Crawford v. Addison, 10th Cir. (2013)

FILED
United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 22, 2013

TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
MICHAEL SANTANA CRAWFORD,

Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
No. 12-5215
(N.D. of Okla.)
MICHAEL ADDISON, Warden,
(D.C. No. 4:09-CV-00236-JHP-FHM)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, EBEL, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Michael Santana Crawford, an Oklahoma state prisoner, requests a

certificate of appealability (COA) under 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(1)(A) to appeal the
district courts denial of federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254. We
construe Crawfords filings liberally because he is proceeding pro se. See Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1991). Exercising jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and 2253(a), we deny his request and dismiss the appeal.
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I. Background
Two patrol cars tried to stop a suspicious vehicle at a Flying J Truck Stop
in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Instead of stopping, the car sped away, ultimately running a
red light, traversing into the wrong side of the road, and crashing into a pickup
truck. A man, later identified as Crawford, then exited the drivers side of the car
and fled the scene on foot. The officers gave chase and subdued him. Crawfords
passenger, Rebecca Camp, died from injuries sustained in the accident.
At an Oklahoma state trial in 2006, a jury convicted Crawford of seconddegree murder in commission of a felony, eluding an officer, leaving the scene of
a personal injury accident, and driving under suspension. The jury recommended
a life sentence plus thirty-six years for all four counts. The trial judge sentenced
Crawford to life plus twenty-six years, with one year (for driving under
suspension) to run concurrently with the rest.
Crawford retained new counsel and appealed his conviction to the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA). The OCCA affirmed his
conviction and sentence. Then, proceeding pro se, Crawford filed an application
for post-conviction relief in the state district court. The state district court denied
the application, and Crawford appealed to the OCCA, which affirmed the denial.
On April 17, 2009, Crawford filed his federal petition for habeas corpus
relief. He raised twelve grounds for error, all of which he also had raised in state
court. The district court denied habeas relief. In a twenty-three-page opinion, it
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concluded that no ground justified relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The district
court also denied Crawfords request for a COA.
Crawford now asks us to grant a COA. We decline to do so for the
following reasons.
II. Analysis
We grant a COA only if an applicant makes a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. 2253(c)(2). An applicant must
show that reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have
been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further. United States v. Taylor, 454 F.3d
1075, 1078 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Crawford re-raises the same twelve grounds for relief that he raised in the
district court. Additionally, in the opening portions of his brief, he suggests the
officers who testified against him had a pecuniary interest to do so, Petrs Br.
at 5, though Crawford cites no evidence in support, nor does he explain how they
had money to gain from testifying against him. Although we construe his pro se
filings liberally, we do not assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant.
Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. Thus, even if we could construe his pleadings to raise a
possible thirteenth ground for relief, we decline to scour the record for factual
support, and we proceed to review each of Crawfords twelve other grounds.
-3-
On Ground 1, Crawford says the trial court erred by admitting his hospitalbed-side confession that he was the driver. He argues that he was in custody
when questioned at the hospital, and he claims that, in any event, his confession
was coerced. But no reasonable jurist could debate whether the district court
should have granted relief on this ground, because on this record, even if it were
error to admit the confession, Crawford would not be entitled to federal habeas
relief. As the district court summarized below for the parties, the record contains
sufficient evidenceeven without Crawfords confessionfor a jury to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that Crawford was the driver. And whether Crawford
was the driver (as opposed to merely a passenger) was the only relevant dispute at
trial. Therefore, this ground for relief cannot succeed.
On Grounds 2, 3, 5, and 11, Crawford disputes how the state court applied
state law. But it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine statecourt determinations on state-law questions. In conducting habeas review, a
federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 6768
(1991) (emphasis added). No reasonable jurist could debate the district courts
refusal to review these grounds for federal habeas relief.
On Ground 4, Crawford raises an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC)
claim. He says his trial counsel erred by failing to raise Crawfords competency
