International Journal of Automation and Computing

7(2), May 2010, 167-172

DOI: 10.1007/s11633-010-0167-7

Subsea Maintenance Service Delivery:

Mapping Factors Influencing Scheduled Service Duration
Efosa Emmanuel Uyiomendo1, 2
1

Tore Markeset1

Faculty of Science and Technology, Department of Operations and Maintenance, University of Stavanger, Stavanger N-4012, Norway
2

Shell Petroleum Development Company, Warri, Nigeria

Abstract: The oil and gas (O&G) industry on the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS) leads the world in terms of the number
of subsea O&G installations. Ensuring the dependability of these assets is critical. Non-intrusive inspection, maintenance and repair
(IMR) services are therefore needed to reduce risks. These services are planned and executed using a mono-hull offshore vessel complete
with remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), a module handling system and an active heave compensated crane. Vessel time is shared
between competing jobs, using a prioritized forward-looking schedule. Extension in planned job duration may have an impact on O&G
production, service costs and health, safety, and environmental (HSE) risks. This paper maps factors influencing the job schedule
efficiency. The influence factors are identified through reviews of literature as well as interviews with experts in one of the large IMR
subsea service providers active on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. The findings show that the most obvious factors are weather
disruption and water depth. Other factors include job complexity, job uncertainty, IMR equipment availability, as well as the mix of
job complexity.
Keywords:
ing.

Oil and gas assets; subsea inspection, maintenance, and repair (IMR) services; service delivery influence factors; schedul-

Introduction

Subsea production systems (SPS) are used to develop

reservoirs which are drilled from multiple locations or
which are too deep for fixed platforms, technically or
economically[1] . The SPS maximize the use of infrastructure and facilitate early startup[2] . Northern Europe holds
the regional record for the highest number of subsea installations in operation and under construction[3, 4] . Subsea wells require one form of intervention at least every
four years. Platform wells are easier and cheaper to maintain. Inspection, maintenance, and repair (IMR) allows
non-intrusive problems on subsea production systems to be
easily corrected[5] . Some SPS failures may require production interruption until a suitable maintenance repair solution is found and implemented. Examples of these include
problems with electrical and hydraulic jumpers, and subsea
control modules. The most robust and common methods of
subsea well maintenance and through tubing intervention
work include mobile offshore drilling units (MODU) and
riser-less well intervention (RLWI) Units. These take control of the well and send tools through the tubing to undertake maintenance such as simple sand cleanout and heavier
tubing replacement[3] . In terms of size and capability, the
IMR support vessel is one level below these. It is cheaper
and more easily mobilized. It relies on the use of remotely
operated vehicles (ROVs) to execute light activities around
the well (but not inside it). The IMR industry has attracted
firms in package supply, construction and non-destructive
testing (NDT), often in an alliance to deliver integrated services. The client retains control over the schedule of each
of the vessels, an approach that is common in the North
Sea, but less so worldwide[6] . The most important equipManuscript received January 15, 2010; revised March 22, 2010

ment on the vessel includes the heave compensated cranes,

two ROVs (of different lifting capacities or classes) and a
system that guides modules through the splash zone. The
operational limits for basic operations such as valve operations and condition monitoring are 4.5 m5 m significant
wave height, Hs , and 2.5 m to 3 m for the more complex operations (module handling and light construction). For Hs
above approximately 6 m it becomes less profitable to invest
in better ROV operability[7] . The subsea IMR industry has
categorized subsea services into inspections, maintenance
and repair based on their complexity, and these have meanings beyond their standard definitions[6, 8] . Five-yearly inspections, executed with ROV carrying appropriate NDT
tools, provide quality assurance, compliance with regulation and defect management benefits[9] . Inspection findings drive the more complex jobs. Maintenance activities
include the replacement of items such as control modules as
well as the regular cleaning and clearing of subsea assets.
The repair job-types include restorations and modifications,
which are job-specific and incorporate substantial engineering input. IMR projects are undertaken in difficult offshore
environments using tools that are complex, expensive and
controlled remotely. Service delays and extensions of the
job duration are potentially costly in terms of service costs
and especially costs due to production losses. Mapping the
factors that may be acting on these activities will provide
a firmer basis for their control and performance prediction.
This can contribute to production gains through production performance management[10, 11] and service efficiency
improvement. The objective of this paper is to identify the
range of delivered subsea maintenance services and to map
factors that influence the scheduled service duration and
the schedule efficiency.

