtectMyID monitors credit reports, but fraudulent
activity, such as the filing of a false tax return, may not appear on a credit report. Although offers
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The identity theft insurance coverage provided by ProtectMyID is limited and often duplicative
of, or even inferior to, basic protections provided by banks and credit card companies.
Additionally and most importantly here, ProtectMyID provides no assistance for pre-existing
identity theft and fraud, which Plaintiffs and Class Members experienced before the ProtectMyID
service took effect as a result of the Data Disclosure.
58.
Many websites that rank identity theft protection services are critical of
ProtectMyID. NextAdvisor ranks ProtectMyID at the bottom of comparable services, noting that
it lacks in protection.10 BestIDTheftCompanys.com ranks ProtectMyID at number 29 on its list
of companies with a mere score of 4.4 out of 10 (and a User Score of only 1.3).11
59.
Class Members have suffered and will continue to suffer damages, including monetary losses,
lost time, anxiety and emotional distress. They have suffered or are at increased risk of suffering:
a. The loss of the opportunity to control how their PII is used;
b. The diminution in value of their PII;
c. The compromise, publication and/or theft of their PII;
d. Out-of-pocket costs associated with the prevention, detection, recovery and
remediation from identity theft or fraud;
e. Lost opportunity costs and lost wages associated with effort expended and the loss
of productivity from addressing and attempting to mitigate the actual and future
consequences of the Data Disclosure, including but not limited to efforts spent
10
Identity
Theft
Protection
Reviews
&
Prices,
NextAdvisor.com,
found
http://www.nextadvisor.com/identity_theft_protection_services/compare.php (last visited May 5, 2016).
11
See, https://bestidtheftcompanys.com/company/experian-protectmyid/ (last visited May 5, 2016).
15
at
researching how to prevent, detect, contest and recover from identity theft and
fraud;
f. Unauthorized use of compromised PII to open new financial accounts and apply for
unemployment benefits;
g. The continued risk to their PII, which remains in the possession of Haeco and is
subject to further breaches so long as Defendants fail to undertake appropriate
measures to protect the PII in their possession; and
h. Current and future costs in terms of time, effort and money that will be expended
to prevent, detect, contest, remediate and repair the impact of the Data Disclosure
for the remainder of the lives of Plaintiffs and Class Members.
CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS
60.
Plaintiffs bring this suit as a class action on behalf of themselves and on behalf of
all others similarly situated pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. This action satisfies
the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance and superiority requirements of
the provisions of Rule 23.
61.
62.
In the alternative to the Nationwide Class, and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(c)(5), Plaintiffs seek to represent the following state class only in the event that the
Court declines to certify the Nationwide Class above. Specifically, the state class consists of the
following:
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All current and former Haeco employees who currently reside in North
Carolina and whose PII was compromised as a result of the Data Disclosure.
63.
Numerosity. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). The members of the Class are so numerous
that joinder of all members is impractical. While the exact number of Class members is unknown
to Plaintiffs at this time, based on information and belief, it is estimated to be at or above 3,000.
The exact number is generally ascertainable by appropriate discovery as Haeco had knowledge of
the employees whose PII was in the data file it disclosed.
64.
Commonality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) and (b)(3). There are questions of law and
fact common to the Class, which predominate over any questions affecting only individual Class
members. These common questions of law and fact include, without limitation:
a. Whether and to what extent Defendants had a duty to protect the PII of Class
Members;
b. Whether Defendants failed to adequately safeguard the PII of Class Members;
c. Whether Defendants timely, adequately, and accurately informed Class Members
that their PII had been compromised;
d. Whether Defendants failed to implement and maintain reasonable security
procedures and practices appropriate to the nature and scope of the information
compromised in the Data Disclosure;
e. Whether Defendants engaged in unfair, unlawful, or deceptive practices by failing
to safeguard the PII of Class Members;
f. Whether Class Members are entitled to actual, damages, statutory damages, and/or
punitive damages as a result of Defendants wrongful conduct;
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i. Whether Plaintiffs and the members of the Classes are entitled to restitution as a
result of Defendants wrongful conduct; and,
j. Whether Class Members are entitled to injunctive relief to redress the imminent
and currently ongoing harm faced as a result of the Data Disclosure.
65.
Typicality. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Plaintiffs claims are typical of those of other
Class Members because Plaintiffs PII, like that of every other class member, was disclosed by
Haeco. Plaintiffs claims are typical of those of the other Class Members because, inter alia, all
Members of the Class were injured through the common misconduct described above and were
subject to Defendants unfair and unlawful conduct. Plaintiffs are advancing the same claims and
legal theories on behalf of themselves and all Class Members.