to stand trial. To succeed on this claim, Crawford must demonstrate that it was
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necessarily unreasonable for the [OCCA] to conclude: (1) that he had not
overcome the strong presumption of competence; and (2) that he had failed to
undermine confidence in the jurys [verdict] . . . . Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.
Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011). In his brief, Crawford presents several quotations from
doctors saying he hallucinates. He also notes the testimony at trial that, when he
was questioned by a police officer after the crash, he was at times hallucinating.
But he cites no evidence that he was acting this way at trial or that he was
otherwise unable to assist his counsel during the trial. His evidence is
insufficient to satisfy either prong of his IAC claim, especially in light of federal
habeass doubly deferential review. Id. The district courts denial of relief
on this ground is not debatable.
On Grounds 6 and 7, Crawford complains he was denied a fair trial by
prosecutorial misconduct. Habeas relief is available for prosecutorial
misconduct only when the misconduct is so egregious that it renders the entire
trial fundamentally unfair. Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610, 618 (10th Cir.
1998). As with Ground 1, the evidence of Crawfords guilt was overwhelming.
We also note that none of the purported misconduct appears particularly
egregious. In fact, as the district court pointed out, several allegations do not
appear to be misconduct at all. Certainly, in light of the evidence, none was so
egregious as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, we cannot
say that a reasonable jurist would debate the denial of relief for Grounds 6 and 7.
-5-
Ground 8 is an IAC claim for trial counsels failure to object to the alleged
prosecutorial misconduct. But because Crawfords trial was not rendered
fundamentally unfair by the prosecutors behavior, Crawford cannot show, as he
must, that his counsels failure to object would have led to a different verdict.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (holding that, to prevail
on an IAC claim, a petitioner must show that the outcome of their trial would
have been different but for their counsels error). So the district courts denial of
relief for Ground 8 cannot be debated, either.
On Ground 9, Crawford argues the trial court erred when it refused to
provide the jury with an instruction on the meaning of reasonable doubt. But
so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendants guilt
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . the Constitution does not require that
any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the governments
burden of proof. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (citation omitted).
And Crawford does not dispute that the trial court did in fact instruct the jury to
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This ground for relief cannot succeed.
On Ground 12, Crawford complains he was denied a fair trial when the trial
court refused to issue a lesser included offense instruction on negligent homicide.
But [o]ur precedents establish a rule of automatic non-reviewability for claims
based on a state courts failure, in a non-capital case, to give a lesser included
offense instruction. Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir. 2004). As a
-6-
result, Crawford cannot raise a debatable claim that he is entitled to habeas relief
on this ground, either.
Finally, on Ground 10, Crawford claims that the cumulative effect of the
alleged errors entitles him to a sentence reduction. But none of the alleged errors,
aside from admitting his confession, calls into question the evidence showing
Crawford drove the vehicle that killed Rebecca Camp, which, as we explained
above, was sufficient for the jury to find Crawford guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt even without his confession.
To the extent Crawford also requests a reduction in his sentence, no
reasonable jurist could debate the district courts decision to deny the request.
We afford wide discretion to the state trial courts sentencing decision, and
challenges to that decision are not generally constitutionally cognizable, unless it
is shown the sentence imposed is outside the statutory limits or unauthorized by
law. Dennis v. Poppel, 222 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 2000). Because
Crawford had been previously convicted of more than two felonies, he was
subject to as much as life in prison for two of his convictions. See Okla. Stat. tit.
21, 51.1(B), (C). Thus, his effective sentence of life plus twenty-five years is
within the statutory range, and we will not disturb it.
-7-
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we DENY Crawfords application for a COA and DISMISS
the appeal.
Entered for the Court,
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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FILED

United States Court of Appeals

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS May 22, 2013

MICHAEL SANTANA CRAWFORD,

MICHAEL ADDISON, Warden,

(D.C. No. 4:09-CV-00236-JHP-FHM)

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *

Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, EBEL, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.

Michael Santana Crawford, an Oklahoma state prisoner, requests a

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