170 F.

3d 1032
1999 CJ C.A.R. 2990

AMERADA HESS CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 97-5223.

United States Court of Appeals,

Tenth Circuit.
March 25, 1999.

Jerry E. Rothrock of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P.,

Washington, D.C. (Patrick D. O'Connor of Moyers, Martin, Santee, Imel
& Tetrick, Tulsa Oklahoma and David M. Castro, Amerada Hess
Corporation, Houston, Texas with him on the briefs) for the PlaintiffAppellant.
Robert L. Klarquist, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Lois J.
Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen Lewis, United States
Attorney, and Phil Pinnell, Assistant United States Attorney, Tulsa,
Oklahoma; David C. Shilton, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.;
and Geoffrey Heath, Office of the Solicitor, Department of Interior,
Washington, D.C., with him on the briefs) for the Defendant-Appellee.
Before TACHA, McWILLIAMS and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
LUCERO, Circuit Judge.

In this case, we are asked primarily to determine whether reimbursements for

certain production-related costs, received by a federal gas lessee from its gas
purchasers under an administrative order of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC"), are properly subjected to federal royalties by the
Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") under the authority of the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA"), 43 U.S.C. 1331-1356. We are also
required to resolve whether the Secretary's claims may be offset by the lessee's
own claims for reimbursement from the Secretary. Finally, we must determine
whether either set of claims is barred under the applicable statute of limitations.

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, we affirm the district court's

holding that the Department of the Interior ("DOI") is entitled to royalties on
cost reimbursements received by Amerada Hess Corporation ("AHC"). Finding
lack of jurisdiction, we vacate the district court's rulings on AHC's claims for
offsetting royalty overpayments against the royalties owed DOI.
2

* The case grows out of two separate administrative proceedings before DOI.
The first, finalized in an agency decision of December 13, 1993, determined
that AHC, a lessee of continental shelf oil and gas deposits owned by the
United States, was time-barred from claiming reimbursement from the
Secretary for a royalty over-payment of $683,333. Under OCSLA, which
authorizes the Secretary to lease continental shelf oil and gas reserves, 43
U.S.C. 1337, the Secretary is entitled to royalties on the "amount or value of
the production saved, removed, or sold" by a lessee, id. at 1337(a)(1)(A). If
the Secretary determines that a lessee has paid excessive royalties, the lessee is
entitled to reimbursement without interest "if a request for repayment of such
excess is filed with the Secretary within two years after the making of the
payment." Id. at 1339(a). In this case, AHC applied for reimbursement nearly
six years after the alleged over-payment was made. The Secretary denied the
request, citing the two year statute of limitations.

A second administrative determination, dated December 1, 1995, requires AHC

to pay DOI $1,022,669.52 in additional royalties on some sixteen offshore
leases. The DOI based this determination on a series of administrative orders
that FERC issued under the price-setting authority of the Natural Gas Policy
Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. 3320(a)(2).1 FERC regulations stipulate that sale
prices may always include "production-related" costs, defined as "costs, other
than production costs, that are incurred ... to deliver, compress, treat, liquefy, or
condition natural gas." 18 C.F.R. 271.1104(a) & 271.1104(c)(7)(i). To
implement these regulations, FERC issued a number of administrative orders
establishing generic cost allowances for gathering and compression costs. See
Order 94-A, 48 Fed.Reg. 5152, 5180 (Feb. 3, 1983). The Fifth Circuit upheld
these orders, see Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. FERC, 769 F.2d 1053
(5th Cir.1985), thereby allowing numerous gas producers, including AHC, to
receive large lump-sum reimbursements from their purchasers. It is these socalled "Order 94 reimbursements" that DOI found royalty-bearing under
OCSLA, 43 U.S.C. 1337(a)(1)(A).

AHC claims this latter determination is arbitrary and capricious, unsupported

by substantial evidence, and in excess of statutory authority. The company also
insists 28 U.S.C. 2415(a) bars DOI's claim for royalty payments on the Order
94 reimbursements.2 Finally, AHC contends that it is entitled to offset its

obligations to DOI against royalty over-payments on other leases ("cross-lease

netting"). In its December 1, 1995, decision, DOI rejected all these claims. The
district court affirmed DOI and granted summary judgment against AHC on all
its claims, and the company appeals.
II
5

* AHC's amended complaint, filed in the district court, asserts jurisdiction

under OCSLA's citizen suit provisions, see 43 U.S.C. 1349(a), as well as
under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), see 5 U.S.C. 704. Section
1349(a)(1) states that:

