American National Insurance Company v. Fidelity Bank, N. A., 691 F.2d 464, 10th Cir. (1982)

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691 F.

2d 464
34 UCC Rep.Serv. 1228

AMERICAN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY,


Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
FIDELITY BANK, N. A., Defendant-Appellee.
No. 80-2058.

United States Court of Appeals,


Tenth Circuit.
Oct. 15, 1982.

James E. Britton, Oklahoma City, Okl. (Hastie & Kirschner, Oklahoma


City, Okl., with him on the briefs), for plaintiff-appellant.
B. J. Rothbaum, Jr., Oklahoma City, Okl. (James A. Kirk and Linn,
Helms, Kirk & Burkett, Oklahoma City, Okl., with him on the brief), for
defendant-appellee.
Before HOLLOWAY, BREITENSTEIN and LOGAN, Circuit Judges.
BREITENSTEIN, Circuit Judge.

In this diversity case a Texas insurance company sued an Oklahoma bank for
losses incurred through the defalcation of the insurance company's agent. The
essence of the claim is that the bank acted improperly by accepting for deposit,
in an account of a corporation controlled by the agent, checks bearing
unauthorized endorsements. After trial without a jury, the court held that the
bank acted in good faith and within reasonable commercial standards of its
business and that negligence of the insurance company substantially
contributed to the unauthorized endorsements. We affirm the judgment for the
bank.

Appellant, American National Insurance Company, is a Texas corporation


engaged in the insurance business. It acquired from Fidelity Bankers Life
Insurance Company group insurance policies covering the Oklahoma Education

Association, the University of Oklahoma and other entities. Fidelity Insurance


had used Charles W. Hilliard to administer the insurance program. Hilliard
controlled Group Insurance Services, Inc. (GIS).
3

When American National took over the group insurance, it entered into a
handwritten "Memo of Understanding" with Hilliard and GIS, acting by
Hilliard, for Hilliard's services "as an Insurance Agent/Broker" and for GIS's
performance of "certain insurance service." Subsequently American National
sent "Standard Group Insurance Management Agreement(s)" to Hilliard for his
signature but they were not returned to American National. Hilliard was aware
of their terms which included American National's right to make scheduled and
unscheduled audits of GIS's books. During the relevant period, American
National made no audit and did not compare the payments received with the
premiums which should have been collected by GIS.

American National made no formal investigation of Hilliard or GIS; no


financial records were required; no credit check was made; and no inquiry was
made into Hilliard's former employment. American National knew that Hilliard
was indebted to Fidelity Bankers, the former insurer. American National made
a written agreement with Fidelity Bankers assigning to Fidelity Bankers the
first $45,000 of commissions earned by Hilliard and GIS each month to pay an
indebtedness of Hilliard to Fidelity Bankers. American National did not inquire
into the nature or amount of the debt which was later estimated to exceed
$1,000,000.

American National instructed Hilliard that premium checks were to be payable


to American National and forwarded to a Galveston, Texas, bank for deposit. In
August, 1974, the first month that premiums were due under the take-over,
American National received on account of premiums a single GIS check drawn
on defendant Fidelity Bank. In November, 1974, American National instructed
Hilliard to deposit premium checks directly into an account at a Dallas, Texas
bank. Hilliard had no authority to deposit, endorse, negotiate or otherwise
transfer any checks except in accordance with American National's instructions.

Hilliard administered the policies from August, 1974, to November, 1975,


when American National terminated his services. In that period over 13,000
premium checks totalling over $5,000,000 were deposited in two bank accounts
maintained by Hilliard and GIS in Fidelity Bank. Approximately 280 of the
checks deposited in account No. 14-1519, a general corporate account of GIS,
bore the following rubber-stamped endorsement:

7"AMERICAN NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE CO.

BY: (Signature)
FOR DEPOSIT ONLY TO THE ACCOUNT OF
8GROUP INSURANCE SERVICES, INC.
9ACCOUNT NO. 14-1519."
10

The checks so endorsed totalled $593,713.15 and represented premiums for


September, October, and November, 1975. The mentioned amount was not
paid to, or received by, American National.

11

The pertinent provision of the endorsement agreement covering account No.


14-1519 reads:

12
"Endorsements
for deposit may be evidenced merely by the name of the corporation
being written or stamped on the instrument deposited, without designation of the
party making the endorsement."
13

Fidelity Bank did not investigate the authority of Hilliard or GIS to endorse or
deposit the checks. American National did not notify Fidelity Bank of its
relationship with Hilliard and GIS. When this action was brought, no GIS funds
remained in the possession of Fidelity Bank.

14

After the termination of Hilliard's and GIS's services, an American National


investigation disclosed the GIS accounts and the failure to transmit premiums
to American National. It then brought this action alleging liability under
theories of breach of trust and assumpsit. In defense Fidelity Bank said: (1)
Hilliard had apparent authority to endorse and deposit the checks; (2) the Bank,
acting in a commercially reasonable manner, had no duty to investigate
Hilliard's authority; and (3) the loss was caused by American National's failure
to investigate, audit, and supervise.

