AD-A211 031

COMPARISON OF CURRENT TEST REQUIREMENTS

AND THE FIELD ENVIRONMENT
FOR HARPOON SEEKER WRA'S
Prepared By:

Daniel J. Pomerening
Southwest Research Institute
6220 Culebra Road
San Antonio, Texas 78284

FINAL REPORT
SwRI Project 17-7958-815

Prepared For:

Pacific Missile Test Center

Point Mugu, California 93042
Performed as a Special Task for the Nondestructive
Testing Information Analysis Center
Under Contract No. DLA900-84-C-0910 CLIN 0001AN

DTIC

June 1989

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AUG09 1989
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17-7958-815

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Southwest Research Institute

Pacific Missile Test Center

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6220 Culebra Road

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Point Mugu, CA

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12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)

Pomerening, Daniel Janes

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1989, June

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FIELD

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18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

SUB-GROUP

HARPOON, ,System Reliability, Mission trof Ile..

Environmental Qualification Test Tailoring

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

The HARPOON missile system has a reduced reliability for the ship based platform in
relationship to the aircraft and submarine based platforms.
One possibility for this is
that the enviromental qualification tests did not demonstrate the susceptibility of the
system to this environment.
It va therefore necessary to look at the defined mission
profiles. enviromental conditions and testing to get an idea of what has been done to
date.
The process of tailoring the levels to the specific platforms was discussed and
recommendations made as to updating the test requirements.

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Comparison of Current Test Requirements
and the Field Environment
for HARPOON Seeker WRA's
Prepared for:.
PACIFIC MISSILE TEST CENTER

Point Mugu, California 93042

By:
SOUTHWEST RESEARCH INSTITUTE
6220 Culebra Road
San Antonio, Texas 78284
Daniel J. Pomerening
FINAL REPORT

SwRI Project 17-7958-815

Performed as a Special Task for the Nondestructive
Testing Information Analysis Center Under
Contract No. DLA900-84-C-0910 CLIN 0001AN
June 1989
Written by:

wed by:

iDaniel J. Pomerening

Daniel D. Kana, Ph.D., PE.

Institute Engineer

Senior Research Engineer

APPROVED*Z

I/

_=Aw

F1/
Robert L. Bass, Director
Department of Mechanical Scienbes

R
*

nSOUTHWEST
SAN ANTONIO

RESEARCH INSTITUTE
HOUSTON

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Table of Contents
1.0

Introduction .............................................................
1

2.0

Objective ...............................................................
8

13.0

Conclusions .............................................................
9
4.0

Recom mendations .........................................................

10

5.0

Discussion ..............................................................
12

5.1

Test Tailoring ........................................................

12

5.2

Current Inform ation and Procedures ..............................................................

13

5.2.1

System Reliability ...........................................................................

17

5.2.2

Life Cycle Environmental Profile ....................................................

23

5.2.2.1

Air Based Platform .........................................................

25

5.2.2.2

Ship Based Platform s .....................................................

32

5.2.2.3

Submarine Based Platforms ...........................................

42

5.2.2.4

Summ ary .........................................................................

43

5.2.3

Environm ental Design Criteria .......................................................

48

5.2.4

Test Plans and Summary of Testing Performed ..............................

59

Captive Carry Platform Characteristics ......................................................

79

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5.3

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5.4

6.0

5.3.1

Air Based .............................................

..................................... 79

5.3.2

Ship Based ....................................................

85

5.3.3

Subm arine Based ................................................

106

Flight Environm ent .....................................................

106

References ..................................................................... ....

. . . .......................
108
NTIS -GRA3&IDIC rAH
Uuu: ncun edi

El
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ByDistribution/
Availability Cod,9a
Avail and/or
ii

Special

Dist

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Table of Tables
1.1

HARPOON Major Subsystems ................................................................................

1.2

Basic Dimensions for the HARPOON .....................................................................

1.3

Levels of Testing .....................................................................................................

1.4

Test Methods in Mil-Std-81OD Applicable to HARPOON Weapons System .........

5.1

HARPOON Platforms ..............................................................................................

15

5.2

Time in the Fleet by Configuration ........................................................................

22

5.3

Failure Percent by Configuration ..........................................................................

22

5.4

HARPOON System Reliability ...............................................................................

23

5.5

Air Based Mission Profiles ....................................................................................

25

5.6

Ship Based Mission Profiles ..................................................................................

33

5.7

Sub Based Mission Profiles ....................................................................................

42

5.8

Environmental Conditions as Defined in XAS-2381A ..........................................

49

5.9

XAS-2381A Requirements ..................................................................................

5.10

Random Vibration Data, grins (OVL), Level Adjustment Factors for the
Maximum Predicted Environment (95th) Percentile with 50-Percent
Confidence, Based on One-Side Tolerance Limit) ..................................................

83

Peak Acceleration Levels Measured During HARPOON Ejection Tests.

Tests 4 thru 9: Low-force cartridges. Tests 10 and 11: High-force
cartridges ...............................................................................................................

87

5.12

Suggested G Levels for Procedure II - Operational Test. ........................................

92

5.13a

Launch Support Structure Peak Vibration Acceleration Measurements,

Constant Speed and Heading Conditions .................................................................

103

5.13b

Launch Support Structure Peak Vibration Acceleration Measurements,

Maneuver Conditions ...............................................................................................

103

5.14

Summary of Peak Vibration G Levels ......................................................................

103

5.15

Summary of Gunfire Response Measurements ........................................................

106

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5.11

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thru
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I1-1

of Figures
Missile Features ........................................................................................................

1-2

Typical Aircraft Configuration ................................................................................

1-3

Canister Configuration .............................................................................................

5-1

Environmental Tailoring Process .............................................................................

14

5-2

Time in Fleet for Ship and Submarine Based System .............................................

18

5-3

Cumulative Distribution for Ship and Submarine Based System ...........................

19

5-4

Cumulative Distribution for Total Ship and Submarine Data vs

Normal Distribution .................................................................................................

20

5-5

Failures by Configuration .......................................................................................

21

5-6

HARPOON Mission Profile, P-3 Aircraft Configuration (Typical) .......................

26

5-7

HARPOON Mission Profile, P-3 Aircraft Configuration .......................................

27

5-8

HARPOON Mission Profile, A-6/A-7/S-3/Air Configuration (Typical) ................

28

5-9

HARPOON Mission Profile, A-6/Air Configuration .............................................

29

5-10

HARPOON Mission Profile, A-7/Air Configuration .............................................

30

I5-11

HARPOON Mission Profile, S-3/Air Configuration ..............................................

31

5-12

HARPOON Mission Profile, ASROC Configuration FF/ASROC (Typical) ..........

34

5-13

HARPOON Mission Profile, ASROC Configuration .............................................

35

5-14

HARPOON Mission Profile, TARTAR Configuration

DDG/FFG-7/TARTAR (Typical) ..........................................................................

36

5-15

HARPOON Mission Profile, DDG/FFG/TARTAR Configuration .......................

37

5-16

HARPOON Mission Profile, PHM/Canister Configuration (Typical) ...................

38

5-17

HARPOON Mission Profile, PiM/Canister Configuration ...................................

39

5-18

HARPOON Mission Profile, Canister Configuration DDG-37/CG/DD-963/

Canister (Typical) ...................................................................................................

40

5-19

HARPOON Mission Profile, DDG-37/CG-DD-963/Canister (Typical) .................

41

5-20

HARPOON Mission Profile, SSN/Capsule Configuration (Typical) .....................

44

5-21

HARPOON Mission Profile, SSN/Capsule Configuration .....................................

45

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thru
47

5-22

Environmental Deployment Profile ..........................................................................

5-23

High Temperature Profile for Capsule and Canister Skins for Handling
and Canister Skin While Installed in Hydrofoil Ship .............................................

55

5-24

HARPOON Missile Vibration Environment, Captive Flight ..................................

56

5-25

HARPOON Missile Vibration Environment, Free Flight (Sustainer) ....................

57

5-26

HARPOON Missile Vibration Environment, Free Flight (Boost) ..........................

58

5-27

Ship Induced Vibration (Ref. Mil-Std-167B) .........................................................

60

5-28

Submarine to Surface Induced Rinusoidal Vibration .............................................

61

5-29

HARPOON Missile Ejection Rack and Probe Erection, Booster Clamp

Ring Shock Spectrum ...............................................................................................

62

5-30

Ship Shock Load Factors vs Time ...........................................................................

63

5-31

Shock Pulse from Gun Blast ..................................................................................

64

5-32

Submarine-to-Surface ...............................................................................................

65

5-33

HARPOON Missile External Acoustic Levels .......................................................

66

5-34

HARPOON Missile Boost Flight External Acoustic Levels ...................................

67

5-35

Combined Temperature/Altitude/Humidity Test Profile ........................................

74

5-36

Vibration Spectrums ..............................................................................................

75

5-37

Random Vibration Data Measurements and Data Analysis Results from

1839 Flight Data Observations ...............................................................................

82

5-38

G. versus Dynamic Pressure for A-6E Aircraft ....................................................

86

5-39

Shock Spectra for Q = 10 Averaged Over Three Axes at Various Locations

for Ejection (Aero 7A- 1 Rack Using High-Force Cartridges) ................................

88

Comparison of Q = 10 Shock Spectrum Levels and Design Criterion for

the Midcourse Guidance Unit ..................................................................................

89

Comparison of Q = 10 Shock Spectrum levels and Design Criterion for

Seeker .......................................................................................................................

89

Variation of Catapult Launch Peak Acceleration Levels with

Missile Location ......................................................................................................

90

5-42

Catapult Launch Shock Spectra for Seeker ............................................................

90

5-43

Variation of Arrested Landing Peak Acceleration Levels with

Missile Location ......................................................................................................

91

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5-40a

5-40b

5-41

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5-44

Comparison of Arrested Landing Shock Spectra for Seeker and FCE Ring ............

91

5-45

Aggravated Temperature-Humidity Cycles ...........................................................

95

5-46

Development of Ship Deck Motion Spectrum ......................................................

96

5-47a

Vibration Test Spectrum Category I Ships, All Axes, All Regions .......................

97

5-47b

Vibration Test Spectrum for Category ITShips, All Axes, All Regions .................

97

5-47c

Vibration Test Spectrum for Category ITI Ships, All Axes, All Regions ...............

98

5-47d

Vibration Test Spectrum for All Ships Combined (Category V), All Axes,
All Regions .......................................................................................................

98

5-48

Variation of Vibration Response with Shaft RPM ...................................................

100

5-49

Comparison of Mil-Std-167B Vibration Spectrum with Maximum Measured

Spectra for Constant Speed and Maneuver at Launch Support Structure/
Ship Deck Interface ..................................................................................................

101

Comparison of Seeker Design Verification Test Requirement with

Measured Maximum Constant Speed and Maneuver Spectra ..................................

102

Response at Seeker Bulkhead, Original Hardware, Tracking Filter

D ata, Run No. 14 ......................................................................................................

105

Comparison of Seeker Qual. Shock Spectrum with Measured HF and

STD Round Gunfire Shock Response ......................................................................

107

5-50
5-51
5-52

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1.0

Introduction
The HARPOON is an all-weather antishipping missile which can be launched from a

number of platforms, including aircraft, ships and submarines [11'. After launch, the HARPOON
flies a sea-skimming trajectory and has the capability to perform several different terminal
maneuvers. Mid-course guidance is provided by an attitude reference assembly, radar altimeter
and digital computer. The terminal guidance is accomplished using a frequency-agile active radar.
Effective range for the HARPOON is in excess of 50 nautical miles.
The HARPOON weapon system consis,.f the following major subsystems [1]:

5Table

1.1

HARPOON Major Subsystems

1.

Guidance Section

2.

Warhead

3.

Sustainer Section

4.

Control Section

5.

Booster

6.

HARPOON Canister Launcher

7.

Submarine Capsule

8.

Support Subsystem

9.

Command and Launch Subsystem

10.

MIvissile Test Set

Figure 1-1 shows the missile itself, items 1 to 5 above. A common missile body, including

the guidance, warhead, sustainer and control sections, is used for air (AGM-84), ship (RGM-84)
and submarine (UGM-84) launch configurations. The addition of the booster and the appropriate
wings and fins adapt the system to the various launch platforms. HARPOON design permits
adaptation to existing launcher and fire control systems. The missile guidance system is autonomous
after launch.

Control surfaces include four electro-mechanical driven aluminum control fins

mounted on the control section. High speed cruise flight is maintained by a turbojet engine with
600 lbs of thrust. For launch from ships or submarines, a solid rocket booster is used to accelerate

the missile to flight velocity.

The missile dimensions and weights are [1]:

t[n] Number in bracket refers to references given in Section 6.0.

1

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-GUIDANCE-

WARHEAD-'

Figure 1-I

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I2
!2

-SUSTAINER- CONTRO

CONTROL

Missile Features (Reference 1)

BOOSTER

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Table 1.2

Basic Dimensions for the HARPOON

Dia,- :ter

12.5 in (34.3 cm)

Wing Span

36.0 in (91.4 cm)

Length

3
iWeight__

Airlaunch

151.5 in (389.8 cm)

Ship/Sublaunch

182.5 in (463.5 cm)

Airlaunch

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Ship/Sublaunch

__

1144.9 lbs (519.9 kg)

1503.3 lbs (681.9 Kg)

A typical configuration for the air launch is shown in Figure 1-2. It is usually carried as a
store under the wing or fuselage and is standard ordnance on both propeller and jet aircraft.
The HARPOON CANISTER Launcher was developed to provide a means of adapting the
HARPOON to almost any ship and surface launch application, including land based shore defense
systems. Launch configurations consists of a cluster of four canisters on a support structure, Figure
1-3. The missile wings and fins are folded against the missile body to fit within the canister.

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The submarine launch HARPOON configuration is the same as for the CANISTER
launcher, except that the missile is installed in a buoyant capsule. The capsule is fired from the
submarine's torpedo tube and aft-mounted control fins unfold to maintain the required attitude as
the missile glides to the surface. Upon broaching the surface, the nose and tail section of the capsule
separate automatically and the missile's booster ignites, launching the missile from the capsule
centerbody in the same trajectory used in surface launches.
HARPOON was originally designed to meet the environmental Uesign criteria given in
XAS-2381A [2]. This document defines environments associated with transportation, storage,
handling, at-sea-transfer, captive flight, aircraft carrier, ASROC, Tartar-Terrier, hydrofoil,
submarine and free flight conditions.
Based on the mission profiles [3 and 4] and the environmental design criteria [2], tests were
developed to show compliance with the requirements. Three levels of testing were specified for
the HARPOON including:

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'K

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Figure 1-2 Typical Aircraft Configuration

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Figurt 1-3

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Canister Configuration

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Table 1.3

Levels of Testing

Qualification/Design Verification Tests

DVT

Pre-Acceptance Screening Tests

PAST

Customer Acceptance Tests

CAT

The DVT tests were designed to demonstrate compliance with the environmental design
criteria. The other two tests, performed at reduced levels, are designed to eliminate early failures
due to component and manufacturing problems. The missile and its various subsystems were
subjected to these types of tests. The environmental conditions simulated in these tests include
some of those given in Mil-Std-810D, Table 1.4, a fairly complete listing giving the majority of
exposure conditions.
Service history records of the HARPOON weapons system indicated that the ship based
systems had a failure rate that was significantly greater than the other platforms. A program was

initiated, under the direction of the Pacific Missile Test Center (PMTC), to look at various aspects
of the ship platform in an effort to determine the cause for the high failure rate.
The first portion of this program consisted of measurement of the missiles dynamic response
during captive carry condition. Instrumented missiles were placed aboard the USS Mississippi and
subject to a series of operating conditions, including various engine RPM, maneuvers and gun fire.