6 person having a valid legal interest which is or may be adversely affected may
any
commence a civil action on his own behalf to compel compliance with this
subchapter against any person, including the United States, and any other
government instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh
amendment to the Constitution) for any alleged violation of any provision of this
subchapter or any regulation promulgated under this subchapter, or of the terms of
any permit or lease issued by the Secretary under this subchapter.
7

43 U.S.C. 1349(a)(1). 3 The government counters, first, that this citizen suit
provision cannot support an action challenging a decision of the Secretary
rendered in fulfillment of his duties under the Act, and second, that even were
jurisdiction to lie under 43 U.S.C. 1349(a), judicial review should nonetheless
proceed in accordance with APA standards and procedures.

We agree with the government's contention that this suit cannot be brought
under 43 U.S.C. 1349(a)(1). In closely analogous circumstances, the Fifth
Circuit has refused to exercise jurisdiction under this provision. See OXY USA,
Inc., v. Babbitt, 122 F.3d 251, 258 (5th Cir.1997). OXY holds that the citizen
suit provision is not available to challenge agency decisions that "were or will
be otherwise subject to judicial review under the APA." Id. Any other
interpretation of the citizen suit provision would implicitly repeal the APA with
respect to such agency decisions--contrary to the well-established canon of
statutory construction against repeals by implication. See id. (citing Watt v.
Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267, 101 S.Ct. 1673, 68 L.Ed.2d 80 (1981); 1A Norman
J. Singer, Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction 23.09, at 338
(5th ed.1993)). In addition, the Supreme Court has recently refused to construe
the Endangered Species Act's citizen suit provision, 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(1)(A),
as an "alternative avenue for judicial review of the Secretary's implementation
of the statute" because such an interpretation "would effect a wholesale
abrogation of the APA's 'final agency action' requirement." Bennett v. Spear,

520 U.S. 154, 174, 117 S.Ct. 1154, 1166-67, 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997).4
Although there is no dispute that "final agency action" has occurred in this case,
appellant's construal of 43 U.S.C. 1349(a)(1) would abrogate the APA in
precisely such fashion. Like the Supreme Court and the Fifth Circuit, we refuse
to adopt such an implausible interpretation. Consequently, we conform our
review to APA standards and the available administrative record.
B
9

Furthermore, we are without jurisdiction to consider appellant's claims that the

Secretary has erroneously refused to repay or refund AHC's various royalty
overpayments. Under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1491, an action against the
United States, for monetary relief in excess of $10,000, and founded upon the
Constitution, federal statute, executive regulation, or government contract, must
be brought in the Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(1). AHC's
claims for repayments proceed from at least one of these enumerated sources of
law, and are intended to obtain more than the minimum amount of monetary
relief required for Court of Claims jurisdiction under the Tucker Act. Exclusive
jurisdiction over these claims thus lies in the Court of Claims. See Diamond
Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159, 1168 (5th Cir.1988)
(finding exclusive jurisdiction of Court of Claims to hear refund request from
oil and gas producer-lessee that had paid royalties to DOI under OCSLA); see
also National Ass'n. of Counties v. Baker, 842 F.2d 369, 376 & n. 5
(D.C.Cir.1988) (characterizing 43 U.S.C. 1339(a) as "compensation
mandating" and therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims when other provisions of the Tucker Act have been met).

10

Both parties argue that the Court of Claims does not have exclusive jurisdiction
over AHC's refund claims because AHC seeks declaratory judgments
concerning its rights to refunds under OCLSA. Accordingly, the parties contend
the district court had jurisdiction to hear all of AHC's claims under the APA,
which provides concurrent jurisdiction to "court[s] of the United States" where
an action seeks "relief other than money damages." 5 U.S.C. 702. This
argument, which asks us to place the form of a complaint over the substance of
its claims, is unavailing.5 "[I]f the plaintiff's 'prime objective' or 'essential
purpose' is to recover money (in an amount in excess of $10,000) from the
federal government, then the Court of Federal Claims' exclusive jurisdiction is
triggered." Burkins v. United States, 112 F.3d 444, 449 (10th Cir.1997)
(citations omitted); see also Amoco Production Co. v. Hodel, 815 F.2d 352, 361
(5th Cir.1987) (citation omitted) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over
OCSLA claim, and stating that "in the 'murky' area of Tucker Act
jurisprudence, one of the few established principles is that the substance of the

pleadings must prevail over their form"). Therefore, this court does not--and the
district court did not--have jurisdiction over AHC's claims arising from DOI's
refusal to refund AHC's excess royalty payments.6
III
11

As to appellant's claim that 28 U.S.C. 2415(a) bars DOI's claim for additional
royalties, the government asserts that this provision does not apply to a claim
for unpaid royalties owed the government under the terms of a lease. We do not
decide the merits of this assertion, however, because, even were we to assume
that 2415(a) did apply, it would not bar the claims made by the Secretary.

