United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938, 10th Cir. (2011)

FILED
United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit
January 18, 2011

PUBLISH
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
No. 10-6024
STEPHEN WILKINSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. NO. 5:09-CR-00154-C-1)
Submitted on the briefs:

William P. Earley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,
for Defendant - Appellant.
Sanford C. Coats, United States Attorney, Jonathon E. Boatman and David P.
Petermann, Assistant United States Attorneys, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for
Plaintiff - Appellee.
Before HARTZ, SEYMOUR, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
HARTZ, Circuit Judge.
After a bench trial in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma, Defendant Stephen Wilkinson Jr. was convicted of
possessing with intent to distribute five grams or more of a mixture containing

cocaine base (crack). See 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Police officers found the
cocaine in his truck after a traffic stop by an officer acting at the request of a
fellow officer who had observed a license-tag violation. Defendant appeals the
district courts denial of his motion to suppress the drugs as fruit of an illegal
stop. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and affirm. The stop was
proper because the collective knowledge doctrineunder which the legality of
the detention of a suspect by an officer can be supported by information
possessed by a fellow officer who requests the detention, even if the requesting
officer does not communicate the information to the other officerapplies to
traffic stops for misdemeanors as well as stops for felonies.
I.
BACKGROUND
On April 10, 2009, Lieutenant Todd Palmer of the Lawton Police
Department received a tip from a reliable informant that a black male would be
bringing crack cocaine into Lawton from Texas in a small red pickup. The
informant gave Palmer the area of town and the time of day to look for the
vehicle. Palmer and his partner were in the area at the given time and saw a red
pickup. Palmer observed that its paper license tag, which the truck had in place
of a license plate, was unlawfully covered in plastic. Because Palmer and his
partner were in an unmarked car, Palmer requested that a patrol unit stop the
truck.
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Officer Timothy Poff received Palmers radio request, although he was not
provided any details regarding the grounds for the stop. As Poff followed the red
pickup into a residential area, he noticed that the license tag looked altered or
wrinkled; it was harder to read the number than it usually is on an Oklahoma
paper tag. He did not notice that the tag was covered in plastic, but thought that
its weathered appearance meant that it had been on the car for longer than 30
days, the amount of time for which paper tags are valid. He could not read the
tags expiration date from his position about a car-length behind the truck because
the expiration date was much smaller than normal for a paper tag. Poff turned on
his emergency lights and pulled the truck over.
Once the truck came to a stop, Poff saw the driver, Defendant, reaching for
something by the center console inside the truck. Because he knew that Palmer
generally targeted violent drug offenders, Poff was concerned for his safety and
decided to deal with Defendant before examining the tag further. He obtained
Defendants drivers license and returned to his car to check it.
About two minutes after Poffs initial contact with Defendant, before he
had even returned to his squad car, a canine unit arrived. The dog alerted on the
truck. Defendant was asked to get out of his vehicle, but while he was being
patted down, he attempted to escape. After he was caught, a search of the truck
revealed 25 grams of crack cocaine.
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At the evidentiary hearing on Defendants motion to suppress, the district

court ruled that the stop and search were lawful. Defendant was convicted in a
bench trial on stipulated facts. He appeals the denial of his suppression motion.
II.
DISCUSSION
We review de novo the reasonableness of a search or seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. The credibility of witnesses, the weight accorded to

evidence, and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom fall within the province
of the district court. United States v. DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). We conduct a two-step inquiry when determining the
constitutionality of a traffic stop, considering first whether the officers action
was justified at its inception, and second, whether it was reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. See
United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2005). Defendant
argues that Poff did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him and that the stop
exceeded the permissible scope of a traffic stop. (He does not challenge on other
grounds the dog sniff of the car or any subsequent action by the police. See
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2003) ([T]he use of a well-trained
narcotics-detection dog . . . during a lawful traffic stop[] generally does not
implicate legitimate privacy interests.)). We address each argument in turn.
A.
Reasonable Suspicion for the Stop
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A traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if there is reasonable