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International Journal of Automation and Computing 7(2), May 2010

Subsea system dependability

The dependability concept is defined as a collective term

which describes availability performance and its influencing factors, namely reliability performance, maintainability
performance, and maintenance support performance[12] .
Hence, dependability improvements can be achieved by
making failures less likely (i.e., by increasing the reliability)
and by reducing the downtime before restorations/repairs
(i.e., by increasing maintainability and supportability). Observed failure rates in subsea assets follow the bathtub
curve[13, 14] . The experts interviewed in the study corroborate this. High early-life failures are addressed with
warranties as well as testing before and during commissioning. The Norwegian state oil company Statoil tested
subsea compressors under representative conditions[15] . In
their useful life, SPS are run to failure. The first generation of SPS presented significant production assurance challenges due to, for instance, material problems, leakages, etc.
that incurred long downtime and high costs, as depicted in
Table 1. Today, service is delivered in days or weeks rather
than months. Modular design, stock retention and a permanently deployed IMR vessel contribute to increased service
efficiency.
Table 1

Project
Foinaven

Foinaven

British petroleum0 s early experience of subsea

failures[13]
Failure mode
Super duplex (steel
pipe) cracking
(Valve) Stem
seal leakage

Direct
cost

Downtime

55 USD/m

10 months

30 USD/m

4 months

13 subsea control
Schiehallion

modules (SCM) suffering

hydraulic fluid leakage.

9 USD/m

9 modules changed out.

Replacement of 8
Troika

connectors. Deferred
production and

20 USD/m

minor leakage.

Each SPS control module is run to failure and then replaced. Norsok Z-008[16] accepts this if the risks of failure
(production, cost and HSE) are low. Run-to-failure philosophy is beneficial if failures are random failures with a constant rate[13, 14] . Even then, the overall dependability of the
entire subsea production system is important for the production performance. ISO 20815[10] recommends a life cycle management approach, to which this paper contributes.
Dependability can be improved through 1) improved reliability of the modules, and 2) improved efficiency of replacement on their failure. The latter is our main focus.
Design considerations and operational experience.
SPS are designed to facilitate fast and easy ROV operations and minimize delays[1, 17] . Some design features
include modularization, ROV access color and marking system, status indicators, work platform and grabber bars and

the minimization of possible snagging points. Also beneficial was the early standardization of the subsea control
systems (SCS), in areas such as their physical dimension,
module components, vibration/shock tolerance and especially Christmas tree interface. Standardizing on an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) per field allows one
running tool to be used, which also saves time in field-wide
campaigns[18] .
Similarly, the use of reliable electro-hydraulic and
multiplex-electro-hydraulic subsea control systems also contributes to the reduction in failure rates. For such subsea
control systems, the most common failure modes are related to the hydraulic and electrical distribution systems
due to mechanical damage of hoses, cables, etc. by fishing
trawlers, other impact or water ingress. Failure of electronic and hydraulic components is extremely rare. Corrosion problems are also infrequent and arise on failure of
cathodic protection[19] .
Early industry experience influenced some of the standard practices adopted to facilitate prompt replacement of
modules on failure[17] . For instance, drill string operated
protective covers gave way to covers operable with faster
guide wires fitted with ROV operable anchors. In addition,
ROV introduction allowed fewer electrical and hydraulic
connectors, quicker installation and expansion, as well as
facilitated efficient subsea intervention. This is necessary to
take advantage of short operational windows and minimize
production disruption. Even then, losses are still incurred
due to slips in scheduled service activities. Mapping these
delays will provide an additional operational platform for
improvement.

Mapping of factors that influence service delivery performance

Delays in the execution of scheduled service jobs can

be influenced by many factors. Some of them are wellknown or intuitive, e.g., water depth and adverse weather.
With the benefit of 30 years of experience, the industry
has evolved ways of proactively identifying and managing
these and other potential causes of delays. These delays
can be measured in terms of difference between scheduled
and actual execution times or as the proportion of actual
execution time to scheduled time. The latter measure is
equivalent to schedule performance index (SPI), as hourly
rates of hired equipment are fixed (see, e.g., [20]). SPI allows performance of projects of different durations to be
reviewed and compared in terms of service efficiency.
The following factors influencing the service delivery efficiency have been identified through the use of literature,
and a study performed within an offshore service company.
The study included site visits, interview of experts with
515 years of experience, reviews of completed job reports
and task plans. These interviews were usually face-to-face,
based on open-ended questions, and focused on real or expected patterns of problems expected in planned jobs or
completed job reports. Ten experts were interviewed and
the interviews lasted for periods ranging from one to three
hours. Many of these interviews were repeated during the
course of the six-month-long study.