12

Section 2415(a) allows the government to bring an "action for money damages"
so long as "the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action
accrues or within one year after final decisions have been rendered in
applicable administrative proceedings." 28 U.S.C. 2415(a). On July 1, 1986,
DOI first ordered AHC to pay royalties on its Order 94 reimbursements. This
order was issued within six years of the July 25, 1980, start date of AHC's
production of natural gas from oil and gas leases covering submerged lands
under OCSLA. According to AHC, royalties on gas sold were due no later than
the end of the month following production. Consequently, DOI made its
demands for royalty payment on the Order 94 reimbursements within six years
of the earliest possible date of accrual.

13

Appellant counters that DOI did not file a counterclaim in district court until
January 6, 1995, well beyond the applicable six-year period. This assumes that
the July 1, 1986, order is not itself a "complaint" in "an action for money
damages" within the meaning of 2415(a). If that assumption is correct,
however, then 2415(a) cannot apply in this case at all because, under the
plain terms of appellant's reading of the statute, 2415(a) only applies to bar
actions based on the filing of a formal complaint. Section 2415(a), therefore,
simply will not apply to the July 1, 1986, order. Yet that order is the entire
basis for the government's action in this case; all that has happened since DOI
issued the order are AHC's administrative and judicial appeals of that decision.

14

It is the district court's refusal to find the order violative of the APA, rather
than its adjudication of the merits of any complaint for money damages filed by
the government, that leaves appellant owing the ordered royalties to the
government. If the order is not tantamount to a complaint for money damages,
then the government did not need to file a complaint until the final
administrative action to establish appellant's obligation. Here, the government
filed its counterclaim before the final agency action on December 1, 1995.

Consequently, operation of the limitations period in 2415(a) cannot

undermine the determination that appellant owes unpaid royalties on the Order
94 reimbursements.
IV
15

Finally, we address appellant's substantive complaint that the Secretary's

demand for royalties on Order 94 reimbursements is arbitrary and capricious,
not supported by substantial evidence, and is otherwise not in accordance with
law. As a preliminary matter, we adopt the Fifth Circuit's holding, based on
DOI's longstanding interpretation of its own regulations, that Order 94
reimbursements are royalty bearing. See Mesa Operating Limited Partnership
v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 931 F.2d 318, 323-26 (5th Cir.1991).

16

In response to the Secretary's order for royalties, AHC originally argued that its
Order 94 reimbursements were for post-production delivery services that were
appropriately excluded from the royalty base under the agency's own
regulations. DOI's Board of Land Appeals ("IBLA") rejected this claim in a
ruling issued August 3, 1993. See Appellant's App. at 553. In that same
decision, however, IBLA remanded for a determination of whether AHC could
substantiate its claim that certain Order 94 reimbursements were for
transportation purposes and hence not royalty-bearing. See id. at 555. The
December 1, 1995, decision by the Secretary, which serves as the final agency
action in this case, determined that the company had failed to prove that any of
the Order 94 reimbursements were exempt from royalties on this basis. See
Appellant's App. at 994, 998-1012.

17

AHC offers three arguments against the agency's conclusion. First, AHC argues
that the agency depends on a reading of the "marketable condition" rule that
DOI itself rejected in Xeno, Inc., 134 IBLA 172 (1995). During the period in
dispute, the marketable condition rule required lessees to "put into marketable
condition, if commercially feasible, all products produced from the leased land.
In calculating the royalty payment, the lessee may not deduct the costs of
treatment." 30 C.F.R. 250.42.7 A related regulation promulgated during this
period, the "gross proceeds rule," provided that "[u]nder no circumstances shall
the value of production be less than the gross proceeds accruing to the lessee."
30 C.F.R. 206.150.8 In Xeno, DOI found that the producer company's gas was
marketable directly at the wellhead. Therefore, all subsequent gathering costs
were post-production and non-royalty-bearing, and were not part of the value of
production and fell outside the terms of the marketable condition and gross
proceeds rules. See Xeno, 134 IBLA at 183-84. AHC argues that its Order 94
reimbursements, like those received by Xeno, are not subject to royalty

payments. We agree with the district court, however, that Xeno reached a
different result because the producer company in that case showed that its gas
was in marketable condition and could be sold directly from the wellhead.
AHC has made no such showing here, and therefore cannot benefit from DOI's
ruling in Xeno.
18