suspicion that the motorist violated a traffic or equipment regulation. See United
States v. Valenzuela, 494 F.3d 886, 888 (10th Cir. 2007). The district court
provided two alternative bases for reasonable suspicion: (1) Poff could rely on
Palmers observation that the license tag was covered in plastic and (2) Poff
himself had reasonable suspicion to believe that the trucks tag was forged. We
affirm on the first basis, so we need not address the second.
It is undisputed on appeal that the pickups license plate was covered in
plastic and that the plastic cover violated Oklahoma law. 1 Also, Defendant
acknowledges that this court has recognized the collective-knowledge doctrine
(also called the fellow officer rule). Under that doctrine, [w]hen law
enforcement officials rely on a bulletin or alert to conduct a stop or make an
arrest, the relevant inquiry is whether the officer who issued the alertrather than
the officer who conducted the challenged actionhad the requisite level of
suspicion. United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 550 F.3d 1223, 1227 (10th
Cir. 2008). Because Palmer had seen plastic covering the pickups paper tag,
thereby establishing reasonable suspicion for the stop, and told Poff to stop the
Oklahoma law provides: The operation of a vehicle in this state,

regardless of where such vehicle is registered, upon which the license plate is
covered, overlaid or otherwise screened with any material, whether such material
be clear, translucent, tinted or opaque, shall be a violation . . . . Okla. Stat. tit.
47, 1113(A)(2) (2008).
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truck, it does not matter that Poff did not see the plastic himself before making
the stop.
Defendant argues, however, that the collective-knowledge doctrine should
not be applied here, because Oklahoma law allows an officer to arrest someone
for a misdemeanor only if committed in the officers presence. See Okla. Stat.
tit. 22, 196 (2003). But this argument is based on faulty factual and legal
premises. Factually, we note that the offensedriving the vehicle when the tag is
covered in plasticwas committed in Poffs presence. More important is the
legal flaw. The legality of a detention under the Fourth Amendment is not
dependent on state law governing detentions. See United States v. Gonzales, 535
F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir. 2008) (constitutional test for determining the validity
of a traffic stop does not require examination of state law). In Virginia v. Moore,
553 U.S. 164, 166 (2008), local police officers arrested Moore for the
misdemeanor offense of driving on a suspended license. It was uncontested that
under state law the officers had no authority to arrest Moore but should have only
issued a summons. See id. at 167. The Supreme Court, however, held that the
arrest did not offend the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 176. As the Court wrote,
A State is free to prefer one search-and-seizure policy among the range of
constitutionally permissible options, but its choice of a more restrictive option
does not render the less restrictive ones unreasonable, and hence
unconstitutional. Id. at 174.
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In addition, there is no reason independent of the Oklahoma statute to limit

the collective-knowledge doctrine to felonies. The doctrine was recognized
(although not so labeled) by the Supreme Court in United States v. Hensley, 469
U.S. 221 (1985), which upheld the validity of a stop based on a teletyped flyer.
(Although the flyer in that case was issued by another police department rather
than by officers in the same department, that makes no difference in the analysis.)
The flyer did not provide sufficient information to justify a stop, but the Court
held that the stop was permissible so long as the flyer . . . ha[d] been issued on
the basis of articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted
person ha[d] committed an offense. Id. at 232. The Court recognized that
effective law enforcement cannot be conducted unless police officers can act on
directions and information transmitted by one officer to another and that officers,
who must often act swiftly, cannot be expected to cross-examine their fellow
officers about the foundation for the transmitted information. Id. at 231 (internal
quotation marks omitted). And it justified the doctrine on the ground that [t]he
law enforcement interests promoted by allowing one department to make
investigatory stops based upon another departments bulletins or flyers are
considerable, while the intrusion on personal security is minimal. Id. at 232.
Little, if any, additional individual freedom would result from requiring officers
to set forth their grounds for reasonable suspicion or probable cause in their
communications with other officers.
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This balance of intereststhe substantial advantage to law enforcement in