E. E. Uyiomendo and T. Markeset / Subsea Maintenance Service Delivery: Mapping Factors Influencing

3.1

Water depth

Water depth is measured as the depth where the SPS is

installed. A number of tools are used in sequence during
IMR operations and many of these are carried to the sea
bottom in the tool basket with nearly vertical ROV flight
whose duration increases with water depth. However, a
significant proportion of the tools used require returning to
the surface for tool selection, installation and configuration.
The duration of such tool setup and tool changes would
increase with water depth. The risks of entanglement of
ROV umbilical and wires increase with depth and a slower
vertical ROV flight speed is required. At the bottom, a
much larger number of lateral ROV flights are required for
tool manipulations and placements. These are influenced
by visibility, complexity, the effects of water pressure and
resistance, and water current.
Pressure is a linear function of water depth, whilst visibility and current have more complex behavior. Wave interaction with sea bottom reduces visibility and hence speed
(up to half the wave length). Strong water currents could
also constrain operations by causing guide wire blow or
sway (although this also depends on the location). Another important effect of working in deeper waters relates
to breakdowns (discussed below). Repairs of equipment in
deep waters would require more time just to retrieve it to
the surface. On the other hand, IMR equipment has been
designed for 1500 m; the constant tension on the guide wire
should reduce sway; the sets of powerful underwater beams
and thrusters should compensate for visibility and resistance, respectively.

3.2

Weather disruption

Weather disruption potential is related to the operability for the job type for the location and month of the year.
The environmental factors that can influence IMR operations include waves, current, wind (speed and direction), ice
and snow fall, air temperature, and sea temperature[21, 22] .
Given the common operational areas of the vessel, wave
height and wave period are the most important measures
of operability[7] . North Sea weather is stochastic but predictable (see, e.g., [23]). IMR operations have different
weather limitations and are planned using weather forecasts, operability databases, and deployment analyses. Activities are also planned taking into account the weather
tolerability of the activity. Even then, equipment lifts and
transfers, personnel movement, etc. would be slower in bad
weather. Even the personnel motivation and concentration
could be affected. The offshore team is empowered to cease
operations when it is considered unsafe to continue. There
will be delays if weather is incorrectly predicted.

3.3

IMR equipment availability

The schedule for the vessel has minimal float, and idle
time is not countenanced. Nothing works without the vessel and the more complex operations require the crane.
Basic operations can be done using a single ROV (either
the stronger work class type for heavy torque operations or
the observation type if the required torque is low). Both
ROVs are required simultaneously for the more complex
module handling and light construction job types, so a fail-

169

ure in either would cause delays until repairs can be carried

out. If equipment spares and competence can be assumed
available, delay is a function of repair conditions such as
the weather. This assumption is less robust for hired and
client provided items. A breakdown during a weather window could cause a longer delay since the weather conditions
change quite often and quickly on the Norwegian continental shelf.

3.4

Job complexity

von Glinow and Mohrman[24] proposed four identifiers

for organizationally complex or high technology firms: employees are largely scientists, engineers and technologists;
high research and design spend; technology-driven obsolescence and rapid growth. IMR companies are considered high technology companies and complex because they
combine expertise from different disciplines and specialties
to resolve complex and poorly-defined projects or puzzles
into mutually compatible solutions in an environment that
is constantly changing and therefore uncertain[24] . The
IMR services are also consistent with Sturman et al.0 s[25]
view of complex tasks and services as those that stimulate
employees0 development of customized solutions and their
own skills. Changes in performance can arise from changes
in the people providing the services, e.g., through training
or motivation, or result from changes in the task factors.
Our focus is on task-related factors that determine performance variability. Historical data on motivation and knowledge are less readily available. In any case, the minimum
experience, qualification, certification and job category of
operational personnel are always complied with and at least
one client representative is always onboard the vessel.
Richardson et al.[26] investigated the relevance of task
variables to assembly operation complexity. The variables
were hypothesized through task analyses and then studied
using statistical multivariable analysis. From these, they
proposed a prediction model for assembly complexity. It
took the form of a model of complexity or the level of difficulty based on 1) the number of components, 2) the symmetrical planes, 3) novel assemblies, 4) the number of fastenings, and 5) the number of component groups. Together,
these five valid variables explained 56% of the variations in
the level of difficulty. With respect to managing risks in
marine and subsea operations, seven parameters are recommended to be assessed[27] :
1) Marine operation method (novelty, feasibility, robustness, type, previous experience);
2) Personnel exposure (qualification, experience, required
presence, shift arrangement);
3) Equipment used (margins robustness, condition maintenance, previous experience, suitability, experience
with operators or contractors);
4) Operational aspects (language barriers, seasonal environment conditions, local marine traffic, shore proximity);
5) Existing field infrastructure (surface and sub-surface);