During the testing the sea states were benign. Results of this captive carry testing are presented in
References 5 and 6.
As a follow-on, modal tests were performed on a Launch Support Structure (LSS) onboard

the USS Scott [7]. In addition, laboratory tests were performed at PMTC to look at the dynamic

response of a single missile inside a canister. The system was subject to a series of vibration test

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with several differert designs for the shoes and studs supporting the missile within the canister [8].

A summary of Southwest Research Institute's (SwRI) participation in all these studies is contained
in Reference 9.
A final portion of the program in which SwRI participated was the performance of
laboratory vibration tests on a complete canister system on a LSS. This was an attempt to perform
Mil-Std-167 [10] testing on the system to demonstrate the feasibility of a new clamp ring isolation
pad. It was not possible to complete the sequence of Mil-Std-167 testing due to damage to the
trainers, used to simulate two of the four missiles. Modal analysis was performed and results
compared favorably with previous data. Results of this testing are contained in Reference 11.
6

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During the course of the overall of this program, directed by PMTC, it was determined that
an updated definition of the environmental design criteria [2] was needed. An updated, but classified,
version of the environmental design criteria has been developed [12]. To keep the scope of this
report unclassified, only references to the original version [2] of this document will be made. Where
necessary, the reader may wish to interpolate the data presented in this report with reference to the

updated requirements.
Table 1.4
810D

Test Methods in Mil-Std-810D Applicable to HARPOON Weapons System

Method

Condition

Applicable Procedures

500.2

Low Pressure

Operation

501.2

High Temperature

Storage

(Altitude)

Hot or Basic Hot Climatic Categories

Ambient Air or Induced Conditions

__Operation

502.2

Comments

Low Temperature

Storage, Operation and

Manipulation

Mild Cold, Basic Cold, Cold or Severe Cold

Climatic Categories
Operational or Induced Conditions

503.2

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Temperature Shock

Aircraft Flight Exposure or Engineering Same Categories and Conditions as 501.2

and 502.2

506.2

Rain

Design
Blowing Rain, Drip or Watertightness

507.2

Humidity

Natural Induced or Aggravated

Hot-Humid Constant, or Cyclic Diurnal

509.2

Salt Fog

Aggravated Screening

510.2

Sand and Dust

Blowing Dust or Blowing Sand

Categories

512.2

Leakage (Inersion)

Basic Leakage

513.3

Acceleration

Structural or Operational

514-3

Vibration

Categories
4 - Propeller Aircraft

Random,
ExcitationSource Dwells, Snusoidal

5-Jet Aircraft and Tactical Missiles

7A -Assembled External Stores, Jet
Aircraft
9 - Shipboard Vibration

Input versus Response-Defined Control

Endurance versus Functional Testing
Engineering Development Testing
Environmental Worthiness Testing

515.3

Acoustic Noise

516.3

Shock

IV11

Qualification Testing

Enviromnental Worthiness,
Qualificaton or Mission Profile
Test Procedue
I - Functional Shock
- Pyoecnc Shock

I3 - Catapult Launch/Anested
L.anding
High Impact/Shipboard Equipment
(MIL-S-901)
519.3
520.0

Gunfire Vibration.

Combined Broadband and Narrowband

Aircraft

Random Excitation

Temperature,
Humidity, Vibration.

Engineering Development, Flight

Operational Support or Qualification

Icing/Freezing Rain

Glaze Ice

Altiude
521.0

523.0

Vibro-Acoustic,

Combined Vibration, Acoustic and Thermal

Stresses

Temperature

Vibration. Thermal, Humidity. Altitude, and

Electrical Stresses

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The problem was approached using the test tailoring procedures outlined in Mil-Std-810D
[13]. The tailoring process was limited to literature review of various data that had been measured
for the HARPOON system as well as generic data. Some adaptation of existing data to satisfy
current requirements was made. No new test programs or detailed analysis was developed to satisfy
the requirements of this phase of the HARPOON program.
Recommendations of how the environmental design criteria should be updated to
correspond to current deployment of the weapon systems have been made. With the amount of
hardware already in the field, these updated criteria will not have an effect on the reliability of

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existing hardware. It is not the intention of these recommendations that old hardware be requalified
to the updated levels, but that the criteria be applied to future hardware systems or components to
insure acceptable reliability levels.
The work was performed for PMTC under a special task for the Nondestructive Testing
Information Analysis Center (NTIAC). Each of the three levels of testing: DVT, PAST, and CAT,
are nondestructive methods of demonstrating the compliance of the hardware components. The
project was aimed at recommending changes to the testing to provide a more realistic test level,
and in turn improve the overall reliability of the system.

2.0

Objective

1There were three primary objectives for this project:

1.

Determine the current test requirements in conjunction with the seeker WRA's. At

the same time, determine the nature of the tests performed on the seeker WRA's and the results.
2.

Define updated field environments for the platforms.

3.

Recommend changes to the current test requirements to reflect updated field

environments.

As noted carlier, this work was performed by SwRI for PMTC. A minor portion of the

work was subcontracted to ORI, Inc., based on their knowledge of the HARPOON system. This
included retrieval of information for the HARPOON library [14]. This project was an overview of
the problem and should not be considered a definitive document. This is due to the fact that the
statement of work was modified during the project to cover other critical items. In addition, there

were time and cost constraints.

The primary interest of the project was a study of the CANISTER version of the HARPOON

system since it had the highest failure rate. Results for the other systems are based solely on
published information and data.

3.0

Conclusions

At the initiation of this program the primary objective was to look at current test levels in
relationship to present knowledge of the service environments for the HARPOON weapons system

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and to develop recommendations as to changes to the test requirements that may be required to
insure acceptable reliability of the system. As the program progressed the thrust began to change.
This was due primarily to the nature of information available. It was difficult to determine the
extent of testing that has been performed on the HARPOON weapons system, and the results
therefrom, both at the system and at the Weapons Replaceable Assemblies (WRA) level. The test
levels that the current system has successfully withstood are not possible to define in any detail.
Therefore, the need for additional test tailoring became more difficult to justify. That is not to say
that tailoring is not necessary, but that it can only be justified on the basis of comparison of levels
rather than demonstrated capabilities and reliabilities of the system.
During the testing performed on the system a number of anomalies were observed as a
result of several environmental conditions. The environmental conditions under which anomalies
occurred included but are not limited to high temperature, restrained firing and shipboard vibration.
Additional anomalies were recorded but it was not possible to define the environmental condition(s)
that caused them due to limited data on the results of some of the testing.
Similar results were noted for tests done at the WRA level. In this case failures were noted
as a result of high temperature, humidity and vibration testing. It appears that the various WRA's
were not subject to the range of testing that the system was.
The majority of the environments in XAS-238 1A [2] are representative of the environments
that the HARPOON will be subjected to. For these environments it is important to insure that they
were then transmitted into requirements in the test plans for the various levels of testing. There are
several environmental conditions defined in XAS-238 1A which do not accurately represent all the
environments that the HARPOON will experience in-service. Since it was initially published in
1978, knowledge of the service environment and the platforms on which it is based have progressed.
Implementation of other weapons systems, such as the high velocity round, and modification of
current platforms such as inclusion of the CANISTER for example, have significantly affected the
environments. It is important to note that the XAS-2381B does exist but it was not reviewed in this
report due to limited access.

The Life Cycle Environment Profile [3 and 4], i.e. the history of events and associated
environmental conditions for an item from its release from manufacturing to its retirement from
use for the HARPOON, needs to be updated. When considering a life cycle, it is not appropriate
to look at a missile as a whole. Because of the interchangeability of the major sections, a given

I
3

missile may be made up of different major sections during it lifetime. Because of this it is appropriate
to define a life cycle in terms of a major section or a WRA. A life cycle of a major section can
include exposure to environmental conditions associated with all of the platforms. Because of the
questions concerning the number of cycle in the current mission profile it was not possible to develop
test times for vibration based on the test levels and the service levels and times.

4.0

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Recommendations

The recommendations are divided into two basic groups. The first are those where sufficient
information exist to make concrete recommendations as to changes in either levels or duration of
testing. The second group is for additional work that is required prior to making judgements on
potential problem areas.
It is appropriate to update the mission profiles to the current usage. After this is done it
will be possible to make a better judgement on the adequacy of the levels for various environmental
conditions. Continued updating of the reliability of the various systems will also provide useful
information. In addition to general reliability numbers, it is also necessary to track failures and
define their cause. In this way it may be possible to isolate weak components and/or damaging
environmental conditions. This will assist in defining the appropriate fixes and testing required to
increase reliability.

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3

It is not apparent from the literature review that the environmental criteria defined in
XAS-2381A have been fully implemented for the missile and WRA's. A further review of the
entire scope of the testing performed is required. This includes tracking the XAS-2381A
requirements to the test plans for the missile in its various configurations as well as all of the WRA's
testing. Once the appropriate test plans have been identified, it will be necessary to determine if
the testing was actually performed with satisfactory results.
One area that needs to be changed is the high temperature limits. As a result of testing and
information on induced conditions resulting from high temperature and solar radiation, a level of
160" F is recommended. It is recommended that future testing for high temperature extremes be
defined by the induced conditions for the hot climatic criteria as defined in Mil-Std-810D. This is
a twenty-four hour cycle designed to represent expected conditions during a day. It is recommended
that at least seven cycles of this profile be performed. During this testing the missile or WRA should
be functionally checked while at the temperature extremes to insure operability. This condition
would simulate the requirement to fire the missile from a CANISTER configuration during a hot

day.

10

Ion

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I

It is apparent that during the testing to date, anomalies have been induced by humidity. It
was not possible to determine the extent of the anomalies or what corrective action was taken to
prevent their reoccurrence. It is therefore recommended that some additional work be performed
in determine the nature of the humidity testing performed on the missile and WRA, and the results
of the testing. Concurrently, the implementation of any corrective action needs to be tracked. Based
these findings, it will be possible to determine if additional humidity testing needs to be performed
on any of the WRA's. Because of the nature of the use of the HARPOON in-service, it is
recommended that humidity testing of components and the systems be based on the aggravated
conditions defined in Mil-Std-810D. It is recommended that when testing is required a minimum

of 10 twenty-four hour cycles be performed in accordance with Figure 507.2-3 [13]. Again,
functionality of the missile and/or WRA needs to be checked during the testing.
The reliability of the CANISTER system, when subjected to the long duration exposure
onboard ship, is low. It is not apparent from the data whether the failures are the result of temperature,
humidity or vibration problems or a combination of these. The adequate simulation of the vibration
environment is still to be resolved. A first step would be to subject four missiles in CANISTERS
on a LSS to the random vibration tests given in Figure 5-47. The duration of the testing needs to
be defined in relationship to current mission profile data and accelerated testing techniques. The
current system has never been qualified to any level since the Mil-Std-l 67 testing performed resulted
in anomalies. The random testing is recommended in lieu of the sine testing since it more closely

represents in-service conditions.

Another consideration concerning the CANISTER system is the level of vibration testing
preformed on the WRA's. From data it is apparent that there is amplification between the levels
present at the feet of the LSS and the WRA locations. Taking the random vibration levels defined
at the deck of the ship and modifying them by the appropriate transfer will define the appropriate
levels. These may be below those utilized for the captive carry on the aircraft, but the duration of
that testing may not be sufficient to simulate the long duration exposure at sea. Based on the updated
mission profiles it will be possible to make these comparisons.
It is also not apparent from the data that the functional vibration levels for captive carry
onboard an aircraft are adequate. Close review shows that data measured on the HARPOON by
McDonnell Douglas is lower than the defined test levels. More recent data on a wide variety of
aircraft shows that the levels may be low. It will be necessary to resolve these differences.

I
I

Based on the results of the USS Mississippi testing, it is appropriate to update the shock
loading due to gunfire for the ship based platform. This means either increasing the amplitude of
the pressure pulse or modification of the required shock spectra. It is not the intent to just increase
the level of the enveloping half sine wave pulse for the WRA's. The shock time histories are not

11

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single pulses and contain energy over a significant time. It is therefore recommended that the shock
test pulses contain multiple peaks due to response of the overall system rather than the single pulse
indicated.
It is not the intent of these recommendations to require requalification of the HARPOON
system. The intent is to adapt the updated requirements to new procurement of replacement
components. It is appropriate to apply this information to other weapons systems where these
systems can be shown to be subjected to similar environmental conditions and have similar platform
characteristics.

5.0

3
3

Discussion
5.1

Test Tailoring
Service history records of the HARPOON weapons system have indicated that the

reliability of the ship based missile is lower than that associated with other platforms [15]. Because
of the higher level of failure, a project was initiated to define more accurately the service
environments and/or structural differences between the platforms. As part of this project, it is
necessary to compare the environmental qualification test levels currently in use, the environmental
design criteria, and the environments measured or expected in the field.
The approach is based on the concept of test tailoring as defined in Mil-Std-801D
[13]. Tailoring is defined as 'The process of choosing or altering test procedures, conditions, values,
tolerances, measures of failure, etc., to simulate or exaggerate the effects of one or more forcing
functions to which an item will be subjected during its life cycle." The objectives and tasks required
to perform the tailoring process include [Ref. 13 page 4]:

3
3
3

"The objective of tailoring it to assure that military equipment is designed and tested
for resistance to the environmental stresses it will encounter during its life cycle ...
To assure such consideration, environmental management plans shall be formulated
that require the following engineering tasks: determination of life cycle
environmental conditions; establishment of environmental design and test
requirements, including a test plan; and collection and analysis of field data for
verification of environmental design and test criteria. Proper attention to each of
these tasks insures that the correct environments are identified for test, that
engineering development as well as qualification tests are phased properly into the
item's acquisition program, that environmental test conditions are traceable to life
cycle conditions realistically encountered, and that testing is appropriate for the item

application."

Documentation required under the tailoring process include [131:

12

a) Environmental Management Plan

b) Life Cycle Environmental Profile
c) Environmental Design Criteria
d) Test Plan and
e) Operational Environmental Verification Plan.

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I

Under normal conditions, all of these documents are generated during the early stages
of the development of a weapons system. For the HARPOON system, the life cycle environmental
profile is contained in Reference 4, while the environmental design criteria refers to Reference 2.
Unique test plans were generated for the system as a whole, as well as the component level. Recent
work [15] has lead to the development of recommendations for a program to satisfy portions of the
operational environmental verification plan. The author has not kept track of the implementation
of the program proposed in this reference. From the documentation received at SwRI, it is not
apparent where the information required for item a) is contained.
As a weapons system is introduced into service and data is obtained on the field
environments and the reliability of the system, it is necessary to cycle this information back into
the other documents. The intent of this project is to provide recommendations where the
environmental design criteria and test plans need to be updated.
Figure 5.1 gives a general outline for the tailoring process prescribed in

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Mil-Std-810D. In this program we will consider aspects of the Natural Environments

Characteristics, Item Platform Characteristics, Platform Environments and Test Procedures. These
four areas will provide sufficient information to answer some important questions relative to
qualification tests, environmental design criteria and the true environment.
If modifications to the HARPOON system are subsequently considered, it will also
be necessary to incorporate the aspects of the Item Requirements Documents and the Design
Requirements. This is not a part of this project.
5.2

Current Information and Procedures

Information presented in this report is based on a review of available literature. No

attempt was made to develop any new information. The available literature included the ORI library
for the HARPOON [14], published literature and additional information supplied by PMTC.
For this project three platforms for deployment were considered:

I
I

1
13

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au

40)

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Table 5.1
Air Based

HARPOON Platforms

AIRLAUNCH

AGM-84A/C-1

ASROC

RGM-84A/C-1

TARTAR

RGM-84A/C-2

Ship Based

CANISTER

Lightweight

RGM-84A-3

Grade-B

RGM-84A/C-4

Thickwalled

RGM-?????