66.
adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class and Subclasses in that they have no
disabling conflicts of interest that would be antagonistic to those of the other members of the
Classes and Subclasses. Plaintiffs seek no relief that is antagonistic or adverse to the members of
the Classes and Subclasses and the infringement of the rights and the damages they have suffered
are typical of other Class members and of other Subclass members. Plaintiffs have retained counsel
experienced in complex consumer class action litigation, and Plaintiffs intend to prosecute this
action vigorously.
67.
appropriate method for fair and efficient adjudication of the claims involved. Class action
treatment is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy alleged herein; it will permit a large number of class members to prosecute their
common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the unnecessary
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duplication of evidence, effort and expense that hundreds of individual actions would require.
Class action treatment will permit the adjudication of relatively modest claims by certain class
members, who could not individually afford to litigate a complex claim against large corporate
defendants. Further, even for those class members who could afford to litigate such a claim, it
would still be economically impractical.
68.
The nature of this action and the nature of laws available to Plaintiffs and the Class
make the use of the class action device a particularly efficient and appropriate procedure to afford
relief to Plaintiffs and the Class for the wrongs alleged because Defendants would necessarily gain
an unconscionable advantage since they would be able to exploit and overwhelm the limited
resources of each individual Class member with superior financial and legal resources; the costs
of individual suits could unreasonably consume the amounts that would be recovered; proof of a
common course of conduct to which Plaintiffs were exposed is representative of that experienced
by the Class and will establish the right of each member of the Class to recover on the cause of
action alleged; and individual actions would create a risk of inconsistent results and would be
unnecessary and duplicative of this litigation.
69.
conduct, the consistent provisions of the relevant laws, and the ascertainable identities of Class
Members demonstrates that there would be no significant manageability problems with
prosecuting this lawsuit as a class action.
70.
properly secure the PII of Class Members, Defendants may continue to refuse to provide proper
19
notification to Class Members regarding the scope of the Data Disclosure, and Defendants may
continue to act unlawfully as set forth in this Complaint.
72.
Defendants have acted, or refused to act, on grounds that apply generally to the
Class, making final injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate to the Class as a whole.
Defendants acts and omissions are the direct and proximate cause of damage described more fully
elsewhere in this Complaint.
73.
Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed classes
and to modify, amend or remove proposed subclasses, before the Court determines whether
certification is appropriate and as the parties engage in discovery.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Negligence
(On Behalf of the Class)
74.
with certain PII, including their date of birth, mailing addresses and Social Security numbers.
76.
Plaintiffs and the Class Members entrusted their PII to Haeco on the premise and
Haeco had full knowledge of the sensitivity of the PII and the types of harm that
Plaintiffs and Class Members could and would suffer if the PII was wrongfully disclosed.
78.
protecting such information from being compromised, lost, stolen, misused, and/or disclosed to
unauthorized parties.
79.
Plaintiffs and the Class Members were the foreseeable victims of any inadequate
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Haecos own conduct created a foreseeable risk of harm to Plaintiffs and Class
Members. Haecos misconduct included, but was not limited to, its failure to take the steps and
opportunities to prevent the Data Disclosure as set forth herein. Haecos misconduct also included
its decision not to comply with industry standards for the safekeeping and encrypted authorized
disclosure of the PII of Plaintiffs and Class Members.
81.
Plaintiffs and the Class Members had no ability to protect their PII that was in
Haecos possession.
82.
Haeco was in a position to protect against the harm suffered by Plaintiffs and Class
Haeco had and continues to have a duty to timely disclose that the PII of Plaintiffs
and Class Members within its possession might have been compromised and precisely the types
of information that were compromised and when. Such timely notice was necessary to allow
Plaintiffs and the Class Members to take steps to prevent, mitigate and repair any identity theft and
the fraudulent use of their PII by third parties.
84.
Haeco had a duty to have proper procedures in place to prevent the unauthorized
Haeco has admitted that the PII of Plaintiffs and Class Members was wrongfully
Haeco, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached its duty to
Plaintiffs and Class Members by failing to exercise reasonable care in protecting and safeguarding
the PII of Plaintiffs and Class Members during the time the PII was within Haecos possession or
control.
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87.
Haeco improperly and inadequately safeguarded the PII of Plaintiffs and Class
Members in deviation of standard industry rules, regulations and practices at the time of the Data
Disclosure.
88.
Haeco failed to heed industry warnings and alerts issued by the IRS to provide
adequate safeguards to protect employees PII in the face of increased risk of a current phishing
email scheme being perpetrated.
89.
Haeco, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached its duty to
Plaintiffs and Class Members by failing to have appropriate procedures in place to detect and
prevent dissemination of its employees PII.
90.
Haeco, through its actions and/or omissions, unlawfully breached its duty to timely
and adequately disclose to Plaintiff and Class Members the existence, timing and scope of the Data
Disclosure.