170

International Journal of Automation and Computing 7(2), May 2010

6) Handled object (value, structural strength/robustness);

7) Overall project particulars (delay, replacement
time/cost, repair possibilities, number of contractors0
interfaces, project development period).
The last parameter is an outcome in the context of this
paper. The penultimate two relate to the physical infrastructure and can be ignored. Personnel factors have been
excluded for pragmatic and practical data availability reasons. The remaining three parameters (marine operation
method, equipment and operational aspects) have important issues that were corroborated during interviews with
employees of the service provider. These include novelty
of the job, equipment condition, experience with the tool,
and environmental conditions (or seastate which is often
measured by significant wave height).
Edmonds[28] collated up to 40 different formulations of
complexity of varying degrees of relevance to IMR. IMR
services have high degrees of abstraction and several dimensions, and thus require different levels of procedural steps
to analyze and describe. The most difficult jobs have several elaborated pictures to assist their visualization (symbol
formulation), and are broken into a series of standardized
sub-tasks to increase their ordering and reduce complexity.
According to [29], cited in [28], a system0 s complexity is
related to the sum of the complexity of its parts. Thus,
IMR operations must be extremely complex as many of
their parts (hydrodynamics, ROV flight, weather) are individually complex (require multiple variables). Predicting
the performance of such a complex operation will also require multiple variables. For simplicity and convenience,
key measures are adopted, e.g., significant wave height for
weather or vessel motions. Richardson et al.[26] simplified
task complexity into five variables from a total of seven investigated.
Thus, the following five measures of complexity were selected after a consideration of the range of tasks involved in
IMR: tool novelty, job/procedure novelty, lifting difficulty,
vessel motion and number of interfaces. Together, these are
considered adequate to efficiently represent the areas of difficulty in IMR operations. Some of them are also used as
criteria for assigning project engineers, assessing risks and
developing job procedures. This list was validated through
interviews with senior experts of the study company.
Other measures considered for representing complexity
include the numbers of pictures, task steps and hold-points
in the procedures. Hold-points sometimes require independent witnessing[30] and they increase with complexity. Some
OEM job steps (e.g., module running tool operation) are
not clearly described in the procedures. The number of
procedure steps could be problematic for this reason.

3.5

Job uncertainty

Another measurable reason why a job might be delayed

is its inherent uncertainty; i.e., our inability to completely
specify a subsea intervention activity beforehand due to lack
of information, changing priorities and dynamic workplace.
Sometimes, a job is interrupted by the client in order to attend to a higher priority job. On returning to the original

job, some level of efficiency is lost as certain setup and placement tasks have to be repeated. We have named this type of
uncertainty as phasing and it is similar to the setup losses
that the overall equipment effectiveness (OEE) measures
when an increase in equipment availability is sought[31] .
Another uncertainty measure is scope change which
can occur on occasions when some of the assumptions held
about the job during its planning phase are found to be incomplete or incorrect on site. Access to the critical modules
may be restricted, the tool may not match or the extent of
the job was not fully appreciated.
Finally, a third aspect of uncertainty is the management
of change (MOC). This is the controlled process of adjusting the prescribed procedure for executing a job. The need
for this could arise if the senior project engineer finds that
this original procedure could not be adopted due to mismatch, access, unavailability of tools and equipment, or for
some other reason. The MOC is documented according to
the project guidelines. It is suitably approved and included
in the completed job reports. The complete MOC records
are kept on the vessel so it is more efficient to access this information directly. Phasing and scope changes are assessed
from completed job reports. The distinction between MOC
and scope change is subtle. Scope change is normally requested by the client, whereas MOC is a control process
implemented by the service provider over a change considered risky or significant. The same event could lead to both
MOC and scope change. Some only cause a scope change.