Submarine Based
CAPSULE

I
i

UGM-84A/C-1

Each of the platforms have differences associated with the support conditions and
enclosure for the captive carry portion of the life cycle. These conditions have a significant effect
on both environmental extremes and platform induced responses.
Each of these three platforms have a basic missile and additional equipment required
to modify it for the specific platform. The basic missile is made up of four major sections: control,
sustainer, warhead and guidance. For certain platforms, a fifth major section, the solid fuel booster,
is attached to the control section. For this project, we were interested in defining the environments

for weapon replaceable assemblies (WRA's) in only the guidance section, including: Seeker,
Probe/Crush Sensor, Electronic Equipment, Midcourse Guidance Unit (MGU), Digital Computer
with Power Supply, Altitude Reference Assembly (ARA), Radar Seeker and Altimeter with Power
Converter.
For the air based system, the environmental conditions during captive carry are

influenced by the flight envelope of the various aircraft. The dynamic characteristics are influenced
by a number of parameters, including: pylon configuration, wing structure dynamic characteristics,
engine location, and type and effect of other armaments. The HARPOON is carried on the following
US aircraft:

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P-3 Orion Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) Patrol
S-3 Viking ASW Patrol
A-6 Intruder Attack
A-7 Cosair Attack
F/A-18 Attack
B-52 Bomber

In addition, foreign nations utilize the missile on several other aircraft types. Each

of the aircraft will induce different environments on the missile. The location of the missile, inboard
vs outboard wing pylons or fuselage pylons, will effect its dynamic response. A primary effect is
the dynamic compliance of the pylon and wing structure. This will influence the low frequency
vibration levels to which the missile is exposed. The location of the missile, in relationship to the

engines, will effect the level of structural and airborne vibration. The flight envelope of the aircraft
will have an influence on the thermal and vibration levels based on the ceiling and maximum
dynamic messure (q).
The three ship based platforms: ASROC, TARTAR and CANISTER, are all placed
on launchers for service. The ASROC and CANISTER missiles are enclosed in a launcher

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throughout its captive carry life. In the ASROC configuration, they are located in an eight cell
system that can vary its orientation prior to firing. The CANISTER system is installed in a four
cell system that is fixed at the base. Since these launchers are deck mounted, they will be subject
to significant temperature variations and moisture exposure. For the TARTAR configuration, the
missile is stored below deck in a magazine prior to loading on the launcher. In all cases, the dynamic
characteristics of the launcher structum will have a significant influence on the response of the
missile during captive carry. In addition, the location of the launcher on the deck and the
characteristics of the ships propulsion and auxiliary machinery will influence long term reliability.
Platforms have been adapted for the following classes of ships:

PHM Patrol Hydrofoils

FFG-7 Guided Missile Frigates

DD and DDG Class Destroyers
CG and CGN Class Guided Missile Cruisers
BB Battleships.

FF-1052 Class Frigates

Compared to the other environments, the captive carry portion of the submarine based

system is benign. This missile is stored on racks inside the capsule prior to loading in the torpedo
tubes. The controlled environment and limited dynamic response are the primary reason that this

1
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configuration has high reliability. Because of this and a lack of published literature, little information
will be presented for this platform in this report.
5.2.1

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System Reliability

From information supplied in Reference 16, the time in the fleet distribution for
the ship and submarine based systems is given in Figure 5-2 and Table 5.2. This information is
based on the number of missiles returned to NWS's between 1980 and 1983. At the time this
information was compiled, the total number of returned missiles for the CANISTER configuration
was the highest, 527.
The time in the fleet data was transformed to cumulative distribution data, Figure
5-3, by dividing the number of missiles in each block by the total number of missiles for a given

configuration. There are a number of underlying facts that need to be considered when reviewing
the data. Among them are the defined mission length for each system which may vary in both
definition and practice. In addition, the time between BIT's will have some effect on the time at
which a missile is returned for repairs. The shape of the cumulative distribution functions can, in

all cases, be fit to a normal distribution with appropriate mean and standard deviation. Data for the
total HARPOON system, i.e. the sum of all configurations, is given in Figure 5-4. The fit is

reasonable because of the large data sample. Comparison of the cumulative distribution for the
various systems in a normal distribution are not as good as that for the entire database.

Compared to all the platforms, the TARTAR and CAPSULE has a higher average
time in the fleet and the CANISTER and ASROC have lower averages. The submarine based
system, CAPSULE, time in the fleet is 26.5 months. This is to be expected considering the controlled
environment onboard the submarine. It also has the highest standard deviation assuming a normal
distribution. Of the returned missiles, the CANISTER configuration shows the highest overall
failure rate. The failures are defined in terms of the factors that may have caused them as identified
by the built in test (BIT). Reference 17 gives these failure percentages for the period 1980 to 1983,
Figure 5-5 and Table 5.3.

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The number of failures during transportation is greatest for the two CANISTER
configurations. This could be due to the fact that these configurations are shipped inside the canisters.
It is possible that the shipping containers, MK 631, used for these configurations are not as effective
at isolating the missile from the transportation induced environments: temperature, humidity,

vibration and shock.

17

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Figure 5-2 Time in Fleet for Ship and Submarine Based System

18

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Figure 5-3

Cumulative Distribution for Ship and Submarine Based System

19

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Figure 5-4

Cumulative Distribution for Total Ship and Submarine Data vs Normal Distribution

20

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Table 5.2
Configuration

Number of Missiles
Returned

Average Time In Fleet

Months

Standard Deviation
Months

CANISTER

527

19.8

9.18

ASROC

192

20.2

9.72

TARTAR

71

21.8

9.22

CAPSULE

155

26.5

11.14

Total

945

21.1

9.93

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Time in the Fleet by Configuration

Table 5.3

Failure Percent by Configuration

Percent Failing

Configuration
Transportation

Deployment

On Test

Overall

LW CANISTER

24

22

54

Grade-B

12

27

45

ASROC

11

23

35

TARTAR

24

36

CAPSULE

18

29

AIR

26

31

COMPOSITE

12

21

37

CANISTER

During deployment, the largest failures are for the Grade-B CANISTER and the
air configurations. The high failure rate for the air conditions may be a result of the high level of
the captive carry environments. For the CANISTER configuration, it is most likely a combination

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of the levels of the environment and their duration that cause failure. This is reflected in the fact
that the LW CANISTER data shows a lower failure rate than the Grade-B, although the
environmental levels are higher. The CAPSULE shows the lowest failure during deployment due
to the benign environment aboard the submarines.

22

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The overall levels of failure during test are low. In addition to the BIT failures,
data based on firing results, after pilot production, indicate that the CANISTER configuration has
a lower reliability, Table 5.4 [16].
Table 5.4 HARPOON System Reliability

Configuration

Reliability

12ANISTER

3
5
3
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5.2.2

0.81

Other Ship Launch

0.96

All Other than CANISTER

0.95

Life Cycle Environmental Profile

One of the documents required for application of the tailoring process is the
Life Cycle Environment Profile, i.e. the history of events and associated environmental conditions
for an item from its release from manufacturing to its retirement from use. It covers the Natural
Environment, Item Platform Characteristics and Platform Environments defined above and should
included conditions associated with:
a) Shipping/Transportation
Road, Rail, Air and Ship
b)

Storage/Logistic Supply
Handling, Logistic Transport and Storage (Open and Sheltered)

c)

Mission/Sortie Use
Deployment, Use and Delivery to Target

Items a) and b) are not part of the current program, and therefore, will not
be considered in this report. However, they must be considered when implementing the
recommendations made herein. This fact has been stressed a number of times including ( 16]:

'TIhe Canister missile shows a higher failure rate while on test and in free
flight where environments are the same as other missile types.

- This is indicative that degradations occurring earlier can show up in later

mission phases. Thus --- Higher failure rates in transportation could be due to degradation during
exposure to ship environments.

23

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-- Higher failure rates aboard ship could be due to degradation during
exposure to transportation environments.

-- etc.

It is therefore necessary to examine all mission phases (transportation,

handling, aboard ship, etc.) to determine where degradation takes place."

1
3
3
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Only information associated with item c) will be considered in this project when comparing field
environments to design criteria and current test levels.
References 3 and 4 give the mission profiles for a number of HARPOON
configurations. The mission profile data is presented first in terms of a flow diagram showing the
interrelationship between various phases of the mission profile. These include time in the container,
transportation, storage, handling and captive flight. Some details as to specific handling equipment,
such as AERO-51 Trailers, and MK 45 load trucks, are included on these flow diagrams. The
second portion of the mission profile data defines in more detail the environmental conditions,
number of cycles and their duration. The environmental conditions include vibration level, peak
shock, temperature range, altitude and peak over-pressure as a function of the phase. For each
phase, a number of cycles is given, as well as the duration of the cycle. This allows the total
exposure period for a given set of environmental conditions to be determined. In addition, the times
at which BITs are performed are given.
It is not apparent if these profiles have been updated since they were defined in 1977.

From discussions of field service data, it appears that the actual mission profiles have been modified
in relation to those defined below. This information will have to be incorporated into the process
to insure an accurate representation of field conditions. For this project, it will be assumed that the
mission profiles are as defined below. The cycle period of any one missile is defined as the time
from all-up-round MSTS testing to the time when maintenance is due. A particular missile or
component may undergo a number of cycles.

3
I
S

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1
I

e rAs
noted earlier, the primary concern of this project is a definition of the service
environments during captive carry conditions. Where appropriate, some discussion will be made
concerning the level of storage and transportation environments. Each of the three types of
platforms; aircraft, ship and submarine, will be discussed. The environments that the missile will
see during free flight will be discussed in Section 5.4. These are the only three portions of the life
cycle that will be considered in this project.

24

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5.2.2.1

Air Based Platforms

The air based platform can be divided into two basic configurations. The first is
captive carry aboard the multiengine turboprop P-3 Orion antisubmarine aircraft. For this
configuration, the mission profile and associated environmental conditions are given in Figures 5-6
and 5-7 respectively. The second configuration consists of captive carry on the A-6 Intruder, A-7
Cosair, and S-3 Viking aircraft. Each of these are jet powered patrol/attack aircraft. The mission
profile, Figure 5-8, is the same for these aircraft with slightly different environmental conditions
based on the performance characteristic of the individual aircraft, Figures 5-9 to 5-11. At the time
of issue of References 3 and 4, platforms using the F/A- 18 and B-52 were not established. Therefore,
data is not available for these platforms.
Table 5.5

24 Month cycle period

Figures 5- 6 and 5-7

22 Month storage and transportation

21 Days intense period (500 hours)
23 Captive Carry Flights
85% ASW/SSSC mission
2 missiles/aircraft
15% Ready Alert (Attack) Mission
Intruder

4 missiles/aircraft

A-6 Intruder

_______________________

Figures 5-8 and 5-9

24 Month cycle period

23 Month storage and transportation
31 Day intense period
93 Captive Carry Flights

Cosair_A-7
Figures 5-8 and 5-10

Air Based Mission Profiles

24 Month cycle period

24 Month Storage and Transportation
One strike mission
2-4 missiles/aircraft

S-3 Viking
Figures 5-8 and 5-11

24 Month cycle period

23 Month Storage and Transportation
31 Day Intense Period
62 Captive Carry Flights

ASW/SSSC Mission (100% of time; Long Range)

missiles/aircraft

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As mentioned earlier, three phases of the life cycle were considered; storage and
transportation, captive carry and free flight. The storage and transportation phase of the life cycle
covers the entire life from manufacture to final disposition. In most cases, storage and transportation
is accomplished with the missile installed in a container specifically designed for it. The MK 607
Container is utilized for transportation of all of the air carried HARPOON missiles. Those missiles
destined for service on a CVA (Attack Aircraft Carrier), with A-7, A-6 and S-3 aircraft, are subjected
to additional transportation and storage loads on the AOE (Fast Combat Support Ship) and during
onload and handling on the flight and hanger decks. All of these conditions are with the missile in
the MK 607 Container. After removal from the container, the P-3 configuration is subjected to
additional transportation, handling and storage levels similar to that seen with the missile in the
container.
For a given configuration, the captive carry portion of the life cycle is that period
during which the missile is on station ready for use. For this project we will define the captive carry
portion of the mission profile for this air based platform to occur between take-off and landing of
the aircraft. This does not include any taxi conditions which are enveloped by other environmental
extremes. The P-3 captive carry conditions are defined as consisting cf 23 flights, each lasting
approximately 12 hours.
The three patrol/attach aircraft defined captive carry environments are identical
in level. Each of the flights last approximately three hours. The A-6 mission profile consists of 93
flights, the A-7 has only one flight and the S-3 has 62 flights. Each of these flights has additional

loads associated with temporary storage, upload/download and taxi. All of these will in one way
effect the lifetime of the missile.
BITs are performed at various stages during the mission profiles. It is during
these BIT tests that the functionality of the missile is determined. For the air configurations the
defined times of the BITs are identical. A BIT is performed at the Naval Weapons Station (NWS)
prior to shipment to the fleet. BITs are also performed after each upload, after takeoff and prior to
each download. These are to insure that the missile is functional prior to the mission and to determine
if any damage was done during the mission. BITs are also performed during the flight when the
aircraft is on station to insure that the missile is in the ready state.
5.2.2.2

Ship Based Platforms

Each of the four ship based systems has a unique mission profile and associated

environmental levels, Figures 5-12 to 5-19. In each case the total cycle time between return to the
NWS is defined as 24 months. Of this time a total of 18 months is spent in the captive carry

condition. With the exception of the PHM (Patrol Combatants Missile Hydrofoil) the 18 months is
divided into three cycles of 6 months apiece.

32

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3
3

Table 5.6

Ship Based Mission Profides

ASROC
Figures 5-12
and 5-13

3T
_____Missiles

Figures 5-14
and 5-15

24 Month cycle period

6 months on AOE (fast combat support ship)
Cycle period 18 months total, 3 cycle, 6 month/cycle/FF (Frigate)
in standby until selected
24 Month cycle period
6 months on AOE
Cycle period 18 months total, 3 cycle, 6 month/DDG or FFG
(Guided missile destroyer or guided missile frigate)
Missile loaded on launcher once for launch

CANISTER
Lightweight (LW)
Figures 5-16
On PHM for 18 months (Patrol Combatants Missile Hydrofoil)
and 5-17
Alongside tender at 1 month intervals
6 months of operation
5 month peacetime
I month intense period

CANISTER
Grade-B
Figures 5-18
and 5-19

3
CANISTER
Thickwalled

24 Month cycle period

6 months on AOE
Cycle period 18 months total, 3 cycle, 6 month/DDG, CG or DD
(Guided missile cruiser or destroyer)
Missile not in standby until selected
Not defined
II

The initial transportation, handling and transport by AOE (if required) for each
configuration is the same. In all cases the missiles are in containers for these periods. The difference
is the containers used to ship the missiles in. For the first two CANISTER configurations the
missiles are shipped in the CANISTER in the MK 631 container. This could have a significant

I
I

influence on the level of vibration and shock seen by the missile since the levels are constant as
input into the container. The ASROC and TARTAR configuration are shipped in MK 608 and MK
632 containers respectively.

33

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34

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39

IeI-

Iz

z
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The ASROC configuration is onloaded to the frigate in its container. It can be
stored onboard in this configuration for a period of time. Following unloading from the container

Ithe

missile is stored in the ships magazine and later transferred to the launcher. For the ASROC
configuration BIT tests are performed on the NWS and during the time that the missile is in the
launcher.

The TARTAR configuration

is removed from its container
prior to onloading

to

the frigate or destroyer. While onboard the missile is either in the magazine or on the launcher.
For the TARTAR configuration the only time a BIT is performed is at the NWS. There is no
indication from the mission profile that it is performed at any other time during the cycle.