facilitating their communications outweighing the minimal protection to citizens
from requiring detailed messages between officersapplies equally when the
offense for which there is reasonable suspicion is a misdemeanor rather than a
felony. Moreover, even if the balance were not as favorable to law enforcement
in the context of a misdemeanor, the same rule should apply. The rationale for
applying the same detention rule for misdemeanors as for felonies is set forth in
Moore:
In determining what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we
have given great weight to the essential interest in readily
administrable rules. In Atwater [v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318,
347 (2001)] we acknowledged that nuanced judgments about the need
for warrantless arrest were desirable, but we nonetheless declined to
limit to felonies and disturbances of the peace the Fourth Amendment
rule allowing arrest based on probable cause to believe a law has
been broken in the presence of the arresting officer. The rule extends
even to minor misdemeanors, we concluded, because of the need for
a bright-line constitutional standard.
553 U.S. at 175 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
It is therefore unremarkable that courts have applied the collectiveknowledge doctrine to stops for misdemeanors without any discussion about
whether the doctrine applies in that context. See Pasiewicz v. Lake Cnty. Forest
Pres. Dist., 270 F.3d 520, 521, 524 n.2 (7th Cir. 2001) (knowledge of officers
who ordered arrest was imputed to arresting officers in public-indecency case);
City of Maumee v. Weisner, 720 N.E.2d 507, 50911 (Ohio 1999) (DUI in
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violation of municipal ordinance); State v. Pratt, 951 P.2d 37, 4344 (Mont.
1997) (DUI); State v. Myers, 490 So. 2d 700, 70103 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (hitting
a traffic sign). And the two opinions that we have found that do consider whether
the collective-knowledge doctrine applies to misdemeanors both hold that it does.
See United States v. Watkins, 243 F. Appx 356, 358 (10th Cir. 2007)
(unpublished) 2; State v. Boatman, 901 So. 2d 222, 22324 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005). We hold that the collective-knowledge doctrine is not limited to felonies
and applies in this case. Poffs stop of Defendants pickup was permissible
because Palmer, who requested the stop, had reasonable suspicion of an
equipment violation.
Defendant argues further that the district courts analysis should have taken
into account that the primary motive of the police was to investigate drug
transportation, not the traffic violation. At the suppression hearing the assistant
United States attorney conceded that theres no doubt that the stop here was
pretextual in nature, that law enforcement in the City of Lawton clearly felt that
[Defendant] was doing other things that day. R., Vol. 3 at 52. But the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness of traffic stops does not depend on the actual motives
of the officer. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996); United
States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1134 (10th Cir. 2009) (under the reasonablesuspicion standard an officers actual motivations or subjective beliefs and
2
As an unpublished opinion, Watkins is not binding precedent.

-9-
intentions are, quite simply, irrelevant (internal quotation marks omitted)). We

agree that the district court could have considered the officers motivations in
assessing their credibility. But evidence of their motives did not compel the court
to disbelieve them. It was not clearly erroneous for the court to believe the
officers accounts of their observations and actions.
B.
Duration of the Stop
Defendants second argument is that the duration of the stop was not
reasonably related in scope to Poffs reasons for it. He contends that Poff could
have determined whether the tag was valid immediately after he had stopped the
vehicle and then let Defendant drive on. See United States v. Edgerton, 438 F.3d
1043, 1051 (10th Cir. 2006) (officer who had stopped a car because he could not
read its license tag had no ground to continue to detain the driver once he could
read the tag and determine its validity); United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558,
561 (10th Cir. 1994) (same). He asserts that Poff proceeded directly to Defendant
only because Palmer had asked for the truck to be stopped.
But Edgerton and McSwain are readily distinguishable. In both cases the
officers observations after the stop revealed that there was no equipment
violation. Here, in contrast, observation by Poff would have revealed the plastic
cover, establishing a violation and reasonable suspicion (even probable cause) to
continue the stop and issue Defendant a warning or a citation. See United States
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v. Eckhart, 569 F.3d 1263, 1273 (10th Cir. 2009) (license-plate violation
confirmed by officer after stop).
III.
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district courts denial of the motion to suppress.
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FILED

United States Court of Appeals

January 18, 2011

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Submitted on the briefs:

Before HARTZ, SEYMOUR, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.

HARTZ, Circuit Judge.

possessing with intent to distribute five grams or more of a mixture containing

At the evidentiary hearing on Defendants motion to suppress, the district

Fourth Amendment. The credibility of witnesses, the weight accorded to

Reasonable Suspicion for the Stop

A traffic stop is valid under the Fourth Amendment if there is reasonable

Oklahoma law provides: The operation of a vehicle in this state,

In addition, there is no reason independent of the Oklahoma statute to limit

This balance of intereststhe substantial advantage to law enforcement in

As an unpublished opinion, Watkins is not binding precedent.

intentions are, quite simply, irrelevant (internal quotation marks omitted)). We

Duration of the Stop

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