15

On Fidelity Bank's motion, District Judge Thompson granted summary


judgment on all claims relating to 13,308 checks deposited in the GIS accounts
except those made or endorsed payable to American National. The amount of
checks so endorsed is $592,717.15. See Memorandum Opinion, R. vol. 1, pp.
145-149. The issues remaining were presented to District Judge West in a nonjury trial. In a Memorandum Opinion, R. vol. III, pp. 554-566, Judge West
made comprehensive findings of fact and held: (1) Fidelity Bank breached no
trust; (2) Fidelity Bank was not liable in assumpsit; and (3) pertinent provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code protected Fidelity Bank from liability. The

court entered judgment dismissing the action. On this appeal American


National attacks all of the mentioned rulings of the district court.
16

The fact findings of the trial court are important to consideration of the legal
issues raised by American National. The court found, R. vol. III, p. 554 et seq.,
and particularly at 564, that: (1) American National selected Hilliard and GIS
without an investigation of either; (2) American National failed to investigate
the suspicious circumstances surrounding Hilliard's indebtedness to his former
principal, Fidelity Bankers; (3) the Management Agreement was never
executed and its provisions were not enforced; (4) "Hilliard and GIS never for
one month followed American National's instructions concerning the procedure
for handling insurance premiums;" (5) American National never audited
Hilliard's or GIS's books; (6) American National did not "exercise close
supervision of its agent's activities;" and (7) after becoming aware of Hilliard's
improprieties in August, 1975, "no action was taken to relieve Hilliard of his
responsibilities for several months."

17

The court found, Id. at 565, "as between American National and Fidelity Bank,
American National was the party that was in the best position to have prevented
the loss and that it failed to exercise care which the ordinarily prudent person
would have exercised under the circumstances." The court also said, Id. at 565,
"negligence on the part of American National substantially contributed to the
making of the unauthorized endorsements by Hilliard and GIS."

18

Under Oklahoma law, the authority of an agent may be established from


appearances or by implication. In W. R. Grimshaw Co. v. First Nat. Bank & Tr.
Co. of Tulsa, Okl., Okl., 563 P.2d 117, 121, the court said:

19
"Although
no persons may have relied on any affirmative statement or conduct of
the principal ... in concluding (that the agent) had the authority to endorse and
deposit the checks, the operative conduct relied on could have been an omission on
the part of (the principal) 'in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence' to be aware
of his agent's ... activities."
20

See also Rosser-Moon Furniture Co. v. Oklahoma State Bank, 192 Okl. 169,
135 P.2d 336, 338. Nothing in the record indicates that Fidelity Bank knew or
had reason to know that Hilliard was misappropriating American National
funds. See Black v. O'Haver, 10 Cir., 567 F.2d 361, 373, a case arising out of
Oklahoma.

21

As adopted in Oklahoma, the Uniform Commercial Code provides, 12A O.S.

3-406, that:
22

"Any person who by his negligence substantially contributes to ... the making
of an unauthorized signature is precluded from asserting the ... lack of authority
against ... a drawee or other payor who pays the instrument in ... accordance
with the reasonable commercial standards of the drawee's or payor's business."

23

American National's negligence spanned the entire course of its dealings with
Hilliard and GIS.

24

Another Code provision, 12A O.S. 3-419(3), provides that a depository or


bank which has,

25 good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial standards applicable to


"in
(its) business ... dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was
not the true owner is not liable in conversion or otherwise to the true owner beyond
the amount of any proceeds remaining in his hands."
26

When this suit was brought Fidelity Bank had no such proceeds in its hands.

27

American National argues that 3-406 is no defense because Fidelity Bank


failed to act in accordance with commercially reasonable standards. Expert
evidence was adduced on the commercial standards. On conflicting testimony
the trial court held that Fidelity Bank acted "in accordance with reasonable
commercial standards." See R. vol. III, p. 565.

28

A trial court's findings are binding on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous.
F.R.Civ.P. Rule 52(a). The test is "whether the appellate court, after reviewing
all the evidence, is left 'with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.' " Reyes v. Hoffman, 10 Cir., 580 F.2d 393, 394. We have no
such conviction. Substantial evidence sustains the trial court. American
National's argument that the court applied local, rather than national standards,
does not support a reversal. While there was testimony directed to the
Oklahoma City banking practice, there was also substantial testimony
concerning the banking industry on a national scale. We do not understand the
trial court to limit its findings to any local situation in view of its general
statement concerning "reasonable commercial standards." R. vol. III, p. 565.

29

The trial court properly rejected American National's breach of trust argument.
Fidelity Bank had no knowledge, either actual or constructive, that a trust
existed. See R. vol. III, p. 562; and Western Assur. Co. v. Genesee Valley Trust

Co., 2 Cir., 171 F.2d 664, 666. Plaintiff's suggestion that Fidelity Bank should
have been aware of the possibility of a trust relation is insufficient to prove a
trust.
30

American National asks the court of appeals to retry the case. Such action
would violate the admonition contained in Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S.
100, 123, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 1576, 23 L.Ed.2d 129, that: "appellate courts must
constantly have in mind that their function is not to decide factual issues de
novo."

31

Affirmed.