Up to the point where the missiles are installed on the launcher the CANISTER
configurations have similar missior, profiles with identical environmental levels. For the Grade B
configuration the time on the launcher is divided up into three six month periods. The LW Canister
is carried on a hydrofoil. BITS are performed for these configurations are performed at the NWS
and periodically while the missile is on the launcher.

3
3

5.2.2.3

Submarine Based Platforms

1
The final configuration is the submarine based CAPSULE. In this configuration
the missile is captive carried on a submarine and fired out of the torpedo tube. It then floats to the
surface inside the capsule which once on the surface acts as a launcher for the system. The missile
I

is assumed to be onboard a submarine for a total of 18 months during two nine month patrols.
During this nine month period the submarine is assumed to be underway for a total of five months.
The remainder of the time will be spent in port. As with the CANISTER configuration the CAPSULE
configurations missile is transported inside the capsule inside a container, MK 630.
Table 5.7

I
iper

CAPSULE
Figures 5-20
and 5-21

Sub Based Mission Profiles

24 month cycle period

6 months total time on AOE/tender
Cycle period 18 months total, 2 cycles, 9 months/cycle
9 month patrol cycle
3 month home port, 2 week transit, 2 month patrol, 1
month port, 2 month patrol, 2 week transit to home port
Two tubes loaded with HARPOON and four HARPOONs
boat

For the submarine configuration the missile is subjected to BI ; a variety of times

during the mission profile. As with all other configuration a BIT is performed at NWS. In addition,
BITs are preformed after tube loading, during the time the missile is in standby in the tube and just

42

I
3

prior to tube unload. This level of BIT testing allows for a good definition of the true time of failure
of the system.

S5.2.2.4

Summary

We have presented some details of the mission profiles for each of the three
platforms, air, sea and submarine. This informations is necessary in the overall tailoring process
to define the appropriate test conditions.

The profiles given only define five major types of environmental conditions:
vibration, shock, temperature, altitude and peak over-pressure. The levels of the environments are
defined, but their specific nature is not defined. In fact, References 3 and 4 state that "The levels
of vibration, shock, temperature, altitude, over-pressure, etc. are only relative levels. They are only
presented for comparison of magnitudes and do not represent specific values. The Environmental
Deployment Profile will address the individual events in a more descriptive and specific manner."
The deployment profile, Figure 5-22, was included as an enclosure in References
3 and 4. To fully develop the environmental levels, other references and engineering judgement

will be used to define the specific nature of the conditions.

3
I

3
I

The mission profiles presented, Figures 5-7 to 5-21, are those that were
established at the beginning of the development program for the HARPOON. All information
presented in this document will be based on this information although it is apparent that current
service profiles do not match those given. It was not part of this task to look at current service use
and update this information. This task will be necessary if more detailed upgrades in the test
requirements are warranted.
As indicated earlier, the mission profile defines a complete cycle at the period
from shipment from the Naval Weapons Station (NWS) until return to the NWS. A given missile
and WRA may be subjected to a number of complete cycles from the time it is introduced into
service until it is finally disposed of. It is also interesting to note that a given WRA may be utilized
in any number of the three platforms during it lifetime. Typically a given WRA, when returned to
the Naval Weapons Station (NWS), will be retained with the current missile if possible. In this
case it will see the same complete cycle a number of times. It is also possible that a given WRA
may be removed from a missile and installed on another missile destined for a different platform.
Therefore all WRA's must be designed and tested to withstand environments introduced by all three
platforms and must include the worst case. When considering the potential for damage to the WRA,
it is necessary to consider the amplitude and duration of the exposure in the failure model. This

1
I

makes determination of the appropriate test levels and durations even more difficult.

43

M)

z,

90

4q

Zw
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m m0

44

LL

r0!

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ui
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<YL-

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47

5.2.3

Environmental Design Criteria

One objective of this program is to develop sufficient information to compare

field environments with current environmental test plan levels. The outcome will determine whether
development of any new test plan is necessary.

5
3
3to

To this point we have not defined the level and nature of the environmental

conditions for the HARPOON. The mission profiles discussed in the previous section will be used
define the number and duration of various phases of the life cycle of the system. The levels of
vibration, shock, temperature, altitude, overpressure, etc. presented in References 3 and 4 are only
relative, designed for comparison of magnitudes. When considering the natural environment and
platform factors the following need to be taken into account:
a)
b)

Magnitude of the natural environment.

Magnitude of platform induced environments.

c)

Probability of occurrence of the environmental conditions.

d)
e)

Absolute and relative duration of exposure phase.

Number of times a phase will occur.

g)
h)
i)

Expected effects and failure modes.

Effect on hardware performance and mission success.
Likelihood of problem's disclosure by test methods.
Experience gained from other equipment similarly deployed.

3
I
I

The magnitude of the natural environment will be discussed in this section. Data
will be based on the information given in XAS-238 1A [2] and supplemented by general information
included in such documents as Mil-Std-810D [13] and Mil-Std-210C [18]. Levels defined in these
documents are based in part on the probability of occurrence. Platform induced environments will
be discussed briefly in this section and covered in more detail in section 5.3. The duration and
number of cycles has been defined in the previous section.
The expected failure modes is an important aspect of this program since it is

3
3
3

known that failures have occurred from review of field data, i.e. experience. A number of
assumptions have been made on the most probable failure modes but they have not been fully
verified with currently available analysis of the field data. One failure mode that has been defined
is that associated with a moisture intrusion problem in one of the capacitors in the seeker. This
would indicate that it will be important to look closely at procedures for humidity testing.
Consideration of the natural and induced environments on the various platforms
has led to the conclusion that shock and vibration may be a driving factor in the reliability associated
with the Canister based system. It is hypothesized that the level and duration of the exposure to

48

3
I

these environments has a definite influence on the hardware capability to satisfy mission
requirements. This failure mode has not been verified with analysis of the field data or the testing

performed to date.
It is necessary to consider the environmental levels of the test program and the
types of failure modes that they are designed to detect. In most instances qualification programs
are established to define susceptibility to the various environments. The intent is to induce failures
in a short period of test time that are representative of service data. They are not set up to determine
mean times to failure, which is left to reliability testing.

Historically the levels of testing defined in Mi1-Std-810 have proven to

demonstrate the susceptibility of a specific piece of equipment to the service environment. Earlier
versions of this document have defined specific test levels and durations for each of the
environments. The driving force behind the adoption of Revision D of the standard was to tailor

3
U

the testing to the particular field environments.

All the environments defined in XAS-238 IA, Table 5.8, are at the external surface
of the missile, canister, capsule or container, as applicable. Data is defined for the following program
phases:
Table 5.8

Environmental Conditions as Defined in XAS-2381A

Program Phase

3
3

XAS-2381A
Table

Transportation

Storage, Handling, and At-Sea-Transfer

II

Airfield and Carrier Storage and Handling

Ii

Captive and Free Flight

IV

ASROC Ship Storage, Handling, Launcher and Free Flight

Tartar-Terrier Ship Storage, Launcher and Free Flight

VI

Hydrofoil Ship Handling, Launcher, and Free Flight

VII

Submarine Handling, Launcher, and Free Flight

VIII

Drop Criteria

Ix

Atmospheric Temperature

I
I

4
49

For this program, we only consider the phases associated with captive carry and
free flight. It is interesting to note that there is no definition of the captive carry conditions for the
CANISTER version of the missile, the one with the lowest reliability. The environmental conditions
considered include: high and low temperature, humidity, rain, ice and hail, snow, sand and dust,
shock, vibration, acceleration, gun blast loading, electromagnetic radiation, acoustics, high pressure
and altitude. Not all conditions are applicable to all the program phases.

Mil-Std-810D defines test methods and procedures for all aspects of the service
life of equipment; shipping/transportation, storage/logistic supply and mission/sortie use. In this
document only those associated with the mission/sortie use for the HARPOON weapons system
will be considered. Table 1.4 is a list of the applicable test methods defined in Mil-Std-810D,
including specific procedures for the different platforms.

3
The environmental conditions given in XAS-2381A are summarized in Table
5.9. These are supplemented by a series of figures, some of which have been included in this report,
IFigures 5-23 to 5-34. The samples included are considered to be the conditions most likely to cause
failure in the missile.
3
The variation of high temperature with time of day, Figure 5-23, is typical of
published data, with maximum tenperatures of 140" F. Recent work on temperature measurements
Eon the HARPOON on hydrofoils have indicated temperatures up to 182" F [19]. Mil-Std-810D
indicates induced temperatures from 145" F to 185" F for various climatic categories from basic
U
hot to extreme induced. Similar data is contained in Mil-Std-201C.
Vibration data is given in Figures 5-24 to 5-28 for the three platforms considered;
air, ship and submarine, as well as free flight. The captive flight environment at the missile forward

lug, Figure 5-24 has an overall of 5.8 g. This compares to a minimum integrity test for external
store equipment in aircraft of7.70 g given in Figure 514.3-36 ofMil-Std-810D. The Mil-Std-810D
is intended for small items, less than 75 lbs, and larger items, such as HARPOON will experience
a lower level. The levels are significantly above those measured on the HARPOON [20]. This is
typical where service levels are increased to test levels to reduce test time.

3
I
I

The free flight vibration levels for the sustainer and boost phases are given in
Figures 5-25 and 5-26 respectively. The boost phase is applicable to the ship and submarine based
systems. The levels generally increase as the location proceeds from the nose of the missile to the
tail. Levels in the region of the seeker are given as 5.8 and 9.14 g for the sustainer and booster
phases respectively. Again these are higher than the levels given in Reference 20. The defined test
curves envelope the series of narrowband peaks evident in the service data. Enveloping of such
data can lead to a conservative test if the overall level is the primary cause of the failure mode rather

than peaks at specific frequencies.

50

A.

I
A.

*~1a.

9?

WI

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69

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A.IA~'IA.
~O~~4C

~a%~.0%U~

.~dII

A.

A.~

WI

WI

@0

@0

A
Z

____

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_____

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c.~~ui~U.--

~-

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u----',

A.

.Z

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~

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-

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51

ISI

+4+1
t.2

Aq ];;44V.

4z

+1 1

fn_n

06

t z zz z

TFI

z4 ;x

02

b .

If

31T

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5

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&4

I
I
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I

140

120

I
OL

100

I
I

I
I

80

60
0000

0400

0800

1200

1600

2000

2400

Time of Day

Figure 5-23 High Temperature Profile for Capsule and Canister Skins for Handling and
Canister Skin While Installed in Hydrofoil Ship (Reference 2)

I
I

55

I
I
I
I
*

Note:
Vibration level is the response
at the missile forward lug.

0.1

*
I

:OVERALL

LEVEL 5.8 G's RMS

0.02
0

ILII0.0

10

0.01

0.00.01

Iu

<

0.001
10

IjII

I 1
1000

100
FREQUENCY, Hz

I
I
Figure 5-24

I
I

HARPOON Missile Vibration Environment, Captive Flight

(Reference 2)
56

I
lN

Note: Vibration levels are inputs at the hard

points (equipment mount ing/pri mary structure
interface) in the missile.

0.1
Zon
I

interface.02
tems

IU

and V
0.032 Zone IV

eI

I.0.1

'

0.03

0.0006

.
0
Z0.0006

o~ooosOVERALL
ZONE

MISSILE STATIONS

LEVELS (G'S RMS)

9.63 THRU 84.50

84.51 THRU 160.50
WING SURFACES
CONTROL FIN SURFACES

5.8
6.5
7.3
7.3

C1

.0

IO

IV

S0.001'
10

I Il l
1000

100
FREQUENCY, Hz

I
I
Figure 5-25

I
I

l l

HARPOON Missile Vibration Environment, Free Flight (Sustainer)

(Reference 2)

57

I
I
I
U
MOT:
.....

UI'WT AT T141
MOUNTING
(EIQUIPMENT
HARO
IN Y'1N1
IN'IRlPAC3U
F STR!.UCTrU
Ie IMIARPINT

VIGNATION LSVILS AR

UdiU

0.01.

N"

4-4

0.1
o

STTI
toN

WISL
NEES(GSRS

S 0.025

*~0.02
-

0.012

1
11

C
4II

IV
V

I
I
I0

0.0001

9.63 THRU 84.50

84.51 THRU 160.50
160.51 THRU 190.00 BOOSTER FIN
WING SURFACES
CONTROL FIN SURFACES

'''t

100

9.14
12.1
17.1
11.5
11.5

i
l l tifi

1000

FREQUENCY, Hz

Figure 5-26

HARPOON Missile Vibration Environment, Free Flight (Boost)

(Reference 2)

I
I

OVERALL
LEVELS (G'S RMS)

STATIONS

00ZOEMISSILE

58

Vibration levels for the ship and submarine systems are given in Figures 5-27
and 5-28. The ship levels are taken directly out of Mil-Std-167 [10]. These levels are based on
very old data and test equipment and are not considered representative of actual service conditions.
This is especially true for large items such as for HARPOON missiles in CANISTERS on a LSS.
Mil-Std-810D also refers to the Mil-Std-167 levels but gives an alternative random test level for

threshold performance, Figure 514.3-34. This curve has an overall level of 0.22 g. The submarine
vibration levels are defined in terms of sinusoidal vibration in the frequency range of 5 to 500 Hz
with peaks up to 10 g's, Figure 5-28. This is intended to represent the environment caused by the
capsule exiting the torpedo tube and rising to the surface.

3
3Shock
3

levels in the air based system are primarily a result of release from the
ejection rack, figure 5-29. This data appears to be derived from the results of testing performed at
PMTC [21]. Since this is a platform specific level Mil-Std-810D does not have a comparable level.
The levels given are said to be enveloped by a short duration pulse of 1,100 g's amplitude. Ship
shock load factors, Figure 5-30, are representative of the response of the ship to various sea states.

An additional shock loading present on the ship is represented by the air blast present during gunfire,
Figure 5-31. The loads are defined in terms of pressure as a function of time and can result in very
high acceleration levels on the test item. The final shock load, Figure 5-32, represents the exit of
the missile form the torpedo tube and broaching the surface. This pulse is base on a 30 g shock
pulse of approximately 25 msec duration.
The final set of data derived from Reference 2 is the acoustic levels for captive

I
I

3
3

and free flight, Figures 5-33 and 5-34. The overall levels vary from 150 to 170 dB. These are
similar to the levels given in Method 515.3 of Mil-Std-810D.
In general, the levels defined in XSA-2381A are similar to those given in
Mil-Std-810 and therefore should be considered to be representative of the general population of
military equipment. This includes the specific example given above as well as the other
environmental conditions. It is apparent from the failure rates associated with the CANISTER
system that something has fallen through the crack. This is one of the primary reasons for
incorporating the concept of test tailoring which seeks to represent actual field data in the best
possible way. To accomplish this task, we will now summarize the testing defined for various
WRAs that was performed successfully.
5.2.4

Test Plans and Summary of Testing Performed

Table 1.3 defines the levels of testing for the HARPOON system. As indicated
previously the DVT tests were designed to demonstrate compliance with the environmental design

criteria. The other two tests, PAST and CAT, are designed to eliminate early failures due to
component and manufacturing problems.
59

I Z\

ZI

S.1
I

0.0

to

2.0

4o15

FREQUENCY, Hz
I

0.2

DISPLACEMENT, In.

00 to 0.6
ACCELERATION, G

______________

Single Ampliude

1-4

"4.OtoO0.06

L0.1

4-15

-0.03

0.05 tO 0.69

16-25

26-33

-0.02

0.01

_______

::0-92tO 1.28

0.69 t 1.11

33-40

L0.005

L0.59 t 0.82

41-50

i-0.003

:0.52 t 0.77

Figure 5-27

00

Ship Vibration (Ref. MiI-Std-167B) (References 2 and 10)

60

I
I
I
I
1

10.0

14

1.0

0.1

II

0.01

0.001

0.000 1

100

10

FREQUENCY, Hz

U
I

I
*

Figure 5-28

Submarine to Surface Induced Sinuso'.,l Vibration (Reference 2)

61

1000

I
I
30,.

