8 - Heirs of Enrique Tan Sr. V Pollescas G.R. No. 145568 November 17 2005
8 - Heirs of Enrique Tan Sr. V Pollescas G.R. No. 145568 November 17 2005
8 - Heirs of Enrique Tan Sr. V Pollescas G.R. No. 145568 November 17 2005
FIRST DIVISION
- versus Promulgated:
REYNALDA POLLESCAS,
Respondent. November 17, 2005
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
[1]
of the Decision
[2]
August 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48823. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board ordering petitioners to respect respondents possession and
cultivation of the land.
The Antecedents
[3]
Heirs) are co-owners of a coconut farmland (Land) located at Labo, Ozamis City with an area of 25,780
square meters.
[4]
Esteban Pollescas (Esteban) was the original tenant of the Land. Upon Estebans death in 1991,
his son Enrique Pollescas (Enrique) succeeded him and was appointed as tenant by the landowner
Enrique Tan (Tan).
[5]
[6]
In its Decision dated 28 April 1993, the DARAB-Ozamis declared Reynalda as the lawful tenant of
the Land. The DARAB-Ozamis apportioned the harvests between the Tan Heirs and Reynalda based on
the customary sharing system which is 2/3 to the landowner and 1/3 to the tenant.
[7]
On the following harvest dates, 11 and 19 of June, 9 September, 6 and 13 of December 1993,
Reynalda failed to deliver to the Tan Heirs 2/3 of the harvests amounting toP3,656.70. The Tan Heirs
demanded Reynalda to pay such amount.
[8]
Consequently, the Tan Heirs filed a complaint for estafa against Reynalda with the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Ozamis City, Branch 2.
[9]
[10]
and sentenced
her to five months of arresto mayor maximum to two years of prisioncorreccional minimum and ordered
her to pay the Tan HeirsP3,656.70, the amount which she misappropriated.
[11]
Subsequently, for Reynaldas continued failure to deliver their share, the Tan Heirs filed with the
DARAB, Misamis Occidental (DARAB-Misamis Occidental) an ejectment case.
[13]
[12]
The MARO of Ozamis City is likewise ordered to investigate and verify in the
subject landholding if there are actual farmer-cultivators in the area who may qualify as
lessees thereof, who then should be placed under leasehold pursuant to the mandate of
Section 12, R.A. 6657.
SO ORDERED.
[14]
Aggrieved by the decision, Reynalda appealed to the DARAB, Diliman, Quezon City (DARAB).
The DARAB reversed the decision of the DARAB-Misamis Occidental, to wit:
SO ORDERED.
[15]
The Tan Heirs appealed the decision of the DARAB to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the DARAB ordering the Tan Heirs to respect Reynaldas possession and
cultivation of the Land.
In affirming the decision of the DARAB, the Court of Appeals cited Roxas y Cia v. Cabatuando, et
al.
[16]
where this Court held that x xx mere failure of a tenant to pay the landholders share does not
necessarily give the latter the right to eject the former when there is lack of deliberate intent on the part of
the tenant to pay x xx.
The Court of Appeals held that Reynaldas failure to deliver the full amount of the Tan Heirs share could
not be considered as a willful and deliberate intent to deprive the Tan Heirs of their share. The Court of
Appeals held that Reynalda honestly believed that she was entitled to a share of the harvests in 19921993 while the case for Annulment of Compromise Agreement was pending before the DARAB-Ozamis.
Reynalda also believed that she could effect a set-off for her 1992-1993 share from the 1994 share of the
Tan Heirs.
The Court of Appeals further declared that the rental must be legal to consider non-payment of such as a
ground for ejectment. The appellate court stated that:
x xx for a tenants failure to pay rental to come within the intendment of the law as
a ground for ejectment, it is imperative that the rental must be legal. What the law
contemplates is the deliberate failure of the tenant to pay the legal rental, not the failure
to pay an illegal rental. A stipulation in a leasehold contract requiring a lessee to pay an
amount in excess of the amount allowed by law is considered contrary to law, morals or
public policy. Such contract is null and void as to the excess.
It is noteworthy that Section 34 of RA 3844 provides that the consideration for the lease
of riceland and lands devoted to other crops shall not be more than the equivalent of
twenty-five per centum of the average normal harvest. The tenant is obliged to pay a
maximum of 25% of the normal harvest and not two thirds as in the case at bar. Thus,
even admitting that a set-off was effected in favor of respondent for her 1992-1993 share,
[17]
yet enough is left to cover the 25% share of the petitioners for the 1994 crop.
Citing Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3844 (RA 3844), the Court of Appeals also held [t]here is nothing in
the
law
that
agreement.
[18]
makes
failure
to
deliver
share
ground
for
extinguishment
of
leasehold
Reynaldas failure to deliver fully the share of the Tan Heirs is not sufficient to disturb the
[19]
The Issues
I
WHETHER THERE IS NO EXCEPTION TO THE GROUNDS FOR EXTINGUISHMENT
OF LEASEHOLD RELATION UNDER SECTION 8 OF RA 3844.
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RULED THAT REYNALDA IS
OBLIGED TO PAY ONLY 1/4 OR 25% OF THE NORMAL HARVEST AND NOT 2/3
WHEN THE SUBJECT LAND WAS NOT YET PLACED UNDER THE LEASEHOLD
[20]
SYSTEM PURSUANT TO SECTION 12 OF RA 6657.
At the outset, the Court declares that RA 6657 is the governing statute in this case.