91.
But for Haecos wrongful and negligent breach of duties owed to Plaintiffs and
Class Members, the PII of Plaintiffs and Class Members would not have been compromised.
92.
As a result of Haecos negligence, Plaintiffs and the Class Members have suffered
and will continue to suffer damages and injury including, but not limited to: out-of-pocket
expenses associated with addressing false tax returns filed; future out-of-pocket costs in
connection with preparing and filing tax returns; out-of-pocket expenses associated with procuring
robust identity protection and restoration services; increased risk of future identity theft and fraud,
and the costs associated therewith; and time spent monitoring, addressing and correcting the
current and future consequences of the Data Disclosure
22
Defendants invaded the right to privacy of Plaintiffs and Class Members by giving
the PII of Plaintiffs and Class Members to unauthorized and unknown third parties.
95.
allowing unknown third parties unauthorized access to the PII of Plaintiffs and Class Members.
96.
The intrusion was offensive and objectionable to Plaintiffs, Class Members and to
a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities in that the PII of Plaintiffs and Class Members was
disclosed without prior authorization.
97.
The intrusion was into a place or thing which was private and is entitled to be
private. Plaintiffs and Class Members disclosed their PII to Haeco as part of their employment,
but privately with an intention that the PII would be kept confidential and would be protected from
unauthorized disclosure. Plaintiffs and Class Members were reasonable to believe that such
information would be kept private and would not be disclosed without their authorization.
98.
As a proximate result of the above acts and omissions of Haeco, the PII of Plaintiffs
and Class Members was disclosed to and used by third parties without authorization, causing
Plaintiffs and Class Members to suffer damages.
99.
Unless and until enjoined, and restrained by order of this Court, Defendants
wrongful conduct will continue to cause great and irreparable injury to Plaintiffs and Class
Members in that the PII maintained by Haeco can be viewed, distributed and used by unauthorized
persons. Plaintiffs and Class Members have no adequate remedy at law for the injuries in that a
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judgment for monetary damages will not end the invasion of privacy for Plaintiffs and the Class.
100.
It is appropriate to apply North Carolina law to the nationwide class claims because
North Carolinas interest in this litigation exceeds that of any other state.
102.
Upon information and belief, the acts leading to the disclosure of employees PII occurred at a
Haeco facility in North Carolina. Based upon the foregoing, the policies, practices, acts and
omissions giving rise to this Action emanated from Haecos headquarters and facilities in North
Carolina.
103.
The conduct of Defendants alleged above constitutes an unfair and deceptive trade
105.
security measures to protect the PII of Plaintiffs and Class Members constitute unfair or deceptive
acts or practices the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA).
106.
employees Social Security numbers, without written consent, to a third party, which it had reason
to believe lacked a legitimate purpose for obtaining the Social Security numbers, in direct violation
of N.C.G.S. 75-62.
109.
Plaintiffs and Class Members have suffered ascertainable losses as a direct result
As a direct and proximate result of the injury caused by the unfair and deceptive
trade practices of the Defendants, Plaintiffs and Class Members are entitled to relief, including
actual and treble damages, under N.C.G.S. 75-1.1 and 75-16. Further, the unlawful acts and
omissions as set forth above were willful violations entitling Plaintiffs to attorneys fees, under
N.C.G.S. 75-16.1. Further, similarly situated members of the proposed classes are likewise
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entitled to remedies due to the injury they have suffered as a result of the unfair and deceptive
trade practices.
A.
For an Order certifying this action as a class action and appointing Plaintiffs and
the PII of the Class by implementing improved security procedures and measures;
C.
of the Class relating to the full nature and extent of the Data Disclosure and the disclosure of PII
to unauthorized persons;
D.
F.
For treble damages pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat 75-16 and for Plaintiffs costs
incurred; and,
G.
Such other and further relief as this court may deem just and proper.
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Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Jean Sutton Martin
JEAN SUTTON MARTIN
North Carolina Bar Number 25703
[email protected]
LAW OFFICE OF JEAN SUTTON
MARTIN PLLC
2018 Eastwood Road Suite 225
Wilmington, NC 28403
Telephone: (910) 292-6676
Facsimile: (888) 316-3489
Email:
/s/ John A. Yanchunis
JOHN A. YANCHUNIS*
Florida Bar No. 324681
[email protected]
MARCIO W. VALLADARES*
Florida Bar No. 986917
[email protected]
PATRICK A. BARTHLE II*
Florida Bar No. 99286
[email protected]
MORGAN & MORGAN
COMPLEX LITIGATION GROUP
201 N. Franklin Street, 7th Floor
Tampa, Florida 33602
Telephone: (813) 223-5505
Facsimile: (813) 223-5402
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and the Proposed Class
* Special Admission to be submitted
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