I
ICURVE

*
3
II
I

101

10

100

1.000

10A00

PRECUENCY. Hz
CURVE A - EJECTION RACK ANO PROBE ERECTION SHOCK SPECTRUM - CAN 8E
OBTAINEO FROM A HALF SINE PULSE WITH AN AMPUTUOE OF 1100g's
PEAK ANO A DURATION OF 0.5 MILLISECONOS

CURVE I - BOOSTER CLAMP RING SHOCK SPECTRUM

Figure 5-29

I
I

HARPOON Missile Ejection Rack and Probe Erection, Booster Clamp

Ring Shock Spectrum (Reference 2)

62

MOMI

PA~OM

LO
.OAN

AX=S VMOLD 84 C IDINED IHOWSEOWFLV

20
2

IwwriAa 1-4

~~1

LATINWAL

:a________

.00

10
I

0.01

69

0.02

VNRTICAL
LaOruaftUON

m.'.

LOCIO1

LOKING POONWAMO

0.03

vErTIAL
LATIRAL."

15g

STAI~MOAN

Figure 5-30 Ship Shock Load Factors vs Time (Reference 2)

63

0.04~

I
I
I
I
I
8

I.=

0.0L

30
I

TIME IN MILLISECONDS

IV
I

Figure 5-31

Shock Pulse from Gun Blast (Reference 2)

3Encapsulated
3100r.r

I)

HARPOON Shock Spectrum

._1

1I,Icai~.1 tgF4

=0

10A

SN
$W PU

1-

100

110
FREQUENCY, Hz

Figure 5-32 Submarine-to-Surface (Reference 2)

65

10

51268451115122-*202 274 9307

; 9- 1-89 ;11:01AM

SENT BY:S W R I

160

150 _

c.
140
N

130

120

,n

CURVE (A) - 160 dB O.A. - CAPTIVE FLIGHT

CURVE (B) - 155 dB O.A. - FREE FLIGHT
CURVE (C) - 150 dB O.A. - ASROC LAUNCHER
ADJACENT CELL

100

31.5

63

125

250

500

1K

2K

4K

8K

16K

31.5K

OCTAVE BAND CENTER FREQUENCY, Hz

Figumr 5-33 HARPOON Missile Ex=eal Acousic Levels (Reference 2)

66

;# 2

I
1

170 dB OVERALL

I170

160

E"

150

EQ

140

130

-I

12

CL
0

Do.
110

100 L31.5

3
I

63

125

250

500

1K

2K

4K

8K

16

31.5K

OCTAVE BAND FREQUENCY, Hz

Figure 5-34 HARPOON Missile Boost Flight External Acoustic Levels (Reference 2)

U
Information on what types of qualification testing have been performed on the
HARPOON, in terms of WRA's or the total system, is difficult to obtain. Data reviewed by SwRI
is limited to reports on Container testing, copies of presentations and a review made by PMTC
personnel. There are several documents available on measurement of field data, but these should
not be considered qualification tests since functionality of the items was not measured. The
information presented in this report contains information made available to SwRI, and therefore
may not represent the complete set of data.

We will first look at qualification testing performed on the system and some

details of testing on specific WRA's. Since the major failure problem is associated with the
CANISTER version of the missile the emphasis will be on that platform.

References 22 and 23 indicate that the following tests have been performed on
the HARPOON niissile. A general discussion of the results of this testing is contained in these

references, but no detailed study of the test reports was possible. It was also not possible to obtain
details of the levels of environmental conditions to which the test items were exposed from the
literature reviewed. Some information can be drawn from the description of the military standard
or document covering the testing. The following groups of testing have been performed as defined

Sany

by References 22 and 23:

Desert Exposure (NWCICL).

No significant environmental induced anomalies
occurred as a result of these tests.
Missile LO 45 Passed MSTS.

Missile LO 92 Failed, Mid-Course Guidance.

Restrained Firing (NSWSES/White Sands).

Missile LO 66 Failed, Altimeter.
Missile Lm 89 Failed, Altimeter.
Diagnostic Testing (Wyle/Norco).
Fungus, Salt Fog, Ice, Rain.
Missile LO 42 Failed, Seeker.
Missile LO 48 Failed, Seeker.
1975 At PMTC.
Ship storage vibration.

Missile handling shock.

Acoustics.
Aircraft ejection.
Fungus/humidity/salt fog.
Sand and dust.

Ship gunfire.

Aircraft carry temperature/pressure/vibration.

Free flight temperature/vibration.
Shipboard shock (Not 901-C).

68

I
3

1976 ASROC Shipboard (DE-1052).

Vibration.
Gunfire.
1977-78 Section combined environment (Guidance, Sustainer, and
Control).
Cold temperature, sine vibration and repetitive shock.
Tested 21 Guidance, 10 Sustainer and 24 Control Sections.
Discontinued as not a cost effective screen.
1978 Grade B Canisters and LSS (AETLUSAUGUS).
Shipboard vibration (Mil-Std- 167).
Produced numerous anomalies.

Primary.
Structural locking features.

Secondary.
Canister rail.

Electrical wiring/connector.

Seeker.
Input considered excessive and unsymmetrical, probably
due to large mass (12,000 lbs).
Conclusions was that test was NOT representative since

similar anomalies had not been observed in fleet operations.

Missile LO 66 Failed, Seeker and Altimeter.
Missile LO 89 Failed, Seeker.
Missile LO 42 Failed, Seeker.
Missile LO 48 Passed MSTS.

1979 Underwater Shock (Mil-S-901C) (SENSY, Hunters Point).

Grade B CANISTERS and LSS successfully completed
test showing the safe (Grade B) and operational.

(Grade A)
capability.

The desert exposure testing at China Lake was limited to exposure to natural

conditions of high temperature in a simulated storage condition. The indicated results are that no

3
3
3
3

significant environmental anomalies concurred as a result of these tests although Missile LO 95

had an indicated failure in the Mid-Course Guidance section. This discrepancy needs to be clarified.

3
3

configuration there is no indication of the actual testing performed or the results. These groups of
tests contain significant information that could give an indication of the susceptibility of the missile
to some of the environments assumed to cause the high failure rates of the shipboard configuration.

69

During the restrained firing testing at White Sands, failures were noted in both
the altimeters. There is no explanation of the nature of the problem or any indication of what
corrective action was taken to prevent its reoccurrence. Similar results were obtained in the
diagnostic testing at Wyle Laboratories, where the seeker failed. Again no explanation or corrective
action is given.
For the testing at PMTC in 1975 and the shipboard testing of the ASROC

These include: acoustics, ship gunfire, aircraft carry temperature/pressure/vibration, free flight

I
3
3

temperature/vibration, shipboard shock, vibration and gunfire. It would be useful to review the
level of testing performed md the results including any anomalies.
The combined environment testing on the guidance, sustainer and control sections

appears to be an attempt to perform environmental stress screening (ESS) of the items. It is not
apparent if these tests were designed to indicate workmanship or manufacturing problems or
susceptibility to service environments. The ESS may have been done at such low levels that it may
not have initiated any failures.
The attempt to perform Mil-Std-167 testing at AETL on the LSS system with
four missiles installed had significant problems. The first was that the equipment utilized to induce

the vibration was not large enough to limit test item interaction with the inputs. In addition, to have
enough force capacity to push the test item, the equir"-,it must be massive enough and have
sufficient resistance to overturning moment to limit te.' Im interaction with the input. For an

estimated weight of 12,000 lbs, a center of gravity 80 inches from the base, an input level of one g
and a dynamic amplification factor of 10, the moment that needs to be resisted is approximately
800,000 ft-lbs, a significant number. All indications are that the levels input into the LSS were not
as defined in Mil-Std-167.
There were a number of anomalies noted during the testing, failure of the seeker
three of the four missiles as well as failure on the altimeter on one of the missiles. Although the
inputs were not in accordance with the test requirements, these results should have drawn attention
to the fact that the seeker was a weak link in the system. Although this fact is brought out in the

3on

references, it is not apparent what corrective action was taken. Reference 24 contains some
additional details of the results of the testing at AETL not covered in References 22 and 23.
A final comment on this test is that Mil-Std-167 test requirements are based on
a significant amount of historical data. This requirement was established when the majority of test
equipment was limited to sinusoidal excitation. Current knowledge indicates that random testing,
wether it be narrow or broad band, is a more appropriate excitation. In addition the standard is
oriented to the testing of smaller test items. The author is of the opinion that for a test item of this
size it is necessary to tailor the vibration levels to simulated service conditions. Without tailoring,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to develop a system to withstand the severe test vibration levels.

Stest

I
U

The final group of tests indicate that the CANISTER system passed an underwater
sequence in accordance with Mil-S-901C.
Since References 22 and 23 were produced, other testing has been performed on
the HARPOON system [5 to 9 and 11]. With the exception of the USS Mississippi testing, all these
tests were performed on dynamic simulators or dummies. Because of this it was not possible to
70

U
I

check the functionality of the missile as a result of the testing. During the USS Mississippi testing
five of the seven missiles failed the post test MSTS. Of these five, two were not tested prior to the
shipboard program. Of the other three remaining failures, two were in the seeker and one was in
the ARA. It should be noted, with the exception of the gunfire, the levels of vibration and shock
during the sea trials were benign. Sea states were very calm during the entire test program.
The vast majority of the testing described above was performed on the complete
missile or a group of missiles. A significant level of effort has gone into performing this testing.
With the data available to SwRI, it is not possible to determine if the levels of testing performed
on the missiles themselves or the various launch platforms was in conformance with the
requirements. It is also not evident what tests the missiles have successfully completed.
It is now appropriate to discuss in some detail the defined test requirements for

WRA's. Documentation is available giving a general description of the testing required [25 to 31]
although no detailed test plans were reviewed. It is apparent from a review of the documentation
list in the ORI library [14] that a significant number of documents exist covering testing at this
level. Only those listed were partially reviewed, due to limited time and access. The following is

a listing of the test levels defined for eight WRA's:

I
3

Qualification/Design Verification Tests (DVT)

a)

Seeker [25]

Random Vibration - 7.6 g., 10 sec/axis, non-operating

5.4 g., 30 min/axis, operating
Sine Vibration - 53.2 mins/3 axis
Shock - 45 g's, 15 msec, 6 shocks, non-operating
30 g's, 15 msec, 6 shocks, operating
Temperature/Humidity - 4 cycles, Figure 5-35

b)

I
I
I
I

Probe/Crush Sensor Mil-P-85459

Random Vibration - 5.8 g,, 10 min/axis, erect, Figure 5-36
5.8 g., 2 hrs/axis, non-erect
9.2 g. I min/axis, boost
Shock - 15 g's, 20 to 1.50 msec
Temperature/Humidity - 2 cycles, Figure 5-35

71

I
Qualification/Design Verification Tests (DV
c)

- Continued

Electronic Equipment [27]

Random Vibration - 5.8 g., I nin/axis, non-operating, Figure 5-36
12.9, 17.1 or 24.2 g., 10 sec/axis, operating
8.2 or 9.2 g, 30 min/axis, operating
Sine Vibration and Sine Dwells 30 - win/resonance, non-operating
Sine Sweeps -2 hours/axis total with dwells
Acoustic - 158 db for 1 win, operating
148 db for 29 min, non-operating
Shock - 42 g's, 25 msec rise time, non-operating

27 g's, 25 msec rise time, operating

1100 g's, 0.5 msec duration, pyro

d)

Temperature/Humidity -65"F and 170"F for 1 hr each, non-operating

170"F with altitude for 1 hour
Midcourse Guidance Unit (MGU) [28]
Random Vibration - 8.2 g, 30 min/axis, non-operating and operational
12.9 g., 10 sec/axis, operational
5.8 g&., 10 win/axis, operational, Figure 5-36
1.1 g, 5 win/axis, gyro operational
Sine Vibration Sine Dwells - 30 min/resonance, non-operating
Sine Sweeps - 2 hours/axis total with dwells
Acoustic - 150 db, operating 168 db for 30 win, operational and non-operating
Shock - 27 g's, 25 msec rise time, operating
385 g's, 0.5 msec duration, pyro
Temperature/Humidity -40"F and 160"F, non-operating
-60"F minimum one hour, operate for at least 10 win, 170"F
non-operating and operating
68"F to 100F non-operating humidity

e)

Digital Computer with Power Supply [29]

f)

Temperature/Humidity 7 cycles
-50"F and 130"F, 2 hours, non-operating
Attitude Reference Assembly (ARA) [30]

Sine Vibration - 20 to 60 hz, 3 min

Sine Vibration - 5.2 g's, 30 to 60 hz, 1.5 minutes

g)

Temperature/Humidity 7 cycles, -60"F and 150"F, 1 hour

Radar Seeker [31]
Random Vibration 5.46 g., 30 win/axis, operating
7.6 g, 10 sec/axis, non-operating
Sine Vibration 53.2 min/axis
Shock

Temperature/Humidity

h)

U
I

Altimeter with Power Converter [32]

Random Vibration - 12.9 g,, 10 sec/axis, operating
8.2 g, 30 win/axis, operating
Sine Vibration - 2 hrs/axis, non-operating
Shock - 27 g's, 25 msec rise time, 6 shocks, operating
1100 g's, 0.5 msec duration
Temperature/Humidity

72

I
Pre-Acceptance Screening Tests (PAST) [26]

a)

Seeker
Temperature Cycling - I cycle -65"F to 170"F
5 cycles -65"F to 120"F
Random Vibration - 4.1 g, 5 min/axis, Figure 5-36

c)

Electronic Equipment
Temperature Cycling - 4 cycles -65"F to 170"F
Random Vibration - 5.8 g., 5 min/axis, Figure 5-36
Digital Computer/Power Supply
Temperature Cycling - 4 cycles -60"F to 150"F
Random Vibration - 5.8 g., 5 min/axis, Figure 5-36

e)

f)

Attitude Reference Assembly

Temperature Cycling - 4 cycles -60"F to 150"F
Random Vibration - 5.8 g., 5 min/axis, Figure 5-36

g)

Altimeter
Temperature Cycling - 8 cycles -65"F to 160"F
Random Vibration - 5.8 g., 1 min/axis, Figure 5-36

Customer Acceptance Tests (CAT) [261

a)

Seeker
Temperature Cycling - 1 cycle -65"F to 170F
3 cycles -65"F to 120"F
All cycles failure free.

c)

Electronic Equipment
Temperature Cycling - 3 cycles -65F to 170'F
All cycles failure free.

d)

Midcourse Guidance Unit

Temperature Cycling- 1 cycle -60"F to 150"F
Failure free.
Random Vibration - 2.5 g, 3 min/axis, Figure 5-36
Digital Computer/Power Supply
Temperature Cycling - 3 cycles -60"F to 130"F
All cycles failure free.

e)

I
I

Attitude Reference Assembly

Temperature Cycling - 3 cycles -60"F to 150"F
All cycles failure free.
Sinusoidal Vibration - 5.2 g's peak at a single frequency between 30 and 60 Hz for 1.5
minutes during each temperature cycle.

h)

Altimeter
Temperature Cycling - 4 cycles -65"F to 160"F
All cycles failure free.

73

Ii
II
I
II
ii*?

ROUST
EATER

SO

I2

7S

S7i

-f

0UUR

-74

I
I
I
i

L/fig

(Q):

20

50

2.5 Gxis

.0012

.057

Fig 1(b):

300

BZ

4.1 Grms

1____ ,

Ioo,
10
9 2 t..