[22]
[21]
Act No. 6389 (RA 6389) amending RA 3844 (RA 3844 as amended) declared share tenancy relationships
as contrary to public policy.
[23]
[25]
[24]
and RA 3844
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (RA 6657) took effect on 15 June 1988. RA 6657 only
expressly repealed Section 35 of RA 3844 as amended.
[26]
case. The harvests in dispute are for the years 1992-1993 or after the effectivity of RA 6657.
Section 7 of RA 3844 as amended provides that once there is a leasehold relationship, as in the
present case, the landowner cannot eject the agricultural tenant from the land unless authorized by the
court for causes provided by law.
[27]
[28]
Section 36 of RA 3844 as amended enumerates the grounds for dispossession of the tenants
landholding, to wit:
SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.Notwithstanding any
agreement as to the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall
continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his
dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory
if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon recommendation of
the National Planning Commission to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or
some other urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to
disturbance compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross harvests on
his landholding during the last five preceding calendar years;
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms
and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is
caused by fortuitous event or force majeure;
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose
other than what had been previously agreed upon;
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined
under paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine;
(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially
damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence
of the agricultural lessee;
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls
due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the
extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall
not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that
particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of
paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven.
In the instant case, the Tan Heirs seek Reynaldas ejectment from the Land on the ground of nonpayment of lease rental.
The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that for non-payment of the lease rental to be a valid
ground to dispossess the agricultural lessee of the landholding, the amount of the lease rental must first
of all be lawful. If the amount of lease rental claimed exceeds the limit allowed by law, non-payment of
lease rental cannot be a ground to dispossess the agricultural lessee of the landholding.
[29]
normal harvest shall constitute the just and fair rental for leasehold. In this case, the Tan Heirs demanded
Reynalda to deliver 2/3 of the harvest as lease rental, which clearly exceeded the 25% maximum amount
prescribed by law. Therefore, the Tan Heirs cannot validly dispossess Reynalda of the landholding for
non-payment of rental precisely because the lease rental claimed by the Tan Heirs is unlawful.
Even assuming Reynalda agreed to deliver 2/3 of the harvest as lease rental, Reynalda is not
obliged to pay such lease rental for being unlawful. There is no legal basis to demand payment of such
unlawful lease rental. The courts will not enforce payment of a lease rental that violates the law. There
was no validly fixed lease rental demandable at the time of the harvests. Thus, Reynalda was never in
default.
Reynalda and the Tan Heirs failed to agree on a lawful lease rental. Accordingly, the DAR must
first fix the provisional lease rental payable by Reynalda to the Tan Heirs pursuant to the second
paragraph of Section 34 of RA 3844 as amended.
[30]
Reynalda cannot be in default in the payment of lease rental since such amount is not yet determined.
There can be no delay in the payment of an undetermined lease rental because it is impossible to pay an
undetermined amount. That Reynalda is not yet in default in the payment of the lease rental is a basic
reason why she cannot be lawfully ejected from the Land for non-payment of rental.
[31]
The Court also holds that there is no ground for the extinguishment of leasehold relation in this
case.
Only in the instances stated in Sections 8 and 28 of RA 3844 as amended can leasehold relation
be terminated. These provisions read:
(2)
Voluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee,
written notice of which shall be served three months in advance; or
(3)
Absence of the persons under Section nine to succeed to the lessee,
in the event of death or permanent incapacity of the lessee.
(1)
Cruel, inhuman or offensive treatment of the agricultural lessee or
any member of his immediate farm household by the agricultural lessor or his
representative with the knowledge and consent of the lessor;
(2)
Non-compliance on the part of the agricultural lessor with any of the
obligations imposed upon him by the provisions of this Code or by his contract with the
agricultural lessee;
(3)
Compulsion of the agricultural lessee or any member of his
immediate farm household by the agricultural lessor to do any work or render any service
not in any way connected with farm work or even without compulsion if no compensation
is paid;
(4)
Commission of a crime by the agricultural lessor or his
representative against the agricultural lessee or any member of his immediate farm
household; or
(5)
Voluntary surrender due to circumstances more advantageous to
him and his family.
The case of Garchitorena v. Panganiban which the Tan Heirs invoked to justify the
extinguishment of leasehold relation does not appear on page 339 of Volume 8 of the Supreme Court
Reports Annotated. What is printed on such page is the case of Republic v. Perez with docket number L16112 and promulgated on 29 June 1963. For making a wrong citation, the Court admonishes Atty. Jesus
S. Anonat, counsel for the Tan Heirs, to be more careful when citing jurisprudence. The Court reminds
him of his duty not to knowingly misquote the text of a decision or authority
[32]
lest he be guilty of
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the assailed Decision dated 31 August 2000
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48823. The CourtREMANDS this case to the Department of
Agrarian Reform for the determination of the provisional lease rental. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Courts Division.
[1]
continue in force and effect until a fixed rental is finally determined. The court shall determine the
fixed rental within thirty days after the petition is submitted for decision.
See Mon v. Court of Appeals, supra note 22.
See Belmonte v. Marin, 76 Phil. 198 (1946), where the Court ruled that the lessee was not in default,
and thus could not be ejected for failure to pay a rental amount that exceeded what had been agreed
upon by the lessee and lessor.
[32]
Rule 10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
[31]
Rule 10.02. A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the
language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly
cite as a law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a
fact that which has not been proved.
See Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees Association NATU, et al. v. Insular Life Assurance Co.,
Ltd., et al., 147 Phil. 194 (1971).