Second, AHC argues that it is entitled to offsets for the cost of transporting the
gas from the wellheads. AHC never proved that its Order 94 reimbursements
were for transportation. It simply argued that all of its gas movement costs
were transportation costs rather than gathering costs covered by the marketable
condition or gross proceeds rules. Because AHC did not meet its burden at the
administrative level, we cannot say that DOI's ruling was arbitrary or
capricious.

19

Third, AHC claims that a similarly situated lessee, Marathon, has been granted
a transportation allowance for its Order 94 reimbursements that exempt it from
paying royalties for the same services that AHC performed and for which AHC
was denied allowance. AHC's comparison to DOI's compromise and settlement
with Marathon is not relevant here because Marathon was allowed its
transportation deductions pursuant to a settlement rather than to DOI's
interpretation of its regulations. Accordingly, we hold that DOI properly
determined that AHC is obligated to pay royalties on the Order 94
reimbursements under its well-established regulations.

V
20

Because the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear AHC's claims for
excess royalty payment, we VACATE that part of its judgment; in all other
matters, we AFFIRM the district court.

Section 3320(a)(2) has since been repealed. See Pub.L. 101-60, 2(b) 103 Stat.
158 (July 26, 1989). At all times relevant to this appeal, however, it provided
that:
a price for the first sale of natural gas shall not be considered to exceed the
maximum lawful price ... if such sale price exceeds the maximum lawful price
to the extent necessary to recover ... any costs of compressing, gathering,
processing, treating, liquefying, or transporting such natural gas, or other
similar costs, borne by the seller and allowed for, by rule or order, by [FERC].
15 U.S.C. 3320(a)(2).

"Every action for money damages brought by the United States ... which is
founded upon any contract ... shall be barred unless the complaint is filed
within six years after the right of action accrues or within one year after final
decisions have been rendered in applicable administrative proceedings required
by contract or by law, whichever is later...." 28 U.S.C. 2415(a)

OCSLA defines "person" to include "a private, public, or municipal

corporation." 43 U.S.C. 1331(d)

Like 43 U.S.C. 1349(a)(1), the Endangered Species Act's citizen suit

provision allows for the commencement of a civil suit to enjoin any person,
"including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or
agency ... who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter or
regulation issued under the authority thereof." 16 U.S.C. 1540(g)(1)(A)

It is irrelevant that AHC presents its prayer for relief in equitable language,
because 702 distinguishes between "specific relief and substitute relief, not
between equitable and nonequitable categories of remedies." Department of
Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., --- U.S. ----, ----, 119 S.Ct. 687, 691, 142 L.Ed.2d 718
(1999). In distinguishing between these two types of remedies, the Court has
explained that "[d]amages are given to the plaintiff to substitute for a suffered
loss, whereas specific remedies 'are not substitute remedies at all, but attempt to
give the plaintiff the very thing to which he is entitled.' " Bowen v.
Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 895, 108 S.Ct. 2722, 101 L.Ed.2d 749 (1988)
(quoting Maryland Dep't. of Human Resources v. Dep't. of Health and Human
Services, 763 F.2d 1441, 1446 (D.C.Cir.1985)). AHC's claims might appear to
be for specific relief, insofar as AHC requests a monetary award representing
royalty overpayments that the government has refused to refund. Traditionally,
however, "a suit seeking to recover a past due sum of money that does no more
than compensate a plaintiff's loss is a suit for damages, not specific relief."
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 918, 108 S.Ct. 2722 (Scalia, J., dissenting)

AHC raises 28 U.S.C. 2406 to support the merits of its claim for offsets.
Implicit in AHC's reliance on this statute is an argument that the government
has waived sovereign immunity for AHC's claims for credits. Section 2406,
however, waives sovereign immunity for such claims only in "an action by the
United States," and not, as here, where the person seeking credit against the
government files suit in district court

The marketable condition rule has remained in effect after 1988 in 30 C.F.R.
206.152(i) and 206.153(i)

The gross proceeds requirement has remained in effect after 1988 as 30 C.F.R.
206.152(h) and 206.153(h)