200.47=

RZ

6U
rig .(c):

'
-7MU 1207 VU000

5.8 Gras

.02

II
I10

I
I

Figure 5-36

20A

500

100

BRZ

Vibration Spectrums (Reference 26)

75

I
There are several general points to note concerning the information presented.
The first is that not all WRA's are subjected to testing at all three levels. For example, the MGU
is not subjected to the PAST testing. There is no apparent reason for the selection of which units
are tested at which levels. It is possible that the missing tests are defined in documentation not
reviewed by SwRI or they are tested at a higher level of assembly.

Another point is that the ranges for temperature cycling within a group varies
with the WRA. In the CAT testing, the high temperature limit varies from 130"F to 170"F. It was
not possible to determine if this variation was due to measured differences in the service conditions,
or if the levels were adjusted to meet the capabilities of the individual WRA's.

There are similar discrepancies in the levels of the shock and vibration testing.
In some instances shock testing is designed to simulate handling, operational and pyrotechnic
conditions for the electronic equipment during DVT testing. It is completely left out for other
WRA's (Digital Computer and Attitude Reference Assembly). It is logical that the vibration levels
since differences have been measured during field and laboratory testing. This is especially

Svary

true for the DVT tests which are designed to show susceptibility and tailoring is appropriate.

SIt

is now appropriate to look at data on the results of testing performed on the

WRA's. The results presented in this report are derived from information suppled to SwRI by
PMTC personnel. No additional study of available literature was performed. Information was
available only on the Midcourse Guidance Unit, the Attitude Reference Assembly and the Altimeter.
It was not possible to obtain any information on the Seeker, the item that displays a high failure
rate during testing and in service.
Information indicates that the MGU was qualified on two occasions, in 1974 and
again in 1982. The first sequence of testing included.
Random Vibration
Sine Vibration
Pyro Shock
Humidity
Temperature/Altitude

I
I

All tests correspond to the DVT testing outlined above with the exception that
acoustic testing was not performed. Anomalies were noted during the testing. These included loss
of C9 from the I/O page and receptive intermittent functioning during sine vibration testing. Changes
to the design to alleviate these two problems are indicated although no repeat of the testing is given.
Humidity testing induced a number anomalies including capacitor problems, substrate short on the
memory module, lack of conforming coating and micro-circuit failure. It is not apparent what action

U
I

76

I
3

items were initiated and followed through as a result of this testing. The second qualification on
the MGU was in 1982. It is interesting to note that qualification to Humidity was by similarity,
although the initial series of tests had problems and no subsequent retess are indicated.
The Attitude Reference Assembly (ARA) was tested by Northmp in 1975 and
by LSI in 1979. The extent of the testing performed was not indicated. In the Northrup testing the
ARA had to be dried at 150"F for a period of 36 hours following the humidity testing to pass the
functional checks. During the LSI testing no humidity testing was performed. Anomalies were
indicated in these tests with several attempts at modifications and retests. It is not apparent if the
item finally passed a complete set of tests.

A number of qualification programs were performed on the Altimeter. The

Kollsman Altimeter was subject to at least two sequences of tests; Phase I in 1982 and Phase 1I in
1984. During the Phase I testing problems were encountered during the random vibration, humidity
and temperature/altitude tests. During the vibration testing the leads on a power supply filter
capacitor broke and a FET shorted. To alleviate the first problem the parts were purged from the
stock. No cause or action item for the second problem was indicated.

During the humidity testing of the Kollsman Altimeter, 10 cycles of 95% RH at

149"F for 8 hours and 85% RH at 86"F for 16 hours, gross anomalies were noted in the capacitors.
Production stock testing indicated a 100% failure rate. The items were purged from the stock and
subsequent purchases limited to tested and approved parts. During the temperature/altitude testing
problems were indicated in a solder joint and an attachment screw. Procedures were adopted for
proper soldering and torquing screws.
The recommendations of Phase I was to develop a Phase H qualification program

to include temperature, vibration and shock. It is not apparent why humidity was left out of this
Phase II program. During the Phase H random vibration testing a buss wire broke, capacitor leads
broke and solder joints fractured. Fixes were outlined to alleviate subsequent failures. Multiple
anomalies were noted at 170"F with various fixes.

Honeywell tested both the HARPOON Missile Radar Altimeter (HMRA) and
the Cruise Missile Radar Altimeter (CMRA). The first sequence was the CMRA and included the
following testing;
Ground Handling and Transportation Shock

Ground Handling and Transportation Vibration

Sine Vibration
Captive Carry Vibration

77

I
Free Flight Vibration
Acoustics
Launcb ]Ejection

A number of anomalies were noted during the test sequence. The first was a problem with resistor
R29 that resulted in an anomaly associated with the indicated altitude requirements. During testing,
measurements were consistently below the requirements and a request for deviation down to a lower
level was made to "allow the unit to pass with the new requirement". During the captive and free
flight vibration, a broken wire at the base of transistor Q1 and an internittent failure of the IF
connector pin was noted. Changes in the construction and quality assurance procedures were made
to eliminate these problems. During the launch ejection testing an isolator load resistor detached

3
3but
3

resulting in a failure of the far range sensitivity. It was determined that an overtest was performed
no retest was indicated. Additional problems were found in the selection for R77 and R79 with
changes made to procedures to alleviate the problems. Additional environmental conditions were
qualified by analysis. These included dust, acceleration, explosive atmosphere, launch ejection,
submunitions ejection shock, catapult and trap shock, salt fog, boost vibration, ground handling

and transportation vibration and fungus.

For the testing of HMRA in 1985, sine and random vibration, operational shock,
temperature cycling and bench handling shock are included in the test plan. It is not clear what

3
3
3
3
3

tests were actually performed. Qualification by similarity to the CMRA is given for pyro shock,
non-operating shock, handling and transportation shock, acoustics and humidity. It is interesting
to note that anomalies had occurred during the testing of the CMRA, and although corrective actions
are indicated there is no evidence of retest. In addition it was not possible to find any information
of the results of the pyro shock and humidity testing of the CMRA.
As with the testing of the entire missile and its varinus platforms, a number of
anomalies were indicated during the testing sequence for the '3There are indications that
corrective action items were initiated for a majority of these anomalies. It is not apparent if the
item was retested with these fixed, incorporated to determine if the problem was actually fixed.
There appears to be a significant amount of qualification by similarity where the original item did
not pass the testing or no indication of testing is available.
It is important to reiterate that the information present in this report is based on
the information supplied to SwRI for rediew. From a review of the documentation in the ORI library
[14] it is apparent that more information is available. Due to time and cost constraints, it was not
possible to review all the data. It is appropriate to update the information presented in this report
to obtain a more complete picture of the status of the HARPOON qualification testing.

78

I
5.3

Captive Carry Platform Characteristics

It has been recognized that the three platforms for deployment have significantly

different environments [2].

Parameters such as temperature extremes (with the exception of

aerodynamic heating), humidity, rain, salt fog, sand and dust and ice and freezing rain are driven
primarily by natural conditions. The location of the platform; on the land, sea or air, and the world
climatic region are controlling factors.

The basic levels are defined in Mil-Std-210C and

Mil-Std-8 10D and are applicable in most instances. There may be some modifications depending

upon the type of protection offered by the various platforms, as defined previously.
The induced environments: including temperature, vibration, acoustics, shock, and
acceleration, are driven primarily by platform characteristics. We will look at some details for these
environments since they seem to be a factor in the failure rate of the missile in service.

5.3.1

Air Based

Hall [33] refers to a study that gives conclusive evidence "that environments are
responsible for 52% of the avionics field failures, with 90%of environment related failures attributed
to temperature, altitude, humidity and vibration." These results are based on analysis of data on

failures of a wide range of avionic components. In addition to extreme conditions that may cause
immediate stress overload failures fatigue may be a problem. "...it was found that the presence of
very low amplitude vibration for a long period of time does have a significant impact on equipment
life." It is therefore necessary to look at both the levels and duration of the exposure conditions.

3
3

Thermal extremes are the result of the basic air temperature, variations in flight
altitude and the potential for aerodynamic heating during high speed flight. In addition to thermal
stress and temperature effects on the material properties, this variation in temperature can result in
condensation of moisture in the air due to thermal lag between the components of the missile and

the surrounding air. Each of these conditions can lead to failure of the missile. In captive flight,
low temperature are experienced during long duration cruise or maximum endurance flight at high
altitude [34]. Extreme flight conditions of this nature can cold soak a weapon to levels that will
cause performance problems with such components as electronics, thermal batteries, propellant

trains and fuel systems. Maximum skin temperatures in captive flight occurs during a supersonic

dash, and maximum internal temperatures can be caused by long duration flights a low altitude and
high supersonic speeds. Thermal problems associated with hot captive flight profiles generally
involve exceeding the temperature limitation of internal electronic components, explosives, and
solid or liquid fuels. The storage and preflight climatic condition is not considered and could cause
deterioration of systems prior to use if long-term temperatures were excessive.

1
I

79

U
The major components of the air based dynamic environments are the
performance parameters of the aircraft, the dynamics of the aircraft and missile and their interaction
on the pylon. A significant amount of information exists on the vibration levels of stores on aircraft
A large number of variables are involved in this data base, including the type of aircraft, pylon and
missile. We will limit our discussion as much a possible to information specificatfly on the
HARPOON. Typical low frequency response of the HARPOON on the wing of an A-6E aircraft

are:

First Modes of the HARPOON on the A-6E Aircraft (analysis from Grumman)

Frequency

Description

9.41 hz
10.32 hz
12.37 hz

HARPOON Yaw
HARPOON Lateral
HARPOON Pitch

These represent missile responses. Additional low frequency dynamic response will be driven by

Ithe
5

influence of the missile on the dynamics of the aircraft wing and fuselage.
The missile is also subjected to high frequency buffeting resulting in vibration

and acoustic excitation. Studies [35] have shown conclusively that the major source of stimulation
of the vibration and acoustic loads on a missile during captive carry is the aerodynamic boundary
layer operating upon the total skin area of the missile. This excitation is drive by air flow around
the geometry of the missile, aircraft and interface and is a function primarily of the dynamic pressure
during flight. Broadband response spectra for captive carry conditions will be colored by low

I
I

frequency characteristics arising from aircraft, pylon/launcher attachments and missile body
bending/cylindrical modes. Typical captive carry life requirements include 90% of the time at
cruise and 10% at high-speed low-altitude flight conditions, supplemented by maneuvers and

transients.

The random vibration and acoustic

data is normally

presented in terms of a power

spectral density (PSD). This gives the energy content of the vibration and acoustics as a function

of frequency A single value giving the overall level is the g, defined as a statistically determined
95&percentile with 50% confidence value based on a one-sided tolerance limit [36].
Recent work by Allen [36] has looked at developing a realistic model of the
environmental stresses on external stores for various configurations and flight conditions. One of
stores in the program was the HARPOON (AGM-84), with a total of 635 measurements for this
missile. The g. as a function of the dynamic pressure (q) is summarized in Figure 5-37 and Table
5.10. Based on a maximum q of 1200 lb/ft2, the maximum defined in Mil-Std-810D, the overall
g, is 6.2 g,,. This is comparable to the 5.8 g, given in Figure 5-24 from XAS-2381A. The

I
I

S80

I
minimum level is defined as 1.3 g. for q less than 250 lb/ft2 . During a normal mission the level
will vary between these two extremes.

To develop a single test level it is necessary to scale the various in-service levels
to a common one. Time compression is related to the stress factor (S), in this case assumed to be
g., by:

s,

Tr,

where a varies with the slope of the fatigue curve of the material (6.5 is typical). By algebra the
equation can be solved for the test time (T) in terms of the service times (T,) at various levels. The
actual duration the test at a defined level is determined from the sum of all the individual times.
Due to questions concerning the current mission profiles and time constraints it was not possible

3
3
3

to do this for the HARPOON.

Another factor to consider is the relative magnitude of the acceleration in the
three major axis of the missile. Based on accelerometer orientation, the longitudinal acceleration
was found to be approximately 2/3's of lateral and vertical components [36]. Finally acceleration
was found to vary along the length of the missile. The relative magnitude of the acceleration in
relationship to the % of body length from the nose is [36]:
% of Body
Length

Relative Amplitude of
Acceleration

20%
53%

1.12
1.00

78%
95%

1.33
2.07

Based on this, it would be necessary to increase the overall level of the vibration environment by
1.12 for the WRA's which are located near the nose of the missile.

E
I

As part of the development program for the HARPOON measurements were

made with the missile mounted on three different aircraft, P-3C Orion (a four engine propeller
driven patrol aircraft), S-3A Viking (anti-submarine aircraft powered by two wing mounted jet
engines) and an A-7C Corsair (subsonic attack aircraft powered by a single fuselage enclosed jet
engine)[37]. The vibration environment was found to be due primarily to the aerodynamic excitation
of the missile structure. Below 220 Hz differences between levels for three aircraft indicate that
characteristics of propulsion systems are important. In addition it was found that gunfire can increase
the overall level by up to 100%. The environments studied in this program included:

s
81

* LIEUTIOFOR aft(OL

NIL-STO-SIOD

(1e4)-(2.U0)
(l

'~
S

SF-S
P-111

A-4
F-14

OW

M sawOW:1.

1014
8(:
ATISTIC AMS
SIOS.

COaTNT 9S6OY)

I.
USITOAtA.qNJOpi

STATSTIL ANLS.
q a M0207 piP
S6.0 dB/OCTAVE MKORT).
(PIANSLO 0.24. lie
55180E SLOPE FOR
ALL STORE ANALYSES
AND TEST EALCAA:..
(r116 g6(oVL Apo
E6G/OCTAVE. ALL SO.
rMZIN. PREDICTED
ENVIROIPEYP. NIINETY-0lFTH

I
3
I

CARAIU

1:

.C

T1
(1%41)( 9W)F

lol

--

- r

I[ROAA

COSTNT4666OV

(D

ON

1466

6OCTAVE. ALL STORES

WIMP ENVELOPE OF
GREATER luax 59.5
OF ALI. FLIGHT DATA
GWUOCTAVE.
CALCLAD EXA3.MLE
D.80
-F
ROM TABLE 514.3-Wt
AT q a 1600 Wi.

3.23. P1~

Figure 5-37. Random Vibration Data Measurements and Data Analysis Results from 1839

Flight Data Observations (Reference 36)

82

I
Table 5.10 Random Vibration Data, grins (OVL), Level Adjustment Factors for the
Maximum Predicted Environment (95th) Percentile with 50-Percent Confidence, Based on
One-Side Tolerance Limit) (Reference 26)

d9l/OCT)
CONDITION AIR.LAUNCHED NUMBER (dBIOCT)
ith
MISSILES AND OF DATA q-702.0207 q-702.0207
MEAS.
MEAN irms MEAN
ASSEMBLED
C
N,
g
EXTERNAL
(OVI
STORESRATIO
CONDITION OF
TO ALL
STORES
CONFIGURATION

(grinS_

FACTOR
(SdUIOCT)
qm 702.0207
RATIO TO
(9550) grmn,,
(OVL)
ENVIRONMENT&AX.
ENVIRONMENT

(6d101OCT)F
q&70210207
OVERALL
rins,,
95/50)

Eins

REMARKS2
(ALCAPTIV E
FLGHT
EXCEPT
AS NOTED)

1.4666)

1.
2.

1839
ALL STORES
SINGLE STORE 542

1.4666
1.2932

1.00
0.88

3.6393
3.2089

1.00
0.88

3.

CLUSTER
1297
MOUNT
1203
AGM (ALL)
SINGLE STORE 816

-1.8814
1.4148
1.2195

1.28
0.96
0.83

4.6682
3.5105
3.0258

1.28
0.96
0.83

1.8267
1.5646
1.4184

1.25
1.07
0.97

4.5324
3.8821
3.5194

1.25
1.07
0.97

4.
5.
6.

CLUSTER
MOUNT

7.
8.

