Daniel R. Dalton v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 104 F.3d 367, 10th Cir. (1996)
Daniel R. Dalton v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 104 F.3d 367, 10th Cir. (1996)
Daniel R. Dalton v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 104 F.3d 367, 10th Cir. (1996)
3d 367
97 CJ C.A.R. 17
NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished opinions remains unfavored,
unpublished opinions may now be cited if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue, and a copy is attached to the citing document or, if cited in oral
argument, copies are furnished to the Court and all parties. See General Order of
November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir. Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or
further order.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without
oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Claimant Daniel R. Dalton appeals from the district court's order adopting the
recommendation of the magistrate judge affirming the Secretary of Health and
Human Services' denial of his application for Social Security disability
insurance benefits.1 Claimant, a thirty-five year old man with a high school
education has worked in the past as a roustabout, construction laborer, and
welder. He alleges disability from November 22, 1991, due to a back injury and
several back surgeries.
An individual is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act only if
his impairments are so severe that he "is not only unable to do his previous
work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage
in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national
economy." 42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A). If a claimant meets his burden of proving
that he cannot return to his past work, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show
that the claimant can perform other jobs in the national economy. Ray v.
Bowen, 865 F.2d 222, 224 (10th Cir.1989). Here, the administrative law judge
denied benefits at step five of the five-step evaluation process applied for
determining disability, see Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th
Cir.1988)(discussing the five steps in detail), finding that although claimant
could not return to his past work, he had the residual functional capacity to
perform other jobs existing in the national economy.
On appeal, claimant argues that (1) the ALJ did not properly evaluate his
subjective complaints of pain; (2) the ALJ did not make the requisite specific
findings regarding claimant's credibility; and (3) the ALJ failed to include the
limitations of headaches, limited motion, arm weakness, and pain in his
hypothetical question to the vocational expert. Claimant did not raise issues two
and three to the district court. Because our scope of review is limited to those
issues properly preserved and presented in the district court, issues two and
three are deemed waived. See Crow v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th
Therefore, the only issue properly before this court is claimant's contention that
the ALJ did not properly evaluate his subjective complaints of pain. Because
claimant presented medical evidence that he suffered a back injury requiring
four surgeries, a condition reasonably likely to produce pain, the ALJ was
required to evaluate whether claimant's pain was disabling by considering all
relevant factors. See Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 164 (10th Cir.1987).
Contrary to claimant's contention, the ALJ did not disregard claimant's
allegations of pain merely because there was no medical evidence to support
his claim that his pain was disabling.
The ALJ noted that following claimant's last surgery in March 1992, he made
steady improvement. R. Vol. II at 16. Dr. Bradley, claimant's treating
neurosurgeon, opined in April 1993, that although claimant required retraining,
he was not permanently disabled. Id. at 451. The ALJ also noted that after
December 1992, claimant did not return to Dr. Bradley for further treatment,
indicating that claimant was not experiencing further functional loss or
discomfort. Id. at 17.
10
11
Our careful review of the record convinces us that there is substantial evidence
to support the ALJ's decision that plaintiff was not disabled on or after March
25, 1993. The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
**
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally
disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3
Although this case was filed after the functions of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, Donna E. Shalala, were transferred to the Commissioner of
Social Security, Shirley S. Chater, we continue to refer to the Secretary because
she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying administrative
decision