3.6

Influence of complexity mix

Weather windows are stochastic. If jobs with different

levels of weather sensitivity can be combined, one may be
able to optimize vessel usage time, reduce disruptions and
improve efficiency. For example, job types such as valve
operations and condition monitoring can be executed if the
significant wave height Hs is between 3 m and 5 m. However, the tool requirements for these jobs are different and
sourced differently. Once a running tool is picked from an
OEM, it has to be paid for. Running tools are job and template specific. Thus, vessel time might be saved, but equipment and personnel time might still be incurred. In addition, wells with production shutdown could cause significant
revenue losses. The lack of standardization in modules and
running tools exacerbates this. The review of jobs executed
by the company during 2006, 2007, and 2008 shows a mixed
flow of job types.

Discussion and concluding remarks

Service delivery performance improves through training

and motivation, or results from changes in the task factors. By assuming that subsea production systems are
designed and installed for easy replacement, adequate access, etc., we have constrained variability in performance to
task factors. IMR projects are somewhat abstract, multidimensional and multi-disciplinary. They are organized and
ordered to solve poorly defined problems.
We found that five measures can be used to describe
its associated complexity, namely: job novelty, tool novelty, lifting, vessel motion and interfaces. Whereas complexity relates to the job difficulty or challenge, the uncer-

E. E. Uyiomendo and T. Markeset / Subsea Maintenance Service Delivery: Mapping Factors Influencing

tainty refers to our inability to completely specify a subsea

intervention beforehand. Three measures of uncertainty
were identified: phasing, scope change, and management
of change. Given the data available and the nature of
projects and the contracts, the most appropriate key performance indicator for assessing the IMR service performance
is the schedule variance measured by SPI which simplifies
to planned duration / actual duration.
In total, the study identified five factors which, to various degrees, influence service delivery performance, namely:
water depth, weather, job complexity, job uncertainty as
well as the mixture of jobs of different complexity (job complexity mix).
IMR has witnessed significant innovation over the last ten
years. For instance, new technology and client initiatives
have often led to increases in ROV operability (technologydriven innovation). MOC procedure controls and encourages employee-driven changes. The service buyer can use
options in the contract to increase specifications (customerdriven innovation). These drivers are consistent with the
drivers of innovations reported in [32].
When it comes to industrial services and innovation management, cost is never the only issue, but it is also never a
non-issue. The culture of learning from previous jobs encourages innovation to improve effectiveness and efficiency.
Job procedures are reviewed for effectiveness first, and then
efficiency. Arguably a leap in innovativeness (e.g., due to
increasing water depth, Arctic conditions, structural complexity, etc.) could potentially impact on efficiency. The
subsea installation unit is replaced on failure as the consequences of failure are normally low and it can be quickly
isolated. However, this corrective maintenance philosophy
assumes an efficient intervention process. If the intervention process is not efficient, the consequences will be much
higher in terms of revenue, lost due to increased downtime,
potential environmental pollution and other risk factors.

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Efosa Emmanuel Uyiomendo graduated with the B. Eng. degree from University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria in 1991,
the MBA from Warwick Business School,
UK in 2006, and the M. Sc. degree in offshore technology (operations and maintenance) from University of Stavanger, Norway in 2009. Following National Service, he
joined Shell Nigeria in 1993 as production
supervisor with responsibilities for operations and maintenance of oil and gas assets. His career has taken
him through support services, health, safety and environment
(HSE) and planning.
His research interests include operations and maintenance,
performance management, industrial services, strategy and risk
management.
E-mail: [email protected]

Tore Markeset
received the B. Sc. degree in petroleum engineering from the University of Stavanger, and the B. Sc. and
M. Sc. degrees in mechanical engineering
from the University of Minnesota, USA. After working in the industry for a number of
years within process, mechanical and reservoir engineering, he received the Ph. D. degree in offshore engineering (operations and
maintenance) from the University of Stavanger. Currently, he is a professor of mechanical engineering
(operations and maintenance) at the University of Stavanger and
adjunct professor at University of Troms, both in Norway.
His research interests include industrial services (product support, innovation, strategy development, sourcing strategies, contractual relationship performance) and industrial asset management (operations, maintenance and support management, design
for performance, and production performance management).
E-mail: [email protected] (Corresponding author)