SINGLE STORE

9.

I
|j

387
636
481

CAPTIVE
FLIGHT &
FREE FUGHT

CAPTIVE
FLIGHT &
FREE FUGHT

CLUSTER
MOUNT

155

5.0073

1.38

2.0181

1.38

NOTES:
'MAXIMUM PREDICTED ENVIRONMENT (RANDOM VIBRATION DATA MEASUREMENTS). NINETY-FIFTH PERCENTILE WITH 50-PERCENT CONFIDENCE. BASED ON ONE-SIDED TOLERANCE LIMIT
'EQUATION OF BASELINE (95/50)
[grins (OVL)J, - (101EXP)
fir a q - (q),
[exp] - [loqio (qh-(2-28537)]
EQUATION FOR CONDITION
CONFIGURATION
rins (OVL)Ii - (FACTOR)i [grins (OVL)h
rOF
3 MAXIMUM (q)j FOR grrns (OVL) - 1.3 (CONSTANT)

q(MN)

2
3

284
195

.N)
I,

j q(MN.

S
6

302
201

8
9

259
182

I
I
I
I
I

BASELINE
CAPTIVE
FLIGHT &
FREE FLIGHT

83

I
IShock during aircraft catapult launches and arrested landings.
Long term vibration during captive flight.
Short term vibration induced by aircraft gunfire.
Shock loads associated with missile launch forced ejections.
For straight and level captive flight the data indicates that the overall g. level
of response is a linear function of the flight dynamic pressure. Similar results are presented in
Reference 38 for the A-6E aircraft, Figure 5.38. This differs with the power relationship given in
Reference 36. The following least square regressions results were obtained [37 and 38]:

3
3
I

3
I

Aircraft

Equation

A-7C

g. = 0.0015 * q

S-3A

g. = 0.0017 * q

P-3C

g. = 0.0021 * q

A-6E

g=0.0011 *q

For a q = 1200 lb/ft2 this would give an overall level of between 1.32 and 2.52 g, which is
significantly below the 6.2 g, obtained utilizing the results of Reference 36. It was not possible
to resolve these discrepancies.
The results [37] indicate that the captive flight vibration environment, in terms
of the overall levels, of externally carried stores is due primarily to aerodynamic excitation and is
relatively independent of the carriage aircraft and mounting location. For sharp turns the vibration
levels are substantially greater (in some case an order of magnitude) in the frequency range below
100 hz due to low frequency buffeting. The aft regions of missiles show levels four times those in
forward region compared to the factor of 2 given in Reference 36. Below 400 Hz the HARPOON
response is higher than Mil-Std-8 10 requirements but is lower for high frequency region [37]. This
is due to the large weight of the missile in relation to those used to generate the Military Standard

data. Gunfire increases the level throughout the entire frequency range.
Shock induced loads are a result of several conditions including, aircraft launch
and trap on the aircraft carrier, buffeting during maneuvers, firing of other weapons, and ejection
of the missile from the pylon. In most cases these loads are very severe and highly dependent on
the specific configuration and therefore it is not possible to define generic levels. It becomes
necessary to make specific measurements on the configuration in question. Reference 21 deals
with the shock environment during ejection launch by aircraft launchers. A series of tests were
performed at the Ground Ejection Test Facility at PMTC. Acceleration time histories were measured

84

I
3

at a number of locations on the missile. Peak accelerations are summarized in Table 5.11 and range
from 6 to 970 g's depending on location and test configuration. The data is also presented in terms
of shock response spectra for various location, Figure 5-39. These levels were also compared to
the specified test levels, Figure 5-40. For this condition the test shock levels are enveloped by the
test requirements.
s rShock
loads are also produced during
the catapult and arrested landing
of the
aircraft on a carrier. Results from a series of tests of the HARPOON on a A-6E aircraft are given
in Reference 38. The peak accelerations as a function of missile station and the shock spectra for

3
3
I

the seeker position are given in Figure 5-41 to 5-44. The peak accelerations vary from 3 to 9 g's
for the seeker location. Although the levels are significantly below those caused by ejection launch
the levels in the low frequency range are significant. The 14 and 30 Hz responses, Figure 5-42,
represent the primary modes of the system on the wing. This correlates well with the 12.37 Hz
pitch mode given above. The FCE response, missile station 38, has a significant amount of high
frequency component due to ringing of the pin-mounted FCE ring.
Acceleration during captive carry is primarily the result of maneuvers of the
aircraft. In most cases the resulting stress levels in the components are low when compared to other
environments. The functionality of certain components, such as gyros, may be affected by this
environment. No specific data is available so the information contained in Mil-Std-8 10D is assumed
to be adequate, Table 5.12. This data includes the acceleration due to catapult launches at a level
of 12 g's in the forward direction and 18 g's vertically. These levels envelope the measure 'evels.

5.3.2

Ship Based
The environmental conditions for the ship based configurations are driven by the

design of the ship, its performance characteristics and the sea states to which it is exposed. It is
first necessary to define a "typical" mission based on historical data and projections concerning
future actions [39]. It was assumed a series of activities, each two weeks long, make up an entire
mission. During a typical deployment it was determined that a surface combatant ship would spend:
I27%
323%

of the time in normal cruising,

35% in combatant activities,
in port, and
15% in maintenance, either alongside a tender or in a repair yard.

I
I
1
I

85

I
I
I
I
I

(a5.6

4.4
4.8-

4.0
3.6
3.2

w2.8

2.4

0 SEEKER

2.0

A SUSTAINER ENGINE J

1.6

1.2

0.

-<

OA
100

200

300

400

-"-"

500

600

700

800

900 1000 1100

(psf)
FREE STREAM DYNAMIC PRESSURE - q

I
I
Figure 5-38

I
I

38)
Gm versus Dynamic Pressure for A-6E Aircraft (Reference

86

I
Table 5.11 Peak Acceleration Levels Measured during Harpoon Ejection Tests.
TestU 4 thru 9: Low-force cartridges. Tests 10 and 11: High-force cartridges.
(Reference 21)

Peak acceleration in p for tests 4 through 11

I
Location

No.

Direction
MAU-OA/A

i
I

VSO1
VS02
VS03
VS04
VSO6

Seeker bulkhead
Seeker bulkhead
Seeker bulkhead
MGUflightcontrolring
MGU flight control ring

Axial
Lateral
Vertical
Axial
Lateral

VS06
VS07
VSO8
VS09
VSI0

MGU flight control ring

Guidance sect. structure
GuiwA sect. structure
Gulnce sm. structure
Proximity fur

VS1 I
VS12
VS13
VS14
VSF6

Aro-7A-l

40

12
12
10
...
50

12
15
20
83
57

23
13
18
...
125

12
10
18
...
85

Vertical
Axial
Vertical
Lateral
Axial

30
24
43
88
52

23
22
40
65
34

19
52
64
75
63

50
45
55
123
see

46
35
75
87
45

Proximity fWe
Proximity fuse
Forwd ttach lug
Formrd attach u
Porvurd wtch lug

Lateral
Vertical
Axial
Lateral
Vertical

90
32
19
42

30
84
42
16
34

50
144
38
36
78

...

40
80
55
35

VSI6
VS17
VSI8
VS19
VS20

Elector foot Imp ct

Ejector foot impact
Ejector foot Impeat
T&E sect. structure
T&E sect. structure

Axial
Lateral
Vertical
Lateral
Vertical

100
140
218
248
206

116
152
176
200
224

248
250
368
576
315

VS21
VS22
VS23
VS24
V825

Aft attach lug

Aft attach lug
Engine ect. structure
Engine
t. structw
Engin it. structure

Axial
Vertical
Axial
Vertical
Lateral

92
92
30
52
72

85
100
22
40
46

V326
VS27
VS28
VS29
VS30

Engine set. structure

Engine smt. structure
Fuel controller
Contrl fin actuator
Control fin actuaor

Axial
Vertical
Vertical
Axial
Radial

38
48
7
33
60

35
52
9
24
44

..

I
I
|

12
12
tO

MAU-9A/A MAU-9A/A Aao-7A-1

87

Aor-7A-1
13
15

Aero-7A-1

Aero-7A1
19
14
20

...
108

15
13
30
...
58

60
55
65
87
60

55
46
110
90
75

45
45
98
100
50

57

63
160
60
50
94

40
100
...
33
55

...

27

60

...
65
35
60

476
360

190
160
500
400
580

250
280
500
600
400

260
450
625
420
60

240
300
660
970
...

118
150
42
80
100

115
160
30
97
60

67
95
13
60
...

137
142
33
85
65

110
130
30
68
55

93
...
80
70
0

54
80
16
54
106

45
70
11
30
48

20
35
6
20
33

40
90
13

67

50
70
20
40

...
6
...

...
..

...

60
..
33
50

I
II

II

70

60 m

.om
i

II

Io

ri

FLIGHT CTRL.RING

4-- -

GUIDANCE SECT. STR.

9-

PROXIMITY FUZE

a,

Il

lIl

FWD. ATTACH LUG

50
d

/ 0,

'..

40

3100
AL

Figure 5-39

315

250

600

400

630

3.

60

1250

1000

2000

1600

3150

2500

5000

4000

80000

6300

10 000

Hz

Shock Spectra for Q = 10 Averaged Over Three Axes at Various Locations for

Ejection (Aero 7A-1 Rack Using High-Force Cartridges). (Reference 21)

160

200

FREOUENCY,

I
I

125

88

I
*

70

-a (

U1

40

-i

im30
MEASURED

820

DESIGNED
560g, O, ma HALF SINE)
10

500

800

125
100

200
160

315
250

400

630

1 ,,I 1

1250
1000

I I-__,_
f
I

2000
1600

3150
2500

5000

4000

1
8000

6300

10 O0

FREQUENCY. Hz

Figure 5-40(a)

Comparison of Q =10 Shock Spectrum Levels and Design Criterion for the
Midcourse Guidance Unit (Reference 21)

*@ 40

-'"

30

20
10

--

,I I1

,,
125
'100

Figure 5-40(b)

S89

DESIGNED
(3859, 0.6 ma. HALF SINE)

315

200
160

250

50
400

am

I1 ]1
1250

1. 1

1 1
3150

2000

1600
1000
630
FREQUENCY. Hz

20

I .. I I - j

50M0
4000

M
6300

10000

Comparison of Q = 10 Shock Spectrum Levels and Design Criterion for Seeker

(Reference 21)

U
I
I
3~

o~LONGITUDINAL"

"T

&LATE RAL

Z 12.0

z12.0 0

I"1VE RTICAL

0
U
U

S4.0-

20

120
100
80
60
MISSILE STATION - INCHES

140

160

NOTE: DATA OBTAINED FROM 4 SEPARATE LAUNCHES AS

DEFINED IN FIGURE 6

I
3

40

Figure 5-41

Variation of Catapult Launch Peak Acceleration Levels with Missile Location

(Reference 38)

100

LONGITUDINAL

I
14 Hz

30 Hz.

VERTICAL

IE
<:

100
FREOUENCY - Hz

10
NOTE:

3
I

I
!

Figure 5-42

1000 2000

LATERAL SHOCK SPECTRA NOT GENERATED DUE TO

LOW LEVEL.

Catapult Launch Shock Spectra for Seeker (Reference 38)

90

U
U
16.0

U~

Co
I

0 LONGITUDINAL
A
LATERAL
0' VERTICAL

20

212.0

4.0

20

40

80

60

120

100

140

160

MISSILE STATION - INCHES

NOTE: MEASUREMENTS FROM LANDING EVENTS 4, 5,6,7 (FIG. 4)

e 5-43 Variation of Arrested Landing Peak Acceleration Levels with Missile Location

(Reference 38)

U
*

100
VERTICAL DIRECTION

SEEKER

- - -

FcE RING

I
*

__
1o

10

__

__,1--

1000 2000

100

FREOUENCY

Hz

Figure 5-44 Comparison of Arrested Landing Shock Spectra for Seeker and FCE Ring
(Reference 38)
91

I
Table 5.12

Suggested G Levels for Procedure II - Operational Test (Reference 13)

Test Level

vehicle
Category
I

Aircraft 2.1, 3/
Helicopters
Manned Aerospace
Vehicles

Direction of Vehicle Acceleration

(See figure 513.3-1)

Forward
Acceleration
A
in 's I/

Lateral
Fore

Aft

Up

Down

Left

Righ~t

1.0k

3.0k

4.5A

1.5A

2.0k

2.0A

Vl

2.0

2.0

7.0

3.0

4.0

4.0

6.0 to 12.0
5/

1.0k

0.33A

1.A5

0.5A

0.66A

0.66A

2.0

5.0k

5.0A

6.O

3.25k

3.75A

3.75A

2.0

Ving/
SpW0son

Aircraft

Mounted

Stores

Fuselags
Mounted
Ground-Launched

2.0

3.5A

4.0A

4.5A

2.7A

1.5A

1.5A

Ii/, A

1.1A

0.33A

1.1A'

1.1A'

1.1A'

1.1k'

//

Z/

missiles

Z/

.I/

Levels in this column should be used when forward acceleration is unknown. When
the forward acceleration of the vehicle is known, that value shall be used for A.
2.1 For carrier-based aircraft, the minims- value to be used for A is 1, representing
a basic condition associated with catapult launches.
.3/ For attack and fighter aircraft, add pitch, yaw, and roll accelerations as
applicable.
A/ For helicopters, forward acceleration is unrelated ti acceleration in other
directions. Test levels are based on current and nec.- "uture helicopter design
requirements.
S/ When forward acceleration is not known, the high value of the acceleration range
should be used.
A/ A is derived from the thrust curve data for maximum firing temperature.
Where A' is the maximum maneuver acceleration.
.A/ In some cases, the maximum maneuver acceleration and the maximum longitudinal

I/

acceleration will occur at the same time.

When this

Occurs,

the test item should

be tested with the appropriate factors using the orientation and levels for the
maximum (vectorial) acceleration.

I
U

92

I
Based on historical and projected requirements its was deduced that 18% of
"typical" ship missions would occur in colder waters and 82% in temperate to equatorial waters
[39]. In this report the environments that were considered are limited to temperature, humidity,
vibration and shock.
On board a Navy ship, temperature and humidity environments can be categorized
1)
2)
3)

Internal, uncontrolled
Internal, controlled
External to the ship

The first two have extremes that are bounded by the third although the humidity levels can be
damaging in the uncontrolled areas. Data for the external condition can be based on Mil-Std-210C
and Mil-Std-8 10D information in terms of variations in temperature and humidity. These are then

adjusted to account for operation in both cold and temperate locations. Figure 5-45 is an example

of an aggravated temperature-humidity cycle designed to propagate failures quickly. A minimum

of ten cycles is recommended for this type of testing.

Work on the TOMAHAWK ABLS during captive carry tests on DD 976 was
aimed at measuring temperature extremes [40]. Interior air temperatures consistently reached in
excess of 135" F and up to 142" F. The outer skin on missile rocket booster was typically up to
120" F and up to 127" F. These temperatures were for ambient air temperatures of 82 to 86" F.

This indicates that there is the potential for a temperature rise of 60"F in relationship to the ambient
air temperature. Tests were also run for desert exposure and on a submarine. In these cases the
data shows ordnance temperatures approaching 1600 F.
There are two basic approaches in developing the definition of the vibration levels

for a ship based system. The first, an analytical approach, is based on the Response Amplitude
Operator (RAO) technique [41]. Utilizing this procedure the ships response in all six degrees of
freedom can be determined, Figure 5-46. It is first necessary to define the nature of the sea conditions
in terms of the significant wave height and modal period. From this information it is possible to

develop the sea spectrum based an analytical representation, such as that defined by Pierson and
Moskowitz [42]. In a parallel effort it is necessary to develop the ship RAO based on a given ship,
ship speed and relative wave heading [41]. This operator is then used to modify the sea spectrum
to develop a ship response spectrum representing six degrees of freedom motion at the ship center
of gravity. This ship motion data is derived for a range of sea conditions representing the range of
conditions that may be expected during a mission. It can then be transformed to a specific location
on the deck, such as the feet of the LSS. This transformation may be difficult to define for large

93

I
structures such as the LSS that may have a significant influence on the local compliance of the deck
structure. This transformation must also include additional vibration sources such as excitation by
the ships propulsion system and other mechanical systems on the ship.
Based on the time scaling procedures defend above, it is then possible to develop
test levels and times for a specific location on the ship. This process is workable if the RAO are
available for the specific ship in question and the information on the transformation to local deck
conditions is available. In most cases approximations must be made at various stages of the process
and questions may arise concerning the validity of the results.
The alternative approach is to develop a test program to make measurements at
the required locations on the ship while under way. Chalmers [39] has categorized surface combatant
ships into four groups based on function:

Category I
Category II
Category II

PG, PGH, PHM

CV, CVN
DD, DDG, FF, FFG, CG

Category IV

LCC, LPA, LHA, LST

The levels of vibration defined in this measurement program are based primarily
on excitation by the engine and propulsion system. Although the screws generate blade passing
pulsations which are rich in harmonic content, ship structure attenuates frequencies above about
50 hz so that vibrations are predominantly low frequency and varying in amplitude [39]. Field data
from Reference 39 was analyzed and reduced to the form of a generic PSD for each of the ship
types, Figures 5-47. In all cases the values presented represent mean plus 3; for input to items and
are an envelope of all axes.
The overall g., for the four categories of ships varies from 0.048 to 0.073 [39].
These represent peak acceleration values up to 0.25 g's based on a normal distribution and a 3a
peak. This is significantly below the peak acceleration utilized in Mil-Std- 167, with a peak of over
1 g based on sinusoidal motion. This difference could be in part due to the fact that data was not

obtained during severe sea states. This is a major problem with measurement of field service data
in that one must wait for the variety of sea states to occur naturally. The data does indicate that the
levels in Mil-Std-167 may be high, which becomes important for large structures such as four
HARPOONs in CANISTERS on the LSS.

For the HARPOON system there are three basic configurations for which it is
necessary to define the dynamic properties of the support structure. They include:

ASROC - Magazine or Launcher Snubbers

TARTAR - Magazine Rack

94

I
U
100
1\0

95

90

~Sao

I
I

L..

85

60

50

Note

See n1ote:

40

'_

24

16

26

32

40

Note: Relative humidity maintainec above 8596 durifng temperature

drops.

Figum 5-45 Aggravated Temperatue-Humidity Cycles (Reference 13)

I9
I

95

48

*AISI
-IDC
IP
Ik-SI
IS
IML

SPU

WAEIUO~
SHPIJTV
SEIWV
Szt"RSOS M EDN
PEMCU

Fiue54Ieeomn fSi ekMto pcrm(eeec 1

I9

I
I
3

ep:

i iiiij

ip

pupJ

,
I
G1_ -

IIo-.

=!

! II

!-CATE.ORY-1

PG3PH,Pt4 TYE

IPS. AL AES. ALL RECIS

I
Figure 5-47(a)

Vibration Test Spectrum Category I Ships, AUl Axes, AU Regions

(Reference 39)

I
G2-la6

4S10.

2 LOG

oi

I
N
II-CATEGY-I

cu.Cm4 rt

I
U

Figure 5-47(b)

smIi.

m.

mES. ftL

WIllOlM

Vibration Test Spectrum for Category I Ships, AU Axes, All Regions

(Reference 39)
97

LOG

l-C*TEO-I IP
FprGOo.~Cc..~

AL

Figure 5-47(c)

AO6S.AL

1WK

SHIPS

WON

Vibration Test Spectrum for Category Ill Ships, All Axes,

All Regions (Reference 39)

LOG

NZ ULG

290

&L SHIPS CMIZW, OL AM$, ALL WGION

Figure 5-47(d)

Vibration Test Spectrum for ARl Ships Combined (Category V), All Axes,
AURegions (Reference39

98

!
CANISTER - Deck to Launch Support Structure

Lightweight
Grade-B
ThickwaUed
The work during this project has been primarily on the definition of the dynamic properties of the
HARPOON in the CANISTER. Specific tests have been preformed including shipboard testing on
the USS Mississippi [5, 6 and 43], modal testing, on the USS Scott [7], laboratory testing on a single
missile and CANISTER at PMTC [8] and vibration testing of a LSS system at Wyle Laboratories

[11]. The majority of the results were aimed at looking at the overall system response while the
testing at PMTC was to look at specifics of the missile response in the CANISTER and methods
of reducing the loads transmitted to the WRA's.

SThe

testing on the USS Mississippi was aimed at looking at the response of the
CANISTER system to both normal ship operations in addition adverse conditions such as shock
resulting from the firing of 5 inch guns. When considering the vibration under normal operating
conditions it should be noted that the measurements onboard the USS Mississippi were taken under
calm sea state conditions with no ship propulsion system problems [5]. Constant speed RPM tests
were preformed between 30 and 240 RPM in addition to various maneuvers.

Since the vibration measurement data does not appear to be random in nature,
caution must be exercised in interpreting any comparison with PSD plots [5]. The environment is
basically of a periodic nature with multiple frequency content and varying amplitude. An example
of the acceleration response of the seeker as a function of shaft RPM is given in Figure 5-48. From
this one can clearly see the presence of a mode of the system at 13 Hz, corresponding to a five
plaided propeller at 160 RPM. There appears to be no significant difference in levels for different

configurations, Grade-B and Thickwalled CANISTERS [5]. Maneuvering generates the higher
response levels and constant RPM tests.
To compare the test requirements, the data on shipboard vibration was presented

E
I

as a composite or envelope covering all test conditions in each test category for all measurement
directions, Figures 5-49 and 5-50 [5]. The measured data was also compared to the equipment
design/qualification test levels. The test levels are appreciably higher than measured on the USS
Mississippi [5]. This is true for both input to base of LSS and at the WRA's. The peak accelerations

at the feet of the LSS, Table 5-13, vary from 0.08 to 0.18 g's peak. These are comparable to the
results presented in Reference 39 which give peaks up to 0.25 g's. The peak accelerations at various
elevated locations are up to 1.42 g's, Table 5-14. The data indicates that there is amplification from
the launcher input (0.18 g's), to the CANISTER frame (0.46 g's) and to the WRA's (0.62 to 1.42
g's).

I9

1.0

~0.5

UU0
I T I

0.1

0
0-o1015

.000

0.1

' I!

.,,

CONSTANT SPEED

so

100

500 600

FREQUENCY (11Z)

Figure 5-49
SStructall!"

.101

. : -Std- 167B Vibration Spectrum with Maximum Measured

Comparison 4 A:
Spectra for Catistnt Speed and Maneuver at Launch Support
p Deck Interface (Reference 5)

I.

I/
I/

~1.0

IDESIGN
/

MANEUVER
SPEED

-CONSTANT

VERIFICATION

0.1

InI

.01

.001

Figure 5-50

10

50
FREQUENCY (HZ)

100

500 600

Comparison of Seeker Design Verification Test Requirement with Measured

Maximum Constant Speed and Maneuver Spectra (Reference 5)

102

--

3
3
3

Table 5.13 (a) Launch Support Structure Peak Vibration Acceleration Measurements,
Constant Speed and Heading Conditions (Reference 5)
LOCATION
Starboard LSS
Starbo'd LSS
Starboard LSS
Starboard LSS

left forward footpad

left forward footpad
left forward footpad
ight forward footpad

DIRECTION

PEAK G'S

X-LAT.
Y-LONG.
Z-VERT.
Z-VERT.

0.10
0.10
0.11

Z-VERT.

0.08

Starboard LSS left forward footpad

Table 5.13 (b)

Launch Support Structure Peak Vibration Acceleration Measurements,

Maneuver Conditions (Reference 5)
DIRECTION

PEAK G'S

Starboard LSS left forward footpad

X-I.AT.

0.13

Starboard LSS left forward footpad

Y-LONG.

0.10

Z-VERT.

0.18

Starboard LSS right forward footpad

Z-VERT.

0.14

Starboard LSS left aft footpad

Z-VERT.

0.09

LOCATION

3Starboard LSS left forward footpad

3

0.08

Table 5.14

Summary of Peak Vibration G Levels (Reference 43)

Location

Constant Speed

Maneuvering

Seeker

0.32

0.62

FCE Ring
Sustainer Eng.

0.71
0.24

1.42
0.61

Missile Shoes

0.27

0.46

Canister Frame

0.23

0.46

Launcher Input

0.13

0.18

Conclusions drawn from the vibration measurements on the USS Mississippi by

McDonnell Douglas are that present CANISTER missile fleet return reliability data indicates no
evidence that equipment failures are induced by vibration. Shipboard vibration alone would not
be anticipated to pose a problem for HARPOON missile equipment [5]. It is noted that the effect
of low frequency vibration over time doe not appear to be adequately covered in missile equipment

103

qualincation testing. Although the levels of vibration are low it is also important to consider the
duration of the loading.
Results from the modal testing on the USS Scott [7] and the vibration testing at
Wyle Laboratories [11] are very similar. Both of these tests show a significant side to side motion
of the LSS at approximately 13 Hz. This corresponds directly to the results of the USS Mississippi
testing verifying that this response is a system dynamic mode. Additional details of some of the
higher order modes were obtained from this testing. This information can be used in developing

--

the appropriate transfer functions to modify deck level vibration to derive input levels into the
WRA's.

_U

The results of the laboratory testing at PMTC indicate the presence of significant
response of the missile within the canister, Figure 5-51. This amplification must be considered
when developing test response spectra for the WRA's. The method of positioning the missile within

3
3
3misses,
I

the CANISTER, on the rails and held in place with the studs and shoes can lead to significant high
frequency rattling under vibration input due to the metal to metal contact at these locations.
Shock is the result of direct hits during hostilities, underwater blasts from near

and the shock from firing ones own weapons including adjacent CANISTERS or cells. The

first two, although of a high level, are sufficiently rare that they can be ignored in most cases.
Qualification to those levels are accomplished during Mil-S-901C tests. Recoil from the firing of

the guns appears not to be a problem, but the muzzle blast has the potential to cause damage [39].
This is also true considering the firing of adjacent cells.
During the test aboard the USS Mississippi, a 5 inch gun was fired at a variety
of train and elevation angles with both standard and high velocity rounds, to get an indication of
the loading due to these conditions. In general, the peak g levels for the high fragmentation round
test conditions exceed the corresponding measurements for the standard rounds. In .-ach case the
maximum shock spectrum occurs in the lateral axes of the missile [5]. Maximum gunfire missile
response was at gun train/elevation angle extremes. The gun elevation influences response primarily

3when

the gun is trained to the same side as the guidance section. Clipping was present in a number

of channels which made analysis of the data difficult.

3The
3

pressure pulse producing the response is attenuated with distance. In addition

to the distance consideration, reflected pressure off of ship structure is effected by gun position and
likely to have a significant influence on missile response [5]. For the USS Mississippi testing, the
missile nearest bulkhead experiences highest response. The response of the system to the pressure
pulse consists of a number of cycles. Therefore, the damping used will effect the results in calculating
the shock spectra levels.

104

I
I
I

I
i

ON

IAM19

-Response

I
Cm

All -Input
0

--

10

Frequency (Hz)

I
Figure 5-51

_---

Response at Seeker Bulkhead, Original Hardware, Tracking Filter

Data, Run No. 14 (Reference 8)

105

100

I
For each of the locations a composite shock spectrum was developed from
individual shock spectra relating the many gunfire test conditions and the three measurement
directions. Peak accelerations for a number of locations are summarized in Table 5.15. Note that
all spectra used for comparison are based on 5% damping and that some of the data was derived
from clipped acceleration time histories. The Seeker shock spectra levels are considerably higher
than qualification test requirement above 1700 Hz, Figure 5-52. The FCE ring and guidance section
response also exceeds qualification test levels.

Table 5.15

Summary of Gunfire Response Measurements (Reference 5)

Location

Standard Rounds

High Velocity Rounds

Seeker

65 g's

65+ g's clipped

FCE Ring

47 g's

65+ g's clipped

Engine Ring

17 g's

33 g's

Pressure

3.2 psi

4.3 psi

The seeker gunfire shock response spectra presented in Figure 5-52 exceeds the
seeker qualification test environment for both the standard and high fragmentation rounds. The

shock spectra presented suggests that the majority of the gunfire response environment is

3
3

concentrated in the high frequency region above 1500 hz. In general typical equipment is insensitive
to shock response at such high frequencies [5]. It is therefore McDonnel Douglas's opinion that
the gunfire levels alone are unlikely to cause a problem. However the cumulative effects on repeated
gunfire response or the effects combined with other environments are difficult to predict It is
recommended that the gunfire measurement data be used to update design/qualification
requirements for guidance section missile equipment. In any future qualification testing of
equipment gunfire shock environment simulation should be included [5].

5.3.3

Submarine Based
Data for environmental conditions associated with submarines is difficult to come

by. Because of the low failure rate for this system it was not necessary to spend any effort in looking
at redefining the levels associated with this platform.
5.4

Flight Environment
Flight environments will be similar for all platforms. The only differences will be

the booster phase for all but the air based and the water phase for the submarine based. It is assumed

XAS-2381 is appropriate in this area with the flight conditions listed in Table 5.9. The one question
that arises from the information is associated with the defined acceleration levels. It appears that
the levels for the vertical and lateral components are switched in some cases.

106

I
I
I
I
UAL
HF ROUND

..

31

,yl

#W
p 1

~Il

d
I4(

10~96O

STD ROUND
1

i f

12

Sw

i~
FREOUENCY (HZ)

I
Figure 5-52

Comparison of Seeker QuaL Shock Specitrum with Measured HF and STD

Round Gunfire Shock Response (Reference 5)

107

I
6.0

References

[1]

An Assessment of the Harpoon Weapon System (HWS) Safety Program, by ORI, Inc., for
The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Contract No. JHU/APL
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[2]

XAS-2381A, Environmental Design Criteria for the AGM-84A/RGM-84A Missile

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[3]

36203LAKcb, Reg 36203-265-77, Ser 7030, HARPOON Mission Profiles, Update of,
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[4]

36203/LAM.naf, Reg 36203-152-77, Ser 4173, HARPOON Missile Subsystem,

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[5]

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[6]

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[7]

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[8]

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[9]

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[10]

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[11]

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[12]

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[13]

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[14]

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[15]

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[16]

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[17]

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3
3
3

1
E

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108

[19]

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[20]

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[21]

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[22]

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[23]

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[24]

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[25]

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[26]

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[27]

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--

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[28]

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[29]

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[30]

Critical Item Product Fabrication Specification for Attitude Reference Assembly,

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[31]

[32]

Critical Item Product Fabrication Specification for Radar Altimeter Receiver-Transmitter,

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[33]

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[34]

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A.C., Proceedings, Institute of Environmental Sciences, 1982.

[35]

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[36]

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[37]

Captive Flight and Gunfire Vibration Environments, Piersol, A.G., Zara, J.A., Gubser, J.L.,
and Jones, W.N., The Journal of Environmental Sciences, Jan/Feb, 1977.

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[381

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J.A., Elton, R.W., Gubser J.L., The Journal of Environmental Sciences, Sept/Oct 1982.

[39]

Environmental Conditions for Shipboard Hardware, Chalmers, R.H., The Journal of

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[40]

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[42]

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[43]

The CGN-40 HARPOON Canister Launcher System Captive Carry Environmental

Measurement Test, Summary and Conclusions, Zara, J.A., McDonnell Douglas, 4 Apr 84.

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110